1879
The amnesty Proclamation--Strength of the Kabul Field Force
--Yakub Khan despatched to India
On the 1st November my Head-Quarters and the 1st division moved into
Sherpur, which the Engineers had prepared for winter quarters, and
where stores of provisions and forage were assuming satisfactory
proportions. The same day Brigadier-General Macpherson left Kabul with
a brigade of about 1,800 men and four guns to join hands with the
troops which I had lately heard were advancing from the Khyber, and
had reached Gandamak. I joined Macpherson the following morning at
Butkhak, about eleven miles from Kabul, where our first post towards
the Khyber had already been established. It was very important that
our communication with India should be by a route good enough for
wheeled carriages; I was therefore anxious to see for myself if it
were not possible to avoid the Khurd-Kabul Pass, which was said to be
very difficult. I had, besides, a strong wish to visit this pass, as
being the scene of Sir Robert Sale's fight with the tribesmen in
1841, and of the beginning of the massacre of General Elphinstone's
unfortunate troops in 1842.[1] The Afghan Commander-in-Chief, Daud
Shah, and several Ghilzai Chiefs, accompanied me; from them I learned
that an easier road did exist, running more to the east, and crossing
over the Lataband mountain. Personal inspection of the two lines
proved that Daud Shah's estimate of their respective difficulties
was correct; the Lataband route was comparatively easy, there was no
defile as on the Khurd-Kabul side, and the kotal, 8,000 feet above the
sea, was reached by a gradual ascent from Butkhak. However, I found
the Khurd-Kabul much less difficult than I had imagined it to be; it
might have been made passable for carts, but there was no object in
using it, as the Lataband route possessed the additional advantage
of being some miles shorter; accordingly I decided upon adopting the
latter as the line of communication with India.
Macpherson reported that the country beyond Khurd-Kabul was fairly
settled, and that, on the 7th, he had been able to open communication
with Brigadier-General Charles Gough, commanding Bright's leading
brigade. I was thus again brought into communication with India, and
in a position to clear my hospitals of those amongst the sick and
wounded who were not progressing favourably, and could not soon be fit
for duty.
By this time the Inquiry Commission had completed its difficult task
of trying to sift the truth concerning the fate of Cavagnari and his
companions from the mass of falsehood with which it was enveloped. The
progress had been slow, particularly when examination touched on the
part Yakub Khan had played in the tragedy; witnesses were afraid to
give evidence openly until they were convinced that he would not be
re-established in a position to avenge himself. The whole matter had
been gone into most fully, and a careful perusal of the proceedings
satisfied me that the Amir could not have been ignorant that an attack
on the Residency was contemplated. He may not have foreseen or desired
the massacre of the Embassy, but there was no room for doubt as to his
having connived at a demonstration against it, which, had it not ended
so fatally, might have served him in good stead as a proof of his
inability to guarantee the safety of foreigners, and thus obtain the
withdrawal of the Mission.
It was impossible, under these circumstances, that Yakub Khan could
ever be reinstated as Ruler of Kabul, and his remaining in his present
equivocal position was irksome to himself and most embarrassing to me.
I therefore recommended that he should be deported to India, to
be dealt with as the Government might decide after reviewing the
information elicited by the political Court of Inquiry, which to
me appeared to tell so weightily against the ex-Amir, that, in my
opinion, I was no longer justified in treating as rebels to his
authority Afghans who, it was now evident, had only carried out his
secret, if not his expressed, wishes when opposing our advance
on Kabul. I decided, therefore, to proclaim a free and complete
amnesty[2] to all persons not concerned, directly or indirectly,
in the attack on the Residency, or who were not found hereafter in
possession of property belonging to our countrymen or their escort, on
the condition that they surrendered their arms and returned to their
homes.
At Daud Shah's suggestion, I sent three influential Sirdars to the
Logar, Kohistan, and Maidan valleys, to superintend the collection of
the amount of forage which was to be levied from those districts;
and in order to lessen the consumption at Kabul, I sent away all
elephants,[3] spare bullocks, and sick transport animals. In
furtherance of the same object, as soon as Macpherson returned, I sent
Baker with a brigade into the Maidan district, about twenty miles from
Kabul, on the Ghazni road, where the troops could more easily be fed,
as it was the district from which a large proportion of our supplies
was expected, and I also despatched to India all time-expired men and
invalids who were no longer fit for service.[4]
Towards the end of November, Mr. Luke, the officer in charge of the
telegraph department, who had done admirable work throughout the
campaign, reported that communication was established with India. As,
however, cutting the telegraph-wires was a favourite amusement of the
tribesmen, a heliograph was arranged at suitable stations between
Landi Kotal and Kabul, which was worked with fair success to the
end of the war. Had we then possessed the more perfect heliographic
apparatus which is now available, it would have made us, in that
land of bright sun, almost independent of the telegraph, so far as
connexion with Landi Kotal was concerned.
Hearing that Baker was experiencing difficulty in collecting his
supplies, I joined him at Maidan to satisfy myself how matters stood.
The headmen in the neighbourhood refused to deliver the _khalsa_ grain
they had been ordered to furnish, and, assisted by a body of Ghilzais
from Ghazni and Wardak, they attacked our Cavalry charged with
collecting it, and murdered our agent, Sirdar Mahomed Hussein Khan.
For these offences I destroyed the chief _malik's_ fort and confiscated
his store of grain, after which there was no more trouble, and
supplies came in freely. I returned to Kabul, and Baker, with his
brigade, followed me on the 1st December.
That same day Yakub Khan was despatched by double marches to India,
careful precautions having been taken to prevent his being rescued on
the way. When saying good-bye to him, he thanked me warmly for the
kindness and consideration he had received, and assured me that he
left his wives and children in my hands in the fullest confidence that
they would be well treated and cared for.
A week later I sent off the two Sirdars, Yahia Khan and Zakariah Khan,
as well as the Wazir, whose guilt had been clearly proved, and whose
powerful influence, I had every reason to believe, was being used to
stir up the country against us. The Mustaufi I allowed to remain; he
had been less prominent than the others in opposing us, and, besides,
I had an idea that he might prove useful to me in the administration
of the country.
[Footnote 1: A most thrilling account of Elphinstone's retreat through
this pass is given in Kaye's 'History of the War in Afghanistan,' vol.
ii., p. 229.]
[Footnote 2: The amnesty Proclamation ran as follows:
'KABUL,
'_12th November, 1879._
'To all whom it may concern. On the 12th October a Proclamation
was issued in which I offered a reward for the surrender of any
person who had fought against the British troops since the 3rd
September, and had thereby become a rebel against the Amir Yakub
Khan. I have now received information which tends to show that
some, at least, of those who shared in the opposition encountered
by the British troops during their advance on Kabul, were led to
do so by the belief that the Amir was a prisoner in my camp, and
had called upon the soldiery and people of Kabul to rise on his
behalf. Such persons, although enemies to the British Government,
were not rebels against their own Sovereign, and the great British
Government does not seek for vengeance against enemies who no
longer resist. It may be that few only of those who took up arms
were thus led away by the statements of evil-minded men, but
rather than punish the innocent with the guilty, I am willing to
believe that all were alike deceived. On behalf of the British
Government, therefore, I proclaim a free and complete amnesty to
all persons who have fought against the British troops since the
3rd September, provided that they now give up any arms in their
possession and return to their homes. The offer of a reward for
the surrender of such persons is now withdrawn, and they will
not for the future be molested in any way on account of their
opposition to the British advance; but it must be clearly
understood that the benefits of this amnesty do not extend to
anyone, whether soldier or civilian, who was concerned directly or
indirectly in the attack upon the Residency, or who may hereafter
be found in possession of any property belonging to members of the
Embassy. To such persons no mercy will be shown. Further, I hold
out no promise of pardon to those who, well knowing the Amir's
position in the British camp, instigated the troops and people of
Kabul to take up arms against the British troops. They have been
guilty of wilful rebellion against the Amir's authority, and they
will be considered and treated as rebels wherever found.']
[Footnote 3: There was a slight fall of snow on the 11th November,
followed by severe frost, and the elephants were beginning to suffer
from the cold. Three of them succumbed on the Lataband Kotal, much
to the annoyance of the olfactory nerves of all passers-by. It was
impossible to bury the huge carcasses, as the ground was all rock, and
there was not wood enough to burn them. So intense was the cold that
the ink froze in my pen, and I was obliged to keep my inkstand under
my pillow at night.]
[Footnote 4: This party marched towards India on the 14th November,
followed by a second convoy of sickly men on the 27th idem. On this
latter date the strength of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, Kabul Field
Force, and the Reserve at Peshawar was as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------
| British Force. | Native Force. |Total.|
|----------------+-----------------| |
|Officers.|Rank &| British |Troops.| |
| |File. |Officers.| | |
--------------------+---------+------+---------+-------+------|
1st Division, at | | | | | |
and around Kabul .. | 100 | 2,783| 71 | 5,060 | 8,014|
2nd Division, on | | | | | |
the Khyber line ... | 90 | 2,385| 118 | 8,590 |11,183|
|---------+------+---------+-------+------|
| 190 | 5,168| 189 |13,650 |19,197|
Reserve at Peshawar | 55 | 1,952| 49 | 4,654 | 6,710|
|---------+------+---------+-------+------|
| 245 | 7,120| 238 |18,304 |25,907|
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total:-- 483 British officers.
7,120 British troops.
18,304 Native troops.
Grand total:-- 25,907 with 60 guns, 24 with 1st Division, and 36 with
2nd Division and the Reserve.]
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