1879
Hector Macdonald and Sher Mahomed--Yakub Khan
--A Proclamation and an Order--The _maliks_ of Logar
--Attack on the Shutargardan--Reconnoitring roads leading to Kabul
On the 27th September I made over the Kuram command to
Brigadier-General T. Gordon, and set out for Kushi, where Baker was
now encamped.
Just before I started I had the pleasure of welcoming my old friend
and brother officer, Major-General J. Hills, V.C., C.B., who had
been with Sir Donald Stewart as Assistant Adjutant-General from the
beginning of the campaign, and who had, the moment he heard there was
to be an advance on Kabul, come with all speed to place his services
at my disposal. Although I had no employment for Hills at the time,
there would be plenty for all to do at Kabul, and I was delighted to
have so good a soldier with me.
My escort consisted of the Head-Quarters of the Cavalry brigade, one
squadron 9th Lancers, 5th Punjab Cavalry, and detachments of the 5th
and 28th Punjab Infantry. We had only gone about halfway through the
pass when I pushed on with the Cavalry, in the hope of reaching the
camp on the top before dark, and was very soon met by twenty-five men
of the 92nd Highlanders, who brought me a note from Colonel Perkins,
R.E., in command on the Shutargardan, warning me that we were sure to
be attacked. We had not proceeded far, when at the narrowest part of
the defile we found the passage blocked by some 2,000 Afghans, and as
we approached a volley was fired from a party concealed by some rocks
on our left. I was told afterwards that it was intended for me, but I
remained unscathed, and the principal medical officer, Dr. Townsend,
who was riding on my right, and to whom I was talking at the moment,
was severely wounded. The Highlanders, supported by some dismounted
Cavalry, cleared away the enemy to the north, but as they clung to the
precipitous hills on the south, we had to wait till the main body of
the escort came up, when they were speedily dispersed.
Meanwhile, a sharp little engagement had taken place further up the
gorge, and as we advanced we could see the enemy retiring before a
detachment of the 92nd Highlanders, under Colour-Sergeant Hector
Macdonald, and of the 3rd Sikhs, under Jemadar Sher Mahomed, a Native
of Kabul. The manner in which the Colour-Sergeant and the Native
officer handled their men gave me a high opinion of them both.[1]
On the top of the Shutargardan Pass that evening I received the Amir's
reply[2] to my last letter, in which he expressed his gratitude for
the sympathy and support afforded him by the British Government, and
informed me that he had given orders to the Governor of Jalalabad that
the Khyber column should not meet with any opposition. I was also
given a letter from Sirdar Wali Mahomed Khan, and several other
Sirdars, professing loyalty to the British Government, and expressing
pleasure at my approach. And at the same time the rather embarrassing
information reached me that the Amir, desiring personal communication
with me, had already arrived in Baker's camp at Kushi, attended by his
son Musa Khan, a lad about seven years old, his father-in-law, and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan army (Daud Shah), with a suite of 45
members and an escort of 200 men.
Although I had met with but slight opposition hitherto, it was evident
from the secret information I received that the Ghilzais were inclined
to be hostile, and intended to oppose us, and as it was important to
keep open communication with Alikhel through their country, I arranged
for the Shutargardan to be held by a Mountain battery, the 3rd Sikhs,
and the 21st Punjab Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel
G.N. Money, an officer on whose judgment and coolness I knew I could
rely.
The next morning I rode to Kushi, where my first interview with the
Amir of Afghanistan took place.
I cannot say that I was favourably impressed by his appearance. He was
an insignificant-looking man, about thirty-two years of age, with a
receding forehead, a conical-shaped head, and no chin to speak of,
and he gave me the idea of being entirely wanting in that force of
character without which no one could hope to govern or hold in check
the warlike and turbulent people of Afghanistan. He was possessed,
moreover, of a very shifty eye, he could not look one straight in the
face, and from the first I felt that his appearance tallied exactly
with the double-dealing that had been imputed to him. His presence in
my camp was a source of the gravest anxiety to me. He was constantly
receiving and sending messages, and was no doubt giving his friends
at Kabul all the information he could collect as to our resources and
intentions. He had, however, come ostensibly as our ally, seeking
refuge from his mutinous soldiers, and whatever suspicions I might
secretly entertain, I could only treat him as an honoured guest, so
long as there was nothing proved against him.
My first visit to Yakub Khan was of a formal character. Nevertheless,
he seized the opportunity to urge strongly upon me the advisability
of delaying my advance, that he might have time, he said, to restore
order amongst his troops, and to punish those who had participated in
the attack on the Embassy. I replied that my orders were peremptory,
and that it was my duty, as it was my determination, to press on to
Kabul with all possible speed. Finding that his arguments had no
effect, he changed his tactics, and declared that he was much alarmed
for the safety of his family, whom he had left in the Bala Hissar;
that he had only one regiment on which he could depend; that he feared
when the others should hear of our approach they would break out
and attack the citadel; and that the innocent people in Kabul, not
considering it possible that a British force could get there so
quickly, had made no arrangements to convey their families away.
Feeling that anxiety for the safety of the families was not the true
cause for the Amir's efforts to delay us, and that his sole object
was to gain time for the development of plans for opposing our
advance--which subsequent events proved had been made with great
care--I told him it was impossible to accede to his wishes, but that
time would be given for all women and children to clear out of the
city if it should prove necessary to attack it. This necessity,
however, I was most anxious to avoid, and earnestly hoped that
our fighting would be over before we entered Kabul, for I had not
forgotten Delhi, and I dreaded the idea of the troops having to force
their way through narrow streets and crowded bazaars.
Yakub Khan was evidently much chagrined at my decision. He had left
Kabul hurriedly, his movements probably being hastened by hearing that
his uncle, Wali Mahomed Khan, and several other Sirdars with whom he
was at enmity, were on their way to join me. He had not even brought
a tent with him, and, had he succeeded in inducing me to delay our
advance, he would without doubt have returned to Kabul at once. As it
was, he was accommodated with a tent in the centre of the camp, and
the best arrangements possible, under the circumstances, made for his
entertainment.
When his own tents arrived, he asked leave to have them pitched
outside camp limits. To this I consented, at the same time ordering
that a guard of the same strength as my own should be detailed as his
escort, ostensibly to do him honour, but in reality that I might
be kept informed as to his movements. Unwelcome guest as he was, I
thought the least of two evils was to keep him now that we had got
him, as his presence in Kabul would be sure to increase the opposition
I felt certain we should encounter.
In response to the fears expressed by the Amir as to the safety of the
non-combatants, I issued the following Proclamation to the people of
Kabul:
'Be it known to all that the British Army is advancing on Kabul to
take possession of the city. If it be allowed to do so peacefully,
well and good; if not, the city will be seized by force.
Therefore, all well-disposed persons, who have taken no part in
the dastardly murder of the British Envoy, or in the plunder of
the Residency, are warned that, if they are unable to prevent
resistance being offered to the entrance of the British army, and
the authority of His Highness the Amir, they should make immediate
arrangements for their own safety, either by coming to the British
camp, or by such other measures as may seem fit to them. And as
the British Government does not make war on women and children,
warning is given that all women and children should be removed
from the city beyond the reach of harm. The British Government
desires to treat all classes with justice, and to respect their
religion, feelings, and customs, while exacting full retribution
from offenders. Every effort will, therefore, be made to prevent
the innocent suffering with the guilty, but it is necessary that
the utmost precaution should be taken against useless opposition.
'After receipt of this Proclamation, therefore, all persons found
armed in or about Kabul will be treated as enemies of the British
Government; and, further, it must be distinctly understood that,
if the entry of the British force is resisted, I cannot hold
myself responsible for any accidental injury which may be done to
the persons or property of even well-disposed people, who may have
neglected this warning.'
At the same time, the matter having been brought to my notice by Lord
Lytton, and bearing in my mind that my father had told me one of
the chief causes of the outbreak in Kabul in 1841 was the Afghans'
jealousy of their women, and resentment at the European soldiers'
intimacy with them, I thought it well to impress upon all the
necessity for caution in this respect by publishing the following
Order:
'Sir Frederick Roberts desires General officers, and officers
commanding corps, to impress upon all officers under their command
the necessity for constant vigilance in preventing irregularities
likely to arouse the personal jealousies of the people of Kabul,
who are, of all races, most susceptible as regards their women.
'The deep-seated animosity of the Afghans towards the English has
been mainly ascribed to indiscretions committed during the first
occupation of Kabul, and the Major-General trusts that the same
excellent discipline so long exhibited by the troops under his
command will remove the prejudices of past years, and cause the
British name to be as highly respected in Afghanistan as it is
throughout the civilized world.[3]
On the 30th September (my forty-seventh birthday), all arrangements
which it was possible for me to make having been completed, the
Cavalry brigade marched eight miles to Zargunshahr, the first
halting-place on the way to Kabul. I accompanied it, for I was
informed that Wali Mahomed Khan and the Sirdars had arrived so far,
and I could not let them come on to my camp so long as the Amir was
still in it. I wished, also, to interview the Logar _maliks_ and
ascertain whether I could procure supplies from their valley. There
was bread-stuff with the force sufficient for fourteen days, but for
the transport of so much grain a large number of animals was required,
which could ill be spared, for carriage was so short that I could only
move a little more than half the troops at one time, and instead of
being able to march direct on Kabul with 6,000 men, a halt would have
to be made every other day to admit of the animals going back to bring
up the rear brigade, which practically meant my only having at my
disposal rather more than half that number at any one time. How
fervently I wished that those in authority, who never can see the
necessity for maintaining transport in time of peace, could be made to
realize the result of their short-sightedness--the danger of having to
divide a none too large force in an enemy's country, the consequent
risk of failure, the enormous increase of anxiety to the Commander,
the delay in achieving the object of the campaign, and the additional
labour to all concerned in an undertaking, arduous enough under the
most favourable circumstances, in a difficult country, and under
a burning eastern sun, even if possessed of good and sufficient
transport.
Stores had been collected at Kushi partly by means of local carriage,
and partly by our own animals doing the journey twice over from
Alikhel, a distance of thirty-six miles. So hard pressed was I for
transport that I had to make the Cavalry soldiers march on foot and
lead their horses laden with grain--an unusual piece of duty, which
was, however, performed with the cheerful alacrity which the troops of
the Kabul Field Force always displayed.
But all this is a digression. To return to my story. The _maliks_
of Logar, greatly to my relief, agreed to bring a certain amount of
supplies; while Wali Mahomed Khan and the other Sirdars were full of
protestations of loyalty and devotion. Most of them remained with me
all the time I was in Kabul, and some of them afforded me considerable
assistance. The Sirdars warned me to place no trust in the Amir, and
enlarged on the treachery of his conduct, but as I knew they looked
upon Yakub Khan as their own deadly enemy, I accepted their counsel
with some reservation. I was not, however, able to feel quite at ease
about the proceedings of my Royal guest, so I returned to Kushi that
same evening.
On the 1st October the whole of the Kabul Field Force was assembled in
the Logar valley.[4]
I waited at Kushi with the last of the Infantry until the morning of
the 2nd. Just as I was leaving camp, I became aware that firing was
going on in the direction of the Shutargardan, and later in the day I
received a report from Colonel Money as to what had happened there.
The enemy, emboldened by the diminished numbers of the garrison, and
undervaluing what might be accomplished by a small number of good
soldiers, had assembled in force, and occupied the crest of the
mountain, the only place from which heliographic communication with me
could be kept up. Money very properly decided that this could not be
permitted, and considered it best to take the initiative before the
enemy should become still stronger, so ordered an advance. Under cover
of the Mountain battery's fire, Major Griffiths, of the 3rd Sikhs,
with 200 of his own men and 50 of the 21st Punjab Infantry, supported
by 150 rifles of the latter corps, stormed the Afghans' position.
The assault, delivered in a most spirited manner, was perfectly
successful.
Major Griffiths, however, was wounded, also a signalling sergeant of
the 67th Foot and five men of the 3rd Sikhs, while the enemy left
thirty dead on the ground, and were pursued down the slope of the hill
without making any attempt to rally.
On the 3rd we marched fifteen miles to Zahidabad, where we first came
in sight of the fortified hill above Kabul. The rear guard was fired
into on the way, and we had considerable difficulty in crossing
the Logar river, as the water from a large irrigation cut had been
directed back into the stream just above the ford. Our only casualty
on this day was Captain 'Dick' Kennedy, who was wounded in the hand.
It was plain from these occurrences, and from the attack on the
Shutargardan, that the people generally were not disposed to be
friendly. From the Amir I could extract no information on this head,
although he must have been fully aware of the feelings and intentions
of his subjects. He was in constant communication with Kabul, and was
frequently being met by mounted messengers, who, from the haste with
which they travelled, as evidenced by the exhausted state of their
horses and the eagerness with which the Amir read the letters they
brought, appeared to be the bearers of important tidings.
It may be imagined how irritating and embarrassing was Yakub Khan's
presence, since his position in my camp enabled him to give the
leaders at Kabul accurate information as to our numbers and movements.
That he felt pretty sure of our discomfiture was apparent from his
change of manner, which, from being at first a mixture of extreme
cordiality and cringing servility, became as we neared Kabul distant,
and even haughty.
On the 5th October, one month from the receipt at Simla of the evil
tidings of the fate of the British Embassy, we reached the pretty
little village of Charasia, nestling in orchards and gardens, with a
rugged range of hills towering above it about a mile away. This range
descended abruptly on the right to permit the exit of the Logar river,
and rose again on its other side in precipitous cliffs, forming a fine
gorge[5] about halfway between our camp and Kabul city, now only from
ten to twelve miles distant.
An uncle of the Amir (Sirdar Nek Mahomed Khan), and a General in the
Afghan army, came out to meet Yakub Khan at this place; he remained
some time in earnest conversation with his nephew, and, as he was
about to remount his horse, called out in so loud a tone that it was
evidently meant for us all to hear, that he was 'now going to disperse
the troops.'[6] Very different, however, was the story brought to me
by an escaped Native servant of Cavagnari's, who came into our camp
later in the day. This man declared that preparations for fighting
were steadily being carried on; that the soldiers and townspeople were
streaming into the arsenal and supplying themselves with cartridges;
that large bodies of troops were moving out in our direction; and
that, when we advanced next day, we should certainly be opposed by a
formidable force. The Amir, on having this intelligence communicated
to him, pretended to disbelieve it utterly, and assured me that all
was at peace in the city, that Nek Mahomed would keep the troops
quiet, and that I should have no trouble; but I was not taken in by
his specious assurances.
Now more than ever I felt the want of sufficient transport! Had it
been possible to have the whole of my force with me, I should have
advanced at once, and have occupied that evening the range of hills I
have described; but Macpherson's brigade was still a march behind,
and all I could do was, immediately on arrival, to send back every
available transport animal to bring it up. I pushed forward Cavalry
patrols along the three roads leading to Kabul, and rode out myself to
reconnoitre the position in front. It was sufficiently strong to make
me wish I had a larger force. Towards evening groups of men appeared
on the skyline all round, giving unmistakable warning that the tribes
were gathering in large numbers.
From the information brought me by the Cavalry, and from my own
examination of the ground, I decided to advance along the left bank of
the river: and to facilitate this movement I determined to seize the
heights on either side of the gorge at daybreak, whether Macpherson's
brigade had arrived or not. That night strong piquets were thrown out
round the camp, and Cavalry patrols were ordered to proceed at dawn to
feel for the enemy. _L'homme propose, mais Dieu dispose_.
[Footnote 1: Macdonald, having subsequently further distinguished
himself, was given a commission, and is now commanding a regiment in
the Egyptian Army. Sher Mahomed was rewarded with the Order of Merit.]
[Footnote 2:
FROM THE AMIR OF KABUL, DATED KUSHI, 27TH SEPTEMBER,1879.
(After compliments.) Your friendly letter has reached me just at
this moment, 8 p.m., the 10th Shawal (27th September), and opened
the doors of joy and happiness on the face of my heart marked
with affection. I feel perfectly certain and confident that the
movements of Her Imperial Majesty's victorious troops are merely
for the purpose of consolidating the foundation of my kingdom and
strengthening the basis of my government.
In truth, the sympathy of friends with friends is fitting and
proper, and the indulgence and kindness of a great Government to
a sincere and faithful friend are agreeable and pleasing. I am
exceedingly gratified with, and thankful to, the representatives
of the illustrious British Government for their expression of
sympathy and their support of my cause. Your friendly and wise
suggestion that none of the ignorant tribes of Afghanistan should
oppose the British troops, so that the officers of the British
Government should be the better able to support and protect me, is
very acceptable and reasonable. Before I received your letter,
I had sent orders repeatedly to the Governors of Jalalabad and
Lalpura not to let anyone oppose or resist the British troops,
and stringent orders have again been issued to the Governor of
Jalalabad to use his utmost endeavours and efforts in this
respect. The order in question to the address of the Governor of
Jalalabad will be shown you to-morrow, and sent by an express
courier.]
[Footnote 3: It was a matter of intense gratification to me that the
whole time we remained in Afghanistan, nearly two years, not a single
complaint was made by an Afghan of any soldier in my force having
interfered with the women of the country.]
[Footnote 4: The force was made up as follows:
--------------------------------------------------------
| |British | Other Ranks. |
| |Officers.|----------------|
| | |British.|Native.|
-------------------------------------------------------|
|Divisional, Brigade, | | | |
|and Departmental Staff | 60 | | |
|F/A, R.H.A. | 7 | 118 | |
|G/3, R.A. | 7 | 137 | |
|No. 2 Mountain Battery | 3 | | 223 |
|Two Gatling guns | 1 | 34 | |
|9th Lancers (one squadron) | 4 | 118 | |
|5th Punjab Cavalry | 7 | | 325 |
|12th Bengal Cavalry | 6 | | 328 |
|14th Bengal Lancers | 7 | | 407 |
|67th Foot | 18 | 686 | |
|72nd Highlanders | 23 | 746 | |
|92nd Highlanders | 17 | 717 | |
|5th Punjab Infantry | 8 | | 610 |
|5th Gurkhas | 7 | | 574 |
|23rd Pioneers | 6 | | 671 |
|28th Punjab Infantry | 8 | | 636 |
|7th Company Bengal Sappers | 3 | | 93 |
| and Miners ---------------------------|
| | 192 | 2,558 |3,867 |
--------------------------------------------------------
]
[Footnote 5: Known as the _sang-i-nawishta_ (inscribed stone).]
[Footnote 6: Shortly after I was settled at Kabul, the following
letter, written by Nek Mahomed on the evening of the day he had been
with the Amir, to some person whom he wished to acquaint with the
state of affairs, was brought to me:
'MY KIND FRIEND,--The truth is that to-day, at sunrise, I went to
the camp, the Amir having summoned me. When I arrived, Mulla Shah
Mahomed [the Wazir] first said to me, "Go back and tell the people
to raise a holy war." I did not feel certain about what he said
[or was not satisfied with this], [but] the Amir afterwards told
me to go back that very hour and rouse the people to a _ghaza_. I
got back to Kabul about 7 o'clock, and am collecting the people.
Salaam.'
The letter was not addressed, but it was sealed with Nek Mahomed's
seal, and there was no reason to doubt its authenticity.]
* * * * *