results necessarily from analysis of the scientific method, is
Scientific Realism, as opposed to Philosophical Idealism; and it
determines the subdivision of scientific philosophy into its three
great departments, the theories of Being, of Knowing, and of Doing.
The scientific theory of Being results from analysis of the
Genus-in-itself, and constitutes ontology or Constructive Realism, as
opposed to all forms of Constructive Idealism. The scientific theory
of Knowledge results from analysis of the Concept, and constitutes
psychology or Critical Realism, as opposed to all forms of
transcendental or Critical Idealism. The scientific theory of Conduct
results from analysis of the Word, and constitutes anthroponomy
(including ethics, politics, and art in its widest sense), sociology,
or Ethical Realism, as opposed to all forms of Ethical Idealism. The
scientific theory of the universe, as the absolute union of Being,
Knowing, and Doing in the One and All, results from comprehension of
these three theories in complete organic unity, and constitutes
organic philosophy, scientific theology, or Religious Realism, as
opposed to all forms of Religious Idealism."
I submit this long extract to you, gentlemen, not to bore you with
metaphysical speculations, but simply to enable you, as educated men
who understand the meaning of plain and straightforward English on any
subject, to follow the twistings and turnings of an extraordinarily
sinuous and disingenuous intellect, and intelligently to decide a
question which needs here to be settled clearly in your own minds:
could any competent professor of philosophy, undertaking to give, as a
fair critic, a truthful account to the public of the contents of my
book, read that passage, and then, omitting all reference to the
contrast there and everywhere made between realism and idealism,
honestly tell that public, without any further information at all on
the subject, that the "conclusion" of my philosophy is "essentially
idealistic"?
Yet that is the conscienceless misrepresentation with which Dr. Royce
prepares the way for all that is to follow, deceives the reader at the
very outset, predisposes him to believe the preposterous charge that I
"appropriated" my main theory from the great idealist Hegel, arouses
his indignation or mirth, as the case may be, at my alleged strutting
about in borrowed plumes, and so leads him at last to applaud the
righteous castigation of the "professional warning," by which the
peacock-feathers are made to fly in all directions and I myself am
scourged back among my brother-jackdaws, the impostors, charlatans,
and quacks of myriad kinds. This is the purport and the spirit of Dr.
Royce's ostensible review, "_as a whole_." Is it the "fair criticism"
which the law allows? Or is it the "libel" which the law condemns? Is
it the fair and critical judgment which your silence shall sanction,
as Harvard's official verdict on my work? Or is it the libellous and
vulgar abuse which your speech shall rebuke, as shaming Harvard more
than me by bringing the ethics and manners of the literary Bedouin
into the professor's chair?
V.
But, gentlemen, the gravest aspect of Dr. Royce's ostensible review
remains still to be considered. Is libel--vulgar, violent, and brutal
libel--the means by which Harvard University, represented by one of
her professors of philosophy who openly claims to address the general
public in the name of his office and of her, proposes to realize the
lofty ideal of her President, and make herself the "philosophical
pioneer" for each new generation in the pursuit of truth? Is this the
welcome which she accords to serious, dignified, and not unscholarly
works, giving the results, however partially and imperfectly wrought
out, of patient and independent reflection for more than thirty years
on the highest problems of human life and thought? Is this the best
sympathy and encouragement she has to offer to her own sons when they
take up in earnest the task of helping her to realize her own ideal?
Is this the attitude in which she confronts the great questions of the
age, and the spirit which she aims to foster in her young men? I do
not believe it; but you alone, gentlemen, can give the authoritative
answer to such queries.
When civil service reformers plead the urgent necessity of political
reform, they are irrelevantly charged by the adherents of the spoils
system with being "hypocrites and pharisees." Precisely so, when I
plead the urgent necessity of philosophical reform, I am irrelevantly
charged by Dr. Royce, in effect, with being a false pretender, a
plagiarist, and an impostor. The charge is just as true in one case as
in the other. But, be the charge true or untrue, the attention of keen
and candid minds is not to be diverted by this perfectly transparent
device from the main point of reform.
What is this needed philosophical reform?
Briefly, _to substitute the scientific method for the idealistic
method in philosophy_, as the only possible means, in this critical
and sceptical age, of making ethics and religion so reasonable as to
command the continued allegiance of reasonable minds. Unphilosophized
science conceives the universe as nothing but a Machine-World; and in
this conception there is no room for any Ethical Ideal. Unscientific
philosophy conceives the universe as nothing but a Thought-World; and
in this conception there is no room for any Mechanical Real. On the
possibility of developing a scientific philosophy out of the
scientific method itself must depend at last the only possibility, for
reasonable men, of believing equally in the real principles of
mechanical science and in the ideal principles of ethical science.
To-day the greatest obstacle to such a reasonable belief is the
"philosophical idealism" which directly contradicts it; and the
greatest reform needed in modern thought, above all in the theory of
ethics, is the substitution of the scientific method for the
idealistic method in philosophy itself.
The cause of philosophical reform, indeed, cannot be long delayed by
any Philistinism in those who, by their professional position, ought
to be its most ardent friends. The method of science is destined to
revolutionize philosophy--to modernize it by founding it anew upon a
thoroughly realistic and scientific theory of universals. The net
result of all the physical sciences thus far, the one fixed result to
which all their other results steadily point with increasingly evident
convergence, is that _the already known constitution of the real
universe is that of the Machine_. This universal fixed result, and not
mere individual self-consciousness, is the necessary and only
beginning-point of a constructive philosophy of Nature; for, where the
special sciences end, there universal philosophy must begin. It is the
task of philosophy to-day to show that the unquestionably mechanical
constitution of the universe, instead of being the ultimate boundary
of scientific investigation, is merely the starting-point in a new
series of investigations, no less scientific than those of physical
science, but far more profound; and to show that the mechanical
constitution itself, when deeply studied and comprehended, necessarily
involves the organic and the personal constitutions. In this way, and
I believe in no other way, can it be proved to the satisfaction of the
modern intelligence that the Mechanical Real itself, at bottom,
includes the Ethical Ideal--that the Moral Law, the Divine Ideal
itself, is the innermost Fact of Nature. I have made, and make now,
not the slightest personal "pretension"; but, finding in all my
reading no outline of any such argument as this, and believing it to
be fruitful of the very noblest results, I have done my best to point
out its possibilities to other earnest searchers after truth. Not
until this new field has been faithfully examined and explored and
proved to be sterile, shall I cease to recommend it to the attention
of all who would fain _see reason_ to believe that the Ethical Ideal
is no Unreality, but rather the innermost Reality of the real universe
itself. I speak only to those who have souls to hear and to respond;
let the rest listen to Dr. Royce, and be dupes of his "professional
warning." But the cause of philosophical reform will not be stayed by
him or by them: the world's heart is hungry for higher truth than
idealism can discover, and will be grateful in the end to any
philosophy which shall show what mighty moral conviction, what
unspeakable spiritual invigoration, must needs grow out of
comprehension of the despised Real.
These thoughts are not remote abstractions, up in the air, out of
reach, of no practical value or application; they touch the very life
and soul of Harvard University. For want of such thoughts, many of the
brightest and most intellectual of her students, graduates from the
philosophical courses, go out year after year disbelieving totally in
the possibility of arriving at any fundamental "truth" whatever, even
in ethics. Several years ago, the then President of the Harvard
"Philosophical Club" said in my hearing that he "saw no ground of
moral obligation anywhere in the universe"; and this declaration was
apparently assented to by every one of the fifteen or twenty members
present. This very last summer, a recent graduate told me that he left
college bewildered, depressed, and "disheartened," because he saw
nowhere any ground of rational "conviction" about anything; and that
it was "just the same with all the other fellows"--that is, all his
companions in the study of philosophy. It is time, high time, that
this state of things should be searchingly investigated in the
interest of Harvard University itself, the facts determined, their
causes ascertained. While such a state of things prevails, Harvard
conspicuously fails to be a "philosophical pioneer" except in a
distinctly retrograde direction--conspicuously fails to discharge the
highest service which she owes to the world: namely, to send out her
young graduates well armed beforehand for the battle of life with
clear, strong, and lofty _moral convictions_. Whatever other causes
may exist for the failure, one cause at least is certain--the
self-proved and amazing inability of one of her professors of
philosophy to give an honest or intelligent reception to a thoughtful,
closely reasoned, and earnest plea for philosophical reform in this
very direction, or to criticise it with anything better than
irrelevant and unparliamentary personalities, studied and systematic
misrepresentation both of the plea and of the pleader, and a
demoralizing example of libel, so bitter and so extreme as to furnish
abundant ground for prosecution.
VI.
Here, gentlemen, you may very properly inquire: "Why do you not, then,
prosecute Dr. Royce in the courts, instead of bringing the case before
us?"
Briefly, because I have not yet exhausted those milder means of
obtaining redress which it befits a peaceable and non-litigious
citizen to employ before resorting to legal measures. You would have
had just cause to complain of me, if I had precipitately prosecuted
one of your professors for a "professional" attack without giving you
previously an opportunity to discipline him in your own way, and in
dignified recognition of your own ultimate responsibility. A
prosecution may not, I trust will not, prove necessary; for I have
neither malice nor vindictiveness to gratify, but only a resolute
purpose to defend my reputation effectually against a malicious libel,
and not to permit the libeller to set up a plausible claim that, by
silence and passive submission, I "tacitly confess the justice of an
official condemnation by Harvard University of my 'philosophical
pretensions.'" Except for that one phrase, "professional warning," in
Dr. Royce's attack, this appeal would never have been written, or the
least notice taken of his intrinsically puerile "criticisms." When Mr.
Herbert Spencer, whom I have more than once publicly criticised, can
yet magnanimously write to me of this very book, "I do not see any
probability that it will change my beliefs, yet I rejoice that the
subject should be so well discussed,"--and Mr. William Ewart
Gladstone, "I am very conscious of the force with which you handle the
subject,"--and ex-President Noah Porter, "I thank you very sincerely
for sending me a copy of your last book; I had already read it nearly
twice, and found much in it very admirable and timely,"--I could very
well afford to pass over Dr. Royce's ineffectual "criticisms" with
indifference. But when he insinuates to the uninformed public that
these same "criticisms" have the weighty sanction of Harvard
University, it is quite another matter. That calls upon me to defend
myself against so atrocious a calumny.
But even self-defence has its proprieties, and to these I scrupulously
submit. The first step was to send a reply to the periodical which
published the attack. This was sent. At first, Dr. Royce effusively
agreed to its publication, and wrote a rejoinder to be published
simultaneously with it. Later, in alarm, he procured its rejection,
and, through legal counsel, served a formal notice upon me not to
publish or to circulate it at all. The second step was to demand from
Dr. Royce a specific retraction and apology; this he contemptuously
refused. The third step was to appeal from the recalcitrant employee
to the responsible employer, and to lay the case respectfully before
the supreme representatives of Harvard University itself. This I now
do, and it is entirely unnecessary to look any farther. But, in order
to lay the case before you fully, it is incumbent upon me to state the
details of these proceedings with some minuteness, and I now proceed
to unfold the extraordinary tale.
VII.
Dr. Royce wound up his ostensible review with these words of bravado
and of challenge: "_We must show no mercy,--as we ask none._" This
fierce flourish of trumpets I understood to be, at least, a fearless
public pledge of a fair hearing in the "Journal of Ethics" of which he
was one of the editors. Moreover, I conceived that a magazine
expressly devoted to ethics would be ashamed not to practise the
ethics which it preached--ashamed not to grant to the accused a
freedom scrupulously made equal to that which it had already granted
to the accuser. Lastly, I was averse to litigation, and desired to use
no coarser weapon, even against a calumniator and libeller, than the
sharp edge of reason itself.
Accordingly, I sought redress in the first instance from the
"International Journal of Ethics." On January 21, I mailed to Mr. S.
Burns Weston, the office editor, an article in reply to Dr. Royce's
ostensible review, together with a letter in which I wrote: "I do not
at all complain of your publishing Dr. Royce's original article,
although it was a most malicious and slanderous one, and undertook
(not to put too fine a point upon it) to post me publicly as a quack.
If you do not deny my indefeasible right to be heard in self-defence
in the same columns, I shall feel that I have no cause whatever to
regard you or your committee as a party to the outrage, and shall
entertain no feelings towards you or towards them other than such as
are perfectly friendly. Let even slander and malice be heard, if truth
shall be as free to reply." Pressing engagements had prevented me from
writing the article in season for the January number of the "Journal
of Ethics," but it was in ample season for the April number.
I sent it at last because I had full confidence in the soundness of
what Thomas Jefferson said so well: "Truth and reason can maintain
themselves without the aid of coercion, if left free to defend
themselves. But then they must defend themselves. Eternal lies and
sophisms on one side, and silence on the other, are too unequal."
The "International Journal of Ethics" is under the control of an
"editorial committee" of eight, Dr. Felix Adler at the head and Dr.
Royce at the end; the other six members live in Europe and have no
share in the home management. Mr. Weston is not a member of the
committee, has little editorial authority, and, in case of
disagreement between the two American members, would, as he himself
expressly and frankly informed me in answer to a direct question, obey
implicitly the directions of Dr. Adler. To Dr. Adler, therefore,
belongs the general and ultimate editorial responsibility, whether
legal or moral, since, according to Mr. Western's just quoted
declaration, Dr. Adler alone has actual power either to procure or to
prevent publication; while to Dr. Royce is assigned merely the special
department of "theoretical ethics." Hence Dr. Adler and Dr. Royce were
jointly responsible for the original libel, the latter for writing it,
the former for publishing it; but Dr. Adler alone was editorially
responsible for publishing or refusing to publish my reply to it. It
was to Dr. Adler alone, as responsible editor-in-chief of the "Journal
of Ethics," that I looked for publication of my defence, as the best
possible reparation for the wrong done in publishing the libellous
attack; and I looked to him with confidence for this partial and
inadequate reparation, believing that, as head of the "ethical culture
movement," he would be anxious to conduct the "Journal of Ethics" in
accordance with the highest principles of justice, honor, and fair
play.
To my astonishment and indignation, however, my manuscript, instead of
being considered and finally passed upon by Dr. Adler, was forwarded
by him or by his direction to Dr. Royce! The latter, getting wind of
it, had "insisted" that it belonged to his department of "theoretical
ethics," and "claimed the right" to _edit it with a rejoinder in the
same issue_. Nothing could be conceived more unfair or more absurd. A
libel had been published by Dr. Adler, and Dr. Adler sent the defence
against this libel to be edited by the libeller himself! Protest was
in vain. Dr Adler denied his own moral responsibility, washed his
hands of the whole affair, and even refused to enlighten himself as to
his own duty (notwithstanding my urgent request that he should do so)
by taking counsel of some wise and able lawyer of his own
acquaintance. Instead of doing this, he affected to consider my
self-defence against a libel as merely a reply to an ordinary
"book-criticism," made a few inquiries as to the "usual practice of
journals" with reference to book-criticisms alone, turned my article
over to Dr. Royce as one on "theoretical ethics," and permitted him to
attach to it a rejoinder which reiterated the original libel with
additions and improvements, but in which he took pains to say of my
reply: "I may add that even now it does not occur to me to feel
personally wounded, nor yet uneasy at Dr. Abbot's present warmth."
These words have a peculiar interest with reference to his later legal
notice against all publication or circulation of this very reply: his
assumed or genuine pachydermatousness soon gave way to fearful
apprehension of its effect upon the public mind.
In no sense whatever was my reply an article on "theoretical ethics."
To what part of the "theory of ethics" belongs Dr. Royce's false
personal accusation of "extravagant pretensions"? To what part of the
"theory of ethics" belongs Dr. Royce's false personal accusation of
"sinning against the most obvious demands of literary
property-rights"? To what part of the "theory of ethics" belongs Dr.
Royce's "professional warning" against pretensions which were never
made? His false accusations and their false grounds were the main
theme of my article, and they had nothing to do with "theoretical
ethics," Dr Adler and Dr. Royce to the contrary notwithstanding. Dr.
Royce had no shadow of right to set up so preposterous a claim, and
Dr. Adler had no shadow of right to yield to it, as he weakly did,
thereby violating his own undeniable obligation, as editor-in-chief,
to do his utmost to repair the wrong which he himself had done in
publishing a libel. My article was avowedly nothing but a defence
against this libel, and, as such, was necessarily addressed to the
responsible editor of the "Journal of Ethics," not to the sub-editor
of one of its special departments--most assuredly not to the libeller
himself. The only fair and just course was to publish this defence
alone by itself, precisely as the libel had been published alone by
itself, and afterwards to allow Dr. Royce to follow it, if he pleased,
with a rejoinder in the succeeding number. I made not the slightest
objection to one rejoinder or a dozen rejoinders from him, provided
the responsible editor held the balance true, accorded as fair a
hearing to the accused as he had accorded to the accuser, and granted
to each in turn an opportunity to plead his cause without interruption
by the other. I asked no more than what Dr. Royce had already
received--an opportunity to enjoy the undivided and undistracted
attention of the audience for a limited time. He had had the ear of
the public for six months. Could I not have it for three?
But I regret to say that considerations of equal justice seemed to
have no weight whatever with Dr. Adler. Dr. Royce, despite his public
pledge, was "asking for mercy," after all, and got from Dr. Adler all
he asked for; I asked Dr. Adler for equity alone, and could not get
even that. The sole concession made was that I might follow Dr.
Royce's rejoinder with a second reply in the same number, thus closing
the case with a last word for the defence.
To this last proposal, in order not to refuse a meagre measure of
justice, I consented under protest. But the proof-sheets of Dr.
Royce's rejoinder, to which I was to reply, did not reach me till
March 18, and were accompanied with a notice from the "Journal of
Ethics" that my reply must be mailed "within ten hours after receiving
Royce's proof." This notice I answered as follows:--
"The proof of Royce's rejoinder, with your notes of the 16th and 17th,
arrived this morning at 9 A.M. As I have had to be at my teaching till
3 P.M., it was obviously impossible to mail a reply by 7 P.M. Hence I
telegraphed to you at once: '_I protest against the gross injustice of
postponing my article, or of publishing this new attack without the
last word you promised me. It is impossible to write this now_ [_i. e._,
within the ten hours stipulated]. _If you have any love of justice,
publish my article now, and postpone the rejoinders to next issue._'
Nothing stands in the way of this, the only fair course, except
Royce's insistence on his right to deprive me of the equality of
treatment which I supposed he himself guaranteed in his--'as we ask
none.' To hold back my reply to his libel for three months longer,
merely because he is afraid to let it go forth without an attempt to
break its force in the same number, would be disgracefully unjust in
him and in the 'Journal.' His rejoinder is simply a fresh libel; there
is nothing in it to which I cannot easily and effectually reply. But
what _right_ is there in refusing to me the opportunity of answering
one libel at a time? Or in compelling me to be silent nine months
[from October to July], in order to save him from being silent three
months [from April to July]? It will be a bitter comment on the
sincerity of the 'ethical culture movement' to make so unethical a
judgment in so grave a case as this."
But the April number of the "Journal of Ethics," nevertheless, was
published without my article. The latter was all in type, and the
proof-sheets had been corrected; nothing prevented its publication in
April except (1) Dr. Royce's insistence that my reply to his first
libel should _not be published at all without his second libel_, and
(2) Dr. Adler's weak submission to this unjust and pusillanimous
demand of his associate.