1879
Massacre of the Embassy--The Kabul Field Force
--Lord Lytton's foresightedness--Start for Kabul--Letter to the Amir
--Proclamation to the people of Kabul--Yakub Khan's agents
--Reasons for remaining at Alikhel
My wife and I thought and talked much over our new life on the
frontier, to which we both looked forward with great interest and
pleasure, but, before entering upon it, we settled to go home for
a time to place our boy at school and see our friends, and we were
arranging our plans accordingly, when suddenly our 'castles in the
air' were dashed to the ground by a ruthless blow from the hand of
Fate, and the whole of India, the whole of the civilized world, was
struck with grief, horror, and indignation at the awful news of the
massacre at Kabul of Cavagnari and his gallant companions.
Throughout the month of August telegrams and letters constantly came
from Cavagnari (now a Lieutenant-Colonel and a K.C.B.) to the Viceroy,
the Foreign Secretary, and myself, in which he always expressed
himself in such a manner as to lead to the belief that he was
perfectly content with his position, and felt himself quite secure;
and in his very last letter, dated the 30th August, received after his
death, he wrote: 'I personally believe that Yakub Khan will turn out
to be a very good ally, and that we shall be able to keep him to
his engagements.' His last telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 2nd
September, concluded with the words, 'All well.' Cavagnari mentioned
in one of his letters that the Afghan soldiers were inclined to be
mutinous, and in another that a dispute had arisen in the bazaar
between them and the men of the British escort, but at the same time
he expressed his confidence in the Amir's ability and determination
to maintain order; I could not, however, help being anxious about
Cavagnari, or divest myself of the feeling that he might be
over-estimating Yakub Khan's power, even if His Highness had the will,
to protect the Mission.
Between one and two o'clock on the morning of the 5th September, I was
awakened by my wife telling me that a telegraph man had been wandering
round the house and calling for some time, but that no one had
answered him.[1] I got up, went downstairs, and, taking the telegram
from the man, brought it up to my dressing-room, and opened it; it
proved to be from Captain Conolly, Political Officer at Alikhel, dated
the 4th September. The contents told me that my worst fears--fears I
had hardly acknowledged to myself--had been only too fully realized.
The telegram ran:
'One Jelaladin Ghilzai, who says he is in Sir Louis Cavagnari's
secret service, has arrived in hot haste from Kabul, and solemnly
states that yesterday morning the Residency was attacked by three
regiments who had mutinied for their pay, they having guns, and
being joined by a portion of six other regiments. The Embassy
and escort were defending themselves when he left about noon
yesterday. I hope to receive further news.'
I was paralyzed for the moment, but was roused by my wife calling out,
'What is it? Is it bad news from Kabul?' She had divined my fears
about Cavagnari, and had been as anxious about him as I had been
myself. I replied, 'Yes, very bad, if true. I hope it is not.' But I
felt it was. I woke my A.D.C., and sent him off at once to the Viceroy
with the telegram. The evil tidings spread rapidly. I was no sooner
dressed than Mr. Alfred Lyall arrived. We talked matters over, I
despatched a telegram[2] to Captain Conolly, and we then went off to
Lord Lytton.
Early as it was, I found the Council assembled. The gravity of the
situation was thoroughly appreciated, and it was unanimously decided
that, should the disastrous report prove to be true, troops must
proceed to Kabul with the least possible delay to avenge or, if
happily incorrect or exaggerated, to support the Mission.
Sir Samuel Browne's force had been broken up, Sir Donald Stewart was
in far off Kandahar, and his troops had, all but a small number, left
on their return march to India; the Kuram force was, therefore, the
only one in a position to reach Kabul quickly, and I was ordered to
proceed at once to Kuram and resume my command.
As a preliminary measure, Brigadier-General Massy, who had been placed
in temporary command during my absence, was directed to move troops
to the Shutargardan, where they were to entrench themselves and await
orders, while Stewart was directed to stop all regiments on their way
back to India, and himself hold fast at Kandahar.
During the day further telegrams were received confirming the truth of
the first report, and telling of the Mission having been overwhelmed
and every member of it cruelly massacred; and later Captain Conolly
telegraphed that messengers had arrived from the Amir bringing two
letters addressed to me giving his version of what had occurred.
During the few hours I remained at Simla I was busily engaged in
discussing with Sir Frederick Haines the formation of the Kabul Field
Force,[3] as my new command was designated, and the many important
matters which had to be considered. More troops had to be hurried up,
for it would be necessary to hold Kuram in strength while I moved
on to Kabul, and, as communication by the Shutargardan could not be
depended upon after December, on account of snow, the Khyber route
would have to be opened out.
At the commencement of the last year's campaign my anxiety had been so
largely increased by having been given officers totally inexperienced
in war to fill the higher posts in the Kuram column, that I did not
hesitate to press upon the Commander-in-Chief, now that I had a far
more difficult operation to carry through, the importance of my senior
officers being tried men on whom I could implicitly rely; and I
succeeded in getting for the command of my two Infantry brigades
Herbert Macpherson[4] and T. D. Baker,[5] the Viceroy's Military
Secretary, both of whom had seen a good deal of service, while the
former had already commanded a brigade in the field.
To the command of the Artillery and Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel B.
Gordon and Brigadier-General Massy were appointed, neither of whom had
much experience of war. Gordon had served in Central India during
the Mutiny, and Massy by his pluck as a subaltern of Infantry in the
Crimea had gained for himself the _sobriquet_ of 'Redan' Massy. But
he had not served with Cavalry in the field, and from my slight
acquaintance with him I could not say whether he possessed the very
exceptional qualities required in a Cavalry Commander.
My staff had proved themselves so capable and reliable that I had no
wish to make any change; it was, however, materially strengthened by
the addition of Colonel MacGregor,[6] as 'Chief of the Staff,' with
Captain Combe,[7] 10th Hussars, and Lieutenant Manners Smith[8] as
Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-Generals.
Mr. H.M. Durand[9] was attached to me as Political Secretary, and
Major Hastings as Political Officer, in place of Colonel Waterfield,
who was _hors de combat_ from a broken leg. Hugh Gough, with the rank
of Brigadier-General, and Major Mark Heathcote as his assistant, were
placed in charge of the lines of communication.
Before leaving Simla I paid a farewell visit to Lord Lytton. I found
him in a state of deep distress and depression. To a man of his
affectionate disposition, the fate of Cavagnari, for whom he had a
great personal regard, was a real grief. But on public grounds he felt
still more strongly the collapse of the Mission and the consequent
heavy blow to the policy he had so much at heart, viz., the
rectification of our defective frontier, and the rendering India
secure against foreign aggression--a policy which, though scouted at
the time by a party which later became all-powerful, has since been
justified by the action of successive Governments, Liberal and
Conservative alike, until at the present moment our frontier is
gradually becoming what Lord Lytton, with his clear foresightedness
and intelligent appreciation of our responsibilities and India's
requirements, would then have made it.
In answer to my request for instructions as to the line I should take
about our future relations with the Afghans, Lord Lytton said:
'You can tell them we shall never again altogether withdraw from
Afghanistan, and that those who help you will be befriended and
protected by the British Government.'
While I was with Lord Lytton, a telegram[10] was brought in from
Captain Conolly, reporting the details of the attack upon the Embassy,
as given to him by the messenger who had been entrusted by the Amir
to deliver the two letters addressed to me. In this telegram Conolly
solicited instructions as to what he was to communicate to the Amir in
reply to His Highness's request for aid, and inquired whether he was
at liberty to make terms with one Badshah Khan, an influential Ghilzai
Chief, who had come to Alikhel to offer his services.
The following telegram was sent in reply by the Foreign Secretary:
'Your telegram 6th. Reply to the Amir at once from the Viceroy
that a strong British force under General Roberts will march
speedily on Kabul to his relief, from the Shutargardan, and
that he should use all his resources to co-operate with, and
facilitate, the advance of the troops through his country. Your
proposal to subsidize Badshah Khan and accept his services is
approved. Roberts will send detailed instructions.'
Late in the afternoon of the same day (September 6th) I left Simla,
accompanied by my wife as far as Umballa, where I found my staff
waiting for me. She saw us off in the train, bidding us a cheery
good-bye and good luck, but I am afraid the return journey must have
been a sad one for her.
Thought for the immediate future filled my mind as we sped on our way
to the front, and not a few difficulties connected with the proposed
advance on Kabul presented themselves to me. My chief causes for
anxiety were the insufficiency of transport, and the great extent of
the lines of communication which would have to be guarded. It would
be necessary to hold the country in strength from Thal to the
Shutargardan, a distance of 115 miles, until such time as the Khyber
route could be opened, and I felt that the force at my disposal
(7,500 men and 22 guns) was none too large for the work before
it, considering that I should have to provide a garrison for the
Shutargardan, if not for other posts between that place and Kabul.
My Commissariat arrangements, too, caused me many misgivings,
increased by the fact that Major Badcock, my chief Commissariat
Officer, and Major Collett, my Assistant Quartermaster-General, who
had afforded such valuable aid in Kuram, thinking the war was at an
end, had taken leave to England. My doubts vanished, however, and my
spirits rose at the sight of my brave troops, and the enthusiastic
welcome they gave me as I rode through Kuram on the 12th September on
my way to Alikhel. A splendid spirit pervaded the whole force; the
men's hearts were on fire with eager desire to press on to Kabul, and
be led against the miscreants who had foully massacred our countrymen,
and I felt assured that whatever it was possible for dauntless
courage, unselfish devotion, and firm determination to achieve, would
be achieved by my gallant soldiers.
On reaching Alikhel, Captain Conolly handed to me the Amir's
letters,[11] to which I replied at once, and the next day, under
instructions from the Government of India, I wrote to His Highness
that, in conformity with his own special request that an English
officer should be deputed as Envoy to his Court, and on condition that
he would himself be responsible for the protection and honourable
treatment of such an Envoy, Major Cavagnari and three British officers
had been allowed to go to Kabul, all of whom within six weeks had been
ruthlessly murdered by his troops and subjects; that his inability to
carry out the treaty engagements, and his powerlessness to establish
his authority, even in his own capital, having thus become apparent,
an English army would now advance on Kabul with the double object of
consolidating his Government, should he himself loyally do his best to
fulfil the terms of the treaty, and of exacting retribution from the
murderers of the British Mission. But that, although His Highness laid
great stress in his letter of the 4th September on the sincerity of
his friendship, my Government had been informed that emissaries had
been despatched from Kabul to rouse the country people and tribes
against us, and as this action appeared inconsistent with friendly
intentions, I considered it necessary for His Highness to send a
confidential representative to confer with me and explain his object.
I had little doubt as to the truth of the report that the Amir was
using every effort to incite the Ghilzais and other tribes to oppose
us, and I was confirmed in my conviction by a Native gentleman, Nawab
Ghulam Hussein Khan,[12] at one time our agent at Kabul, who told me
that, although he did not believe that Yakub Khan had actually planned
the massacre of the Embassy, he had certainly taken no steps to
prevent it, and that he, Ghulam Hussein Khan, was convinced that the
Amir was now playing us false. It was, therefore, a relief to
find awaiting me at Alikhel several of the leading men from the
neighbouring districts, to whom I had telegraphed, before leaving
Simla, asking them to meet me.
These men were profuse in their proffers of assistance, and, although
I did not place a great deal of faith in their promises, I came to the
conclusion that, notwithstanding Yakub Khan's treacherous efforts to
stir up the tribes, if I could only push on rapidly with a fairly
strong force, I need not anticipate any opposition that I could not
overcome. Everything depended on speed, but rapidity of movement
depended on the condition of the transport service, and my inspection
of the animals, as I passed through Kuram, was not calculated to
raise hopes of being able to make a very quick advance; for, owing
to continuous hard work and the want of a staff of trained transport
attendants, the numbers of animals had steadily diminished, and those
that remained were for the most part sickly and out of condition.
On the 16th of September I issued a Proclamation,[13] copies of which
I caused to be sent to the people of Kabul, Ghazni, and all the
neighbouring tribes; this, I hoped, would facilitate our advance, and
reassure those who had taken no part in the attack on the Residency.
I also wrote a letter[14] to the _maliks_ of the Logar valley, whose
territory we must enter directly we had crossed the Shutargardan, and
whose co-operation I was most anxious to obtain. On the 18th I again
wrote[15] to the Amir, enclosing copies of these two documents, and
informing him that I was still awaiting a reply to my first letter
and the arrival of His Highness's confidential representative; that I
hoped he would soon issue the necessary orders for the furtherance of
our plans and that he might rest assured of the support of the British
Government.
On the 19th September matters had so far progressed that I was able to
tell the Viceroy that Brigadier-General Baker was entrenched with his
brigade on the Shutargardan, and engaged in improving the road to
Kushi, the first halting-place in the Logar valley; that supplies were
being collected by means of local transport; that I was bringing up
reserve ammunition and treasure from the rear on Artillery waggons;
and that every possible effort was being made to render the force
mobile.
On the 20th I received the Amir's reply. He expressed regret that
he was unable to come to Alikhel himself, but intimated that he was
sending two confidential agents, his Mustaufi (Finance Minister),
Habibulla Khan, and his Wazir (Prime Minister), Shah Mahomed Khan, who
accordingly arrived the next day.
At each interview I had with these gentlemen during the three days
they remained in my camp, they impressed upon me that the Amir was
inclined to be most friendly, and that his only wish was to be guided
by the advice of the British Government. But, notwithstanding these
plausible assurances, I soon discovered that Yakub Khan's real object
in sending these two high officials was to stop the advance of the
force, and induce me to leave the punishment of the troops who had
committed the massacre in the hands of the Afghan authorities, or else
to delay us long enough to give time for the whole country to rise
against us.
As the conversations which were carried on at the meetings with the
Afghan agents are interesting, and have an important bearing on the
subsequent proceedings, I give in the Appendix* the notes taken at the
time by my Political Secretary.
(*Appendix V.)
I was anxious to keep one of the Amir's representatives with me, but
neither of them was willing to remain, so I felt bound to let them
both depart, taking with them the following letter to the Amir:
TO HIS HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF KABUL.
_Camp, Alikhel, 25th September, 1879._
(After compliments.) I have received Your Highness's two letters
of the 19th and 20th September (1st and 2nd Shawal), delivered
to me by the hands of Your Highness's two confidential
representatives, Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Mahomed.
I am much obliged to Your Highness for sending me two such
well-known men, and of such character as the Mustaufi and the
Wazir. They have informed me of Your Highness's wishes, and I
quite understand all they have told me. It is unfortunate that the
season is so late, and that winter will soon be here; but there is
yet time for a British army to reach Kabul before the great cold
sets in.
The Viceroy of India is much concerned that there should have been
any delay in promptly acceding to Your Highness's request for
advice and assistance, as conveyed in Your Highness's letters of
the 3rd and 4th instant. It was His Excellency's earnest wish
that troops should march on Kabul at once, so as to ensure Your
Highness's personal safety and aid Your Highness in restoring
peace and order at your capital.
Unfortunately, the want of transport, and the necessity for
collecting a certain amount of supplies, have caused a few weeks'
delay; it is, however, a source of gratification and happiness to
the Viceroy to learn that Your Highness's safety is not at present
endangered, and His Excellency trusts Your Highness will be able
to keep everything quiet in your kingdom, until such time as
British troops may reach Kabul.
I am glad to be able to inform Your Highness that news reached me
yesterday of the departure of a considerable force from Kandahar
under the command of a brave and distinguished officer, and that
a large body of troops, under command of General Bright, were
advancing rapidly from Peshawar to Jalalabad and onwards _viâ_
Gandamak to Kabul. My own force will, I hope, be in a state to
march before long. As Your Highness is aware, the Shutargardan has
been occupied for some days. Meanwhile regiments of Cavalry and
Infantry and batteries of Artillery have reached Kuram to replace
those I am taking on with me, and to reinforce my own column
should a necessity for more troops arise--a contingency I do not
in the least expect.
The Viceroy of India, in His Excellency's anxiety for Your
Highness's welfare and safety, issued orders that each of the
three armies, now advancing from Kandahar, Kuram, and the Khyber,
should be strong enough to overcome any opposition Your Highness's
enemies could possibly offer. That each is strong enough there can
be no doubt.
I understand that there is no one at Kelat-i-Ghilzai or Ghazni to
stop the progress of the troops _en route_ from Kandahar. There is
no reason, therefore, why they should not reach Kabul in a very
short time.
The Khyber tribes, having understood and appreciated the Treaty
of peace made by Your Highness with the British Government in May
last, have unanimously agreed to assist the troops from Peshawar
in every way, and are now eager to keep the road through the
Khyber safe, and to place all their transport animals at the
disposal of the British Commander, who will thus be enabled to
concentrate his force rapidly at Kabul. Through the kindness of
Your Highness I have experienced much less difficulty than I could
have expected, and I may now reasonably hope to be with Your
Highness at least as soon as either the Kandahar or Khyber column.
I look forward with great pleasure to the meeting with Your
Highness, and trust that you will continue your kind assistance to
obtain for me supplies and transport.
I have carefully considered Your Highness's proposal that you
yourself should be permitted to administer just punishment to the
mutinous troops and others who shared in the treacherous and cruel
attack on the British Envoy and his small escort, and thus save
Her Majesty's troops the trouble, hardship, and privation which
must necessarily be encountered by an advance on Kabul at this
season of the year. I thank Your Highness most cordially, on the
part of the Viceroy and Government of India, for this further
proof of Your Highness's friendly feelings. Under ordinary
circumstances such an offer would be gratefully and willingly
accepted, but after what has recently occurred, I feel sure that
the great British nation would not rest satisfied unless a British
army marched to Kabul and there assisted Your Highness to inflict
such punishments as so terrible and dastardly an act deserves.
I have forwarded Your Highness's letters in original to the
Viceroy; a copy of this, my reply, will be submitted by to-day's
post for His Excellency's consideration. Meanwhile I have
permitted Mustaufi Habibulla Khan and Wazir Shah Mahomed to take
their leave and rejoin Your Highness.
I delayed my own departure from Alikhel until a sufficiency of
supplies had been collected at Kushi, and everything was ready for as
rapid an advance on Kabul as my limited transport would admit of; for,
so long as I remained behind, the people of Afghanistan could not
be sure of my intentions, and no doubt hoped that the Amir's
remonstrances would have the desired effect, and prevent our doing
more than occupying the Shutargardan, or making a demonstration toward
Kushi. My crossing the pass would, I knew, be the signal for all those
determined on opposition to assemble; it was politic, therefore, to
remain behind until the last moment.
When all arrangements were complete, so far as was possible with the
means at my disposal, I issued the following Field Force Order:
'The Government of India having decided that a force shall proceed
with all possible despatch to Kabul, in response to His Highness
the Amir's appeal for aid, and with the object of avenging the
dastardly murder of the British representative and his escort, Sir
Frederick Roberts feels sure that the troops under his command
will respond to the call with a determination to prove themselves
worthy of the high reputation they have maintained during the
recent campaign.
'The Major-General need address no words of exhortation to
soldiers whose courage and fortitude have been so well proved. The
Afghan tribes are numerous, but without organization; the regular
army is undisciplined, and whatever may be the disparity in
numbers, such foes can never be formidable to British troops. The
dictates of humanity require that a distinction should be
made between the peaceable inhabitants of Afghanistan and the
treacherous murderers for whom a just retribution is in store,
and Sir Frederick Roberts desires to impress upon all ranks the
necessity for treating the unoffending population with justice,
forbearance, and clemency.
'The future comfort and well-being of the force depend largely on
the friendliness of our relations with the districts from which
supplies must be drawn; prompt payment is enjoined for all
articles purchased by departments and individuals, and all
disputes must be at once referred to a political officer for
decision.
'The Major-General confidently looks forward to the successful
accomplishment of the object of the expedition, and the
establishment of order and a settled Government in Afghanistan.'
[Footnote 1: There are no such things as bells or knockers in India.]
[Footnote 2: 'Lose no time and spare no money to obtain reliable
information of what is going on in Kabul, and keep me constantly
informed by urgent telegrams. I am in hopes that Jelaladin's report
will turn out to be greatly exaggerated, if not untrue. As, however,
his intelligence is sure to spread and cause a certain amount of
excitement, warn General Massy and Mr. Christie (the Political Officer
in Kuram) to be on the alert.']
[Footnote 3: The Kabul Field Force was composed as follows:
ARTILLERY.
Lieutenant-Colonel B. L. Gordon, commanding.
Captain J.W. Inge, Adjutant.
F/A, Royal Horse Artillery, Major J. C. Smyth-Windham.
G/3, Royal Artillery, Major Sydney Parry.
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery (four guns), Captain Morgan.
No. 2 (Derajât) Mountain Battery (four guns), Captain Swinley.
Two Gatling guns, Captain Broadfoot.
ENGINEERS.
Lieutenant-Colonel Æ. Perkins, C.B., commanding.
Lieutenant F. Spratt, Adjutant.
Captain Woodthorpe, R.E., in charge of surveying.
Captain Stratton, 22nd Regiment, in charge of signalling.
Lieutenant F. Burn-Murdoch, R.E., Royal Engineer Park.
CAVALRY.
Brigadier-General W.D. Massy, commanding.
Lieutenant J.P. Brabazon, 10th Hussars, Brigade-Major.
9th Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Cleland.
5th Punjab Cavalry, Major B. Williams.
12th Bengal Cavalry, Major Green.
14th Bengal Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel Ross.
1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General H. Macpherson, C.B., V.C., commanding.
Captain G. de C. Morton, 6th Foot, Brigade-Major.
67th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel C.B. Knowles.
92nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel G.H. Parker.
28th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hudson.
2ND INFANTRY BRIGADE.
Brigadier-General T. D. Baker, C.B., 18th Foot, commanding.
Captain W.C. Farwell, 26th Punjab Infantry, Brigade-Major.
72nd Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel Brownlow.
5th Gurkhas, Lieutenant-Colonel Fitz-Hugh.
5th Punjab Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Macqueen.
3rd Sikhs, Lieutenant-Colonel G.N. Money.
23rd Pioneers, Lieutenant-Colonel Currie.]
[Footnote 4: The late Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Macpherson, V.C.,
K.C.B., who died as Commander-in-Chief of Madras.]
[Footnote 5: The late Sir Thomas Baker, K.C.B., who died as
Quartermaster-General at the Horse Guards.]
[Footnote 6: The late Sir Charles MacGregor, K.C.B.]
[Footnote 7: Now Major-General Combe, C.B.]
[Footnote 8: This promising young officer greatly distinguished
himself at Kabul, and died a few years afterwards of cholera.]
[Footnote 9: Now Sir Mortimer Durand, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., British
Minister at Teheran.]
[Footnote 10: TELEGRAM DATED 6TH SEPTEMBER, 1879.
_From_ CAPTAIN CONOLLY, ALIKHEL.
_To_ FOREIGN SECRETARY, SIMLA.
'_Clear the Line._--Sirkai Khan, bearer of the Amir's first
letter, confirms previous reports of disaster, and describes how
Badshah Khan visited the spot, and saw the dead bodies of the
Envoy, staff, and escort. Of the latter, some nine sowars are said
to have been out getting grass that day, and were not killed with
the rest; defence was very stubborn, and the loss of the Kabulis
heavy, put down at one hundred, or more. Finding they could not
storm the place, the mutineers set fire to the doorway below,
and, when that gave way, swarmed in and up to the upper story,
overwhelmed the defenders, and sacked the place.
'The second letter was brought by another messenger, servant of
the Embassy _Mehmandar_, whose story in all but a few unimportant
details is the same as that first received.
'If an advance on Kabul is decided on to revenge massacre of
Embassy, and also to quiet surrounding tribes, whom any (?) action
would tempt to break out, it appears to me all-important to
secure safe passage of the Shutargardan, and with this object to
subsidize Badshah Khan handsomely.
'I have detained the Kabul messengers pending receipt of
instructions as to the line of policy to follow, and what to
communicate to the Amir or Badshah Khan. The former invokes our
aid; the latter expresses himself, through his messenger, anxious
to serve us. Once in Logar valley, where they have had a bumper
harvest, we could live on the country.']
[Footnote 11: TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM THE AMIR OF KABUL TO
GENERAL ROBERTS, DATED KABUL, 8 A.M., THE 3RD SEPTEMBER, 1879.
(After compliments.) The troops who had assembled for pay at the
Bala Hissar suddenly broke out and stoned their officers, and then
all rushed to the Residency and stoned it, receiving in return a
hail of bullets. Confusion and disturbance reached such a height
that it was impossible to quiet it. People from Sherpur and
country around the Bala Hissar, and city people of all classes,
poured into the Bala Hissar and began destroying workshops,
Artillery park, and magazine; and all the troops and people
attacked the Residency. Meanwhile, I sent Daud Shah[*] to help the
Envoy. On reaching the Residency, he was unhorsed by stones and
spears, and is now dying. I then sent Sirdar Yahia Khan and my own
son, the heir-apparent, with the Koran to the troops; but no use.
I then sent well-known Syads and Mullahs of each class, but of no
avail; up till now, evening, the disturbance continues. It will
be seen how it ends. I am grieved with this confusing state of
things. It is almost beyond conception. (Here follow the date and
the Amir's seal.)
(Note *: The Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan army.)
SECOND LETTER FROM THE AMIR, DATED KABUL, THE 4TH SEPTEMBER, 1879.
Yesterday, from 8 a.m. till evening, thousands assembled to
destroy the Embassy. There has been much loss of life on both
sides. At evening they set fire to the Residency. All yesterday
and up till now, I with five attendants have been besieged. I have
no certain news of the Envoy, whether he and his people have
been killed in their quarters, or been seized and brought out.
Afghanistan is ruined; the troops, city, and surrounding country
have thrown off their yoke of allegiance. Daud Shah is not
expected to recover; all his attendants were killed. The workshops
and magazine are totally gutted--in fact, my kingdom is ruined.
After God, I look to the Government for aid and advice. My true
friendship and honesty of purpose will be proved as clear as
daylight. By this misfortune I have lost my friend, the Envoy, and
also my kingdom. I am terribly grieved and perplexed. (Here follow
the date and the Amir's seal.)]
[Footnote 12: The Nawab was on his way from Kandahar to Kabul, but on
hearing of the massacre he came to Alikhel.]
[Footnote 13: TRANSLATION OF A PROCLAMATION ISSUED BY MAJOR-GENERAL
SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS.
_Alikhel, 16th September_, 1879.
Be it known to all the Chiefs and the people of the country of
Kabul and its dependencies that, in accordance with the Treaty
concluded in May, 1879, corresponding to Jamdi-ul-Akhir 1296
Hijri, between the two great Governments, and to the terms of
which His Highness the Amir expressed his assent, and agreed to
the location of an Envoy of Her Imperial Majesty the Empress, a
British Envoy was, at the special request of His Highness the
Amir, located at the Kabul Court, and the Amir guaranteed that he
should be treated honourably and protected.
Within six weeks after the said Envoy was received at and entered
Kabul the whole Embassy was besieged and massacred in the very
citadel of His Highness the Amir, who could not save or protect
them from the hands of the soldiers and the people. From this, the
lack of power of the Amir and the weakness of his authority in his
capital itself are quite apparent and manifest. For this reason
the British troops are advancing for the purpose of taking a
public vengeance on behalf of the deceased as well as of obtaining
satisfaction (_lit._, consolidation) of the terms entered into in
the Treaty concluded. The British troops are entering Afghanistan
for the purpose of strengthening the royal authority of His
Highness the Amir on condition that His Highness loyally uses
those powers for the maintenance of friendship and of amicable
relations with the British Government. This is the only course by
which the Amir's kingdom can remain intact, and (by which) also
the friendly sentiments and sincerity expressed in his letter of
the 4th September, 1879, after the occurrence of the (said) event
can be proved.
For the purpose of removing any doubt about the concord of the two
Governments, the Amir has been addressed to depute a confidential
agent to my camp. The British force will not punish or injure
anyone except the persons who have taken part or joined in the
massacre of the Embassy unless they offer opposition. All the
rest, the small and great, who are unconcerned (therein) may rest
assured of this. Carriage and supplies of every description should
be brought into the British camp. Full price and hire shall be
paid for everything that may be taken. Whereas mercy and
humanity are the characteristics of this great Government, this
proclamation is issued beforehand for the information of the
people at large.]
[Footnote 14: TRANSLATION OF A LETTER FROM MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FREDERICK
ROBERTS TO CERTAIN _maliks_ OF THE LOGAR VALLEY.
From the Proclamation already issued by me, you will have learnt
the reasons for the march of the British troops to Kabul. Her
Majesty's Government, by the movement of troops, intends to
exact retribution for the massacre of the Embassy and to aid His
Highness the Amir in restoring order.
Let all those not concerned in the massacre rest assured, provided
no opposition is shown, His Highness the Amir, in communications
received by me, expresses his friendship, and wishes to continue
amicable relations. As the British troops under my command will
shortly enter the Logar valley I write to reassure you, and expect
that you will inform all the residents of the valley not concerned
in the late hateful massacre the purport of the Proclamation, and
give every assistance in providing carriage and supplies required
for the troops for which adequate hire and payment will be made. I
hope that after the above assurance all the headmen will come to
meet me in my camp where I shall be glad to see them.]
[Footnote 15: This letter is given in full in the Appendix.]
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