Produced by Curtis Weyant, Diane Monico, and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net. (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by Case Western Reserve University Preservation Department
Digital Library.)
PROFESSOR ROYCE'S LIBEL.
* * * * *
A
PUBLIC APPEAL FOR REDRESS
TO THE
CORPORATION AND OVERSEERS
OF
HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
BY
FRANCIS ELLINGWOOD ABBOT, PH.D.
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
* * * * *
BOSTON, MASS.
GEO. H. ELLIS, 141 FRANKLIN STREET, 1891.
PUBLIC APPEAL.
TO THE PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS AND BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF HARVARD
UNIVERSITY:
_Gentlemen_,--Believing it to be a necessary part of good citizenship
to defend one's reputation against unjustifiable attacks, and
believing you to have been unwarrantably, but not remotely, implicated
in an unjustifiable attack upon my own reputation by Assistant
Professor Josiah Royce, since his attack is made publicly, explicitly,
and emphatically on the authority of his "professional" position as
one of your agents and appointees, I respectfully apply to you for
redress of the wrong, leaving it wholly to your own wisdom and sense
of justice to decide what form such redress should take. If Dr. Royce
had not, by clear and undeniable implication, appealed to your high
sanction to sustain him in his attack,--if he had not undeniably
sought to create a widespread but false public impression that, in
making this attack, he spoke, and had a right to speak, with all the
prestige and authority of Harvard University itself,--I should not
have deemed it either necessary or becoming to appeal to you in
self-defence, or, indeed, to take any public notice whatever of an
attack otherwise unworthy of it. But under the circumstances I am
confident that you will at once recognize the inevitableness and
unquestionable propriety of my appeal from the employee to the
employer, from the agent to the principal; and it would be
disrespectful to you to doubt for a moment that, disapproving of an
attack made impliedly and yet unwarrantably in your name, you will
express your disapprobation in some just and appropriate manner. My
action in thus laying the matter publicly before you can inflict no
possible injury upon our honored and revered Alma Mater: injury to
her is not even conceivable, except on the wildly improbable
supposition of your being indifferent to a scandalous abuse of his
position by one of your assistant professors, who, with no imaginable
motive other than mere professional jealousy or rivalry of authorship,
has gone to the unheard-of length of "professionally warning the
public" against a peaceable and inoffensive private scholar, whose
published arguments he has twice tried, but twice signally failed, to
meet in an intellectual way. If the public at large should have reason
to believe that conduct so scandalous as this in a Harvard professor
will not be condemned by you, as incompatible with the dignity and the
decencies of his office and with the rights of private citizens in
general, Harvard University would indeed suffer, and ought to suffer;
but it is wholly within your power to prevent the growth of so
injurious a belief. I beg leave, therefore, to submit to you the
following statement, and to solicit for it the patient and impartial
consideration which the gravity of the case requires.
I.
The first number of a new quarterly periodical, the "International
Journal of Ethics," published at Philadelphia in October, 1890,
contained an ostensible review by Dr. Royce of my last book, "The Way
out of Agnosticism." I advisedly use the word "ostensible," because
the main purport and intention of the article were not at all to
criticise a philosophy, but to sully the reputation of the
philosopher, deprive him of public confidence, ridicule and
misrepresent his labors, hold him up by name to public obloquy and
contempt, destroy or lessen the circulation of his books, and, in
general, to blacken and break down his literary reputation by any and
every means, even to the extent of aspersing his personal reputation,
although there had never been the slightest personal collision. Its
bitter and invidious spirit was not in the least disguised by a few
exaggerated compliments adroitly inserted here and there: these
merely furnish the foil needed to give greater potency and efficiency
to the personal insinuations, and, like Mark Antony's compliments to
Caesar's assassins, subserved quite too many politic purposes to be
accepted as sincere. Only a native of Boeotia could be imposed upon by
them, when the actual character of the book in question was carefully
misrepresented, and when the self-evident trend, tenor, and aim of the
ostensible review were to excite public prejudice against the author
on grounds wholly irrespective of the truth or untruth of his
expressed opinions.
Of course, the very largest liberty must be and should be conceded to
legitimate criticism. From this, as is well known, I never shrank in
the least; on the contrary, I court it, and desire nothing better for
my books, provided only that the criticism be pertinent, intelligent,
and fair. But misrepresentation for the purpose of detraction is not
criticism at all; and (notwithstanding numerous quotations perverted
by unfair and misleading glosses, including two misquotations quite
too useful to be accidental) this ostensible review is, from beginning
to end, nothing but misrepresentation for the purpose of detraction.
Passing over numerous minor instances, permit me to invite your
attention to three gross instances of such misrepresentation.
II.
The book under review had taken the utmost pains (pages 16-39,
especially page 39) to distinguish "realism" from "idealism," and to
argue for the former in opposition to the latter, on the ground of the
absolute incompatibility of the latter with the scientific method of
investigation. It had taken the utmost pains to make the contrast
broad and deep, and to point out its far-reaching consequences by
explicitly opposing (1) scientific realism to philosophical idealism
in general, and in particular (2) constructive realism to constructive
idealism, (3) critical realism to critical idealism, (4) ethical
realism to ethical idealism, and (5) religious realism to religious
idealism. Any fair or honorable critic would recognize this contrast
and opposition between realism and idealism as the very foundation of
the work he was criticising, and would at least state it candidly, as
the foundation of his own favorable or unfavorable comments. How did
Dr. Royce treat it? He not only absolutely ignored it, not only said
nothing whatever about it, but actually took pains to put the reader
on a false scent at the start, by assuring him (without the least
discussion of this all-important point) that my philosophical
conclusions are "essentially idealistic"!
So gross a misrepresentation as this might be charitably attributed to
critical incapacity of some sort, if it did not so very conveniently
pave the way for the second gross misrepresentation which was to
follow: namely, that the theory actually propounded in my book had
been, in fact, "_appropriated" and "borrowed" from an idealist_! The
immense utility of misrepresenting my system at the start as
"essentially idealistic" lay in the fact that, by adopting this
stratagem, Dr. Royce could escape altogether the formidable necessity
of _first arguing the main question of idealism versus realism_.
Secretly conscious of his own inability to handle that question, to
refute my "Soliloquy of the Self-Consistent Idealist," or to overthrow
my demonstration that consistent idealism leads logically to hopeless
absurdity at last, Dr. Royce found it infinitely easier to deceive his
uninformed readers by a bold assertion that I myself am an idealist at
bottom. This assertion, swallowed without suspicion of its absolute
untruth, would render it plausible and quite credible to assert, next,
that I had actually "appropriated" my philosophy from a greater
idealist than myself.
For the only substantial criticism of the book made by Dr. Royce is
that I "borrowed" my whole theory of universals from
Hegel--"unconsciously," he has the caution to say; but that
qualification does not in the least mitigate the mischievous intention
and effect of his accusation as a glaring falsification of fact and
artful misdescription of my work. It would be inopportune and
discourteous to weary you with philosophical discussions. I exposed
the amazing absurdity of Dr. Royce's accusation of plagiarism in the
reply to his article which, as appears below, Dr. Royce himself
anxiously suppressed, and which I should now submit to you, if he had
not at last taken fright and served upon me a legal protest against
its circulation. But, to any well-educated man, such an accusation as
this refutes itself. It would be just as reasonable, just as
plausible, to accuse Darwin of having borrowed his theory of natural
selection from Agassiz, or Daniel Webster of having borrowed his
theory of the inseparable Union from John C. Calhoun, or ex-President
Cleveland of having borrowed his message on tariff reform from the
Home Market Club, as to accuse me of having borrowed my theory of
universals from Hegel. Hegel's theory of universals is divided from
mine by the whole vast chasm between realism and idealism. The two
theories contradict each other absolutely, uncompromisingly,
irreconcilably: Hegel's is a theory of "absolute idealism" or "pure
thought" (_reines Denken_), that is, of _thought absolutely
independent of experience_, while mine is a theory of "scientific
realism," that is, of _thought absolutely dependent upon experience._
It is quite immaterial here which theory is the true one; the only
point involved at present is that the two theories flatly contradict
each other, and that it is self-evidently impossible that either
_could_ be "borrowed," consciously or unconsciously, from the other.
If Dr. Royce had ever done any hard thinking on the theory of
universals, or if he had the slightest comprehension of the problems
it involves, he would never have been so rash as to charge me with
"borrowing" my theory from Hegel, and thus to commit himself
irrevocably to a defence of the absurd; but eagerness to accuse
another has betrayed him into a position whence it is impossible for
him to escape with honor. Solely by misdescribing my philosophy as
"essentially idealistic" when it openly and constantly and
emphatically avows itself to be essentially realistic, could Dr. Royce
give the faintest color of plausibility to his monstrous and
supremely ridiculous accusation of plagiarism; solely by presuming
upon the public ignorance both of Hegel and of my own work could he
dare to publish such an accusation to the world. These gross
misrepresentations, however, he did not hesitate to make, since they
were necessary in order to pave the way to a third and still grosser
misrepresentation on which he apparently had set his heart: namely,
that, after borrowing the whole substance of my philosophy from Hegel,
I have been guilty of making "vast and extravagant pretensions" as to
my own "novelty," "originality," and "profundity," not only with
regard to my published books, but also with regard to my "still
unpublished system of philosophy." His words are these:--
"Of novelty, good or bad, the book contains, indeed, despite its vast
pretensions, hardly a sign."
"It is due also to the extravagant pretensions which he frequently
makes of late as to the originality and profundity of his still
unpublished system of philosophy, to give the reader some hint of what
so far appears to be the nature of our author's contributions to
philosophical reflection."
Precisely what have been these alleged "pretensions"? Dr. Royce cites
only three instances.
I. He first garbles a sentence in the prefatory Note to "The Way out
of Agnosticism," by quoting only one phrase from it. The sentence in
full is this: "By a wholly new line of reasoning, drawn exclusively
from those sources [science and philosophy], this book aims to show
that, in order to refute agnosticism and establish enlightened theism,
nothing is now necessary but to philosophize that very scientific
method which agnosticism barbarously misunderstands and misuses."
There is no "pretension" whatever in these words, except that the
general "line of reasoning" set forth in the book is, _as a whole_,
different from that of other books. If not, why publish it? Or,
without the same cause, why publish any book? I see no reason to
recall or to modify this perfectly true statement; Dr. Royce, at
least, has shown none. The "novelty" of the book lies in its very
attempt to evolve philosophy as a whole out of the scientific method
itself, as "observation, hypothesis, and experimental verification,"
by developing the theory of universals which is implicit in that
purely experiential method; and Dr. Royce does not even try to prove
that Hegel, or anybody else, has ever made just such an attempt as
that. Unless there can be shown somewhere a _parallel attempt_, the
statement is as undeniably true as it is certainly unpretentious.
II. Next, Dr. Royce extracts these sentences from the body of the book
(I supply in brackets words which he omitted): "The first great task
of philosophy is to lay deep and solid foundations for the expansion
[and ideal perfection] of human knowledge in a bold, new, and true
theory of universals. For so-called modern philosophy rests
complacently in a theory of universals which is thoroughly mediaeval or
antiquated." What personal pretension, even of the mildest sort, can
be conceived to lurk in these innocent words? I did not say that I
have succeeded in performing that "task"; I repeat now what I have
often said and what I meant then; namely, that modern science has
unawares performed it already, that I have faithfully tried to
formulate and further apply what science has done, and that I
respectfully submit the result (so far as already published), not to
such critics as Dr. Royce, but to able, learned, and magnanimous
students of philosophy everywhere.
III. Lastly, though employing quotation marks so as to evade a charge
of formal misquotation, he perverts and effectually misquotes a
sentence of the book in a way which makes it appear exactly what it is
not,--"pretentious." I had said at the end of my own book (page 75):
"_Its aim has been to show_ the way out of agnosticism into the
sunlight of the predestined philosophy of science." This expression is
perfectly in harmony with the prefatory Note, which says that "_this
book aims to show_ that, in order to refute agnosticism and establish
enlightened theism, nothing is now necessary but to philosophize that
very scientific method which agnosticism barbarously misunderstands
and misuses," and which immediately adds: "_Of the success of the
perhaps unwise attempt to show this in so small a compass, the
educated public must be the judge._" Most certainly, there is no
"pretension" in this modest and carefully guarded avowal of the simple
aim of my book. But Dr. Royce twists this modest avowal into a
barefaced boast, and injuriously misquotes me to his own readers thus:
"At the conclusion of the book, we learn that _we have been shown_
'the way out of agnosticism into the sunlight of the predestined
philosophy of science.'" Gentlemen, I request you to compare
thoughtfully the expressions which I have here italicized, and then
decide for yourselves whether this injurious misquotation is purely
accidental, or, in view of Dr. Royce's purpose of proving me guilty of
"vast pretensions," quite too useful to be purely accidental.
IV. But Dr. Royce does not content himself with quoting or misquoting
what I have published, for the self-evident reason that what I have
published is not sufficiently "pretentious" for his purpose.
Disinterested anxiety for the public welfare, and tender sorrow over
the "harm to careful inquiry" which my book is doing by "getting
influence over immature or imperfectly trained minds," constrain him
to accuse me of "frequently making of late extravagant pretensions as
to the originality and profundity" of my "still unpublished system of
philosophy."
Precisely what have been these "extravagant pretensions"? Simply
these:--
In the preface to "Scientific Theism," I said of that book: "It is a
mere _resume_ of a small portion of a comprehensive philosophical
system, so far as I have been able to work it out under most
distracting, discouraging, and unpropitious circumstances of many
years; and for this reason I must beg some indulgence for the
unavoidable incompleteness of my work."
Enumerating some reasons why I hesitated to begin the series of papers
afterwards published as "The Way out of Agnosticism," I said, in the
first of these papers: "First and foremost, perhaps, is the fact that,
although the ground-plan of this theory is already thoroughly matured,
the literary execution of it is as yet scarcely even begun, and from
want of opportunity may never be completed; and it seems almost absurd
to present the abridgment of a work which does not yet exist to be
abridged."
Finally, in an address printed in the "Unitarian Review" for December,
1889, I said: "Without advancing any personal claim whatever, permit
me to take advantage of your indulgent kindness, and to make here the
first public confession of certain painfully matured results of thirty
years' thinking, which, in the momentous and arduous enterprise of
developing a scientific theology out of the scientific method itself,
appear to be principles of cosmical import.... Perhaps I can make them
intelligible, as a contribution to that 'Unitary Science' which the
great Agassiz foresaw and foretold." In a postscript to this address I
added: "For fuller support of the position taken above, I am
constrained to refer ... to a large treatise, now in process of
preparation, which aims to rethink philosophy as a whole in the light
of modern science and under the form of a natural development of the
scientific method itself."
What remotest allusion to my own "originality" is contained in these
passages, or what remotest allusion to my own "profundity"? What
"pretension" of any sort is here made, whether "extravagant" or
moderate? Yet this is the only actual evidence, _and the whole of it_,
on which Dr. Royce dares to accuse me of "frequently making of late
extravagant pretensions as to the originality and profundity of my
still unpublished system of philosophy"! The pure absurdity of such an
accusation reveals itself in the very statement of it. Dr. Royce is
referring here, be it understood, not to my published books, but to my
"unpublished system of philosophy." _How does he know anything about
it?_ I certainly have never shown him my unpublished manuscript, and
beyond those published allusions to it he possesses absolutely no
means whatever of knowing anything about its contents. Nothing,
surely, except full and exact knowledge, derived from careful and
patient personal examination of that manuscript, could possibly be a
ground of just judgment of its character. How, then, in absolute
ignorance of its character and contents, could any fair man hazard any
public verdict upon it? Yet Dr. Royce not only accuses me of making
"pretensions" about it which I never made, but dares to characterize
them as "extravagant," when, _for all he knows_, they might (if made)
fall far short of the truth. Whether in this case the evidence
supports the accusation, and whether the conscience which permits the
making of such an accusation on such evidence is itself such a
conscience as you expect to find in your appointees,--these,
gentlemen, are questions for you yourselves to decide.
III.
These three connected and logically affiliated _misstatements of
fact_--namely, (1) that my philosophy is "essentially idealistic," (2)
that it has been "appropriated" and "unconsciously borrowed" from the
idealist Hegel, and (3) that I have frequently made "extravagant
pretensions as to the originality and profundity" of this merely
"borrowed" and "appropriated" philosophy--constitute in their totality
a regular system of gross and studied misrepresentation, as methodical
and coherent as it is unscrupulous. It is not "fair criticism"; it is
not "criticism" at all; and I do not hesitate to characterize it
deliberately as a disgrace both to Harvard University and to American
scholarship.
Yet, gross and studied and systematic as this misrepresentation is, I
should have passed it over in silence, precisely as I did pass over a
similar attack by Dr. Royce on my earlier book in "Science" for April
9, 1886, were it not that, perhaps emboldened by former impunity, he
now makes his misrepresentations culminate in the perpetration of a
literary outrage, to which, I am persuaded, no parallel can be found
in the history of polite literature. It is clear that forbearance must
have somewhere its limit. The commands of self-respect and of civic
conscience, the duty which every citizen owes to his fellow-citizens
not to permit the fundamental rights of all to be unlimitedly violated
in his own person, must at last set a bound to forbearance itself, and
compel to self-defence. These are the reasons which, after patient
exhaustion of every milder means of redress, have moved me to this
public appeal.
Dr. Royce's misstatements of fact, so elaborately fashioned and so
ingeniously mortised together, were merely his foundation for a
deliberate and formal "professional warning to the liberal-minded
public" against my alleged "philosophical pretensions." The device of
attributing to me extravagant but groundless "pretensions" to
"originality" and "profundity"--since he is unable to cite a single
passage in which I ever used such expressions of myself--was probably
suggested to him by the "Press Notices of 'Scientific Theism,'"
printed as a publishers' advertisement of my former book at the end of
the book which lay before him. These "Press Notices," as usual,
contain numerous extracts from eulogistic reviews, in which, curiously
enough, these very words, "original" and "profound," or their
equivalents, occur with sufficient frequency to explain Dr. Royce's
choleric unhappiness. For instance, Dr. James Freeman Clarke wrote in
the "Unitarian Review": "If every position taken by Dr. Abbot cannot
be maintained, his book remains an original contribution to philosophy
of a high order and of great value"; M. Renouvier, in "La Critique
Philosophique," classed the book among "de remarquables efforts de
construction metaphysique et morale dus a des penseurs independants et
profonds"; and M. Carrau, in explaining why he added to his critical
history of "Religious Philosophy in England" a chapter of twenty pages
on my own system, actually introduced both of the words which, when
thus applied, jar so painfully on Dr. Royce's nerves: "La pensee de M.
Abbot m'a paru assez profonde et assez originale pour meriter d'etre
reproduite litteralement." (La Philosophie Religieuse en Angleterre.
Par Ludovic Carrau, Directeur des Conferences de philosophie a la
Faculte des lettres de Paris. Paris, 1888.) These extracts, be it
remembered, were all printed at the end of the book which Dr. Royce
was reviewing. Now he had an undoubted right to think and to say that
such encomiums as these on my work were silly, extravagant,
preposterous, and totally undeserved; but _to take them out of the
mouth of others and put them into mine was wilful and deliberate
calumny_. Systematic and calumnious misrepresentation is the sole
foundation of the "professional warning" in which Dr. Royce's
ostensible review culminates, and which is too extraordinary not to be
quoted here in full:--
"And so, finally, after this somewhat detailed study of Dr. Abbot's
little book, I feel constrained to repeat my judgment as above.
Results in philosophy are one thing; a careful way of thinking is
another. Babes and sucklings often get very magnificent results. It is
not the office of philosophy to outdo the babes and sucklings at their
own business of receiving revelations. It is the office of philosophy
to undertake a serious scrutiny of the presuppositions of human
belief. Hence the importance of the careful way of thinking in
philosophy. But Dr. Abbot's way is not careful, is not novel, and,
when thus set forth to the people as new and bold and American, it is
likely to do precisely as much harm to careful inquiry as it gets
influence over immature or imperfectly trained minds. I venture,
therefore, to speak plainly, by way of a professional warning to the
liberal-minded public concerning Dr. Abbot's philosophical
pretensions. And my warning takes the form of saying that, if people
are to think in this confused way, unconsciously borrowing from a
great speculator like Hegel, and then depriving the borrowed
conception of the peculiar subtlety of statement that made it useful
in its place,--and if we readers are for our part to accept such
scholasticism as is found in Dr. Abbot's concluding sections as at all
resembling philosophy,--then it were far better for the world that no
reflective thinking whatever should be done. If we can't improve on
what God has already put into the mouth of the babes and sucklings,
let us at all events make some other use of our wisdom and prudence
than in setting forth the American theory of what has been in large
part hidden from us."
Gentlemen, I deny sweepingly the whole groundwork of cunning and
amazing misrepresentation on which this unparalleled tirade is
founded.
I. I deny that my philosophy is "essentially idealistic," or that any
"careful" or conscientious scholar could possibly affirm it to be
such.
II. I deny that I "borrowed" my realistic theory of universals from
the idealist, Hegel, whether consciously or unconsciously. The charge
is unspeakably silly. Realism and idealism contradict each other more
absolutely than protectionism and free-trade.
III. I deny that I ever made the "philosophical pretensions" which Dr.
Royce calumniously imputes to me. But, if I had made pretensions as
high as the Himalayas, I deny his authority to post me publicly--to
act as policeman in the republic of letters and to collar me on that
account. A college professor who thus mistakes his academic gown for
the policeman's uniform, and dares to use his private walking-stick
for the policeman's bludgeon, is likely to find himself suddenly
prostrated by a return blow, arrested for assault and battery, and
unceremoniously hustled off into a cell, by the officer whose function
he has injudiciously aped without waiting for the tiresome but quite
indispensable little preliminary of first securing a regular
commission.
IV. Most of all, I deny Dr. Royce's self-assumed right to club every
philosopher whose reasoning he can neither refute nor understand. I
deny, in general, that any Harvard professor has the right to
fulminate a "professional warning" _against anybody_; and, in
particular, that you, gentlemen, ever voted or intended to invest Dr.
Royce with that right. He himself now publicly puts forth a worse than
"extravagant pretension" when he arrogates to himself this right of
literary outrage. He was not appointed professor by you for any such
unseemly purpose. To arrogate to himself a senseless "professional"
superiority over all non-"professional" authors, to the insufferable
extent of publicly posting and placarding them for a mere difference
of opinion, is, from a moral point of view, scandalously to abuse his
academical position, to compromise the dignity of Harvard University,
to draw down universal contempt upon the "profession" which he
prostitutes to the uses of mere professional jealousy or literary
rivalry, and to degrade the honorable office of professor in the eyes
of all who understand that a weak argument is not strengthened, and a
false accusation is not justified, by throwing "professional warnings"
as a make-weight into the scales of reason. I affirm emphatically that
no professor has a moral right to treat anybody with this undisguised
"insolence of office," or to use any weapon but reason in order to put
down what he conceives to be errors in philosophy. In the present
case, I deny that Dr. Royce has any better or stronger claim than
myself to speak "professionally" on philosophical questions. The very
book against which he presumes to warn the public "professionally" is
founded upon lectures which I myself "professionally" delivered, not
only from Dr. Royce's own desk and to Dr. Royce's own college class,
but as a substitute for Dr. Royce himself, at the request and by the
appointment of his own superiors, the Corporation and Overseers of his
own University; and the singular impropriety (to use no stronger word)
of his "professional warning" will be apparent to every one in the
light of that fact.
IV.
So far I have treated Dr. Royce's attack solely from the literary and
ethical points of view. The legal point of view must now be
considered.
Plagiarism, conscious or unconscious, is a very grave and serious
charge to bring against an author, and one which may entail upon him,
not only great damage to his literary reputation, but also social
disgrace and pecuniary loss. If proved, or even if widely believed
without proof, it cannot but ruin his literary career and destroy the
marketable value of his books; and it matters little, so far as these
practical results are concerned, whether the plagiarism attributed to
him is conscious or unconscious. In an able editorial article on "Law
and Theft," published in the New York "Nation" of Feb. 12, 1891, it is
forcibly said: "Authors or writers who do this [borrowing other men's
ideas] a good deal, undoubtedly incur discredit by it with their
fellows and the general public. It greatly damages a writer's fame to
be rightfully accused of want of originality, or of imitation, or of
getting materials at second hand. But no one has ever proposed to
punish or restrain this sort of misappropriation by law. No one has
ever contended for the infliction on the purloiners of other men's
ideas of any penalty but ridicule or disgrace." Whoever _wrongfully_
accuses an author of plagiarism, then, holds him up _undeservedly_ to
"discredit, ridicule, or disgrace," and "slanders his title" to the
product of his own brain. This is contrary to the law. Yet this is
precisely what Dr. Royce has done in accusing me _falsely_, and as a
_"certain" matter of fact_, of borrowing my theory of universals from
Hegel. His accusation is made with as many sneers and as much insult
as could well be compressed into the space:--
"Dr. Abbot is hopelessly unhistorical in his consciousness. His
'American theory of universals' is so far from being either his own or
a product of America that in this book he continually has to use, in
expounding it, one of the most characteristic and familiar of Hegel's
technical terms, namely, 'concrete,' in that sense in which it is
applied to the objective and universal 'genus.' Dr. Abbot's
appropriation of Hegel's peculiar terminology comes ill indeed from
one who talks," _etc._ "This I say not to defend Hegel, for whose
elaborate theory of universals I hold in no wise a brief, but simply
in the cause of literary property-rights. When we plough with another
man's heifer, however unconscious we are of our appropriation, however
sincerely we seem to remember that we alone raised her from her
earliest calfhood, it is yet in vain, after all, that we put our brand
on her, or call her 'American.'... Now Hegel's whole theory may be
false; but what is certain is that Dr. Abbot, who has all his life
been working in an atmosphere where Hegelian ideas were more or less
infectious, has derived his whole theory of universals, so far as he
has yet revealed it with any coherency, from Hegelian sources, and
even now cannot suggest any better terminology than Hegel's for an
important portion of the doctrine. Yet in the volume before us we find
all this pretentious speech of an 'American' theory, and discover our
author wholly unaware that he is sinning against the most obvious
demands of literary property-rights."
Passing over the self-evident point that whoever is "_unaware_ that he
is sinning" cannot be "sinning" at all, since "sinning" consists in
_being aware_ of the wrong we do,--and, consequently, that Dr. Royce
comes here as near as he dares to a direct insinuation that my
plagiarism is conscious, and not "unconscious,"--let me call your
attention to the more important point, that Dr. Royce affirms my
conscious or unconscious theft from Hegel as a matter of _"certain"
fact_, not merely as a matter of _probable inference_. Yet the only
evidence he has to offer in support of this "certainty" is (1) that I
use the word "concrete" in the same sense as Hegel, and (2) that I
have worked all my life in a Hegelian "atmosphere." These two points
cover all the grounds of his accusation. Permit me very briefly to
examine them.
(1) The word "concrete" is not in the least a technical term
copyrighted by Hegel, nor is it his trademark. It is one of the
commonest of words, and free to all. But what sort of a reasoner is he
who infers the identity of two whole complex theories from their
coincidence in the use of only a single word? Even this poor and
solitary little premise slips out of Dr. Royce's clutch, for Hegel's
use of the word is _contradictory to mine_! Hegel has to put upon the
word "concrete" a very unusual, strained, and artificial sense, in
order to cover up the weakest point of his idealistic system. He
explains it, however, frankly, clearly, and unambiguously: "The
Concept or Notion (_Begriff_) may be always called 'abstract,' if the
term 'concrete' must be limited to the mere concrete of sensation and
immediate perception; the Notion as such cannot be grasped by the
hands, and, when we deal with it, eyes and ears are out of the
question. Yet, as was said before, the Notion is the only true
concrete." (_Encyklopaedie, Werke_, VI. 316.) Again: "Just as little is
the sensuous-concrete of Intuition a rational-concrete of the Idea."
(_Ibid., Werke_, VI. 404.) A score of similar passages can easily be
cited. That is to say, Hegel avowedly excludes from his _idealistic_
theory of universals the "concrete" of sensation, perception,
intuition, or _real experience_, and admits into it only the
"concrete" of _pure or non-empirical thought_; while I avowedly
exclude from my _realistic_ theory of universals the "concrete" of
_pure thought_, and admit into it only the "concrete" of _real
experience_. Hegel's "concrete" cannot be seen, heard, or touched;
while to me nothing which cannot be seen, heard, or touched is
"concrete" at all. A mere common school education is quite sufficient
for comprehension of the contradictoriness of these two uses of the
word. Yet, in order to found a malicious charge of plagiarism, Dr.
Royce has the hardihood to assure the uninformed general public that
Hegel and I use the word "concrete" in one and the same sense!
(2) The assertion that I have lived all my life in a Hegelian
"atmosphere" I can only meet with a short, sharp, and indignant
denial. I know of no such "atmosphere" in all America; if it anywhere
exists, I certainly never lived, moved, or worked in it. The statement
is a gratuitous, impertinent, and _totally false allegation of fact_,
wholly outside of my book and its contents, and is used in this
connection solely to feather an arrow shot at my reputation; it is a
pure invention, a manufactured assertion which is absolutely without
foundation, and, when thus artfully thrown out with apparent
artlessness (_ars celare artem_) as itself foundation for a false and
malicious charge of plagiarism, it becomes fabrication of evidence for
the purpose of defamation. The less said about such an offence as
that, the better for Dr. Royce, and I spare him the comment it
deserves.
Now, while it might be "fair criticism" _to infer_ my plagiarism from
Hegel, if there were only some reasonable or even merely plausible
evidence to support the inference (which I have just proved not to be
the case), it is incontestable that _to affirm_ this plagiarism, as a
"certain" matter of fact, without any reasonable evidence at all, is
not that "fair criticism" which the law justly allows, but, on the
contrary, a totally unjustifiable libel. In accusing me personally of
plagiarism on no reasonable grounds whatever, as I have just
unanswerably proved him to have done, and in making the "certainty" of
the plagiarism depend upon an allegation of fact wholly independent of
the book which he professed to be criticising (namely, the false
allegation that I have worked all my life in a Hegelian "atmosphere"),
Dr. Royce has beyond all controversy transgressed the legally defined
limits of "fair criticism," and become a libeller.
But this is by no means all. If the bat-like accusation of an
"unconscious", yet "sinning" (or sinful) plagiarism hovers ambiguously
between attacking my literary reputation and attacking my moral
character, there is no such ambiguity hanging about the accusation of
"extravagant pretensions as to the originality and profundity of my
still unpublished system of philosophy." A decent modesty, a
self-respectful reserve, a manly humility in presence of the
unattainable ideal of either moral or intellectual perfection, a
speechless reverence in the presence of either infinite goodness or
infinite truth,--these are virtues which belong to the very warp and
woof of all noble, elevated, and justly estimable character; and
wherever their absence is conspicuously shown, there is just ground
for moral condemnation and the contempt of mankind. Dr. Royce has not
scrupled to accuse me of making, not only "pretensions," but even
"extravagant pretensions," which are absolutely incompatible with the
possession of these beautiful and essential virtues, and thereby to
hold me up to universal contempt and derision. He has done this, by
the very terms of his accusation, absolutely and confessedly _without
cause_; for the system of philosophy which is "unpublished" to others
is no less "unpublished" to him, and an accusation thus made
confessedly without any knowledge of its truth is, on the very face
of it, an accusation which is as malicious as it is groundless. To
make such a self-proved and self-condemned accusation as this is, I
submit, to be guilty of libel with no ordinary degree of culpability.
But the libel of which I have greatest cause to complain is not
confined to exceptional or isolated expressions. These might
charitably be explained as mere momentary ebullitions of pettishness
or spleen, and pardonable as merely faults of temper in a criticism
which was in the main conscientious and fair. But the libel of which I
complain most of all is one that constitutes the entire ground and
framework of the article _as a whole_. Every part of it is
methodically spun and interwoven with every other part, in such a way
as to make it one seamless tissue of libel from beginning to end. This
I say in full consciousness of the interspersed occasional
compliments, since these have only the effect of disguising the
libellous intent of the whole from a simple-minded or careless reader,
and since they subserve the purpose of furnishing to the writer a
plausible and ready-made defence of his libel against a foreseen
protest. Compliments to eke out a libel are merely insults in
masquerade. The libellous plan of the article as a whole is shown in
the _regular system_ of gross and studied misrepresentation, of
logically connected and nicely dovetailed misstatements of facts,
which I exposed at the outset. Every intelligent reader of my two
books is perfectly aware that they are both devoted to an exposition
of the fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between philosophical
idealism and scientific realism, and to a defence of the latter
against the former, as the only possible method by which a spiritual
theism can be intellectually, and therefore successfully, defended in
this age of science. Only one who has read and digested the two books
can fully appreciate the enormity and the unscrupulousness of the
initial misrepresentation, slipped in, as it were, quite casually, and
without any argument, in the apparently incidental and
matter-of-course statement that my "conclusion" is "essentially
idealistic." It is _not_ "idealistic" at all, but as radically
realistic as the premises themselves; and no professor of philosophy
could ever have called it "idealistic" by a mere slip of the tongue or
pen. The intelligent origin of this misrepresentation is clearly
enough suggested in the use to which it is at once put: namely, to
render plausible the otherwise ridiculous charge that my theory of
universals was "borrowed" from an idealist. Next, the same origin is
more than suggested by the use to which these two misrepresentations
together are put: namely, to show that any claim of "novelty" for a
merely "borrowed" philosophy is a "vast" and "extravagant pretension."
Lastly, the same origin is inductively and conclusively proved, when
these three inter-linked misrepresentations, as a whole, are made the
general foundation for a brutal "professional warning" to the public
at large against my "philosophical pretensions" in general. Not one of
these fundamental positions of Dr. Royce's article is a fact,--least
of all, an "admitted fact"; on the contrary, each of them is
energetically and indignantly denied. But the libel of which I
complain above all is the _regular system_ of gross and studied
misrepresentation by which the most essential facts are first
misstated and falsified, and then used to the injury of my literary
and personal reputation.
It may, I trust, be permitted to me here to show clearly what the law
is, as applicable to the case in hand, by a few pertinent citations.
"The critic must confine himself to criticism, and not make it the
veil for personal censure, nor allow himself to run into reckless and
unfair attacks, merely from the love of exercising his power of
denunciation. Criticism and comment on well-known and admitted facts
are very different things from the assertion of unsubstantiated facts.
A fair and _bona fide_ comment on a matter of public interest is an
excuse of what would otherwise be a defamatory publication. The
statement of this rule assumes the matters of fact commented on to be
somehow ascertained. It does not mean that a man may invent facts, and
comment on the facts so invented in what would be a fair and _bona
fide_ manner, on the supposition that the facts were true. If the
facts as a comment upon which the publication is sought to be excused
do not exist, the foundation fails.... The distinction cannot be too
clearly borne in mind between comment or criticism and allegations of
fact.... To state matters which are libellous is not comment or
criticism." (_Newell on Defamation, Slander, and Libel_, p. 568.)
Applying this to the case in hand: the "admitted facts" are these: (1)
my philosophy is realistic from beginning to end; (2) I have not
worked all my life, nor any part of my life, in a Hegelian
"atmosphere"; (3) I did not borrow my theory of universals from Hegel;
(4) I have made no vast or extravagant pretensions whatever as to my
own philosophy. But Dr. Royce invents and states the exact opposite of
all these facts, and then bases on these purely invented facts most
undeserved "personal censure" and most "reckless and unfair attacks."
Therefore, his article is a libel in its whole groundwork and
essential spirit.
"If a person, under pretence of criticising a literary work, defames
the private character of the author, and, instead of writing in the
spirit and for the purpose of fair and candid discussion, travels into
collateral matter, and introduces facts not stated in the work,
accompanied with injurious comment upon them, such person is a
libeller, and liable to an action." (_Broom's Legal Maxims_, p. 320.)
Applying this to the case in hand: Dr. Royce "defames" my "private
character," when he accuses me of "frequently" indulging in
"extravagant pretensions"; he "travels into collateral matter," when
he alludes at all to my unpublished manuscript; he "introduces facts
not stated in the work, accompanied with injurious comment upon them,"
when he alludes to this unpublished manuscript for the sole purpose of
saying (untruthfully) that I "frequently make, of late, extravagant
pretensions as to its originality and profundity," and again when he
says that I have worked all my life in a Hegelian "atmosphere," for
the sole purpose of founding upon this false statement a false charge
of plagiarism.
In the "Griffith Gaunt" case, Judge Clerke said in his charge to the
jury: "The interests of literature and science require that the
productions of authors shall be subject to fair criticism,--that even
some animadversion may be permitted, unless it appears that the
critic, under the pretext of reviewing his book, takes an opportunity
of attacking the character of the author, and of holding him up as an
object of ridicule, hatred, or contempt. In other words, the critic
may say what he pleases of the literary merits or demerits of the
published production of an author; but, with respect to his personal
rights relating to his reputation, the critic has no more privilege
than any other person not assuming the business of criticism."
(_Abbott's Practice Reports_, New Series, VI. 18.) Applying this to
the case in hand: Dr. Royce, "under the pretext of reviewing" my
"book, takes an opportunity of attacking the author, and of holding
him up as an object of ridicule and contempt," if ridicule and
contempt are the deservedly universal punishment of the plagiarist and
the braggart. To so unprecedented a length has he carried this attack,
as deliberately and formally, in the name of his "profession," and
therefore, by necessary implication, in the name of Harvard University
itself, to "warn the liberal-minded public" against me, _precisely as
one warns the general public against an impostor soliciting alms under
false pretences_! This is a flagrant violation of my "personal rights
relating to my reputation"; and, therefore, according to the above
judicial ruling of an American court, Dr. Royce is guilty of wanton
and unprovoked libel against one who never injured him in the
slightest degree.
In the case of Strauss _versus_ Francis, Chief Justice Cockburn said:
"The question is as to the article as a whole.... The verdict must be
upon the article as a whole, and whether, as a whole, it is to be
deemed malicious and libellous." (_Foster and Finlason's Reports_, IV.
1107.) Applying this to the case in hand: Dr. Royce's ostensible
review presents its darkest, most odious, and most libellous aspect to
him who most thoroughly, penetratingly, and comprehensively studies
out the inner structure of its argument _as a whole_, and who most
intelligently compares it with the book which it falsely professes to
criticise fairly. Allow me to quote here a passage from page 39 of
"the Way out of Agnosticism" in order simply to show you how
uncompromisingly this passage, which sums up the entire results of the
first half of the book and luminously forecasts the entire conclusion
of the whole, plants my system on the side of Realism:--