CHAPTER XIX.

OPERATIONS AT THE SOUTH. 1780.

Although Washington was aware that the British were aiming at the

conquest of the southern States he still considered the middle States to

be the main theater of war, and felt the necessity of reserving his main

force for the defense of that portion of the Union. He did not believe

that the possession by the British of a few posts in the South would

contribute much to the purposes of the war, and he sent no more troops

to that part of the country than he could conveniently spare from the

main army. Writing to Lafayette in Paris, after the fall of Savannah

(8th March, 1779), he says: "Nothing of importance has happened since

you left us except the enemy's invasion of Georgia and possession of

its capital, which, though it may add something to their supplies on the

score of provisions, will contribute very little to the brilliancy of

their arms; for, like the defenseless Island of St. Lucia, [1] it only

required the appearance of force to effect the conquest of it, as the

whole militia of the State did not exceed 1,200 men, and many of them

disaffected. General Lincoln is assembling a force to dispossess them,

and my only fear is that he will precipitate the attempt before he is

fully prepared for the execution."

As early as September 1778, General Lincoln had been appointed to

supersede Gen. Robert Howe in the command of the southern army. Lincoln

had baffled the attempts of General Prevost on South Carolina, and had

commanded the American forces in the unsuccessful siege of Savannah,

acting in concert with D'Estaing. He was still in command at Charleston

when Clinton, whose departure from New York on an expedition to the

South we have already noticed, made his descent on South Carolina. In

this command at Charleston General Lincoln unfortunately labored under

great disadvantages and discouragements.

The failure of the attack on Savannah (in which bombardment 1,000 lives

were lost, Count Pulaski, the Polish patriot, was mortally wounded, and

the simple-hearted Sergeant Jasper died grasping the banner presented to

his regiment at Fort Moultrie), with the departure of the French fleet

from the coast of America, presented a gloomy prospect and was the

forerunner of many calamities to the southern States. By their courage

and vigor the northern provinces had repelled the attacks of the enemy

and discouraged future attempts against them. And although having

bravely defended Sullivan's Island, in 1776, the southern colonists were

latterly less successful than their victorious brethren in the North.

The rapid conquest of Georgia and the easy march of Prevost to the very

gates of Charleston had a discouraging effect and naturally rendered

the southern section vulnerable to attack. In the North the military

operations of 1778 and 1779 had produced no important results, and,

therefore, the late transactions in Georgia and South Carolina more

readily attracted the attention of the British Commander-in-Chief to

those States.

Savannah, the chief town of Georgia, as we have already seen, was in the

hands of the British troops, and had been successfully defended against

a combined attack of the French and Americans, and therefore Sir Henry

Clinton resolved to gain possession of Charleston also, the capital of

South Carolina, which would give him the command of all the southern

parts of the Union. Having made the necessary preparations he sailed, as

we have seen, from New York on the 26th of December 1779, under convoy

of Admiral Arbuthnot, but did not arrive at Savannah till the end of

January (1780). The voyage was tempestuous; some of the transports and

victuallers were lost, others shattered, and a few taken by the American

cruisers. Most of the cavalry and draught horses perished. One of the

transports, which had been separated from the fleet and captured by the

Americans, was brought into Charleston on the 23d of January, and

the prisoners gave the first certain notice of the destination of the

expedition.

As soon as it was known that an armament was fitting out at New York

many suspected that the southern States were to be assailed, and such

was the unhappy posture of American affairs at that time, that no

sanguine expectations of a successful resistance could be reasonably

entertained. The magazines of the Union were everywhere almost empty,

and Congress had neither money nor credit to replenish them. The army at

Morristown, under the immediate orders of Washington, was threatened, as

we have seen, with destruction by want of provisions, and consequently

could neither act with vigor in the North, nor send reinforcements to

the South.

General Lincoln, though aware of his danger,--was not in a condition

to meet it. On raising the siege of Savannah he had sent the troops of

Virginia to Augusta; those of South Carolina were stationed partly at

Sheldoa, opposite Port Royal, between thirty and forty miles north from

Savannah, and partly at Fort Moultrie, which had been allowed to

fall into decay; those of North Carolina were with General Lincoln at

Charleston. All these detachments formed but a feeble force, and to

increase it was not easy, for the Colonial paper money was in a state of

great depreciation; the militia, worn out by a harassing service, were

reluctant again to repair to the standards of their country, and the

brave defense of Savannah had inspired the people of the southern

provinces with intimidating notions of British valor. The patriotism of

many of the Colonists had evaporated; they contemplated nothing but the

hardships and dangers of the contest and recoiled from the protracted

struggle.

In these discouraging circumstances Congress recommended the people

of South Carolina to arm their slaves, a measure to which they were

generally averse; although, had they been willing to comply with the

recommendation, arms could not have been procured. Washington had, as we

have already seen, ordered the Continental troops of North Carolina and

Virginia to march to Charleston, and four American frigates, two French

ships of war; the one mounting twenty-six and the other eighteen guns,

with the marine force of South Carolina under Commodore Whipple, were

directed to cooperate in the defense of the town. No more aid could be

expected; yet, under these unpromising circumstances, a full house of

assembly resolved to defend Charleston to the last extremity.

Although Clinton had embarked at New York on the 26th of December, 1779,

yet, as his voyage had been stormy and tedious, and as some time had

been necessarily spent at Savannah, it was the 11th of February, 1780,

before he landed on John's Island, thirty miles south from Charleston.

Had he even then marched rapidly upon the town he would probably have

entered it without much opposition, but mindful of his repulse in 1776

his progress was marked by a wary circumspection. He proceeded by the

islands of St. John and St. James, while part of his fleet advanced to

blockade the harbor. He sent for a reinforcement from New York, ordered

General Prevost to join him with 1,100 men from Savannah, and neglected

nothing that could insure success.

General Lincoln was indefatigable in improving the time which the

slow progress of the royal army afforded him. Six hundred slaves were

employed in constructing or repairing the fortifications of the town;

vigorous though not very successful measures were taken to bring the

militia into the field; and all the small detachments of regular

troops were assembled in the capital. The works which had been begun on

Charleston Neck when General Prevost threatened the place were resumed.

A chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries was formed between the Cooper

and Ashley rivers. In front of each flank the works were covered by

swamps extending from the rivers; those opposite swamps were connected

by a canal; between the canal and the works were two strong rows

of abattis, and a ditch double picketed, with deep holes at short

distances, to break the columns in case of an assault. Toward the water,

works were thrown up at every place where a landing was practicable.

The vessels intended to defend the bar of the harbor having been found

insufficient for that purpose, their guns were taken out and planted on

the ramparts, and the seamen were stationed at the batteries. One of

the ships, which was not dismantled, was placed in the Cooper river to

assist the batteries, and several vessels were sunk at the mouth of the

channel to prevent the entrance of the royal fleet. Lincoln intended

that the town should be defended until such reinforcements would arrive

from the North as, together with the militia of the State, would compel

Clinton to raise the siege. As the regular troops in the town did not

exceed 1,400, a council of war found that the garrison was too weak to

spare detachments to obstruct the progress of the royal army. Only a

small party of cavalry and some light troops were ordered to hover on

its left flank and observe its motions.

While these preparations for defense were going on in Charleston the

British army was cautiously but steadily advancing toward the town.

As he proceeded Clinton erected forts and formed magazines at proper

stations, and was careful to secure his communications with those forts

and with the sea. All the horses of the British army had perished in the

tedious and stormy voyage from New York to Savannah, but on landing in

South Carolina Clinton procured others to mount his dragoons, whom

he formed into a light corps, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel

Tarleton. That officer was extremely active in covering the left wing of

the army and in dispersing the militia. In one of his excursions he fell

in with Lieut.-Col. William Washington, who commanded the remnant of

Baylor's regiment, and who beat him back with loss.

On the 20th of March (1780) the British fleet, under Admiral Arbuthnot,

consisting of 1 ship of 50 guns, 2 of 44 each, 4 of 32 each, and an

armed vessel, passed the bar in front of Rebellion Road, and anchored in

Five Fathom Hole.

It being now thought impossible to prevent the fleet from passing Fort

Moultrie, and taking such stations in Cooper river as would enable them

to rake the batteries on shore, and to close that communication between

the town and country, the plan of defense was once more changed, and the

armed vessels were carried into the mouth of Cooper river, and sunk in a

line from the town to Shute's Folly.

This was the critical moment for evacuating the town. The loss of

the harbor rendered the defense of the place, if not desperate, so

improbable, that the hope to maintain it could not have been rationally

entertained by a person who was not deceived by the expectation of aids

much more considerable than were actually received.

When this state of things was communicated to Washington by

Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens he said in reply: "The impracticability of

defending the bar, I fear, amounts to the loss of the town and garrison.

At this distance it is impossible to judge for you. I have the greatest

confidence in General Lincoln's prudence, but it really appears to me

that the propriety of attempting to defend the town depended on the

probability of defending the bar, and that when this ceased, the

attempt ought to have been relinquished. In this, however, I suspend

a definitive judgment, and wish you to consider what I say as

confidential." Unfortunately this letter did not arrive in time to

influence the conduct of the besieged.

On the 4th of April (1780), Admiral Arbuthnot, taking advantage of a

strong southerly wind and a flowing tide, passed Fort Moultrie [2] and

anchored just without reach of the guns of Charleston. The fort kept

up a heavy fire on the fleet while passing which did some damage to the

ships and killed or wounded twenty-seven men.

On the 29th of March the royal army reached Ashley river and crossed it

ten miles above the town without opposition, the garrison being too

weak to dispute the passage. Sir Henry Clinton having brought over his

artillery, baggage, and stores marched down Charleston Neck, and on the

night of the 1st of April, broke ground at the distance of 800

yards from the American works. The fortifications of Charleston were

constructed under the direction of Mr. Laumoy, a French engineer of

reputation in the American service, and, although not calculated to

resist a regular siege, were by no means contemptible; and Clinton

made his approaches in due form. Meanwhile the garrison received a

reinforcement of 700 Continentals under General Woodford, and, after

this accession of strength, amounted to somewhat more than 2,000 regular

troops, besides 1,000 militia of North Carolina, and the citizens of

Charleston.

On the 9th of April (1780) Clinton finished his first parallel, forming

an oblique line between the two rivers, from 600 to 1,100 yards from the

American works, and mounted his guns in battery. He then, jointly with

the admiral, summoned Lincoln to surrender the town. Lincoln's answer

was modest and firm: "Sixty days," said he, "have passed since it has

been known that your intentions against this town were hostile, in which

time was afforded to abandon it, but duty and inclination point to the

propriety of supporting it to the last extremity."

On receiving this answer Clinton immediately opened his batteries, and

his fire was soon felt to be superior to that of the besieged. Hitherto

the communication with the country north of the Cooper was open and

a post was established to prevent the investiture of the town on that

side. After the summons, Governor Rutledge, with half of his council,

left the town for the purpose of exercising the functions of the

executive government in the State, and in the hope of being able to

bring a large body of the militia to act on the rear or left flank of

the besieging army, but the militia were as little inclined to embody

themselves as to enter the town.

For the purpose of maintaining the communication with the country north

of the Cooper, of checking the British foragers, and of protecting

supplies on their way to the town, the American cavalry, under General

Huger, had passed the river and taken post at Monk's Corner, thirty

miles above Charleston. Posts of militia were established between the

Cooper and Santee and at a ferry on the last-named river, where boats

were ordered to be collected in order to facilitate the passage of the

garrison, if it should be found necessary to evacuate the town. But

Clinton defeated all these precautions. For as the possession of

the harbor rendered the occupation of the forts to the southward

unnecessary, he resolved to call in the troops which had been employed

in that quarter, to close the communication of the garrison with the

country to the northward, and to complete the investiture of the town.

For these purposes, as the fleet was unable to enter the Cooper river,

he deemed it necessary to dislodge the American posts and employed

Tarleton to beat up the quarters of General Huger's cavalry at Monk's

Corner. Conducted during the night by a negro slave through unfrequented

paths, Tarleton proceeded toward the American post, and, although

General Huger had taken the precaution of placing sentinels a mile in

front of his station and of keeping his horses saddled and bridled, yet

Tarleton advanced so rapidly that, notwithstanding the alarm was given

by the outposts, he began the attack before the Americans could put

themselves in a posture of defense, killed or took about thirty of them,

and dispersed the rest. General Huger, Colonel Washington, and many

others made good their retreat through the woods. Such as escaped

concealed themselves for several days in the swamps. The horses taken by

the British fell very seasonably into their hands, as they were not

well mounted. After this decisive blow it was some time before any armed

party of the Americans ventured to show themselves south of the Santee.

That part of the country was laid open to the British, who established

posts in such a way as completely to enclose the garrison. The arrival

of 3,000 men from New York greatly increased the strength of the

besiegers.

The second parallel was completed, and it daily became more apparent

that the garrison must ultimately submit. An evacuation of the town was

proposed and Lincoln seems to have been favorable to the measure, but

the garrison could scarcely have escaped, and the principal inhabitants

entreated the general not to abandon them to the fury of the enemy.

The British troops on the north of the Cooper were increased, and

Cornwallis was appointed to command in that quarter. On the 20th April

(1780) General Lincoln again called a council of war to deliberate on

the measures to be adopted. The council recommended a capitulation;

terms were offered, but rejected, and hostilities recommenced. After

the besiegers had begun their third parallel, Colonel Henderson made

a vigorous sally on their right, which was attended with some success;

but, owing to the weakness of the garrison, this was the only attempt of

the kind during the siege.

After the fleet passed it, Fort Moultrie became of much less importance

than before, and part of the garrison was removed to Charleston. The

admiral, perceiving the unfinished state of the works on the west side,

prepared to storm it. On the 7th of May, everything being ready for the

assault, he summoned the garrison, consisting of 200 men, who, being

convinced of their inability to defend the place, surrendered themselves

prisoners of war without firing a gun. On the same day the cavalry which

had escaped from Monk's Corner, and which had reassembled under the

command of Colonel White, were again surprised and defeated by Colonel

Tarleton. After Cornwallis had passed the Cooper and made himself master

of the peninsula between that river and the Santee, he occasionally sent

out small foraging parties. Apprised of that circumstance, Colonel White

repassed the Santee, fell in with and took one of those parties, and

dispatched an express to Colonel Buford, who commanded a regiment of

new levies from Virginia, requesting him to cover his retreat across

the Santee at Lanneau's ferry, where he had ordered some boats to be

collected to carry his party over the river. Colonel White reached the

ferry before Buford's arrival, and, thinking himself in no immediate

danger, halted to refresh his party. Cornwallis, having received notice

of his incursion, dispatched Tarleton in pursuit, who, overtaking him a

few minutes after he had halted, instantly charged him, killed or took

about thirty of the party, and dispersed the rest.

Charleston was now completely invested, all hopes of assistance had

been cruelly disappointed, and the garrison and inhabitants were left

to their own resources. The troops were exhausted by incessant duty and

insufficient to man the lines. Many of the guns were dismounted, the

shot nearly expended, and the bread and meat almost entirely consumed.

The works of the besiegers were pushed very near the defenses of

the town, and the issue of an assault was extremely hazardous to the

garrison and inhabitants. In these critical circumstances, General

Lincoln summoned a council of war, which recommended a capitulation.

Terms were accordingly proposed, offering to surrender the town and

garrison on condition that the militia and armed citizens should not

be prisoners of war, but should be allowed to return home without

molestation. These terms were refused, hostilities were recommenced,

and preparations for an assault were in progress. The citizens, who had

formerly remonstrated against the departure of the garrison, now became

clamorous for a surrender. In this hopeless state Lincoln offered to

give up the place on the terms which Clinton had formerly proposed. The

offer was accepted and the capitulation was signed on the 12th of May

(1780).

The town and fortifications, the shipping, artillery, and all public

stores were to be given up as they then were; the garrison, consisting

of the Continental troops, militia, sailors, and citizens who had borne

arms during the siege, were to be prisoners of war; the garrison were to

march out of the town and lay down their arms in front of the works, but

their drums were not to beat a British march, and their colors were not

to be uncased; the Continental troops and sailors were to be conducted

to some place afterward to be agreed on, where they were to be well

supplied with wholesome provisions until exchanged; the militia were to

be allowed to go home on parole; the officers were to retain their arms,

baggage, and servants, and they might sell their horses, but were

not permitted to take them out of Charleston; neither the persons nor

property of the militia or citizens were to be molested so long as they

kept their parole. [3]

On these terms the garrison of Charleston marched out and laid down

their arms, and General Leslie was appointed by Clinton to take

possession of the town. The siege was more obstinate than bloody. The

besiegers had 76 men killed and 189 wounded; the besieged had 92 killed

and 148 wounded; about 20 of the inhabitants were killed in their houses

by random shots. The number of prisoners reported by Clinton amounted

to upward of 5,000, exclusive of sailors, but in that return all the

freemen of the town capable of bearing arms, as well as the Continental

soldiers and militia, were included. The number of Continental troops in

the town amounted only to 1,777, about 500 of whom were in the hospital.

The effective strength of the garrison was between 2,000 and 3,000 men.

The besieging army consisted of about 9,000 of the best of the British

troops.

After the British got possession of the town the arms taken from the

Americans, amounting to 5,000 stand, were lodged in a laboratory near a

large quantity of cartridges and loose powder. By incautiously snapping

the muskets and pistols the powder ignited and blew up the house, and

the burning fragments, which were scattered in all directions, set fire

to the workhouse, jail, and old barracks, and consumed them. The British

guard stationed at the place, consisting of fifty men, was destroyed,

and about as many other persons lost their lives on the disastrous

occasion.

Clinton carried on the siege in a cautious but steady and skilful

manner. Lincoln was loaded with undeserved blame by many of his

countrymen, for he conducted the defense as became a brave and

intelligent officer. The error lay in attempting to defend the town,

but, in the circumstances in which Lincoln was placed, he was almost

unavoidably drawn into that course. It was the desire of the State that

the capital should be defended, and Congress, as well as North and South

Carolina, had encouraged him to expect that his army would be increased

to 9,000 men--a force which might have successfully resisted all the

efforts of the royal army. But neither Congress nor the Carolinas were

able to fulfill the promises which they had made, for the militia were

extremely backward in taking the field, and the expected number of

Continentals could not be furnished. Lincoln, therefore, was left to

defend the place with only about one-third of the force which he had

been encouraged to expect. At any time before the middle of April he

might have evacuated the town, but the civil authority then opposed

his retreat, which soon afterward became difficult, and ultimately

impracticable.

At General Lincoln's request Congress passed a resolve directing the

Commander-in-Chief to cause an inquiry to be made concerning the loss

of Charleston and the conduct of General Lincoln while commanding in

the southern department. Washington, who knew Lincoln's merit well,

determined to give Congress time for reflection before adopting any

measure which had the least appearance of censure. The following extract

from his letter to the President of Congress (10th July, 1780) points

out clearly the impropriety of the hasty proceedings which had been

proposed in regard to this able and deserving officer:

"At this time," Washington writes, "I do not think that the

circumstances of the campaign would admit, at any rate, an inquiry to be

gone into respecting the loss of Charleston, but, if it were otherwise,

I do not see that it could be made so as to be completely satisfactory

either to General Lincoln or to the public, unless some gentlemen could

be present who have been acting in that quarter. This, it seems, would

be necessary on the occasion, and the more so as I have not a single

document or paper in my possession concerning the department, and a copy

of the instructions and orders which they may have been pleased to

give General Lincoln from time to time and of their correspondence. And

besides the reasons against the inquiry at this time, General Lincoln

being a prisoner of war, his situation, it appears to me, must preclude

one till he is exchanged, supposing every other obstacle were out of the

question. If Congress think proper, they will be pleased to transmit to

me such papers as they may have which concern the matters of inquiry,

that there may be no delay in proceeding in the business when other

circumstances will permit."

The fall of Charleston was matter of much exultation to the British and

spread a deep gloom over the aspect of American affairs. The southern

army was lost, and, although small, it could not soon be replaced. In

the southern parts of the Union there had always been a considerable

number of persons friendly to the claims of Britain. The success of her

arms roused all their lurking partialities, gave decision to the conduct

of the wavering, encouraged the timid, drew over to the British cause

all those who are ever ready to take part with the strongest, and

discouraged and intimidated the friends of Congress.

Clinton was perfectly aware of the important advantage which he had

gained, and resolved to keep up and deepen the impression on the public

mind by the rapidity of his movements and the appearance of his troops

in different parts of the country. For that purpose he sent a strong

detachment under Cornwallis over the Santee toward the frontier of

North Carolina. He dispatched an inferior force into the center of the

province, and sent a third up the Savannah to Augusta. These detachments

were instructed to disperse any small parties that still remained in

arms, and to show the people that the British troops were complete

masters of South Carolina and Georgia.

Soon after passing the Santee, Cornwallis was informed that Colonel

Buford was lying, with 400 men, in perfect security, near the border

of North Carolina. He immediately dispatched Colonel Tarleton, with his

cavalry, named the Legion, to surprise that party. After performing a

march of 104 miles in fifty-four hours, Tarleton, at the head of 700

men, overtook Buford on his march, at the Waxhaws, and ordered him to

surrender, offering him the same terms which had been granted to the

garrison of Charleston. On Buford's refusal, Tarleton instantly charged

the party, who were dispirited and unprepared for such an onset. Most of

them threw down their arms and made no resistance, but a few continued

firing, and an indiscriminate slaughter ensued of those who had

submitted as well as of those who had resisted. Many begged for

quarter, but no quarter was given. Tarleton's quarter became proverbial

throughout the Union and certainly rendered some subsequent conflicts

more fierce and bloody than they would otherwise have been. Buford and a

few horsemen forced their way through the enemy and escaped; some of

the infantry, also, who were somewhat in advance, saved themselves by

flight, but the regiment was almost annihilated. Tarleton stated that

113 were killed on the spot, 150 left on parole, so badly wounded that

they could not be removed, and 53 brought away as prisoners. So feeble

was the resistance made by the Americans that the British had only 12

men killed and 5 wounded. The slaughter on this occasion excited much

indignation in America. The British endeavored to justify their

conduct by asserting that the Americans resumed their arms after having

pretended to submit, but such of the American officers as escaped from

the carnage denied the allegation. For this exploit, Tarleton was highly

praised by Cornwallis.

After the defeat of Buford there were no parties in South Carolina

or Georgia capable of resisting the royal detachments. The force

of Congress in those provinces seemed annihilated and the spirit of

opposition among the inhabitants was greatly subdued. Many, thinking

it vain to contend against a power which they were unable to withstand,

took the oath of allegiance to the King or gave their parole not to bear

arms against him.

In order to secure the entire submission of that part of the country,

military detachments were stationed at the most commanding points, and

measures were pursued for settling the civil administration and for

consolidating the conquest of the provinces. So fully was Clinton

convinced of the subjugation of the country and of the sincere

submission of the inhabitants, or of their inability to resist, that, on

the 3d of June (1780), he issued a proclamation, in which, after stating

that all persons should take an active part in settling and securing

his majesty's government and in delivering the country from that anarchy

which for some time had prevailed, he discharged from their parole the

militia who were prisoners, except those only who had been taken in

Charleston and Fort Moultrie, and restored them to all the rights and

duties of inhabitants; he also declared that such as should neglect to

return to their allegiance should be treated as enemies and rebels.

This proclamation was unjust and impolitic. Proceeding on the

supposition that the people of those provinces were subdued rebels,

restored by an act of clemency to the privileges and duties of citizens,

and forgetting that for upward of four years they had been exercising an

independent authority, and that the issue of the war only could stamp

on them the character of patriots or rebels. It might easily have been

foreseen that the proclamation was to awaken the resentment and alienate

the affections of those to whom it was addressed. Many of the Colonists

had submitted in the fond hope of being released, under the shelter of

the British government, from that harassing service to which they had

lately been exposed, and of being allowed to attend to their own affairs

in a state of peaceful tranquility; but the proclamation dissipated this

delusion and opened their eyes to their real situation. Neutrality and

peace were what they desired, but neutrality and peace were denied them.

If they did not range themselves under the standards of Congress, they

must, as British subjects, appear as militia in the royal service. The

people sighed for peace, but, on finding that they must fight on one

side or the other, they preferred the banners of their country and

thought they had as good a right to violate the allegiance and parole

which Clinton had imposed on them as he had to change their state from

that of prisoners to that of British subjects without their consent.

They imagined that the proclamation released them from all antecedent

obligations. Not a few, without any pretense of reasoning on the

subject, deliberately resolved to act a deceitful part and to make

professions of submission and allegiance to the British government so

long as they found it convenient, but with the resolution of joining the

standards of their country on the first opportunity. Such duplicity and

falsehood ought always to be reprobated, but the unsparing rapacity with

which the inhabitants were plundered made many of them imagine that no

means of deception and vengeance were unjustifiable.

Hitherto the French fleets and troops had not afforded much direct

assistance to the Americans, but they had impeded and embarrassed the

operations of the British Commander-in-Chief. He had intended to sail

against Charleston so early as the month of September, 1779, but the

unexpected appearance of Count D'Estaing on the southern coast had

detained him at New York till the latter part of December. It was his

intention, after the reduction of Charleston, vigorously to employ the

whole of his force in the subjugation of the adjacent provinces, but

information, received about the time of the surrender of the town, that

Monsieur de Ternay, with a fleet and troops from France, was expected on

the American coast, deranged his plan and induced him to return to New

York with the greater part of his army, leaving Cornwallis at the head

of 4,000 men to prosecute the southern conquests. Clinton sailed from

Charleston on the 5th of June.

After the reduction of Charleston and the entire defeat of all the

American detachments in those parts, an unusual calm ensued for six

weeks. Imagining that South Carolina and Georgia were reannexed to the

British empire in sentiment as well as in appearance, Cornwallis now

meditated an attack on North Carolina. Impatient, however, as he was

of repose, he could not carry his purpose into immediate execution. The

great heat, the want of magazines, and the impossibility of subsisting

his army in the field before harvest, compelled him to pause. But the

interval was not lost. He distributed his troops in such a manner in

South Carolina and the upper parts of Georgia as seemed most favorable

to the enlistment of young men who could be prevailed on to join the

royal standard; he ordered companies of royal militia to be formed; and

he maintained a correspondence with such of the inhabitants of North

Carolina as were friendly to the British cause. He informed them of the

necessity he was under of postponing the expedition into their country,

and advised them to attend to their harvest and to remain quiet till the

royal army advanced to support them. Eager, however, to manifest

their zeal and entertaining sanguine hopes of success, certain

Tories disregarded his salutary advice and broke out into premature

insurrections, which were vigorously resisted and generally suppressed

by the patriots, who were the more numerous and determined party. But

one band of Tories, amounting to 800 men, under a Colonel Bryan, marched

down the Yadkin to a British post at the Cheraws and afterward reached

Camden.

The people of North Carolina were likely to prove much more intractable

than those of South Carolina and Georgia. They were chiefly descendants

of Scotch-Irish settlers--stern Presbyterians and ardent lovers of

liberty. When Tryon was their governor, they had resisted his tyranny

under the name of Regulators, and at Mecklenburg had published a

declaration of independence more than a year before Congress took the

same attitude of defiance. Such were the North Carolinians; and their

State was destined to be the scene of many battles in which the power of

Britain was bravely resisted.

Having made the necessary dispositions Cornwallis entrusted the command

on the frontier to Lord Rawdon and returned to Charleston in order to

organize the civil government of the province and to establish such

regulations as circumstances required. But Cornwallis showed himself

more a soldier than a politician, and more a tyrant than either. Instead

of endeavoring to regain, by kindness and conciliation, the good will of

a people whose affections were alienated from the cause in which he was

engaged, Cornwallis attempted to drive them into allegiance by harshness

and severity. Indeed, many of the British officers viewed the Americans

merely in the light of rebels and traitors, whose lives it was

indulgence to spare; treated them not only with injustice, but with

insolence and insult more intolerable than injustice itself; and

exercised a rigor which greatly increases the miseries without promoting

the legitimate purposes of war.

By the capitulation of Charleston, the citizens were prisoners on

parole, but successive proclamations were published, each abridging the

privileges of prisoners more than that which had gone before. A board

of police was established for the administration of justice, and before

that board British subjects were allowed to sue for debts, but prisoners

were denied that privilege; they were liable to prosecution for debts,

but had no security for what was owing them, except the honor of their

debtors, and that, in many instances, was found a feeble guarantee. If

they complained they were threatened with close confinement; numbers

were imprisoned in the town and others consigned to dungeons at a

distance from their families. In short, every method, except that of

kindness and conciliation, was resorted to in order to compel the people

to become British subjects. A few, who had always been well affected

to the royal cause, cheerfully returned to their allegiance, and many

followed the same course from convenience. To abandon their families and

estates and encounter all the privations of fugitives required a degree

of patriotism and fortitude which few possessed.

In that melancholy posture of American affairs, many of the ladies of

Charleston displayed a remarkable degree of zeal and intrepidity in the

cause of their country. They gloried in the appellation of rebel ladies,

and declined invitations to public entertainments given by the British

officers, but crowded to prison ships and other places of confinement

to solace their suffering countrymen. While they kept back from the

concerts and assemblies of the victors they were forward in showing

sympathy and kindness toward American officers whenever they met them.

They exhorted their brothers, husbands, and sons to an unshrinking

endurance in behalf of their country, and cheerfully became the

inmates of their prison and the companions of their exile--voluntarily

renouncing affluence and ease and encountering labor, penury, and

privation.

For some time the rigorous measures of the British officers in South

Carolina seemed successful and a deathlike stillness prevailed in the

province. The clangor of arms ceased and no enemy to British authority

appeared. The people of the lower parts of South Carolina were generally

attached to the revolution, but many of their most active leaders were

prisoners. The fall of Charleston and the subsequent events had sunk

many into despondency, and all were overawed. This gloomy stillness

continued about six weeks when the symptoms of a gathering storm began

to show themselves. The oppression and insults to which the people were

exposed highly exasperated them; they repented the apathy with which

they had seen the siege of Charleston carried on, and felt that the fall

of their capital, instead of introducing safety and rural tranquility,

as they had fondly anticipated, was only the forerunner of insolent

exactions and oppressive services. Peaceful and undisturbed neutrality

was what they desired and what they had expected; but when they found

themselves compelled to fight, they chose to join the Provincial

banners, and the most daring only waited an opportunity to show their

hostility to their new masters.

Such an opportunity soon presented itself. In the end of March (1780)

Washington dispatched the troops of Maryland and Delaware, with a

regiment of artillery, under the Baron de Kalb, to reinforce the

southern army. That detachment met with many obstructions in its

progress southward. Such was the deranged state of the American finances

that it could not be put in motion when the order was given. After

setting out it marched through Jersey and Pennsylvania, embarked at the

head of Elk river, was conveyed by water to Petersburgh in Virginia,

and proceeded thence towards the place of its destination. But as no

magazines had been provided, and as provisions could with difficulty be

obtained, the march of the detachment through North Carolina was greatly

retarded. Instead of advancing rapidly, the troops were obliged to

spread themselves over the country in small parties, in order to collect

corn and to get it ground for their daily subsistence. In this way

they proceeded slowly through the upper and more fertile parts of North

Carolina to Hillsborough, and were preparing to march by Cross creek

to Salisbury, where they expected to be joined by the militia of North

Carolina.

The approach of this detachment, together with information that great

exertions were making to raise troops in Virginia, encouraged the

irritation which the rigorous measures of the British officers had

occasioned in South Carolina; and numbers of the inhabitants of that

State, who had fled from their homes and taken refuge in North Carolina

and Virginia, informed of the growing discontents in their native State,

and relying on the support of regular troops, assembled on the frontier

of North Carolina.

About 200 of these refugees chose Colonel Sumter, an old Continental

officer, called by his comrades the "Gamecock," as their leader. On

the advance of the British into the upper parts of South Carolina, this

gentleman had fled into North Carolina, but had left his family behind.

Soon after his departure a British party arrived, turned his wife and

family out of door, and burned his house and everything in it. This

harsh and unfeeling treatment excited his bitterest resentment, which

operated with the more virulence by being concealed under the fair veil

of patriotism.

At the head of his little band, without money or magazines, and but ill

provided with arms and ammunition, Sumter made an irruption into South

Carolina. Iron implements of husbandry were forged by common blacksmiths

into rude weapons of war; and pewter dishes, procured from private

families and melted down, furnished part of their supply of balls.

This little band skirmished with the royal militia and with small

parties of regular troops, sometimes successfully, and always with the

active courage of men fighting for the recovery of their property.

Sometimes they engaged when they had not more than three rounds of shot

each, and occasionally some of them were obliged to keep at a distance

till, by the fall of friends or foes, they could be furnished with arms

and ammunition. When successful, the field of battle supplied them with

materials for the next encounter.

This party soon increased to 600 men, and, encouraged by its daring

exertions, a disposition manifested itself throughout South Carolina

again to appeal to arms. Some companies of royal militia, embodied under

the authority of Cornwallis, deserted to Sumter and ranged themselves

under his standard.

Cornwallis beheld this change with surprise: he had thought the conflict

ended, and the southern provinces completely subdued; but, to his

astonishment, saw that past victories were unavailing, and that the work

yet remained to be accomplished. He was obliged to call in his outposts

and to form his troops into larger bodies.

But Cornwallis was soon threatened by a more formidable enemy than

Sumter, who, though an active and audacious leader, commanded only an

irregular and feeble band, and was capable of engaging only in desultory

enterprises. Congress, sensible of the value and importance of the

provinces which the British had overrun, made every effort to reinforce

the southern army; and, fully aware of the efficacy of public opinion

and of the influence of high reputation, on the 13th of June (1780)

appointed General Gates to command it. He had acquired a splendid name

by his triumphs over Burgoyne, and the populace, whose opinions

are formed by appearances and fluctuate with the rumors of the day,

anticipated a success equally brilliant. [4]

On receiving notice of his appointment to the command of the southern

army, Gates, who had been living in retirement on his estate in

Virginia, proceeded southward without delay, and on the 25th of July

(1780) reached the camp at Buffalo ford, on Deep river, where he was

received by De Kalb with respect and cordiality. The army consisted of

about 2,000 men, and considerable reinforcements of militia from North

Carolina and Virginia were expected. In order that he might lead

his troops through a more plentiful country, and for the purpose of

establishing magazines and hospitals at convenient points, De Kalb

had resolved to turn out of the direct road to Camden. But Gates, in

opposition to De Kalb's advice, determined to pursue the straight route

toward the British encampment, although it lay through a barren country,

which afforded but a scanty subsistence to its inhabitants.

On the 27th of July (1780) he put his army in motion and soon

experienced the difficulties and privations which De Kalb had been

desirous to avoid. The army was obliged to subsist chiefly on poor

cattle, accidentally found in the woods, and the supply of all kinds of

food was very limited. Meal and corn were so scarce that the men

were compelled to use unripe corn and peaches instead of bread. That

insufficient diet, together with the intense heat and unhealthy climate,

engendered disease, and threatened the destruction of the army. Gates at

length emerged from the inhospitable region of pine-barrens, sand hills,

and swamps, and, after having effected a junction with General Caswell,

at the head of the militia of North Carolina, and a small body of

troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Porterfield, he arrived at Clermont, or

Rugely's Mills, on the 13th of August (1780), and next day was joined by

the militia of Virginia, amounting to 700 men, under General Stevens.

On the day after Gates arrived at Rugley's Mills, he received an express

from Sumter, stating that a number of the militia of South Carolina

had joined him on the west side of the Wateree, and that an escort of

clothes, ammunition, and other stores for the garrison at Camden was on

its way from Ninety-Six and must pass the Wateree at a ford covered by a

small fort nor far from Camden.

Gates immediately detached 100 regular infantry and 300 militia of North

Carolina to reinforce Sumter, whom he ordered to reduce the fort and

intercept the convoy. Meanwhile he advanced nearer Camden, with the

intention of taking a position about seven miles from that place. For

that purpose he put his army in motion at 10 in the evening of the 15th

of August, having sent his sick, heavy baggage, and military stores

not immediately wanted, under a guard to Waxhaws. On the march Colonel

Armand's [5] legion composed the van; Porterfield's light infantry,

reinforced by a company of picked men from Stevens' brigade, marching in

Indian files, two hundred yards from the road, covered the right flank

of the legion, while Major Armstrong's light infantry of North Carolina

militia, reinforced in like manner by General Caswell, in the same

order, covered the left. The Maryland division, followed by the North

Carolina and Virginia militia, with the artillery, composed the main

body and rear guard; and the volunteer cavalry were equally distributed

on the flanks of the baggage. The American army did not exceed 4,000

men, only about 900 of whom were regular troops, and 70 cavalry.

On the advance of Gates into South Carolina, Lord Rawdon had called

in his outposts, and concentrated his force at Camden. Informed of the

appearance of the American army, and of the general defection of the

country between the Pedee and the Black river, Cornwallis quitted

Charleston and repaired to Camden, where he arrived on the same day that

Gates reached Clermont.

The British force was reduced by sickness, and Cornwallis could not

assemble more than two thousand men at Camden. That place, though

advantageous in other respects, was not well adapted for resisting an

attack; and as the whole country was rising against him, Cornwallis

felt the necessity of either retreating to Charleston, or of instantly

striking a decisive blow. If he remained at Camden, his difficulties

would daily increase, his communication with Charleston be endangered,

and the American army acquire additional strength. A retreat to

Charleston would be the signal for the whole of South Carolina and

Georgia to rise in arms; his sick and magazines must be left behind;

and the whole of the two provinces, except the towns of Charleston and

Savannah, abandoned. The consequences of such a movement would be nearly

as fatal as a defeat. Cornwallis, therefore, although he believed the

American army considerably stronger than what it really was, determined

to hazard a battle; and, at 10 at night, on the 15th of August, the

very hour when Gates proceeded from Rugely's Mills, about thirteen miles

distant, he marched towards the American camp.

About 2 in the morning of the 16th of August (1780) the advanced guards

of the hostile armies unexpectedly met in the woods, and the firing

instantly began. Some of the cavalry of the American advanced guard

being wounded by the first discharge, the party fell back in confusion,

broke the Maryland regiment which was at the head of the column, and

threw the whole line of the army into consternation. From that first

impression, deepened by the gloom of night, the raw and ill-disciplined

militia seem not to have recovered. In the reencounter several prisoners

were taken on each side, and from them the opposing generals acquired a

more exact knowledge of circumstances than they had hitherto possessed.

Several skirmishes happened during the night, which merely formed a

prelude to the approaching battle, and gave the commanders some notion

of the position of the hostile armies.

Cornwallis, perceiving that the Americans were on ground of no great

extent, with morasses on their right and left, so that they could not

avail themselves of their superior numbers to outflank his little army,

impatiently waited for the returning light, which would give every

advantage to his disciplined troops. [6]

Both armies prepared for the conflict. Cornwallis formed his men in two

divisions; that on the right was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel

Webster, that on the left under Lord Rawdon. In front were four field

pieces. The Seventy-first regiment, with two cannon, formed the reserve;

and the cavalry, about 300 in number, were in the rear, ready to act as

circumstances might require.

In the American army the second Maryland brigade, under General Gist,

formed the right of the line; the militia of North Carolina, commanded

by General Caswell, occupied the center; and the militia of Virginia,

with the light infantry and Colonel Armand's corps, composed the left;

the artillery was placed between the divisions. The First Maryland

brigade was stationed as a reserve 200 or 300 yards in the rear. Baron

de Kalb commanded on the right; the militia generals were at the head of

their respective troops, and General Gates resolved to appear wherever

his presence might be most useful.

At dawn of day Cornwallis ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Webster, with the

British right wing, to attack the American left. As Webster advanced he

was assailed by a desultory discharge of musketry from some volunteer

militia who had advanced in front of their countrymen, but the British

soldiers, rushing through that loose fire, charged the American line

with a shout. The militia instantly threw down their arms and fled, many

of them without even discharging their muskets, and all the efforts

of the officers were unable to rally them. A great part of the center

division, composed of the militia of North Carolina, imitated the

example of their comrades of Virginia; few of either of the divisions

fired a shot, and still fewer carried their arms off the field. Tarleton

with his legion pursued and eagerly cut down the unresisting fugitives.

Gates, with some of the militia general officers, made several attempts

to rally them, but in vain. The further they fled the more they

dispersed, and Gates in despair hastened with a few friends to

Charlotte, eighty miles from the field of battle.

De Kalb at the head of the Continentals, being abandoned by the militia,

which had constituted the center and left wing of the army, and being

forsaken by the general also, was exposed to the attack of the whole

British army. De Kalb and his troops, however, instead of imitating the

disgraceful example of their brethren in arms, behaved with a steady

intrepidity and defended themselves like men. Rawdon attacked them about

the time when Webster broke the left wing, but the charge was firmly

received and steadily resisted, and the conflict was maintained for some

time with equal obstinacy on both sides. The American reserve covered

the left of De Kalb's division, but its own left flank was entirely

exposed by the flight of the militia, and, therefore, Webster, after

detaching some cavalry and light troops in pursuit of the fugitive

militia, with the remainder of his division attacked them at once in

front and flank. A severe contest ensued. The Americans, in a great

measure intermingled with British, maintained a desperate conflict.

Cornwallis brought his whole force to bear upon them; they were at

length broken and began to retreat in confusion. The brave De Kalb,

while making a vigorous charge at the head of a body of his men, fell

pierced with eleven wounds. His aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel de

Buysson, embraced the fallen general, announced his rank and nation to

the surrounding enemy, and while thus generously exposing his own life

to save his bleeding friend, he received several severe wounds, and was

taken prisoner with him. De Kalb met with all possible attention and

assistance from the victorious enemy, but that gallant officer expired

in a few hours. Congress afterward ordered a monument to be erected to

his memory.

Never was victory more complete or defeat more total. Every regiment was

broken and dispersed through the woods, marshes, and brushwood, which

at once saved them from their pursuers and separated them more entirely

from each other. The officers lost sight of their men and every

individual endeavored to save himself in the best way he was able. The

British cavalry pursued; and for many miles the roads were strewed with

the wrecks of a ruined army. Wagons or fragments of wagons, arms,

dead or maimed horses, dead or wounded soldiers, were everywhere seen.

General Rutherford, of the North Carolina militia, was made prisoner,

but the other general officers reached Charlotte at different times and

by different routes.

About 200 wagons, a great part of the baggage, military stores, small

arms, and all the artillery fell into the hands of the conquerors. This

decisive victory cost the British only 80 men killed and 245 wounded.

Eight hundred or 900 of the Americans were killed or wounded, and about

1,000 taken prisoners. The militia endeavored to save themselves by

flight; the Continentals alone fought, and almost half their number

fell.

While the army under Gates was completely defeated and dispersed

Colonel Sumter was successful in his enterprise. On the evening in which

Cornwallis marched from Camden he reduced the redoubt on the Wateree,

took the stores on their way to Camden, and made about 100 prisoners.

On hearing, however, of the disastrous fate of the army under Gates,

Sumter, fully aware of his danger, retreated hastily with his stores and

prisoners up the south side of the Wateree. On the morning of the

17th (September, 1780) Cornwallis sent Tarleton, with the legion and a

detachment of infantry, in pursuit of him. That officer proceeded with

his usual rapidity. Finding many of his infantry unable to keep pace

with him he advanced with about 100 cavalry and sixty of the most

vigorous of the infantry, and on the 18th (September, 1780) suddenly and

unexpectedly came upon the Americans.

Sumter, having marched with great diligence, thought himself beyond the

reach of danger, and his men being exhausted by unremitting service and

want of sleep, he halted near the Catawba ford to give them some repose

during the heat of the day. In order to prevent a surprise he had placed

sentinels at proper stations to give warning of approaching danger,

but overcome by fatigue and equally regardless of duty and safety the

sentinels fell asleep at their post and gave no alarm. Tarleton suddenly

burst into the encampment of the drowsy and unsuspecting Americans, and,

though some slight resistance was at first made from behind the baggage,

soon gained a complete victory. The Americans fled precipitately toward

the river or the woods. Between 300 and 400 of them were killed or

wounded. Sumter escaped, galloping off on horseback, without coat, hat,

or saddle, but all his baggage fell into the hands of the enemy, while

the prisoners and stores which he had taken were recovered. About 150 of

his men made good their retreat.

By the complete defeat and dispersion of the army under Gates and of

Sumter's corps, South Carolina and Georgia appeared to be again laid

prostrate at the feet of the royal army, and the hope of maintaining

their independence seemed more desperate than ever.

Affairs did not seem desperate, however, to Washington. He knew the

defensible nature of the country--intersected in every direction by

rivers and swamps, and affording every facility for partisan warfare

against regular troops, and he knew that the infamous conduct of the

British in the South had thoroughly roused the indignation of the

people. While Gates was gathering together a new army and stationing

detachments in different posts near Hillsborough, Washington received

intelligence of the disastrous battle of Camden. The sad news came

unexpectedly, as the previous reports had given hopes of some brilliant

feat on the part of Gates. The unlooked-for disaster, however, did

not for a moment dishearten Washington. He was fully aware of the

determination of the British to conquer the South, and if possible to

detach it from the confederacy, and he was determined on his part to

defeat their purpose. This was to be done chiefly by rousing the South

itself to action, since the position of affairs at the North did not

admit of large detachments from the force under his own immediate

command. He ordered, however, that some regular troops enlisted in

Maryland for the war should be sent to the southward. To show how

attentive he was to all the details of the necessary measures for

defending the South we copy his letter of September 12th (1780)

to Governor Rutledge, of South Carolina, who had been armed with

dictatorial power by the Legislature of that State. [7]

"I am fully impressed," he writes, "with the importance of the southern

States, and of course with the necessity of making every effort to expel

the enemy from them. The late unlucky affair near Camden renders their

situation more precarious and calls for every exertion to stop at least

the further progress of the British army. It is to be wished that the

composition of our force in this quarter, our resources, and the present

situation of the fleet and army of our ally would admit of an immediate

and sufficient detachment, not only to answer the purpose I have just

mentioned, but to carry on operations of a more serious and extensive

nature. But this not being the case, for reasons which must be obvious

to you, let it suffice that your Excellency be informed that our views

tend ultimately to the southward.

"In the meantime our endeavors in that quarter should be directed rather

to checking the progress of the enemy by a permanent, compact, and

well-organized body of men, than attempting immediately to recover the

State of South Carolina by a numerous army of militia, who, besides

being inconceivably expensive, are too fluctuating and undisciplined to

oppose one composed chiefly of regular troops. I would recommend to you,

therefore, to make use of your influence with the States from Maryland

southward, to raise without delay at least 5,000 men for the war, if it

can be effected; if not, for as long a time as possible. These, with the

militia in the vicinity, would answer the purpose I have last mentioned,

and would in proper time make a useful body, either to form a diversion

in favor of, or to cooperate with, a force upon the coast.

"I have hinted the outlines of a plan to your Excellency which for many

reasons should be in general kept to yourself. You will oblige me by

informing yourself as accurately as possible, what may be the present

resources of the country as to meat, corn, wheat, or rice, and

transportation, as I suppose circumstances may have occasioned a

considerable change. And if it is possible to form magazines of either,

it should be done, especially of salt meat, which is an article so

essential to military operations, that the States of Virginia and North

Carolina should be requested to lay up, as soon as the weather will,

permit, at least 4,000 barrels in proportion to their respective

ability. You will also be pleased to endeavor to gain a knowledge of the

force of the enemy, the posts they occupy, the nature and state of those

posts, and the reinforcements they may probably derive from the people

of the country. As you receive these several intelligences you will be

pleased to communicate them to me with your opinion of the best place

for debarking troops, in case of an expedition against the enemy in

the southern States, and the names of the persons in that quarter whose

opinion and advice may be serviceable in such an event."

In the following extract from a letter to Count de Guichen in the

West Indies, September 12, 1780, we have from Washington a view of the

general state of affairs after the battle of Camden. Its object was to

induce the French admiral to come immediately to the United States.

The letter did not reach the West Indies until De Guichen had sailed to

France.

"The situation of America," Washington writes, "at this time is

critical. The government is without finances. Its paper credit is sunk

and no expedients can be adopted capable of retrieving it. The resources

of the country are much diminished by a five years' war in which it has

made efforts beyond its ability. Clinton, with an army of 10,000 regular

troops (aided by a considerable body of militia, whom from motives of

fear and attachment he has engaged to take arms), is in possession

of one of the capital towns and a large part of the State to which it

belongs. The savages are desolating the frontier. A fleet superior to

that of our allies not only protects the enemy against any attempt of

ours, but facilitates those which they may project against us. Lord

Cornwallis, with seven or eight thousand men, is in complete possession

of two States, Georgia and South Carolina, and by recent misfortunes

North Carolina is at his mercy. His force is daily increasing by an

accession of adherents, whom his successes naturally procure in a

country inhabited by emigrants from England and Scotland who have not

been long enough transplanted to exchange their ancient habits and

attachments in favor of their new residence.

"By a letter received from General Gates we learn that in attempting

to penetrate and regain the State of South Carolina he met with a total

defeat near Camden in which many of his troops have been cut off and the

remainder dispersed with the loss of all their cannon and baggage.

The enemy are said to be now making a detachment from New York for a

southern destination. If they push their successes in that quarter we

cannot predict where their career may end. The opposition will be feeble

unless we can give succor from hence, which, from a variety of causes

must depend on a naval superiority."

The remainder of the letter gives more details and urges the admiral to

give his aid to the United States.

It will be recollected by the reader that Gates when in the height of

his glory did not make any report to Washington of the surrender of

Burgoyne. This was in the days of the Conway Cabal. He then slighted and

almost insulted the great commander, whom, it is not improbable he

hoped to supersede. But in the hour of disaster and defeat it was to

Washington himself that he turned for help, protection, and countenance.

He is prompt enough with his official report now although he writes his

first dispatch to Congress in order that his apology may be published.

The following letter to Washington is dated at Hillsborough, August 30,

1780: [8]

"My public letter to Congress has surely been transmitted to your

Excellency. Since then I have been able to collect authentic returns of

the killed, wounded, and missing of the officers of the Maryland line,

Delaware regiment, artillerists, and those of the legion under Colonel

Armand. They are enclosed. The militia broke so early in the day, and

scattered in so many directions upon their retreat, that very few have

fallen into the hands of the enemy.

"By the firmness and bravery of the Continental troops the victory is

far from bloodless on the part of the foe, they having upwards of 500

men, with officers in proportion, killed and wounded. I do not think

Lord Cornwallis will be able to reap any advantage of consequence from

his victory as this State seems animated to reinstate and support the

army. Virginia, I am confident, will not be less patriotic. By the joint

exertions of these two States there is good reason to hope that should

the events of the campaign be prosperous to your Excellency all South

Carolina might be again recovered. Lord Cornwallis remained with his

army at Camden when I received the last accounts from thence. I am

cantoning ours at Salisbury, Guilford, Hillsborough, and Cross creek.

The Marylanders and artillerists, with their general hospital, will be

here; the cavalry near Cross creek, and the militia to the westward.

This is absolutely necessary as we have no magazine of provisions and

are only supplied from hand to mouth. Four days after the action of

the 16th, fortune seemed determined to distress us; for Colonel Sumter

having marched near forty miles up the river Wateree halted with the

wagons and prisoners he had taken the 15th; by some indiscretion the

men were surprised, cut off from their arms, the whole routed, and the

wagons and prisoners retaken.

"What encouragement the numerous disaffected in this State may give Lord

Cornwallis to advance further into the country I cannot yet say. Colonel

Sumter, since his surprise and defeat upon the west side of the Wateree,

has reinstated and increased his corps to upwards of 1,000 men. I

have directed him to continue to harass the enemy upon that side. Lord

Cornwallis will therefore be cautious how he makes any considerable

movement to the eastward while his corps remains in force upon his left

flank, and the main body is in a manner cantoned in his front. Anxious

for the public good I shall continue my unwearied endeavors to stop

the progress of the enemy, to reinstate our affairs, to recommence an

offensive war and recover all our losses in the southern States. But

if being unfortunate is solely reason sufficient for removing me from

command, I shall most cheerfully submit to the orders of Congress and

resign an office few generals would be anxious to possess, and where the

utmost skill and fortitude are subject to be baffled by the difficulties

which must for a time surround the chief in command here. That your

Excellency may meet with no such difficulties, that your road to fame

and fortune may be smooth and easy is the sincere wish of, sir, your

Excellency's most obedient, etc."

In the following extract from a letter of the 3d of September (1780), he

again calls Washington's attention to his own pitiable case: "If I can

yet render good service to the United States," he writes, "it will be

necessary it should be seen that I have the support of Congress and your

Excellency; otherwise some men may think they please my superiors by

blaming me, and thus recommend themselves to favor. But you, sir, will

be too generous to lend an ear to such men, if such there be, and will

show your greatness of soul rather by protecting than slighting the

unfortunate. If, on the contrary, I am not supported and countenance is

given to everyone who will speak disrespectfully of me it will be better

for Congress to remove me at once from where I shall be unable to render

them any good service. This, sir, I submit to your candor and honor, and

shall cheerfully await the decision of my superiors. With the warmest

wishes for your prosperity, and the sincerest sentiments of esteem and

regard, I am, sir, your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant."

Notwithstanding these letters and any friendly help which Washington

may have rendered to his fallen rival, the fickle Congress, as we shall

presently see, deserted at his utmost need the man who they had advanced

against Washington's advice.

After the battle of Camden, Cornwallis was unable to follow up the

victory with his usual activity. His little army was diminished by the

sword and by disease. He had not brought with him from Charleston the

stores necessary for a long march, and he did not deem it expedient to

leave South Carolina till he had suppressed that spirit of resistance to

his authority which had extensively manifested itself in the province.

In order to consummate, as he thought, the subjugation of the State, he

resorted to measures of great injustice and cruelty. He considered the

province as a conquered country, reduced to unconditional submission

and to allegiance to its ancient sovereign, and the people liable to the

duties of British subjects and to corresponding penalties in case of

a breach of those duties. He forgot, or seemed to forget, that many

of them had been received as prisoners of war on parole; that, without

their consent, their parole had been discharged, and that, merely by

a proclamation, they had been declared British subjects instead of

prisoners of war.

In a few days after the battle of Camden, when Cornwallis thought the

country was lying prostrate at his feet, he addressed the following

letter to the commandant of the British garrison at Ninety-six: "I

have given orders that all the inhabitants of this province who have

subscribed and taken part in the revolt should be punished with the

utmost rigor; and also those who will not turn out, that they may be

imprisoned and their whole property taken from them or destroyed. I have

also ordered that compensation should be made out of these estates to

the persons who have been injured or oppressed by them. I have ordered,

in the most positive manner, that every militiaman who has borne arms

with us and afterward joined the enemy shall be immediately hanged. I

desire you will take the most vigorous measures to punish the rebels in

the district you command and that you obey, in the strictest manner, the

directions I have given in this letter relative to the inhabitants

of the country." Similar orders were given to the commanders of other

posts. [9]

In any circumstances, such orders given to officers often possessing

little knowledge and as little prudence or humanity could not fail to

produce calamitous effects. In the case under consideration, where

all the worst passions of the heart were irritated and inflamed, the

consequences were lamentable. The orders were executed in the spirit in

which they were given. Numbers of persons were put to death; many were

imprisoned and their property was destroyed or confiscated. The country

was covered with blood and desolation, rancor and grief.

The prisoners on parole thought they had a clear right to take arms, for

from their parole they had been released by the proclamation of the

20th of June (1780), which indeed called them to the duty of subjects, a

condition to which they had never consented, and therefore they reckoned

that they had as good a right to resume their arms as the British

commander had to enjoin their allegiance. The case of those who had

taken British protections in the full persuasion that they were to be

allowed to live peaceably on their estates, but who, on finding that

they must fight on one side or the other, had repaired to the standards

of their country, was equally hard. Deception and violence were

practiced against both. So long as the struggle appeared doubtful the

Colonists met with fair promises and kind treatment, but at the moment

when resistance seemed hopeless and obedience necessary they were

addressed in the tone of authority, heard stern commands and bloody

threatenings, and received harsh usage. Hence the province, which for

some time presented the stillness of peace, again put on the ruthless

aspect of war.

A number of persons of much respectability remained prisoners of war in

Charleston since the capitulation of that town, but, after the battle

of Camden, Cornwallis ordered them to be carried out of the province.

Accordingly, early in the morning of the 27th of August (1780), some of

the principal citizens of Charleston were taken out of bed, put on board

a guard-ship, and soon afterward transported to St. Augustine. They

remonstrated with Lieutenant-Colonel Balfour, the commandant of

Charleston, but experienced only the insolence of authority from that

officer.

While Cornwallis endeavored by severe measures to break the spirits of

the people and to establish the royal authority in South Carolina, he

did not lose sight of his ulterior projects. He sent emissaries into

North Carolina to excite the Loyalists there, and to assure them of

the speedy march of the British army into that province. On the 8th of

September (1780) he left Camden, and toward the end of the month arrived

at Charlottetown, in North Carolina, of which place he took possession

after a slight resistance from some volunteer cavalry under Colonel

Davie. Though symptoms of opposition manifested themselves at Charlotte

yet he advanced toward Salisbury and ordered his militia to cross the

Yadkin. But Cornwallis was suddenly arrested in his victorious career

by an unexpected disaster. He made every exertion to embody the Tory

inhabitants of the country and to form them into a British militia. For

that purpose he employed Major Ferguson of the Seventy-first regiment

with a small detachment in the district of Ninety-six, to train the

Loyalists and to attach them to his own party. From the operations of

that officer he expected the most important services.

Ferguson executed his commission with activity and zeal, collected

a large number of Loyalists, and committed great depredations on the

friends of independence in the back settlements. When about to return to

the main army in triumph he was detained by one of those incidents which

occasionally occur in war and influence the course of events and the

destiny of nations. Colonel Clarke, of Georgia, who had fled from

that province on its reduction by Campbell in 1779, had retired to the

northward, and having collected a number of followers in the Carolinas,

he returned to his native province at the head of about 700 men, and

while Cornwallis was marching from Camden to Charlottetown, attacked the

British post at Augusta. Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, who commanded at that

place with a garrison of about 150 Provincials, aided by some friendly

Indians, finding the town untenable, retired toward an eminence on the

banks of the Savannah, named Garden Hill. But the Americans occupied

it before his arrival; by bringing his artillery, however, to bear upon

them, after a desperate conflict he succeeded in dislodging them and in

gaining possession of the hill, but with the loss of his cannon. There

Clarke besieged him till informed of the near approach of a British

detachment from Ninety-six, under Colonel Kruger. He then retreated,

abandoning the cannon which he had taken, and, though pursued, effected

his escape. Notice was instantly sent to Ferguson of Clarke's retreat

and of his route, and high hopes of intercepting him were entertained.

For that purpose Ferguson remained longer in those parts and approached

nearer the mountains than he would otherwise have done. As he had

collected about 1,500 men he had no apprehension of any force assembling

in that quarter able to embarrass him.

Meanwhile the depredations committed by Ferguson exasperated many of the

inhabitants of the country, some of whom, fleeing across the Allegheny

mountains, gave their western brethren an alarming account of the evils

with which they were threatened. Those men, living in the full enjoyment

of that independence for which the Atlantic States were struggling,

resolved to keep the war at a distance from their settlements. The

hardy mountaineers of the western parts of Virginia and North Carolina

assembled under Colonels Campbell, Shelby, Cleveland, and Sevier. Other

parties, under their several leaders, hastened to join them. They were

all mounted and unencumbered with baggage. Each man had his blanket,

knapsack, and rifle, and set out in quest of Ferguson, equipped in the

same manner as when they hunted the wild beasts of the forest. At night

the earth afforded them a bed and the heavens a covering; the flowing

stream quenched their thirst; their guns, their knapsacks, or a few

cattle driven in their rear, supplied them with food. Their numbers

made them formidable, and the rapidity of their movements rendered it

difficult to escape them. They amounted to nearly 3,000 men.

On hearing of their approach Ferguson began to retreat toward Charlotte

and sent messengers to Cornwallis to apprise him of his danger. But the

messengers were intercepted, and Cornwallis remained ignorant of the

perilous situation of his detachment. In the vicinity of Gilbert town

the Americans, apprehensive of Ferguson's escape, selected 1,000 of

their best riflemen, mounted them on their fleetest horses, and

sent them in pursuit. Their rapid movements rendered his retreat

impracticable, and Ferguson, sensible that he would inevitably be

overtaken, chose his ground on King's mountain on the confines of North

and South Carolina, and waited the attack.

On the 7th of October (1780) the Americans came up with him. Campbell

had the command, but his authority was merely nominal, for there was

little military order or subordination in the attack. They agreed to

divide their forces in order to assail Ferguson from different quarters,

and the divisions were led on by Colonels Cleveland, Shelby, Sevier,

and Williams. Cleveland, who conducted the party which began the attack,

addressed his men as follows:

"My brave fellows! we have beaten the Tories and we can beat them. When

engaged you are not to wait for the word of command from me. I will show

you by my example how to fight; I can undertake no more. Every man

must consider himself an officer and act on his own judgment. Though

repulsed, do not run off; return and renew the combat. If any of you are

afraid you have not only leave to withdraw, but are requested to do so."

Cleveland instantly began the attack, but was soon compelled to retire

before the bayonet. But Ferguson had no time to continue the pursuit,

for Shelby came forward from an unexpected quarter and poured in a

destructive fire. Ferguson again resorted to the bayonet and was again

successful. But at that moment Campbell's division advanced on another

side and a new battle began. Campbell, like his comrades, was obliged to

retreat. But Cleveland had now rallied his division and advanced anew to

the combat. The Royalists wheeled and met this returning assailant. In

this way there was an unremitting succession of attacks for about

fifty minutes. Ferguson obstinately defended himself and repulsed every

assailant, but at last he fell mortally wounded, and the second in

command, seeing the contest hopeless, surrendered. Ferguson and 150 of

his men lay dead on the field; as many were wounded; nearly 700 laid

down their arms, and upwards of 400 escaped. Among the prisoners the

number of regular British soldiers did not amount to 100. The Americans

lost about twenty men, who were killed on the field, and they had many

wounded. They took 1,500 stand of arms. Major Ferguson's position was

good, but the hill abounded with wood and afforded the Americans, who

were all riflemen, an opportunity of fighting in their own way and of

firing from behind trees.

The Americans hanged ten of their prisoners on the spot, pleading the

guilt of the individuals who suffered and the example of the British,

who had executed a great number of Americans. One of the victims was

a militia officer, who accepted a British commission, although he

had formerly been in the American service. Those rude warriors, whose

enterprise was the spontaneous impulse of their patriotism or revenge,

who acknowledged no superior authority, and who were guided by no

superior counsels, having achieved their victories and attained their

object, dispersed and returned home. Most of the prisoners were soon

afterward released on various conditions.

The ruin of Ferguson's detachment, from which so much had been expected,

was a severe blow to Cornwallis; it disconcerted his plans and prevented

his progress northward. On the 14th of October (1780), as soon after

obtaining certain information of the fall of Major Ferguson as the army

could be put in motion, he left Charlotte, where Ferguson was to have

met him and began his retreat toward South Carolina. In that retrograde

movement the British army suffered severely; for several days it rained

incessantly; the roads were almost impassable; the soldiers had no

tents, and at night encamped in the woods in an unhealthy climate. The

army was ill supplied with provisions; sometimes the men had beef, but

no bread; at other times bread, but no beef. Once they subsisted during

five days on Indian corn collected as it stood in the fields. Five ears

were the daily allowance of two men, but the troops bore their toils and

privations without a murmur.

In these trying circumstances the American Loyalists who had joined

the royal standard were of great service, but their services were ill

requited, and several of them, disgusted by the abusive language and

even blows, which they received from some of the officers, left the

British army forever. At length the troops passed the Catawba, and

on the 29th of October (1780) reached Wynnesborough, an intermediate

station between Camden and Ninety-six. During this difficult march

Cornwallis was ill and Lord Rawdon had the command.

Washington directed the operations of this southern campaign as far

as it was in his power. But he was interfered with by the pragmatical,

imbecile, and conceited Congress. Had Greene been appointed to take

command of the southern army, according to Washington's desire, instead

of Gates, he would soon have assembled around him that "permanent,

compact, and well-organized body of men," referred to in Washington's

letter to Governor Rutledge, which we have quoted, and would have given

a very different account of the British from that of Gates. Greene was

second only to the Commander-in-Chief in ability--second to none in

courage, coolness, and perseverance. His campaign in the South, as we

shall presently see, was one of the most remarkable performances of

the war. But Congress would not send him to the South till repeated

disasters compelled them to listen to Washington's advice. The old virus

of the Conway Cabal must have been still lurking among the members or

they would scarcely have preferred Gates to Greene. We must now leave

the South for a season and turn to the course of events in the northern

States.

1. Footnote: This was a recent conquest of the British fleet in the West

Indies.

2. Footnote: The reader will recollect that Fort Moultrie received its

name from its defense by Colonel Moultrie in 1776.

3. Footnote: The reader will recollect that Fort Moultrie received its

name from its defense by Colonel Moultrie in 1776.

4. Footnote: Washington, who had long ago taken the measure of Gates'

capacity, was desirous that Greene should receive the appointment to the

command of the southern army at this time; but his wishes were overruled

by Congress. Had Greene been appointed, or even had De Kalb been left in

command, the campaign of 1780 would have been quite another affair.

5. Footnote: Charles Armand, Marquis de la Rouerie, was a French officer

of note when he entered our army as colonel in 1777, and was ordered to

raise a corps of Frenchmen not exceeding 200 men. He served in Jersey

and Pennsylvania in 1777, and in Westchester county, New York, in 1778,

where he captured Major Baremore and his Loyalists, as mentioned in

Washington's certificate below. In 1779 he was stationed at Ridgefield,

Connecticut, under Gen. Robert Howe. He was sent with a legion composed

of his own and Pulaski's cavalry to aid in Gates' southern expedition,

as mentioned in the text. In 1781 he went to France to obtain clothes

and equipments, and returned soon enough to assist at the siege of

Yorktown. Washington recommended him strongly to Congress, who gave him

the commission of brigadier-general in the spring of 1783. He returned

to France in 1784, engaged in the French revolution, and took an active

part. He died January 30th, 1793. On the occasion of Colonel Armand's

going to join the southern army under Gates, Washington gave him the

following certificate under his own hand:

CERTIFICATE.

I certify that the Marquis de la Rouerie has served in the army of the

United States since the beginning of 1777, with the rank of colonel,

during which time he has commanded an independent corps with much honor

to himself and usefulness to the service. He has upon all occasions

conducted himself as an officer of distinguished merit, of great zeal,

activity, vigilance, intelligence, and bravery. In the last campaign,

particularly, he rendered very valuable services, and towards the close

of it made a brilliant partisan stroke, by which, with much enterprise

and address, he surprised a major and some men of the enemy in quarters,

at a considerable distance within their pickets, and brought them off

without loss to his party. I give him this certificate In testimony

of my perfect approbation of his conduct, and esteem for himself

personally.

6. Footnote: Colonel Armand censured Gates' conduct on this occasion

severely. It is clear that he chose the ground best suited for the

enemy's purpose. "I will not say," Armand remarked, "that the general

contemplated treason, but I will say, that if he had desired to betray

his army, he could not have chosen a more judicious course."

7. Footnote: Sparks, "Writings of Washington," vol. VII, p.201. 8.

Footnote: Sparks, "Correspondence of the Revolution," vol. III, P.66.

9. Footnote: The orders of Rawdon and Cornwallis to the subordinates to

treat the Americans in this cruel manner were intercepted and sent to

Washington, who transmitted them, with a sharp letter, to Sir Henry

Clinton. His reply sustained Rawdon and Cornwallis. The original letters

and the whole correspondence may be found in the 7th volume of Sparks,

"Writings of Washington."