WASHINGTON HOLDS HOWE IN CHECK. 1777.
Washington seems to have been by no means disheartened at the loss of
Philadelphia. On the contrary he justly regarded the circumstance of the
enemy holding that city as one which might, as in the sequel it actually
did, turn to the advantage of the American cause. Writing to General
Trumbull on the 1st of October (1777), he says: "You will hear, before
this gets to hand, that the enemy have at length gained possession of
Philadelphia. Many unavoidable difficulties and unlucky accidents which
we had to encounter helped to promote this success. This is an event
which we have reason to wish had not happened, and which will be
attended with several ill consequences, but I hope it will not be so
detrimental as many apprehend, and that a little time and perseverance
will give us some favorable opportunity of recovering our loss, and of
putting our affairs in a more flourishing condition. Our army has now
had the rest and refreshment it stood in need of, and our soldiers are
in very good spirits."
Philadelphia being lost Washington sought to make its occupation
inconvenient and insecure by rendering it inaccessible to the British
fleet. With this design works had been erected on a low, marshy island
in the Delaware, near the junction of the Schuylkill, which, from the
nature of its soil, was called Mud Island. On the opposite shore of
Jersey, at Red Bank, a fort had also been constructed which was defended
with heavy artillery. In the deep channel between, or under cover of
these batteries, several ranges of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been sunk.
These were so strong and heavy as to be destructive of any ship which
might strike against them, and were sunk in such a depth of water as
rendered it equally difficult to weigh them or cut them through; no
attempt to raise them, or to open the channel in any manner, could
be successful until the command of the shores on both sides should be
obtained.
Other ranges of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been sunk about three miles
lower down the river, and some considerable works were in progress at
Billingsport on the Jersey side, which were in such forwardness as to be
provided with artillery. These works were further supported by several
galleys mounting heavy cannon, together with two floating batteries, a
number of armed vessels, and some fire ships.
The present relative situation of the armies gave a decisive importance
to these works. Cutting off the communication of Howe with his brother's
fleet, they prevented his receiving supplies by water. While the
American vessels in the river above Fort Mifflin, the name given to
the fort on Mud Island, rendered it difficult to forage in Jersey,
Washington hoped to render his supplies on the side of Pennsylvania so
precarious as to compel him to evacuate Philadelphia.
The advantages of this situation were considerably diminished by the
capture of the Delaware frigate.
The day after Cornwallis entered Philadelphia three batteries were
commenced for the purpose of acting against any American ships which
might appear before the town. While yet incomplete they were attacked
by two frigates, assisted by several galleys and gondolas. The Delaware,
being left by the tide while engaged with the battery, grounded and was
captured, soon after which the smaller frigate and the other vessels
retired under the guns of the fort. This circumstance was the more
unfortunate as it gave the British general the command of the ferry,
and consequently free access to Jersey, and enabled him to intercept the
communication between the forts below and Trenton, from which place the
garrisons were to have drawn their military stores.
All the expected reinforcements, except the State regiment and militia
from Virginia, being arrived, and the detached parties being called in,
the effective strength of the army amounted to 8,000 Continental troops
and 3,000 militia. With this force Washington determined to approach the
enemy and seize the first favorable moment to attack him. In pursuance
of this determination the army took a position on the Skippack road,
September 30th (1777), about twenty miles from Philadelphia and sixteen
from Germantown--a village stretching on both sides the great road
leading northward from Philadelphia, which forms one continued street
nearly two miles in length. The British line of encampment crossed
this village at right angles near the center, and Cornwallis, with four
regiments of grenadiers, occupied Philadelphia. The immediate object of
General Howe being the removal of the obstructions in the river, Colonel
Stirling, with two regiments, had been detached to take possession of
the fort at Billingsport, which he accomplished without opposition.
This service being effected, and the works facing the water destroyed,
Colonel Stirling was directed to escort a convoy of provisions from
Chester to Philadelphia. Some apprehensions being entertained for the
safety of this convoy, another regiment was detached from Germantown,
with directions to join Colonel Stirling.
This division of the British force appeared to Washington to furnish a
fair opportunity to engage Sir William Howe with advantage. Determining
to avail himself of it, he formed a plan for surprising the camp at
Germantown. This plan consisted, in its general outline, of a night
march and double attack, consentaneously made, on both flanks of the
enemy's right wing, while a demonstration, or attack, as circumstances
should render proper, was to be directed on the western flank of his
left wing. With these orders and objects the American army began its
march from Skippack creek at 7 o'clock in the evening of the 3d of
October (1777), in two columns--the right, under Sullivan and Wayne,
taking the Chestnut Hill road, followed by Stirling's division in
reserve; the left, composed of the divisions of Greene and Stephen,
with M'Dougal's brigade and 1,400 Maryland and Jersey militia taking
the Limekiln and old York roads, while Armstrong's Pennsylvania militia
advanced by the Ridge road. Washington accompanied the right wing, and
at dawn of day, next morning, attacked the royal army. After a smart
conflict he drove in the advance guard, which was stationed at the head
of the village, and with his army divided into five columns prosecuted
the attack, but Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave, of the Fortieth regiment,
which had been driven in, and who had been able to keep five companies
of the regiment together, threw himself into a large stone house in the
village, belonging to Mr. Chew, which stood in front of the main column
of the Americans, and there almost a half of Washington's army was
detained for a considerable time. Instead of masking Chew's house with
a sufficient force and advancing rapidly with their main body, the
Americans attacked the house, which was obstinately defended. The delay
was very unfortunate, for the critical moment was lost in fruitless
attempts on the house; the royal troops had time to get under arms and
be in readiness to resist or attack, as circumstances required. General
Grey came to the assistance of Colonel Musgrave; the engagement for some
time was general and warm; at length the Americans began to give way and
effected a retreat with all their artillery. The morning was very foggy,
a circumstance which had prevented the Americans from combining and
conducting their operations as they otherwise might have done, but which
now favored their retreat by concealing their movements.
In this engagement the British had 600 men killed or wounded; among
the slain were Brigadier-General Agnew and Colonel Bird, officers of
distinguished reputation. The Americans lost an equal number in killed
and wounded, besides 400 who were taken prisoners. General Nash, of
North Carolina, was among those who were killed. After the battle
Washington returned to his encampment at Skippack creek.
The plan of attack formed by Washington for the battle of Germantown
was fully justified by the result. The British camp was completely
surprised, and their army was on the point of being entirely routed,
when the continued fog led the American soldiers to mistake friends
for foes, and caused a panic which threw everything into confusion and
enabled the enemy to rally.
Washington, writing to his brother John Augustine, says: "If it had not
been for a thick fog, which rendered it so dark at times that we were
not able to distinguish friend from foe at the distance of thirty yards,
we should, I believe, have made a decisive and glorious day of it. But
Providence designed it otherwise, for, after we had driven the enemy a
mile or two, after they were in the utmost confusion and flying before
us in most places, after we were upon the point, as it appeared to
everybody, of grasping a complete victory, our own troops took fright
and fled with precipitation and disorder. How to account for this I know
not, unless, as I before observed, the fog represented their own friends
to them for a reinforcement of the enemy, as we attacked in different
quarters at the same time, and were about closing the wings of our army
when this happened. One thing, indeed, contributed not a little to our
misfortune, and that was a want of ammunition on the right wing, which
began the engagement, and in the course of two hours and forty minutes,
which time it lasted, had, many of them, expended the forty rounds that
they took into the field. After the engagement we removed to a place
about twenty miles from the enemy to collect our forces together, to
take care of our wounded, get furnished with necessaries again, and be
in a better posture either for offensive or defensive operations. We are
now advancing toward the enemy again, being at this time within twelve
miles of them."
Writing to the President of Congress (October 7, 1777) he still imputes
the disaster to the fog: "It is with much chagrin and mortification I
add that every account confirms the opinion I at first entertained, that
our troops retreated at the instant when victory was declaring herself
in our favor. The tumult, disorder, and even despair, which, it seems,
had taken place in the British army, were scarcely to be paralleled; and
it is said, so strongly did the idea of a retreat prevail, that Chester
was fixed on as their rendezvous. I can discover no other cause for
not improving this happy opportunity, than the extreme haziness of the
weather."
Much controversy has arisen among writers as to the cause of failure
at Germantown, but Washington's means of observation were certainly
not inferior to those of any other person whatever, and in the above
extracts the whole matter is clearly explained. He does not refer to
the delay at Chew's house as the cause of failure. Panic struck as the
British were, they would have been defeated, notwithstanding the delay
at that impromptu fortress, if the fog had not occasioned the American
soldiers to believe that the firing on their own side proceeded from the
enemy, and that they were about to be surrounded. Hence the recoil and
retreat. It was apparently a great misfortune, but it was the destiny
of Washington to achieve greatness in spite of severe and repeated
misfortunes.
The same opinion respecting the fog is expressed in the following
extract from a letter from General Sullivan to the President of New
Hampshire: "We brought off all our cannon and all our wounded. Our loss
in the action amounts to less than 700, mostly wounded. We lost some
valuable officers, among whom were the brave General Nash, and my two
aides-de-camp, Majors Sherburne and White, whose singular bravery must
ever do honor to their memories. Our army rendezvoused at Paulen's
Mills, and seems very desirous of another action. The misfortunes of
this day were principally owing to a thick fog which, being rendered
still more so by the smoke of the cannon and musketry, prevented our
troops from discovering the motions of the enemy, or acting in concert
with each other. I cannot help observing that with great concern I saw
our brave commander exposing himself to the hottest fire of the enemy in
such a manner that regard for my country obliged me to ride to him and
beg him to retire. He, to gratify me and some others, withdrew a small
distance, but his anxiety for the fate of the day soon brought him up
again, where he remained till our troops had retreated."
Congress unanimously adopted the following resolution on hearing of the
battle of Germantown:
"_Resolved,_ That the thanks of Congress be given to General Washington,
for his wise and well-concerted attack upon the enemy's army near
Germantown, on the 4th instant, and to the officers and soldiers of the
army for their brave exertions on that occasion; Congress being well
satisfied, that the best designs and boldest efforts may sometimes fail
by unforeseen incidents, trusting that, on future occasions, the valor
and virtue of the army will, by the blessing of Heaven, be crowned with
complete and deserved success."
The attention of both armies was now principally directed to the forts
below Philadelphia. These it was the great object of Howe to destroy,
and of Washington to defend and maintain.
The loss of the Delaware frigate, and of Billingsport, greatly
discouraged the seamen by whom the galleys and floating batteries
were manned. Believing the fate of America to be decided, an opinion
strengthened by the intelligence received from their connections in
Philadelphia, they manifested the most alarming defection, and several
officers as well as sailors deserted to the enemy. This desponding
temper was checked by the battle of Germantown, and by throwing a
garrison of Continental troops into the fort at Red Bank, called Fort
Mercer, the defense of which had been entrusted to militia. This fort
commanded the channel between the Jersey shore and Mud Island, and the
American vessels were secure under its guns. The militia of Jersey
were relied on to reinforce its garrison, and also to form a corps of
observation which might harass the rear of any detachment investing the
place.
To increase the inconvenience of Howe's situation by intercepting his
supplies Washington ordered 600 militia, commanded by General Potter,
to cross the Schuylkill and scour the country between that river and
Chester, and the militia on the Delaware, above Philadelphia, were
directed to watch the roads in that vicinity.
The more effectually to stop those who were seduced by the hope of gold
and silver to supply the enemy at this critical time, Congress passed a
resolution subjecting to martial law and to death all who should furnish
them with provisions, or certain other enumerated articles, who should
be taken within thirty miles of any city, town, or place in Jersey,
Pennsylvania, or Delaware, occupied by British troops.
These arrangements being made to cut off supplies from the country,
Washington took a strong position at White Marsh, within fourteen miles
of Philadelphia.
Meanwhile General Howe was actively preparing to attack Fort Mifflin
from the Pennsylvania shore. He erected some batteries at the mouth of
the Schuylkill, in order to command Webb's Ferry, which were attacked by
Commodore Hazlewood and silenced; but the following night a detachment
crossed over Webb's Ferry into Province Island, and constructed a slight
work opposite Fort Mifflin, within two musket shots of the blockhouse,
from which they were enabled to throw shot and shells into the barracks.
When daylight discovered this work three galleys and a floating battery
were ordered to attack it and the garrison surrendered. While the boats
were bringing off the prisoners, a large column of British troops
were seen marching into the fortress, upon which the attack on it
was renewed, but without success, and two attempts made by
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to storm it failed. [1]
In a few nights works were completed on the high ground of Province
Island, which enfiladed the principal battery of Fort Mifflin, and
rendered it necessary to throw up some cover on the platform to protect
the men who worked the guns.
The aid expected from the Jersey militia was not received. "Assure
yourself," said Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, in a letter pressing earnestly
for a reinforcement of Continental troops, "that no dependence is to be
put on the militia; whatever men your Excellency determines on sending,
no time is to be lost." The garrison of Fort Mifflin was now reduced to
156 effectives, and that of Red Bank did not much exceed 200.
In consequence of these representations Washington ordered Col.
Christopher Greene, of Rhode Island, with his regiment, to Red Bank,
and Lieut.-Col. John Greene, of Virginia, with about 200 men, to Fort
Mifflin.
Immediately after the battle of Brandywine Admiral Howe had sailed for
the Delaware, where he expected to arrive in time to meet and cooperate
with the army in and about Philadelphia. But the winds were so
unfavorable, and the navigation of the Bay of Delaware so difficult,
that his van did not get into the river until the 4th of October. The
ships of war and transports which followed came up from the 6th to the
8th, and anchored from New Castle to Reddy Island.
The frigates, in advance of the fleet, had not yet succeeded in
their endeavors to effect a passage through the lower double row
of _chevaux-de-frise_. Though no longer protected by the fort at
Billingsport, they were defended by the water force above, and the work
was found more difficult than had been expected. It was not until the
middle of October that the impediments were so far removed as to afford
a narrow and intricate passage through them. In the meantime the fire
from the Pennsylvania shore had not produced all the effect expected
from it, and it was perceived that greater exertions would be necessary
for the reduction of the works than could safely be made in the present
relative situation of the armies. Under this impression, General Howe,
soon after the return of the American army to its former camp on the
Skippack, withdrew his troops from Germantown into Philadelphia, as
preparatory to a combined attack by land and water on Forts Mercer and
Mifflin.
After effecting a passage through the works sunk in the river at
Billingsport, other difficulties still remained to be encountered by
the ships of war. Several rows of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been sunk about
half a mile below Mud Island, which were protected by the guns of the
forts, as well as by the movable water force. To silence these
works, therefore, was a necessary preliminary to the removal of these
obstructions in the channel.
On the 21st of October (1777) a detachment of Hessians, amounting
to 1,200 men, commanded by Col. Count Donop, crossed the Delaware
at Philadelphia with orders to storm Fort Mercer, at Red Bank. The
fortifications consisted of extensive outer works, within which was an
entrenchment eight or nine feet high, boarded and fraized. Late in the
evening of the 22d Count Donop appeared before the fort and attacked
it with great intrepidity. It was defended with equal resolution by
the brave garrison of Rhode Island Continentals, under command of Col.
Christopher Greene. The outer works being too extensive to be manned
by the troops in the fort, were used only to gall the assailants while
advancing. On their near approach the garrison retired within the
inner entrenchment, whence they poured upon the Hessians a heavy
and destructive fire. Colonel Donop received a mortal wound, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Mengerode, the second in command, fell about the same
time. [2]
Lieutenant-Colonel Linsing, the oldest remaining officer, drew off his
troops and returned next day to Philadelphia. The loss of the assailants
was estimated by the Americans at 400 men. The garrison was reinforced
from Fort Mifflin, and aided by the galleys which flanked the Hessians
in their advance and retreat. The American loss, in killed and wounded,
amounted to only thirty-two men.
The ships having been ordered to cooperate with Count Donop,
the Augusta, with four smaller vessels, passed the lower line of
_chevaux-de-frise_, opposite to Billingsport, and lay above it, waiting
until the assault should be made on the fort. The flood tide setting in
about the time the attack commenced they moved with it up the river.
The obstructions sunk in the Delaware had in some degree changed its
channel, in consequence of which the Augusta and the Merlin grounded a
considerable distance below the second line of _chevaux-de-frise_, and a
strong wind from the north so checked the rising of the tide that these
vessels could not be floated by the flood. Their situation, however, was
not discerned that evening, as the frigates which were able to approach
the fort, and the batteries from the Pennsylvania shore, kept up an
incessant fire on the garrison, till night put an end to the cannonade.
Early next morning it was recommenced in the hope that, under its
cover, the Augusta and the Merlin might be got off. The Americans, on
discovering their situation, sent four fire ships against them, but
without effect. Meanwhile a warm cannonade took place on both sides,
in the course of which the Augusta took fire, and it was found
impracticable to extinguish the flames. Most of the men were taken out,
the frigates withdrawn, and the Merlin set on fire, after which the
Augusta blew up, and a few of the crew were lost in her.
This repulse inspired Congress with flattering hopes for the permanent
defense of the posts on the Delaware. That body expressed its high sense
of the merits of Colonel Greene, of Rhode Island, who had commanded in
Fort Mercer; of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Maryland, who had commanded
in Fort Mifflin; and of Commodore Hazlewood, who commanded the galleys;
and presented a sword to each of these officers, as a mark of the
estimation in which their services were held.
The situation of these forts was far from justifying this confidence
of their being defensible. That on Mud Island had been unskillfully
constructed and required at least 800 men fully to man the lines. The
island is about half a mile long. Fort Mifflin was placed at the lower
end, having its principal fortifications in front for the purpose of
repelling ships coming up the river. The defenses in the rear consisted
only of a ditch and palisade, protected by two blockhouses, the upper
story of one of which had been destroyed in the late cannonade. Above
the fort were two batteries opposing those constructed by the British on
Province and Carpenter's Islands, which were separated from Mud Island
only by a narrow passage between 400 and 500 yards wide.
The garrison of Fort Mifflin consisted of only 300 Continental troops,
who were worn down with fatigue and incessant watching, under the
constant apprehension of being attacked from Province Island, from
Philadelphia, and from the ships below.
Having failed in every attempt to draw the militia of New Jersey to the
Delaware, Washington determined to strengthen the garrison by further
drafts from his army. Three hundred Pennsylvania militia were detached
to be divided between the two forts, and a few days afterward General
Varnum was ordered, with his brigade, to take a position above Woodbury,
near Red Bank, and to relieve and reinforce the garrisons of both
forts as far as his strength would permit. Washington hoped that the
appearance of so respectable a Continental force might encourage the
militia to assemble in greater numbers.
Aware of the advantage to result from a victory over the British army
while separated from the fleet, Washington had been uniformly determined
to risk much to gain one. He had, therefore, after the battle of
Germantown, continued to watch assiduously for an opportunity to attack
his enemy once more to advantage. The circumspect caution of General
Howe afforded none. After the repulse at Red Bank his measures were slow
but certain, and were calculated to insure the possession of the forts
without exposing his troops to the hazard of an assault.
In this state of things intelligence was received of the successful
termination of the northern campaign, in consequence of which great part
of the troops who had been employed against Burgoyne, might be drawn to
the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. But Washington had just grounds to
apprehend that before these reinforcements could arrive Howe would gain
possession of the forts and remove the obstructions to the navigation of
the Delaware. This apprehension furnished a strong motive for vigorous
attempts to relieve Fort Mifflin. But the relative force of the armies,
the difficulty of acting offensively against Philadelphia, and, above
all, the reflection that a defeat might disable him from meeting his
enemy in the field even after the arrival of the troops expected from
the north, determined Washington not to hazard a second attack under
existing circumstances.
To expedite the reinforcements for which he waited, Washington
dispatched Colonel Hamilton to General Gates, with directions to
represent to him the condition of the armies in Pennsylvania, and
to urge him, if he contemplated no other service of more importance,
immediately to send the regiments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to
aid the army of the middle department. These orders were not peremptory,
because it was possible that some other object (as the capture of New
York) still more interesting than the expulsion of General Howe from
Philadelphia might be contemplated by Gates; and Washington meant not to
interfere with the accomplishment of such object.
On reaching General Putnam, Colonel Hamilton found that a considerable
part of the northern army had joined that officer, but that Gates had
detained four brigades at Albany for an expedition intended to be made
in the winter against Ticonderoga. Having made such arrangements with
Putnam as he supposed would secure the immediate march of a large body
of Continental troops from that station, Colonel Hamilton proceeded
to Albany for the purpose of remonstrating with General Gates against
retaining so large and valuable a part of the army unemployed at a time
when the most imminent danger threatened the vitals of the country.
Gates was by no means disposed to part with his troops. He could not
believe that an expedition then preparing at New York was designed
to reinforce General Howe; and insisted that, should the troops then
embarked at that place, instead of proceeding to the Delaware, make a
sudden movement up the Hudson, it would be in their power, should Albany
be left defenseless, to destroy the valuable arsenal which had been
there erected, and the military stores captured with Burgoyne, which had
been chiefly deposited in that town.
Having, after repeated remonstrances, obtained an order directing three
brigades to the Delaware, Hamilton hastened back to Putnam and found the
troops which had been ordered to join Washington, still at Peekskill.
The detachment from New York had suggested to Putnam the possibility
of taking that place; and he does not appear to have made very great
exertions to divest himself of a force he deemed necessary for an
object, the accomplishment of which would give so much splendor to his
military character. In addition to this circumstance, an opinion had
gained ground among the soldiers that their share of service for the
campaign had been performed, and that it was time for them to go into
winter quarters. Great discontents, too, prevailed concerning their pay,
which the government had permitted to be more than six months in arrear;
and in Poor's brigade a mutiny broke out in the course of which a
soldier who was run through the body by his captain, shot the captain
dead before he expired. Colonel Hamilton came in time to borrow money
from the Governor, George Clinton, of New York, to put the troops
in motion; and they proceeded by brigades to the Delaware. But these
several delays retarded their arrival until the contest for the forts on
that river was terminated.
The preparations of Sir William Howe being completed, a large battery on
Province Island of twenty-four and thirty-two pounders and two howitzers
of eight inches each opened, early in the morning of the 10th of
November, upon Fort Mifflin, at the distance of 500 yards, and kept
up an incessant fire for several successive days. The blockhouses were
reduced to a heap of ruins; the palisades were beaten down, and most of
the guns dismounted and otherwise disabled. The barracks were battered
in every part, so that the troops could not remain in them. They were
under the necessity of working and watching the whole night to repair
the damages of the day, and to guard against a storm, of which they were
in perpetual apprehension. If, in the days, a few moments were allowed
for repose, it was taken on the wet earth, which, in consequence of
heavy rains, had become a soft mud. The garrison was relieved by General
Varnum every forty-eight hours, but his brigade was so weak that half
the men were constantly on duty.
Colonel Smith was decidedly of opinion, and General Varnum concurred
with him, that the garrison could not repel an assault, and ought to be
withdrawn; but Washington still cherished the hope that the place might
be maintained until he should be reinforced from the northern army.
Believing that an assault would not be attempted until the works were
battered down, he recommended that the whole night should be employed in
making repairs. His orders were that the place should be defended to the
last extremity; and never were orders more faithfully executed.
Several of the garrison were killed and among them Captain Treat, a
gallant officer, who commanded the artillery. Colonel Smith received a
contusion on his hip and arm which compelled him to give up the command
and retire to Red Bank. Major Fleury, a French officer of distinguished
merit, who served as engineer, reported to Washington that, although
the blockhouses were beaten down, all the guns in them, except two,
disabled, and several breaches made in the walls, the place was still
defensible; but the garrison was so unequal to the numbers required by
the extent of the lines, and was so dispirited by watching, fatigue, and
constant exposure to the cold rains, which were almost incessant, that
he dreaded the event of an attempt to carry the place by storm. Fresh
troops were ordered to their relief from Varnum's brigade, and the
command was taken, first by Colonel Russell, and afterward by Major
Thayer. The artillery, commanded by Captain Lee, continued to be well
served. The besiegers were several times thrown into confusion, and a
floating battery, which opened on the morning of the 14th, was silenced
in the course of the day.
The defense being unexpectedly obstinate, the assailants brought up
their ships (November 15, 1777) as far as the obstructions in the river
permitted and added their fire to that of the batteries, which was the
more fatal as the cover for the troops had been greatly impaired. The
brave garrison, however, still maintained their ground with unshaken
firmness. In the midst of this stubborn conflict, the Vigilant and a
sloop-of-war were brought up the inner channel, between Mud and Province
Islands, which had, unobserved by the besieged, been deepened by the
current in consequence of the obstructions in the main channel, and,
taking a station within 100 yards of the works, not only kept up a
destructive cannonade, but threw hand-grenades into them, while the
musketeers from the round-top of the Vigilant killed every man that
appeared on the platform.
Major Thayer applied to the Commodore to remove these vessels, and he
ordered six galleys on the service, but, after reconnoitering their
situation, the galleys returned without attempting anything. Their
report was that these ships were so covered by the batteries on Province
Island as to be unassailable.
It was now apparent to all that the fort could be no longer defended.
The works were in ruins. The position of the Vigilant rendered any
further continuance on the island a prodigal and useless waste of human
life; and on the 16th, about 11 at night, the garrison was withdrawn.
A second attempt was made to drive the vessels from their stations, with
a determination, should it succeed, to repossess the island, but the
galleys effected nothing, and a detachment from Province Island soon
occupied the ground which had been abandoned.
The day after, receiving intelligence of the evacuation of Fort Mifflin,
Washington deputed Generals De Kalb and Knox to confer with General
Varnum and the officers at Fort Mercer on the practicability of
continuing to defend the obstructions in the channel, to report thereon,
and to state the force which would be necessary for that purpose. Their
report was in favor of continuing the defense. A council of the navy
officers had already been called by the Commodore in pursuance of a
request of the Commander-in-Chief, made before the evacuation had taken
place, who were unanimously of opinion that it would be impracticable
for the fleet, after the loss of the island, to maintain its station or
to assist in preventing the _chevaux-de-frise_ from being weighed by the
ships of the enemy.
General Howe had now completed a line of defense from the Schuylkill to
the Delaware, and a reinforcement from New York had arrived at Chester.
These two circumstances enabled him to form an army in the Jerseys,
sufficient for the reduction of Fort Mercer, without weakening himself
so much in Philadelphia as to put his lines in hazard. Still, deeming
it of the utmost importance to open the navigation of the Delaware
completely, he detached Lord Cornwallis, about 1 in the morning of the
17th (1777), with a strong body of troops to Chester. From that place
his lordship crossed over to Billingsport, where he was joined by the
reinforcement from New York.
Washington received immediate intelligence of the march of this
detachment, which he communicated to General Varnum, with orders that
Fort Mercer should be defended to the last extremity. With a view to
military operations in that quarter he ordered one division of the
army to cross the river at Burlington, and dispatched expresses to the
northern troops who were marching on by brigades, directing them to move
down the Delaware on its northern side until they should receive further
orders.
General Greene was selected for this expedition. A hope was entertained
that he would be able not only to protect Fort Mercer, but to obtain
some decisive advantage over Lord Cornwallis, as the situation of
the fort, which his lordship could not invest without placing himself
between Timber and Manto creeks, would expose the assailants to great
peril from a respectable force in their rear. But, before Greene could
cross the Delaware, Cornwallis approached with an army rendered more
powerful than had been expected by the junction of the reinforcement
from New York, and Fort Mercer was evacuated. A few of the smaller
galleys escaped up the river, and the others were burnt by their crews.
Washington still hoped to recover much of what had been lost. A victory
would restore the Jersey shore, and this object was deemed so important
that General Greene's instructions indicated the expectation that he
would be in a condition to fight Cornwallis.
Greene feared the reproach of avoiding an action less than the just
censure of sacrificing the real interests of his country by engaging the
enemy on disadvantageous terms. The numbers of the British exceeded his,
even counting his militia as regulars, and he determined to wait for
Glover's brigade, which was marching from the north. Before its arrival,
Cornwallis took post on Gloucester point, a point of land making deep
into the Delaware, which was entirely under cover of the guns of the
ships, from which place he was embarking his baggage and the provisions
he had collected for Philadelphia.
Believing that Cornwallis would immediately follow the magazines he had
collected, and that the purpose of Howe was, with his united forces,
to attack the American army while divided, General Washington ordered
Greene to re-cross the Delaware and join the army.
Thus, after one continued struggle of more than six weeks, in which
the Continental troops displayed great military virtues, the army in
Philadelphia secured itself in the possession of that city by opening a
free communication with the fleet.
While Lord Cornwallis was in Jersey, and General Greene on the Delaware
above him, the reinforcements from the north being received, an attack
on Philadelphia was strongly pressed by several officers high in rank,
and was, in some measure, urged by that torrent of public opinion,
which, if not resisted by a very firm mind, overwhelms the judgment, and
by controlling measures not well comprehended may frequently produce,
especially in military transactions, the most disastrous effects. The
officers who advised this measure were Lord Stirling, Generals Wayne,
Scott, and Woodford. The considerations urged upon Washington in its
support were: That the army was now in greater force than he could
expect it to be at any future time; that being joined by the troops who
had conquered Burgoyne, his own reputation, the reputation of his army,
the opinion of Congress and of the nation required some decisive blow
on his part; and that the rapid depreciation of the paper currency,
by which the resources for carrying on the war were dried up, rendered
indispensable some grand effort to bring it to a speedy termination.
Washington reconnoitered the enemy's lines with great care and took into
serious consideration the plan of attack proposed. The plan proposed
was that General Greene should embark 2,000 men at Dunks' ferry, and
descending the Delaware in the night land in the town just before day,
attack the enemy in the rear, and take possession of the bridge over the
Schuylkill; that a strong corps should march down on the west side of
that river, occupy the heights enfilading the works of the enemy, and
open a brisk cannonade upon them, while a detachment from it should
march down to the bridge and attack in front at the same instant that
the party descending the river should commence its assault on the rear.
Not only the Commander-in-Chief, but some of his best officers--those
who could not be impelled by the clamors of the ill-informed to ruin the
public interests--were opposed to this mad enterprise. The two armies,
they said, were now nearly equal in point of numbers, and the detachment
under Lord Cornwallis could not be supposed to have so weakened Sir
William Howe as to compensate for the advantages of his position. His
right was covered by the Delaware, his left by the Schuylkill, his
rear by the junction of those two rivers, as well as by the city of
Philadelphia, and his front by a line of redoubts extending from river
to river and connected by an abatis and by circular works. It would be
indispensably necessary to carry all these redoubts, since to leave a
part of them to play on the rear of the columns while engaged in front
with the enemy in Philadelphia would be extremely hazardous. Supposing
the redoubts carried and the British army driven into the town, yet
all military men were agreed on the great peril of storming a town. The
streets would be defended by an artillery greatly superior to that of
the Americans, which would attack in front, while the brick houses
would be lined with musketeers, whose fire must thin the ranks of the
assailants.
A part of the plan, on the successful execution of which the whole
depended, was that the British rear should be surprised by the corps
descending the Delaware. This would require the concurrence of too many
favorable circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence. As the
position of General Greene was known, it could not be supposed that Sir
William Howe would be inattentive to him. It was probable that not even
his embarkation would be made unnoticed, but it was presuming a degree
of negligence which ought not to be assumed to suppose that he could
descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered. So soon as his movement
should be observed, the whole plan would be comprehended, since it would
never be conjectured that Greene was to attack singly.
If the attack in front should fail, which was not even improbable, the
total loss of the 2,000 men in the rear must follow, and General Howe
would maintain his superiority through the winter.
The situation did not require these desperate measures. The British
general would be compelled to risk a battle on equal terms or to
manifest a conscious inferiority to the American army. The depreciation
of paper money was the inevitable consequence of immense emissions
without corresponding taxes. It was by removing the cause, not by
sacrificing the army, that this evil was to be corrected.
Washington possessed too much discernment to be dazzled by the false
brilliant presented by those who urged the necessity of storming
Philadelphia in order to throw lustre round his own fame and that of
his army, and too much firmness of temper, too much virtue and real
patriotism to be diverted from a purpose believed to be right, by the
clamors of faction or the discontents of ignorance. Disregarding
the importunities of mistaken friends, the malignant insinuations of
enemies, and the expectations of the ill-informed, he persevered in his
resolution to make no attempt on Philadelphia. He saved his army and was
able to keep the field in the face of his enemy, while the clamor of the
moment wasted in air and was forgotten.
About this time Washington learnt, by a letter from General Greene, that
his young friend Lafayette, although hardly recovered from the wound
received at Brandywine, had signalized his spirit and courage by
an attack on Cornwallis' picket guard at Gloucester point, below
Philadelphia. "The Marquis," writes Greene, "with about 400 militia and
the rifle corps, attacked the enemy's picket last evening, killed about
20, wounded many more, and took about 20 prisoners. The Marquis is
charmed with the spirited behavior of the militia and rifle corps; they
drove the enemy about half a mile and kept the ground till dark. The
enemy's picket consisted of about 300 and were reinforced during the
skirmish. The Marquis is determined to be in the way of danger."
The following letter to Washington, cited by Sparks, contains
Lafayette's own account of this affair: "After having spent the most
part of the day in making myself well acquainted with the certainty of
the enemy's motions, I came pretty late into the Gloucester road between
the two creeks. I had 10 light horse, almost 150 riflemen, and 2 pickets
of militia. Colonel Armand, Colonel Laumoy, and the Chevaliers
Duplessis and Gimat were the Frenchmen with me. A scout of my men, under
Duplessis, went to ascertain how near to Gloucester were the enemy's
first pickets, and they found at the distance of two miles and a half
from that place a strong post of 350 Hessians, with field pieces, and
they engaged immediately. As my little reconnoitering party were all in
fine spirits I supported them. We pushed the Hessians more than half a
mile from the place where their main body had been and we made them run
very fast. British reinforcements came twice to them, but, very far
from recovering their ground, they always retreated. The darkness of the
night prevented us from pursuing our advantage. After standing on
the ground we had gained, I ordered them to return very slowly to
Haddonfield."
The Marquis had only one man killed and six wounded. "I take the
greatest pleasure," he added, "in letting you know that the conduct
of our soldiers was above all praise. I never saw men so merry, so
spirited, and so desirous to go on to the enemy, whatever force they
might have, as that same small party in this little fight."
Washington, in a letter to Congress dated November 26, 1777, mentions
this affair with commendation, and suggests, as he had repeatedly done
before, Lafayette's appointment to one of the vacant divisions of the
army, and on the same day that this letter was received Congress
voted that such an appointment would be agreeable to them. Three days
afterward Washington placed Lafayette in command of the division of
General Stephen, who had been dismissed from the army for having been
intoxicated, to the great injury of the public service, on the eventful
day of the battle of Germantown. We shall see that this appointment, by
enabling Lafayette to act occasionally on a separate command, afforded
him the opportunity of rendering essential service to the cause of
independence.
On the 27th of November (1777), the Board of War was increased
from three to five members, viz.: General Mifflin, formerly aide to
Washington and recently quartermaster-general; Joseph Trumbull, Richard
Peters, Col. Timothy Pickering, of Massachusetts, and General Gates.
Gates was appointed president of the board, with many flattering
expressions from Congress. His recent triumph over Burgoyne had gained
him many friends among the members of Congress and a few among the
officers of the army. His head, naturally not over-strong, had been
turned by success, and he entered into the views of a certain clique
which had recently been formed, whose object was to disparage Washington
and put forward rather high pretensions in favor of the "hero of
Saratoga." This clique, called from the name of its most active member,
General Conway, the "Conway Cabal," we shall notice hereafter. At the
time of this change in the constitution of the Board of War it was in
full activity, and its operations were well known to Washington. In
fact, he had already applied the match which ultimately exploded the
whole conspiracy and brought lasting disgrace on every one of its
members.
General Howe in the meantime was preparing to attack Washington in
his camp, and, as he confidently threatened, to "drive him beyond the
mountains."
On the 4th of December (1777), Captain M'Lane, a vigilant officer on the
lines, discovered that an attempt to surprise the American camp at
White Marsh was about to be made, and communicated the information to
Washington. In the evening of the same day General Howe marched out of
Philadelphia with his whole force, and about 11 at night, M'Lane, who
had been detached with 100 chosen men, attacked the British van at
the Three Mile Run on the Germantown road, and compelled their front
division to change its line of march. He hovered on the front and flank
of the advancing army, galling them severely until 3 next morning, when
the British encamped on Chestnut Hill in front of the American right,
and distant from it about three miles. A slight skirmish had also taken
place between the Pennsylvania militia, under General Irvine, and the
advanced light parties of the enemy, in which the general was wounded
and the militia without much other loss were dispersed.
The range of hills on which the British were posted approached nearer
to those occupied by the Americans as they stretched northward. Having
passed the day in reconnoitering the right Howe changed his ground in
the course of the night, and moving along the hills to his right took
an advantageous position about a mile in front of the American left.
The next day he inclined still further to his right, and in doing so
approached still nearer to the left wing of the American army. Supposing
a general engagement to be approaching Washington detached Gist, with
some Maryland militia, and Morgan, with his rifle corps, to attack the
flanking and advanced parties of the enemy. A sharp action ensued in
which Major Morris, of New Jersey, a brave officer in Morgan's regiment
was mortally wounded, and twenty-seven of his men were killed and
wounded. A small loss was also sustained in the militia. The parties
first attacked were driven in, but the enemy reinforcing in numbers and
Washington unwilling to move from the heights and engage on the ground
which was the scene of the skirmish, declining to reinforce Gist and
Morgan, they, in turn, were compelled to retreat.
Howe continued to maneuver toward the flank and in front of the left
wing of the American army. Expecting to be attacked in that quarter in
full force Washington made such changes in the disposition of his troops
as the occasion required, and the day was consumed in these movements.
In the course of it Washington rode through every brigade of his army,
delivering in person his orders respecting the manner of receiving the
enemy, exhorting his troops to rely principally on the bayonet, and
encouraging them by the steady firmness of his countenance, as well as
by his words, to a vigorous performance of their duty. The dispositions
of the evening indicated an intention to attack him the ensuing morning,
but in the afternoon of the 8th the British suddenly filed off from
their right, which extended beyond the American left, and retreated
to Philadelphia. The parties detached to harass their rear could not
overtake it. [3]
The loss of the British in this expedition, as stated in the official
letter of General Howe, rather exceeded 100 in killed, wounded, and
missing, and was sustained principally in the skirmish of the 7th
(December, 1777) in which Major Morris fell.
On no former occasion had the two armies met, uncovered by works, with
superior numbers on the side of the Americans. The effective force of
the British was then stated at 12,000 men. Stedman, the historian, who
then belonged to Howe's army, states its number to have been 14,000. The
American army consisted of precisely 12,161 Continental troops and
3,241 militia. This equality in point of numbers rendered it a prudent
precaution to maintain a superiority of position. As the two armies
occupied heights fronting each other neither could attack without giving
to its adversary some advantage in the ground, and this was an advantage
which neither seemed willing to relinquish.
The return of Howe to Philadelphia without bringing on an action after
marching out with the avowed intention of fighting is the best testimony
of the respect which he felt for the talents of his adversary and the
courage of the troops he was to encounter.
The cold was now becoming so intense that it was impossible for an army
neither well-clothed nor sufficiently supplied with blankets longer to
keep the field in tents. It had become necessary to place the troops
in winter quarters, but in the existing state of things the choice of
winter quarters was a subject for serious reflection. It was impossible
to place them in villages without uncovering the country or exposing
them to the hazard of being beaten in detachment.
To avoid these calamities it was determined to take a strong position
in the neighborhood of Philadelphia, equally distant from the Delaware
above and below that city, and there to construct huts in the form of
a regular encampment which might cover the army during the winter.
A strong piece of ground at Valley Forge, on the west side of the
Schuylkill between twenty and thirty miles from Philadelphia, was
selected for that purpose, and some time before day on the morning of
the 11th of December (1777) the army marched to take possession of it.
By an accidental concurrence of circumstances Lord Cornwallis had been
detached the same morning at the head of a strong corps on a foraging
party on the west side of the Schuylkill. He had fallen in with a
brigade of Pennsylvania militia commanded by General Potter which he
soon dispersed, and, pursuing the fugitives, had gained the heights
opposite Matron's ford, over which the Americans had thrown a bridge for
the purpose of crossing the river, and had posted troops to command the
defile called the Gulph just as the front division of the American army
reached the bank of the river. This movement had been made without any
knowledge of the intention of General Washington to change his position
or any design of contesting the passage of the Schuylkill, but the
troops had been posted in the manner already mentioned for the sole
purpose of covering the foraging party.
Washington apprehended from his first intelligence that General Howe had
taken the field in full force. He therefore recalled the troops already
on the west side and moved rather higher up the river for the purpose of
understanding the real situation, force, and designs of the enemy. The
next day Lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia, and in the course of
the night the American army crossed the river.
Here the Commander-in-Chief communicated to his army in general orders
the manner in which he intended to dispose of them during the winter.
He expressed in strong terms his approbation of their conduct, presented
them with an encouraging state of the future prospects of their
country, exhorted them to bear with continuing fortitude the hardships
inseparable from the position they were about to take, and endeavored to
convince their judgments that those hardships were not imposed on them
by unfeeling caprice, but were necessary for the good of their country.
The winter had set in with great severity, and the sufferings of
the army were extreme. In a few days, however, these sufferings were
considerably diminished by the erection of logged huts, filled up with
mortar, which, after being dried, formed comfortable habitations, and
gave content to men long unused to the conveniences of life. The order
of a regular encampment was observed, and the only appearance of winter
quarters was the substitution of huts for tents.
Stedman, who, as we have already remarked, was in Howe's army, has not
only given a vivid description of the condition of Washington's army,
which agrees in the main with those of our own writers, but he has also
exhibited in contrast the condition and conduct of the British army in
Philadelphia. We transcribe this instructive passage:
"The American general determined to remain during the winter in the
position which he then occupied at Valley Forge, recommending to his
troops to build huts in the woods for sheltering themselves from the
inclemency of the weather. And it is perhaps one of the most striking
traits in General Washington's character that he possessed the faculty
of gaining such an ascendancy over his raw and undisciplined followers,
most of whom were destitute of proper winter clothing and otherwise
unprovided with necessaries, as to be able to prevail upon so many of
them to remain with him during the winter in so distressing a situation.
With immense labor he raised wooden huts, covered with straw and earth,
which formed very uncomfortable quarters. On the east and south an
entrenchment was made--the ditch six feet wide and three in depth; the
mound not four feet high, very narrow, and such as might easily have
been beat down by cannon. Two redoubts were also begun but never
completed. The Schuylkill was on his left with a bridge across. His rear
was mostly covered by an impassable precipice formed by Valley creek,
having only a narrow passage near the Schuylkill. On the right his camp
was accessible with some difficulty, but the approach on his front was
on ground nearly on a level with his camp. It is indeed difficult to
give an adequate description of his misery in this situation. His army
was destitute of almost every necessary of clothing, nay, almost naked,
and very often on short allowance of provisions; an extreme mortality
raged in his hospitals, nor had he any of the most proper medicines to
relieve the sick. There were perpetual desertions of parties from him of
ten to fifty at a time. In three months he had not 4,000 men and these
could by no means be termed effective. Not less than 500 horses perished
from want and the severity of the season. He had often not three days'
provisions in his camp and at times not enough for one day. In this
infirm and dangerous state he continued from December to May, during all
which time every person expected that General Howe would have stormed
or besieged his camp, the situation of which equally invited either
attempt. To have posted 2,000 men on a commanding ground near the
bridge, on the north side of the Schuylkill, would have rendered
his escape on the left impossible; 2,000 men placed on a like ground
opposite the narrow pass would have as effectually prevented a retreat
by his rear, and five or six thousand men stationed on the front and
right of his camp would have deprived him of flight on those sides. The
positions were such that if any of the corps were attacked they could
have been instantly supported. Under such propitious circumstances what
mortal could doubt of success? But the British army, neglecting all
these opportunities, was suffered to continue at Philadelphia where the
whole winter was spent in dissipation. A want of discipline and proper
subordination pervaded the whole army, and if disease and sickness
thinned the American army encamped at Valley Forge, indolence and luxury
perhaps did no less injury to the British troops at Philadelphia. During
the winter a very unfortunate inattention was shown to the feelings of
the inhabitants of Philadelphia, whose satisfaction should have been
vigilantly consulted, both from gratitude and from interest. They
experienced many of the horrors of civil war. The soldiers insulted and
plundered them, and their houses were occupied as barracks without
any compensation being made to them. Some of the first families were
compelled to receive into their habitations individual officers who were
even indecent enough to introduce their mistresses into the mansions of
their hospitable entertainers. This soured the minds of the inhabitants,
many of whom were Quakers. But the residence of the army at Philadelphia
occasioned distresses which will probably be considered by the
generality of mankind as of a more grievous nature. It was with
difficulty that fuel could be got on any terms. Provisions were most
exorbitantly high. Gaming of every species was permitted and even
sanctioned. This vice not only debauched the mind, but by sedentary
confinement and the want of seasonable repose enervated the body. A
foreign officer held the bank at the game of faro by which he made a
very considerable fortune, and but too many respectable families in
Britain had to lament its baleful effects. Officers who might have
rendered honorable service to their country were compelled, by what was
termed a bad run of luck, to dispose of their commissions and return
penniless to their friends in Europe. The father who thought he had
made a provision for his son by purchasing him a commission in the army
ultimately found that he had put his son to school to learn the science
of gambling, not the art of war. Dissipation had spread through the
army, and indolence and want of subordination, its natural concomitants.
For if the officer be not vigilant the soldier will never be alert.
"Sir William Howe, from the manners and religious opinions of the
Philadelphians, should have been particularly cautious. For this public
dissoluteness of the troops could not but be regarded by such people
as a contempt of them, as well as an offense against piety; and it
influenced all the representations which they made to their countrymen
respecting the British. They inferred from it, also, that the commander
could not be sufficiently intent on the plans of either conciliation
or subjugation; so that the opinions of the Philadelphians, whether
erroneous or not, materially promoted the cause of Congress. During the
whole of this long winter of riot and dissipation, General Washington
was suffered to continue with the remains of his army, not exceeding
5,000 effective men at most, undisturbed at Valley Forge, considerable
arrears of pay due to them; almost in a state of nature for want of
clothing; the Europeans in the American service disgusted and deserting
in great numbers, and indeed in companies, to the British army, and the
natives tired of the war. Yet, under all these favorable circumstances
for the British interest, no one step was taken to dislodge Washington,
whose cannon were frozen up and could not be moved. If Sir William Howe
had marched out in the night he might have brought Washington to action,
or if he had retreated, he must have left his sick, cannon, ammunition,
and heavy baggage behind. A nocturnal attack on the Americans would
have had this further good effect: it would have depressed the spirit
of revolt, confirmed the wavering, and attached them to the British
interest. It would have opened a passage for supplies to the city,
which was in great want of provisions for the inhabitants. It would have
shaken off that lethargy in which the British soldiers had been immerged
during the winter. It would have convinced the well-affected that the
British leader was in earnest. If Washington had retreated the British
could have followed. With one of the best-appointed in every respect
and finest armies (consisting of at least 14,000 effective men) ever
assembled in any country, a number of officers of approved service,
wishing only to be led to action, this dilatory commander, Sir William
Howe, dragged out the winter without doing any one thing to obtain
the end for which he was commissioned. Proclamation was issued after
proclamation calling upon the people of America to repair to the British
standard, promising them remission of their political sins and an
assurance of protection in both person and property, but these promises
were confined merely to paper. The best personal security to the
inhabitants was an attack by the army, and the best security of property
was peace, and this to be purchased by successful war. For had Sir
William Howe led on his troops to action victory was in his power and
conquest in his train. During Sir William Howe's stay at Philadelphia a
number of disaffected citizens were suffered to remain in the garrison;
these people were ever upon the watch and communicated to Washington
every intelligence he could wish for."
We have copied this passage from Stedman, with a view to show the
contrast between the situation of Washington and Howe and their
respective armies, as exhibited by an enemy to our cause. It is
literally the contrast between virtue and vice. The final result shows
that Providence in permitting the occupation of Philadelphia by the
British army was really promoting the cause of human liberty.
Stedman's statement of the numbers of Washington's army is erroneous,
even if it refers only to effective men, and his schemes for
annihilating Washington's army would probably not have been so easily
executed as he imagined. Still the army was very weak. Marshall says
that although the total of the army exceeded 17,000 men (February,
1778), the present effective rank and file amounted to only 5,012. This
statement alone suggests volumes of misery, sickness, destitution, and
suffering.
We must now call the reader's attention to the northern campaign of 1777
which, remote as it was from Washington's immediate scene of action, was
not conducted without his aid and direction.
1. Footnote: This was Lieut.-Col. Samuel Smith, of the Maryland line.
After serving in this perilous post at Fort Mifflin, he was made
general, and in that rank assisted in the defense of Baltimore in the
War of 1812. See Document [A] at the end of this chapter.
2. Footnote: Donop was a brave officer. He was found on the battlefield
by Captain Mauduit Duplessis, a talented French engineer, who had
assisted Greene in defense of the fort, and who attended the unfortunate
count on his death-bed till he expired, three days after the battle, at
the early age of thirty-seven. "I die," said he, in his last hour,
"a victim of my ambition, and of the avarice of my sovereign." A fine
commentary on the mercenary system of the German princes. The government
of Hesse Cassel quite recently caused the remains of Count Donop to be
removed from Red Bank, to be interred with distinguished honor in his
own country.
3. Footnote: Judge Marshall, the biographer of Washington, on whose
account of this affair ours is founded, was present on the occasion. He
served in the army from the beginning of the war; was appointed first
lieutenant in 1776, and captain in 1777. He resigned his commission in
1778, and, devoting himself to the practice of the law, subsequently
rose to the eminent office of Chief Justice of the United States. He
died at Philadelphia, July 6th, 1836, aged seventy-nine.