MONMOUTH. 1778.
For prosecuting the campaign of 1778 Washington had not been provided
with an adequate force. The committee of Congress who visited the army
at Valley Forge had agreed that the army should consist of about 40,000
men, besides artillery and horse. In May (1778) the army, including the
detachments at different places, was found to amount only to 15,000,
with little prospect of increase. At Valley Forge Washington had 11,800.
The British army at this time numbered 33,000. With such odds the plan
of operations for this season must necessarily be defensive.
From the position which Washington had taken at Valley Forge, and
from the activity and vigilance of his patrols, the British army
in Philadelphia was straitened for forage and fresh provisions. A
considerable number of the people of Pennsylvania were well affected to
the British cause and desirous of supplying the troops, while many more
were willing to carry victuals to Philadelphia, where they found a ready
market and payment in gold or silver, whereas the army at Valley Forge
could pay only in paper money of uncertain value. But it was not easy
to reach Philadelphia nor safe to attempt it, for the American parties
often intercepted and took the provisions without payment and not
unfrequently chastised those engaged. The first operations on the part
of the British, therefore, in the campaign of 1778, were undertaken
in order to procure supplies for the army. About the middle of March
a strong detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Mawhood, made a foraging
excursion for six or seven days into Jersey, surprised and defeated the
American parties at Hancock's and Quinton's bridges on Always creek,
which falls into the Delaware to the south of Reedy Island, killed or
took fifty or sixty of the militia prisoners, and after a successful
expedition returned to Philadelphia with little loss.
A corps of Pennsylvania militia, daily varying in number, sometimes not
exceeding fifty, sometimes amounting to 600, under General Lacey, had
taken post at a place called Crooked Billet, about seventeen miles from
Philadelphia on the road to New York, for the purpose of intercepting
the country people who attempted to carry provisions to the British
army. Early on the morning of the 4th of May, Colonel Abercrombie and
Major Simcoe, with a strong detachment, attempted to surprise this
party, but Lacey escaped with little loss, except his baggage, which
fell into the hands of the enemy.
On the 7th of May the British undertook an expedition against the
galleys and other shipping which had escaped up the Delaware after the
reduction of Mud Island, and destroyed upward of forty vessels and some
stores and provisions. The undisputed superiority of the British
naval force and the consequent command of the Delaware gave them great
facilities in directing a suitable armament against any particular
point, and the movements of the militia, on whom Congress chiefly
depended for repelling sudden predatory incursions and for guarding the
roads to Philadelphia, were often tardy and inefficient. The roads were
ill guarded, and the British frequently accomplished their foraging and
returned to camp before an adequate force could be assembled to oppose
them.
To remedy these evils--to annoy the rear of the British troops in case
they evacuated Philadelphia, which it was now suspected they intended to
do, and also to form an advanced guard of the main army--Lafayette, with
upward of 2,000 chosen men and six pieces of artillery, was ordered to
the east of the Schuylkill, and took post on Barren Hill, seven or
eight miles in advance of the army at Valley Forge. Sir William Howe
immediately got notice of his position and formed a plan to surprise and
cut him off. For that purpose a detachment of 5,000 of the best troops
of the British army, under General Grant, marched from Philadelphia
on the night of the 20th of May and took the road which runs along the
Delaware and consequently does not lead directly to Barren Hill. But
after advancing a few miles the detachment turned to the left, and
proceeding by White Marsh passed at no great distance from Lafayette's
left flank and about sunrise reached a point in his rear where two roads
diverged, one leading to the camp of the marquis, the other to Matson's
ford, each about a mile distant. There General Grant's detachment was
first observed by the Americans, and the British perceived by the rapid
movements of some hostile horsemen that they were seen. Both Lafayette's
camp and the road leading from it to Matson's ford were concealed from
the British troops by intervening woods and high grounds. General Grant
spent some time in making dispositions for the intended attack. That
interval was actively improved by Lafayette, who, although not apprised
of the full extent of his danger, acted with promptitude and decision.
He marched rapidly to Matson's ford, from which he was somewhat more
distant than the British detachment, and reached it while General Grant
was advancing against Barren Hill in the belief that Lafayette was still
there. The Americans hurried through the ford leaving their artillery
behind, but on discovering they were not closely pursued some of them
returned and dragged the field pieces across the river; a small party
was also sent into the woods to retard the progress of the British
advanced guard, if it should approach while the artillery was in the
ford.
On finding the camp at Barren Hill deserted General Grant immediately
pursued in the track of the retreating enemy toward Matson's ford. His
advanced guard overtook some of the small American party, which had
been sent back to cover the passage of the artillery, before they could
recross the river and took or killed a few of them, but on reaching
the ford General Grant found Lafayette so advantageously posted on the
rising ground on the opposite bank and his artillery so judiciously
placed that it was deemed unadvisable to attack him. Thus the attempt
against Lafayette failed, although the plan was well concerted and on
the very point of success. In the British army sanguine expectations of
the favorable issue of the enterprise were entertained, and in order
to insure a happy result a large detachment, under General Grey, in the
course of the night took post at a ford of the Schuylkill, two or three
miles in front of Lafayette's right flank, to intercept him if he should
attempt to escape in that direction, while the main body of the army
advanced to Chestnut Hill to support the attack, but on the failure of
the enterprise the whole returned to Philadelphia.
General Grant's detachment was seen by Washington from the camp at
Valley Forge about the time it was discovered by the troops at Barren
Hill, alarm guns were fired by his order to warn Lafayette of his
danger, and the whole army was drawn out to be in readiness to act as
circumstances might require. The escape of the detachment was the cause
of much joy and congratulation in the American and of disappointment and
chagrin in the British army.
That a strong detachment of hostile troops should pass at a small
distance from Lafayette's flank and gain his rear unobserved seems
to argue a want of due vigilance on the part of that officer, but a
detachment of the Pennsylvania militia had been posted at a little
distance on his left and he relied on them for watching the roads in
that quarter. The militia, however, had quitted their station without
informing him of their movement, and consequently his left flank and the
roads about White Marsh remained unguarded.
This was the last enterprise attempted by Sir William Howe. Soon after
he resigned the command of the army. So far back as the month of October
in the preceding year he had requested to be relieved from the painful
service in which he was engaged. On the 14th of April, 1778, he received
the King's permission to resign, but at the same time he was directed,
while he continued in command, to embrace every opportunity of putting
an end to the war by a due employment of the force under his orders. In
the beginning of June after having received, in a triumphal procession
and festival, a testimony of the approbation and esteem of the army
he sailed for England, leaving the troops under the care of Sir Henry
Clinton as his successor.
Sir William Howe has been much blamed for inactivity and for not
overwhelming the Americans, but he was at least as successful as any
other general employed in the course of the war. He was cautious and
sparing of the lives of his men. In his operations he discovered
a respectable share of military science, and he met with no great
reverses. They who blame him for want of energy may look to the history
of Generals Burgoyne and Cornwallis for the fate of more enterprising
leaders in America.
About the time when Howe resigned the command of the army the British
government ordered the evacuation of Philadelphia. While the British had
an undisputed naval superiority Philadelphia was in some respects a good
military station. Although in all the States a decided majority of the
people gave their support to Congress, yet in every province south of
New England there was a considerable minority friendly to the claims of
the mother country. The occupation of Philadelphia, the principal city
of the confederation, encouraged the latter class of the inhabitants,
and the army there formed a point round which they might rally. But
Philadelphia is more than 100 miles up the Delaware, and as Howe
had been unable to drive Washington from the field he had found some
difficulty in subsisting his army in that city, even when the British
ships had the full command of the sea and could force their way up the
great rivers; but when the empire of the ocean was about to be disputed
by the French Philadelphia became a hazardous post on account of
the difficulty and uncertainty of procuring provisions, receiving
communications, or sending aid to such places as might be attacked. It
was accordingly resolved to abandon that city, and after shipping
his cavalry, formed of the German troops and American Loyalists, his
provision train and heavy baggage, on the few vessels that were in
the river, Clinton had to march the remainder of his army through the
Jerseys to New York, where the communication with the ocean is more
easy.
The preparations for this movement could not be so secretly made as to
escape the notice of the Americans, and to be in readiness for it was
one reason of detaching Lafayette to Barren Hill, where he had been
exposed to so much danger. Washington called in his detachments and
pressed the State governments to hasten the march of their new levies
in order that he might be enabled to act offensively; but the new
levies arrived slowly, and in some instances the State Legislatures were
deliberating on the means of raising them at the time when they should
have been in the field.
Although Washington was satisfied of the intention of the British
Commander-in-Chief to evacuate Philadelphia yet it was uncertain in what
way he would accomplish his purpose, but the opinion that he intended
to march through the Jerseys to New York gained ground in the American
camp; and in this persuasion Washington detached General Maxwell
with the Jersey brigade across the Delaware to cooperate with General
Dickinson, who was assembling the Jersey militia, in breaking down the
bridges, felling trees across the roads, and impeding and harassing
the British troops in their retreat, but with orders to be on his guard
against a sudden attack.
Washington summoned a council of war to deliberate on the measures to be
pursued in that emergency. It was unanimously resolved not to molest
the British army in passing the Delaware, but with respect to subsequent
operations there was much difference of opinion in the council. General
Lee, who had lately joined the army after his exchange, was decidedly
against risking either a general or partial engagement. The British army
he estimated at 10,000 men fit for duty, exclusive of officers, while
the American army did not amount to more than 11,800; he was, therefore,
of opinion that with so near an equality of force it would be criminal
to hazard a battle. He relied much on the imposing attitude in which
their late foreign alliance placed them, and maintained that nothing but
a defeat of the army could now endanger their independence. Almost all
the foreign officers agreed in opinion with General Lee, and among the
American generals only Wayne and Cadwalader were decidedly in favor
of attacking the enemy. Under these circumstances Washington, although
strongly inclined to fight, found himself constrained to act with much
circumspection.
Having made all the requisite preparations Sir Henry Clinton, early
in the morning of the 18th of June (1778), led the British army to the
confluence of the Delaware and Schuylkill, where boats and other vessels
were ready to receive them, and so judicious were the arrangements
made by Admiral Lord Howe that all the troops, with the baggage and
artillery, were carried across the Delaware and safely landed on
the Jersey side of the river before 10 in the forenoon. Many of the
Loyalists of Philadelphia accompanied the army, carrying their effects
along with them, and such of them as ventured to remain behind met with
little indulgence from their irritated countrymen. Several of them
were tried for their lives and two Quakers were executed. The Americans
entered the city before the British rear guard had entirely left it.
There were two roads leading from Philadelphia to New York--the one
running along the western bank of the Delaware to Trenton Ferry, and
the other along the eastern bank to the same point. The British army
had wisely crossed the river at the point where it was least exposed
to molestation and entered on the last of these two roads. In marching
through a difficult and hostile country Sir Henry Clinton prudently
carried along with him a considerable quantity of baggage and a large
supply of provisions, so that the progress of the army, thus heavily
encumbered, was but slow. It proceeded leisurely through Huddersfield,
Mount Holly, and Crosswick, and reached Allentown on the 24th (June,
1778), having in seven days marched less than forty miles. This slow
progress made the Americans believe that Sir Henry Clinton wished to be
attacked. General Maxwell, who was posted at Mount Holly, retired on his
approach, and neither he nor General Dickinson was able to give him much
molestation.
As the march of the British army till it passed Crosswick was up the
Delaware, and only at a small distance from that river, Washington,
who left Valley Forge on the day that Sir Henry Clinton evacuated
Philadelphia, found it necessary to take a circuitous route and pass the
river higher up at Coryell's Ferry, where he crossed it on the 22d and
took post at Hopewell on the high grounds in that vicinity, and remained
during the 23d in that position.
From Allentown there were two roads to New York--one on the left,
passing through South Amboy to the North river; the other on the right,
leading to Sandy Hook. The first of these was somewhat shorter but the
river Raritan lay in the way and it might be difficult and dangerous to
pass it in presence of a hostile force. Sir Henry Clinton, therefore,
resolved to take the road to Sandy Hook by which the Raritan would be
altogether avoided.
Although a great majority in the American council of war were averse
to fighting, yet Washington was strongly inclined to attack the British
army. He summoned the council of war a second time and again submitted
the subject to their consideration, but they adhered to their former
opinion, and Washington, still inclined to attack the enemy, determined
to act on his own responsibility.
The Jersey militia and a brigade of Continentals, under Generals
Dickinson and Maxwell, hovered on the left flank of the British army;
General Cadwalader, with a Continental regiment and a few militia was in
its rear, and Colonel Morgan, with his rifle regiment 600 strong, was on
its right. These detachments were ordered to harass the enemy as much as
possible.
As Sir Henry Clinton proceeded on the route toward Sandy Hook Washington
strengthened his advanced guard till it amounted to 5,000 men. General
Lee, from his rank, had a claim to the command of that force, but at
first he declined it and Lafayette was appointed to that service. But
General Lee perceiving the importance of the command solicited the
appointment which he had at first declined, and was accordingly sent
forward with a reinforcement, when, from seniority, the whole of the
advanced guard became subject to his orders.
On the evening of the 27th (June, 1778) Sir Henry Clinton took a strong
position on the high grounds about Freehold Court House, in the county
of Monmouth. His right was posted in a small wood; his left was covered
by a thick forest and a morass; he had a wood in front, also a marsh for
a considerable space toward his left, and he was within twelve miles of
the high grounds at Middletown, after reaching which no attempt could
be made upon him with any prospect of success. His position was
unassailable, but Washington resolved to attack his rear in the morning,
as soon as it descended from the high grounds into the plain beyond them
and gave orders accordingly to Lee, who was at Englishtown, three miles
in the rear of the British army and as much in advance of the main body
of the Americans.
By the strong parties on his flanks and rear Clinton was convinced that
the hostile army was at hand, and suspecting that an attempt on his
baggage was intended on the morning of the 28th he changed his order of
march and put all the baggage under the care of General Knyphausen, who
commanded the van division of his army, in order that the rear division,
consisting of the flower of the troops under Cornwallis, might be
unencumbered and ready to act as circumstances might require. Clinton
remained with the rear division.
To avoid pressing on Knyphausen Cornwallis remained on his ground
until about 8, and then descending from the heights of Freehold into an
extensive plain took up his line of march in rear of the front division.
General Lee had made dispositions for executing orders given the
preceding evening, and repeated in the morning, and soon after the
British rear had moved from its ground prepared to attack it. General
Dickinson had been directed to detach some of his best troops, to take
such a position as to cooperate with him, and Morgan, with his riflemen,
was ordered to act on the right flank.
Lee appeared on the heights of Freehold soon after Cornwallis had left
them, and following the British into the plain ordered General Wayne to
attack the rear of their covering party with sufficient vigor to check
it, but not to press it so closely as either to force it up to the main
body or to draw reinforcements to its aid. In the meantime he intended
to gain the front of this party by a shorter road, and, intercepting its
communication with the line, to bear it off before it could be assisted.
While in the execution of this design an officer in the suite of
Washington came up to gain intelligence and Lee communicated to him his
present object. Before he reached the point of destination, however,
there was reason to believe that the British rear was much stronger
than had been conjectured. The intelligence on this subject being
contradictory, and the face of the country well calculated to conceal
the truth, he deemed it advisable to ascertain the fact himself.
Sir Henry Clinton, soon after the rear division was in full march,
received intelligence that an American column had appeared on his left
flank. This, being a corps of militia, was soon dispersed and the march
was continued. When his rear guard had descended from the heights he
saw it followed by a strong corps, soon after which a cannonade was
commenced upon it, and at the same time a respectable force showed
itself on each of his flanks. Suspecting a design on his baggage he
determined to attack the troops in his rear so vigorously as to compel
a recall of those on his flanks, and for this purpose marched back his
whole rear division. This movement was in progress as Lee advanced for
the purpose of reconnoitering. He soon perceived his mistake respecting
the force of the British rear, but still determined to engage on that
ground although his judgment disapproved the measure--there being a
morass immediately in his rear, which would necessarily impede the
reinforcements which might be advancing to his aid and embarrass his
retreat should he be finally overpowered. This was about 10. While both
armies were preparing for action General Scott (as stated by General
Lee) mistook an oblique march of an American column for a retreat, and
in the apprehension of being abandoned left his position and repassed
the ravine in his rear.
Being himself of opinion that the ground was unfavorable Lee did not
correct the error he ascribed to Scott but ordered the whole detachment
to regain the heights. He was closely pressed and some slight
skirmishing ensued without much loss on either side.
As soon as the firing announced the commencement of the action the rear
division of the army advanced rapidly to the support of the front. As
they approached the scene of action, Washington, who had received no
intelligence from Lee giving notice of his retreat, rode forward, and to
his utter astonishment and mortification met the advanced corps retiring
before the enemy without having made a single effort to maintain its
ground. The troops he first saw neither understood the motives which had
governed Lee nor his present design, and could give no other information
than that by his orders they had fled without fighting.
Washington rode to the rear of the division where he met Lee, to whom he
spoke in terms of some warmth, implying disapprobation of his conduct.
[2]
Orders were immediately given to Colonel Stewart and Lieutenant-Colonel
Ramsay to form their regiments for the purpose of checking the pursuit,
and Lee was directed to take proper measures with the residue of his
force to stop the British column on that ground. Washington then rode
back to arrange the rear division of the army.
These orders were executed with firmness, and, when forced from his
ground, Lee brought off his troops in good order, and was directed to
form in the rear of Englishtown.
This check afforded time to draw up the left wing and second line of
the American army on an eminence covered by a morass in front. Lord
Stirling, who commanded the left wing, brought up a detachment of
artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington, and some field pieces,
which played with considerable effect on a division of the British which
had passed the morass, and was pressing on to the charge. These pieces,
with the aid of several parties of infantry, effectually stopped the
advance of the enemy.
Finding themselves warmly opposed in front, the British attempted to
turn the left flank of the American army, but were repulsed. They then
attempted the right with as little success. General Greene had advanced
a body of troops with artillery to a commanding piece of ground in his
front, which not only disappointed the design of turning the right, but
enfiladed the party which yet remained in front of the left wing.
At this moment General Wayne was advanced with a body of infantry to
engage them in front, who kept up so hot and well-directed a fire that
they soon withdrew behind the ravine to the ground on which the action
had commenced immediately after the arrival of Washington.
Lafayette, speaking of this battle, said: "Never was General Washington
greater in war than in this action. His presence stopped the retreat.
His dispositions fixed the victory. His fine appearance on horseback,
his calm courage roused by the animation produced by the vexation of the
morning, gave him the air best calculated to excite enthusiasm."
The position now taken by the British army was very strong. Both flanks
were secured by thick woods and morasses, and their front was
accessible only through a narrow pass. The day had been intensely hot,
and the troops were much fatigued. Notwithstanding these circumstances,
Washington resolved to renew the engagement. For this purpose he
ordered Brigadier-General Poor, with his own and the North Carolina
brigade, to gain their right flank, while Woodford with his brigade
should turn their left. At the same time the artillery was ordered to
advance and play on their front. These orders were obeyed with
alacrity, but the impediments on the flanks of the British were so
considerable, that before they could be overcome it was nearly dark.
Further operations were therefore deferred until next morning; and the
brigades which had been detached to the flanks of the British army
continued on their ground through night, and the other troops lay on
the field of battle with their arms in their hands. Washington passed
the night in his cloak in the midst of his soldiers.
The British employed the early part of the morning in removing their
wounded, and about midnight marched away in such silence that their
retreat was not perceived until day.
As it was certain that they must gain the high grounds about Middletown
before they could be overtaken, as the face of the country afforded no
prospect of opposing their embarkation, and as the battle already fought
had terminated in a manner to make a general impression favorable to the
American arms, Washington decided to relinquish the pursuit. Leaving a
detachment to hover about the British rear, the main body of the army
moved towards the Hudson.
Washington was highly gratified with the conduct of his troops in
this action. Their behavior, he said, after recovering from the first
surprise occasioned by the unexpected retreat of the advanced corps,
could not be surpassed. Wayne he particularly mentioned, and spoke of
the artillery in terms of high praise.
The loss of the Americans in the battle of Monmouth was 8 officers
and 61 privates killed, and about 160 wounded. Among the slain were
Lieutenant-Colonel Bonner, of Pennsylvania, and Major Dickinson, of
Virginia, both of whom were much regretted. One hundred and thirty were
missing, but a considerable number of these afterward rejoined their
regiments.
In his official letter, Sir Henry Clinton states his dead and missing
at 4 officers and 184 privates; his wounded, at 16 officers and 154
privates. This account, so far as it respects the dead, cannot be
correct, as 4 officers and 245 privates were buried on the field by
persons appointed for the purpose, who made their report to Washington;
and some few were afterward found, so as to increase the number to
nearly 300. The uncommon heat of the day proved fatal to several on both
sides.
As usual, when a battle has not been decisive, both parties claimed the
victory. In the early part of the day the advantage was certainly
with the British; in the latter part it may be pronounced with equal
certainty to have been with the Americans. They maintained their ground,
repulsed the enemy, were prevented only by the night and by the retreat
of the hostile army from renewing the action, and suffered less in
killed and wounded than their adversaries.
It is true that Sir Henry Clinton effected what he states to have
been his principal object--the safety of his baggage. But when it is
recollected that the American officers had decided against hazarding
an action, that this advice must have trammeled the conduct and
circumscribed the views of Washington, he will be admitted to have
effected no inconsiderable object in giving the American arms that
appearance of superiority which was certainly acquired by this
engagement.
Independent of the loss sustained in the action, the British army was
considerably weakened in its march from Philadelphia to New York. About
100 prisoners were made, and near 1,000 soldiers, chiefly foreigners,
deserted while passing through Jersey. Many of the soldiers had formed
attachments in Philadelphia, which occasioned their desertion. Clinton's
whole loss, including killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters,
amounted to at least 2,000 men.
The conduct of Lee was generally disapproved. As, however, he had
possessed a large share of the confidence and good opinion of the
Commander-in-Chief, it is probable that explanations might have been
made which would have rescued him from the imputations that were cast
on him, and have restored him to the esteem of the army, could his
haughty temper have brooked the indignity he believed to have been
offered him on the field of battle. Washington had taken no measures in
consequence of the events of that day, and would probably have come to
no resolution concerning them without an amicable explanation, when he
received from Lee a letter expressed in very unbecoming terms, in which
he, in the tone of a superior, required reparation for the injury
sustained "from the very singular expressions" said to have been used
on the day of the action by Washington.
This letter was answered (July 30, 1778) by an assurance that, so
soon as circumstances would admit of an inquiry, he should have an
opportunity of justifying himself to the army, to America, and to the
world in general; or of convincing them that he had been guilty
of disobedience of orders and misbehavior before the enemy. On his
expressing a wish for a speedy investigation of his conduct, and for a
court-martial rather than a court of inquiry, he was arrested--first,
for disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy on the 28th of
June, agreeably to repeated instructions; secondly, for misbehavior
before the enemy on the same day, in making an unnecessary,
disorderly, and shameful retreat; and thirdly, for disrespect to the
Commander-in-Chief in two letters.
Before this correspondence had taken place, strong and specific charges
of misconduct had been made against General Lee by several officers of
his detachment, and particularly by Generals Wayne and Scott. In these,
the transactions of the day, not being well understood, were represented
in colors much more unfavorable to Lee than facts, when properly
explained, would seem to justify.
These representations, most probably, induced the strong language of the
second article in the charge. A court-martial, over which Lord Stirling
presided, after a tedious investigation, found him guilty of all the
charges exhibited against him, and sentenced him to be suspended for one
year. This sentence was afterward, though with some hesitation, approved
almost unanimously by Congress. The court, softened in some degree the
severity of the second charge, by finding him guilty, not in its very
words, but "of misbehavior before the enemy, by making an unnecessary,
and, in some few instances, a disorderly retreat."
Lee defended himself with his accustomed ability. He proved that, after
the retreat had commenced, in consequence of General Scott's repassing
the ravine, on the approach of the enemy, he had designed to form on the
first advantageous piece of ground he could find; and that in his
own opinion, and in the opinion of some other officers, no safe and
advantageous position had presented itself until he met Washington, at
which time it was his intention to fight the enemy on the very ground
afterwards taken by Washington himself. He suggested a variety
of reasons in justification of his retreat, which, if they do not
absolutely establish its propriety, give it so questionable a form as
to render it probable that a public examination never would have taken
place, could his proud spirit have stooped to offer explanation instead
of outrage to the Commander-in-Chief.
His suspension gave general satisfaction through the army. Without
judging harshly of his conduct as a military man, they perfectly
understood the insult offered to their general by his letters; and,
whether rightly or not, believed his object to have been to disgrace
Washington and to obtain the supreme command for himself. So devotedly
were all ranks attached to their general, that the mere suspicion of
such a design would have rendered his continuance in the army extremely
difficult.
Whatever judgment may be formed on the propriety of his retreat, it is
not easy to justify either the omission to keep the Commander-in-Chief
continually informed of his situation and intentions, or the very rude
letters written after the action was over.
The battle of Monmouth gave great satisfaction to Congress. A resolution
was passed unanimously, thanking Washington for the activity with which
he marched from the camp at Valley Forge in pursuit of the enemy; for
his distinguished exertions in forming the line of battle, and for his
great good conduct in the action; and he was requested to signify
the thanks of Congress to the officers and men under his command who
distinguished themselves by their conduct and valor in the battle.
After the battle of Monmouth, Washington gave his army one day's repose,
and then (June 30, 1778,) commenced his march toward Brunswick, at which
place he encamped, and remained for several days. Thence he sent out
parties to reconnoiter the enemy's position, and learn his intentions.
Among other persons sent out with this design was Aaron Burr, a
lieutenant-colonel, who had served in Arnold's expedition to Quebec, and
who was destined to become a conspicuous person in American history.
Clinton had arrived with his army in the neighborhood of Sandy Hook on
the 30th of June. Here he was met by Lord Howe with the fleet, which had
just arrived from Philadelphia. Sandy Hook having been converted by the
winter storms from a peninsula to an island, Lord Howe caused a bridge
of boats to be constructed, over which Clinton's army passed from the
mainland to the Hook. It was soon afterward distributed into different
encampments on Staten Island, Long Island, and the island of New York.
When Washington had learned that the British army was thus situated, he
was satisfied that Clinton had no present intention of passing up the
Hudson, and he halted a few days at Paramus, at which place he received
intelligence of an important event which will claim our attention in the
next chapter.
1. Footnote: Spencer, "History of the United States."
2. Footnote: This interview between Washington and Lee was followed by
such important results that one is naturally curious to know exactly
what passed between them. The interview is described by Lee himself in
his defense before the court-martial:
"When I arrived first in his presence, conscious of having done nothing
which could draw on me the least censure, but rather flattering myself
with his congratulation and applause, I confess I was disconcerted,
astonished, and confounded by the words and manner in which his
Excellency accosted me. It was so novel and unexpected from a man,
whose discretion, humanity, and decorum I had from the first of our
acquaintance stood in admiration of, that I was for some time unable to
make any coherent answer to questions so abrupt, and in a great measure
to me unintelligible. The terms, I think, were these: 'I desire to know,
sir, what is the reason, whence arises this disorder and confusion?' The
manner in which he expressed them was much stronger and more severe
than the expressions themselves. When I recovered myself sufficiently,
I answered that I saw or knew of no confusion but what naturally
arose from disobedience of orders, contradictory intelligence, and the
impertinence and presumption of individuals, who were invested with no
authority, intruding themselves in matters above them and out of their
sphere; that the retreat in the first instance was contrary to my
intentions, contrary to my orders, and contrary to my wishes."
Washington replied that all this might be true, but that he ought not to
have undertaken the enterprise unless he intended to go through with it.
He then rode away, and ordered some of the retreating regiments to be
formed on the ground which he pointed out.
Gordon says that, after the first meeting with Lee, Washington rode on
towards the rear of the retreating troops. He had not gone many yards
before he met his secretary, who told him that the British army were
within fifteen minutes' march of that place, which was the first
intelligence he received of their pushing on so briskly. He remained
there till the extreme rear of the retreating troops got up, when,
looking about, and judging the ground to be an advantageous spot for
giving the enemy the first check, he ordered Colonel Stewart's and
Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsey's battalions to form and incline to their
left, that they might be under cover of a corner of woods, and not be
exposed to the enemy's cannon in front. Lee having been told by one of
his aids that Washington had taken the command, answered, "Then I
have nothing further to do," and turned his horse and rode after his
Excellency in front. Washington, on his coming up, asked, "Will you
command on this ground or not? If you will, I will return to the main
body and have them formed upon the next height." Lee replied, "It is
equal with me where I command." Washington then told him, "I expect
you will take proper measures for checking the enemy," Lee said, "Your
orders shall be obeyed, and I will not be the first to leave the field."
Washington then rode to the main army, which was formed with the utmost
expedition on the eminence, with the morass in front. Immediately upon
his riding off, a warm cannonade commenced between the British and
American artillery on the right of Stewart and Ramsay, between whom and
the advanced troops of the British army a heavy fire began soon after in
the skirt of the woods before mentioned. The British pressed on close;
their light horse charged upon the right of the Americans, and the
latter were obliged to give way in such haste, that the British horse
and infantry came out of the wood seemingly mixed with them.
The action then commenced between the British and Colonel Livingston's
regiment, together with Varnum's brigade, which had been drawn up by
Lee's order, and lined the fence that stretched across the open field
in front of the bridge over the morass, with the view of covering
the retreat of the artillery and the troops advanced with them. The
artillery had timely retired to the rear of the fence, and from an
eminence discharged several rounds of shot at the British engaged with
Livingston's and Varnum's troops; these were soon broken by a charge of
the former, and retired. The artillery were then ordered off. Prior to
the commencement of the last action, Lee sent orders to Colonel Ogden,
who had drawn up in the wood nearest the bridge to defend that post to
the last extremity, thereby to cover the retreat of the whole over the
bridge. Lee was one of the last that remained on the field, and brought
off the rear of the retreating troops. Upon his addressing General
Washington, after passing the morass, with, "Sir, here are my troops,
how is it your pleasure that I should dispose of them?" he was ordered
to arrange them in the rear of Englishtown.