1879
Afghans afraid to befriend us--Kabul Russianized
--Yakub Khan's abdication accepted--State treasury taken over
I had given much thought to the question of housing the troops during
the winter, which was now fast approaching. Some of the senior
officers were in favour of quartering them in the Bala Hissar, as
being the place with most prestige attached to it; but the fact that
there was not accommodation in it for the whole force, and that,
therefore, the troops would have to be separated, as well as the
dangerous proximity of the huge store of gunpowder, which could only
be got rid of by degrees, decided me to occupy in preference the
partly-fortified cantonment of Sherpur, about a mile north-east of the
city, and close to the ruins of the old British entrenchment. It was
enclosed on three sides by a high and massive loop-holed wall, and on
the fourth by the Bimaru heights, while it possessed the advantage of
having within its walls sufficient shelter in long ranges of brick
buildings for the British troops, and good hospital accommodation,
and there was ample space for the erection of huts for the Native
soldiers.
The drawback was that the great extent of its perimeter, more than
four and a half miles, made it a very difficult place to defend; but,
remembering the grievous results of General Elphinstone's force being
scattered in 1841, I thought the advantage of being able to keep my
troops together outweighed the disadvantage of having to defend so
long a line.
Materials for the Native soldiers' huts were brought from the Bala
Hissar, the demolition of which, as an act of retributive justice, I
had recommended to the Government of India, as it appeared to me that
the destruction of the fortified palace in which the massacre had
taken place, and which was the symbol of the power of the Afghans and
their boasted military strength, would be a more fitting punishment
for treachery and insult than any other we could inflict, and a more
lasting memorial of our ability to avenge our countrymen than any we
could raise. The tidings that their ancient citadel had been levelled
to the ground would, I felt sure, spread throughout the length and
breadth of Afghanistan, bearing with them a political significance
that could hardly be over-estimated.
I now set to work to collect supplies for the winter. A1 _khalsa_,
or State grain, we took as our right, the justice of this being
recognized both by the Amir and the people, but what was the property
of private individuals was purchased at a price the avaricious Afghan
could not resist. There had been a good harvest, and supplies were
abundant; but the people from the outlying districts were chary of
assisting us, for they knew from experience that all who befriended
the British would be sure to suffer when we took our departure.
I had repeated complaints brought to me of the harshness and injustice
with which those who had shown themselves well disposed towards us
were treated by the Amir on his return from signing the Treaty at
Gandamak, and most of the Afghans were so afraid of the Amir's
vengeance when they should again be left to his tender mercies, that
they held aloof, except those who, like Wali Mahomed Khan and his
following, were in open opposition to Yakub Khan, and some few who
were still smarting from recent injury and oppression.
I was frequently asked by the Afghans, when requiring some service to
be rendered, 'Are you going to remain?' Could I have replied in the
affirmative, or could I have said that we should continue to exercise
sufficient control over the Government of the country to prevent their
being punished for helping us, they would have served us willingly.
Not that I could flatter myself they altogether liked us, but
they would have felt it wise in their own interests to meet our
requirements; and, besides, the great mass of the people were heartily
sick and tired of a long continuance of oppression and misrule, and
were ready to submit (for a time, at least) to any strong and just
Government.
Lord Lytton, in the hope of saving from the resentment of the Amir
those who had been of use to us in the early part of the war, had
expressly stipulated in Article II. of the Gandamak Treaty that 'a
full and complete amnesty should be published, absolving all Afghans
from any responsibility on account of intercourse with the British
Forces during the campaign, and that the Amir should guarantee
to protect all persons, of whatever degree, from punishment or
molestation on that account.'
But this stipulation was not adhered to. Yakub Khan more than once
spoke to me about it, and declared that it was impossible to control
the turbulent spirits in Afghanistan without being supreme, and that
this amnesty, had it been published, would have tied his hands with
regard to those who had proved themselves his enemies.
His neglect to carry out this Article of the treaty added considerably
to my difficulty, as will be seen from the following letter from
Asmatula Khan, a Ghilzai Chief, to whom I wrote, asking him to meet me
at Kabul.
'I received your kind letter on the 8th of Shawal [28th
September], and understood its contents, and also those of the
enclosed Proclamation to the people of Kabul. I informed all whom
I thought fit of the contents of the Proclamation.
'Some time ago I went to Gandamak to Major Cavagnari. He
instructed me to obey the orders of the Amir, and made me over to
His Highness. When Major Cavagnari returned to India, the Amir's
officials confiscated my property, and gave the Chiefship to my
cousin[1] [or enemy], Bakram Khan.
'The oppression I suffered on your account is beyond description.
They ruined and disgraced every friend and adherent of mine. On
the return of Major Cavagnari to Kabul, I sent my Naib [deputy] to
him, who informed him of my state. Major Cavagnari sent a message
to me to the effect that I should recover my property by force if
I could, otherwise I should go to the hills, and not come to Kabul
until I heard from him. In the meantime I received news of the
murder of the Envoy, and I am still in the hills.'
The thought of what might be in store for those who were now aiding me
troubled me a good deal. No doubt their help was not disinterested,
but they were 'friends in need,' and I could not be quite indifferent
to their future.
I had several interesting conversations with Yakub Khan, and in
discussing with him Sher Ali's reasons for breaking with us, he dwelt
on the fact that his father, although he did not get all he wished out
of Lord Mayo, was fairly satisfied and content with what had been done
for him, but when Saiyad Nur Mahomed returned from Simla in 1873,
he became thoroughly disgusted, and at once made overtures to the
Russians, with whom constant intercourse had since been kept up.
Yakub Khan's statements were verified by the fact that we found Kabul
much more Russian than English. The Afghan Sirdars and officers were
arrayed in Russian pattern uniforms, Russian money was found in the
treasury, Russian wares were sold in the bazaars, and although the
roads leading to Central Asia were certainly no better than those
leading to India, Russia had taken more advantage of them than we had
to carry on commercial dealings with Afghanistan.[2]
When I inquired of Yakub Khan what had become of the correspondence
which must have been carried on between his father and the Russians,
he declared that he had destroyed it all when on his way to Gandamak;
nevertheless, a certain number of letters[3] from Generals Kauffmann
and Stoliatoff came into my possession, and a draft of the treaty the
latter officer brought from Tashkent was made for me from memory by
the man who had copied it for Sher Ali, aided by the Afghan official
who was told off to be in attendance on Stoliatoff, and who had
frequently read the treaty.
In one of my last conversations with Yakub Khan, he advised me 'not to
lose sight of Herat and Turkestan.' On my asking him whether he had
any reason to suppose that his representatives in those places meant
to give trouble, he replied: 'I cannot say what they may do; but,
remember, I have warned you.' He, no doubt, knew more than he told
me, and I think it quite possible that he had some inkling of his
brother's[4] (Ayub Khan's) intentions, in regard to Kandahar, and he
probably foresaw that Abdur Rahman Khan would appear on the scene from
the direction of Turkestan.
I duly received an answer to my telegram regarding the abdication of
Yakub Khan, in which I was informed that His Highness's resignation
was accepted by Her Majesty's Government, and I was directed to
announce the fact to the people of Afghanistan in the following terms:
'I, General Roberts, on behalf of the British Government, hereby
proclaim that the Amir, having by his own free will abdicated,
has left Afghanistan without a Government. In consequence of the
shameful outrage upon its Envoy and suite, the British Government
has been compelled to occupy by force of arms Kabul, the capital,
and to take military possession of other parts of Afghanistan.
'The British Government now commands that all Afghan authorities,
Chiefs, and Sirdars do continue their functions in maintaining
order, referring to me whenever necessary.
'The British Government desire that the people shall be treated
with justice and benevolence, and that their religious feelings
and customs be respected.
'The services of such Sirdars and Chiefs as assist in preserving
order will be duly recognized, but all disturbers of the peace and
persons concerned in attacks upon the British authority will meet
with condign punishment.
'The British Government, after consultation with the principal
Sirdars, tribal Chiefs, and others representing the interests and
wishes of the various provinces and cities, will declare its will
as to the future permanent arrangements to be made for the good
government of the people.'
This manifesto was issued on the 28th October, and the same day
I informed Yakub Khan that his abdication had been accepted, and
acquainted him with the orders passed by the British Government in
connexion with this fact.[5]
Yakub Khan showed no interest either in the Proclamation, a Persian
translation of which was read to him, or the Government's decision as
to himself, and made no comment beyond a formal '_bisyar khub_' ('very
good') and an inclination of the head.
I then told Yakub Khan that, as I was now charged with the government
of the country, it was necessary that I should take possession of the
treasury and all moneys therein. He signified his assent, but demurred
to certain sums being considered as public property, contending
that they formed part of his father's wealth, and that the British
Government might as well take from him his _choga_,[6] this
also having come from the pockets of the people. 'My father was
_Padishah_,' he said; 'there was no distinction between public and
private money. However,' he went on, 'I have given up the crown, and I
am not going to dispute about rupees. You may take all I have, down to
my clothes; but the money was my father's, and is mine by right.'
I replied that it was necessary that all money in his possession
should be given up, but that his private effects should not be
touched; that he would be given a receipt for the money, and that, if
the Government of India decided it to be his personal property, it
should be returned to him.
This Yakub Khan at first declined to accept, with some show of temper.
Eventually he came round, and said, 'Yes, give me a receipt, so that
no one may say hereafter that I carried off State money to which I
had no right. It can be easily made sure that I have no money when I
go.'[7]
Spite of all his shortcomings, I could not help feeling sorry for the
self-deposed Ruler, and before leaving him I explained that he would
be treated with the same consideration that had always been accorded
to him, that Nawab Sir Ghulam Hussein Khan[8] should have a tent next
to his, and that it should be the Nawab's care to look after his
comfort in every way, and that I should be glad to see him whenever he
wished for an interview. That same day, under instructions, I issued
the following further manifesto:
'In my Proclamation of yesterday I announced that His Highness the
Amir had of his own free will abdicated, and that for the present
the government of Afghanistan would be carried on under my
supervision. I now proclaim that, in order to provide for the cost
of administration, I have taken possession of the State treasury,
and that, until the British Government shall declare its will
as to the permanent arrangements to be made for the future good
government of the country, the collection of revenue and the
expenditure of public money will be regulated by me. All persons
concerned are hereby informed that they must obey without dispute
or delay such orders as may be issued by me in regard to the
payment of taxes and other connected matters; and I give plain
warning that anyone resisting or obstructing the execution of such
orders will be treated with the utmost severity as an enemy to the
British Government.'
[Footnote 1: In Pushtu the word _tarbur_ signifies a cousin to any
degree, and is not unfrequently used as 'enemy,' the inference being
that in Afghanistan a cousin is necessarily an enemy.]
[Footnote 2: As I reported at the time, the magnitude of Sher
Ali's military preparations was, in my opinion, a fact of peculiar
significance. He had raised and equipped with arms of precision
sixteen regiments of Cavalry and sixty-eight of Infantry, while his
Artillery amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisans
were constantly employed in the manufacture of rifled cannon and
breech-loading small arms. Swords, helmets, uniforms, and other
articles of military equipment, were stored in proportionate
quantities. Upon the construction of the Sherpur cantonment Sher Ali
had expended an astonishing amount of labour and money. The size and
cost of this work may be judged from the fact that the main line of
rampart, with barrack accommodation, extended to a length of nearly
two miles under the western and southern slopes of the Bimaru hills,
while the original design was to carry the wall entirely round the
hills, a distance of four and a half miles, and the foundations were
laid for a considerable portion of this length. All these military
preparations must have been going on for some years, and were quite
unnecessary, except as a provision for contemplated hostilities with
ourselves. Sher Ali had refused during this time to accept the subsidy
we had agreed to pay him, and it is difficult to understand how their
entire cost could have been met from the Afghan treasury, the annual
gross revenue of the country at that time amounting only to about 80
lakhs of rupees.]
[Footnote 3: These letters, as well as my report to the Secretary to
the Government of India in the Foreign Department, with an account of
my conversation with Yakub Khan, are given in the Appendix.]
[Footnote 4: Sirdar Ayub Khan was Governor of Herat in 1879.]
[Footnote 5: There were present at the interview, besides myself,
Colonel Macgregor, Major Hastings, Surgeon-Major Bellew, Nawab Sir
Ghulam Hussein Khan, and Mr. H.M. Durand.]
[Footnote 6: A kind of mantle worn by Afghans.]
[Footnote 7: As Yakub Khan refused under one pretext or another to
deliver up any money, Major Moriarty, the officer in charge of the
Kabul Field Force treasure-chest, and Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain,
accompanied by an escort, searched a house in the city in which a
portion of Yakub Khan's money was said to be concealed. Upwards of
eight and a half lakhs of rupees, and a certain amount of jewellery
and gold coins, tillas and Russian five-rouble pieces, in all
amounting to nine and a half lakhs, were found. This sum was
subsequently refunded to the Afghan Government.]
[Footnote 8: The Nawab had been made a K.C.S.I.]
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