1879
Sher Ali's death--Premature negotiations--The treaty of Gandamak
--Making friends with the tribesmen--Gloomy forebodings
--Good-bye to Cavagnari
I was informed by the Viceroy's Private Secretary in the beginning of
March that, unless satisfactory arrangements could soon be come to
with Yakub Khan, an onward move would have to be made. Accordingly I
now set about preparing for such a contingency.
Sher Ali had died in Afghan Turkestan on the 21st February, and, in
communicating the event to the Viceroy, Yakub Khan wrote that he was
anxious matters might be so arranged that 'the friendship of this
God-granted State with the illustrious British Government may remain
constant and firm.'
The new Amir was told in reply that Lord Lytton was prepared to enter
into negotiations for the conclusion of peace, and for the restoration
of a friendly alliance between the two Governments, provided that His
Highness renounced all claim to authority over the Khyber and Michni
Passes, and the independent tribes inhabiting the territory directly
connected with the main routes leading to India; that the district
of Kuram from Thal to the crest of the Shutargardan Pass, and the
districts of Pishin and Sibi, should remain under the control of the
British Government; that the foreign relations of Afghanistan should
be conducted in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British
Government; and that British officers should be accredited to the
Kabul Government, and permitted to reside at such places as might
hereafter be decided upon.
Yakub Khan's reply was not altogether satisfactory. He agreed to
British officers being deputed to Afghanistan on the understanding
that they should reside in Kabul, and abstain from interference in
State affairs; but he declined to renounce his authority over the
Khyber and Michni Passes and the tribes in their vicinity, and refused
to consent to Kuram, Pishin, and Sibi being placed under British
protection.
The Viceroy now determined to try what a personal conference between
the Amir and Cavagnari could effect towards a settlement of these
vexed questions, so in answering the Amir Cavagnari was directed
to convey a hint that an invitation to him to visit Kabul might be
productive of good results, and to point out that the places we
desired to occupy were looked upon as essential to the permanent
security of the Indian frontier. The Amir replied, expressing his
readiness to receive Cavagnari in his capital, and laying stress on
his determination to regulate his future conduct in strict conformity
with his professions of loyalty, but begged that he might not be
called upon to cede any portion of his territory.
Hardly had this letter, dated the 29th March, been received, than a
proclamation addressed by Yakub to the Khagianis, a tribe which had
been giving much trouble, was intercepted and brought to Cavagnari; in
it the Amir praised and complimented the Khagianis for their religious
zeal and fidelity to himself. He exhorted them to have no fear of the
infidels, against whom he was about to launch an irresistible force of
troops and _Ghazis_, and wound up as follows: 'By the favour of
God, and in accordance with the verse "Verily God has destroyed the
powerful ones," the whole of them will go to the fire of hell for
evermore. Therefore kill them to the extent of your ability.' A
curious commentary this on the Amir's protestation of loyalty.
Notwithstanding this piece of treachery, it was decided not to break
off negotiations, and Yakub Khan was informed by Cavagnari that a
Mission would proceed to Kabul so soon as the necessary arrangements
could be made for its reception. At the same time Lord Lytton himself
wrote to the Amir, telling him that, as he was willing to receive an
Envoy, Cavagnari would be deputed to visit Kabul, and communicate
unreservedly with him upon the questions at issue between the two
States.
I, personally, was not at all satisfied that the time had come for
negotiation, for I felt that the Afghans had not had the sense of
defeat sufficiently driven into them to convince them of our strength
and ability to punish breach of treaty, and, therefore, that a peace
made now, before they had been thoroughly beaten, would not be a
lasting one, and would only end in worse trouble in the near future.
The Afghans are an essentially arrogant and conceited people; they had
not forgotten our disastrous retreat from Kabul, nor the annihilation
of our array in the Khurd Kabul and Jagdalak Passes in 1842, and
believed themselves to be quite capable of resisting our advance on
Kabul. No great battle had as yet been fought; though Ali Masjid and
the Peiwar Kotal had been taken, a small force of the enemy had been
beaten by Charles Gough's brigade, near Jalalabad, and a successful
Cavalry skirmish had occurred near Kandahar, the Afghans had nowhere
suffered serious loss, and it was not to be wondered at if the
fighting men in distant villages, and in and around Kabul, Ghazni,
Herat, Balkh, and other places, still considered themselves undefeated
and capable of defying us. They and their leaders had to depend for
information as to recent events upon the garbled accounts of those who
had fought against us, and it was unlikely they would be shaken in
their belief in their superiority by such one-sided versions of what
had occurred. On many occasions I had been amused, in listening to
Afghan conversation, to find that, while they appeared thoroughly
conversant with and frequently alluded to their triumphs over us, they
seemed to know nothing, or had no recollection, of Sale's successful
defence of Jalalabad, or of Pollock's victorious march through the
Khyber Pass and the destruction by him of the chief bazaar in Kabul.
My ideas about the negotiations being premature were freely expressed
to Colonel Colley,[1] Lord Lytton's Private Secretary, who paid me a
visit in Kuram at this time, and had been a constant correspondent of
mine from the commencement of the war. Colley, however, explained to
me that, right or wrong, the Viceroy had no option in the matter; that
there was the strongest feeling in England against the continuance of
the war; and that, unless the new Amir proved actively hostile, peace
must be signed. He expressed himself sanguine that the terms of the
treaty which Cavagnari hoped to conclude with Yakub Khan would give us
an improved frontier, and a permanent paramount influence at Kabul,
the two points about which he said the Viceroy was most anxious, and
to which he assigned the first place in his political programme. Lord
Lytton foresaw that, whatever might be the future policy of the two
European Powers concerned, the contact of the frontiers of Great
Britain and Russia in Asia was only a matter of time, and his aim was
to make sure that the conterminous line, whenever it might be reached,
should be of our choosing, and not one depending on the exigencies of
the moment, or on the demands of Russia.
The Native agent (Bukhtiar Khan), who was the bearer of the Viceroy's
and Cavagnari's letters to the Amir, reached Kabul at the moment
when the Afghan officials who had accompanied Sher Ali in his flight
returned to that place from Turkestan. Counsel was held with these men
as to the manner of receiving the British Mission; but there was an
influential military party averse to peace, and the Amir was strongly
advised to abandon the English alliance and trust to Russia. Upon
hearing this, our agent became alarmed for the safety of the Mission,
and being apprehensive that Yakub Khan would not have the power to
protect its members from insult, he suggested to the Amir that he
should visit our camp instead of the British Mission coming to Kabul,
a suggestion which was ultimately adopted, the Viceroy considering
that it was infinitely the best arrangement that could be made.
On the 8th May the Amir arrived in Sir Samuel Browne's camp at
Gandamak, thirty miles on the Kabul side of Jalalabad, and on the
26th, owing to the tact and diplomatic skill of Louis Cavagnari, the
Treaty of Gandamak was signed, and so ended the first phase of the
second Afghan war.
Under the terms of the treaty, Yakub Khan agreed to the cession of
territory considered necessary by us, and bound himself to conduct
his foreign policy in accordance with the advice of the British
Government; while, on our side, we promised to support him against
external aggression. It was further arranged that a British
representative, with a suitable escort, should reside at Kabul;[2]
that the Amir should in like manner (if he desired it) depute an agent
to the Viceregal Court; that British agents with sufficient escorts
should be at liberty to visit the Afghan frontiers whenever, in the
interests of both countries, it was considered necessary by the
British Government; that there should be no hindrance to British
subjects trading peaceably within the Amir's dominions; that traders
should be protected, the transit of merchandise facilitated, and roads
kept in good order; that a line of telegraph should be constructed
from India to Kabul, at the expense of the British, but under the
protection of the Afghan Government; and that an annual subsidy of six
lakhs of rupees should be paid to the Amir and his successors.
The Khyber column was now withdrawn, with the exception of two
brigades, and orders were sent to the Kandahar column to prepare to
withdraw on the 1st September, the earliest date at which the troops
could safely march through the Bolan Pass. I was told to stay where
I was, as Kuram, by the treaty conditions, was to remain under our
control and be administered by the British Government.
On the 24th May I held a parade in honour of the Queen's birthday, at
which 6,450 officers and men were present.[3] They were thoroughly fit
and workmanlike, and being anxious that the tribesmen should see what
grand soldiers I had at hand should an advance be necessary, I invited
all the neighbouring clans to witness the display. The Afghans were
seated in picturesque groups round the flag-staff, when suddenly, as
the first round of the _feu-de-joie_ was fired, they started to their
feet, thinking that treachery was intended, and that they were
caught in a trap: they took to their heels, and we had considerable
difficulty in bringing them back, and in making them understand that
the firing which had so upset their equanimity was only a sign of
rejoicing on that auspicious anniversary. By degrees they became
assured that there was no thought of taking an unfair advantage of
them, and at the conclusion of the ceremony they were made happy by a
present of sheep. In the afternoon an impromptu rifle meeting was got
up. The matchlock men could not hold their own against our good shots
armed with Martini-Henry rifles, a fact which evidently greatly
impressed the tribesmen, some of whom then and there came forward and
promised that if I should be required to advance on Kabul they would
not oppose me.
I took advantage of our improved relations with the Afghans,
consequent on the ratification of the treaty, to enlarge our
geographical knowledge of the passes which lead from Kuram towards
Kabul, and the independent territories in the neighbourhood. The
presence of the troops, no doubt, had something to say to the cheerful
acquiescence of the tribesmen in these explorations, which they
appeared to look upon as the result of a wish to make ourselves
acquainted with the country assigned to us by the treaty, and having,
to use their own expression, lifted for us the _purdah_ (curtain) of
their country, they became most friendly, and took a curious pleasure
in pointing out to us the points of defence at which they would have
opposed us, had we been advancing as enemies.
Towards the end of June I heard from Lord Lytton that he wished me to
be one of the military members of a Commission of Inquiry into army
expenditure and organization which was about to be convened at Simla,
if I thought I could be spared from my post at Kuram. The people of
the valley had by this time settled down so contentedly, and the
tribesmen showed themselves so peacefully disposed, that I thought I
could safely leave my post for a time, before returning to take up my
abode in the neighbourhood for some years, as I hoped to do, when my
appointment as Frontier Commissioner should have received the sanction
of the authorities in England.
Meanwhile, however, some temporary arrangement was necessary for the
administration of Kuram, and I wrote to the Foreign Secretary (Alfred
Lyall), pointing out my views upon the subject.
Seeing how much could be done with these wild people by personal
influence, and how ready they were to submit to my decisions when
disputes arose amongst them--decisions at times literally given from
the saddle--I was very adverse to their being handed over to some
official who, from his training, would not be able to understand
dealing out the rough-and-ready justice which alone was suited to
these lawless beings, and who could not imagine any question being
properly settled without its having undergone the tedious process of
passing through the law courts. Such a rule would, I knew, disgust
a people accustomed to decide their quarrels at the point of the
sword--a people to whom law and order had been hitherto unknown,
and must be distasteful, until they had had time to realize their
beneficial effects. Profitable employment and judicious management
would in time, no doubt, turn them into peaceful subjects. Friendly
intercourse had already done much towards this end, and tribes who for
generations had been at feud with each other now met, when visiting
our camp, on common ground, without (much I think to their own
astonishment) wanting to cut each other's throats. What was further
required, I conceived, was the opening up of the country by means of
roads, which would facilitate intercommunication and give remunerative
employment to thousands who had hitherto lived by plunder and
bloodshed.
In answering my letter, the Foreign Secretary informed me that the
future of Kuram would be settled when I reached Simla, whither I
was to proceed so soon as I had seen the British Mission across the
frontier.
On the 15th July Major Cavagnari, who had been selected as 'the Envoy
and Plenipotentiary to His Highness the Amir of Kabul,' arrived in
Kuram, accompanied by Mr. William Jenkins, C.I.E., of the Civil
Service, and Lieutenant Hamilton, V.C., Surgeon-Major Kelly, 25
Cavalry and 50 Infantry of the Guides Corps. I, with some fifty
officers who were anxious to do honour to the Envoy and see the
country beyond Kuram, marched with Cavagnari to within five miles of
the crest of the Shutargardan Pass, where we encamped, and my staff
and I dined that evening with the Mission. After dinner I was asked to
propose the health of Cavagnari and those with him, but somehow I did
not feel equal to the task; I was so thoroughly depressed, and my mind
was filled with such gloomy forebodings as to the fate of these fine
fellows, that I could not utter a word. Like many others, I thought
that peace had been signed too quickly, before, in fact, we had
instilled that awe of us into the Afghan nation which would have been
the only reliable guarantee for the safety of the Mission. Had we
shown our strength by marching to Kabul in the first instance, whether
opposed or not, and there dictated the terms of the treaty, there
would have been some assurance for its being adhered to; as it was,
I could not help feeling there was none, and that the chances were
against the Mission ever coming back.
Cavagnari, however, showed no sign of sharing my forebodings; he and
his companions were in the best of spirits; he spoke most hopefully of
the future, and talked of a tour he hoped to make with me in the cold
weather along the northern and western frontiers of Afghanistan. Other
matters of intense interest to us both were discussed, and before
separating for the night it was arranged that Mrs. Cavagnari should
either join him in Kabul the following spring, or come and stay with
my wife and me in Kuram, where I had already laid the foundations of a
house near the beautifully situated village of Shalufzan.
Early next morning the Sirdar, who had been deputed by the Amir to
receive the Mission, came into camp, and soon we all started for the
top of the pass. We had gone about a mile, when we were joined by an
escort of Afghan Cavalry, dressed something like British Dragoons,
with the exception of their head-gear, which consisted of the
discarded helmets of the old Bengal Horse Artillery. They were mounted
on small, useful-looking horses, and were armed with smooth-bore
carbines and _tulwars_ (Native swords).
As we ascended, curiously enough, we came across a solitary magpie,
which I should not have noticed had not Cavagnari pointed it out and
begged me not to mention the fact of his having seen it to his wife,
as she would be sure to consider it an unlucky omen.
On reaching the Afghan camp, we were received in a large, tastefully
decorated tent, where tea was served, and we were afterwards conducted
to the top of the mountain, where carpets were spread and more tea
passed round, while we gazed on the fine view of the Logar valley
which stretched out beneath us.
On descending to the camp, we were invited to partake of dinner,
served in Oriental fashion on a carpet spread on the ground.
Everything was done most lavishly and gracefully, and nothing was
omitted that was calculated to do us honour. Nevertheless, I could not
feel happy as to the prospects of the Mission, and my heart sank as I
wished Cavagnari good-bye. When we had proceeded a few yards in our
different directions, we both turned round, retraced our steps, shook
hands once more, and parted for ever.
I did not delay at Kuram; there was nothing to keep me there, and the
prospect of getting back to my belongings and to civilization, now
that all active work was at an end, was too alluring to be withstood.
My wife met me at the foot of the Hills, and we drove up to Simla
together. I was greeted by Lord Lytton and many kind friends most
warmly, and had the gratification of hearing that I had been made a
K.C.B., and that I had been accorded the thanks of both Houses of
Parliament.
I was soon deep in the work of the Army Commission, which met for
the first time under the presidency of the Hon. Sir Ashley Eden,[4]
K.C.S.I., on the 1st August. The heavy loss to the revenues of India,
consequent on the unfavourable rate of exchange, rendered extensive
reductions in public expenditure imperative, and the object of this
Commission was to find out how the cost of the army could be reduced
without impairing its efficiency.
Very little was done at the first meeting, and at its close Eden
confessed to me that he did not at all see his way, and that he was
somewhat aghast at the difficulties of the task before the Commission.
To me it seemed clear that the maintenance of a separate army for each
presidency, Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, was at the root of the evils
it was our duty to consider and try to reform; and I promised the
President that, before the Commission again assembled, I would prepare
a scheme which might form a basis for them to work upon.
I considered it an anachronism, since railways and telegraphs had
annihilated distance, to keep up three Commanders-in-Chief, and
separate departments, each having an independent head, in the three
different presidencies. I put my ideas on paper, and Eden announced
himself in favour of my scheme, which substituted for the three
presidential armies four army corps, all subordinate to the
Commander-in-Chief in India. Portions of my recommendation began to
be carried into effect directly they had received the sanction of the
authorities in England--such as the amalgamation of the Commissariat,
Pay, Ordnance, and Stud departments--but it was not until April,
1895, sixteen years after the proposal had been recommended by the
Government of India, and although, during that period, four successive
Viceroys, each backed up by a unanimous Council, had declared
themselves strongly in favour of the change, that the finishing touch
was given to the new organization, by the abolition of the offices of
Commanders-in-Chief of Madras and Bombay, and the creation of four
Army Corps, namely, the Punjab, the Bengal, the Madras, and the
Bombay, each commanded by a Lieutenant-General.
[Footnote 1: The late Major-General Sir George Colley, K.C.B.]
[Footnote 2: Kabul was expressly selected by Yakub Khan as the place
where he wished the Embassy to reside.]
[Footnote 3: At this parade I had the great pleasure of decorating
Captain Cook with the Victoria Cross, and Subadar Ragobir Nagarkoti,
Jemadar Pursoo Khatri, Native Doctor Sankar Dass, and five riflemen of
the 5th Gurkhas, with the Order of Merit, for their gallant conduct
in the attack on the Spingawi Kotal, and during the passage of the
Mangior defile. It was a happy circumstance that Major Galbraith, who
owed his life to Captain Cook's intrepidity, and Major Fitz-Hugh,
whose life was saved by Jemadar (then Havildar) Pursoo Khatri, should
both have been present on the parade.]
[Footnote 4: Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.]
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