PREPARATIONS FOR THE CAMPAIGN. 1781.
The contest between Great Britain and her revolted Colonies had involved
her in other wars. Spain had already joined with France in the alliance
against her, and the Dutch were now drawn into the contest. Great
Britain had claimed and exercised what she called the "right of search,"
which included the right to seize the property of an enemy, wherever
found, at sea. The Dutch, who had an extensive carrying trade with
France, being plundered by the British under their insolent "right of
search," were already preparing to join the other allies and commence
open hostilities.
The next act in the drama was the formation of the armed neutrality
denying the "right of search," and declaring that free ships made free
goods. Catharine II. of Russia was at its head. Sweden and Denmark
immediately joined it. It was resolved that neutral ships should enjoy
a free navigation even from port to port and on the coasts of the
belligerent powers; that all effects belonging to the subjects of the
said belligerent powers should be looked upon as free on board
such neutral ships, except only such goods as were stipulated to be
contraband, and that no port should be considered under blockade unless
there should be a sufficient force before it to render the blockade
effectual. The other European powers were invited to join this
confederacy. France and Spain agreed to do so at once; Portugal
hesitated and declined, and the United Provinces delayed for a time
their answer. The Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia joined the
armed neutrality in 1781.
Meanwhile, Henry Laurens having been taken prisoner on his way to
Holland (1780) to solicit a loan for the United States, and his papers
having made the British ministry acquainted with the fact that overtures
for a treaty between Holland and America were under consideration,
England, at the close of 1780, resolved upon a war with the States
General. Thus England, by this step, without friend or allies, prepared
to wage, single-handed, the contest with enemies in every quarter of the
globe.
In the beginning of the year 1781, the affairs of the American Union
wore a gloomy and alarming aspect. Vigorous and united efforts were
needful; but all seemed feeble and irresolute. The people were heartily
tired of the war; and, though no better affected to the parent State
than before, yet they earnestly desired deliverance from the multiplied
miseries of the protracted struggle.
The alliance with France had promised a speedy termination to the war;
but hitherto, while its existence made the Americans comparatively
remiss in their own exertions to prosecute hostilities, the French fleet
and army had performed no important service.
Congress had called for an army of 37,000 men, to be in camp on the
1st of January (1781). The resolution, as usual, was too late, but even
although it had been promulgated in due time, so large a force could
not have been brought into the field. The deficiencies and delays on the
part of the several States exceeded all reasonable anticipation. At no
time during this active and interesting campaign did the regular force,
drawn from Pennsylvania to Georgia inclusive, amount to 3,000 men. So
late as the month of April (1781), the States, from New Jersey to New
Hampshire inclusive, had furnished only 5,000 infantry, but this force
was slowly and gradually increased, till, in the month of May, including
cavalry and artillery which never exceeded 1,000 men, it presented a
total of about 7,000, of whom upwards of 4,000 might have been relied
on in active service. A considerable part of this small force arrived
in camp too late to acquire during the campaign that discipline which is
essential to military success. Inadequate as this army was for asserting
the independence of the country, the prospect of being unable to support
it was still more alarming. The men were in rags; clothing had long been
expected from Europe but had not yet arrived and the disappointment was
severely felt.
The magazines were ill supplied, the troops were often almost starving
and the army ready to be dissolved for want of food. The arsenals were
nearly empty. Instead of having the requisites of a well-appointed army
everything was deficient and there was little prospect of being better
provided, for money was as scarce as food and military stores. Congress
had resolved to issue no more bills on the credit of the Union, and
the care of supplying the army was devolved upon the several States
according to a rule established by that body. Even when the States had
collected the specified provisions, the quartermaster-general had no
funds to pay for the transportation of them to the army to accomplish
which military impressment was resorted to in a most offensive degree.
Congress was surrounded with difficulties, the several States were
callous and dilatory, and affairs generally wore an aspect of debility
and decay.
To deepen the general gloom there were portentous rumors of preparations
for savage warfare along the whole extent of the western frontier and
of an invasion on the side of Canada. In the midst of financial
difficulties and apprehensions of attack both from foreign and domestic
enemies, a new and alarming danger appeared in a quarter where it was
little expected and which threatened to consummate the ruin of American
independence. The privations and sufferings of the troops had been
uncommonly great. To the usual hardships of a military life were added
nakedness and hunger, under that rigor of climate which whets the
appetite and renders clothing absolutely necessary. By the depreciation
of the paper currency their pay was little more than nominal, and it was
many months in arrear.
Besides those evils which were common to the whole army the troops of
Pennsylvania imagined that they labored under peculiar grievances. Their
officers had engaged them for three years or during the war. On the
expiration of three years the soldiers thought themselves entitled to a
discharge; the officers alleged that they were engaged for the war. The
large bounties given to those who were not bound by previous enlistment
heightened the discontent of the soldiers, and made them more zealous
in asserting what they thought their rights. In the first transports
of their patriotism they had readily enlisted, but men will not long
willingly submit to immediate and unprofitable hardships in the prospect
of distant and contingent rewards.
The discontents engendered by the causes now mentioned had for some time
been increasing and on the 1st of January, 1781, broke out into the open
and almost universal mutiny of the troops of Pennsylvania. On a signal
given, the greater part of the noncommissioned officers and privates
paraded under arms, declaring their intention of marching to the seat
of Congress at Philadelphia to obtain a redress of grievances, or to
abandon the service. The officers made every exertion to bring them back
to their duty, but in vain; in the attempt, a captain was killed and
several other persons wounded. General Wayne interposed, but, on cocking
his pistols at some of the most audacious of the mutineers, several
bayonets were at his breast, the men exclaiming, "We respect you--we
love you; but you are a dead man if you fire! Do not mistake us: we
are not going to the enemy, on the contrary, were they to come out, you
should see us fight under you with as much resolution and alacrity as
ever, but we wish a redress of grievances and will no longer be trifled
with." Such of the Pennsylvania troops as had at first taken no part in
the disturbance were prevailed on to join the mutineers and the whole,
amounting to 1,300 men, with six field pieces, marched from Morristown
under temporary officers of their own election. Washington's
headquarters were then at New Windsor on the North river.
Next day (Jan. 2, 1781), General Wayne and Colonels Butter and Stewart,
officers who in a high degree enjoyed the confidence and affection of
the troops, followed the mutineers, but though civilly received,
they could not succeed in adjusting the differences or in restoring
subordination. On the third day the mutineers resumed their march and
in the morning arrived at Princeton. Congress and the Pennsylvania
government, as well as Washington, were much alarmed by this mutiny
fearing the example might be contagious and lead to the dissolution of
the whole army. Therefore a committee of Congress, with President
Reed [1] at their head and some members of the executive council of
Pennsylvania, set out from Philadelphia for the purpose of allaying this
dangerous commotion.
Sir Henry Clinton, who heard of the mutiny on the morning of the 3d
(January 1781), was equally active in endeavoring to turn it to the
advantage of his government. He ordered a large corps to be in readiness
to march on a moment's notice and sent two American spies by way of
Amboy and two by way of Elizabethtown, as agents from himself to treat
with the mutineers. But two of the persons employed were actually spies
on himself and soon disclosed his proposals to the American authorities.
The two real spies on reaching Princeton were seized by the mutineers
and afterwards delivered up to General Wayne who had them tried and
executed on the 10th.
At first the mutineers declined leaving Princeton, but finding their
demands would be substantially complied with they marched to Trenton
on the 9th, and before the 15th (January 1781), the matter was so far
settled that the committee of Congress left Trenton and returned to
Philadelphia. All who had enlisted for three years or during the war
were to be discharged, and in cases where the terms of enlistment could
not be produced the oath of the soldier was to be received as evidence
on the point. They were to receive immediate certificates for the
depreciation on their pay, and their arrears were to be settled as
soon as circumstances would admit. On those terms about one-half of the
Pennsylvania troops obtained their discharge, numbers of them having,
as afterwards appeared, made false declarations concerning the terms of
their enlistment.
Intelligence of this mutiny was communicated to Washington at New
Windsor before any accommodation had taken place. Though he had been
long accustomed to decide in hazardous and difficult situations yet
it was no easy matter in this delicate crisis to determine on the most
proper course to be pursued. His personal influence had several times
extinguished rising mutinies. The first scheme that presented itself was
to repair to the camp of the mutineers and try to recall them to a sense
of their duty, but on mature reflection this was declined. He well knew
that their claims were founded in justice, but he could not reconcile
himself to wound the discipline of his army by yielding to their demands
while they were in open revolt with arms in their hands. He viewed the
subject in all its relations and was well apprised that the principal
grounds of discontent were not peculiar to the Pennsylvania line, but
common to all the troops.
If force was requisite he had none to spare without hazarding West
Point. If concessions were unavoidable they had better be made by any
person than the Commander-in-Chief. After that due deliberation which
he always gave to matters of importance he determined against a personal
interference and to leave the whole to the civil authorities which had
already taken it up, but at the same time prepared for those measures
which would become necessary if no accommodation took place. This
resolution was communicated to Wayne, with a caution to regard the
situation of the other lines of the army in any concessions which
might be made and with a recommendation to draw the mutineers over the
Delaware, with a view to increase the difficulty of communicating with
the enemy in New York. The result, however, showed that this last was an
unnecessary precaution.
The success of the Pennsylvania troops in exacting from their country by
violence what had been denied to the claims of equity produced a similar
spirit of insubordination in another division of the army. On the night
of the 20th of January (1781), about 160 of the Jersey brigade, which
was quartered at Pompton, complaining of grievances similar to those of
the Pennsylvania line and hoping for equal success, rose in arms, and
marched to Chatham with the view of prevailing on some of their comrades
stationed there to join them. Their number was not formidable and
Washington, knowing that he might depend on the fidelity of the greater
part of his troops detached Gen. Robert Howe against the mutineers, with
orders to force them to unconditional submission and to execute some
of the most turbulent of them on the spot. These orders were promptly
obeyed and two of the ringleaders were put to death.
Sir Henry Clinton, as in the case of the Pennsylvanians, endeavored to
take advantage of the mutiny of the Jersey brigade. He sent emissaries
to negotiate with them, and detached General Robertson with 3,000 men to
Staten Island to be in readiness to support them if they should accede
to his proposals, but the mutiny was so speedily crushed that his
emissaries had no time to act.
The situation of Congress at this time was trying in the extreme. The
contest was now one for very existence. A powerful foe was in full
strength in the heart of the country; they had great military operations
to carry on, but were almost without an army and wholly without money.
Their bills of credit had ceased to be of any worth; and they were
reduced to the mortifying necessity of declaring by their own acts
that this was the fact, as they no longer made them a legal tender or
received them in payment of taxes. Without money of some kind an army
could neither be raised nor maintained. But the greater the exigency
the greater were the exertions of Congress. They directed their agents
abroad to borrow, if possible, from France, Spain, and Holland. They
resorted to taxation, although they knew that the measure would be
unpopular and that they had not the power to enforce their decree. The
tax laid they apportioned among the several States, by whose authority
it was to be collected. Perceiving that there was great disorder and
waste, or peculation, in the management of the fiscal concerns they
determined on introducing a thorough reform and the strictest economy.
They accordingly appointed as treasurer Robert Morris of Philadelphia,
a man whose pure morals, ardent patriotism, and great knowledge of
financial concerns eminently fitted him for this important station. The
zeal and genius of Morris soon produced the most favorable results. By
means of the "Bank of North America," to which in the course of the year
he obtained the approbation of Congress, he contrived to draw out the
funds of wealthy individuals. By borrowing in the name of the government
from this bank and pledging for payment the taxes not yet collected, he
was enabled to anticipate them and command a ready supply. He also used
his own private credit which was good though that of the government
had failed, and at one time bills signed by him individually, were in
circulation to the amount of $581,000.
The establishment of a revenue subject to the exclusive control and
direction of the Continental government was connected inseparably
with the restoration of credit. The efforts, therefore, to negotiate a
foreign loan were accompanied by resolutions requesting the respective
States to place a fund under the control of Congress which should be
both permanent and productive. A resolution was passed recommending the
respective States to vest a power in Congress to levy for the use of the
United States a duty of five per centum ad valorem on all goods imported
into any of them, and also on all prizes condemned in any of the
American courts of admiralty.
This fund was to be appropriated to the payment of both the principal
and interest of all debts contracted in the prosecution of the war, and
was to continue until those debts should be completely discharged.
Congress at that time contained several members who perceived the
advantages which would result from bestowing on the government of the
nation the full power of regulating commerce, and consequently, of
increasing the imports as circumstances might render advisable;
but State influence predominated and they were overruled by great
majorities. Even the inadequate plan which they did recommend was never
adopted. Notwithstanding the greatness of the exigency and the pressure
of the national wants, never during the existence of the Confederation
did all the States unite in assenting to this recommendation, so
unwilling are men possessed of power to place it in the hands of others.
About the same time a reform was introduced into the administration the
necessity of which had been long perceived. From a misplaced prejudice
against institutions sanctioned by experience all the great executive
duties had been devolved either on committees of Congress or on boards
consisting of several members. This unwieldy and expensive system had
maintained itself against all the efforts of reason and public utility.
But the scantiness of the national means at length prevailed over
prejudice, and the several committees and boards yielded to a secretary
for foreign affairs, a superintendent of finance, a secretary of
war, and a secretary of marine. But so miserably defective was the
organization of Congress as an executive body that the year (1781) had
far advanced before this measure, the utility of which all acknowledged,
could be carried into complete operation by making all the appointments.
The war had continued much longer than was originally anticipated, and
the natural resources of the country, mismanaged by the inexperience of
the government and its ignorance of the principles of political economy
were so much exhausted that it became apparent the war could not be
carried on without a foreign loan and France, sufficiently embarrassed
with her own affairs, was the only country to which Congress could look
for pecuniary aid. Accordingly, Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, who had
been one of Washington's aids, was employed on this mission, and besides
endeavoring to negotiate a loan was instructed to press on the French
monarch the advantage of maintaining a naval superiority in the American
seas. While the energies of America were thus paralyzed by the financial
difficulties of Congress, the mutinous spirit of part of the army
and the selfishness and apathy of several of the States, the British
interest in the Provinces seemed in a prosperous condition. General
Greene, as we shall presently see, was maintaining a doubtful and
hazardous struggle against Cornwallis on the northern frontier of North
Carolina. A British detachment from New York had made a deep impression
on Virginia where the resistance was neither so prompt nor so vigorous
as had been expected from the strength of that State and the unanimity
of its citizens.
On the 1st of May, 1781, Washington commenced a military journal. The
following statement is extracted from it: "I begin at this epoch a
concise journal of military transactions, &c. I lament not having
attempted it from the commencement of the war in aid of my memory, and
wish the multiplicity of matter which continually surrounds me and
the embarrassed state of our affairs which is momentarily calling
the attention to perplexities of one kind or another may not defeat
altogether or so interrupt my present intention and plan as to render it
of little avail.
"To have the clearer understanding of the entries which may follow it
would be proper to recite in detail our wants and our prospects, but
this alone would be a work of much time and great magnitude. It may
suffice to give the sum of them, which I shall do in a few words, viz.:
"Instead of having magazines filled with provisions we have a scanty
pittance scattered here and there in the distant States.
"Instead of having our arsenals well supplied with military stores they
are poorly provided, and the workmen all leaving them. Instead of
having the various articles of field equipage in readiness the
quartermaster-general is but now applying to the several States to
provide these things for their troops respectively. Instead of having
a regular system of transportation established upon credit, or funds in
the quartermaster's hands to defray the contingent expenses thereof we
have neither the one nor the other; and all that business, or a great
part of it being done by impressment, we are daily and hourly oppressing
the people, souring their tempers, and alienating their affections.
Instead of having the regiments completed agreeable to the requisitions
of Congress, scarce any State in the Union has at this hour one-eighth
part of its quota in the field, and there is little prospect of ever
getting more than half. In a word, instead of having anything in
readiness to take the field, we have nothing; and, instead of having the
prospect of a glorious offensive campaign before us we have a bewildered
and gloomy prospect of a defensive one, unless we should receive a
powerful aid of ships, troops, and money from our generous allies, and
these at present are too contingent to build upon."
While the Americans were suffering the complicated calamities which
introduced the year 1781 their adversaries were carrying on the most
extensive plan of operations against them which had ever been attempted.
It had often been objected to the British commanders that they had not
conducted the war in the manner most likely to effect the subjugation
of the revolted provinces. Military critics found fault with them for
keeping a large army idle at New York, which, they said, if properly
applied, would have been sufficient to make successful impressions at
one and the same time on several of the States. The British seemed to
have calculated the campaign of 1781 with a view to make an experiment
of the comparative merit of this mode of conducting military operations.
The war raged in that year not only in the vicinity of the British
headquarters at New York, but in Georgia, South Carolina, North
Carolina, and in Virginia.
In this extensive warfare Washington could have no immediate agency in
the southern department. His advice in corresponding with the officers
commanding in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia, was freely and
beneficially given, and as large detachments sent to their aid as could
be spared consistently with the security of West Point. In conducting
the war his invariable maxim was to suffer the devastation of property
rather than hazard great and essential objects for its preservation.
While the war raged in Virginia, Thomas Jefferson, the Governor, its
representatives in Congress, and other influential citizens, urged his
return to the defense of his native State. But considering America as
his country and the general safety as his object, he deemed it of more
importance to remain on the Hudson. There he was not only securing the
most important post in the United States but concerting a grand plan of
combined operations which, as shall soon be related, not only delivered
Virginia but all the States from the calamities of the war. In
Washington's disregard of property when in competition with national
objects he was in no respect partial to his own. While the British were
in the Potomac they sent a flag to Mount Vernon requiring a supply
of fresh provisions. Refusals of such demands were often followed by
burning the houses and other property near the river. To prevent this
catastrophe the person entrusted with the management of the estate went
on board with the flag and carrying a supply of provisions, requested
that the buildings and improvements might be spared. For this he
received a severe reprimand in a letter to him in which Washington
observed: "It would have been a less painful circumstance to me to have
heard that in consequence of your noncompliance with the request of the
British they had burned my house and laid my plantation in ruins. You
ought to have considered yourself as my representative, and should have
reflected on the bad example of communicating with the enemy and making
a voluntary offer of refreshment to them with a view to prevent a
conflagration."
To the other difficulties with which Washington had to contend in the
preceding years of the war a new one was about this time added. While
the whole force at his disposal was unequal to the defense of the
country against the common enemy, a civil war was on the point of
breaking out among his fellow-citizens. The claims of Vermont to be
a separate, independent State, and of the State of New York to their
country, as within its chartered limits, together with open offers from
the royal commanders to establish and defend them as a British province,
produced a serious crisis which called for the interference of the
American chief. This was the more necessary, as the governments of New
York and Vermont were both resolved on exercising a jurisdiction over
the same people and the same territory. Congress, wishing to compromise
the controversy, on middle ground, resolved, in August, 1781, to accede
to the independence of Vermont on certain conditions and within certain
specified limits which they supposed would satisfy both parties.
Contrary to their expectations this mediatorial act of the national
Legislature was rejected by Vermont, and yet was so disagreeable to the
Legislature of New York as to draw from them a spirited protest against
it. Vermont complained that Congress interfered in their internal
police; New York viewed the resolve as a virtual dismemberment of their
State, which was a constituent part of the Confederacy. Washington,
anxious for the peace of the Union, sent a message to Governor
Chittenden of Vermont desiring to know "what were the real designs,
views, and intentions of the people of Vermont; whether they would
be satisfied with the independence proposed by Congress, or had it
seriously in contemplation to join with the enemy and become a British
province." The Governor returned an unequivocal answer: "That there were
no people on the continent more attached to the cause of America than
the people of Vermont, but they were fully determined not to be put
under the government of New York; that they would oppose this by force
of arms and would join with the British in Canada rather than submit to
that government." While both States were dissatisfied with Congress, and
their animosities, from increasing violence and irritation, became daily
more alarming, Washington, aware of the extremes to which all parties
were tending, returned an answer to Governor Chittenden in which
were these expressions: "It is not my business, neither do I think
it necessary now to discuss the origin of the right of a number of
inhabitants to that tract of country formerly distinguished by the name
of the New Hampshire grants, and now known by that of Vermont. I will
take it for granted that their right was good, because Congress by their
resolve of the 17th of August imply it, and by that of the 21st are
willing fully to confirm it, provided the new State is confined to
certain described bounds. It appears, therefore, to me that the dispute
of boundary is the only one that exists, and that being removed all
other difficulties would be removed also and the matter terminated to
the satisfaction of all parties. You have nothing to do but withdraw
your jurisdiction to the confines of your old limits and obtain an
acknowledgment of independence and sovereignty under the resolve of the
21st of August (1781), for so much territory as does not interfere
with the ancient established bounds of New York, New Hampshire, and
Massachusetts. In my private opinion, while it behooves the delegates to
do ample justice to a body of people sufficiently respectable by
their numbers and entitled by other claims to be admitted into that
confederation, it becomes them also to attend to the interests of their
constituents and see that under the appearance of justice to one they
do not materially injure the rights of others. I am apt to think this is
the prevailing opinion of Congress."
The impartiality, moderation, and good sense of this letter, together
with a full conviction of the disinterested patriotism of the writer,
brought round a revolution in the minds of the Legislature of Vermont,
and they accepted the propositions of Congress though they had rejected
them four months before. A truce among the contending parties followed
and the storm blew over. Thus the personal influence of one man, derived
from his pre-eminent virtues and meritorious services, extinguished the
sparks of civil discord at the time they were kindling into flame. [2]
While Washington, during the early part of the year 1781, was thus
contending with every species of discouragement and difficulty,
prevented from acting offensively by want of means, and thus apparently
wasting away the fighting season in comparative inaction the war
was actively raging in the southern States. To this grand theater of
hostilities, as interesting as they are terrible, we must now call the
reader's attention.
1. Footnote: Gen. Joseph Reed, formerly secretary to Washington.
2. Footnote: It was during this dispute between New York and Vermont
that Gen. Ethan Allen, then residing in the latter State, received large
offers from the British to use his influence to detach Vermont from the
Union and annex it to Canada. Of course these offers were indignantly
rejected.