1880
Commencement of the fight--72nd Highlanders and 2nd Sikhs
--92nd Highlanders and 2nd Gurkhas--Ayub Khan's camp
--Difficulties about supplies--Parting with the troops
--A pleasing memory
The next morning, the 1st September, in accordance with instructions
from Simla, I assumed command of the army in southern Afghanistan.
There was no return to show the strength or composition of General
Phayre's column, but the troops at Kandahar all told now amounted in
round numbers to 3,800 British and 11,000 Native soldiers, with 36
guns.
An hour before daybreak the whole of the troops were under arms, and
at 6 a.m. I explained to Generals Primrose and Ross and the officers
commanding brigades the plan of operations. Briefly, it was to
threaten the enemy's left (the Baba Wali Kotal), and to attack in
force by the village of Pir Paimal.
The Infantry belonging to the Kabul column, upon whom devolved the
duty of carrying the enemy's position, were formed up in rear of the
low hills which covered the front of our camp, their right being at
Piquet Hill and their left resting on Chitral Zina. The Cavalry of the
Kabul column were drawn up in rear of the left, ready to operate by
Gundigan towards the head of the Arghandab, so as to threaten the
rear of Ayub Khan's camp and his line of retreat in the direction of
Girishk. Four guns of E Battery Royal Horse Artillery, two companies
of the 2-7th Fusiliers, and four companies of the 28th Bombay
Infantry, were placed at the disposal of Brigadier-General Hugh Gough,
whose orders were to occupy with these troops the position above
Gundigan, which had been so useful during the previous day's
reconnaissance, and to push his Cavalry on to the Arghandab.
Guards having been detailed for the protection of the city, the
remainder of Lieutenant-General Primrose's troops were ordered to be
disposed as follows: Brigadier-General Daubeny's brigade to occupy the
ground between Piquet Hill and Chitral Zina as soon as the Infantry of
the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force advanced to the attack. The remnant of
Brigadier-General Burrows's brigade, with No. 5 Battery, 11th Brigade
Royal Artillery, under Captain Hornsby, and the Cavalry under
Brigadier-General Nuttall, to take up a position north of the
cantonment, from which the 40-pounders could be brought to bear on
the Baba Wali Kotal, while the Cavalry could watch the pass, called
Kotal-i-Murcha, and cover the city.
From an early hour it was clear that the enemy contemplated an
offensive movement; the villages of Gundigan and Gundi Mulla Sahibdab
were being held in strength, and a desultory fire was brought to bear
on the British front from the orchards connecting these two villages
and from the Baba Wali Kotal.
The Bombay Cavalry moved out at 7.30 a.m., and Daubeny's brigade at
eight o'clock. Burrows's troops followed, and shortly after 9 a.m.,
their disposition being completed, Captain Hornsby opened fire upon
the kotal, which was one mass of _ghazis_.
This feint, made by General Primrose's troops, having had the effect I
had hoped, of attracting the enemy's attention, I gave the order
for Major-General Ross to make the real attack with the 1st and 2nd
Brigades of his division. The 3rd Brigade, under Brigadier-General
Macgregor, I placed in front of the village of Abbasabad, with the
double object of being a reserve to the 1st and 2nd Brigades and of
meeting a possible counter-attack from the Baba Wali Kotal.
Ross's orders were to advance against Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, capture
the village, and then drive the enemy from the enclosures which lay
between it and the low spur of Pir Paimal hill. This duty he entrusted
to Brigadier-General Macpherson, and he directed Brigadier-General
Baker to advance to the west, to keep touch with the 1st Brigade, and
to clear the gardens and orchards in his immediate front.
Greig's 9-pounder and Robinson's 7-pounder (screw gun) batteries
covered the attack on Gundi Mulla Sahibdad, which was made by the
2nd Gurkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Battye, and the 92nd
Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Parker, supported by the 23rd
Pioneers, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. Collett, and the 24th Punjab
Infantry, under Colonel F. Norman. The village was carried with the
utmost gallantry, Highlanders and Gurkhas, always friendly rivals in
the race for glory, by turns outstripping each other in their efforts
to be first within its walls. The enemy sullenly and slowly withdrew,
a goodly number of _ghazis_ remaining to the very last to receive
a bayonet charge of the 92nd. Meanwhile, Baker's troops had been
threading their way through the narrow lanes and loop-holed enclosures
which lay in the line of their spirited attack; the resistance they
encountered was most stubborn, and it was during this advance that the
72nd lost their dashing Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brownlow,[1]
Captain Frome, and Lance-Sergeant Cameron, the latter a grand specimen
of a Highland soldier.
In the 2nd Brigade, the 72nd Highlanders and the 2nd Sikhs bore
the brunt of the fighting; they were the leading battalions, and
frequently had to fix bayonets to carry different positions or to
check the desperate rushes of the Afghans.
After continued and severe fighting, both leading brigades emerged
at the point of the hill close to Pir Paimal, and, wheeling to their
right, they pressed rapidly on, sweeping the enemy through the
thickly-wooded gardens which covered the western slopes, until noon,
when the whole of Pir Paimal was in our possession.[2]
During the early part of the advance the Afghans collected in great
strength on the low hills beneath the Baba Wali Kotal, evidently
preparing for a rush on our guns; their leaders could be seen urging
them on, and a portion of them came down the hill, but the main body
apparently refused to follow, and remained on the crest until the
position was turned, when they at once retreated.
Having become assured of General Ross's complete success, and seeing
that there was now no necessity for detaining Macgregor's (the 3rd)
brigade to meet a counter-attack, I pushed on with it to join Ross,
who, however, knowing how thoroughly he could depend upon his troops,
without waiting to be reinforced, followed up the retreating foe,
until he reached an entrenched position at the other side of the Baba
Wali Kotal, where the Afghans made another most determined stand.
_Ghazis_ in large numbers flocked to this spot from the rear, while
the guns on the kotal were turned round and brought to bear on our
men, already exposed to a heavy Artillery fire from behind the
entrenched camp.
It now became necessary to take this position by storm, and
recognizing the fact with true soldierly instinct, Major White, who
was leading the advanced companies of the 92nd, called upon the men
for just one charge more 'to close the business.' The battery of screw
guns had been shelling the position, and, under cover of its fire
and supported by a portion of the 2nd Gurkhas and 23rd Pioneers, the
Highlanders, responding with alacrity to their leader's call, dashed
forward and drove the enemy from their entrenchments at the point of
the bayonet.[3]
Major White was the first to reach the guns, being closely followed
by Sepoy Inderbir Lama, who, placing his rifle upon one of them,
exclaimed, 'Captured in the name of the 2nd (Prince of Wales' Own)
Gurkhas!'
Whilst the 1st Brigade was advancing towards the last position, a
half-battalion of the 3rd Sikhs (belonging to the 2nd Brigade), under
Lieutenant-Colonel G. Money, charged a body of Afghans and captured
three guns.
The enemy were now absolutely routed, but, owing to the nature of the
ground, it was impossible for General Ross to realize how complete had
been his victory, and he fully expected that the enemy would take up
a fresh position further on; he therefore ordered the 1st and 2nd
Brigades to halt while they replenished their ammunition, and then
proceeded for about a mile, when they suddenly came in sight of Ayub
Khan's enormous camp. It was entirely deserted, and apparently stood
as it had been left in the morning when the Afghans moved out to the
attack. With his camp was captured the whole of Ayub Khan's Artillery,
thirty-two pieces, including our two Horse Artillery guns[4] which had
been taken at Maiwand on the 27th July.
Further pursuit by the Infantry being valueless, the 1st and 2nd
Brigades halted on the far side of Mazra, where I with the 3rd Brigade
shortly afterwards joined them.
Brigadier-General Hugh Gough, having satisfied himself as to the
security of our left flank, scouted as far as Kohkeran, and then
proceeded with the Cavalry of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force to
execute the extended movement entrusted to him. He crossed the
Arghandab, and pushed round to get in front of the line of the enemy's
retreat towards Khakrez. Some _ghazis_ and Irregular Afghan troops
were overtaken, but no Regular regiments were met with, the soldiers
having, as is their custom, quickly divested themselves of their
uniform and assumed the garb of harmless agriculturists.
Ayub Khan himself had fled early in the day with his principal
Sirdars.
As I rode into the abandoned camp, I was horrified to hear that the
body of Maclaine, the Horse Artillery officer who had been taken
prisoner at Maiwand, was lying with the throat cut about forty yards
from Ayub Khan's own tent. From what I could learn, the latter had
not actually ordered the murder, but as a word from him would have
prevented it, he must be held responsible for the assassination of an
officer who had fallen into his hands as a prisoner of war.
Our losses during the day comprised: killed, 3 British officers,[5]
1 Native officer, and 36 men; wounded, 11 British officers, 4 Native
officers, and 195 men, 18 of whom succumbed to their wounds. It was
difficult to estimate the loss of the enemy, but it must have been
heavy, as between Kandahar and the village of Pir Paimal alone 600
bodies were buried by us.
With the exception of the 1st Brigade, which remained at Mazra for the
night to protect the captured guns and stores, the troops all returned
to camp before 9 p.m.[6]
Utterly exhausted as I was from the hard day's work and the weakening
effects of my late illness, the cheers with which I was greeted by the
troops as I rode into Ayub Khan's camp and viewed the dead bodies of
my gallant soldiers nearly unmanned me, and it was with a very big
lump in my throat that I managed to say a few words of thanks to each
corps in turn. When I returned to Kandahar, and threw myself on the
bed in the little room prepared for me, I was dead-beat and quite
unequal to the effort of reporting our success to the Queen or to the
Viceroy. After an hour's rest, however, knowing how anxiously news
from Kandahar was looked for both in England and India, I managed
to pull myself together sufficiently to write out and despatch the
following telegram:
'KANDAHAR,
'_1st September, 1880_ (6 p.m.).
'Ayub Khan's army was to-day defeated and completely dispersed
with, I hope, comparatively slight loss on our side; his camp was
captured, the two lost guns of E Battery, B Brigade Royal Horse
Artillery were recovered, and several wheeled guns of various
calibre fell to the splendid Infantry of this force; the Cavalry
are still in pursuit. Our casualties are: 22nd Foot, Captain
Straton, killed; 72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow,
Captain Frome, killed, Captain Murray and Lieutenant Monro,
wounded, 7 men killed, 18 wounded; 92nd Highlanders, Lieutenants
Menzies and Donald Stewart wounded, 11 men killed and 39 wounded;
2nd Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, and 2nd Sikhs, Major
Slater wounded. It is at present impossible to ascertain the
casualties amongst the Native troops, but I have no reason to
believe they are excessive; full details will be telegraphed
to-morrow. The quite recently murdered remains of Lieutenant
Maclaine, Royal Horse Artillery, were found on the arrival of the
British troops in Ayub Khan's camp. Ayub Khan is supposed to have
fled towards Herat.'
It can easily be imagined with what an intense sense of relief I awoke
on the morning of the 2nd September--the march had ended, Kandahar had
been relieved, Ayub Khan's army had been beaten and dispersed, and
there was an adequate force in southern Afghanistan to prevent further
disturbances.
Amongst the innumerable questions of detail which now confronted me
was the all-important one, and that which caused me greatest anxiety,
of how the large body of troops hastily concentrated at Kandahar, and
for which the produce of the country was quite inadequate, were to be
fed.
No supplies and very little forage were procurable between Quetta and
Kandahar, and in the neighbourhood of the latter place there was now
hardly anything in the shape of food for man or beast to be had for
love or money, the resources of this part of the country having been
quite exhausted. Relief could only be obtained by reducing the number
of mouths to be fed, and with this object I scattered the troops in
different directions, to posts as far distant from each other as
possible, consistent with safety; and in accordance with my promise to
the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, that they should not be required to
garrison Kandahar when the fighting was at an end, I arranged to
despatch without delay to India the corps which had come with me from
northern Afghanistan.
[Illustration: SKETCH OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF KANDAHAR]
One column proceeded to Maiwand to inter the bodies of our soldiers
who fell on the 27th July. The Cavalry brigade moved with a number
of sick men and transport animals to Kohkeran. Macgregor's brigade
started for Quetta on the 8th, and was followed soon after by Baker's
and Macpherson's brigades. I accompanied Macgregor in the hope that
the change to Quetta (where I remained about a month) would pick me
up, and enable me to meet Lord Ripon's wish that I should retain the
command in southern Afghanistan until some satisfactory settlement
could be arrived at.
Before leaving Kandahar I issued an order thanking all ranks of the
Kabul-Kandahar Field Force for the work they had so nobly performed,
and I had the gratification of acknowledging, on their behalf and my
own, congratulatory messages from the Queen, the Duke of Cambridge,
the Marquis of Ripon, and many others. On the way to Quetta I had
the further gratification of being informed by the Viceroy that Her
Majesty had been graciously pleased to make me a G.C.B., and to
appoint me Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army.
I now heard that Abdur Rahman had been finally nominated Amir of
Kabul on the 10th August, and that immediately after the ceremony of
installation Sir Donald Stewart had marched the whole British force
of 6,678 men of all arms out of Kabul on their return to India. Sir
Donald left Peshawar to take up his appointment of Military Member of
Council at Simla on the 31st August, and by the 7th September the last
of his troops had arrived at the former place, except one brigade left
as a temporary measure in the Khyber Pass.
At Quetta I stayed with Sir Robert Sandeman, the capable Resident,
who by his great personal influence had done much to allay excitement
amongst the tribes, and to prevent serious trouble in Baluchistan
and along the border. I had never before been to that part of the
frontier, and I was greatly impressed by the hold Sandeman had
obtained over the country; he was intimately acquainted with every
leading man, and there was not a village, however out of the way,
which he had not visited. 'Sinniman _sahib_,' as the Natives called
him, had gained the confidence of the lawless Baluchis in a very
remarkable manner, and it was mainly owing to his power over them that
I was able to arrange with camel contractors to transport to Quetta
and Kandahar the huge stocks of winter clothing, medical comforts,
grain, and the various requirements of an army in the field, which
had been brought by rail to Sibi, and had there remained for want of
transport to take them further on.
As the change to Quetta did not benefit me, and as I found that,
owing to indifferent health, I was unable to carry on my duty with
satisfaction to myself, I applied to be relieved. My request was
acceded to, and I started on the 12th October for India.
Riding through the Bolan Pass I overtook most of the regiments of the
Kabul-Kandahar Field Force marching towards Sibi, thence to disperse
to their respective destinations. As I parted with each corps in turn
its band played 'Auld Lang Syne,' and I have never since heard that
memory-stirring air without its bringing before my mind's eye the last
view I had of the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force. I fancy myself crossing
and re-crossing the river which winds through the pass; I hear the
martial beat of drums and plaintive music of the pipes; and I see
Riflemen and Gurkhas, Highlanders and Sikhs, guns and horses, camels
and mules, with the endless following of an Indian army, winding
through the narrow gorges, or over the interminable boulders which
made the passage of the Bolan so difficult and wearisome to man and
beast.
I shall never forget the feeling of sadness with which I said good-bye
to the men who had done so much for me. I looked upon them all, Native
as well as British, as my valued friends. And well I might, for never
had a Commander been better served. From first to last a grand spirit
of _camaraderie_[7] pervaded all ranks. At the Peiwar Kotal, at
Charasia, and during the fighting round Kabul, all were eager to close
with the enemy, no matter how great the odds against them. Throughout
the march from Kabul all seemed to be animated with but one desire, to
effect, cost what it might in personal risk, fatigue, or discomfort,
the speedy release of their beleaguered fellow-soldiers in Kandahar;
and the unflagging energy and perseverance of my splendid troops
seemed to reach their full height, when they realized they were about
to put forth their strength against a hitherto successful enemy. Their
exemplary conduct, too, under circumstances often of the most
trying nature, cannot be praised in terms too strong or too full.
Notwithstanding the provocation caused by the cruel murder of any
stragglers who fell into the hands of the Afghans, not one act
infringing the rules of civilized warfare was committed by my troops.
The persons and property of the Natives were respected, and full
compensation for supplies was everywhere given. In short, the
inhabitants of the district through which we passed could not have
been treated with greater consideration nor with a lighter hand, had
they proved themselves friendly allies, and the conduct of the troops
will ever be to me as pleasing a memory as are the results which they
achieved.
[Footnote 1: Brownlow's death was a great loss, for throughout the
war he had frequently distinguished himself as a leader--at the Peiwar
Kotal, during the operations round Kabul, and notably on the 14th
December, when he won the admiration of the whole force by his
brilliant conduct in the attack on the Asmai heights.]
[Footnote 2: The following Native officers, British and Native
non-commissioned officers, and Native soldiers were brought forward as
having been very conspicuous during this part of the fight:
Colour-Sergeant G. Jacobs 72nd Highlanders.
Colour-Sergeant R. Lauder " "
Lance-Corporal J. Gordon " "
Subadar-Major Gurbaj Sing 2nd Sikhs.
Jemadar Alla Sing " "
Naick Dir Sing " "
Sepoy Hakim " "
Sepoy Taj Sing " "
Sepoy Pertap Sing " "
Sepoy Bir Sing " "]
[Footnote 3: During this engagement the following officers and men
were specially remarked for their gallantry:
Major G. White 92nd Highlanders.
Lieutenant C. Douglas " "
Corporal William McGillvray " "
Private Peter Grieve " "
Private D. Grey " "
Major Sullivan Becher 2nd Gurkhas.
Havildar Gopal Borah " "
Sepoy Inderbir Lama " "
Sepoy Tikaram Kwas " "]
[Footnote 4: These guns were presented to me by the Indian Government,
and are now at the Royal Hospital Dublin.]
[Footnote 5: The third British officer killed was Captain Straton,
22nd Foot, Superintendent of Army Signalling, a most accomplished
officer, under whose direction signalling as applied to Field
Service reached a wonderful pitch of perfection. His energy knew no
difficulties, and his enthusiasm was beyond praise.]
[Footnote 6: The ammunition expended by the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force
on the 31st August and 1st September was:
_Rounds_.
Gun 102 /Shrapnel shell 78
\Common " 24
Rifle 57,705 /Martini-Henry 15,129
\Snider 42,576
and in addition 313 rounds were fired by the Artillery, and 4,971
rounds by the Infantry of the Kandahar Garrison.]
[Footnote 7: The 72nd Highlanders and 5th Gurkhas were brigaded
together throughout the campaign, and at their return to India the
latter regiment presented the former with a shield bearing the
following inscription:
FROM THE
MEN OF THE 5TH GURKHAS
TO THE
MEN OF THE 72ND (DUKE OF ALBANY'S OWN) HIGHLANDERS,
IN REMEMBRANCE OF
THE AFGHAN CAMPAIGN, 1878 TO 1880.
The gift was entirely spontaneous, and was subscribed for by the
Native officers, non-commissioned officers, and men.
In return, the non-commissioned officers and men of the 72nd gave the
5th Gurkhas a very handsome ebony, silver-mounted Drum-Major's staff.]
* * * * *