1880
The order of marching--Ghazni and Kelat-i-Ghilzai
--Food required daily for the force--A letter from General Phayre
--Kandahar--Reconnoitring the enemy's position--A turning movement
Before daybreak on the 11th August, as I was starting from camp, I
received my last communication from the outside world in the shape
of a telegram from my wife, sent off from a little village in
Somersetshire, congratulating me and the force, and wishing us all
God's speed. She had taken our children to England a few months
before, thinking that the war in Afghanistan was over, and that I
would soon be able to follow.
Four days brought us to the end of the Logar valley, a distance of
forty-six miles. So far the country was easy and supplies plentiful. I
thought it wise, however, not to attempt long distances at first, that
both men and animals might become gradually hardened before entering
on the difficult and scantily cultivated ground between Ghazni and
Kelat-i-Ghilzai, where I knew that forced marches were inevitable, and
that their powers of endurance would be sorely taxed. Moreover, it
was necessary to begin quietly, and organize some system by which
confusion in the crowded camping-grounds might be avoided, and the
physical strain upon everyone lightened as much as possible.
When it is remembered that the daily supply for over 18,000 men and
11,000 animals had to be drawn from the country after arrival in camp,
that food had to be distributed to every individual, that the fuel
with which it was cooked had often to be brought from long distances,
and that a very limited time was available for the preparation of
meals and for rest, it will readily be understood how essential it was
that even the stupidest follower should be able to find his place in
camp speedily, and that everyone should know exactly what to do and
how to set about doing it.
On the march and in the formation of the camps the same principles
were, as far as possible, applied each day. The 'rouse' sounded at
2.45 a.m., and by four o'clock tents had been struck, baggage loaded
up, and everything was ready for a start.
As a general rule, the Cavalry covered the movement at a distance of
about five miles, two of the four regiments being in front, with the
other two on either flank. Two of the Infantry brigades came next,
each accompanied by a Mountain battery; then followed the field
hospitals, Ordnance and Engineer parks, treasure, and the baggage,
massed according to the order in which the brigades were moving. The
third Infantry brigade with its Mountain battery and one or two troops
of Cavalry formed the rear guard.
A halt of ten minutes was made at the end of each hour, which at eight
o'clock was prolonged to twenty minutes to give time for a hasty
breakfast. Being able to sleep on the shortest notice, I usually took
advantage of these intervals to get a nap, awaking greatly refreshed
after a few minutes' sound sleep.
On arrival at the resting-place for the night, the front face of the
camp was told off to the brigade on rear guard, and this became the
leading brigade of the column on the next day's march. Thus every
brigade had its turn of rear guard duty, which was very arduous, more
particularly after leaving Ghazni, the troops so employed seldom
reaching the halting-ground before six or seven o'clock in the
evening, and sometimes even later.
One of the most troublesome duties of the rear guard was to prevent
the followers from lagging behind, for it was certain death for anyone
who strayed from the shelter of the column; numbers of Afghans always
hovered about on the look-out for plunder, or in the hope of being
able to send a Kafir, or an almost equally-detested Hindu, to eternal
perdition. Towards the end of the march particularly, this duty became
most irksome, for the wretched followers were so weary and footsore
that they hid themselves in ravines, making up their minds to die, and
entreating, when discovered and urged to make an effort, to be left
where they were. Every baggage animal that could possibly be spared
was used to carry the worn-out followers; but notwithstanding this and
the care taken by officers and men that none should be left behind,
twenty of these poor creatures were lost, besides four Native
soldiers.
The variation of temperature (at times as much as eighty degrees
between day and night) was most trying to the troops, who had to carry
the same clothes whether the thermometer was at freezing-point at
dawn or at 110° Fahr. at mid-day. Scarcity of water, too, was a great
trouble to them, while constant sand-storms, and the suffocating
dust raised by the column in its progress, added greatly to their
discomfort.
Daily reports regarding the health of the troops, followers, and
transport animals were brought to me each evening, and I made it my
business to ascertain how many men had fallen out during the day, and
what had been the number of casualties amongst the animals.
On the 12th August the Head-Quarters and main body of the force halted
to allow the Cavalry and the second Infantry brigade to push on and
get clear over the Zamburak Kotal (8,100 feet high) before the rest
of the column attempted its ascent. This kotal presented a serious
obstacle to our rapid progress, the gradient being in many places one
in four, and most difficult for the baggage animals; but by posting
staff officers at intervals to control the flow of traffic, and by
opening out fresh paths to relieve the pressure, we got over it much
more quickly than I had expected.
On the 15th we reached Ghazni, ninety-eight miles from Kabul, a place
of peculiar interest to me from the fact that it was for his share in
its capture, forty-one years before, that my father was given the C.B.
I was met by the Governor, who handed me the keys of the fortress, and
I placed my own guards and sentries in and around the city to prevent
collisions between the inhabitants and our troops, and also to make
sure that our demands for supplies were complied with. Up to this
point we had been fairly well off for food, forage, and water.
Our next march was across a barren, inhospitable track for twenty
miles to a place called Yarghati. On the way we passed Ahmedkhel,
where Sir Donald Stewart won his victory; the name had been changed
by the Natives to 'the Resting-place of Martyrs,' and the numerous
freshly-covered-in graves testified to the _ghazis'_ heavy losses. The
remains of the few British soldiers, who had been buried where they
had fallen, had been desecrated, and the bones were exposed to view
and scattered about.
At Chardeh, our next halting-place, a communication from Colonel
Tanner, Commanding at Kelat-i-Ghilzai, was brought to me by a Native
messenger; it was dated the 12th August, and informed me that Kandahar
was closely invested, but that the garrison had supplies for two
months and forage for fifteen days.
On the 21st we arrived at a point thirty miles from Kelat-i-Ghilzai,
whence we opened heliograph communication with that place, and were
told of an unsuccessful sortie made from Kandahar five days before, in
which General Brooke and eight other British officers had been killed.
[Illustration: CROSSING THE ZAMBURAK KOTAL.
_From a painting by the Chevalier Desanges._]
On the 23rd Kelat-i-Ghilzai was reached. The garrison[1] had been well
taken care of by Colonel Tanner,[2] and a large quantity of food for
man and beast had been collected; but I thought it unadvisable
at present to continue to hold the place, and have to keep open
communication between it and Kandahar, and as I could see no
compensating advantage in doing so, I determined to withdraw the
troops and take them along with me.
Colonel Tanner's report satisfied me there was no immediate danger to
be apprehended at Kandahar, so I decided to halt for one day; both men
and animals greatly needed rest after a continuous march of 225 miles.
I had endeavoured to keep the Government of India informed of my
progress by a message from Ghazni, and one from Oba Karez on the
18th August, but neither reached its destination. I now despatched a
message which was more successful, and was delivered at Simla on the
30th August. It was as follows:
'KELAT-I-GHILZAI,
'_23rd August,_ 1880.
'The force under my command arrived here this morning. The
authorities at Kandahar having stated on the 17th instant that
they have abundant supplies and can make forage last until
1st September, I halt to-morrow to rest the troops, and more
especially the transport animals and camp-followers. The force
left Ghazni on the 16th, and has marched 136 miles during the last
eight days; the troops are in good health and spirits. From this I
purpose moving by regular-stages, so that the men may arrive fresh
at Kandahar. I hope to be in heliographic communication with
Kandahar from Robat, distant twenty miles, on the 29th. If General
Phayre reaches Takht-i-Pul, I should also hope to communicate with
him and arrange a combined movement on Kandahar. I am taking the
Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison with me, making the Fort over to Mahomed
Sadik Khan, a Toki Chief, who had charge of the place when we
arrived in 1879; the present Governor, Sirdar Sherindil Khan,
refuses to remain. We have met with no opposition during the
march, and have been able to make satisfactory arrangements for
supplies, especially forage, which at this season is plentiful.
The Cavalry horses and Artillery mules are in excellent order; our
casualties to date are, one soldier 72nd Highlanders, one sepoy
23rd Pioneers, one 2nd Sikhs, two sepoys 3rd Sikhs dead; one sepoy
4th Gurkhas, two sepoys 24th Punjab Native Infantry, one Duffadar
3rd Punjab Cavalry missing; six camp-followers dead, five missing.
The missing men have, I fear, been murdered. I telegraphed from
Ghazni on the 15th, and from Oba Karez on the 18th August.'
I wrote also to Major-General Phayre, telling him of the date on
which I expected to reach Kandahar, and that if I heard of his being
anywhere near I would arrange my movements to suit his, in order that
the two forces might make a combined attack on Ayub Khan's position.
As I was afraid the supplies at Kandahar would be insufficient for the
additional troops about to be collected there, I sent General Phayre
a memorandum[3] of the amount of food required daily by my force, and
begged him to get pushed up from the rear such articles as were more
particularly wanted. I pointed out that we were badly off for boots,
and that the 92nd Highlanders had only one hundred greatcoats fit for
wear, which were used by the men on night duties.
On the 25th we marched to Jaldak, seventeen miles, and the same
distance the next day to Tirandaz, where I received a letter from
Lieutenant-General Primrose, informing me that Ayub Khan had raised
the siege on the 23rd, and was entrenching himself at Mazra, beyond
the Baba Wali Kotal, in the valley of the Arghandab.
I awoke on the morning of the 27th feeling very unwell, and soon found
I was in for an attack of fever. The heat during the day was becoming
more and more overpowering as we proceeded south, and I had lately
been feeling somewhat knocked up by it and by exposure to the sun. I
had now to give in for the time being, and was compelled to perform
the march in a doolie, a most ignominious mode of conveyance for a
General on service; but there was no help for it, for I could not sit
a horse.
That day the 3rd Bengal and 3rd Punjab Cavalry marched thirty-four
miles to Robat, in order to establish direct heliographic
communication with Kandahar. The main body halted about half-way, when
I again reported progress as follows:
SHAHR-I-SAFA,
'_27th August, 1880._
'My force arrived here to-day. I received a letter yesterday,
dated 25th, from Colonel St. John. He writes: "The rumours of the
approach of your force have been sufficient to relieve the city
from investment. On Monday night the villages on the east and
south were abandoned by their mixed garrisons of _ghazis_ and
regulars. Yesterday morning Ayub struck his camp, and marched to a
position on the Arghandab, between Baba Wali and Sheikh Chela,
due north of the city, and separated from it by a range of rocky
hills. He has about 4,000 Infantry regulars, six 12-pounders and
two 9-pounders rifled, four 6-pounder smooth-bore batteries, and
one 4-pounder battery, 2,000 sowars, and perhaps twice that number
of _ghazis_, of whom a third have firearms. The Kizilbashes and
Kohistanis in his army, about 1,200 Infantry and 300 Cavalry,
offered to desert and join us directly we made a show of attack.
They are at last aware of Abdur Rahman's succession, but I think
Ayub will remain unmolested until the arrival of the Kabul force,
provided he waits, which is unlikely. He will, I expect, strike
away north into Khakrez, on which line a vigorous pursuit will
give us his guns. Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, is still a
prisoner; I am making every effort to obtain his release, but I am
not very hopeful of success. This morning, the 25th, I went to the
field of the unlucky sortie of the 16th, and found the bodies of
the poor fellows who fell there, some forty in number; they will
be buried this afternoon. All the wounded are doing well. No
signs or tidings of Phayre." General Gough, with two regiments of
Cavalry, is at Robat; they are in heliographic communication
with Kandahar. General Primrose heliographs that Ayub Khan has
entrenched his camp at Baba Wali. The force marches for Robat
to-morrow, seventeen miles distant from Kandahar.'
The following day the column joined the two Cavalry regiments at
Robat, where I was met by Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, from whom I
heard that Ayub Khan was likely to make a stand. I thought it prudent,
therefore, to halt on Sunday, the 29th, and divide the last twenty
miles into two short marches, in order that the men and animals might
arrive as fresh as possible, and fit for any work which might be
required of them; for should Ayub Khan retire towards Herat, he would
have to be followed up, and his army attacked and defeated wherever we
might overtake him.
Before leaving Robat, a letter arrived from General Phayre, which put
an end to all hope of his force being able to co-operate with mine,
for his leading brigade, he wrote, had only just got to the Kohjak
Pass. This was to be regretted, but it was unavoidable. I was well
aware of the strenuous efforts the gallant Commander had made to
relieve the beleaguered garrison, and I knew if co-operation had been
possible it would have been effected.
We encamped at Momund on the 30th, whence I sent the following
telegram to Simla:
'My force arrived here to-day; we march to Kandahar to-morrow.
General Primrose heliographs that a letter from Ayub's camp brings
information that the mother of the late Heir-Apparent, Abdulla
Jan, with other ladies, has been sent to Zamindawar. Arrival of
the young Musa Jan in Ayub's camp is confirmed. Hashim Khan is
also there. The position is being strengthened, especially on
the Pir Paimal side, where two guns have been placed with two
regiments. From further information, I learn that the Baba
Wali Kotal is occupied by three regiments and two guns. The
Kotal-i-Murcha is held by the Kabul regiments, and Ayub's own camp
is at Mazra, where it is said that the majority of his guns are
parked. I propose to encamp the Infantry to the west of Kandahar
immediately under the walls, and the Cavalry under the walls to
the south. Should I hear that Ayub contemplates flight, I shall
attack without delay. If, on the contrary, he intends to resist,
I shall take my own time. The country he is occupying is, from
description and map, extremely difficult and easily defensible,
and each separate advance will require careful study and
reconnaissance to prevent unnecessary loss of life.'
On the morning of the 31st we marched into Kandahar, just over 313
miles from Kabul. The fever, which had attacked me rather sharply, had
left me extremely weak, and I was unable to ride the whole way. I got
on my horse, however, some distance from Kandahar to meet Generals
Primrose, Burrows, and Nuttall, who came out to receive the column. As
we approached the city, the whole garrison turned out and gave us a
hearty welcome; officers and men, Native and British, crowded round
us, loud in their expressions of gratitude for our having come so
quickly to their assistance. We, on our side, were all anxiety
to learn the particulars about Maiwand, how they had fared while
invested, and all they could tell us of Ayub Khan, his position,
strength of his army, etc.
I confess to being very greatly surprised, not to use a stronger
expression, at the demoralized condition of the greater part of the
garrison;[4] there were notable exceptions,[5] but the general bearing
of the troops reminded me of the people at Agra in 1857. They
seemed to consider themselves hopelessly defeated, and were utterly
despondent; they never even hoisted the Union Jack until the relieving
force was close at hand. The same excuses could not, however, be made
for them, who were all soldiers by profession, as we had felt inclined
to make for the residents at Agra, a great majority of whom were
women, children, and civilians. The walls[6] which completely
surrounded Kandahar were so high and thick as to render the city
absolutely impregnable to any army not equipped with a regular
siege-train. Scaling-ladders had been prepared by the enemy, and
there was an idea that an assault would be attempted; but for British
soldiers to have contemplated the possibility of Kandahar being taken
by an Afghan army showed what a miserable state of depression and
demoralization they were in.
[Illustration: Map: SKETCH OF THE ROUTE TAKEN ON THE MARCH FROM KABUL
TO KANDAHAR. AUGUST. 1880.]
I halted the column for two hours outside the south wall of the city,
where it was sheltered from the enemy's fire, Ayub Khan's position
being within long range directly north of Kandahar. While the men
rested and breakfasted, and the baggage animals were being unloaded,
fed, and watered, I went into the citadel to talk matters over with
General Primrose and Colonel St. John, and inquire whether there was
sufficient accommodation for the sick men of my force, numbering 940,
who needed to be taken into hospital. The thermometer now registered
105° Fahr. in tents during the day, but the nights were still bitterly
cold, and the sudden changes of temperature were extremely trying to
people in bad health.
On the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, whose intimate
acquaintance with the neighbourhood of Kandahar, gained while serving
on Sir Donald Stewart's staff, was now most valuable to me, I
determined to take up a position to the west of the city, with my
right on the cantonment and my left touching Old Kandahar. This
enabled me to cover the city, gave me command of a good supply of
water, and placed me within striking distance of Ayub Khan's camp.
At 10 a.m. the first and third brigades moved off and occupied Piquet
Hill, Karez Hill, and the north-east spur of the hill above Old
Kandahar. A few shots were fired at the advance guard from distant
orchards, and the ground proved to be within range of some of the
enemy's Field-pieces on the Baba Wali Kotal, but it was a case of
Hobson's choice, as water was not to be found anywhere else at a
come-at-able distance.
Large numbers of men were to be seen crowning the Baba Wali Kotal, and
constructing shelter-trenches along the crest of the low black ridge,
which jutted out in a south-easterly direction from the more lofty
range on which the kotal is situated. Piquets were immediately sent to
occupy the northern spur of the Kohkeran Hill commanding the road to
Gundigan, the village of Abbasabad, the Karez Hill, the village of
Chihal Dukhtaran, the greater and lesser Piquet Hills, and the village
of Kalachi, all of which were found to be deserted.
From a cursory examination of the ground, I satisfied myself that any
attempt to carry the Baba Wali Kotal by direct attack must result in
very severe loss, and I determined to turn it. But before I could
decide how this could best be done, it was necessary to ascertain
the strength and precise extent of the Afghan position. I therefore
detailed a small party,[7] under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh
Gough, to make as complete a reconnaissance as time would allow. In
the meantime I despatched the following telegram to the authorities at
Simla:
'KANDAHAR, _31st August,_ 1880.
'The force under my command arrived here this morning without
opposition. Enemy are said to be in considerable strength at
Mazra, but the ridge of hills which divides Kandahar from the
Arghandab completely covers their position, and at present I have
only been able to ascertain that the Baba Wali Kotal and one or
two other points on this ridge are held in great strength,
and that the enemy are busily engaged in defensive works.
Reconnaissances are now being conducted, and I shall soon, I hope,
be sufficiently acquainted with affairs generally to enable me to
arrange for an attack. The Kandahar garrison are in good health;
the horses and transport animals appear to be in good condition.
Major Vandeleur, 7th Fusiliers, has died of his wounds; the
remainder of the wounded, both officers and men, are generally
doing well. The troops from Kabul are in famous health and
spirits. The assurance of the safety of this garrison enabled
comparatively short marches to be made from Kelat-i-Ghilzai,
which much benefited both men and animals. The Cavalry horses and
Artillery mules are in excellent condition, and the transport
animals are, as a rule, in very fair order. General Primrose has
arranged for the sick of the force from Kabul being accommodated
inside the city; many of the cases are sore feet; none are
serious. To-morrow the telegraph line towards India will commence
to be re-constructed, and as General Phayre is probably on this
side of the Kohjak to-day, through communication should soon be
restored.'
The reconnaissance, which started at 1 p.m., proceeded towards the
high ground immediately above the villages of Gundigan and Murghan.
Here the Infantry and guns were halted, while the Cavalry advanced
between two or three miles, avoiding the numerous orchards and
enclosures, and coming out in front of Pir Paimal, which was found to
be strongly entrenched.
As soon as the enemy's fire along this line had been drawn, the 3rd
Bengal Cavalry fell back, admirably handled by their Commandant,
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Mackenzie. In the meantime, two guns of No.
11 Battery 9th Brigade were brought into action, partly to test the
range, and partly to check the enemy, who were passing rapidly into
the gardens near Gundigan. The Infantry and Artillery then retired
within the line of piquets, and the moment they began to fall back the
Afghans came after them in great strength; they were so persistent
that I ordered the whole of the 3rd Brigade and part of the 1st
Brigade under arms. The enemy, however, were unable to come to close
quarters owing to the bold front shown by the 15th Sikhs, under the
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hennessy, and before dark the troops
were all back in camp, with a loss of five men killed and fifteen
wounded.
From the information obtained by this reconnaissance, I found that it
was quite practicable to turn the Afghan right, and thus place myself
in rear of the Baba Wali range; I decided, therefore, to attack the
position the following morning. It was too close to our camp to risk
delay. Moreover, I knew that the retrograde movement of Gough's small
body would be construed into a defeat by the enemy, who, if we did not
move at once, would assuredly think that we were afraid to take the
initiative, and would become correspondingly bold.
I accordingly issued orders for the troops to breakfast at 7 a.m., and
for one day's cooked rations to be carried by the Infantry and two
days by the Cavalry and Horse Artillery. Brigades were to be in
position by eight o'clock, tents being previously struck and the
baggage stored in a walled enclosure.
The night passed quietly except for occasional bursts of musketry
along the line of piquets to the west, showing that the Afghans were
holding the villages they had occupied the previous evening.
[Footnote 1: The garrison consisted of 2 guns of C/2, Royal Artillery,
145 rifles of the 66th Foot, 100 of the 3nd Sind Horse, and the 2nd
Baluch Regiment, 639 strong.]
[Footnote 2: Now Lieutenant-General Sir Oriel Tanner, K.C.B.]
[Footnote 3: Estimate of daily requirements for the Kabul-Kandahar
Field Force and the Kelat-i-Ghilzai garrison:
Europeans 3,200
Native troops 8,000
Followers 8,500
Horses 2,300
Transport --yabus 1,592,
mules and ponies 5,926,
camels 400,
donkeys 400.
Meat 4,000 lbs.
Bread-stuff 40 maunds.[*]
Vegetables 4,000 lbs.
Rice 800 "
Salt 133 "
Sugar 600 "
Tea 150 "
Rum, 25 per cent. 80 gallons.
Atta 320 maunds.
Dall 51-1/2 "
Ghee 19-1/4 "
Salt 8-1/2 "
Grain 700 "
A. R. BADCOCK, Major,
Deputy Commissary-General.
KELAT-I-GHILZAI,
_24th August,_ 1880.
[Note *: A maund is equivalent to 80 lbs.]
]
[Footnote 4: The effective garrison consisted of 1,000 British
soldiers, 3,000 Native soldiers, and fifteen Field guns.]
[Footnote 5: One and all bore testimony to the unfailing good
behaviour and creditable bearing of the Royal Artillery and the Bombay
Sappers and Miners, not only during the investment, but in the very
trying time of the retreat from Maiwand.]
[Footnote 6: The walls had an average height of 30 feet, and breadth
of 15 feet on the north and east fronts.]
[Footnote 7: Two Royal Artillery guns, 3rd Bengal Cavalry, and 15th
Sikhs. Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman accompanied the party, and was of
great assistance to Brigadier-General Gough.]
* * * * *