THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
II. _The 2/4th Battalion on the Northern Ridges_
After the restricted success of the 16th August, the renewal of
operations on a large scale was inevitably postponed for some time
through the continuance of adverse weather conditions; though in
the north minor operations had the effect of widening and deepening
the breach in the German defences in the neighbourhood of St
Julien, combined with the capture of a good many prisoners. These
local advances carried the British positions forward east of the
St Julien-Poelcapelle Road and gave them a firm footing in the
Gheluvelt-Langemarck line on both sides of the Ypres-Staden Railway.
The withdrawal of some of the divisions which had been engaged in the
battle since the end of July being now necessary, the 58th Division was
among the fresh divisions which were sent north to take part in the
next large attack.
On the 24th August the 2/4th Londons marched from Izel-les-Hameau
to Aubigny entraining for Hopoutre (Poperinghe), whence it marched
to quarters in Dirty Bucket Camp, one of a series of camps near
Vlamertinghe. The Division now became attached to the XVIII Corps
(Maxse). The Battalion continued its training in the new area, paying
a good deal of attention to intensive digging and musketry, and during
the days spent in Dirty Bucket the company commanders and seconds in
command attended a course of instruction at the XVIII Corps School at
Volckeringhove.
On the night of the 28th/29th August the 58th Division entered the
trenches, taking over with the 174th and 175th Brigades, the sector
occupied by the 48th Division east of St Julien, the frontage extending
from the Hanebeek on the right to the vicinity of Keerselare on the
left. The sector was lightly held with one battalion of each brigade in
the outpost line, one battalion on the Canal Bank and two in camps west
of the Yser Canal.
The 173rd Brigade remained in Divisional reserve and continued
training. The 2/4th Londons changed station on the last day of
the month, moving to Browne Camp, about four miles north-east of
Poperinghe. Here a further week's training was obtained, after which
the whole of B Company spent four days at the Fifth Army Musketry Camp
near St Omer. Nothing worthy of record occurred during this period
except on the 1st September, when the transport lines were heavily
shelled causing casualties to 26 N.C.O.'s and men, of whom 1 died of
wounds, and to 13 horses, 8 being killed.
Reinforcements at this period included 2/Lieut. A. C. Knight (4th
Londons) and 2/Lieut. W. D. Warren (19th Londons), and about 110
N.C.O.'s and men.
On the 9th September the 2/4th Londons moved forward to Reigersburg
Camp, between Brielen and the Canal, and on the 11th-13th August the
173rd Brigade took over the whole Divisional sector.
A warning order had now been issued as to the next attack which in
view of the markedly improved conditions of weather had been arranged
for the 20th September. The front of attack was more extended than on
the 16th August, the southern limit being the Ypres-Comines Canal near
Hollebeke, and the Ypres-Staden Railway north of Langemarck marking the
northern extremity.
The success which had attended the enemy's resistance to our efforts
to advance in the Menin Road region had pointed to the necessity of
modifying the methods of attack. The successes obtained by the British
Army on the Somme, at Arras and at Messines, had caused the Germans to
alter their mode of defence, and instead of a strongly held trench line
they now presented to our attacks a system of concreted machine-gun
posts ("pillboxes" "or Mebus") disposed in great depth in front of
their main line of resistance. This system supplied their defence with
the elasticity which had hitherto been lacking, and the pillboxes,
being sited with remarkable skill to develop the employment of enfilade
fire to the fullest extent, proved a very serious obstacle to British
assaulting columns, which frequently suffered severe casualties at
their hands after making a deep advance into the enemy defensive
system. The pillboxes were, moreover, of such enormously strong
construction that nothing short of a direct hit by a heavy shell could
put them out of action. The effect of our severe artillery preparation
for attacks was therefore nullified, and the occupants of the pillboxes
could only be ejected as a rule by hand-to-hand fighting with bombs.
This new feature in the fighting called for prompt measures on the
part of the British, and henceforward no attempt was made as a rule
to penetrate the enemy's pillbox system as long as any risk existed
of leaving any of these hornets' nests undisposed of in rear of the
advancing troops. In other words, the attacks were arranged with
objectives much more limited than formerly, while the artillery paid
more attention to the pillboxes, the ultimate capture of which formed
the task of special units detailed for the purpose.
The assault arranged for the 20th September was prepared on these
revised lines, and all ranks were impressed beforehand with the
importance, not only of locating enemy strong points quickly and
rushing them before their occupants had recovered from the British
barrage, but also of methodical "mopping-up" and consolidation of all
ground gained.
From the 9th September onwards the work of preparation for the
impending offensive was pushed forward with all possible speed, the
2/4th Londons bearing a heavy share of these necessary duties. For four
of the five nights spent at Reigersburg Camp a working party of the
strength of two companies was engaged in completing the advanced cable
line trench, while on the last night, the 13th, the whole Battalion
less B Company (still at the Musketry Camp) was detailed for carrying
various sorts of R.E. material forward to advanced dumps in readiness
for consolidation of the position it was hoped to gain.
On the 14th the 2/4th Londons moved to a fresh position on the east
side of the Yser Canal, and for four nights following, the whole
Battalion was engaged in the desperate task of laying a duckboard track
of double width in front of St Julien, as far forward as possible in
the direction of the enemy positions, with the object of providing
a means of communication in the forward area, and of reinforcing or
relieving the advanced troops after the assault should have been
delivered.
This week of continual working parties was most exhausting to all
concerned. The distance to be covered each night to and from the scene
of the work was about three and a half miles in each direction, and the
labour of the march was increased tenfold by the shocking condition of
the ground, which was still waterlogged, and, away from the defined
tracks, nothing but a series of lakes formed by shell craters full of
water. Heavy as the cable line duties were found, the laying of the
duckboard track during the latter half of the week proved still more
onerous. Not only had the troops to march to St Julien from the Canal
Bank, but the duckboards which were drawn from a dump at Alberta Farm
had to be carried on the men's shoulders for some five hundred yards to
the starting-point of the track. Progress was slow through the heavy
going and the continual delays caused by German Véry lights. Although
some two hundred and forty yards were laid during the four nights'
work, and the track was carried forty yards beyond our most advanced
positions, the task was never completed. The work was obviously fraught
with considerable risk of serious casualties owing to the large numbers
of men employed, and in the circumstances the losses incurred during
the week were light; 11 men being hit on the 11th, while on the 15th
2/Lieut. Carlisle was killed and 2/Lieut. Pike wounded, with 2 men
killed and 5 wounded.
On the night of the 18th the 2/4th Londons relieved the 2/3rd Londons
in the line, which was still held by isolated posts, and the following
evening assembly for the attack began at about 9 p.m.
The 58th Division front of attack was entirely north of the Hanebeek,
a small stream which runs almost due east from St Julien, the attack
south of the stream being undertaken by the 164th Brigade of the 55th
Division. The 58th Divisional front was taken up by the 173rd Brigade
on the right with the 174th on its left, the assaulting columns of
the 173rd Brigade consisting of four companies, each 100 strong, of
the 2/4th Londons. The 2/3rd Londons were in reserve to make a dummy
attack, with one company on the waterlogged portions of the front over
which no advance was possible.
The 2/4th Londons' assembly position which was defined by tape lines
laid down by the adjutant, Capt. A. Grover, was on the line Janet
Farm-Springfield, and covered a front of some 800 yards. Almost in the
centre of this front and some 400 yards from starting-point, lay a
strongly fortified area around Winnipeg cross-roads. To the right of
the cross-roads the whole area as far as the Hanebeek was waterlogged
and impassable, while to the left a series of enemy strong points,
notably at the Cemetery and Spot Farm seemed likely to cause a good
deal of trouble to the attackers. The objective of the 2/4th Londons
lay on an undefined line running roughly north and south about 100
yards beyond Winnipeg cross-roads. This marked the limit of the 173rd
Brigade's task, though the objective of the day lay about 500 yards
further east, its principal feature being a machine-gun nest in the
Schuler Galleries in the vicinity of the Hanebeek. The further advance
to this final objective was entrusted to the 164th and 174th Brigades,
who by a converging movement were to "squeeze out" the 2/4th Londons
leaving them in occupation of what would become a line of supporting
posts at the end of the day.
Before the assembly a preliminary reconnaissance of the terrain was
carried out by the company commanders, and in connection with this
Capt. Hetley writes:
I think all were impressed by the wonderful sight at Admirals Road.
This unsavoury road ran parallel to the front about 1500 yards or
more to the rear of St Julien and when passing over it on the
duckboard track, there could be seen guns in such large quantities
that there seemed to be very little greater interval than 150-200
yards between them in any direction--a really wonderful contrast to
April 1915, when the Lahore Division was on exactly the same spot.
On the evening of the 19th September Brigade Headquarters were
established at Cheddar Villa, while the 2/4th Londons' Battle
Headquarters opened in St Julien. The assembly was conducted by
Capt. Grover and Lieut. Seys (Intelligence Officer) who were solely
responsible for an operation which proved exceedingly difficult owing
to the still heavy state of the ground. So bad was the mud that men
constantly sank to their knees, and in some cases touch could only be
maintained by tying the men of each section together with tapes. In
spite of these difficulties the 400 men were in position by 3 a.m.
on the 20th without a hitch, and with practically no casualties,
although the most advanced platoons were within 150 yards of the enemy
positions. The assembly completed, the 2/3rd Londons who were holding
the line withdrew a short distance to the rear.
The assault was delivered at 5.40 a.m. under cover of an intense
creeping barrage which proved to be excellent, and companies moved off
in good order in the half light close up to the barrage. The companies
were disposed as follows: on the right A Company (S. Davis) with two
platoons and Headquarters of D Company (Stark) attached; in the centre
B Company (Hetley); and on the left C Company (Hewlett) with two
platoons of D Company attached.
The principal resistance, as had been anticipated, was encountered
in the neighbourhood of Winnipeg cross-roads, and at a pillbox which
lay between them and the cemetery. This was most gallantly captured
single-handed by Pte. Bolton, A Company, who bayonetted three of the
occupants and captured the remainder consisting of an officer and three
men. A slight check at the cross-roads produced a further small bag of
prisoners, sixteen in number, of whom one was an officer. On the left
the chief opposition was encountered at a pillbox some 300 yards east
of Springfield which was holding up the advance of C Company and of
the 174th Brigade on the left. 2/Lieut. F. W. Walker, quickly grasping
the situation, outflanked the position with six men, and succeeded in
rushing it, capturing two machine-guns and twenty men who were sent
back under escort, Walker and the rest of his party at once pushing on
to the objective where touch was gained with the 174th Brigade. Within
half an hour the 2/4th Londons were established on their objective,
the consolidation of which was promptly put in hand, while the flank
brigades after a pause of half an hour pressed forward to their final
objectives in accordance with the plan of attack.
The complete success of this operation was undoubtedly due to the
careful provision which had been made in advance for the capture
of strong points by specially detailed units who thus ensured the
efficient "mopping-up" of all ground captured, while enabling the
remainder of the assaulting column to keep well up to the barrage.
Owing to the known strength of Schuler Farm in the final objective,
special arrangements had been made for the attack of this point,
in conjunction with the 164th Brigade, by a strong platoon of D
Company 2/4th Londons with which two tanks were to co-operate in an
outflanking movement from the north. The earliest reports from this
region indicated that the attack had been successful, but subsequent
information made it clear that the first attack failed, partly owing
to the non-arrival of the tanks which stuck fast in the mud, and
partly owing to unexpected resistance met with at a machine-gun post
some 150 yards in advance of the farm. The capture of this post,
which produced 16 prisoners and 2 guns, cost the lives of 2/Lieut.
Warren and the whole platoon except Sergt. Watson and 6 men. The
delay caused, moreover, was serious, and by the time the survivors
of the platoon were able to continue their advance, the barrage had
passed beyond Schuler Farm. Sergt. Watson, being of opinion that the
strength of his party was insufficient to justify an attack on the main
position, sent back his prisoners and established himself with the
captured machine-guns at a point about 250 yards south-east of Winnipeg
cross-roads.
[Illustration: THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (2/4TH BATTALION)]
The shell fire of the enemy during the advance and subsequent to the
Battalion reaching its objective had been severe, and by this time
not more than 100 rifles of the 2/4th Londons remained effective.
Arrangements were therefore made to stiffen its line with one company
of the 2/3rd Londons. A further attack on Schuler Farm, to be
undertaken by the 2/3rd Londons, was organised for daybreak on the 21st.
At about three o'clock in the afternoon the enemy was observed to be
advancing in fours against the brigade on our right, and the artillery
was immediately called into action. In spite of heavy losses, however,
the enemy continued to advance with praiseworthy courage until they
deployed, when their morale appeared to break and their ranks rapidly
melted under our shell fire.
During the remainder of the day a good deal of annoyance was caused by
the continued sniping from Schuler Farm, of which the Germans remained
in possession, but no further counter-attack developed on our front,
and night fell with the 2/4th Londons' position intact. The casualties
already suffered had been heavy, and three company commanders, Hewlett,
Stark and Davis, had unluckily been hit, though the last was able to
remain with his company until after relief the following evening, when
having been wounded a second time he was evacuated.
The attack of the platoon of the 2/3rd Londons under 2/Lieut.
Middlemiss on the 21st was postponed for further reconnaissance, in
the course of which Middlemiss observed the garrison of Schuler Farm
surrender to men of the 164th Brigade. Believing the situation to be
clear he proceeded along the road, but was hit by fire from a post
by the Hanebeek near that established by Sergt. Watson. Middlemiss'
report, which was the first information obtained of the fall of Schuler
Farm, caused the alteration of his platoon's objective to the pillbox
from which he had been hit, but in the evening this was found to have
been evacuated by its garrison, so that the whole position was now in
our hands.
During the evening of the 21st violent counter-attacks under cover of
intense bombardments were delivered against the 164th and 174th Brigade
sectors, but these were dispersed, and the 2/4th Londons did not come
into action though their newly-dug trenches were almost obliterated by
the German shell fire and many more casualties occurred.
At 9 p.m. on the 21st, the 2/4th Londons handed over their position,
intact at all points, to the 2/9th Londons, and withdrew across
the Yser Canal to Dambre Camp, where they remained training and
reorganising for some days.
This was the most completely successful operation in which the 2/4th
Battalion had hitherto taken part, and indeed all along the line of the
Fifth Army attack the new methods which have been described met with
marked success.
The outstanding achievements of the day were those of 2/Lieut. Walker,
Sergt. Watson and Pte. Bolton, of which some description has already
been given, but reference should also be made to the excellent work
of Capt. S. Davis, whose clear grasp of situations and the accurate
and complete information with which he kept Headquarters constantly
supplied, were of great value; of Pte. Austin, runner of A Company,
who passed backwards and forwards several times with important
messages through intense barrages; of Pte. Bull, the only surviving
stretcher-bearer of A Company, who displayed the greatest coolness and
devotion in tending wounded men under heavy fire; and Lieut. Altounyan,
the medical officer, whose services were of the utmost value and
carried out under exceedingly trying conditions.
Mention should also be made of Pte. Anthony of the Battalion Signallers
who from an advanced point in the line established visual communication
with Brigade Headquarters, his station subsequently proving of great
value to the supporting artillery.
On the evening of the 19th Brig.-Gen. Freyberg, V.C., D.S.O., was
seriously hit on his way to Battle Headquarters at Cheddar Villa; but
he insisted on remaining at duty, and directed operations from his
stretcher, though wounded in ten places, until after news of the
complete capture of the objective was received the next day, when his
removal was insisted upon by the A.D.M.S. who came forward to fetch
him. Command of the Brigade was taken temporarily by Lieut.-Col. Dann,
D.S.O.
The following decorations were awarded after this action: 2/Lieut. F.
W. Walker, the D.S.O.; Capts. A. Grover and S. Davis, and Lieut. E. H.
R. Altounyan, the M.C.; Sergt. Watson, Ptes. Bolton, Austin, Anthony
and Bull, the D.C.M.; and Sergts. H. O. Wilderspin and F. W. Yandle,
Ptes. J. W. Ling and A. Westcott, the M.M.
The casualties sustained during the action included: 2/Lieuts. H. N.
Bundle, E. R. Seabury and W. D. Warren, killed; 2/Lieut. F. B. Burd,
died of wounds; Capts. W. A. Stark, H. A. T. Hewlett and S. Davis,
M.C., 2/Lieuts. D. S. Boorman, M. C. (at duty), A. J. Angel, W. F.
Vines and A. C. Knight, wounded; and 60 N.C.O.'s and men killed, 176
wounded and 29 missing.
The 58th Division remained in line after this attack, and on the 26th
September took part in the third general attack which was delivered
by the Second and Fifth Armies on a front of some six miles, of which
the northern limit was the Divisional sector. The attack was delivered
by the 175th Brigade and a further considerable success gained, the
Divisional front having been carried forward in the operations since
the 19th a total distance of about 1600 yards.
On the 27th September, the 2/4th Londons moved to Brake Camp, in the
Vlamertinghe area. Two days were occupied in training here, during
which the area in which the Battalion was located suffered on the
night of the 28th/29th September the most prolonged and serious
bombing by enemy aircraft it ever experienced, the bombardment lasting
without cessation from 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. Fortunately no casualties were
sustained.
At Brake Camp the following joined the Battalion:
Capt. R. C. Dickins.
2/Lieuts. C. C. Gibbs, D. G. Spring, F. J. Jones, E. G. Gardner and
A. W. Dodds (21st Londons); and 2/Lieut. S. J. Richardson
(7th Londons).
250 N.C.O.'s and men.
Further casualties during September included Lieut., C. Potter and
2/Lieuts. O. H. Mattison and J. McDonald, to hospital.
2/Lieut. Cook was appointed to the 173rd L.T.M. Battery.
On the 30th September the 58th Division was withdrawn from the line and
concentrated as Corps reserve for rest in the Nordausques area (eight
miles north-west of St Omer), and the 2/4th Londons moved by rail from
Vlamertinghe to Zouafques where they went into billets on the 1st
October. The train was followed and bombed during the journey by German
airmen, 1 sergeant and 2 men being killed.
During the period of the 58th Division's withdrawal from the line the
offensive was pressed forward under adverse conditions of weather.
The season was now becoming advanced and the condition of the ground
offered a far greater obstacle to our progress than the enemy's
resistance. Probably no series of battles of the whole war was waged
under such persistently adverse conditions, or imposed a greater
physical strain on the attacking troops. In every direction the
salient was by now a series of "shell hole lakes" the ground being
waterlogged and the mud more glutinous than ever. An increasing number
of casualties to men and beasts occurred through drowning in the shell
holes of this ghastly shell-battered inferno, but though the whole
forces of the elements seemed to be arrayed against us, advances of
enormous importance were achieved during the early part of October,
as a result of which the Allied positions were pushed forward to the
outskirts of Houthulst Forest, to the east of Poelcapelle and to within
2000 yards of Passchendaele.
The prolonged continuance of active operations was obviously becoming
increasingly difficult, but G.H.Q. was impelled to pursue the course
of this dreary offensive partly by reason of the serious situation
caused on the Italian front by the defeat of Caporetto at the end of
October, and partly by the need of containing as many German divisions
as possible during the preparations for the Cambrai battle, which were
not yet complete.
The 2/4th Londons remained at Zouafques training and reorganising for
over three weeks. Several drafts were received from the Base, which
together made the considerable addition of 244 N.C.O.'s and men to the
Battalion strength, thus bringing it above its numbers prior to the
action of the 20th September.
On the 15th October the Battalion was joined by 2/Lieut. H. G. Langton;
and by 2/Lieuts. H. A. Snell, J. R. Naylor and R. J. Richards (1st
Londons). During this period also 2/Lieuts. H. E. English and C. C. H.
Clifford were evacuated sick. Capt. S. H. Stedman was posted to the
173rd Brigade Labour Company at Louches.
On the 23rd October the 2/4th Londons returned by train to the
Vlamertinghe area and took over quarters in Siege Camp, moving the
following day to the concentration area on the canal bank, whence
the battle surplus under 2/Lieut. Askham left the Battalion for the
Divisional Depôt Battalion.
On the 25th October, Major W. A. Nunneley, second in command of the
Battalion since July 1916, fell sick and was evacuated to hospital, his
duties being taken over by the adjutant, Capt. A. Grover, M.C. Major
Nunneley was subsequently appointed to command the German officers'
Prisoners of War Camp at Donington Hall. Capt. Grover, M.C., was
succeeded in the Adjutancy by Lieut. F. W. Walker, D.S.O. On the 22nd
2/Lieut D. G. Spring was seconded to the XX Corps School as Instructor.
The operation in which the 173rd Brigade was detailed to take part
was arranged for the 26th October, and consisted of an attack on a
frontage from the Ypres-Roulers Railway (south of Passchendaele) to
beyond Poelcapelle. The task of the 173rd Brigade, who were flanked
on the right by the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division and on the left by
the 57th Division, was to carry forward the British line east of
Poelcapelle for some 700 yards in a due easterly direction astride the
Poelcapelle-Westroosebeeke Road. The Divisional frontage was some 1800
yards in length, and bounded on the north by the Poelcapelle-Staden
Road and on the south by the Lekkerbotebeek. The assaulting troops
were provided by the 2/2nd, 2/3rd and 2/4th Londons, while the 2/1st
Londons were in Brigade reserve, with two battalions of the 174th
Brigade concentrated in the old German trench system near St Julien,
also at the disposal of the 173rd Brigade.
The first objective, which was on the line Spider Crossroads-Moray
House, was to be taken by the 2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalions, while after a
pause of 45 minutes, the 2/4th Londons were to "leapfrog" through them
on to the second and final objective.
As in the September action, particular preparation was made for the
assault of all known pillboxes by special parties, and the system of
posts to be established by each company was carefully and definitely
decided beforehand. The whole strength of the Battalion was necessary
to cover the wide frontage allotted to it, the order of battle from
the right being D Company (C. A. Clarke), C Company (Boorman), B
Company (Hetley) and A Company (Dickins). In addition to the stipulated
frontage the Battalion was also held responsible for some 200 yards of
waterlogged ground near the Lekkerbotebeek on its right, over which
touch with the 63rd Division could not be actively maintained.
The attack was to be delivered under a creeping barrage supported by
heavy guns, machine-guns and smoke barrages, while look-out for enemy
counter-attacks was to be maintained by aeroplanes.
On the morning of the 25th the 2/4th Londons left Siege Camp in battle
order and moved forward to positions in the original front German
system where they remained until the afternoon. At 3 p.m. the forward
move was resumed, and the Battalion was completely assembled in its
allotted area immediately east of Poelcapelle by 10.15 p.m., Battalion
Headquarters being established at Gloster Farm.
The weather had for some days past shown a marked improvement, and
the ground over which the advance was to be made was reported to be
drying fast. But our much-tried troops could not escape their usual
fate in the matter of weather, for on the night of the 25th rain fell
pitilessly once more, filling up the shell holes, liquefying the mud
and drenching everyone to the skin. All movement was rendered a matter
of extraordinary difficulty, and when the time for the attack arrived
the assaulting columns could scarcely drag themselves forward.
The British front line being composed of a line of unconnected posts,
the actual "jumping-off " line was defined by tapes which made it
essential to attack before daybreak. At 5.30 a.m. the British barrage
came down, and the 2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalions followed by the 2/4th
began their laborious advance. The barrage was disappointing, for not
only was it not as well distributed as on former occasions, but, having
regard to the state of the ground, it advanced far too quickly so that
the assaulting troops were soon left far behind.
The 2/2nd Londons were successful in capturing four pillboxes of which
three were at Cameron Houses, about half-way to the first objective,
while the 2/3rd Londons on the left pushed forward to what was at
the time believed to be Spider cross-roads, but was probably a less
important road junction some 250 yards short of it. The line of this
cross-road and Cameron Houses was, however, the limit of the advance,
which was unsupported on the left owing to the adjoining division
on that flank having been held up. The only post taken by the 2/4th
Londons was Tracas Farm on the extreme right.
The men were now thoroughly exhausted by their efforts, and were
practically defenceless as the mud had choked rifles and Lewis guns,
and rendered them temporarily useless. Indeed, for over half an hour
the Battalion possessed hardly a single rifle which could be fired. At
this juncture the enemy counter-attacked in great force both at Cameron
Houses and on the unsupported left flank, and his attack, as was to
be expected in the circumstances, was successful, and our troops were
driven back with severe loss to the assembly line where the enemy's
advance was finally held.
After their rough handling of the morning it was clear that the
attacking battalions could not pursue the offensive or remain in the
line, and arrangements were accordingly made for their relief, on the
south of the Poelcapelle-Westroosebeeke Road by the 2/1st Londons and
on the north of it by the 2/7th Londons. The relief was completed by
10.15 p.m., and the 2/4th Londons returned to Siege Camp.
In other parts of the line greater success was achieved this day,
notably in the vicinity of Passchendaele where the Canadians captured
all their objectives, and on the extreme left in the area held by the
French.
The 26th October must be regarded as one of the most unfortunate days
ever experienced by the 2/4th Londons. The gallantry of officers,
N.C.O.'s and men alike left nothing to be desired, and their defeat
was at the hands of the elements far more than of the Germans. So bad
indeed was the state of the ground that not a few men, becoming stuck
in the mud and exhausted by their efforts to extricate themselves, met
their death by drowning in the flooded shell holes.
For their good work on this day decorations were awarded to Capt. C. A.
Clarke (the M.C.) and Pte C. H. W. Roberts (the D.C.M.).
The casualties sustained in this unfortunate affair were in officers:
2/Lieuts. F. J. Jones, H. G. Langton and J. R. Naylor, killed; 2/Lieut.
R. J. Richards, died of wounds; Capts. R. C. Dickins and D. S. Boorman,
M.C., 2/Lieuts. G. E. Lester, R. Michell, H. A. Snell and A. W. Dodds,
wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men 25 killed, 214 wounded and 109
missing--a total of 359 all ranks. This was the most costly single day
in the history of the 2/4th Battalion.
The 2/4th Londons spent five days at Brake Camp cleaning up, resting
and reorganising, moving on the 1st November to Roads Camp, and on
the following day to St Jans-ter-biezen, about four miles west of
Poperinghe. The Battalion was now reduced to an organisation of
one company for fighting purposes, pending the arrival of further
reinforcements to fill the gaps created on the 26th October.
On the 6th November a further move was made to P Camp near Peselhoek,
north of Poperinghe, and here the Battalion remained for eight days,
all of which were occupied in training except for three working parties
of 100 N.C.O.'s and men under Capt. Hetley who proceeded to Gwent Farm
for stretcher-bearing duties.
[Illustration: _Passchendaele Ridge_]
A further attempt was made by the 175th Brigade on the 30th October to
complete the unfulfilled task of the 26th, but again the state of the
ground rendered the operation abortive. On the higher ground, however,
Canadian troops again achieved some success, and by the 6th November
had captured Passchendaele.
Thus was this stupendous offensive brought to a close. It had
been maintained for three and a half months under conditions of
unprecedented difficulty, and at enormous cost in personnel. Having
regard to the obstacles which were encountered at every step the
achievement was magnificent, and had served a definite purpose in the
War, not only by securing positions on the high ground for the winter,
but also by assisting our French and Italian Allies at a period when,
especially in the case of the latter, any operation which could relieve
the pressure on their front was of vital importance.
On the 15th November the Division was concentrated in Corps reserve,
and the 2/4th Londons moved to Piccadilly Camp in the Proven area.
The 2/4th Londons now spent a prolonged period out of the battle
area; occupying billets successively, after leaving Piccadilly Camp,
at Coulemby on the 26th November, at Bellebrune and Cremarest (about
twelve miles west of St Omer) from the 27th November to the 9th
December, and at Soult Camp near Brielen, to which the Battalion moved
on the last-mentioned date in anticipation of returning to the trenches.
This period of training passed with the usual routine of
"back-of-the-line" training in drill, musketry, bombing, route marching
and games, interspersed with highly welcome entertainments given by
the Divisional concert troop "The Goods." Advantage was taken of the
time spent in rest to refill the gaps in the Battalion's ranks, and an
excellent opportunity was afforded of assimilating the newly-received
drafts as they arrived and before they were called upon to go into
action. These drafts totalled 213 N.C.O.'s and men, but even with this
accession of strength the 2/4th Londons still remained considerably
weaker than prior to the recent action.
Officer reinforcements were more numerous in proportion, and included:
Lieuts. H. J. M. Williams and G. E. Lester.
2/Lieuts. R. W. Chamberlain, E. P. Higgs and L. H. Sheppard.
2/Lieut. F. B. Johnson (13th Londons).
Lieut. F. J. Griffiths, 2/Lieuts. F. E. Norrish, F. G. Williams, W.
H. G. Newman and W. Blair (20th Londons).
2/Lieuts. S. H. Jehu and J. R. Peryer (21st Londons).
Lieut. C. A. Sampson (25th Londons).
Lieuts. E. R. Howden and J. Cairns (A.S.C.).
On the 16th/17th December the 173rd Brigade took over the whole
Divisional sector, which constituted the left of the II Corps front,
from the Lekkerbotebeeke on the right to the Broembeek, a small stream
close to the Ypres-Staden Railway on the left. The Corps line was in
practically the same position as on the occasion of the Battalion's
last visit to this area, and ran roughly north and south in front of
Poelcapelle, and about 500 yards east of the Poelcapelle-Houthulst
Road. The front line, which was occupied in a series of isolated shell
hole posts, which were being strengthened and linked up to each other
as opportunity offered, was held by two battalions, with support
battalions in the captured German trenches around Langemarck and
Pilckem.
The 2/4th Battalion took over from the 2/10th Londons the left
support position in Eagle and Candle Trenches on the 16th December,
thus covering a depth of about 3500 yards. The ground between the
forward and rear companies was a quagmire of battered trenches, and
work was immediately necessary to attempt to reduce the chaos of the
defensive system to something approaching cohesion. After five quiet
days in these positions the Battalion moved forward to the left front
positions, relieving the 2/3rd Londons on the 20th December with three
companies in line and one in support. Headquarters were at Louis Farm.
With the exception of an attack against our left company which was
attempted under a severe barrage on the afternoon of the 22nd, and
which was effectually dispersed, the tour passed quietly and the
Battalion was relieved on the 24th December by the 2/10th Londons,
and concentrated at Battle Siding (Brielen), entraining there for
Elverdinghe. Casualties were 2/Lieut. Jehu and 10 N.C.O.'s and men
wounded and shell-shocked.
A week at Bridge No. 1 Camp, occupied for the most part in training and
bathing, was enlivened by the Christmas festivities, for which such
provision as was possible had been made, the outstanding feature being
the production by "The Goods" of their famous pantomime, "The Babes in
the Wood," which proved an immediate and enormous success.
New Year's Day 1918 found the Battalion once more in left support
positions in Whitemill, Eagle, Bear and Candle Trenches, with
Headquarters in dugouts at Langemarck which rejoiced in the name of Pig
and Whistle. Five days of peaceful trench work here were succeeded by
an uneventful tour in the front line positions, and on the 8th January
the Battalion handed over its trenches to the 17th Lancashire Fusiliers
preparatory to the withdrawal of the whole Division. Concentrating on
relief at Bridge No. 1 Camp the Battalion moved the following day to
School Camp, Proven, where a few days' rest was obtained. The G.O.C. II
Corps here presented ribands to those who had recently been decorated.
Officer reinforcements at this period were:
27th December--2/Lieuts. P. J. Payne, N. A. Brown and
V. C. Prince.
10th January--2/Lieuts. S. F. G. Mears, E. M.
Cuthbertson, S. C. Geering and G. C. Ewing.
Early in January Lieut. D. C. Cooke went to hospital and the medical
officer, Lieut. Altounyan, M.C. (wounded), was replaced by Lieut. C. E.
Dunaway, U.S. Army.
On the 21st January the 2/4th Londons finally left the Ypres area
after nearly five months of hard work in it, and the 58th Division was
transferred to the III Corps (Pulteney) in the Fifth Army which had now
removed to the extreme south of the British lines.
In recognition of their good work in these actions, all "other ranks"
of the Battalion were subsequently granted permission to wear a small
grenade--similar to that worn as a cap badge, but smaller--on the
corners of the tunic collar.
This closes the regiment's connection with the Ypres Salient, the
scene of so much hardship and suffering, but at the same time of so
much gallantry and devotion to duty. Ypres occupies a position in the
estimation of the Empire which is challenged by no place in which
British troops served in the War; and it must be for ever a source of
pride to the regiment that it was privileged to take part in the second
and third battles for its liberation from the Germans.