WASHINGTON AT VALLEY FORGE. 1777, 1778.
We have already given some details of the sufferings endured by
Washington and his brave soldiers at Valley Forge. One-half the tale
is not told--never will be told; their sufferings were unutterable. A
review of this portion of Washington's life will show that at Valley
Forge not only was a great deal suffered but a great deal was done. Here
the army was hardened from the gristle of youth to the bone and muscle
of manhood. It entered the tents of that dreary encampment a courageous
but disorderly rabble; it left them a disciplined army. But we must not
anticipate events.
This army, which was under the immediate command of Washington, was
engaged through the winter (1777-1778) in endeavoring to stop the
intercourse between Philadelphia and the country. To effect this object
General Smallwood was detached with one division to Wilmington; Colonel
Morgan, who had been detached from Gates's army, was placed on the
lines on the west side of the Schuylkill, and General Armstrong with the
Pennsylvania militia, was stationed near the old camp at White Marsh.
Major Jameson with two troops of cavalry and M'Lane's infantry, was
directed to guard the east and Capt. Henry Lee with his troop, the west
side of that river. General Count Pulaski, who commanded the horse, led
the residue of the cavalry to Trenton, where he trained them for the
ensuing campaign.
One of the first operations meditated by Washington after crossing the
Schuylkill was the destruction of a large quantity of hay which remained
in the islands above the mouth of Darby creek, within the power of the
British. Early in the morning, after his orders for this purpose had
been given (December 22d), Howe marched out in full force and encamped
between Darby and the middle ferry, so as completely to cover the
islands while a foraging party removed the hay. Washington, with the
intention of disturbing this operation, gave orders for putting his army
in motion, when the alarming fact was disclosed that the commissary's
stores were exhausted and that the last ration had been delivered and
consumed.
Accustomed as were the Continental troops to privations of every
sort, it would have been hazarding too much to move them under these
circumstances against a powerful enemy. In a desert or in a garrison
where food is unattainable, courage, patriotism, and habits of
discipline enable the soldier to conquer wants which, in ordinary
situations, would be deemed invincible. But to perish in a country
abounding with provisions requires something more than fortitude; nor
can soldiers readily submit while in such a country to the deprivation
of food. It is not, therefore, surprising that among a few of the troops
some indications of a mutiny appeared. It is much more astonishing that
the great body of the army bore a circumstance so irritating, and to
them so unaccountable, without a murmur.
On receiving intelligence of the fact, Washington ordered the country to
be scoured and provisions for supplying the pressing wants of the moment
to be seized wherever found. In the meantime light parties were detached
to harass the enemy about Darby, where Howe, with his accustomed
circumspection, kept his army so compact and his soldiers so within the
lines that an opportunity to annoy him was seldom afforded even to the
vigilance of Morgan and Lee. After completing his forage he returned,
with inconsiderable loss, to Philadelphia.
That the American army, while the value still retained by paper bills
placed ample funds in the hands of government, should be destitute
of food in the midst of a State so abounding with provisions as
Pennsylvania, is one of those extraordinary facts which cannot fail
to excite attention. A few words of explanation seem to be needed
to account for such a fact. Early in the war the office of
commissary-general had been conferred on Colonel Trumbull, of
Connecticut, a gentleman well fitted for that important station. Yet,
from the difficulty of arranging so complicated a department, complaints
were repeatedly made of the insufficiency of supplies. The subject
was taken up by Congress, but the remedy administered served only to
increase the disease. The system was not completed till near midsummer,
and then its arrangements were such that Colonel Trumbull refused
the office assigned to him. The new plan contemplated a number of
subordinate officers, all to be appointed by Congress, and neither
accountable to nor removable by the head of the department. This
arrangement, which was made in direct opposition to the opinion of the
Commander-in-Chief, drove Colonel Trumbull from the army. Congress,
however, persisted in the system, and its effects were not long in
unfolding themselves. In every military division of the continent loud
complaints were made of the deficiency of supplies. The armies were
greatly embarrassed and their movements suspended by the want of
provisions. The present total failure of all supply was preceded by
issuing meat unfit to be eaten. Representations on this subject had been
made to the Commander-in-Chief and communicated to Congress. That body
had authorized him to seize provisions for the use of his army within
seventy miles of headquarters and to pay for them in money or in
certificates. The odium of this measure was increased by the failure
of government to provide funds to take up these certificates when
presented. At the same time the provisions carried into Philadelphia
were paid for in specie at a fair price. The temptation was too great
to be resisted. Such was the dexterity employed by the inhabitants
in eluding the laws that notwithstanding the vigilance of the troops
stationed on the lines they often succeeded in concealing their
provisions from those authorized to impress for the army and in
conveying them to Philadelphia. Washington, urged on by Congress, issued
a proclamation requiring all the farmers within seventy miles of Valley
Forge to thresh out one-half of their grain by the 1st of February and
the rest by the 1st of March, under the penalty of having the whole
seized as straw. Many farmers refused, defended their grain and cattle
with muskets and rifle, and, in some instances, burnt what they could
not defend.
It would seem that Washington had a sufficiently heavy burden upon his
shoulders in the harassing cares and anxieties of his position, and that
he might have been spared from trials of another sort to which he was
exposed at this time, but Washington experienced what every great and
good man must expect to meet with in an envious and malicious world.
Thus far, apparently, little else than ill-success had attended the
military exploits of the Commander-in-Chief. He had been compelled to
retreat continually before a powerful enemy. New York and Philadelphia
had been lost, and there was almost nothing of a brilliant or striking
character in what had transpired during the war under Washington's
immediate direction. On the other hand, the victory at Saratoga had
thrown a lustre around Gates' name which far outshone for the time the
solid and enduring light of Washington's noble and patriotic devotion
to his country. It was the first great victory of the war and it was a
victory which necessarily had a most important effect upon the future
prospects of the United States. No wonder, then, that restless and
envious men should make invidious comparisons between the hero of
Saratoga and the Commander-in-Chief. No wonder that Washington should
suffer from detraction and the intrigues of dissatisfied and scheming
men, to whom his unsullied virtue, purity, and integrity were invincible
obstacles to every design of theirs to promote selfish or ambitious
ends.
A direct and systematic attempt was made to ruin the reputation of
Washington, and from the name of the person principally concerned this
attempt is known by the title of Conway's Cabal. General Gates and
General Mifflin of the army and Samuel Adams and others in Congress had
more or less to do with this matter. Gates and Mifflin had taken offense
at not receiving certain appointments during the siege of Boston, and
were at no time well disposed toward Washington; Conway, a restless,
boastful, and intriguing character, had always been distrusted by
Washington, and he knew it. Some of the New England members do not
seem ever to have cordially liked Washington's appointment as
Commander-in-Chief, and now, when the capture of Burgoyne had been
effected by the northern army without the intervention of Washington the
malcontents ventured to assume a bolder attitude. Anonymous letters were
freely circulated, attributing the ill-success of the American arms
to the incapacity or vacillating policy of Washington and filled with
insinuations and exaggerated complaints against the Commander-in-Chief.
[1]
Washington was not unaware of what his enemies were attempting, but it
was not till after the victory of Saratoga that the matter assumed a
definite shape. The success of the northern army, which in fact was
chiefly due to Schuyler, so elated Gates that he seemed to adopt the
views of those other members of the cabal who were disposed to favor his
aspirations to the office of commander-in-chief. He even ventured to do
what few men ever dared, to treat Washington with disrespect. After the
victory of the 7th of October (1777) had opened to him the prospect of
subduing the army of Burgoyne, he not only omitted to communicate his
success to Washington, but carried on a correspondence with Conway, in
which that officer expressed great contempt for the Commander-in-Chief.
When the purport of this correspondence, which had been divulged by
Wilkinson to Lord Stirling, became known to Washington, he exploded the
whole affair by sending the offensive expressions directly to Conway,
who communicated the information to Gates. [1] Gates demanded the name
of the informer in a letter to Washington, far from being conciliatory
in its terms, which was accompanied with the very extraordinary
circumstance of being passed through Congress. Washington's answer
completely humbled him.
It pointed out the inconsistencies and contradictions of Gates' defense
and showed him that Washington had penetrated his whole scheme and
regarded it with lofty contempt. In a subsequent letter Gates besought
him to bury the subject in oblivion.
Meantime, Washington's enemies in Congress were bold and active. A new
Board of War was created, of which Gates was appointed the president,
and Mifflin, who was of the party unfriendly to Washington, was one of
its members. Conway, who was probably the only brigadier in the army
that had joined this faction, was appointed Inspector-general and was
promoted above senior brigadiers to the rank of major-general. These
were evidences that if the hold which the Commander-in-Chief had
taken of the affections and confidence of the army and nation could be
loosened, the party in Congress disposed to change their general was far
from being contemptible in point of numbers. But to loosen this hold
was impossible. The indignation with which the idea of such a change was
received, even by the victorious troops who had conquered under Gates,
forms the most conclusive proof of its strength. Even the northern army
clung to Washington as the savior of his country.
These machinations to diminish the well-earned reputation of Washington
made no undue impression on his steady mind, nor did they change one of
his measures. His sensibilities seem to have been those of patriotism,
of apprehension for his country, rather than of wounded pride. [2]
His desire to remain at the head of the army seemed to flow from the
conviction that his retaining that station would be useful to his
country, rather than from the gratification his high rank might furnish
to ambition.
When he unbosomed himself to his private friends, the feelings and
sentiments he expressed were worthy of Washington. To Mr. Laurens, [3]
the President of Congress, and his private friend, who, in an unofficial
letter, had communicated an anonymous accusation made to him, as
President, containing heavy charges against the Commander-in-Chief, he
said. "I cannot sufficiently express the Obligation I feel toward you
for your friendship and politeness upon an occasion in which I am deeply
interested. I was not unapprised that a malignant faction had been for
some time forming to my prejudice, which, conscious as I am of having
ever done all in my power to answer the important purposes of the trusts
reposed in me, could not but give me some pain on a personal account;
but my chief concern arises from an apprehension of the dangerous
consequences which intestine dissensions may produce to the common
cause.
"As I have no other view than to promote the public good, and am
unambitious of honors not founded in the approbation of my country,
I would not desire in the least degree to suppress a free spirit of
inquiry into any part of my conduct that even faction itself may deem
reprehensible. The anonymous paper handed you exhibits many serious
charges and it is my wish that it may be submitted to Congress. This I
am the more inclined to as the suppression or concealment may possibly
involve you in embarrassment hereafter since it is uncertain how many or
who may be privy to the contents.
"My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They know the delicacy
of my situation and that motives of policy deprive me of the defense I
might otherwise make against their insidious attacks. They know I cannot
combat their insinuations, however injurious, without disclosing secrets
it is of the utmost moment to conceal. But why should I expect to be
free from censure, the unfailing lot of an elevated station? Merit and
talents which I cannot pretend to rival have ever been subject to it.
My heart tells me it has been my unremitted aim to do the best which
circumstances would permit. Yet I may have been very often mistaken
in my judgment of the means and may in many instances deserve the
imputation of error."
While Washington expressed himself in these modest terms to a personal
friend, he assumed a much bolder and higher tone to the dastardly
enemies who were continually thwarting his designs and injuring the
public service by their malignity and incapacity. These were public
enemies to be publicly arraigned. Seizing the occasion to which we have
already referred, when the army was unable to march against the enemy
for want of provisions, he sent to the President of Congress the
following letter which, of course, like the rest of his correspondence,
was to be read to the whole house. It is severer than any he had ever
written: "Full as I was in my representation of the matters in the
commissary's department yesterday, fresh and more powerful reasons
oblige me to add that I am now convinced beyond a doubt that unless some
great and capital change suddenly takes place in that line this army
must inevitably be reduced to one or other of these three things--to
starve, dissolve, or disperse in order to obtain subsistence. Rest
assured, sir, that this is not an exaggerated picture, and that I have
abundant reason to suppose what I say.
"Saturday afternoon receiving information that the enemy in force had
left the city and were advancing toward Darby with apparent design to
forage and draw subsistence from that part of the country, I ordered
the troops to be in readiness that I might give every opposition in
my power, when, to my great mortification, I was not only informed
but convinced that the men were unable to stir on account of a want
of provisions, and that a dangerous mutiny begun the night before, and
which with difficulty was suppressed by the spirited exertions of some
officers, was still much to be apprehended from the want this article.
"This brought forth the only commissary in the purchasing line in this
camp and with him this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had not
a single hoof of any kind to slaughter and not more than twenty-five
barrels of flour! From hence form an opinion of our situation when I add
that he could not tell when to expect any.
"All I could do under these circumstances was to send out a few light
parties to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other parties were
instantly detached different ways to collect, if possible, as much
provisions as would satisfy the pressing wants of the soldiers; but will
this answer? No, sir. Three or four days of bad weather would prove our
destruction. What then is to become of the army this winter? And if we
are now as often without provisions as with them what is to become of us
in the spring when our force will be collected, with the aid perhaps of
militia, to take advantage of an early campaign before the enemy can be
reinforced? These are considerations of great magnitude, meriting the
closest attention, and will, when my own reputation is so intimately
connected with and to be affected by the event, justify my saying that
the present commissaries are by no means equal to the execution of the
office, or that the disaffection of the people surpasses all belief. The
misfortune, however, does in my opinion proceed from both causes, and
though I have been tender heretofore of giving my opinion or of lodging
complaints, as the change in that department took place contrary to my
judgment and the consequences thereof were predicted, yet finding that
the inactivity of the army, whether for want of provisions, clothes, or
other essentials is charged to my account, not only by the common vulgar
but by those in power, it is time to speak plain in exculpation of
myself. With truth then I can declare that no man, in my opinion, ever
had his measures more impeded than I have by every department of
the army. Since the month of July we have had no assistance from the
Quartermaster-General, and to want of assistance from this department
the Commissary-General charges great part of his deficiency. To this I
am to add that notwithstanding it is a standing order (often repeated)
that the troops shall always have two days' provision by them, that they
may be ready at any sudden call, yet scarcely any opportunity has
ever offered of taking advantage of the enemy that has not been either
totally obstructed or greatly impeded on this account, and this, the
great and crying evil, is not all. Soap, vinegar, and other articles
allowed by Congress we see none of, nor have we seen them, I believe,
since the battle of Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have little
occasion for--few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety
of one, and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof of
the little benefit from a clothier-general, and at the same time as a
further proof of the inability of an army under the circumstances of
this to perform the common duties of soldiers, we have, by a field
return this day made, besides a number of men confined to hospitals for
want of shoes and others in farmers' houses on the same account, no less
than 2,898 men now in camp unfit for duty because they are barefoot and
otherwise naked. By the same return it appears that our whole strength
in Continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have joined
us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive of the Maryland
troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to no more than 8,200 in camp fit for
duty; notwithstanding which, and that since the 4th inst., our number
fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have undergone,
particularly from the want of blankets, have decreased near 2,000 men,
we find, gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going
into winter quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution of mine would
warrant the remonstrance), reprobating the measure as much as if
they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally
insensible to frost and snow; and, moreover, as if they conceived it
easily practicable for an inferior army, under the disadvantages I have
described ours to be--which are by no means exaggerated--to confine a
superior one, in all respects well appointed and provided for a winter's
campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depredation
and waste the States of Pennsylvania, Jersey, etc. But what makes this
matter still more extraordinary in my eye is that these very gentlemen,
who were well apprised of the nakedness of the troops from ocular
demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than others and
advised me near a month ago to postpone the execution of a plan I was
about to adopt, in consequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing
clothes, under strong assurances that an ample supply would be collected
in ten days, agreeably to a decree of the State (not one article of
which, by the by, is yet come to hand), should think a winter's campaign
and the covering of their States from the invasion of an enemy so easy
and practicable a business. I can assure those gentlemen that it is
a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a
comfortable room, by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill,
and sleep under frost and snow without clothes or blankets. However,
although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed
soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and from my soul pity those
miseries which it is not in my power either to relieve or to prevent."
This letter must have convinced Washington's implacable enemies in
Congress that he had no thoughts of conciliating them. He despised
and defied them. Its effect on those who were friendly to him would
necessarily be inspiriting. His bold attitude justified their reliance
on his moral courage and enabled them to demand the enactment of those
measures which were necessary for the preservation of the army and the
successful assertion of the country's independence.
It is probable that this letter gave the finishing stroke to the Conway
Cabal. While Gates and Mifflin denied that they had ever desired or
aimed at Washington's removal from the office of Commander-in-Chief
and sought to recover his confidence, Conway himself, who was still
inspector-general, after denying any design to remove Washington, still
maintained an offensive attitude toward him, wrote impertinent letters
to him, and persisted in intriguing against him with Congress. But he
found himself foiled in all his ambitious and factious designs, and he
had become excessively unpopular in the army. He felt at last that he
was in a false position; we shall presently see how his career in this
country terminated.
Washington's conduct through the whole period of the Conway Cabal, which
lasted several months, is highly characteristic of the man. While he
regarded it with contempt, so far as he was personally concerned, he
felt annoyed and distressed at the injury which it was inflicting on the
public service. When the moment was come for unmasking the conspirators,
by informing Conway that he was aware of their designs, he applied the
match which was to explode the whole plot and cover its originators with
shame and confusion. This he did in a quiet, business-like way because
the public service required it. Congress, having committed itself by
promoting his enemies, could not at once retract, but the officers
themselves made haste to escape from public indignation by denials and
apologies, and the final effect of the Conway Cabal was to establish
Washington more firmly than ever in the confidence and affection of the
whole country. [4]
His situation, however, was by no means enviable. His army was much
attached to him, but weakened by disease, and irritated by nakedness and
hunger, it was almost on the point of dissolution. In the midst of
the difficulties and dangers with which he was surrounded Washington
displayed a singular degree of steady perseverance, unshaken fortitude,
and unwearied activity. Instead of manifesting irritable impatience
under the malignant attacks made on his character he behaved with
magnanimity, and earnestly applied to Congress and to the legislative
bodies of the several States for reinforcements to his army in order
that he might be prepared to act with vigor in the ensuing campaign.
But to recruit and equip the army was no easy task. The great
depreciation of paper money rendered the pay of the soldiers inadequate
to their support, and consequently it was not likely that voluntary
enlistment would be successful, especially since the patriotic ardor of
many had begun to cool by the continuance of the war, and all knew that
great hardships and dangers were to be encountered by joining the army.
The pay even of the officers, in the depreciated paper currency, was
wholly unequal to the maintenance of their rank. Some of them who had
small patrimonial estates found them melting away, while their lives
were unprofitably devoted to the service of their country, and they
who had no private fortune could not appear in a manner becoming their
station. A commission was a burden, and many considered the acceptance
of one as conferring rather than receiving a favor--a state of things
highly disadvantageous to the service, for the duties of an office
scarcely reckoned worth holding will seldom be zealously and actively
discharged. There was reason to apprehend that many of the most
meritorious officers would resign their commissions, and that they only
who were less qualified for service would remain with the army.
Congress, moved by the remonstrances of Washington, and by the
complaints with which they were assailed from every quarter, deputed
a committee of their body to reside in camp during the winter, and in
concert with the general to examine the state of the army and report on
the measures necessary to be taken for placing it in a more respectable
condition. The members of this committee were Francis Dana, General
Reed, Nathaniel Folsom, Charles Carroll, and Governeur Morris. On their
arrival at Valley Forge Washington submitted to them a memoir, filling
fifty folio pages, exhibiting the existing state of the army, the
deficiencies and disorders, and their causes, and suggesting such
reforms as he deemed necessary. Upon this document the plan for
improving the efficiency of the army was formed and communicated to
Congress by the committee, who remained in camp nearly three months.
Congress approved of their proceedings and adopted their plan, but they
legislated so slowly that the effect of their proceedings was hardly
felt before the month of April (1778).
Among the reforms recommended by the committee, called the "Committee
of Arrangement," who were sent to the camp, none met with so much
opposition in Congress as that which provided for increasing the pay
of the officers and soldiers of the army. Hitherto there had been no
provision made for officers after the war should end, and the pay which
they were actually receiving being in depreciated Continental bills was
merely nominal. To the effect of this state of things in the army we
have already adverted. It was most disastrous. Washington was desirous
that Congress should make provision for giving officers half pay for
life, or some other permanent provision, and increasing the inducements
for soldiers to enlist. A party in Congress opposed this as having the
appearance of a standing army, a pension list, and a privileged order in
society.
In a letter to Congress Washington said: "If my opinion is asked with
respect to the necessity of making this provision for the officers I am
ready to declare that I do most religiously believe the salvation of
the cause depends upon it, and without it your officers will moulder to
nothing, or be composed of low and illiterate men, void of capacity for
this or any other business.
"Personally, as an officer, I have no interest in their decision,
because I have declared, and I now repeat it, that I never will receive
the smallest benefit from the half-pay establishment, but as a man who
fights under the weight of a proscription, and as a citizen, who
wishes to see the liberty of his country established upon a permanent
foundation, and whose property depends upon the success of our arms,
I am deeply interested. But all this apart and justice out of the
question, upon the single ground of economy and public saving, I will
maintain the utility of it, for I have not the least doubt that until
officers consider their commissions in an honorable and interested point
of view, and are afraid to endanger them by negligence and inattention,
no order, regularity, or care either of the men or public property, will
prevail."
The following passages, from a letter addressed to a delegate in
Congress from Virginia, exhibit the view Washington took at the time of
public affairs and the spirit and eloquence with which he pleaded the
cause of the country and the army.
"Before I conclude there are one or two points more upon which I will
add an observation or two. The first is the indecision of Congress and
the delay used in coming to determinations on matters referred to
them. This is productive of a variety of inconveniences, and an early
decision, in many cases, though it should be against the measure
submitted, would be attended with less pernicious effects. Some new plan
might then be tried, but while the matter is held in suspense nothing
can be attempted. The other point is the jealousy which Congress
unhappily entertain of the army, and which, if reports are right, some
members labor to establish. You may be assured there is nothing more
injurious or more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon the commonly
received opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly true,
that standing armies are dangerous to a State. The prejudices in other
countries have only gone to them in time of peace, and these from their
not having in general cases any of the ties, the concerns, or interests
of citizens, or any other dependence than what flowed from their
military employ; in short, from their being mercenaries, hirelings. It
is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of war, though they
are citizens, having all the ties and interests of citizens, and in most
cases property totally unconnected with the military line.
"If we would pursue a right system of policy, in my opinion, there
should be none of these distinctions. We should all, Congress and army,
be considered as one people, embarked in one cause, in one interest,
acting on the same principle and to the same end. The distinction, the
jealousies set up, or perhaps only incautiously let out, can answer
not a single good purpose. They are impolitic in the extreme. Among
individuals the most certain way to make a man your enemy is to tell him
you esteem him such. So with public bodies, and the very jealousy which
the narrow politics of some may affect to entertain of the army, in
order to a due subordination to the supreme civil authority, is a likely
means to produce a contrary effect--to incline it to the pursuit of
those measures which they may wish it to avoid. It is unjust because no
order of men in the thirteen States has paid a more sacred regard to
the proceedings of Congress than the army, for without arrogance or the
smallest deviation from truth it may be said that no history now extant
can furnish an instance of an army's suffering such uncommon hardships
as ours has done, and bearing them with the same patience and fortitude.
To see men without clothes to cover their nakedness, without blankets
to lie on, without shoes (for the want of which their marches might
be traced by the blood from their feet), and almost as often without
provisions as with them, marching through the frost and snow, and at
Christmas taking up their winter quarters within a day's march of the
enemy, without a house or hut to cover them till they could be built,
and submitting without a murmur, is a proof of patience and obedience
which in my opinion can scarcely be paralleled."
Such representations as these could not fail to produce some effect even
on the minds of those who were opposed to the measures which Washington
proposed. Still the action of Congress was, as usual, dilatory. After a
great deal of discussion a vote was passed by a small majority to give
the officers half pay for life. This vote was reconsidered, and it was
finally agreed that the officers should receive half pay for seven years
after the close of the war, or that each noncommissioned officer and
soldier, who should continue in the army till the close of the war,
should receive a bounty of $80.
We have anticipated the order of time in order to dispose finally of
this matter which was not terminated till the spring of 1778.
During the winter Howe confined his operations to those small excursions
that were calculated to enlarge the comforts of his own soldiers, who,
notwithstanding the favorable dispositions of the neighboring country,
were much distressed for fuel and often in great want of forage and
fresh provisions. The vigilance of the parties on the lines, especially
on the south side of the Schuylkill, intercepted a large portion of the
supplies intended for the Philadelphia market, and corporal punishment
was frequently inflicted on those who were detected in attempting this
infraction of the laws. As Capt. Henry Lee, called in the army "Light
Horse Harry," was particularly active, a plan was formed late in January
to surprise and capture him in his quarters. An extensive circuit was
made by a large body of cavalry who seized four of his patrols without
communicating an alarm. About break of day the British horse appeared,
upon which Captain Lee placed his troopers that were in the house at the
doors and windows, who behaved so gallantly as to repulse the assailants
without losing a horse or man. Only Lieutenant Lindsay and one private
were wounded. The whole number in the house did not exceed ten. That of
the assailants was said to amount to 200. They lost a sergeant and three
men, with several horses killed, and an officer and three men wounded.
The result of this skirmish gave great pleasure to Washington who had
formed a high opinion of Lee's talents as a partisan. He mentioned the
affair in his orders with strong marks of approbation, and in a private
letter to the captain testified the satisfaction he felt. For his merit
through the preceding campaign Congress promoted him to the rank of
major and gave him an independent partisan corps, to consist of three
troops of horse.
While the deficiency of the public resources, arising from the alarming
depreciation of the bills of credit, manifested itself in all the
military departments, a plan was matured in Congress and in the Board of
War, without consulting the Commander-in-Chief, for a second irruption
into Canada. It was proposed to place the Marquis de Lafayette at the
head of this expedition and to employ Generals Conway and Stark as the
second and third in command.
This was a measure planned by those who were not friendly to Washington;
and one of its objects was to detach Lafayette from his best and dearest
friend and bring him over to the Conway party. Lafayette would have
declined the appointment, but Washington advised him to accept it,
probably foreseeing how the affair would terminate.
The first intimation to Washington that the expedition was contemplated
was given in a letter from the President of the Board of War of the
24th of January (1778), enclosing one of the same date to the Marquis,
requiring his attendance on Congress to receive his instructions.
Washington was requested to furnish Colonel Hazen's regiment, chiefly
composed of Canadians, for the expedition, and in the same letter his
advice and opinion were asked respecting it. The northern States were to
furnish the necessary troops.
Without noticing the manner in which this business had been conducted
and the marked want of confidence it betrayed, Washington ordered
Hazen's regiment to march toward Albany, and Lafayette proceeded
immediately to the seat of Congress at Yorktown. At his request he was
to be considered as an officer detached from the army of Washington, to
remain under his orders, and Major-General the Baron de Kalb was added
to the expedition; after which Lafayette repaired in person to Albany to
take charge of the troops who were to assemble at that place in order to
cross the lakes on the ice and attack Montreal.
On arriving at Albany he found no preparations made for the expedition.
Nothing which had been promised being in readiness, he abandoned
the enterprise as impracticable. Some time afterward Congress also
determined to relinquish it, and Washington was authorized to recall
both Lafayette and De Kalb.
While the army lay at Valley Forge the Baron Steuben arrived in camp.
This gentleman was a Prussian officer who came to the United States with
ample recommendations. He had served many years in the armies of the
great Frederick, had been one his aides-de-camp, and had held the
rank of lieutenant-general. He was well versed in the system of field
exercise which the King of Prussia had introduced, and was qualified to
each it to raw troops. He claimed no rank and offered his services as
a volunteer. After holding a conference with Congress he proceeded to
Valley Forge.
Although the office of inspector-general had been bestowed on Conway,
he had never entered on its duties, and his promotion to the rank of
major-general had given much umbrage to the brigadiers who had been his
seniors. That circumstance, in addition to the knowledge of his being in
a faction hostile to the Commander-in-Chief, rendered his situation in
the army so uncomfortable that he withdrew to Yorktown, in Pennsylvania,
which was then the seat of Congress. When the expedition to Canada was
abandoned he was not directed, with Lafayette and De Kalb, to rejoin the
army. Entertaining no hope of being permitted to exercise the functions
of his new office, he resigned his commission about the last of April
and, some time afterward, returned to France. [6]
On his resignation the Baron Steuben, who had, as a volunteer, performed
the duties of inspector-general much to the satisfaction of the
Commander-in-Chief and of the army, was, on the recommendation of
Washington, appointed to that office, with the rank of major-general,
without exciting the slightest murmur.
This gentleman was of immense service to the American troops. He
established one uniform system of field exercise, and, by his skill and
persevering industry, effected important improvements through all ranks
of the army during its continuance at Valley Forge.
While it was encamped at that place several matters of great interest
engaged the attention of Congress. Among them was the stipulation in the
convention of Saratoga for the return of the British army to England.
Boston was named as the place of embarkation. At the time of the
capitulation the difficulty of making that port early in the winter
was unknown to General Burgoyne. Consequently, as some time must elapse
before a sufficient number of vessels for the transportation of his army
could be collected, its embarkation might be delayed until the ensuing
spring.
On being apprised of this circumstance, Burgoyne applied to Washington,
desiring him to change the port of embarkation and to appoint Newport,
in Rhode Island, or some other place on the Sound instead of Boston,
and, in case this request should not be complied with, soliciting, on
account of his health and private business, that the indulgence might
be granted to himself and suite. Washington, not thinking himself
authorized to decide on such an application, transmitted it to Congress,
which took no notice of the matter further than to pass a resolution
"That General Washington be directed to inform General Burgoyne that
Congress will not receive or consider any proposition for indulgence
or altering the terms of the convention of Saratoga, unless immediately
addressed to their own body." The application was accordingly made
to Congress, who readily complied with the request in so far as it
respected himself personally, but refused the indulgence to his troops,
and ultimately forbade their embarkation.
Congress watched with a jealous eye every movement of the convention
army and soon gave public indications of that jealousy. Early in
November they ordered General Heath, who commanded in Boston, "to take
the name, rank, former place of abode, and description of every person
comprehended in the convention of Saratoga, in order that, if afterward
found in arms against the United States, they might be punished
according to the law of nations." Burgoyne showed some reluctance to the
execution of this order, and his reluctance was imputed to no honorable
motives.
If the troops had been embarked in the Sound they might have reached
Britain early in the winter, where, without any breach of faith,
government might have employed them in garrison duty and been enabled to
send out a corresponding number of troops in time to take an active part
in the next campaign. But if the port of Boston were adhered to as the
place of embarkation, the convention troops could not, it was thought,
sail before the spring, and, consequently, could not be replaced by the
troops whose duties they might perform at home till late in the year
1778. This circumstance, perhaps, determined Congress to abide by Boston
as the port of embarkation, and in this their conduct was free from
blame. But, by the injuries mutually inflicted and suffered in the
course of the war, the minds of the contending parties were exasperated
and filled with suspicion and distrust of each other. Congress placed
no reliance on British faith and honor, and, on the subject under
consideration, gave clear evidence that on those points they were not
over-scrupulous themselves.
On arriving in Boston the British officers found their quarters
uncomfortable. This probably arose from the large number of persons to
be provided for and the scarcity of rooms, fuel, and provisions, arising
from the presence of the whole captured army. But the officers were much
dissatisfied, and, after a fruitless correspondence with Heath, Burgoyne
addressed himself to Gates and complained of the inconvenient quarters
assigned his officers as a breach of the articles of capitulation.
Congress was highly offended at the imputation and considered or
affected to consider the charge as made with a view to justify a
violation of the convention by his army as soon as they escaped from
captivity. A number of transports for carrying off the convention troops
was collected in the Sound sooner than was expected, but that number,
amounting only to twenty-six, the Americans thought insufficient for
transporting such a number of men to Britain in the winter season, and
inferred that the intention could only be to carry them to the Delaware
and incorporate them with Howe's army. They also alleged that a number
of cartouche-boxes and other accoutrements of war belonging to the
British army had not been delivered up, agreeably to the convention, and
argued that this violation on the part of the British released Congress
from its obligations to fulfill the terms of that compact.
On the 8th of January (1778), Congress resolved "to suspend the
embarkation of the army till a distinct and explicit ratification of the
convention of Saratoga shall be properly notified by the court of
Great Britain to Congress." Afterward the embarkation of the troops was
delayed or refused for various reasons, and that part of the convention
remained unfulfilled. The troops were long detained in Massachusetts;
they were afterward sent to the back parts of Virginia and none of them
were released but by exchange.
Mrs. Washington, as usual, visited her illustrious consort in his
quarters at Valley Forge during the winter. Writing from thence to a
friend in Boston, she says: "I came to this place some time about
the 1st of February (1778), where I found the General very well. The
General's apartment is very small; he has had a log cabin built to dine
in, which has made our quarters much more tolerable than they were at
first." To those American citizens who are now reaping the rich fruits
of Washington's toils and sufferings in his country's cause, these few
lines are very suggestive. One cannot help contrasting the luxurious
habitations of the present generation with that log hut of the Father of
his Country at Valley Forge, to which the addition of another log hut to
dine in was considered by his consort a very comfortable appendage. We
should remember these things.
The effect of the news of Burgoyne's surrender, which reached Europe in
the autumn of 1777, could not be otherwise than highly favorable to
the cause of American independence. Our envoys in France, Dr. Franklin,
Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee had long been soliciting an alliance with
France. But the cautious ministers of Louis XVI, although secretly
favoring our cause and permitting supplies to be forwarded by
Beaumarchais, and the prizes of our ships to be brought into their ports
and sold, had hitherto abstained from openly supporting us, lest our
arms should finally prove unsuccessful. But the surrender of a large
army to Gates and the firm attitude of Washington's army, besieging Howe
in Philadelphia, as they had previously besieged him in Boston, gave a
new turn to French policy and disposed the ministry of Louis to treat
for an alliance with the new republic.
On the other hand, the British court was in a state of utter
consternation. The war began to assume a more portentous aspect, and
the British ministry, unable to execute their original purpose, lowered
their tone and showed an inclination to treat with the Colonies on
any terms which did not imply their entire independence and complete
separation from the British empire. In order to terminate the quarrel
with America before the actual commencement of hostilities with France,
Lord North introduced two bills into the House of Commons. The first
declared that Parliament would impose no tax or duty whatever, payable
within any of the Colonies of North America, except only such duties as
it might be expedient to impose for the purposes of commerce, the net
produce of which should always be paid and applied to and for the use
of the Colonies in which the same shall be respectively levied, in like
manner as other duties collected under the authority of their respective
Legislatures are ordinarily paid and applied; the second authorized
the appointment of commissioners by the Crown, with power to treat with
either the constituted authorities or with individuals in America, but
that no stipulation entered into should have any effect till approved
in Parliament. It empowered the commissioners, however, to proclaim
a cessation of hostilities in any of the Colonies; to suspend the
operation of the Non-intercourse Act; also to suspend, during the
continuance of the act, so much of all or any of the acts of Parliament
which have passed since the 10th day of February, 1763, as relates to
the Colonies; to grant pardons to any number or description of persons,
and to appoint a governor in any Colony in which his Majesty had
heretofore exercised the power of making such appointment. The duration
of the act was limited to the 1st day of June, 1779.
These bills passed both Houses of Parliament, and as about the time of
their introduction ministry received information of the conclusion of
the treaty between France and the Colonies, they sent off copies of them
to America, even before they had gone through the usual formalities, in
order to counteract the effects which the news of the French alliance
might produce. Early in March, the Earl of Carlisle, George Johnstone,
and William Eden, Esqs., were appointed commissioners for carrying
the acts into execution, and the celebrated Dr. Adam Ferguson, then
professor of moral philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, was
nominated their secretary. The commissioners sailed without delay for
America. But the present measure, like every other concession in the
course of this protracted contest, came too late. What was now offered
would at one time have been hailed in America with acclamations of joy
and secured the grateful affection of the Colonists. But circumstances
were now changed. The minds of the people were completely alienated from
the parent state and their spirits exasperated by the events of the war.
Independence had been declared, victory had emblazoned the standards of
Congress, and a treaty of alliance with France had been concluded.
On the 16th of December (1777) the preliminaries of a treaty between
France and America were agreed on, and the treaty itself was signed
at Paris on the 6th of February, 1778--an event of which the British
ministry got information in little more than forty-eight hours after the
signatures were affixed. The principal articles of the treaty were: That
if Britain, in consequence of the alliance, should commence hostilities
against France, the two countries should mutually assist each other;
that the independence of America should be effectually maintained; that
if any part of North America still professing allegiance to the Crown of
Britain should be reduced by the Colonies it should belong to the United
States; that if France should conquer any of the British West India
Islands they should be deemed its property; that the contracting parties
should not lay down their arms till the independence of America was
formally acknowledged, and that neither of them should conclude a peace
without the consent of the other.
Lord North's conciliatory bills reached America before the news of the
French treaty and excited in Congress considerable alarm. There were a
number of Loyalists in each of the Colonies; many, though not unfriendly
to the American cause, had never entered cordially into the quarrel, and
the heavy pressure of the war had begun to cool the zeal and exhaust
the patience of some who had once been forward in their opposition to
Britain. Congress became apprehensive lest a disposition should prevail
to accept of the terms proposed by the British government, and the great
body of the people be willing to resign the advantages of independence,
in order to escape from present calamity.
The bills were referred to a committee, which, after an acute and
severe examination, gave in a report well calculated to counteract the
effects which it was apprehended the terms offered would produce on the
minds of the timid and wavering. They reported as their opinion that it
was the aim of those bills to create divisions in the States; and "that
they were the sequel of that insidious plan, which, from the days of
the Stamp Act down to the present time, hath involved this country in
contention and bloodshed; and that, as in other cases, so in this,
although circumstances may at times force them to recede from their
unjustifiable claims, there can be no doubt but they will, as
heretofore, upon the first favorable occasion, again display that lust
of domination which hath rent in twain the mighty empire of Britain.”
They further reported it as their opinion that any men or body of men
who should presume to make any separate or partial convention or
agreement with commissioners under the Crown of Great Britain should be
considered and treated as open and avowed enemies of the United States.
The committee further gave it as their opinion that the United States
could not hold any conference with the British commissioners unless
Britain first withdrew her fleets and armies, or in positive and
express terms acknowledged the independence of the States.
While these things were going on, Mr. Silas Deane arrived from Paris
with the important and gratifying information that treaties of alliance
and commerce had been concluded between France and the United States.
This intelligence diffused a lively joy throughout America and was
received by the people as the harbinger of their independence. The
alliance had been long expected, and the delays thrown in the way of
its accomplishment had excited many uneasy apprehensions. But these
were now dissipated, and, to the fond imaginations of the people, all
the prospects of the United States appeared gilded with the cheering
beams of prosperity.
Writing to the President of Congress on this occasion (May 4, 1778),
Washington says: “Last night at 11 o’clock I was honored with your
dispatches of the 3d. The contents afford me the most sensible
pleasure. Mr. Silas Deane had informed me by a line from Bethlehem that
he was the bearer of the articles of alliance between France and the
States. I shall defer celebrating this happy event in a suitable manner
until I have liberty from Congress to announce it publicly. I will only
say that the army are anxious to manifest their joy upon the occasion.”
On the 7th of May the great event referred to in the preceding extract
was celebrated by the army at Valley Forge with the highest enthusiasm.
The following general orders were issued by Washington on the day
before:
“It having pleased the Almighty Ruler of the universe to defend the
cause of the United American States, and finally to raise us up a
powerful friend among the princes of the earth, to establish our
liberty and independency upon a lasting foundation, it becomes us to
set apart a day for gratefully acknowledging the Divine goodness and
celebrating the important event, which we owe to his Divine
interposition. The several brigades are to be assembled for this
purpose at 9 o’clock to-morrow morning, when their chaplains will
communicate the intelligence contained in the postscript of the
‘Pennsylvania Gazette’ of the 2d instant, and offer up thanksgiving and
deliver a discourse suitable to the occasion. At half after 10 o’clock
a cannon will be fired, which is to be a signal for the men to be under
arms; the brigade inspectors will then inspect their dress and arms and
form the battalions according to the instructions given them, and
announce to the commanding officers of the brigade that the battalions
are formed.
“The commanders of brigades will then appoint the field officers to the
battalions, after which each battalion will be ordered to load and
ground their arms. At half-past 11 a second cannon will be fired as a
signal for the march, upon which the several brigades will begin their
march by wheeling to the right by platoons and proceed by the nearest
way to the left of their ground by the new position; this will be
pointed out by the brigade inspectors. A third signal will then be
given, on which there will be a discharge of thirteen cannon, after
which a running fire of the infantry will begin on the right of
Woodford’s and continue throughout the front line; it will then be
taken upon the left of the second line and continue to the right. Upon
a signal given, the whole army will huzza, ‘Long live the King of
France!’ The artillery then begins again and fires thirteen rounds;
this will be succeeded by a second general discharge of the musketry in
a running fire, and huzza, ‘Long live the friendly European Powers!’
The last discharge of thirteen pieces of artillery will be given,
followed by a general running fire and huzza, ‘The American States!’ ”
An officer who was present describes the scene as follows: “Last
Wednesday was set apart as a day of general rejoicing, when we had a
_feu de joie_ conducted with the greatest order and regularity. The
army made a most brilliant appearance, after which his Excellency dined
in public, with all the officers of his army, attended with a band of
music. I never was present where there was such unfeigned and perfect
joy as was discovered in every countenance. The entertainment was
concluded with a number of patriotic toasts, attended with huzzas. When
the General took his leave there was a universal clap, with loud
huzzas, which continued till he had proceeded a quarter of a mile,
during which time there were a thousand hats tossed in the air. His
Excellency turned round with his retinue and huzzaed several times.”
Dr. Thacher, in his “Military Journal,” mentions the presence of
“Washington’s lady and suite, Lord Stirling and the Countess of
Stirling, with other general officers and ladies,” at this fête. Our
readers, after passing with us through the dismal scenes of the
preceding winter, will readily sympathize with the army in the feelings
attending this celebration. It is worthy of special notice that in his
general order Washington was careful to give the religious feature of
the scene a prominent place by distinctly acknowledging the Divine
interposition in favor of the country. This was his invariable habit on
all occasions. Religion with him was not merely an opinion, a creed, or
a sentiment. It was a deep-rooted, all-pervading feeling, governing his
life and imparting earnestness, dignity, and power to all his actions.
Hence the reverence and affection which was the voluntary homage of all
who knew him.
Lord North’s conciliatory bills, as we have seen, were not acceptable
to Congress. Washington’s views in relation to them are given in the
following letter, written to a member of that body two days after he
had learned the terms proposed by the British government:
“Nothing short of independence, it appears to me, can possibly do. A
peace on other terms would, if I may be allowed the expression, be a
peace of war. The injuries we have received from the British nation
were so unprovoked, and have been so great and so many, that they can
never be forgotten. Besides the feuds, the jealousies, the animosities
that would ever attend a union with them; besides the importance, the
advantages, which we should derive from an unrestricted commerce, our
fidelity as a people, our gratitude, our character as men, are opposed
to a coalition with them but in case of the last extremity. Were we
easily to accede to terms of dependence, no nation, upon future
occasions, let the oppression of Britain be ever so flagrant and
unjust, would interpose for our relief, or, at most, they would do it
with a cautious reluctance and upon conditions most probably that would
be hard, if not dishonorable, to us.”
Congress fully agreed in these views and rejected the advances of the
British government, refusing all terms of accommodation which did not
begin with the withdrawal of the British fleets and armies and the
acknowledgment of American independence. At the same time the bills
were published, together with the action of Congress on the subject,
and dispersed throughout the country. This decisive stand was taken
before it was known that a treaty had been concluded with France.
The British commissioners, Carlisle, Johnstone, and Eden, charged with
negotiating and reconciliation on the basis of Lord North's bills, did
not arrive until (June, 1778) six weeks after drafts of the bills had
been published by Governor Tryon and rejected by Congress. On their
arrival at New York, Sir Henry Clinton, who had succeeded Howe as
Commander-in-Chief, requested a passport for Dr. Ferguson, the secretary
of the commissioners, to proceed to Yorktown and lay certain papers
before Congress.
Washington, not deeming the matter within his province, declined until
he could have the instruction of Congress, who sustained him in refusing
the passport. The commissioners, impatient of delay, sent on the papers
through the ordinary medium of a flag, addressed to the President of
Congress.
The commissioners offered in their letter to consent to an immediate
cessation of hostilities by sea and land; to agree that no military
force should be kept up in the Colonies without the consent of Congress,
and also both to give up the right of taxation and to provide for a
representation in Parliament. They promised to sustain and finally pay
off the paper money then in circulation. Every inducement short of the
recognition of independence was held out to lead the Colonists to return
to their allegiance. But if, when relying upon their own strength alone,
they had refused to listen to such overtures, they were not likely to
do so now that they were assured of the support of France. By order
of Congress the President of that body wrote as follows to the
commissioners: "I have received the letter from your Excellencies, dated
the 9th instant, with the enclosures, and laid them before Congress.
Nothing but an earnest desire to spare the further effusion of human
blood could have induced them to read a paper containing expressions so
disrespectful to his Most Christian Majesty, the good and great ally of
these States, or to consider propositions so derogatory to the honor
of an independent nation. The acts of the British Parliament, the
commission from your sovereign, and your letter suppose the people
of these States to be subjects of the Crown of Great Britain and are
founded on the idea of dependence, which is utterly inadmissible. I am
further directed to inform your Excellencies that Congress are inclined
to peace, notwithstanding the unjust claims from which this war
originated, and the savage manner in which it hath been conducted. They
will, therefore, be ready to enter upon the consideration of a treaty
of peace and commerce not inconsistent with treaties already subsisting,
when the King of Great Britain shall demonstrate a sincere disposition
for that purpose. The only solid proof of this disposition will be an
explicit acknowledgment of these States or the withdrawing his fleets
and armies."
The British commissioners remained several months in the country and
made many and various attempts to accomplish the objects of their
mission, but without success.
They were compelled to return to England baffled and disappointed.
Thus the Americans, as an eloquent historian suggests, steady in their
resolutions, chose rather to trust to their own fortune, which they had
already proved, and to the hope they placed in that of France, than to
link themselves anew to the tottering destiny of England; abandoning all
idea of peace, war became the sole object of their solicitude. Such
was the issue of the attempts to effect an accommodation and thus were
extinguished the hopes which the negotiation had given birth to in
England. It was the misfortune of England to be governed by ministers
who were never willing to do justice until they were compelled by main
force. Their present concessions, as on all previous occasions, came too
late.
We have had frequent occasion to notice the embarrassments and
mortifications to which Washington was subjected by the interference of
Congress in those executive matters which should have been left entirely
under his own control. This was particularly injurious to the public
service in their conduct with respect to the treatment and exchange
of prisoners. Much correspondence on this subject took place between
Washington and Howe during the winter when the army was at Valley Forge,
and whenever the generals were on the eve of arranging an exchange
Congress would interfere and prevent it. Washington had been compelled,
by his sense of justice and humanity, to censure Howe for his treatment
of American prisoners. An order hastily given out by the Board of War
exposed Washington himself, without any fault of his own, to a similar
censure from Howe. The circumstances, as related by Marshall, were
these:
"General Washington had consented that a quartermaster, with a small
escort, should come out of Philadelphia, with clothes and other comforts
for the prisoners who were in possession of the United States. He had
expressly stipulated for their security, and had given them a passport.
While they were traveling through the country, information was given to
the Board of War that General Howe had refused to permit provisions
to be sent in to the American prisoners in Philadelphia by water. This
information was not correct. General Howe had only requested that flags
should not be sent up or down the river without previous permission
obtained from himself. On this information, however, the board ordered
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith immediately to seize the officers, though
protected by the passport of Washington, their horses, carriages, and
the provisions destined for the relief to the British prisoners, and
to secure them until further orders, either from the Board or from the
Commander-in-Chief.
"Washington, on hearing this circumstance, dispatched one of his aids
with orders for the immediate release of the persons and property which
had been confined; but the officers refused to proceed on their journey,
and returned to Philadelphia. [10]
"This untoward event was much regretted by Washington. In a letter
received some time afterwards, Howe, after expressing his willingness
that the American prisoners should be visited by deputy commissaries,
who should inspect their situation and supply their wants, required,
as the condition on which this indulgence should be granted, 'that a
similar permit should be allowed to persons appointed by him, which
should be accompanied with the assurance of General Washington, that
his authority will have sufficient weight to prevent any interruption
to their progress, and any insult to their persons.' This demand was
ascribed to the treatment to which officers under the protection of his
passport had already been exposed.
"Washington lamented the impediment to the exchange of prisoners,
which had hitherto appeared to be insuperable, and made repeated but
ineffectual efforts to remove it. Howe had uniformly refused to proceed
with any cartel unless his right to claim for all the diseased and
infirm, whom he had liberated, should be previously admitted.
"At length, after all hope of inducing him to recede from that high
ground had been abandoned, he suddenly relinquished it of his own
accord, and acceded completely to the proposition of Washington for the
meeting of commissioners, in order to settle equitably the number to
which he should be entitled for those he had discharged in the
preceding winter. This point being adjusted, commissioners were mutually
appointed, who were to meet on the 10th of March (1778), at Germantown,
to arrange the details of a general cartel.
"Washington had entertained no doubt of his authority to enter into this
agreement. On the 4th of March, however, he had the mortification to
perceive in a newspaper a resolution of Congress, calling on the several
States for the amounts of supplies furnished the prisoners, that they
might be adjusted according to the rule of the 10th of December, before
the exchange should take place.
"On seeing this embarrassing resolution, Washington addressed a letter
to Howe, informing him that particular circumstances had rendered
it inconvenient for the American commissioners to attend at the time
appointed, and requesting that their meeting should be deferred from
the 10th to the 21st of March. The interval was employed in obtaining a
repeal of the resolution.
"It would seem probable that the dispositions of Congress, on the
subject of an exchange, did not correspond with those of Washington.
From the fundamental principle of the military establishment of the
United States at its commencement, an exchange of prisoners would
necessarily strengthen the British much more than the American army. The
war having been carried on by troops raised for short times, aided by
militia, the American prisoners, when exchanged, returned to their homes
as citizens, while those of the enemy again took the field.
"Washington, who was governed by a policy more just, and more
permanently beneficial, addressed himself seriously to Congress, urging
as well the injury done the public faith and his own personal honor, by
this infraction of a solemn engagement, as the cruelty and impolicy of
a system which must cut off forever all hopes of an exchange, and render
imprisonment as lasting as the war. He represented in strong terms
the effect such a measure must have on the troops on whom they should
thereafter be compelled chiefly to rely, and its impression on the
friends of those already in captivity. These remonstrances produced the
desired effect, and the resolutions were repealed. The commissioners met
according to the second appointment; but, on examining their powers, it
appeared that those given by Washington were expressed to be in virtue
of the authority vested in him, while those given by Howe contained no
such declaration. This omission produced an objection on the part of
Congress; but Howe refused to change the language, alleging that he
designed the treaty to be of a personal nature, founded on the mutual
confidence and honor of the contracting generals, and had no intention
either to bind his government or to extend the cartel beyond the limits
and duration of his own command.
"This explanation being unsatisfactory to the American commissioners,
and Howe persisting in his refusal to make the required alteration in
his powers, the negotiation was broken off, and this fair prospect of
terminating the distresses of the prisoners on both sides passed away
without effecting the good it had promised.
"Some time after the failure of this negotiation for a general cartel,
Howe proposed that all prisoners actually exchangeable should be sent
into the nearest posts, and returns made of officer for officer of equal
rank, and soldier for soldier, as far as numbers would admit; and that
if a surplus of officers should remain, they should be exchanged for an
equivalent in privates.
"On the representations of Washington, Congress acceded to this
proposition so far as related to the exchange of officer for officer and
soldier for soldier, but rejected the part which admitted an equivalent
in privates for a surplus of officers, because the officers captured
with Burgoyne were exchangeable within the powers of Howe. Under this
agreement an exchange took place to a considerable extent; but as the
Americans had lost more prisoners than they had taken, unless the army
of Burgoyne should be brought into computation, many of their troops
were still detained in captivity."
The British army held possession of Philadelphia during the winter and
the following spring; but they were watched and checked during the whole
time by the Americans. They were not quite so closely besieged as in
Boston, but they were quite as effectually prevented from accomplishing
any military purpose. They sent out occasional foraging parties, who
were fiercely attacked by Washington's detachments, and almost always
purchased their supplies with blood. But Howe never made an attack on
Washington's camp. Doctor Franklin, when he heard in Paris that General
Howe had taken Philadelphia, corrected his informant very justly.
"Say, rather," said the acute philosopher, "that Philadelphia has taken
General Howe." The capture of Philadelphia, as we have already
taken occasion to remark, was perfectly useless--in fact, worse than
useless--to the British arms. It only provided winter quarters to an
army which would have been more comfortable and secure in New York;
and it held them beleaguered at a remote point when their services were
greatly needed to aid Burgoyne and save his army from capture. In point
of fact, Philadelphia did take Howe; and Washington kept him out of the
way and fully employed until Burgoyne had fallen, and by his fall had
paved the way to the French alliance and to the ruin of the British
cause in America.
1. Footnote: The cool contempt expressed in Washington's letter to
Conway is one of the most curious features of this affair. It reads as
follows: "To Brigadier-General Conway: Sir--A letter which I received
last night contained the following paragraph: 'In a letter from General
Conway to General Gates, he says, "Heaven has determined to save your
country, or a weak general and bad counsellors would have ruined it."'
"I am, sir, your humble servant."
2. Footnote: Marshall
3. Footnote: John Hancock, who succeeded Peyton Randolph as president of
Congress, retired on the 29th of October, 1777. His successor was Henry
Laurens, of South Carolina.
4. Footnote: The correspondence relating to the Conway Cabal is given
entire in the Appendix to the fifth volume of Sparks' "Writings of
Washington." It is very curious and interesting. Among other letters are
anonymous ones addressed to Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia, and to
Mr. Laurens, President of Congress, full of slanders against Washington.
5. Footnote: Previous to this affair, Captain Lee, in his frequent
skirmishes with the enemy, had already captured at least a hundred of
their men.
6. Footnote: General Conway, after his resignation, frequently indulged
in expressions of extreme hostility to the Commander-in-Chief.
These indiscretions were offensive to the gentlemen of the army. In
consequence of them, he was engaged in an altercation with General
Caldwalader, which produced a duel, in which Conway received a wound
supposed for some time to be mortal. While his recovery was despaired
of, he addressed the following letter to General Washington:
PHILADELPHIA, July 23d, 1778.
SIR--I find myself just able to hold the pen during a few minutes, and
take this opportunity of expressing my sincere grief for having done,
written, or said, any thing disagreeable to your excellency. My career
will soon be over; therefore, justice and truth prompt me to declare my
last sentiments. You are, in my eyes, the great and good man. May you
long enjoy the love, veneration, and esteem of these States, whose
liberties you have asserted by your virtues. I am, with the greatest
respect, sir,
Your excellency's most obedient humble servant, THS. CONWAY.
7. Footnote: Gordon says: "May 13, 1778. General Burgoyne landed at
Portsmouth. On his arrival at London, he soon discovered that he was no
longer an object of court favor. He was refused admission to the royal
presence; and from thence experienced all those marks of being in
disgrace, which are so well understood, and so quickly observed by the
retainers and followers of courts."
8. Footnote: As early as the month of April, 1776, Turgot had said to
the ministers of Louis XVI--"The supposition of the absolute separation
between Great Britain and her Colonies seems to me infinitely probable.
This will be the result of it; when the independence of the Colonies
shall be entire and recognized by the English themselves, a total
revolution will follow in the political and commercial relations between
Europe and America; and I firmly believe that every other mother-country
will be forced to abandon all empire over her Colonies, and to leave
an entire freedom of commerce with all nations, to content herself
with partaking with others in the advantages of a free trade, and with
preserving the old ties of friendship and fraternity with her former
colonists. If this is an evil, I believe that there exists no remedy or
means of hindering it; that the only course to pursue is to submit to
the inevitable necessity, and console ourselves as best we may under it.
I must also observe, that there will be a very great danger to all such
powers as obstinately attempt to resist this course of events; that
after ruining themselves by efforts above their means, they will still
see their Colonies equally escape from them, and become their bitter
enemies, instead of remaining their allies." Mémoire de M. Turgot, à
l'occasion du Mémoire remis par M. le Compte de Vergennes sur la manière
dont la France at l'Espagne doivent envisager les suites de la querelle
entre la Grande Bretagne et ses Colonies. In "Politique de tous les
Cabinets de l'Europe pendant les Règnes to Louis XV. et de Louis XVI."
Par L.P. Segue l'ainé.
9. Footnote: The commissioners published their final manifesto and
proclamation to the Americans on the 3d of October, and on the 10th.
Congress issued a cautionary declaration in reply. No overtures were
made to the commissioners from any quarter, and not long after they
embarked for England. Thacher, in his "Military Journal," states
that "Governor Johnstone, one of the commissioners, with inexcusable
effrontery, offered a bribe to Mr. Reed, a member of Congress. In
an interview with Mrs. Ferguson at Philadelphia, whose husband was a
Royalist, he desired she would mention to Mr. Reed, that if he would
engage his interest to promote the object of their commission, he might
have any office in the Colonies in the gift of his Britannic majesty,
and ten thousand pounds in hand. Having solicited an interview with Mr.
Reed, Mrs. Ferguson made her communication. Spurning the idea of being
purchased, he replied that he was not worth purchasing, but such as he
was, the King of Great Britain was not rich enough to do it."
10. Footnote: They alleged that their horses had been disabled, and the
clothing embezzled.