1880
Affairs at Kandahar--The Maiwand disaster
--Relief from Kabul suggested--A force ordered from Kabul
--Preparations for the march--The Kabul-Kandahar Field Force
--Commissariat and Transport
For more than six months rumours had been afloat of Ayub Khan's
determination to advance on Kandahar; but little attention was paid to
them by the authorities at that place until towards the end of May,
when a Sirdar, named Sher Ali,[1] who had been a few days before
formally installed as Wali, or Ruler, of Kandahar, informed the
political officer, Lieutenant-Colonel St. John, that the British
occupation of Kabul had had the effect of bringing about a
reconciliation between the various chiefs at Herat, who had placed
themselves under the leadership of Ayub Khan and induced him to
proclaim a _jahad_. Sher Ali, who evidently considered this news
authentic, declared his belief that his own troops,[2] who were then
engaged in collecting revenue in Zamindawar, would desert to Ayub Khan
as he approached Kandahar, and he begged that a brigade of British
soldiers might be sent to Girishk to support him.
On General Primrose communicating this information to the
Commander-in-Chief in India, he recommended to the Government that the
Bombay reserve division, located at Jacobabad, Hyderabad, and Karachi,
should be mobilized so soon as it became certain that Ayub Khan really
contemplated this move, as in his opinion the garrison at Kandahar
would be left dangerously weak after a brigade had been detached for
Girishk.
Ayub Khan's movements, however, were not ascertained until the 27th
June, when he had advanced halfway to the Helmand; it was too late
then to mobilize troops so far off as Jacobabad, Hyderabad, and
Karachi with any chance of their being in time to check his onward
march. The news of his approach spread rapidly, and had the most
disturbing effect in Kandahar and its neighbourhood. The Governor's
authority daily diminished, and many of the inhabitants left the city.
Ayub Khan had with him, when he started from Herat on the 15th June,
7,500 men and ten guns as the nucleus of an army, which he calculated,
as he moved forward, would be strongly reinforced by tribesmen,
levies, and _ghazis_.
On the 4th July a brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General
Burrows, started from Kandahar, and reached the Helmand on the 11th,
encamping on the near bank of the river opposite Girishk. On the
further bank Sirdar Sher Ali's troops were located, having with them
six guns. Two days afterwards these troops deserted in a body to the
enemy, but did not succeed in taking their Artillery with them, as
Burrows, on perceiving their intention, crossed the river and captured
the guns.
Brigadier-General Burrows's position had now entirely changed; instead
of there being a loyal force under the Wali, with which to co-operate
and prevent Ayub Khan crossing the Helmand, he found himself with an
inadequate number of troops, the Wali's men gone over to the enemy,
and the Wali himself a fugitive in the British camp. The Helmand was
fordable everywhere at that season, making it easy for Ayub to cut off
Burrows's retreat; the first twenty-five of the eighty miles by which
he was separated from Kandahar was a desert, and no supplies were
forthcoming owing to the hostile attitude of the people. Burrows
therefore determined to retire to Khushk-i-Nakhud, an important
position half-way to Kandahar, covering the road from Girishk, and
where supplies and water were plentiful.
Burrows reached Khushk-i-Nakhud on the 16th July. On the 22nd the
Commander-in-Chief in India, who had been inquiring from General
Primrose whether there were 'any routes from the Helmand passing by
the north to Ghazni, by which Ayub Khan might move with his guns,'
telegraphed to Primrose: 'You will understand that you have full
liberty to attack Ayub, if you consider you are strong enough to do
so. Government consider it of the highest political importance that
his force should be dispersed, and prevented by all possible means
from passing on to Ghazni.'
On the afternoon of the 26th information was received by
Brigadier-General Burrows that 2,000 of the enemy's Cavalry and a
large body of _ghazis_ had arrived at Maiwand, eleven miles off, and
that Ayub Khan was about to follow with the main body of his army.
To prevent Ayub Khan getting to Ghazni, General Burrows had to do one
of two things, either await him at Khushk-i-Nakhud, or intercept him
at Maiwand. After consulting with Colonel St. John, he determined to
adopt the latter course, as he hoped thus to be able to deal with the
_ghazis_ before they were joined by Ayub Khan.
The brigade started soon after 6 a.m. on the 27th. It was encumbered
by a large number of baggage animals, which Burrows considered could
not be left behind because of the hostile state of the country, and
the impossibility of detaching any part of his already too small force
for their protection.
At 10 a.m., when about half-way to Maiwand, a spy brought in
information that Ayub Khan had arrived at that place, and was
occupying it in force; General Burrows, however, considered it then
too late to turn back, and decided to advance. At a quarter to twelve
the forces came into collision, and the fight lasted until past three
o'clock. The Afghans, who, Burrows reported, numbered 25,000, soon
outflanked the British. Our Artillery expended their ammunition, and
the Native portion of the brigade got out of hand, and pressed back on
the few British Infantry, who were unable to hold their own against
the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Our troops were completely
routed, and had to thank the apathy of the Afghans in not following
them up for escaping total annihilation.
Of the 2,476 men engaged at Maiwand, 934 were killed and 175 were
wounded and missing;[3] the remnant struggled on throughout the night
to Kandahar, where the first of the fugitives arrived early on the
morning of the 28th. Brigadier-General Burrows, who had two horses
shot under him during the engagement, was amongst the last to reach
Kandahar.
This lamentable story imparted to me by Stewart almost took my breath
away, and we eagerly discussed the situation as we rode back together
to Sherpur. It was impossible to predict how the news would affect
the recent arrangements entered into with Abdur Rahman, or what the
attitude of the tribesmen would be; but we agreed that, whatever might
happen in our immediate neighbourhood, the only means of affording
speedy relief to the Kandahar garrison was by sending a force from
Kabul.
It soon, however, became apparent, by telegrams received from Simla,
that the Government were in doubt as to the best course to pursue, and
looked to Quetta rather than Kabul as the place from which Kandahar
could be most conveniently and rapidly succoured. This was not
altogether surprising, for the authorities naturally hesitated to
weaken Kabul until matters had been finally settled with Abdur Rahman,
and it was only to be expected that, after what had occurred at
Maiwand, they should be alarmed at the idea of a force being cut
off from all communication with India during the four weeks, or
thereabouts, it would take to reach Kandahar. But there was really
no alternative, for, as Major-General Phayre[4] (commanding in
Baluchistan) reported,[5] the troops available for Field Service were
but few in number, it would require at least fifteen days to equip
them, and there was no organized transport at hand, the animals having
been sent to distant grazing grounds on account of the scarcity of
water and forage.
I knew nothing as to the actual condition of the troops in
Baluchistan, except that, as belonging to the Bombay Presidency, they
could not be composed of the best fighting races, and I had a strong
feeling that it would be extremely unwise to make use of any but the
most proved Native soldiers against Ayub Khan's superior numbers,
elated as his men must be with their victory at Maiwand.
The disaster to our arms caused, as was to be expected, considerable
excitement all along the border; indeed, throughout India the
announcement produced a certain feeling of uneasiness--a mere surface
ripple--but enough to make those who remembered the days of the Mutiny
anxious for better news from the north.
To me it seemed of such supreme importance that Kandahar should be
relieved without delay, and the reverse to our arms retrieved, that
I made up my mind to communicate my views to the Viceroy through
the Commander-in-Chief, in the hope that, when he realized that a
thoroughly efficient force was ready and willing to start from Kabul,
he would no longer hesitate as to what was best to do.
On the 30th July, I dined with Stewart, and, leaving his mess-tent
at an early hour, I retired to my own quarters, and wrote out the
following telegram in cipher, but, before despatching it, I showed it
to Stewart, for, although I knew that his views were in accord with
mine, I could not with propriety have sent it without his knowledge:
'To Major-General Greaves,[6] Adjutant-General in India, Simla.
'Kabul,
'_30th July,_ 1880.
'Personal and secret. I strongly recommend that a force be sent
from this to Kandahar. Stewart has organized a very complete one
consisting of nine regiments of Infantry, three of Cavalry, and
three Mountain batteries. This will suffice to overcome all
opposition _en route_; it will have the best possible effect
on the country, and will be ready to go anywhere on reaching
Kandahar, being fully equipped in all respects. He proposes
sending me in command.
'I am sure that but few Bombay regiments are able to cope with
Afghans, and once the Kabul Field Force leaves this country, the
chance of sending a thoroughly reliable and well-equipped column
will be lost. The movement of the remainder of the Kabul troops
towards India should be simultaneous with the advance of my
division towards Kandahar, it being most desirable to limit the
area of our responsibilities as soon as possible; at the same
time, it is imperative that we should now show our strength
throughout Afghanistan. The withdrawal, under existing
circumstances, of the whole force from Kabul to India would
certainly be misunderstood, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. You
need have no fears about my division. It can take care of itself,
and will reach Kandahar under the month. I will answer for the
loyalty and good feeling of the Native portion, and would propose
to inform them that, as soon as matters have been satisfactorily
settled at Kandahar, they will be sent straight back to India.
Show this to Lyall.'
Exaggerated reports of the Maiwand affair being rife in the Kabul
bazaars, which were daily becoming crowded with armed Afghans from
Abdur Rahman's camp, and the prospect of troops having to leave at
once for Kandahar, made it more than ever necessary to bring the
negotiations with the new Amir to a speedy conclusion. It was
accordingly arranged that Mr. Griffin should meet him at Zimma, about
sixteen miles from Kabul. This interview had the happiest results,
and must have been extremely gratifying to Mr. Griffin, whom we all
heartily congratulated on the successful ending to the very delicate
and difficult negotiations which he had carried on with so much skill
and patience.
In taking leave of His Highness, Mr. Griffin invited him to come
to the British camp the following day to be received by Sir Donald
Stewart. Abdur Rahman himself was quite willing to come, and some of
his supporters were in favour of his doing so, but others vehemently
opposed the idea, and 'swore by their faith they would leave him if he
persisted.' After a stormy meeting with his Chiefs, the Amir wrote
to Mr. Griffin as follows: 'If you really wish me to come to you,
irrespective of the opinion of the people, I am quite ready to do
so. Please write and let me know your wishes. I am in the hands of
ignorant fools, who do not know their own interests, good or bad. What
can I do? I am most anxious to meet you.'
Upon receipt of this note Stewart decided that it would be impolitic
to press for an interview, for instead of strengthening the Amir, as
had been the intention, it was evident it would have the opposite
effect, so the meeting was given up.
On the morning of the 3rd August the telegram arrived from Lord Ripon,
which I had been so anxiously expecting, authorizing the despatch of a
force to Kandahar, and directing that I should be placed in command.
I heard afterwards that my message to the Adjutant-General was
received at Simla at a most opportune moment. Lyall took it without
delay to Lord Ripon, who from the first had been in favour of a force
being sent from Kabul, but had refrained from ordering the movement
in deference to the views held by some members of his Council, whose
longer experience of India, His Excellency considered, entitled their
opinions to be treated with respect.
I set to work at once to organize the column which I was to have the
great honour of commanding. In this most congenial duty I received
every possible assistance and encouragement from Stewart; he gave me
carte-blanche, and I should only have had myself to blame if every
unit had not been as efficiently equipped as circumstances would
admit.
I wished that the force should be composed, as far as possible, of
those who had served with me throughout the campaign; but as some of
the regiments (more especially Native corps) had been away from their
homes for two years, and had had more than their share of fighting,
besides having suffered heavy losses in action and through sickness, I
considered it right to consult their commanders before detailing the
troops. With the exception of three, who thought that their regiments
had been long enough away from India, all, to my great delight,
eagerly responded to my call, and I took upon myself to promise the
men that they should not be left to garrison Kandahar, but should be
sent back to India as soon as the fighting ceased.
When the several regiments were decided upon, every man not likely to
stand the strain of prolonged forced marches was weeded out, and the
scale of baggage, tents, and impedimenta was reduced to a minimum.[7]
I had no fear as to the officers and men ably and cheerfully
performing their part of the task; we had been long enough together to
enable us thoroughly to understand and trust each other, and I felt
that I could depend upon each and all to respond heartily to whatever
call I might make upon them.
The question of supplies was my greatest anxiety, and I had many
consultations with my experienced Commissariat officer, Major Badcock,
before I could feel satisfied in this respect.
The transport, as I have already recorded, was in good order; it was
fortunate that the soldiers had been practised in loading, leading,
and tending the animals, for the Afghan drivers deserted to a man a
march or two from Kabul, and the Hazaras followed their example on
reaching their own country. Sir Donald Stewart's account of the
troubles he had encountered during his march from Kandahar was not
very encouraging, and I should have been glad if I could have taken a
larger amount of supplies;[8] but on this point I had to be guided by
the number of animals that could be allotted to the column, which was
necessarily limited, as carriage had to be provided simultaneously for
the withdrawal of the rest of the army of occupation.
The strength of the force placed at my disposal consisted of 9,986
men of all ranks and eighteen guns, divided into three brigades of
Infantry, one brigade of Cavalry, and three batteries of Mountain
Artillery. There were, besides, over 8,000 followers[9] and 2,300
horses and gun-mules.
It was designated the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force.
Major-General J. Ross, C.B., was given the command of the Infantry
division, his three Brigadier-Generals being Herbert Macpherson, T.D.
Baker, and Charles Macgregor. Brigadier-General Hugh Gough commanded
the Cavalry brigade; Colonel Alured Johnson the Artillery; while
Colonel Æ. Perkins held the position of Commanding Royal Engineer;
Deputy-Surgeon-General J. Hanbury that of Principal Medical Officer;
and Lieutenant-Colonel E.F. Chapman, Chief of the Staff.
From the detail of the force given below,[10] it will be seen that
there was no wheeled Artillery, and that the number of guns was not
in proportion to the strength of the other branches. This was my own
doing; I was pressed to take more and heavier guns, but, after due
consideration, I decided that I would only have Mountain batteries. We
could not tell how long the Kandahar garrison would be able to hold
out, so that our first object must be to reach that place with the
least possible delay, and wheeled Artillery would, in a country where
there were practically no roads, have only prevented our moving as
rapidly as we might otherwise have done.
For the equipment of the force, inclusive of carriage for footsore
soldiers[11] and followers, and allowing ten per cent. spare, more
than 8,000[12] animals were required.
Fortunately, it turned out that a fair amount of Indian corn in the
ear was almost everywhere procurable, which was so nutritious that a
large majority of the Cavalry horses and transport animals reached
Kandahar in excellent condition.
Throughout the march great difficulties were experienced in procuring
food, but they were always overcome, with the able assistance of Major
Hastings and his political staff,[13] and by means of the admirable
arrangements made by the Commissariat[14] and Transport[15] officers,
who were quite untiring, and after the longest march, and with the
prospect of having to start again at an early hour the following
morning, had often to work far into the night.
The want of fuel was our chief drawback. We had on many occasions to
purchase houses and pull them to pieces for the sake of the wood to be
got out of them, and frequently there was nothing to cook with save
tiny roots of southernwood, which had to be dug out and collected
after a long day's march before the men could prepare their food and
satisfy their hunger.
One day's corn was carried by each animal in addition to the ordinary
load, and as far as Ghazni grain was tolerably plentiful; beyond that
we had to depend for forage on the crops still standing. At the end of
the day's march, certain fields were told off to the several brigades;
from these all that was required was cut and carried away, the fields
were then measured and assessed, and compensation was awarded by the
political officers, who also adjusted all claims on account of wrecked
houses, and fruit, vegetables, etc., brought in for the troops.
On Sunday, the 8th August, the force moved into camp by brigades, my
Head-Quarters being with the first and third Infantry brigades at
Beni Hissar, on the way to the Logar valley, which route I had chosen
instead of the slightly shorter line by Maidan, on account of the
greater facility it afforded for supplies.
Sir Donald Stewart paid us a farewell visit in the afternoon, and at 6
a.m. the following morning we began the march to Kandahar.
[Footnote 1: Sirdar Sher Ali had been appointed Governor of Kandahar
by the Amir Yakub Khan after the treaty of Gandamak, and had since
assisted Sir Donald Stewart in the civil administration of the
province.]
[Footnote 2: Local Native levies.]
[Footnote 3:
_Killed_ _Missing_
British officers 20 9
" troops 290 48
Native " 624 118
--- ---
934 175
Total, 1,109
Of the regimental followers 331 were killed and 7 were missing; 455
transport followers and drivers were reported as killed or missing,
but a number of these, being Afghans, probably joined the enemy.
A large quantity of arms and ammunition was lost, including over 1,000
rifles and carbines, and 600 or 700 swords and bayonets.
201 horses were killed, and 1,676 camels, 355 ponies, 24 mules, 291
donkeys, and 79 bullocks, were not forthcoming.]
[Footnote 4: Afterwards General Sir Robert Phayre, G.C.B.]
[Footnote 5: General Phayre reported on the 28th July that there
were only seven Native regiments in Baluchistan, three of which were
required for the lines of communication, leaving only four available
for Field Service; and that a battalion of British Infantry and a
battery of Field Artillery required for his column were a long way
off, being still in Sind.]
[Footnote 6: Now General Sir George Greaves, G.C.B., G.C.M.C.]
[Footnote 7:
Each British soldier was allowed for kit and
camp-equipage,
including great-coat and waterproof sheet 30 lbs.
Each Native soldier 20 "
Each public and private follower 10 "
Each European officer 1 mule.
Every eight officers for mess 1 "
Each staff-officer for office purposes 80 lbs.
Each Native officer 30 "]
[Footnote 8: The amount of supplies taken with the force was as
follows:
FOR BRITISH TROOPS.
Bread-stuff 5 days.
Preserved vegetables 15 "
Tea, sugar, salt, and rum 30 "
FOR NATIVE TROOPS AND FOLLOWERS.
Flour 5 days
_Dal_ and salt 30 "
Rum for spirit-drinking men 8 "
Sheep, ten days' supply for British troops and four issues for Native
troops, with 20 per cent. spare. Nearly 5,000 sheep were purchased
on the march. N.B.--There are no horned cattle in
Afghanistan, except those used for the plough or transport.
In addition to the above, a small reserve of lime-juice, pea-soup, and
tinned meat was taken; these proved most useful, and might have been
increased with advantage had carriage been available.
I gave strict orders that the reserve of bread-stuff, flour, and sheep
was never to be used without my sanction, and that wherever
possible food for the day's consumption was to be purchased. We had
occasionally to trench upon the reserve, but we nearly made it up at
other places, and we arrived at Kandahar with three days' supplies in
hand.]
[Footnote 9: The followers consisted of:
Doolie-bearers 2,192
Transport and other departments 4,698
Private servants, and _saices_ of Native Cavalry regiments 1,244
-----
Total 8,134]
[Footnote 10: DETAIL OF FORCE.
1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.
_British_. _Native_.
92nd Highlanders 651 --
23rd Pioneers 701
24th Punjab Native Infantry -- 575
2nd Gurkhas -- 501
--- -----
Total 651 1,777
2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.
_British_. _Native_.
72nd Highlanders 787 --
2nd Sikh Infantry -- 612
3rd Sikh Infantry -- 570
5th Gurkhas -- 561
--- -----
Total 787 1,743
3RD INFANTRY BRIGADE.
| | _British_. | _Native_. |
|60th Rifles, 2nd Battalion | 616 | -- |
|15th Sikhs | -- | 650 |
|25th Punjab Native Infantry | -- | 629 |
|4th Gurkhas | -- | 637 |
| | ___ | ___ |
| Total | 616 | 1,916 |
|CAVALRY BRIGADE.----------------------------------------
| | _British_. | _Native_. |
|9th Queen's Royal Lancers | 318 | -- |
|3rd Bengal Cavalry | -- | 394 |
|3rd Punjab Cavalry | -- | 408 |
|Central India Horse | -- | 495 |
| | ___ | ___ |
| Total | 318 | 1,297 |
|ARTILLERY DIVISION.------------------------------------------
| _British.|Native.|Guns_. |
|6-8th Royal Artillery--screw guns| 95 | 139 | 6 |
|11-9th Royal Artillery | 95 | 139 | 6 |
|No. 2 Mountain Battery | -- | 140 | 6 |
| | ___ | ___ | ___ |
| Total | 190 | 418 | 18 |
|TOTAL OF FORCE.----------------------------------------------
|British troops 2,562 |
|Native " 7,151 |
|British officers 273 |
|Guns 18 |
|Cavalry horses 1,779 |
|Artillery mules 450 |
Two hundred rounds of ammunition were taken for each Infantry soldier:
seventy rounds were carried by each man, thirty rounds were in reserve
with the regiment, and a hundred rounds in the Field Park.
Each Mountain battery had:
Common shell 264
Double shell 60
Shrapnel shell 144
Star shell 24
Case shot 48
___
Total 540 rounds.
And thirty rounds per gun in the Field Park.]
[Footnote 11: British troops were allowed ponies at the rate of 2 per
cent, of strength. Native troops were allowed ponies at the rate of
2-1/2 per cent. of strength. Followers were allowed ponies at the rate
of 1-1/2 per cent. of strength.]
[Footnote 12:
-------------------------------------------------------------
| |Yabus, | |Indian | | |
| | or |Mules.|ponies.|Donkeys.|Camels. |
| |Afghan | | | | |
| |ponies.| | | | |
-------------------------------------------------------------
|Number of animals | | | | | |
| that left Kabul | 1,589 | 4,510| 1,244 | 912 | 6[1*]|
|Purchased during | | | | | |
| the march[2*] | 35 | 1| -- | 208 | 171 |
|Number of animals | | | | | |
| that reached | | | | | |
| Kandahar | 1,179 | 4,293| 1,138 | 1,078 | 177 |
|Casualties during | | | | | |
| the march | 445 | 218| 106 | 42 | |
--------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1*: With hospital equipment.
Note 2*: Only twice had animals to be taken against the will of the
owners, and on both occasions the matter was amicably settled in the
end.]
[Footnote 13: Major E. Hastings, Captain West Ridgeway, Major Euan
Smith, C.S.I., and Major M. Prothero.]
[Footnote 14: Major A. Badcock, Captain A. Rind, and Lieutenants
C. Fitzgerald, H. Hawkes, and H. Lyons Montgomery, all of the Bengal
Staff Corps.]
[Footnote 15: Lieutenant-Colonel R. Low, Bengal Staff Corps; Captain
W. Wynter, 33rd Foot; Captains G. H. Eliot and C. R. Macgregor, Bengal
Staff Corps; Lieutenants L. Booth, 33rd Foot, H. Elverson, 2nd Foot,
R. Fisher, 10th Hussars, R. Wilson, 10th Hussars, and C. Robertson,
8th Foot.]
* * * * *