CHAPTER X.

WASHINGTON OUT-GENERALS HOWE. 1777.

Among the many perplexing subjects which claimed the attention of

Washington during the winter (1776-1777), while he was holding his

headquarters among the hills at Morristown, none gave him more annoyance

than that of the treatment of American prisoners in the hands of the

enemy. Among the civilized nations of modern times prisoners of war are

treated with humanity and principles are established on which they are

exchanged. The British officers, however, considered the Americans as

rebels deserving condign punishment and not entitled to the sympathetic

treatment commonly shown to the captive soldiers of independent nations.

They seem to have thought that the Americans would never be able,

or would never dare, to retaliate. Hence their prisoners were most

infamously treated. Against this the Americans remonstrated, and,

on finding their remonstrances disregarded, they adopted a system of

retaliation which occasioned much unmerited suffering to individuals.

Col. Ethan Allen, who had been defeated and made prisoner in a bold but

rash attempt against Montreal, was put in irons and sent to England as

a traitor. In retaliation, General Prescott, who had been taken at the

mouth of the Sorel, was put in close confinement for the avowed purpose

of subjecting him to the same fate which Colonel Allen should suffer.

Both officers and privates, prisoners to the Americans, were more

rigorously confined than they would otherwise have been, and, that

they might not impute this to wanton harshness and cruelty, they were

distinctly told that their own superiors only were to blame for any

severe treatment they might experience.

The capture of General Lee became the occasion of embittering the

complaints on this subject, and of aggravating the sufferings of the

prisoners of war. Before that event something like a cartel for the

exchange of prisoners had been established between Generals Howe

and Washington, but the captivity of General Lee interrupted that

arrangement. The general, as we have seen, had been an officer in the

British army, but having been disgusted had resigned his commission,

and, at the beginning of the troubles, had offered his services to

Congress, which were readily accepted. General Howe affected to consider

him as a deserter, and ordered him into close confinement. Washington

had no prisoner of equal rank, but offered six Hessian field officers

in exchange for him, and required that, if that offer should not be

accepted, General Lee should be treated according to his rank in the

American army. General Howe replied that General Lee was a deserter from

his majesty's service, and could not be considered as a prisoner of war

nor come within the conditions of the cartel. A fruitless discussion

ensued between the Commanders-in-Chief. Congress took up the matter and

resolved that General Washington be directed to inform General Howe,

that should the proffered exchange of six Hessian field officers for

General Lee not be accepted, and his former treatment continued, the

principle of retaliation shall occasion five of the Hessian field

officers, together with Lieut. Col. Archibald Campbell, or any other

officers that are or shall be in possession of equivalent in number or

quality, to be detained, in order that the treatment which General Lee

shall receive may be exactly inflicted upon their persons. Congress also

ordered a copy of their resolution to be transmitted to the Council of

Massachusetts Bay, and that they be desired to detain Lieutenant-Colonel

Campbell, and keep him in close custody till the further orders of

Congress, and that a copy be also sent to the committee of Congress, in

Philadelphia, and that they be desired to have the prisoners, officers,

and privates lately taken properly secured in some safe place.

Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of the Seventy-first Regiment, with about

270 of his men, had been made prisoner in the bay of Boston, while

sailing for the harbor, ignorant of the evacuation of the town by

the British. Hitherto the colonel had been civilly treated; but,

on receiving the order of Congress respecting him, the Council of

Massachusetts Bay, instead of simply keeping him in safe custody,

according to order, sent him to Concord jail, and lodged him in a filthy

and loathsome dungeon, about twelve or thirteen feet square. He was

locked in by double bolts and expressly prohibited from entering the

prison yard on any consideration whatever. A disgusting hole, fitted up

with a pair of fixed chains, and from which a felon had been removed to

make room for his reception, was assigned him as an inner apartment.

The attendance of a servant was denied him, and no friend was allowed to

visit him.

Colonel Campbell naturally complained to Howe of such unworthy

treatment, and Howe addressed Washington on the subject. The latter

immediately wrote to the Council of Massachusetts Bay, and said, "You

will observe that exactly the same treatment is to be shown to Colonel

Campbell and the Hessian officers that General Howe shows to General

Lee, and as he is only confined to a commodious house, with genteel

accommodation, we have no right or reason to be more severe to Colonel

Campbell, whom I wish to be immediately removed from his present

situation and put into a house where he may live comfortably."

The historian (Gordon), who wrote at the time, gives a very graphic

account of the sufferings of the American prisoners in New York, which,

dreadful as it seems, is confirmed by many contemporary authorities. He

says: "Great complaints were made of the horrid usage the Americans met

with after they were captured."

The garrison of Fort Washington surrendered by capitulation to General

Howe, the 16th of November. The terms were that the fort should be

surrendered, the troops be considered prisoners of war, and that the

American officers should keep their baggage and sidearms. These articles

were signed and afterwards published in the New York papers. Major Otho

Holland Williams, of Rawling's Rifle Regiment, in doing his duty

that day, unfortunately fell into the hands of the enemy. The haughty

deportment of the officers, and the scurrility of the soldiers of the

British army, he afterward said, soon dispelled his hopes of being

treated with lenity. Many of the American officers were plundered of

their baggage and robbed of their sidearms, hats, cockades, etc., and

otherwise grossly ill-treated. Williams and three companions were, on

the third day, put on board the Baltic-Merchant, a hospital ship, then

lying in the sound. The wretchedness of his situation was in some degree

alleviated by a small pittance of pork and parsnip which a good-natured

sailor spared him from his own mess. The fourth day of their captivity,

Rawlings, Hanson, M'Intire, and himself, all wounded officers, were put

into one common dirt-cart and dragged through the city of New York as

objects of derision, reviled as rebels, and treated with the utmost

contempt.

From the cart they were set down at the door of an old wastehouse, the

remains of Hampden Hall, near Bridewell, which, because of the openness

and filthiness of the place, he had a few months before refused as

barracks for his privates, but now was willing to accept for himself

and friends, in hopes of finding an intermission of the fatigue and

persecution they had perpetually suffered. Some provisions were issued

to the prisoners in the afternoon of that day, what quantity he could

not declare, but it was of the worst quality he ever, till then, saw

made use of. He was informed the allowance consisted of six ounces of

pork, one pound of biscuit, and some peas per day for each man, and

two bushels and a half of sea coal per week for the officers to each

fireplace. These were admitted on parole, and lived generally in

wastehouses. The privates, in the coldest season of the year, were close

confined in churches, sugar-houses, and other open buildings (which

admitted all kinds of weather), and consequently were subjected to the

severest kind of persecution that ever unfortunate captives suffered.

Officers were insulted and often struck for attempting to afford some

of the miserable privates a small relief. In about three weeks Colonel

Williams was able to walk, and was himself a witness of the sufferings

of his countrymen. He could not describe their misery. Their

constitutions were not equal to the rigor of the treatment they received

and the consequence was the death of many hundreds. The officers were

not allowed to take muster-rolls, nor even to visit their men, so that

it was impossible to ascertain the numbers that perished; but from

frequent reports and his own observations, he verily believed, as well

as had heard many officers give it as their opinion, that not less than

1,500 prisoners perished in the course of a few weeks in the city of New

York, and that this dreadful mortality was principally owing to the want

of provisions and extreme cold. If they computed too largely, it must be

ascribed to the shocking brutal manner of treating the dead bodies, and

not to any desire of exaggerating the account of their sufferings.

When the King's commissary of prisoners intimated to some of the

American officers General Howe's intention of sending the privates

home on parole, they all earnestly desired it, and a paper was signed

expressing that desire; the reason for signing was, they well knew the

effects of a longer confinement, and the great numbers that died when on

parole justified their pretensions to that knowledge. In January almost

all the officers were sent to Long Island on parole, and there billeted

on the inhabitants at $2 per week.

The filth in the churches (in consequence of fluxes) was beyond

description. Seven dead have been seen in one of them at the same time,

lying among the excrements of their bodies. The British soldiers were

full of their low and insulting jokes on those occasions, but less

malignant than the Tories. The provision dealt out to the prisoners was

not sufficient for the support of life, and was deficient in quantity,

and more so in quality. The bread was loathsome and not fit to be

eaten, and was thought to have been condemned. The allowance of meat

was trifling and of the worst sort. The integrity of these suffering

prisoners was hardly credible. Hundreds submitted to death rather than

enlist in the British service, which they were most generally pressed

to do. It was the opinion of the American officers that Howe perfectly

understood the condition of the private soldiers, and they from thence

argued that it was exactly such as he and his council intended. After

Washington's success in the Jerseys, the obduracy, and malevolence of

the Royalists subsided in some measure. The surviving prisoners were

ordered to be sent out as an exchange, but several of them fell down

dead in the streets while attempting to walk to the vessels.

Washington wrote to General Howe in the beginning of April: "It is a

fact not to be questioned that the usage of our prisoners while in your

possession, the privates at least, was such as could not be justified.

This was proclaimed by the concurrent testimony of all who came out.

Their appearance justified the assertion, and melancholy experience in

the speedy death of a large part of them, stamped it with infallible

certainty."

The cruel treatment of the prisoners being the subject of conversation

among some officers captured by Sir Guy Carleton, General Parsons, who

was of the company, said, "I am very glad of it." They expressed their

astonishment and desired him to explain himself. He thus addressed them:

"You have been taken by General Carleton, and he has used you with great

humanity, would you be inclined to fight against him?" The answer was,

"No." "So," added Parsons, "would it have been, had the troops taken by

Howe been treated in like manner, but now through this cruelty we shall

get another army."

The Hon. William Smith, learning how the British used the prisoners,

and concluding it would operate to that end by enraging the Americans,

applied to the committee of New York State for leave to go into the city

and remonstrate with the British upon such cruel treatment, which he

doubted not but that he should put a stop to. The committee,

however, either from knowing what effect the cruelties would have in

strengthening the opposition to Britain, or from jealousies of his being

in some other way of disservice to the American cause or from these

united, would not grant his request.

Washington, at the beginning of 1777, determined to have the army

inoculated for the smallpox, which had made fearful ravages in the

ranks. It was carried forward as secretly and carefully as possible, and

the hospital physicians in Philadelphia were ordered at the same time to

inoculate all the soldiers who passed through that city on their way

to join the army. The same precautions were taken in the other military

stations, and thus the army was relieved from an evil which would have

materially interfered with the success of the ensuing campaign.

The example of the soldiery proved a signal benefit to the entire

population, the practice of inoculation became general, and, by little

and little, this fatal malady disappeared almost entirely.

In the hope that something might be effected at New York, Washington

ordered General Heath, who was in command in the Highlands, to move

down towards the city with a considerable force. Heath did so, and in a

rather grandiloquent summons called upon Fort Independence to surrender.

The enemy, however, stood their ground, and Heath, after a few days,

retreated, having done nothing, and exposed himself to ridicule for not

having followed up his words with suitable deeds.

While Washington was actively employed in the Jerseys in asserting the

independence of America, Congress could not afford him much assistance,

but that body was active in promoting the same cause by its enactments

and recommendations. Hitherto the Colonies had been united by no bond

but that of their common danger and common love of liberty. Congress

resolved to render the terms of their union more definite, to ascertain

the rights and duties of the several Colonies, and their mutual

obligations toward each other. A committee was appointed to sketch the

principles of the union or confederation.

This committee presented a report in thirteen Articles of Confederation

and perpetual Union between the States, and proposed that, instead of

calling themselves the United Colonies, as they had hitherto done, they

should assume the name of the United States of America; that each State

should retain its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every

power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the confederation

expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled;

that they enter into a firm league for mutual defense; that the free

inhabitants of any of the States shall be entitled to the privileges

and immunities of free citizens in any other State; that any traitor or

great delinquent fleeing from one State and found in another shall be

delivered up to the State having jurisdiction of his offense; that full

faith and credit shall be given in each of the States to the records,

acts, and judicial proceedings of every other State; that delegates

shall be annually chosen in such manner as the legislature of each State

shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday of November, with

power to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time

within the year, and to send others in their stead; that no State shall

be represented in Congress by less than two or more than seven members,

and no person shall be a delegate for more than three out of six years,

nor shall any delegate hold a place of emolument under the United

States; that each State shall maintain its own delegates; that in

Congress each State shall have only one vote; that freedom of speech

shall be enjoyed by the members, and that they shall be free from

arrest, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace; that no

State, without the consent of Congress, shall receive any ambassador, or

enter into any treaty with any foreign power; that no person holding any

office in any of the United States shall receive any present, office, or

title from any foreign State, and that neither Congress nor any of the

States shall grant any titles of nobility; that no two or more of the

States shall enter into any confederation whatever without the consent

of Congress; that no State shall impose any duties which may interfere

with treaties made by Congress; that in time of peace no vessels of

war or military force shall be kept up in any of the States but by the

authority of Congress, but every State shall have a well-regulated and

disciplined militia; that no State, unless invaded, shall engage in war

without the consent of Congress, nor shall they grant letters of marque

or reprisal till after a declaration of war by Congress; that colonels

and inferior officers shall be appointed by the Legislature of each

State for its own troops; that the expenses of war shall be defrayed out

of a common treasury, supplied by the several States according to the

value of the land in each; that taxes shall be imposed and levied by

authority and direction of the several States within the time prescribed

by Congress; that Congress has the sole and exclusive right of deciding

on peace and war, of sending and receiving ambassadors, and entering

into treaties; that Congress shall be the last resort on appeal in

all disputes and differences between two or more of the States; that

Congress have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the

alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of

the respective States, fixing the standard of weights and measures,

regulating the trade, establishing post-offices, appointing all

officers of the land forces in the service of the United States, except

regimental officers, appointing all the officers of the naval forces,

and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United

States, making rules for the government and regulation of the said land

and naval forces, and directing their operations; that Congress have

authority to appoint a committee to sit during their recess, to be

dominated a Committee of the States, and to consist of one delegate from

each State; that Congress shall have power to ascertain the necessary

sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and

to appropriate and apply the same, to borrow money or emit bills on

the credit of the United States, to build and equip a navy, to fix the

number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its

quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State;

that the consent of nine States shall be requisite to any great public

measure of common interest; that Congress shall have power to adjourn to

any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, but

the adjournment not to exceed six months, and that they shall publish

their proceedings monthly, excepting such parts relating to treaties,

alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment require

secrecy; that the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State shall,

if required, be entered on the journal, and extracts granted; that the

Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall, during the recess

of Congress, exercise such powers as Congress shall vest them with;

that Canada, if willing, shall be admitted to all the advantages of

the union; but no other colony shall be admitted, unless such admission

shall be agreed to by nine States; that all bills of credit emitted,

moneys borrowed, or debts contracted by Congress before this

confederation, shall be charges on the United States; that every State

shall abide by the determinations of Congress on all questions submitted

to them by this confederation; that the articles of it shall be

inviolably observed by every State, and that no alteration in any of

the articles shall be made, unless agreed to by Congress, and afterward

confirmed by the legislature of every State.

Such was the substance of this confederation or union. After much

discussion, at thirty-nine sittings, the articles were approved by

Congress, transmitted to the several State Legislatures, and, meeting

with their approbation, were ratified by all the delegates on the 15th

of November, 1778.

Congress maintained an erect posture, although its affairs then wore the

most gloomy aspect. It was under the provisions of this confederation

that the war was afterward carried on, and, considered as a first

essay of legislative wisdom, it discovers a good understanding, and

a respectable knowledge of the structure of society. Had peace been

concluded before the settlement of this confederation, the States would

probably have broken down into so many independent governments, and the

strength of the Union been lost in a number of petty sovereignties.

It is not hazarding much to say that, considering all the circumstances,

it was the best form of government which could have been framed at

that time. Its radical defect arose from its being a confederation

of independent States, in which the central government had no direct

recourse to the people. It required all grants of men or money to be

obtained from the State governments, who were often, during the war,

extremely dilatory in complying with the requisitions of Congress. This

defect was strongly felt by Washington, who was often compelled to exert

his personal influence, which, in all the States, was immense, to

obtain the supplies which Congress had no power to exact. We shall

see hereafter, that in forming the new constitution, a work in which

Washington took a leading part, this defect was remedied.

While Congress was beginning to form these articles of confederation,

and Washington was giving a new aspect to the war in New Jersey, the

people of Great Britain, long accustomed to colonial complaints and

quarrels, and attentive merely to their own immediate interests, paid

no due regard to the progress of the contest or to the importance of the

principles in which it originated. Large majorities in both houses of

parliament supported the ministry in all their violent proceedings,

and although a small minority, including several men of distinguished

talents, who trembled for the fate of British liberty if the court

should succeed in establishing its claims against the colonists,

vigorously opposed the measures of administration, yet the great body

of the people manifested a loyal zeal in favor of the war, and the

ill success of the Colonists in the campaign of 1776, gave that zeal

additional energy.

But amidst all the popularity of their warlike operations, the

difficulties of the ministry soon began to multiply. In consequence of

hostilities with the American provinces, the British West India islands

experienced a scarcity of the necessaries of life. About the time

when the West India fleet was about to set sail, under convoy, on its

homeward voyage, it was discovered that the negroes of Jamaica meditated

an insurrection. By means of the draughts to complete the army in

America, the military force in that island had been weakened, and the

ships of war were detained to assist in suppressing the attempts of the

negroes. By this delay the Americans gained time for equipping their

privateers. After the fleet sailed it was dispersed by stormy weather

and many of the ships, richly laden, fell into the hands of the American

cruisers who were permitted to sell their prizes in the ports of France,

both in Europe and in the West Indies.

The conduct of France was now so openly manifested that it could no

longer be winked at, and it drew forth a remonstrance from the British

cabinet. The remonstrance was civilly answered, and the traffic in

British prizes was carried on somewhat more covertly in the French ports

in Europe; but it was evident that both France and Spain were in a state

of active preparation for war. The British ministry could no longer shut

their eyes against the gathering storm, and began to prepare for it.

About the middle of October (1776) they put sixteen additional ships

into commission, and made every exertion to man them.

On the 31st of October the parliament met and was opened by a speech

from the throne, in which his majesty stated that it would have given

him much satisfaction if he had been able to inform them that the

disturbances in the revolted Colonies were at an end, and that the

people of America, recovering from their delusion, had returned to their

duty; but so mutinous and determined was the spirit of their leaders

that they had openly abjured and renounced all connection and

communication with the mother country and had rejected every

conciliatory proposition. Much mischief, he said, would accrue not only

to the commerce of Great Britain but to the general system of Europe if

this rebellion were suffered to take root. The conduct of the Colonists

would convince every one of the necessity of the measures proposed to be

adopted, and the past success of the British arms promised the happiest

results; but preparations must be promptly made for another campaign. A

hope was expressed of the general continuance of tranquility in Europe,

but that it was thought advisable to increase the defensive resources at

home.

The addresses to the speech were in the usual form, but amendments

were moved in both houses of parliament; in the Commons by Lord John

Cavendish and in the Lords by the Marquis of Rockingham. After an

animated debate the amendment was rejected, in the House of Commons by

242 against 87, and in the Lords by 91 against 26. During the session

of parliament some other attempts were made for adopting conciliatory

measures, but the influence of ministry was so powerful that they were

all completely defeated, and the plans of administration received the

approbation and support of parliament.

During the winter (1776-1777), which was very severe, the British

troops at Brunswick and Amboy were kept on constant duty and suffered

considerable privations. The Americans were vigilant and active, and the

British army could seldom procure provisions or forage without fighting.

But although in the course of the winter the affairs of the United

States had begun to wear a more promising aspect, yet there were still

many friends of royalty in the provinces. By their open attachment to

the British interest, numbers had already exposed themselves to the

hostility of the patriotic party; and others, from affection to Britain

or distrust of the American cause, gave their countenance and aid to

General Howe. Early in the season a considerable number of these men

joined the royal army, and were embodied under the direction of the

Commander-in-Chief with the same pay as the regular troops, besides

the promise of an allotment of land at the close of the disturbances.

Governor Tryon, who had been extremely active in engaging and

disciplining them, was promoted to the rank of major-general of the

Loyal Provincialists. [1]

The campaign opened on both sides by rapid predatory incursions and bold

desultory attacks. At Peekskill, on the North river, about fifty miles

above New York, the Americans had formed a post, at which, during the

winter, they had collected a considerable quantity of provisions and

camp-equipage to supply the stations in the vicinity as occasion might

require.

The most mountainous part of the district, named the Manor of Courland,

was formed into a kind of citadel, replenished with stores, and

Peekskill served as a port to it. On the 23d of March (1777), as soon

as the river was clear of ice, Howe, who thought Peekskill of more

importance than it really was, detached Colonel Bird, with about 500

men, under convoy of a frigate and some armed vessels, against that

post. General M'Dougal, who commanded there, had then only about 250

men in the place. He had timely notice of Colonel Bird's approach, and,

sensible that his post was untenable, he exerted himself to remove the

stores to the strong grounds about two miles and a half in his rear; but

before he had made much progress in the work the British appeared, when

he set fire to the stores and buildings and retreated. Colonel Bird

landed and completed the destruction of the stores which he was unable

to remove. On the same day he re-embarked, and returned to New York.

On the 8th of April (1777), says Gordon, Congress concluded upon the

erection of a monument to the memory of General Warren in the town of

Boston, and another to the memory of General Mercer in Fredericksburg,

in Virginia, and that the eldest son of General Warren, and the youngest

son of General Mercer, be educated from henceforward at the expense of

the United States. They conveyed in a few words the highest eulogium on

the characters and merits of the deceased. Through inattention, General

Warren, who fell on Breed's Hill, had not been properly noted when

Congress passed their resolve respecting General Montgomery: the

proposal for paying due respect to the memory of Mercer led to the like

in regard to Warren.

On the 13th of April Lord Cornwallis and General Grant, with about 2,000

men, attempted to surprise and cut off General Lincoln, who, with 500

men, was posted at Bound Brook, seven miles from Brunswick, and nearly

succeeded in their enterprise. But by a bold and rapid movement Lincoln,

when almost surrounded, forced his way between the British columns and

escaped, with the loss of sixty men, his papers, three field pieces, and

some baggage.

At that early period of the campaign Howe attempted no grand movement

against the main body of the army under Washington at Morristown, but

he made several efforts to interrupt his communications, destroy his

stores, and impede his operations. He had received information that

the Americans had collected a large quantity of stores in the town of

Danbury and in other places on the borders of Connecticut. These

he resolved to destroy, and appointed Major-General Tryon of the

Provincials, who panted for glory in his newly-acquired character, to

command an expedition for that purpose, but prudently directed Generals

Agnew and Sir William Erskine to accompany him.

On the 25th of April (1777) the fleet appeared off the coast of

Connecticut, and in the evening the troops were landed without

opposition between Fairfield and Norwalk. General Silliman, then

casually in that part of the country, immediately dispatched expresses

to assemble the militia. In the meantime Tryon proceeded to Danbury

which he reached about 2 the next day. On his approach Colonel

Huntingdon, who had occupied the town with about 150 men, retired to a

neighboring height, and Danbury, with the magazines it contained, was

consumed by fire.

General Arnold, who was also in the State superintending the recruiting

service, joined General Silliman at Reading, where that officer had

collected about 500 militia. General Wooster, who had resigned his

commission in the Continental service, and been appointed major-general

of the militia, fell in with them at the same place, and they proceeded

in the night through a heavy rain to Bethel, about eight miles from

Danbury. Having heard next morning that Tryon, after destroying the town

and magazines, was returning, they divided their troops, and General

Wooster, with about 300 men, fell in his rear, while Arnold, with about

500, crossing the country, took post in his front at Ridgefield. Wooster

came up with his rear about 11 in the morning, attacked it with great

gallantry, and a sharp skirmish ensued in which he was mortally wounded,

[2] and his troops were repulsed.

Tryon then proceeded to Ridgefield where he found Arnold already

entrenched on a strong piece of ground, and prepared to dispute his

passage. A warm skirmish ensued, which continued nearly an hour.

Arnold was at length driven from the field after which he retreated to

Paugatuck, about three miles east of Norwalk.

At break of day next morning, after setting Ridgefield on fire, the

British resumed their march. About 11 in the forenoon, April 28th

(1777), they were again met by Arnold, whose numbers increased during

the day to rather more than 1,000 men, among whom were some Continental

troops. A continued skirmishing was kept up until 5 in the afternoon,

when the British formed on a hill near their ships. The Americans

attacked them with intrepidity, but were repulsed and broken. Tryon,

availing himself of this respite, re-embarked his troops and returned to

New York.

The loss of the British amounted to about 170 men. [3] That of the

Americans was represented by Tryon as being much more considerable. By

themselves it was not admitted to exceed 100. In this number, however,

were comprehended General Wooster, Lieutenant-Colonel Gould, and another

field officer, killed, and Colonel Lamb wounded. Several other

officers and volunteers were killed. Military and hospital stores to

a considerable amount, which were greatly needed by the army, were

destroyed in the magazines at Danbury, but the loss most severely

felt was rather more than 1,000 tents which had been provided for the

campaign about to open.

Not long afterward this enterprise was successfully retaliated. A

British detachment had been for some time employed in collecting forage

and provisions on the eastern end of Long Island. Howe supposed this

part of the country to be so completely secured by the armed vessels

which incessantly traversed the Sound, that he confided the protection

of the stores deposited at a small port called Sag Harbor to a schooner

with twelve guns and a company of infantry.

General Parsons, who commanded a few recruits at New Haven, thinking

it practicable to elude the cruisers in the bay, formed the design of

surprising this party and other adjacent posts, the execution of which

was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Meigs, a gallant officer who had

accompanied Arnold in his memorable march to Quebec. He embarked with

about 230 men on board 13 whale-boats, and proceeded along the coast

to Guilford, where he was to cross the Sound. With about 170 of his

detachment, under convoy of two armed sloops, he proceeded (May

23, 1777) across the Sound to the north division of the island near

Southhold in the neighborhood of which a small foraging party against

which the expedition was in part directed, was supposed to lie, but they

had marched two days before to New York. The boats were conveyed across

the land, a distance of about fifteen miles, into a bay which deeply

intersects the eastern end of Long Island, where the troops re-embarked.

Crossing the bay they landed at 2 in the morning, about four miles from

Sag Harbor, which they completely surprised and carried with charged

bayonets. At the same time a division of the detachment secured the

armed schooner and the vessels laden with forage, which were set on fire

and entirely consumed. Six of the enemy were killed and ninety taken

prisoners. A very few escaped under cover of the night.

The object of his expedition being effected without the loss of a man,

Colonel Meigs returned to Guilford with his prisoners. "Having," as

was stated in the letter to General Parsons, "moved with such uncommon

celerity as to have transported his men by land and water 90 miles in 25

hours." Congress directed a sword to be presented to him, and passed a

resolution expressing the high sense entertained of his merit, and of

the prudence, activity, and valor displayed by himself and his party.

The exertions made by Washington through the winter to raise a powerful

army for the ensuing campaign had not been successful. The hopes

respecting its strength, which the flattering reports made from every

quarter had authorized him to form, were cruelly disappointed, and

he found himself not only unable to carry into effect the offensive

operations he had meditated, but unequal even to defensive warfare. That

steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported himself and

the American cause through the gloomy scenes of the preceding year

did not forsake him, and that sound judgment which applies to the best

advantage those means which are attainable, however inadequate they may

be, still remained. His plan of operations was adapted to that which

he believed his enemy had formed. He was persuaded either that General

Burgoyne, who was then at Quebec, would endeavor to take Ticonderoga and

to penetrate to the Hudson, in which event General Howe would cooperate

with him by moving up that river, and attempting to possess himself

of the forts and high grounds commanding its passage, or that Burgoyne

would join the grand army at New York by sea, after which the combined

armies would proceed against Philadelphia.

To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, to

defend the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York,

and Philadelphia, against two powerful armies so much superior to him

in arms, in numbers, and in discipline, it was necessary to make such an

arrangement of his troops as would enable the parts reciprocally to

aid each other without neglecting objects of great and almost equal

magnitude, which were alike threatened, and were far asunder. To effect

these purposes, the troops of New England and New York were divided

between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to North

Carolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be formed

in Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that State for its

protection.

These arrangements being made and the recruits collected, the camp

at Morristown was broken up, the detachments called in, and the army

assembled at Middlebrook (May 28, 1777), just behind a connected

ridge of strong and commanding heights north of the road leading to

Philadelphia, and about ten miles from Brunswick.

This camp, the approaches to which were naturally difficult, Washington

took care to strengthen still further by entrenchments. The heights in

front commanded a prospect of the course of the Raritan, the road to

Philadelphia, the hills about Brunswick, and a considerable part of the

country between that place and Amboy, so as to afford him a full view of

the most interesting movements of the enemy.

The force brought into the field by the United States required all

the aid which could be derived from strong positions and unremitting

vigilance. On the 20th of May (1777) the army in Jersey, excluding

cavalry and artillery, amounted to only 8,378 men, of whom upwards of

2,000 were sick. The effective rank and file were only 5,738.

Had this army been composed of the best disciplined troops, its

inferiority in point of numbers must have limited its operations to

defensive war, and have rendered it incompetent to the protection of any

place whose defense would require a battle in the open field. But more

than half the troops were unacquainted with the first rudiments

of military duty, and had never looked an enemy in the face. As an

additional cause of apprehension, a large proportion of the soldiers,

especially from the middle States, were foreigners, in whose attachment

to the American cause full confidence could not be placed.

Washington, anticipating a movement by land toward Philadelphia, had

taken the precaution to give orders for assembling on the western bank

of the Delaware an army of militia strengthened by a few Continental

troops, the command of which was given to General Arnold who was then in

Philadelphia employed in the settlement of his accounts.

The first and real object of the campaign on the part of Howe was the

acquisition of Philadelphia. He intended to march through Jersey, and

after securing the submission of that State to cross the Delaware on a

portable bridge constructed in the winter for the purpose and proceed

by land to that city. If, in the execution of this plan, the Americans

could be brought to a general action on equal ground, the advantages of

the royal army must insure a victory. But should Washington decline an

engagement and be again pressed over the Delaware the object would be as

certainly obtained.

Had Howe taken the field before the Continental troops were assembled

this plan might probably have been executed without any serious

obstruction, but the tents and camp equipage expected from Europe

did not arrive until Washington had collected his forces and taken

possession of the strong post on the Heights of Middlebrook. It would be

dangerous to attack him on such advantageous ground, for, although his

camp might be forced, victory would probably be attended with such loss

as to disable the victor from reaping its fruits.

If it was deemed too hazardous to attack the strong camp at Middlebrook,

an attempt to cross the Delaware in the face of an army collected on its

western bank, while that under Washington remained unbroken in his rear,

was an experiment of equal danger. It suited the cautious temper of Howe

to devise some other plan of operation to which he might resort should

he be unable to seduce Washington from his advantageous position.

The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeake suggested the alternative

of proceeding by water, should he be unable to maneuver Washington out

of his present encampment.

The plan of the campaign being settled and some small reinforcements

with the expected camp equipage being received from Europe, Howe,

leaving a garrison in New York and a guard in Amboy, assembled his army

at Brunswick, and gave strong indications of an intention to penetrate

through the country to the Delaware and reach Philadelphia by land.

Believing this to be his real design Washington (June 13, 1777) placed

a select corps of riflemen under the command of Colonel Morgan, who had

distinguished himself in the unfortunate attempt to storm Quebec, and

in whom those particular qualities which fit a man for the command of a

partisan corps, designed to act on the lines of a formidable enemy, were

eminently united.

He was ordered to take post at Vanvighton's bridge on the Raritan, just

above its confluence with the Millstone river, to watch the left flank

of the British army and seize every occasion to harass it.

Early in the morning of the 14th, Howe, leaving 2,000 men under the

command of General Matthews at Brunswick, advanced in two columns toward

the Delaware. The front of the first, under Cornwallis, reached Somerset

Court House, nine miles from Brunswick, by the appearance of day, and

the second, commanded by General de Heister, reached Middlebush about

the same time.

This movement was made with the view of inducing Washington to quit his

fortified camp and approach the Delaware, in which event, Howe expected

to bring on an engagement on ground less disadvantageous than that now

occupied by the American army. But Washington understood the importance

of his position too well to abandon it.

On the first intelligence that the enemy was in motion, he drew out his

whole army, and formed it to great advantage on the heights in front of

his camp. This position was constantly maintained. The troops remained

in order of battle during the day, and in the night slept on the ground

to be defended.

In the meantime the Jersey militia, with alacrity theretofore unexampled

in that State, took the field in great numbers. They principally joined

General Sullivan, who had retired from Princeton, behind the Sourland

hills toward Flemington, where an army of some extent was forming, which

could readily cooperate with that under the immediate inspection of

Washington.

The settled purpose of Washington was to defend his camp, but not to

hazard a general action on other ground. He had therefore determined not

to advance from the heights he occupied into the open country, either

towards the enemy or the Delaware.

The object of Howe was, by acting on his anxiety for Philadelphia, to

seduce him from the strong ground about Middlebrook, and tempt him to

approach the Delaware in the hope of defending its passage. Should

he succeed in this, he had little doubt of being able to bring on an

engagement, in which he counted with certainty on victory.

The considerations which restrained Howe from attempting to march

through Jersey, leaving the American army in full force in his rear, had

determined Washington to allow him to proceed to the Delaware, if such

should be his intention. In that event, he had determined to throw those

impediments only in the way of the hostile army which might harass and

retard its march, and maintaining the high and secure grounds north

of the road to be taken by the enemy, to watch for an opportunity of

striking some important blow with manifest advantage.

Washington was not long in penetrating Howe's designs. "The views of

the enemy," he writes to General Arnold in a letter of the 17th (June,

1777), "must be to destroy this army and get possession of Philadelphia.

I am, however, clearly of opinion, that they will not move that way

until they have endeavored to give a severe blow to this army. The risk

would be too great to attempt to cross a river when they must expect

to meet a formidable opposition in front and would have such a force

as ours in their rear. They might possibly be successful, but the

probability would be infinitely against them. Should they be imprudent

enough to make the attempt, I shall keep close upon their heels and will

do everything in my power to make the project fatal to them."

"But, besides the argument in favor of their intending, in the first

place, a stroke at this army, drawn from the policy of the measure,

every appearance contributes to conform the opinion. Had their design

been for the Delaware in the first instance, they would probably have

made a secret, rapid march for it, and not have halted so as to awaken

our attention, and give us time to prepare for obstructing them. Instead

of that they have only advanced to a position necessary to facilitate an

attack on our right, the part in which we are most exposed. In addition

to this circumstance, they have come out as light as possible, leaving

all their baggage, provisions, boas, and bridges at Brunswick. This

plainly contradicts the idea of their intending to push for the

Delaware."

Finding the American army could not be drawn from its strong position

Howe determined to waste no more time in threatening Philadelphia

by land, but to withdraw from Jersey and to embark his army as

expeditiously as possible for the Chesapeake or the Delaware. On the

night of the 19th of June (1777), he returned to Brunswick, and on the

22d to Amboy, from which place the heavy baggage and a few of his troops

passed into Staten Island on the bridge which had been designed for the

Delaware. [2]

Washington had expected this movement from Brunswick and had made

arrangements to derive some advantage from it. General Greene was

detached with three brigades to annoy the British rear, and Sullivan

and Maxwell were ordered to cooperate with him. In the meantime the army

paraded on the Heights of Middlebrook, ready to act as circumstances

might require.

About sunrise, Colonel Morgan drove in a picket-guard, soon after which

that division commenced its march to Amboy. Some sharp skirmishing took

place between this party and Morgan's regiment, but the hope of gaining

any important advantage was entirely disappointed, and the retreat to

Amboy was effected with inconsiderable loss.

In order to cover his light parties, which still hung on the British

flank and rear, Washington advanced six or seven miles to Quibbletown

on the road to Amboy, and Lord Stirling's division was pushed still

further, to the neighborhood of the Metucking Meeting House, for the

purpose of co-operating with the light parties should the retreat to

Staten Island afford an opportunity of striking at the rear.

Believing it now practicable to bring on an engagement and probably

hoping to turn the left of the American army and gain the heights in its

rear, Howe, in the night of the 25th, recalled the troops from Staten

Island, and early next morning (June 26, 1777) made a rapid movement

in two columns, towards Westfield. The right, under the command of

Cornwallis took the route by Woodbridge to the Scotch plains, and the

left, led by Howe in person, marched by Metucking Meeting House to fall

into the rear of the right column. It was intended that the left should

take a separate road soon after this junction and attack the left flank

of the American army at Quibbletown, while Cornwallis should gain the

heights on the left of the camp at Middlebrook. Four battalions with six

pieces of cannon were detached to Bonhamtown.

About Woodbridge the right column fell in with one of the American

parties of observation, which gave notice of this movement. Washington

discerned his danger, put the whole army instantly in motion, and

regained the camp at Middlebrook. Cornwallis fell in with Lord Stirling

and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Americans were driven from

their ground with the loss of three field-pieces and a few men. They

retreated to the hills about the Scotch Plains and were pursued as far

as Westfield. Perceiving the passes in the mountains on the left of the

American camp to be guarded, and the object of this skilful maneuver to

be, consequently, unattainable, Cornwallis returned through Rahway to

Amboy, and the whole army crossed over to Staten Island. Washington was

now again left to his conjectures respecting the plan of the campaign.

The very next day (June 27), after Howe had finally evacuated the

Jerseys, intelligence was received of the appearance of Burgoyne on

Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. This intelligence

strengthened the opinion that the design of Howe must be to seize the

passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the command of that river,

and effect a junction between the two armies. Yet Washington could not

permit himself to yield so entirely to this impression, as to make a

movement which might open the way by land to Philadelphia. His army,

therefore, maintained its station at Middlebrook, but arrangements were

made to repel any sudden attack on the posts which defended the Hudson.

Some changes made in the stations of the British ships and troops

having relieved Washington from his apprehensions of a sudden march to

Philadelphia, he advanced Sullivan's division to Pompton Plains, on

the way to Peekskill, and proceeded with the main body of his army to

Morristown, thus approaching the Highlands of New York without removing

so far from Middlebrook as to be unable to regain that camp should Howe

indicate an intention to seize it.

Meanwhile Howe prosecuted diligently his plan of embarkation, which was

necessarily attended with circumstances indicating a much longer voyage

than one up the North river. These circumstances were immediately

communicated to the Eastern States, and Congress was earnestly pressed

to strengthen the fortifications on the Delaware, and to increase the

obstructions in that river.

In the midst of these appearances certain intelligence was received

that Burgoyne was in great force on the lakes, and was advancing against

Ticonderoga. This intelligence confirmed the opinion that the main

object of Howe must be to effect a junction with Burgoyne on the North

river. Under this impression Washington ordered Sullivan to Peekskill,

and slowly advanced himself, first to Pompton Plains, and afterward to

the Clove, where he determined to remain until the views of the enemy

should be disclosed.

While Washington thus anxiously watched the movements of his adversary,

an agreeable and unexpected piece of intelligence was received from New

England. The command of the British troops in Rhode Island had devolved

on General Prescot. Thinking himself perfectly secure in an island,

the water surrounding which was believed to be entirely guarded by his

cruisers, and at the head of an army greatly superior to any force then

collected in that department, he indulged himself in convenient quarters

rather distant from camp, and was remiss with respect to the guards

about his person. Information of this negligence was communicated to the

main, and a plan was formed to surprise him. This spirited enterprise

was executed with equal courage and address by Lieutenant-Colonel Barton

of the Rhode Island militia.

On the night of the 10th (June, 1777) he embarked on board four

whale-boats at Warwick Neck, with a party consisting of about forty

persons, including Captains Adams and Philips, and several other

officers. After proceeding about ten miles by water unobserved by the

British guard boats, although several ships of war lay in that quarter,

he landed on the west of the island, about midway between Newport

and Bristol Ferry, and marching a mile to the quarters of Prescot,

dexterously seized the sentinel at his door, and one of his aids. The

general himself was taken out of bed and conveyed to a place of safety.

The success of this intrepid enterprise diffused the more joy throughout

America, because it was supposed to secure the liberation of General Lee

by enabling Washington to offer an officer of equal rank in exchange for

him.

Congress expressed a high sense of the gallant conduct of Colonel Barton

and his party, and presented him with a sword as a mark of approbation.

As the fleet fell down toward Sandy Hook, Washington withdrew slowly

from the Clove, and disposed his army in different divisions, so as to

march to any point which might be attacked.

At length the embarkation was completed and the fleet put to sea. Still,

its destination was uncertain. It might be going to the south, or

it might return to New York and ascend the Hudson. Soon, however,

Washington received intelligence that it had been seen off the capes

of the Delaware. It was of course expected to come up the Delaware and

attack Philadelphia.

Washington ordered the army to march to Germantown, and himself hastened

forward to Chester. The fleet of the British had disappeared again. It

might have returned to New York, or it might have sailed to New England,

with a view to joining Burgoyne as he was advancing on Ticonderoga.

During this period of suspense and conjecture, Washington was for

several days in Philadelphia consulting on public measures with the

committees and members of Congress. Here he first met Lafayette. This

young nobleman, whose name has since become so dear to every American

heart, was born at Auvergne, in France, on the 6th of September, 1757.

His family was of ancient date and of the highest rank among the French

nobility. He was left an orphan at an early age, heir to an immense

estate, and exposed to all the temptations of "the gayest and most

luxurious city on earth at the period of its greatest corruption. He

escaped unhurt." Having completed his college education, he married at

the age of sixteen the daughter of the Duke D'Ayen, of the family of

Noailles. She was younger than himself and was always "the encourager of

his virtues, and the heroic partner of his sufferings, his great name,

and his honorable grave." [3]

In the summer of 1776 (says Mr. Everett), and just after the American

declaration of independence, Lafayette was stationed at Metz, a

garrisoned town on the road from Paris to the German frontier with the

regiment to which he was attached as a captain of dragoons, not then

nineteen years of age. The Duke of Gloucester, the brother of the King

of England happened to be on a visit to Metz, and a dinner was given to

him by the commandant of the garrison. Lafayette was invited with other

officers to the entertainment. Dispatches had just been received by the

duke from England relating to American affairs--the resistance of the

Colonists, and the strong measures adopted by the ministers to crush the

rebellion. Among the details stated by the Duke of Gloucester was

the extraordinary fact that these remote, scattered, and unprotected

settlers of the wilderness had solemnly declared themselves an

independent people. That word decided the fortunes of the enthusiastic

listener, and not more distinctly was the great declaration a charter

of political liberty to the rising States, than it was a commission to

their youthful champion to devote his life to the same cause.

The details which he heard were new to him. The American contest was

known to him before but as a rebellion--a tumultuary affair in a remote

transatlantic colony. He now, with a promptness of perception

which, even at this distance of time, strikes us as little less than

miraculous, addressed a multitude of inquiries to the Duke of Gloucester

on the subject of the contest. His imagination was kindled at the idea

of a civilized people struggling for political liberty. His heart was

warmed with the possibility of drawing his sword in a good cause. Before

he left the table his course was mentally resolved on, and the brother

of the King of England (unconsciously, no doubt) had the singular

fortune to enlist, from the French court and the French army, this

gallant and fortunate champion in the then unpromising cause of the

colonial Congress.

He immediately repaired to Paris to make further inquiries and

arrangements toward the execution of his great plan. He confided it

to two young friends, officers like himself, the Count de Ségur and

Viscount de Noailles, and proposed to them to join him. They shared his

enthusiasm, and determined to accompany him, but on consulting their

families, they were refused permission. But they faithfully kept

Lafayette's secret. Happily--shall I say--he was an orphan, independent

of control, and master of his own fortune, amounting to near $40,000 per

annum.

He next opened his heart to the Count de Broglie, a marshal in the

French army. To the experienced warrior, accustomed to the regular

campaigns of European service, the project seemed rash and quixotic, and

one that he could not countenance. Lafayette begged the count at least

not to betray him, as he was resolved (notwithstanding his disapproval

of the subject) to go to America. This the count promised, adding,

however, "I saw your uncle fall in Italy, and I witnessed your father's

death at the battle of Minden, and I will not be accessory to the ruin

of the only remaining branch of the family." He then used all the powers

of argument which his age and experience suggested to him, to dissuade

Lafayette from the enterprise, but in vain. Finding his determination

unalterable, he made him acquainted with the Baron De Kalb, who the

count knew was about to embark for America--an officer of experience and

merit who, as is well known, fell at the battle of Camden.

The Baron de Kalb introduced Lafayette to Silas Deane, then agent of the

United States in France, who explained to him the state of affairs in

America, and encouraged him in his project. Deane was but imperfectly

acquainted with the French language, and of manners somewhat repulsive.

A less enthusiastic temper than that of Lafayette might, perhaps, have

been chilled by the reception that he met with from Deane. He had, as

yet, not been acknowledged in any public capacity, and was beset by

the spies of the British ambassador. For these reasons it was judged

expedient that the visit of Lafayette should not be repeated, and their

further negotiations were conducted through the intervention of Mr.

Carmichael, an American gentleman at that time in Paris. The arrangement

was at length concluded, in virtue of which Deane took upon himself,

without authority, but by a happy exercise of discretion, to engage

Lafayette to enter the American service with the rank of major-general.

A vessel was about to be dispatched with arms and other supplies for

the American army, and in this vessel it was settled that he should take

passage.

At this juncture the news reached France of the evacuation of New York,

the loss of Fort Washington, the calamitous retreat through New Jersey,

and other disasters of the campaign of 1776. The friends of America in

France were in despair. The tidings, bad in themselves, were greatly

exaggerated in the British gazettes. The plan of sending an armed

vessel with munitions was abandoned. The cause, always doubtful, was now

pronounced desperate, and Lafayette was urged by all who were privy to

his project, to give up an enterprise so wild and hopeless. Even our

commissioners (for Deane had been joined by Dr. Franklin and Arthur Lee)

told him they could not in conscience urge him to proceed. His answer

was: "My zeal and love of liberty have perhaps hitherto been the

prevailing motive with me, but now I see a chance of usefulness which

I had not anticipated. These supplies I know are greatly wanted by

Congress. I have money; I will purchase a vessel to convey them to

America, and in this vessel my companions and myself will take passage."

His purpose was opposed by the government, and he was obliged to escape

into Spain and sail from that country. He landed near Georgetown in

South Carolina, and in company with the Baron de Kalb, the companion

of his voyage, proceeded to Charleston, where they were received with

enthusiasm by the magistrates and the people.

As soon as possible they proceeded by land to Philadelphia. On his

arrival there, with the eagerness of a youth anxious to be employed upon

his errand, he sent his letters to Mr. Lovell, chairman of the committee

of foreign relations. He called the next day at the hall of Congress,

and asked to see this gentleman. Mr. Lovell came out to him, stated that

so many foreigners offered themselves for employment in the American

army that Congress was greatly embarrassed to find them commands; that

the finances of the country required the most rigid economy, and that he

feared, in the present case, there was little hope of success. Lafayette

perceived that the worthy chairman had made up his report without

looking at the papers; he explained to him that his application,

if granted, would lay no burden upon the finances of Congress, and

addressed a letter to the president, in which he expressed a wish to

enter the American army on the condition of serving without pay or

emolument, and on the footing of a volunteer. These conditions removed

the chief obstacles alluded to in reference to the appointment of

foreign officers; the letters brought by Lafayette made known to

Congress his high connections, and his large means of usefulness,

and without an hour's delay he received from them a commission of

major-general in the American army, a month before he was twenty years

of age.

Washington was at headquarters when Lafayette reached Philadelphia,

but he was daily expected in the city. The introduction of the youthful

stranger to the man on whom his career depended was therefore delayed

a few days. It took place in a manner peculiarly marked with the

circumspection of Washington, at a dinner party, where Lafayette was one

among several guests of consideration. Washington was not uninformed

of the circumstances connected with his arrival in the country. He knew

what benefit it promised the cause if his character and talents were

adapted to the cause he had so boldly struck out, and he knew also how

much it was to be feared that the very qualities which had prompted

him to embark in it, would make him a useless and even a dangerous

auxiliary. We may well suppose that the piercing eye of the Father of

his Country was not idle during the repast. But that searching glance,

before which pretense or fraud never stood undetected, was completely

satisfied. When they were about to separate, Washington took Lafayette

aside, spoke to him with kindness, paid a just tribute to the noble

spirit which he had shown, and the sacrifices he had made in the

American cause, invited him to make the headquarters of the army his

home, and to regard himself at all times as one of the family of the

Commander-in-Chief.

Such was the reception given to Lafayette by the most sagacious and

observant of men, and the personal acquaintance thus commenced ripened

into an intimacy, a confidence, and an affection without bounds, and

never for one moment interrupted. If there lived a man whom Washington

loved it was Lafayette. The proofs of this are not wanted by those who

have read the history of the Revolution, but the private correspondence

of these two great men, hitherto unpublished, discloses the full extent

of the mutual regard and affection which united them. It not only shows

that Washington entertained the highest opinion of the military talent,

the personal probity, and the general prudence and energy of Lafayette,

but that he regarded him with the tenderness of a father, and found in

the affection which Lafayette bore to him in return one of the greatest

comforts and blessings of his own life. Whenever the correspondence of

Washington and Lafayette shall be published, the publication will

do what perhaps nothing else can--raise them both in the esteem and

admiration of mankind.

Our readers will pardon this somewhat lengthened quotation respecting

the bosom friend of Washington. We now return to our narrative of

events.

Late in the month of August (1777), Washington was relieved from his

suspense in regard to the movements of Howe. He received intelligence

that the British fleet had sailed up Chesapeake Bay, and that he was

landing his army at the head of Elk river, now Elkton. It was at length

clearly apparent that his object was the capture of Philadelphia.

At the place of debarkation the British army was within a few days'

march of Philadelphia; no great rivers were in its way, and there was

no very strong position of which the enemy could take possession. On

landing, General Howe issued a proclamation promising that private

property should be respected, and offering pardon and protection to all

who should submit to him, but, as the American army was at hand, the

proclamation produced little effect.

Washington distinctly understood the nature of the contest in which he

was engaged, and, sensible of the inferiority of his raw and disorderly

army to the veteran troops under Howe, he wished to avoid a general

engagement, but aware of the effect which the fall of Philadelphia would

produce on the minds of the people, determined to make every effort in

order to retard the progress and defeat the aim of the royal army.

Accordingly, he marched to meet General Howe, who, from want of horses,

many of which had perished in the voyage, and from other causes, was

unable to proceed from the head of the Elk before the 3d of September

(1777). On the advance of the royal array, Washington retreated across

Brandywine creek, which falls into the Delaware at Wilmington. He took

post with his main body opposite Chad's ford, where it was expected the

British would attempt the passage, and ordered General Sullivan, with a

detachment, to watch the fords above. He sent General Maxwell with about

1,000 light troops, to occupy the high ground on the other side of

the Brandywine, to skirmish with the British, and retard them in their

progress.

On the morning of the 11th of September, the British army advanced in

two columns; the right, under General Knyphausen, marched straight

to Chad's ford; the left, under Cornwallis, accompanied by Howe and

Generals Grey, Grant, and Agnew, proceeded by a circuitous route toward

a point named the Forks, where the two branches of the Brandywine unite,

with a view to turn the right of the Americans and gain their rear.

General Knyphausen's van soon found itself opposed to the light troops

under General Maxwell. A smart conflict ensued. General Knyphausen

reinforced his advanced guard, and drove the Americans across the

rivulet to shelter themselves under their batteries on the north bank.

General Knyphausen ordered some artillery to be placed on the most

advantageous points, and a cannonade was carried on with the American

batteries on the heights beyond the ford.

Meanwhile the left wing of the British crossed the fords above the

Forks. Of this movement General Washington had early notice, but the

information which he received from different quarters, through his raw

and unpracticed scouts, was confused and contradictory, and consequently

his operations were embarrassed. After passing the fords, Cornwallis

took the road to Dilworth, which led him on the American right. General

Sullivan, who had been appointed to guard that quarter, occupied the

heights above Birmingham Church, his left extending to the Brandywine,

his artillery judiciously placed, and his right flank covered by woods.

About four in the afternoon Cornwallis formed the line of battle

and began the attack: for some time the Americans sustained it with

intrepidity, but at length gave way. When Washington heard the firing

in that direction he ordered General Greene, with a brigade, to support

General Sullivan. General Greene marched four miles in forty-two

minutes, but, on reaching the scene of action, he found General

Sullivan's division defeated, and in confusion. He covered the retreat,

and, after some time, finding an advantageous position, he renewed the

battle, and arrested the progress of the pursuing enemy.

General Knyphausen, as soon as he heard the firing of Cornwallis's

division, forced the passage of Chad's ford, attacked the troops opposed

to him, and compelled them to make a precipitate and disorderly retreat.

General Washington, with the part of his army which he was able to keep

together, retired with his artillery and baggage to Chester, where he

halted within eight miles of the British army, till next morning, when

he retreated to Philadelphia.

Among the foreign officers engaged in this battle besides Lafayette, who

was wounded in the leg during the action, were General Deborre, a French

officer; [6] General Conway, an Irishman, who had served in France;

Capt. Louis Fleury, a French engineer, and Count Pulaski, a Polish

nobleman, subsequently distinguished as a commander of cavalry.

As must ever be the case in new-raised armies, unused to danger and from

which undeserving officers have not been expelled, their conduct was not

uniform. Some regiments, especially those which had served the preceding

campaign, maintained their ground with the firmness and intrepidity of

veterans, while others gave way as soon as they were pressed. The author

of a very correct history of the war, speaking of this action, says: "A

part of the troops, among whom were particularly numbered some Virginia

regiments, and the whole corps of artillery, behaved exceedingly well in

some of the actions of this day, exhibiting a degree of order, firmness,

and resolution, and preserving such a countenance in extremely sharp

service, as would not have discredited veterans. Some other bodies of

their troops behaved very badly."

The official letter of Sir William Howe stated his loss at rather less

than 100 killed and 400 wounded, and this account was accepted at the

time as true. A late discovery shows its falsehood. Mr. Headley, in his

recent "Life of Washington," notices the finding of a document which

settles the question.

It was found, he says, among Gen. James Clinton's papers, carefully

filed away and indorsed by himself. On the back, in his own handwriting,

is inscribed: "Taken from the enemy's ledgers, which fell into the hands

of General Washington's army at the action of Germantown."

Within is the following statement: "State of the British troops and

position they were in when they made the attack at Brandywine, the 11th

of September, 1777.

The upper ford, under the command of Lieutenant

Lord Cornwallis:

Killed and

Second Regiment, British Guards; Second wounded.

Regiment, Light Infantry 1,740 612

Second Brigade, British Foot 2,240 360

First Division, Hessians 800 70

Ferguson's Riflemen 80 46

______ _____

Totals 4,860 1,088

Middle ford, under the command of Major-General

Gray:

Second Battalion, Guards 500

Second Battalion, Second Highlanders 700

Second Battalion, Seventieth Highlanders 700

____

Total 1,900

Lower ford, under the command of Lieutenant-General

Knyphausen:

Second Brigade, consisting of the Fourth, Killed and

Fifth, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-third, wounded.

Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Fortieth,

Forty-fourth, and Fifty-fifth Regiments 2,240 580

Hessians to the amount of 800 28

Queen's Rangers 480 290

________ _____

Total 3,520 898

1,900

4,860 1,088

________ ______

The whole British force 10,280 1,986

1,986

________

8,294"

The estimate, says Mr. Headley, of the total force which the British

had on the field, makes the two armies actually engaged about equal. The

heavy loss here given seems, at first sight, almost incredible, and

puts an entirely different aspect on the battle. Of the authenticity and

accuracy of this document I think there can be no doubt.

From the ardor with which Washington had inspired his troops before this

action, it is probable that the conflict would have been more severe had

the intelligence respecting the movement on the left of the British army

been less contradictory. Raw troops, changing their ground in the moment

of action, and attacked in the agitation of moving, are easily thrown

into confusion. This was the critical situation of a part of Sullivan's

division, and was the cause of its breaking before Greene could be

brought up to support it, after which it was impossible to retrieve the

fortune of the day. But had the best disposition of the troops been made

at the time, which subsequent intelligence would suggest, the action

could not have terminated in favor of the Americans. Their inferiority

in numbers, in discipline, and in arms was too great to leave them a

probable prospect of victory. A battle, however, was not to be avoided.

The opinion of the public and of Congress demanded it. The loss of

Philadelphia, without an attempt to preserve it, would have excited

discontent throughout the country, which might be productive of serious

mischief, and action, though attended with defeat, provided the loss

be not too great, must improve an army in which not only the military

talents, but even the courage of officers, some of them of high rank,

remained to be ascertained.

The battle of Brandywine was not considered as decisive by Congress,

the general, or the army. The opinion was carefully cherished that the

British had gained only the ground, and that their loss was still more

considerable than had been sustained by the Americans. Congress appeared

determined to risk another battle for the metropolis of America. Far

from discovering any intention to change their place of session, they

passed vigorous resolutions for reinforcing the army, and directed

Washington to give the necessary orders for completing the defenses of

the Delaware.

From Chester the army marched through Darby, over the Schuylkill bridge

to its former ground near the falls of that river. Greene's division,

which, having been less in action, was more entire than any other,

covered the rear, and the corps of Maxwell remained at Chester until

the next day as a rallying point for the small parties and straggling

soldiers who might yet be in the neighborhood.

Having allowed his army one day for repose and refreshment, Washington

recrossed the Schuylkill and proceeded on the Lancaster road, with the

intention of risking another engagement.

Sir William Howe passed the night of the 11th on the field of battle. On

the succeeding day he detached Major-General Grant with two brigades

to Concord Meeting House, and on the 13th (September, 1777), Lord

Cornwallis joined General Grant, and marched toward Chester. Another

detachment took possession of Wilmington, to which place the sick and

wounded were conveyed.

To prevent a sudden movement to Philadelphia by the lower road the

bridge over the Schuylkill was loosened from its moorings, and General

Armstrong was directed, with the Pennsylvania militia, to guard the

passes over that river.

On the fifteenth the American army, intending to gain the left of the

British, reached the Warren tavern, on the Lancaster road, twenty-three

miles from Philadelphia. Intelligence was received early next morning

that Howe was approaching in two columns. It being too late to reach the

ground he had intended to occupy Washington resolved to meet and engage

him in front.

Both armies prepared with great alacrity for battle. The advanced

parties had met, and were beginning to skirmish, when they were

separated by a heavy rain, which, becoming more and more violent,

rendered the retreat of the Americans a measure of absolute necessity.

The inferiority of their arms never brought them into such imminent

peril as on this occasion. Their gun-locks not being well secured, their

muskets soon became unfit for use. Their cartridge-boxes had been so

badly constructed as not to protect their ammunition from the tempest.

Their cartridges were soon damaged, and this mischief was the more

serious, because very many of the soldiers were without bayonets.

The army being thus rendered unfit for action the design of giving

battle was reluctantly abandoned by Washington and a retreat commenced.

It was continued all the day and great part of the night, through a cold

and most distressing rain and very deep roads. A few hours before day

(September 17th), the troops halted at the Yellow Springs, where their

arms and ammunition were examined, and the alarming fact was disclosed

that scarcely a musket in a regiment could be discharged and scarcely

one cartridge in a box was fit for use. This state of things suggested

the precaution of moving to a still greater distance in order to refit

their arms, obtain a fresh supply of ammunition, and revive the spirits

of the army. Washington therefore retired to Warwick Furnace on the

south branch of French creek, where ammunition and muskets might be

obtained in time to dispute the passage of the Schuylkill and make yet

another effort to save Philadelphia.

The extreme severity of the weather had entirely stopped the British

army. During two days Howe made no other movement than to unite his

columns.

From French creek General Wayne was detached with his division into

the rear of the British with orders to join General Smallwood, and,

carefully concealing himself and his movements, to seize every occasion

which this march might offer of engaging them to advantage. Meanwhile,

General Washington crossed the Schuylkill at Parker's Ferry, and

encamped on both sides of Perkyomen creek.

General Wayne lay in the woods near the entrance of the road from Darby

into that leading to Lancaster, about three miles in the rear of

the left wing of the British troops encamped at Trydruffin, where

he believed himself to be perfectly secure. But the country was so

extensively disaffected that Howe received accurate accounts of his

position and of his force. Major-General Gray was detached to surprise

him, and effectually accomplished his purpose. About 11 in the night of

the 20th his pickets, driven in with charged bayonets, gave the first

intimation of Gray's approach. Wayne instantly formed his division, and,

while his right sustained a fierce assault, directed a retreat by the

left, under cover of a few regiments, who, for a short time, withstood

the violence of shock. In his letter to Washington, he says that they

gave the assailants some well-directed fires, which must have done

considerable execution, and that, after retreating from the ground on

which the engagement commenced, they formed again, at a small distance

from the scene of action, but that both parties drew off without

renewing the conflict. He states his loss at about 150 killed and

wounded. The British accounts admit, on their part, a loss of only 7.

When the attack commenced, General Smallwood, who was on his march to

join Wayne, a circumstance entirely unexpected by General Gray, was

within less than a mile of him, and, had he commanded regulars, might

have given a very different turn to the night. But his militia thought

only of their own safety, and, having fallen in with a party returning

from the pursuit of Wayne, fled in confusion, with the loss of only one

man.

Some severe animadversions on this unfortunate affair having been

made in the army, General Wayne demanded a court-martial, which, after

investigating his conduct, was unanimously of opinion, "that he had done

everything to be expected from an active, brave, and vigilant officer,"

and acquitted him with honor.

Having secured his rear, by compelling Wayne to take a greater distance,

Howe marched along the valley road to the Schuylkill and encamped on the

bank of that river, from the Fatland ford up to French creek, along

the front of the American army. To secure his right from being turned,

Washington again changed his position and encamped with his left near,

but above, the British right.

Howe now relinquished his plan of bringing Washington to another battle,

and thinking it advisable, perhaps, to transfer the seat of war to the

neighborhood of his ships, determined to cross the Schuylkill and take

possession of Philadelphia. In the afternoon he ordered one detachment

to cross at Fatland ford, which was on his right, and another to cross

at Gordon's ford, on his left, and to take possession of the heights

commanding them. These orders were executed without much difficulty, and

the American troops placed to defend these fords were easily dispersed.

This service being effected, the whole army marched by its right,

about midnight, and crossing at Fatland without opposition, proceeded

a considerable distance toward Philadelphia, and encamped with its left

near Sweed's ford and its right on the Manatawny road, having Stony Run

in its course.

It was now apparent that only immediate victory could save Philadelphia

from the grasp of the British general whose situation gave him the

option of either taking possession of that place or endeavoring to bring

on another engagement. If, therefore, a battle must certainly be risked

to save the capital it would be necessary to attack the enemy.

Public opinion, which a military chief finds too much difficulty in

resisting, and the opinion of Congress, required a battle; but, on a

temperate consideration of circumstances, Washington came to the wise

decision of avoiding one for the present.

His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood had

not yet joined the army. The Continental troops ordered from Peekskill,

who had been detained for a time by an incursion from New York, were

approaching, and a reinforcement of Jersey militia, under General

Dickenson, was also expected.

To these powerful motives against risking an engagement, other

considerations of great weight were added, founded on the condition of

his soldiers. An army, maneuvering in an open country, in the face of

a very superior enemy, is unavoidably exposed to excessive fatigue and

extreme hardship. The effect of these hardships was much increased by

the privations under which the American troops suffered. While in almost

continual motion, wading deep rivers, and encountering every vicissitude

of the seasons, they were without tents, newly without shoes, or winter

clothes, and often without food.

A council of war concurred in the opinion Washington had formed, not to

march against the enemy, but to allow his harassed troops a few days

for repose and to remain on his present ground until the expected

reinforcements should arrive.

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, the distressed situation

of the army had been represented to Congress, who had recommended the

executive of Pennsylvania to seize the cloths and other military stores

in the warehouses of Philadelphia, and, after granting certificates

expressing their value, to convey them to a place of safety. The

executive, being unwilling to encounter the odium of this strong

measure, advised that the extraordinary powers of the Commander-in-Chief

should be used on the occasion. Lieut. Col. Alexander Hamilton, one

of the General's aides, already in high estimation for his talents and

zeal, was employed on this delicate business. "Your own prudence," said

the General, in a letter to him while in Philadelphia, "will point out

the least exceptionable means to be pursued; but remember, delicacy and

a strict adherence to the ordinary mode of application must give place

to our necessities. We must, if possible, accommodate the soldiers with

such articles as they stand in need of or we shall have just reason

to apprehend the most injurious and alarming consequences from the

approaching season."

All the efforts, however, of this very active officer could not obtain

a supply in any degree adequate to the pressing and increasing wants of

the army.

Colonel Hamilton was also directed to cause the military stores which

had been previously collected to a large amount in Philadelphia, and the

vessels which were lying at the wharves, to be removed up the Delaware.

This duty was executed with so much vigilance that very little public

property fell, with the city, into the hands of the British general,

who entered it on the 26th of September (1777). The members of Congress

separated on the 18th, in the evening, and reassembled at Lancaster on

the 27th of the same month. From thence they subsequently adjourned

to Yorktown, where they remained eight months, till Philadelphia was

evacuated by the British.

From the 25th of August, when the British army landed at the head of

Elk, until the 26th of September, when it entered Philadelphia, the

campaign had been active, and the duties of the American general

uncommonly arduous.

Some English writers bestow high encomiums on Sir William Howe for his

military skill and masterly movements during this period. At Brandywine

especially, Washington is supposed to have been "out-generaled, more

out-generaled than in any action during the war." If all the operations

of this trying period be examined, and the means in possession of both

be considered, the American chief will appear in no respect inferior

to his adversary, or unworthy of the high place assigned to him in the

opinions of his countrymen. With an army decidedly inferior, not only

in numbers, but in every military requisite except courage, in an open

country, he employed his enemy near thirty days in advancing about sixty

miles. In this time he fought one general action, and, though defeated,

was able to reassemble the same undisciplined, unclothed, and almost

unfed army; and, the fifth day afterward, again to offer battle. When

the armies were separated by a storm which involved him in the most

distressing circumstances, he extricated himself from them, and still

maintained a respectable and imposing countenance.

The only advantage he is supposed to have given was at the battle of

Brandywine, and that was produced by the contrariety and uncertainty

of the intelligence received. A general must be governed by his

intelligence, and must regulate his measures by his information. It

is his duty to obtain correct information, and among the most valuable

traits of a military character is the skill to select those means which

will obtain it. Yet the best-selected means are not always successful;

and, in a new army, where military talent has not been well tried by the

standard of experience, the general is peculiarly exposed to the chance

of employing not the best instruments. In a country, too, which is

covered with wood precise information of the numbers composing different

columns is to be gained with difficulty.

Taking into view the whole series of operations, from the landing of

Howe at the Head of Elk to his entering Philadelphia, the superior

generalship of Washington is clearly manifest. Howe, with his numerous

and well-appointed army, performed a certain amount of routine work and

finally gained the immediate object which he had in view--the possession

of Philadelphia--when, by every military rule, he should have gone

up the Hudson to cooperate with Burgoyne. Washington, with his army,

composed almost entirely of raw recruits and militia, kept his adversary

out of Philadelphia a month, still menaced him with an imposing front in

his new position, and subsequently held him in check there while Gates

was defeating and capturing Burgoyne.

We shall see, in the ensuing chapter, that although Howe had attained

his first object in gaining possession of Philadelphia, he had still

many new difficulties and dangers to encounter at the hands of his

daring and persevering opponent before he could comfortably establish

himself in winter quarters.

1. Footnote: About this time the Royalists in the counties of Somerset

and Worcester, in the province of Maryland, became so formidable that an

insurrection was dreaded. And it was feared that the insurgents would,

in such a case, be joined by a number of disaffected persons in the

county of Sussex, in the Delaware State. Congress, to prevent this evil,

recommended the apprehension and removal of all persons of influence, or

of desperate characters, within the counties of Sussex, Worcester, and

Somerset, who manifested a disaffection to the American cause, to some

remote place within their respective States, there to be secured. From

appearances, Congress had also reason to believe that the Loyalists in

the New England governments and New York State, had likewise concerted

an insurrection. See Gordon's "History of the American Revolution," vol.

II, pp. 461, 462. By the same authority we are informed that General

Gates wrote to General Fellowes for a strong military force, for the

prevention of plots and insurrection in the provinces of New England and

New York.

2. Footnote: Congress voted a monument to his memory.

3. Footnote: Stedman, the British historian of the Revolution,

acknowledges a loss of 200, including 10 officers.

4. Footnote: Lieutenant-Colonel Palfrey, formerly an aide-de-camp to

General Washington, and now paymaster-general, wrote to his friend: "I

was at Brunswick just after the enemy had left it. Never let the

British troops upbraid the Americans with want of cleanliness, for such

dog-kennels as their huts were my eyes never beheld. Mr. Burton's house,

where Lord Cornwallis resided, stunk so I could not bear to enter it.

The houses were torn to pieces, and the inhabitants as well as the

soldiers have suffered greatly for want of provisions."--Gordon,

"History of the American Revolution."

5. Footnote: Eulogy on Lafayette. See "Orations and Speeches on Various

Occasions," by Edward Everett, vol. I, p. 462.

6. Footnote: Deborre's brigade broke first; and, on an inquiry into his

conduct being directed, he resigned. A misunderstanding existed between

him and Sullivan, on whose right he was stationed.

7. Footnote: All English writers do not concur in this view of the

matter. The British historian, Stedman, gives the following sharp

criticism on Howe's conduct in the affair of the Brandywine:

"The victory does not seem to have been improved in the degree which

circumstances appeared to have admitted. When the left column of the

British had turned Washington's right flank, his whole army was hemmed

in:--General Knyphausen and the Brandywine in front; Sir William Howe

and Lord Cornwallis on his right; the Delaware in his rear; and the

Christiana river on his left. He was obliged to retreat twenty-three

miles to Philadelphia, when the British lay within eighteen miles of

it. Had the Commander-in-Chief detached General Knyphausen's column in

pursuit early next morning, General Washington might with ease have been

intercepted, either at the Heights of Crum Creek, nine miles; at Derby,

fourteen; or at Philadelphia, eighteen miles, from the British camp;

or, the Schuylkill might have been passed at Gray's Ferry, only seventy

yards over, and Philadelphia, with the American magazines, taken, had

not the pontoons been improvidently left at New York as useless. Any one

of these movements, it was thought, might have been attended with the

total destruction of the American army. For some reason, however, which

it is impossible to divine, the Commander-in-Chief employed himself

for several days in making slight movements which could not by any

possibility produce any important benefits to the British cause."