THE CAMPAIGN AT THE SOUTH. 1781.
In our last notice of the movements and operations of the contending
armies in the southern States, we left Cornwallis, after a dreary and
disastrous retreat, at Wynnsborough. The Americans, in the meantime,
were not idle. Defeated, but not subdued, they were active in preparing
to renew the struggle. After the defeat and dispersion of his army at
Camden, General Gates retreated to Charlotte, eighty miles from the
field of battle. There he halted to collect the straggling fugitives and
to endeavor from the wreck of his discomfited army to form a force with
which he might check or impede the advancing foe. He was soon joined
by Generals Smallwood and Gist, and about 150 dispirited officers and
soldiers. Most of the militia who escaped returned home, and General
Caswell was ordered to assemble those of the neighboring counties. Major
Anderson of the Third Maryland regiment, who had collected a number of
fugitives not far from the field of battle, proceeded toward Charlotte
by easy marches in order to give stragglers time to join him. But as
Charlotte was utterly indefensible and as no barrier lay between it
and the victorious enemy Gates retreated to Salisbury and sent Colonel
Williams, accompanied by another officer, on the road leading to Camden
to gain information of the movements of Cornwallis, and to direct
such stragglers as he met to hasten to Salisbury. From Salisbury Gates
proceeded to Hillsborough, where he intended to assemble an army with
which he might contend for the southern Provinces.
It was from Hillsborough that he wrote the letter to Washington, which
we have already quoted, desiring the exertion of his influence to
prevent his being superseded in the command of the southern army.
At Hillsborough every exertion was made to collect and organize a
military force and ere long Gates was again at the head of 1,400 men.
Even before the royal army entered North Carolina that State had called
out the second division of its militia, under Generals Davidson and
Sumner, and they were joined by the volunteer cavalry under Colonel
Davie.
When Cornwallis entered Charlotte, Gates ordered General Smallwood to
take post at the fords of the Yadkin in order to dispute the passage of
the river, and Morgan, who had joined the southern army with the rank of
brigadier-general, was employed with a light corps to harass the enemy.
When Cornwallis retreated Gates advanced to Charlotte; he stationed
General Smallwood further down the Catawba on the road to Camden and
ordered Morgan to some distance in his front. Such was the position
of the troops when Gates was superseded in the command of the southern
army.
On the 5th of October (1780) Congress, without any previous indications
of dissatisfaction, had passed a resolution requiring Washington to
order a court of inquiry into the conduct of Major-General Gates, as
commander of the southern army, and to appoint another officer to that
command till such inquiry should be made. The order of Congress to
inquire into the conduct of Gates was unsatisfactory, as we have already
seen, to Washington. It was afterward dispensed with and Gates restored
to a command in the army.
Meanwhile Washington recommended Major-General Greene to Congress as a
person qualified to command the southern army. Greene, by his activity,
intrepidity, and good conduct, had gained the confidence of Washington
long ago; he had desired him to have the command when Gates was
appointed, as we have already seen, and he now again recommended him as
an officer in whose ability, fortitude, and integrity he could trust. On
the 2d of December (1780) Greene arrived at Charlotte and informed Gates
of his commission. That was the first official notice which Gates, the
former favorite of Congress, received of his removal from the command of
the southern army. Next day Gates resigned the command of the army with
becoming dignity and patriotism, and Greene, who was dissatisfied with
the treatment which he had received, behaved toward him with the most
polite attention.
In a few hours after Greene entered on his command he received the
report of one of Morgan's foraging parties, not far from Camden. The
party advanced to the vicinity of the British posts at Clermont, which
was viewed by Col. William A. Washington, who saw that it was too
strong to be taken by small arms and cavalry, the only weapons and force
present; he therefore had recourse to stratagem. Having made an imposing
show of part of his men and having placed the trunk of a pine tree in
such a situation as, at a distance, to have the appearance of a cannon,
he summoned the post to surrender, and it yielded without firing a shot.
The Tory Colonel Rugely and 112 men whom he had collected in the place
were made prisoners. This inconsiderable event elated Greene's army and
was considered by them as a good omen of success under their new leader.
General Greene's situation was embarrassing. His army was feeble,
consisting, on the 8th of December (1780), of 2,029 infantry, of whom
1,482 were in camp and 547 in detachments; 821 were Continentals
and 1,208 were militia. Besides these there were 90 cavalry, 60
artillerymen, and 128 Continentals on extra service, constituting in all
a force of 2,307 men.
In North Carolina there were many Loyalists, and hostilities were
carried on between them and their republican neighbors with the most
rancorous animosity. The country was thinly inhabited and abounded
in woods and swamps. The cultivated parts were laid waste by hostile
factions, and no magazines for the army were provided. The troops were
almost naked, and Greene obliged to procure subsistence for them day by
day.
He found that he could not long remain at Charlotte for the country
between that place and Camden, having been traversed by the contending
armies, was quite exhausted. In order, therefore, to procure subsistence
for his troops, as well as to distract and harass the enemy, Greene,
though fully aware of the danger of such a measure, felt himself
constrained to divide his little army.
General Morgan had been invested with the command of the light troops by
Gates, and Greene placed him at the head of one of the divisions of his
army, consisting of nearly 400 infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard,
170 Virginia riflemen under Major Triplett, and 80 light dragoons under
Lieut.-Col. William A. Washington. With this small force Morgan was sent
to the south of the Catawba to observe the British at Wynnsborough and
Camden and to shift for himself, but was directed to risk as little as
possible. On the 25th of December (1780) he took a position toward the
western frontier of South Carolina, not far from the confluence of
the Pacolet and Broad rivers, and about fifty miles northwest from
Wynnsborough. With the other division of his army Greene left Charlotte
on the 20th of the same month (December, 1780), and on the 29th arrived
at Hick's Corner on the east side of the Pedee, opposite the Cheraw
hills, about seventy miles northeast from Wynnsborough, where he
remained some time. He marched to that place in the hope of finding
more plentiful subsistence for his troops, but his difficulties in that
respect were not much diminished, for the country was almost laid waste
by the cruel feuds of the hostile factions.
General Morgan did not long remain inactive. On the 27th of December
(1780) he detached Colonel Washington with his dragoons and 200 militia,
who next day marched forty miles, surprised a body of Loyalists at
Ninety-six, killed or wounded 150 of them, and took 40 prisoners,
without sustaining any loss. At that time Morgan was joined by Major
M'Dowell with 200 North Carolina, and by Colonel Pickens with 70 South
Carolina militia.
The British had to contend not only with the force under Greene and
Morgan, but were also obliged to watch other adversaries not less active
and enterprising. Sumter had been defeated by Tarleton on the 18th
of August (1780), and his followers dispersed, but that daring and
indefatigable partisan did not long remain quiet. He was soon again at
the head of a considerable band and had frequent skirmishes with his
adversaries. Always changing his position about Enoree, Broad, and Tiger
rivers, he often assailed the British posts in that quarter. On the 12th
of November (1780) he was attacked at Broad river by Major Wemyss, but
repulsed the party and made the major prisoner. On the 20th of the same
month he was attacked by Tarleton at Black Stocks, near Tiger river; the
encounter was sharp and obstinate; Tarleton was repulsed with loss,
but Sumter was wounded in the battle, and, being unfitted for active
service, his followers dispersed. Sumter showed much humanity to his
prisoners. Although Wemyss had deliberately hanged Mr. Cusack in the
Cheraw district, and although he had in his pocket a list of several
houses burned by his orders, yet he met with every indulgence. At Black
Stocks the wounded were kindly treated.
Other partisan chiefs arose and among them General Marion held a
distinguished place. He had commanded a regiment in Charleston at the
time of the siege, but having received a wound which fractured his leg,
and being incapable of discharging the [1] active duties of his office,
he withdrew from the town. On the advance of Gates, having procured a
band of followers, he penetrated to the Santee, harassed the British
detachments, and discouraged the Loyalists. After the defeat of the
Americans at Camden he rescued a party of Continental prisoners who
were under a British guard. So ill was he provided with arms that he
was obliged to forge the saws of the sawmills into rude swords for his
horsemen, and so scanty was his ammunition that at times he engaged when
he had not three cartridges to each of his party. He secured himself
from pursuit in the recesses of the forest and in deep swamps. [2]
Cornwallis impatiently waited the arrival of reinforcements. After the
victory at Camden, when he was flushed with the sanguine hope not only
of overrunning North Carolina, but of invading Virginia, General Leslie
was detached from New York to the southward with a considerable body of
troops, and, according to orders, landed in Virginia, expecting to meet
the southern army in that State. On finding himself unable to accomplish
his lofty schemes, and obliged to fall back into South Carolina,
Cornwallis ordered Leslie to re-embark and sail for Charleston. He
arrived there on the 13th of December (1780), and on the 19th began his
march with 1,500 men to join Cornwallis. His lordship resolved to begin
offensive operations immediately on the arrival of his reinforcements,
but, in the meantime, alarmed by the movements of Morgan for the safety
of the British post at Ninety-six, he detached Tarleton with the light
and legion infantry, the fusiliers or Seventh regiment, the first
battalion of the Seventy-first regiment, 350 cavalry, 2 field pieces,
and an adequate number of the royal artillery, in all about 1,100
men, with orders to strike a blow at Morgan and drive him out of the
province. As Tarleton's force was known to be superior to that under
Morgan, no doubt whatever was entertained of the precipitate flight or
total discomfiture of the Americans.
Meanwhile Cornwallis left Wynnsborough and proceeded toward the
northwest, between the Broad and Catawba rivers. General Leslie, who had
halted at Camden in order to conceal as long as possible the road which
the British army was to take, was now ordered to advance up the Catawba
and join the main body on its march. By this route Cornwallis hoped to
intercept Morgan if he should escape Tarleton, or perhaps to get between
General Greene and Virginia and compel him to fight before the arrival
of his expected reinforcements. The British generals encumbered with
baggage and military stores, marching through bad roads, and a country
intersected by rivulets which were often swollen by the rains, advanced
but slowly. Tarleton, however, with his light troops, proceeded with
great celerity and overtook Morgan probably sooner than was expected.
On the 14th of January (1781) Morgan was informed of the movements of
the British army and got notice of the march of Tarleton and of the
force under his command. Sensible of his danger he began to retreat, and
crossed the Pacolet, the passage of which he was inclined to dispute,
but, on being told that Tarleton had forded the river six miles above
him, he made a precipitate retreat, and at ten at night on the 16th of
January the British took possession of the ground which the Americans
had left a few hours before.
Although his troops were much fatigued by several days' hard marching
through a difficult country, yet, determined that Morgan should not
escape, Tarleton resumed the pursuit at three next morning, leaving his
baggage behind under a guard with orders not to move till break of
day. Morgan, though retreating, was not disinclined to fight. By great
exertions he might have crossed Broad river or reached a hilly tract of
country before he could have been overtaken. He was inferior to
Tarleton in the number of his troops, but more so in their quality, as
a considerable part of his force consisted of militia, and the British
cavalry were three times more numerous than the American. But
Morgan, who had great confidence both in himself and in his men, was
apprehensive of being overtaken before he could pass Broad river, and
he chose rather to fight voluntarily than to be forced to a battle.
Therefore, having been joined by some militia under Colonel Pickens, he
halted at a place called the Cowpens, about three miles from the line
of separation between North and South Carolina. Before daylight on
the morning of the 17th of January (1781), he was informed of the near
approach of Tarleton, and instantly prepared to receive him.
The ground on which Morgan halted had no great advantages, but his
dispositions were judicious. On rising ground, in an open wood, he drew
up his Continental troops and Triplett's corps, amounting together to
nearly 500 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard. Colonel Washington with
his cavalry was posted in their rear, behind the eminence, ready to
act as occasion might require. At a small distance in front of his
Continentals was a line of militia under Colonel Pickens and Major
M'Dowell, and 150 yards in front of Pickens was stationed a battalion
of North Carolina and Georgia volunteers under Major Cunningham, with
orders to give one discharge on the approaching enemy, and then to
retreat and join the militia. Pickens was directed, when he could no
longer keep his ground, to fall back with a retreating fire and form on
the right of the Continentals.
Scarcely were those dispositions made when the British van appeared.
Tarleton, who had been informed by two prisoners of Morgan's position
and strength, instantly formed his troops. The light and legion infantry
and the Seventh regiment, and a captain with fifty dragoons on
each flank, constituted his first line; the first battalion of the
Seventy-first regiment and the rest of the cavalry composed the reserve.
Formerly Tarleton had succeeded by sudden and impetuous assaults, and,
entertaining no doubt of speedy and complete victory on the present
occasion, he led on his men to the attack with characteristic ardor,
even before his troops were well formed. The British rushed forward
impetuously, shouting and firing as they advanced. The American
volunteers, after a single discharge, retreated to the militia under
Pickens. The British advanced rapidly, and furiously attacked the
militia, who soon gave way and sought shelter in the rear of the
Continentals. Tarleton eagerly pressed on, but the Continentals,
undismayed by the retreat of the militia, received him firmly, and an
obstinate conflict ensued. Tarleton ordered up his reserve, and the
Continental line was shaken by the violence of the onset. Morgan ordered
his men to retreat to the summit of the eminence and was instantly
obeyed. The British, whose ranks were somewhat thinned, exhausted by the
previous march and by the struggle in which they had been engaged, and
believing the victory won, pursued in some disorder, but, on reaching
the top of the hill, Howard ordered his men to wheel and face the enemy;
they instantly obeyed and met the pursuing foe with a well-directed and
deadly fire. This unexpected and destructive volley threw the British
into some confusion, which Howard observing, ordered his men to charge
them with the bayonet. Their obedience was as prompt as before, and the
British line was soon broken. About the same moment Washington routed
the cavalry on the British right, who had pursued the flying militia
and were cutting them down on the left and even in the rear of the
Continentals. Ordering his men not to fire a pistol, Washington charged
the British cavalry sword in hand. The conflict was sharp, but not of
long duration. The British were driven from the ground with considerable
loss and closely pursued. Howard and Washington pressed the advantage
which they had gained; many of the militia rallied and joined in the
battle. In a few minutes after the British had been pursuing the enemy,
without a doubt of victory, the fortune of the day entirely changed;
their artillerymen were killed, their cannon taken, and the greater part
of the infantry compelled to lay down their arms. Tarleton, with about
forty horse, made a furious charge on Washington's cavalry, but the
battle was irrecoverably lost, and he was reluctantly obliged to
retreat. Upwards of 200 of his cavalry, who had not been engaged, fled
through the woods with the utmost precipitation, bearing away with them
such of the officers as endeavored to oppose their flight. The only
part of the infantry which escaped was the detachment left to guard the
baggage, which they destroyed when informed of the defeat, and, mounting
the wagons and spare horses, hastily retreated to the army. The cavalry
arrived in camp in two divisions; one in the evening, with the tidings
of their disastrous discomfiture, and the other, under Tarleton himself,
appeared next morning. In this battle the British had ten commissioned
officers and upwards of 100 privates killed. More than 500 were made
prisoners, nearly 200 of whom, including twenty-nine commissioned
officers, were wounded. Two pieces of artillery, two standards, 800
muskets, thirty-five baggage wagons and about 100 horses fell into the
hands of the Americans whose loss amounted only to 12 men killed and 60
wounded. The British force under Tarleton has been commonly estimated
at 1,100 men, and the American army at 1,000, although Morgan, in his
official report to Greene, written two days after the battle, states it
to have been only 800. [3]
Cornwallis was at Turkey creek, twenty-five miles from the Cowpens,
confident of the success of his detachment or at least without the
slightest apprehension of its defeat. He was between Greene and Morgan
and it was a matter of much importance to prevent their junction and
to overthrow the one of them while he could receive no support from the
other. For that purpose he had marched up Broad river and instructed
General Leslie to proceed on the banks of the Catawba in order to keep
the Americans in a state of uncertainty concerning the route which he
intended to pursue, but the unexpected defeat of his detachment was an
occurrence equally mortifying and perplexing and nothing remained but to
endeavor to compensate the disaster by the rapidity of his movements and
the decision of his conduct.
He was as near the fords of the Catawba as Morgan and flattered himself
that, elated with victory and encumbered with prisoners and baggage,
that officer might yet be overtaken before he could pass those fords.
Accordingly, on the 18th of January, (1781) he formed a junction with
General Leslie and on the 19th began his remarkable pursuit of Morgan.
In order the more certainly to accomplish his end at Ramsour's Mills he
destroyed the whole of his superfluous baggage. He set the example
by considerably diminishing the quantity of his own and was readily
imitated by his officers although some of them suffered much less by the
measure. He retained no wagons except those loaded with hospital stores
and ammunition and four empty ones for the accommodation of the sick
and wounded. But notwithstanding all his privations and exertions he
ultimately missed his aim for Morgan displayed as much prudence and
activity after his victory as bravery in gaining it. Fully aware of his
danger he left behind him, under a flag of truce, such of the wounded as
could not be moved with surgeons to attend them, and scarcely giving his
men time to breathe he sent off his prisoners under an escort of militia
and followed with his regular troops and cavalry, bringing up the rear
in person. He crossed Broad river at the upper fords, hastened to the
Catawba, which he reached on the evening of the 28th, and safely passed
it with his prisoners and troops next day--his rear having gained the
northern bank only about two hours before the van of the British army
appeared on the opposite side.
Much rain had fallen on the mountains a short time before and it rained
incessantly during the night. The river rose and in the morning was
impassable. Morgan made a hair-breadth escape, for had the river risen
a few hours sooner he would have been unable to pass and probably would
have been overtaken and overwhelmed by his pursuers and had the flood in
the river been a little later Cornwallis might have forced a passage and
entirely discomfited the American division. But it was two days before
the inundation subsided, and in that interval Morgan sent off his
prisoners towards Charlottesville, in Virginia, under an escort of
militia and they were soon beyond the reach of pursuit. The Americans
regarded the swelling of the river with pious gratitude as an
interposition of Heaven in their behalf and looked forward with
increased confidence to the day of ultimate success.
Morgan called for the assistance of the neighboring militia, and
prepared to dispute the passage of the river; but on the 31st of January
(1781), while he lay at Sherwood's ford, General Greene unexpectedly
appeared in camp and took on himself the command. Toward the end of
December, (1781) Greene, as already mentioned, took a position at Hick's
creek on the east side of the Peedee, and had in camp 1,100 Continental
and State troops fit for service. On the 12th of January (1781) he was
joined by Col. Henry Lee's partisan legion which arrived from the
North and consisted of 100 well-mounted horsemen and 120 infantry. This
reinforcement was next day dispatched on a secret expedition and in
order to divert the attention of the enemy from the movements of the
legion, Major Anderson, with a small detachment was sent down the
Peedee. On the night of the 24th, Lee surprised Georgetown and killed
some of the garrison, but the greater part fled into the fort which Lee
was not in a condition to besiege.
Although Cornwallis perceived that he would meet with opposition yet
he determined to force the passage. The river was about 500 yards wide,
three feet deep, and the stream rapid. The light infantry of the guards
under Colonel Hall, accompanied by a guide, first entered the ford; they
were followed by the grenadiers who were succeeded by the battalions.
As soon as Davidson perceived the direction of the British column he led
his men to the point where it was about to land. But before he arrived
the light infantry had overcome all difficulties and were ascending the
bank and forming. While passing the river, in obedience to orders, they
reserved their fire, and, on gaining the bank, soon put the militia to
flight. Davidson was the last to retreat and on mounting his horse to
retire he received a mortal wound.
The defeat of Davidson opened the passage of the river. All the American
parties retreated, and on the same day the rest of the British
army crossed at Beattie's ford. Tarleton, with the cavalry and the
Twenty-third regiment, was sent in pursuit of the militia, and being
informed on his march that the neighboring militia were assembling at
Tarrant's tavern, about ten miles distant, he hastened with the
cavalry to that place. About 500 militia were assembled and seemed not
unprepared to receive him. He attacked them with his usual impetuosity
and soon defeated and dispersed them with considerable slaughter.
The passage of the river and the total discomfiture of the party at
Tarrant's tavern so much intimidated the inhabitants of the country that
the royal army received no further trouble from the militia till it had
passed the Yadkin.
A grand military race now began between the retreating Americans under
Greene and the pursuing British under Cornwallis. Greene marched so
rapidly that he passed the Yadkin at the trading ford on the night
between the 2d and 3d of February (1781), partly by fording and partly
by means of boats and flats. So closely was he pursued that the British
van was often in sight of the American rear and a sharp conflict
happened not far from the ford, between a body of American riflemen
and the advanced guard of the British army, when the latter obtained
possession of a few wagons. Greene secured all the boats on the south
side and here it again happened as at the Catawba--the river suddenly
rose by reason of the preceding rains and the British were unable to
pass. This second escape by the swelling of the waters was interpreted
by the Americans as a visible interposition of Heaven in their behalf
and inspired then with a lofty enthusiasm in that cause which seemed to
be the peculiar care of Omnipotence.
Greene, released from the immediate pressure of his pursuers, continued
his march northward and on the 7th of February joined his division under
Huger and Williams near Guilford Courthouse.
In order to cover his retreat and to check the pursuing enemy
Greene formed a light corps out of Lee's legion, Howard's infantry,
Washington's cavalry, and some Virginia riflemen under Major Campbell,
amounting to 700 men, the flower of the southern army. As General Morgan
was severely indisposed the command of these light troops was given to
Col. Otho Holland Williams, formerly adjutant-general.
Having refreshed his troops, and made the necessary arrangements on the
morning of the 10th of February (1781), Greene left Guilford Courthouse
on his march towards the Dan, and was pursued by Cornwallis, who had
been detained by the long circuit which he was obliged to make in order
to pass the Yadkin. The retreat and pursuit were equally rapid, but the
boldness and activity of the American light troops compelled the British
to march compactly and with caution, for on one occasion Colonel Lee
charged the advanced cavalry of the British army suddenly and furiously,
killed a number, and made some prisoners. On this occasion Cornwallis
felt the loss of the light troops who had been killed or taken at the
Cowpens. He was destined to regret their loss through the rest of the
campaign.
Greene's precautions and preparations for passing the Dan were
successful and on the 14th of February he crossed that river at Boyd's
and Irwin's ferries with his army, baggage, and stores. Although his
light troops had marched forty miles that day, yet the last of them
had scarcely reached the northern bank when the advanced guard of the
British army appeared on the other side of the river.
The escape of Greene into Virginia without a battle and without any
loss except a few wagons at the Yadkin, was a severe disappointment to
Cornwallis. He had entirely failed in his attempts against Greene, but
he was consoled by the reflection that he had completely driven him out
of North Carolina, and that now there was nothing to hinder the loyal
inhabitants from openly espousing the British cause and reinforcing the
royal army.
Cornwallis now gave up the pursuit and repaired to Hillsborough with the
view of calling out and organizing the Royalist forces. His adherents,
though here particularly strong, did not come forward to the extent
expected. The larger portion, as elsewhere, regarded the cause with
that passive and inert attachment which we have remarked to be generally
prevalent and even the more zealous having suffered severely by former
premature displays, dreaded lest the republican cause should regain the
ascendancy. The view also of the distress and exhaustion of the British
troops after so long a march was by no means alluring. Yet seven
companies were formed and detachments began to come in from different
quarters.
On the other hand, Greene, having obtained a reinforcement of Virginia
militia, repassed the Dan and with his light troops endeavored to
annoy the British army and prevent recruiting. Major Lee surprised a
detachment of Royalists who mistook him for Tarleton and cut them
nearly to pieces. On account of the exhausted state of the country at
Hillsborough, Cornwallis soon withdrew to a position on the Allimance
creek between Haw and Deep rivers, where he could be better supplied
and support his friends who were numerous there. Greene, however, by
an active use of his cavalry and light troops, severely harassed his
opponent and by changing his own position every night, eluded the
attempt to bring him to an engagement.
At length General Greene, having received reinforcements which raised
his army to above 4,200 men, of whom about a third were regulars,
determined to offer battle. This was what Cornwallis had eagerly sought,
yet his own effective force being reduced to somewhat under 2,000 he
felt now some hesitation, and probably would have acted more wisely in
maintaining the defensive. Even the enterprising Tarleton observes
that in his circumstances defeat would have been total ruin, while any
victory he might expect to gain could yield little fruit. All the habits
and views of Cornwallis, however, being directed to an active campaign,
he formed his resolution and, on the 15th of March (1781), proceeded to
the attack. Greene had drawn up his army very judiciously near Guilford
Courthouse mostly on a range of hills covered with trees and brushwood.
Greene made disposition of his troops in the following order: The first
line was composed of North Carolina militia, the right under General
Eaton and the left under General Butler, with two pieces of artillery
under Captain Singleton. The right flank was supported by
Kirkwood's Delawareans, Lynch's riflemen, and the cavalry, all
under Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, and the left in like manner by
Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's riflemen and the infantry of the legion,
all under Lieutenant-Colonel Lee. The second line, which was formed 300
yards in the rear of the first, consisted of two brigades of Virginia
militia, the right under General Lawson and the left under General
Stevens. The third, 400 yards in reserve was formed upon the brow of the
hill near the courthouse. The right of this line was composed of Hawes's
and Greene's Virginia regiments under General Huger; the left of the
first and second Maryland regiments, the former under Gunby, the latter
under Ford--the whole commanded by Colonel Williams. In the center of
the last line was placed the remainder of the artillery.
Captain Singleton commenced his fire, which was returned by the enemy,
who had formed their line of battle--the right wing under General Leslie
and the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, with the artillery in
the center under Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod. The first battalion of the
guards, under Lieutenant-Colonel Norton, served as a support for the
right, and the second, with one company of grenadiers under General
O'Hara, for the left wing. Tarleton's dragoons were held in reserve. The
British commander having made all his dispositions advanced, fired one
round, and charged bayonets. Our militia having given a few shots while
the enemy was at a distance were seized by a panic when they saw him
coming down upon them. Many of them threw away their muskets, and the
entreaties of Butler, Eaton, and Davie, with the threats of Lee, were of
no avail. Almost the entire body fled. The artillery now retired to the
left of the Marylanders. At this crisis the enemy considered victory as
already within his grasp and continued to push on when he was attacked
on his right and left by Lee and Washington. Cornwallis perceiving this
threw one regiment out to engage Lee, and one regiment together with his
light infantry and yagers to resist Washington, filling up the breach
thus created by advancing the grenadiers with two battalions of the
guards, which had formed the supports to the flanks. Lee and Washington
fell back in good order, delivering their fire until they came up with
the second line which gave battle in good earnest. The right flank was
supported by Washington, who ordered Lynch's riflemen to fall upon the
left of Webster, who had to be supported by O'Hara. Here Webster ordered
the Thirty-third regiment to attack Lynch and was thereby in a measure
relieved. O'Hara charged the Virginia right wing, which was obliged to
yield ground. Lee on the left nobly did his duty and firmly held his
position. When the militia on the right gave way those on the left fell
back and were not rallied until they came up on the left of the third
line. Campbell's riflemen and Lee's legion stood perfectly firm and
continued the contest against one regiment, one battalion, and a body of
infantry and riflemen. The American reserve, with the artillery posted
in a most favorable position, was fresh and ready for the word of
command. Webster having overcome the Americans of the second line in
his front advanced upon the third and was received by Gunby's Maryland
regiment with a most galling fire which made his troops falter. Gunby
advanced, charging bayonets, when the enemy was completely routed.
Leslie, after the left of the Virginia militia gave way, advanced to
the support of O'Hara, who had forced the American right wing, and the
combined commands of these generals charged the Second Maryland regiment
of the third line. This regiment, panic-stricken, fled. Gunby, coming up
at the time, held the enemy in check and a deadly conflict ensued. Gunby
having his horse shot under him, Lieutenant-Colonel Howard assumed the
command. Washington seeing how hot was the battle at this point pushed
forward and charged the enemy, and Howard advancing with his bayonets
leveled, the British were completely routed.
The pursuit was continued for some distance when Cornwallis came up and
determined to gain the victory at any cost. He opened the fire of his
artillery alike on friend and foe, causing an indiscriminate slaughter
of British and Americans.
The British were rallied at all points, and Greene, considering it
better to preserve the advantages he had gained, withdrew his forces.
This was done in good order and Cornwallis continued the pursuit but a
short distance. The loss of the Americans was about 400 in killed and
wounded; that of the British about 800. The enemy retained the field,
but his victory was both empty, and disastrous.
Notwithstanding Cornwallis claimed a victory he resolved to fall back
on Wilmington, near the mouth of Cape Fear river, where he could recruit
his troops and obtain supplies and reinforcements by sea.
Greene retreated about fifteen miles, taking post behind a small stream
called Troublesome creek, where he expected and awaited an attack.
1. Footnote: Marion was a strict temperance man. Being at a dinner party
where the guests, determined on a hard drinking bout, had locked the
door to prevent his exit, he jumped out of a second-story window, and
broke his leg. This was the wound above referred to. It occasioned him
to leave the city. He thus escaped surrendering when Charleston
fell, and his temperance preserved to the country one of its bravest
defenders.
2. Footnote: Marion, on account of his successful stratagems and sudden
surprises of the British, was called by them the _Swamp-Fox_. His own
countrymen styled him the _Bayard_ of the South.
3. Footnote: The action at the Cowpens was one of the medal victories.
Congress had separate gold medals struck in honor of it, and presented
to Morgan, Howard, and Col. William A. Washington. The name Cowpens,
according to Irving, comes from the old designation of Hannah's Cowpens,
the place being part of a grazing establishment belonging to a man named
Hannah. The worthy grazier could hardly have foreseen the immortality
which was destined to attach to his Cowpens.