number, primarily at Dr. Royce's instigation. But I now found that I
was to be refused the freedom necessary to self-defence against the
second libel--the same freedom already yielded in replying to the
first. Now to answer a libel effectively requires the freedom, not of
the parliament, but of the courts. A mere literary discussion admits
of parliamentary freedom alone, and properly excludes all reflections
upon personal character. But Dr. Royce had most unparliamentarily
turned his ostensible review into a libel, and, contrary to all canons
of literary discussion, had indulged himself in reflections upon my
personal character as malicious as they were false. Now the only
possible disproof of a libel is the proof that it _is_ a libel,--that
it is either untruthful, or malicious, or both; and, since a libel is
both a civil injury and a criminal offence, the proof of its libellous
character cannot be established without reflecting upon the personal
character of the libeller. Hence Dr. Royce himself, by writing a
libel, had self-evidently raised the question of his own personal
character, and bound himself beforehand, by his own act, to submit
with what grace he could to the necessary consequences of that act;
and to seek to shield himself from these consequences, which he should
have foreseen clearly and nerved himself to bear bravely, was only to
incur the ridicule invited by a timorous man who first strikes
another and then runs away. Dr. Adler, moreover, as the responsible
editor of the "Journal of Ethics," had laid himself, by publishing Dr.
Royce's libel, under the clear moral obligation of according to the
accused the same freedom of the courts which he had already accorded
to the accuser; and to seek to escape this moral obligation was to
incur the censure invited by any one who assumes the editorial
function without properly informing himself of the duties which it
imposes with reference to third parties. Both the one and the other
had estopped themselves from denying to the accused in self-defence
the same freedom of the courts which they had granted to themselves as
accusers in attack.
Notwithstanding these plain facts, Dr. Royce and Dr. Adler united in
denying to me the necessary freedom of self-defence against the attack
which they had united in making.
At first, Dr. Royce undertook to dictate to me beforehand the nature
of my reply to his rejoinder, and sought to restrict it to the
parliamentary freedom of a purely literary discussion. Ignoring the
fact that he had himself rendered a purely literary discussion
impossible by his own reflections upon personal character, he
endeavored now to restrict my defence to a purely literary discussion
of what, with amusing deficiency in the sense of humor, he considered
to be his "criticisms"; whereas these pointless and ignorant
criticisms had no importance whatever except as leading up to his
"professional warning." The only object of a reply to his rejoinder
was to expose its true character as a second libel, and thereby make
plain to the dullest mind the outrage of his "professional warning."
Evidently fearing this, and being anxious to prevent the exposure, he
sent to me through Mr. Weston, who called upon me for the purpose on
April 15, the following unspeakable document, apparently without a
suspicion that it pricked the bubble of his previous iridescent pledge
to "ask no mercy":--
MEMORANDUM OF APR. 13, 1891.
1. Dr. Abbot's article must be in Mr. Weston's hands in MS.
by June 1, for issue in the July No., if possible.
2. This article must not exceed, in actual number of words,
Prof. Royce's last rejoinder.
3. Prof. Royce is not to reply to the above article of Dr.
Abbot before or simultaneously with its publication in the
"Journal of Ethics"; and the controversy is thus to be
closed in the "Journal" by Dr. Abbot.
4. Dr. Abbot's article is to be strictly a rejoinder, is not
to raise essentially new issues, is not to assault any
further his opponent's personal character, is to be
parliamentary in form, and free from personally abusive
language. Otherwise it is perfectly free as to plainness of
speech.
5. Prof. Royce is to see this article at once, and before it
goes to the printer.
6. Should Prof. Royce, after seeing the paper, object to the
article as "_not in conformity with the conditions of No. 4_
(_above_)," then, but only then, the article is to be
submitted, before publication, to the judgment of some
impartial friend or friends of both the disputants, such
friend or friends to be chosen as promptly as possible, and
by agreement, and to arbitrate the question, "_Whether Dr.
Abbot's final rejoinder is in conformity with the conditions
of this present memorandum?_" The arbitrator or arbitrators
may be any person or persons agreable [_sic_] to the wishes
of both the disputants, as determined in case the mentioned
objection of Prof. Royce should be made, but not otherwise.
7. Should Prof. Royce _not_ object to the article, or should
he not formally object _on the grounds mentioned_, then the
article of Dr. Abbot is to close the controversy in the
"Journal of Ethics."
8. Should Dr. Abbot _not_ accept the conditions of the
present memorandum, he is at liberty to withdraw his paper,
or else to let both the papers now in type appear as they
are, at his pleasure.
[Signed] J. R.
It is difficult to conceive the state of mind in which so
extraordinary a document as this could have originated. My answer to
Dr. Royce's officious interference was a short and dry rejection _in
toto_. Dr. Royce was not the responsible editor of the "Journal of
Ethics," and had no power to dictate any conditions of publication
whatever. That a libeller should actually presume to dictate to the
libelled the terms of his defence, to demand that this defence should
be submitted to himself in advance of publication for approval or
disapproval, and, in case of disapproval, to invoke a board of
referees for the sole purpose of enforcing his own arbitrary and
preposterous "conditions,"--this was too exquisitely absurd. But there
was method in the madness. The central aim of the "Memorandum" is
clear on its face: namely, _to refuse the forensic freedom necessary
to self-defence against a libel, and to concede only the parliamentary
freedom proper to a purely literary discussion_. Since, however, the
only object of my writing at all was to expose his rejoinder as a
second libel, and since the central aim of the "Memorandum" was to
defeat this very object, nothing could be plainer than this: that Dr.
Royce, having been guilty of two unprovoked and malicious libels, now
sought to prevent the exposure of his guilt by suppressing the
necessary freedom of self-defence. For, I repeat, the only possible
defence against a libel is to prove that it _is_ a libel, and this
cannot be done without reflecting upon the "personal character" of the
libeller. It was no fault of mine that he had himself rendered a
"parliamentary" discussion impossible; it was no fault of mine that he
had made his own "personal character" the real point at issue; it was
no fault of mine that he now betrayed his secret alarm, uttered a cry
for "mercy," and convicted himself out of his own mouth, in his
extraordinary and indescribable "Memorandum." That "Memorandum" tells
the whole story.
On the failure of Dr. Royce's very injudicious attempt at dictation,
Dr. Adler found himself compelled to assume the editorial power and
responsibility, which he ought to have assumed and exercised in the
first instance by refusing publication to Dr. Royce's original libel.
But, yielding to Dr. Royce's influence, he took the same position, and
still tried to shield the libeller from the just and lawful
consequences of his libel. No principle is more firmly established in
the public conscience, as interpreted by the common law, than that the
fact of an attack by A involves the right of self-defence by B.
Whoever, therefore, has permitted an attack which he might have
prevented is bound to permit the self-defence, also; and Dr. Adler,
having granted to Dr. Royce the freedom of libelling me, was bound to
grant to me the equal freedom of defending myself against the libel.
But this equal freedom Dr. Adler denied. After some fruitless
correspondence, I wrote to him on May 4 as follows: "I require the
freedom, not of 'parliament,' but of the courts--freedom to present my
'facts,' and no less to draw my 'inferences'--freedom to array my
evidence, and no less to make my pleading. By publishing his new
libel, you estop yourself from denying me this freedom. If you do deny
it, I withdraw altogether and seek justice and redress elsewhere. I
ask only what is self-evidently fair: (1) equal space with Dr. Royce,
(2) equal freedom with Dr. Royce, (3) no further rejoinders by Dr.
Royce, and (4) no editorial mention of the matter at all from the
'Journal' itself." To this letter Dr. Adler merely telegraphed his
final reply on May 6 in these brief terms: "Regret your insistence on
freedom of courts--parliamentary freedom open to you." This ended the
matter, so far as the "Journal of Ethics" was concerned, in Dr.
Adler's explicit denial of a full and fair hearing in its columns to a
party calumniated and libelled by one of his own contributors and a
member of his own "editorial committee."
Negotiations, it is true, for the publication of my reply in the July
number were a little later re-opened by Dr. Adler, on receiving advice
from a legal friend of his own that to publish it would be his wisest
course; but he himself broke them off on a trivial pretext, after
receiving contrary advice from Dr. Royce's counsel, together with a
copy of the legal protest sent to me personally. Thus Dr. Royce
himself, recalling his original consent, procured the final rejection
by the "Journal of Ethics" of my reply to his own attack. On June 19,
I was notified that the July number had been made up without it.
But already, on June 9, I had received from Mr. J. B. Warner, acting
as Dr. Royce's counsel, this formal protest against any other use
whatever of my reply: "On Dr. Royce's behalf, I must warn you that he
protests against the publication or any circulation of it, in its
present shape, and must point out to you that it may, if circulated,
entail a serious legal responsibility." To this strangely impolitic
and utterly futile attempt to intimidate me in the defence of my own
reputation, I chose to offer not the slightest resistance. The protest
only facilitated that defence. How could a libeller more conspicuously
put himself in the wrong, or more effectually ruin his own evil cause
in all eyes, than by _trying to gag the man he had injured_? First, to
prevent publication in the "Journal of Ethics" of the very reply he
had publicly and defiantly challenged, and then to suppress all
circulation of a few privately printed copies of it by means of legal
threats: if Dr. Royce could afford to commit such blunders, why should
I shield him from himself? "Whom the gods destroy, they first make
mad."
Before proceeding to any more energetic measures, however, in order to
vindicate my reputation, I was anxious to offer to Dr. Royce an
opportunity of doing me justice in a manner which should be consistent
with full vindication, yet should involve the least possible publicity
and the least possible mortification to himself. Accordingly, on June
20, I wrote to Mr. Warner thus: "I beg leave to enclose a Card, which,
if returned to me within a week from to-day, unchanged, dated, and
signed by Dr. Royce, and if actually published in the October number
of the 'Journal,' will render unnecessary further measures of
self-vindication as now contemplated. I send this because you assured
me that Dr. Royce disclaims all malice in the publication of the
original article I complain of, and because I am willing to test the
sincerity of his disclaimer before resorting to other measures for my
self-protection. I expect you, who came to me in the character of a
pacificator, and who expressed a creditable desire, in which I fully
join, for the settlement of this trouble in some way which shall
occasion no scandal to Harvard College, to exert your utmost
influence with Dr. Royce to persuade him to perform this act of
manifest justice to me. A frank retraction and apology, when unjust
charges have been made as now, is not dishonorable and ought not to be
humiliating; and I shall consider Dr. Royce's action in this matter as
showing the sincerity or insincerity of his disclaimer of all malice
in his original article." The enclosed paper above mentioned was
this:--
A CARD.
CAMBRIDGE, June --, 1891.
I. I admit that I have no knowledge whatever of any
"extravagant pretensions" made by Dr. Abbot "as to the
originality and profundity of his still unpublished system
of philosophy."
II. I admit that Dr. Abbot did not, consciously or
unconsciously, "borrow his theory of universals from Hegel,"
or "sin against the most obvious demands of literary
property-rights."
III. I unconditionally retract my "professional warning to
the liberal-minded public against Dr. Abbot's philosophical
pretensions," acknowledge that it was groundless and
unjustifiable, and apologize to Dr. Abbot for having
published it in the "International Journal of Ethics."
IV. I authorize the publication of this retraction and
apology in the next number of the "International Journal of
Ethics" without note or comment.
In his answer of June 24, Mr. Warner informed me that Dr. Royce had
gone to Denver, and wrote: "As for the Card which you propose, I will
leave Dr. Royce to make his own answer after he has seen it. I will
say, however, for my own part, that, while he has always been ready to
disclaim any desire to injure you personally, I think that his
opinions concerning your philosophical system and its origin are
unchanged, and he is not likely to retract them. I must say, too, that
you have put your Card in a form in which you could not have expected
Dr. Royce to sign it, and I do not regard it as any step, on your
part, toward a pacific settlement, nor think your demand a reasonable
one to make of a self-respecting man."
The next day, June 25, I wrote to Mr. Warner: "I ought distinctly to
deny that my rejected article is 'a libellous paper.' Its statements
are true; its motive is not malice, but a self-evident purpose to
defend myself against Dr. Royce's libel; and, even if it should be
concluded to come under any legal definition of 'libel,' I maintain
that it is self-evidently a 'justifiable libel.' If I pay any heed to
your notice, it is merely because your notice strengthens my
case.--You do not mention when Dr. Royce will return from Denver; but,
because my purpose in enclosing to you that Card is in good faith a
pacific one, I will wait a reasonable time for his return beyond the
date I mentioned. You will not judge the character of that Card
accurately, and you cannot give sound or salutary advice to your
client, if you ignore the libellous character of his original article.
I do not see how 'a self-respecting man' could ever have written such
a paper; but, if he did it inadvertently and not maliciously, he would
certainly do one of two things: (1) either submit courageously,
unflinchingly, and without legal protest, to the reply it challenged
and evoked, or (2) manfully retract charges demonstrated, as these
have been, to be false. Have you really a different idea of
'self-respect'? Certainly not, for you are an honorable gentleman. Be
this as it may, I warn you not to persist in considering that Card as
other than a pacific step on my part, if you desire to counsel your
client to his own good, or to prove yourself a real friend to Harvard
College. I say this in good faith."
To this, on July 2, Mr. Warner replied: "Dr. Royce has returned, and I
have submitted to him the Card which you have prepared. As I
anticipated, Dr. Royce says that he cannot sign it, nor can I advise
him to do so. It goes far beyond any disavowal of malice or personal
hostility, and it amounts to a retraction of the opinions which he
actually holds about your philosophical system, and that retraction
you surely cannot expect him to make. Dr. Royce has again expressed to
me his regret that the form of his article should have wounded you,
and he is entirely ready to disavow any intention of wounding you."
On July 11, I wrote in answer: "Most certainly I do not expect, or
wish, that Dr. Royce should disavow any philosophical 'opinions' he
may hold. What I complain of is a _misstatement of fact_, demonstrated
to be such, which I believe to have had its origin in a spirit of
malicious detraction, and to be now persevered in from no other cause.
In my reply to his article, which he himself challenged and then
pusillanimously suppressed, he has had abundant means of information.
If he now refuses to correct a misstatement which grossly injures me,
after he has been informed of the truth, the refusal admits of but one
interpretation, and throws a satirical light on the merely private
'regret' he professes. Inasmuch, however, as you have objected (quite
unnecessarily, as I think) to the 'form' of the Card I sent you, and
inasmuch as I intend to leave no room for doubt as to Dr. Royce's real
animus in this affair, I propose now that he send me such a retraction
and apology as you yourself shall deem adequate, fitting, and due. In
your letter of June 9, you admitted that Dr. Royce had 'transgressed
the limits of courteous discussion' and that you 'do not defend in all
respects the tone of the review.' It is plain enough that you, Dr.
Royce's own counsel, perceive at least something improper, something
that ought to be retracted and apologized for. You are, then, I
submit, bound to do what you can to right the wrong, which is not at
all done by Dr. Royce's profuse, _but private_, disclaimers. He
professes to bear no malice. Very well, then: let him make reparation
for the wrong he has committed. He owes it to himself, if he considers
himself a gentleman, certainly to his position in Harvard College, to
send me some paper, specifying what he himself regrets in his own
article, with authority to publish this paper in the 'Journal of
Ethics.' The Card I sent sufficiently indicates what I think is due to
me; if Dr. Royce, in other language, covers the same ground, it will
be accepted as satisfactory. That is the very least that a gentleman
would do under the circumstances. You cannot object to this proposal
on account of its 'form'; if either you or he objects to it at all,
it must be on account of its substance. Certainly you cannot affect to
consider it as other than 'pacific.' I shall await your answer to it
as to the only 'pacific step on my part' which remains possible to
me."
In reply to this letter, on July 24, Mr. Warner wrote: "I forwarded
your letter of July 11 to Dr. Royce, and he has written a reply to me
which I think it best to enclose as he wrote it." In this enclosed
letter, dated July 14, Dr. Royce first re-affirmed, in substance, the
truth of his false and ridiculous accusation of plagiarism from Hegel,
and then wrote as follows: "Now as to my feeling concerning what was
regrettable in my article. I repeat once more--regrettable, in my
eyes, was the manner of the article in so far as it actually gave
unnecessary pain to Dr. Abbot. And I regard any pain as unnecessary
that may have been due, _not_ to my objectively justified opinion of
Dr. Abbot's work (an opinion which I cannot alter in the least), but
to any severity of expression that may not have been absolutely
needful to give form to this opinion itself. Dr. Abbot's reply has
shown him to be not merely alive to the strong difference of opinion
that separates us, but personally offended by an attack that was
intended to be indeed severe, but directed wholly to matters of
professional, but not of personal concern. This attitude of Dr.
Abbot's I regret, and, in so far as I am to blame for it, I am willing
to express my regret publicly."
This letter of Dr. Royce is, in effect, a deliberate and unqualified
re-affirmation of every fact as alleged, and every inference as drawn,
in his original libel--a deliberate and contemptuous re-affirmation of
the whole system of elaborate misrepresentation which constitutes it
one tissue of libel from beginning to end. Nothing whatever in the
substance of his article is retracted or regretted; nothing is
"regrettable" even in its form, except vaguely, hypothetically, and
conditionally; the only thing Dr. Royce "regrets," as a fact, is that
his "objectively justified" and "intentionally severe attack" should
have given needless "personal offence" and "unnecessary pain" to its
object! This deliberate and contemptuous refusal to recall, to modify,
or to apologize for any of the false accusations he has made against
me is, I submit, demonstration of the malice which originally prompted
them, and now moves him to maintain them; nothing further is needed to
make their malicious character perfectly plain, and to prove the
insincerity of his disclaimers of malice. But Dr. Royce seriously
mistakes the nature of the effect produced by his "attack," when he
affects to consider it as the quite needless excitation of excessive
sensitiveness. If a gentleman in a crowd discovers his nearest
neighbor engaged in filching his pocket-book, and at once hands the
culprit over to the police, it would hardly be graphic to describe his
frame of mind as needless "personal offence" or "unnecessary pain";
and the expressions are no more graphic as to my own frame of mind,
when I discover Dr. Royce endeavoring to filch from me my reputation
in the name of Harvard University. It is not always safe to reckon on
the absence, in parties confessedly "attacked," of all capacity for
_moral indignation_, or all capacity for moral self-defence.
In reply to Mr. Warner, August 4, I wrote as follows: "Permit me
further to say, with regard to Dr. Royce's letter, that I can only
interpret it as a distinct refusal to retract his accusation that I
have made 'extravagant pretensions as to the originality and
profundity of my still unpublished system of philosophy'--a distinct
refusal to retract his accusation that I have 'borrowed my theory of
universals from Hegel'--a distinct refusal to retract his
'professional warning' based upon these accusations. These were the
chief points of my Card, and I note the refusal implied by Dr. Royce's
evasive letter. But I decline to accept his plea of
'conscientiousness' in maintaining the accusation as to Hegel. I might
as well plead 'conscientiousness' in maintaining an accusation that
Dr. Royce assassinated Abraham Lincoln, in face of the evidence that
John Wilkes Booth was the assassin."
Here the correspondence closed. My apology for inflicting it upon you,
gentlemen, must be the necessity of showing to you that, as I was
plainly bound to do, I first exhausted every means of private redress
before laying the matter before you publicly. Not till I had failed to
obtain a fair hearing in the same periodical which published Dr.
Royce's libel, and not till I had failed to obtain from Dr. Royce
himself a retraction of this libel, did I find myself reduced to the
alternatives of either acquiescing in your own unwarrantably
insinuated condemnation, or else of clearing my assailed reputation
through direct and open appeal to you. I am no lover of strife, and
least of all do I now seek revenge. I seek only such a vindication of
my good name from unmerited calumny as you, in your own good judgment
and in your own chosen way, are now, I most respectfully submit, bound
in justice to give.
VIII.
To you, therefore, gentlemen of the Corporation and Board of Overseers
of Harvard University, I make with all due deference this public
appeal for redress of a wrong done to me by one of your appointees--a
wrong done, not in his private capacity as an individual (for which,
of course, you would not be justly held responsible), but publicly and
explicitly and emphatically in the name of his "profession," that is,
of his position as a professor in Harvard College. This position is an
official one, due to your appointment; and his scandalous abuse of it
renders him amenable to discipline by you to whom he owes it.
Therefore, I now formally appeal to you for redress of these specific
wrongs, committed by Assistant Professor Josiah Royce in flagrant
violation of my rights as a citizen and as a man:--