THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917
The 30th August 1917 found the 1/4th Battalion much reduced in strength
moving from Arques to Bapaume, to the great satisfaction of all ranks,
for all had been expecting a return to the unhealthy conditions of the
Ypres Salient. On detrainment at Bapaume an evening march was made to
Beaulencourt, where quarters were allotted in a concentration camp.
This march was not without interest as it was the Battalion's first
introduction to the "devastated area," the appalling lifeless and
ruined belt of country left behind him by the Bosche in his retirement
from the Ancre-Scarpe salient to the Hindenburg line. Beaulencourt
lies between Bapaume and Le Transloy, and is thus on the ridge which
lay beyond the old Lesbœufs lines and which had proved the final check
to the Battalion's advances in the Somme battles of 1916. From the
village the Lesbœufs-Morval Ridge was visible, though of those two
ill-fated villages no ruins were discernible. The whole area was a
vast waste of rank vegetation which was rapidly covering the scars
of the previous year's battles without healing them. Shell fire had
contributed comparatively little to the desolation, but villages had
been completely demolished and trees felled, and the British troops
themselves provided the only relief to the awful silence of this
strange land from which the life of the fields had vanished.
The Battalion was now attached to the IV Corps (Woollcombe), and the
first few days were spent in very necessary reorganisation of its
slender resources in personnel. The casualties of the Ypres action were
not replaced by drafts, and each company was reduced to two platoons.
That such work as was possible was done to good purpose was shown on
the 4th September, when the Corps commander inspected the Battalion
and expressed himself gratified at the completeness and good order
of its clothing and equipment in view of its recent withdrawal from
the Flanders battlefield. This day was the third anniversary of the
Battalion's departure from England.
Between the 5th and 8th September the 56th Division took over from the
3rd the left sector of the IV Corps front. The new sector was held
with all three Brigades in line, each Brigade area being occupied with
two battalions in front trenches, one in Brigade support and one in
Divisional reserve, in positions facing the Hindenburg line from the
neighbourhood of Lagnicourt on the left to south of the Bapaume-Cambrai
Road in the vicinity of Demicourt on the right. Activity on the enemy's
part was evidently not anticipated in this area, for by this relief the
56th Division became responsible for a front of approximately 10,500
yards.
Of this front the 168th Brigade took over the left or Lagnicourt
sector, with Headquarters in dugouts about half a mile in rear of
Lagnicourt, the Headquarters of the Division being in Frémicourt. This
sector faced the village of Quéant, which was within the defences of
the Hindenburg line. The front line of the left subsector consisted of
a series of platoon posts which were not yet connected up, numbered
respectively C 18/5, C 18/6, C 12/1, C 12/2, C 12/3 and C 12/4.
These posts were the original battle outpost positions which had
been constructed earlier in the year during the advance towards the
Hindenburg line. No Man's Land here averaged 1000 yards wide, and
though from most of these posts the enemy front line was invisible
owing to the lie of the ground, they were all, except on the left,
unapproachable from our side, except under cover of darkness. Some
500 yards in rear of this chain of defences ran a continuous trench
known as the intermediate line, well constructed, with deep dugouts,
moderately strong wire and a good field of fire. Battalion Headquarters
were in dugouts in the sunken road on the left of Lagnicourt, and were
connected with the intermediate line by a communication trench called
Dunelm Avenue. Forward of the intermediate line there was but one
trench leading to the advanced positions and this, Wakefield Avenue,
connected with Post C 18/6.
In this area the Battalion settled down very comfortably to a period
of two months' routine work in and out of the trenches, unbroken by
operations of any interest, and happily almost entirely free from
casualties. In order to avoid the tedium of following closely the
common round of duty we propose to deal with these months by means of a
few general remarks on the life of the Battalion.
During this period the Battalion was joined by the following officers:
Capt. E. E. Spicer, Lieuts. A. Bath and A. M. Duthie, and 2/Lieut.
E. L. Mills.
and by the following attached officers:
2/Lieuts. W. Shand, E. Petrie, C. W. Rowlands, and E. A. Ratcliffe
(1st Londons).
2/Lieut. A. Franks (6th Londons).
2/Lieut. W. H. Eastoe (7th Londons).
2/Lieuts. E. L. Stuckey, C. S. Richards and A. B. Creighton (17th
Londons).
2/Lieuts. F. Barnes, F. S. C. Taylor, R. S. B. Simmonds, J. L.
Backhouse and E. D. Buckland (20th Londons).
Tours of duty were six-day periods as follows:
6 days in Lagnicourt } 2 companies in posts.
left subsector } 2 " intermediate line.
6 days in Brigade support--either side of Lagnicourt village.
6 days in Lagnicourt } Dispositions as before but companies
left subsector } changed over.
6 days in Divisional reserve--at Frémicourt, and so on.
The transport lines and Quartermaster's stores were at Frémicourt,
where permanent horse standings, kitchens, butcher's shop and stores
were erected on an elaborate scale, which appeared to suggest that all
ranks were quite prepared to settle down permanently in this unusually
pleasant sector.
In the line a very considerable amount of work was got through during
September and October. The front line posts were linked up by a
continuous traversed trench, about 7 feet deep and 3 feet wide at the
bottom, and provided with "baby elephant" shelters for the garrison.
Two embryo trenches in which forward company headquarters were
situate--Whitley and York supports--were extended and strengthened and
the intermediate line was maintained. In addition a large amount of
additional wire was put out.
While in Brigade support the Battalion always occupied shelters in the
sunken roads which ran parallel to the lines each side of Lagnicourt
village, B and D Companies being on the north side and A and C
Companies and Battalion Headquarters on the south. The dwellings here
were much improved, and fresh ones were constructed, of which the best
were one built under the supervision of Lieut. Bath and "Twin Villa" by
Headquarters. Not all the Battalion's time, however, was devoted to the
adornment of its own homes, for the support battalion was invariably
called upon to supply heavy working parties, the largest of which were
digging under the R.E.'s, while others were attached to tunnelling
companies for the construction of additional deep dugouts at trench
headquarters and in the intermediate line.
Training was not overlooked, and a great deal of valuable work was
effected. In particular mention should be made of the signallers, who
attained a very high pitch of proficiency under Lieut. Gray, while
Sergt. Randall achieved much success with the Lewis gunners, and
Sergts. Oakely and Taylor did very good work with bombers and rifle
grenadiers.
In the line the enemy's activity on the Battalion's front was slight
and confined to occasioned shelling and trench mortaring, of which the
bulk occurred at night. The sectors right and left of the Battalion
came in for a rather greater share of the enemy's hatred. The London
Scottish on the right were immediately opposed to a network of trenches
sapped out from the Hindenburg front line, known as the Quéant
Birdcage, and in this vicinity a certain degree of bickering was always
in progress, in the course of which IV Corps developed a pleasing
habit of discharging gas projectors--about 600 at a time--against the
Birdcage. The Bosche, however, did not retaliate. It should not,
however, be supposed that the Division had settled down for a prolonged
rest in this quiet sector. Day and night our excellent artillery were
searching for--and finding--the enemy's "weak spots," and up and down
the sector No Man's Land was every night the scene of very great
patrolling activity. In this direction really useful work was effected
by the Battalion Scouts under Lieut. O. D. Garratt, M.C., and Sergts.
Housden and Hayes.
The great width of No Man's Land facilitated the operation of a novel
method of supplying the Battalion when in trenches with rations and
stores. The limbers came up nightly as usual from transport lines at
Frémicourt to trench headquarters at Lagnicourt, and from this point
the rations were sent up to company headquarters in half limbers and on
pack mules; whereby a considerable saving of troops for work elsewhere
was effected. On one of these nightly journeys a bridge over Wakefield
Avenue broke and precipitated an elderly transport horse, named Tommy,
on to his back in the trench. It was two hours' hard work to dig room
round him to get him up and make a ramp for him to walk out of the
trench! Tommy's mishap was commemorated in the new bridge which was
named Horsefall Bridge.
A nasty accident in the line was averted by the coolness of Pte.
Bunker, A Company. While a section was cleaning some Mills bombs one
of the pins fell out and the bomb, with the fuse burning, fell among
the men. Bunker picked it up and threw it out of the trench, when it at
once exploded. For this action Bunker was awarded the M.S.M.
In the first week of October, while the Battalion was in line, a series
of heavy explosions was heard behind the enemy line in the vicinity of
Quéant and Pronville and these, combined with the sudden disappearance
one night of Baralle chimney--a well-known observation point in the
enemy's country--conduced to the belief, which held sway for a few
days, that a further Bosche retirement was imminent. This, of course,
did not materialise.
Although we are not recording the actions of the Divisional Artillery
we may, perhaps, be pardoned for quoting the following crisp little
record from the Divisional Intelligence Summary as illustrating how
well the infantry was served by its guns. The incident occurred on the
10th October:
Movement was seen at an O.P. or sentry post about D.7.d.4.6. An
18-pr. opened fire, but the first shot fell a few yards wide,
whereupon the German observer waved a "washout" signal with a piece
of white paper. The second shot, however, altered his opinion of
our artillery.
His amended opinion has, unfortunately, not been recorded.
The losses of the Battalion in personnel up to the end of October
were practically nil, this being accounted for by the vastness of the
terrain and the fact that about 450 men were occupying some 5000 yards
of firing and communication trench. On the 28th October, however, the
Battalion had the misfortune to lose two promising young officers,
2/Lieuts. Elders and Barnes, both of whom were killed by shells during
an enemy shoot on Posts C 12/3 and C 12/4.
During this period also the Battalion sustained a great loss in
Regimental Sergt.-Major M. Harris, who took his discharge after nearly
twenty-three years of soldiering in the Royal Fusiliers and the 4th
Londons. Sergt.-Major Harris had served continuously with the 1/4th
Battalion since mobilisation, and had filled the position of Senior
Warrant Officer with conspicuous success since March 1915. The last
member of the pre-war permanent staff to remain on active service with
the Battalion, Harris' imperturbable geniality was the means of adding
enormous force to his disciplinary strictness. His share in achieving
the Battalion's efficiency can hardly be over-rated, while his kindly
personality was ever a factor in the social life of the Battalion.
Harris was gazetted Lieutenant and Quartermaster to the Battalion in
the reconstituted Territorial Army in July 1921. The duties of R.S.M.
in the 1/4th Battalion were taken by C.S.M. Jacques.
At the end of October information was circulated among commanding
officers that active operations were imminent. The secrets of the
operations were jealously guarded, and only a vague idea was given as
to what would be the opening day. On the 10th November, however, orders
were issued for a feint attack to be delivered by the 56th Division,
which would be on the left of the main operation. This feint was to
be accompanied by a heavy bombardment by all available batteries, by
a smoke screen and the display of dummy figures over the parapet.
Dummy tanks were also to be erected in No Man's Land, and the illusion
completed--or anyway increased--by running motor cycle engines in the
front line trenches. Arrangements for this demonstration were pushed
on with vigour, and it was understood that Z day would fall during the
Battalion's occupancy of the line.
On the evening of the 18th, however, the 167th Brigade extended to its
left, taking over the 168th sector, and thus holding a two-brigade
front. The 168th Brigade was concentrated in close billets in
Frémicourt and Beugny, the Battalion being in the former village.
* * * * *
The preparations for the offensive were conducted with the greatest
possible secrecy, and in order to secure the maximum surprise effect
it was arranged for the attack to be delivered without any preliminary
bombardment or even registration of batteries, the road into the
enemy's defences being cleared instead by a vast number of tanks.
The attack was delivered by the IV (Woollcombe) III (Pulteney) and
VII (Snow) Corps, on a six-mile front, between Hermies and Gonnelieu,
a subsidiary operation being conducted north of Bullecourt by the VI
Corps (Haldane). The 56th Division was thus outside the actual area of
advance, but was to co-operate on the opening day by means of the feint
attack, for which it had already made preparations, and its further
action was to depend on the success gained in the main operation. The
left flank of the area of advance was intersected by the Canal du Nord,
running between Bourlon and Mœuvres. The frontage in this region was
taken up by the 36th (Ulster) Division, which adjoined the right flank
of the 56th and was the left of the whole attack. The 36th was to
attack with two brigades east of the Canal and one brigade west, the
Division moving northwards along the Hindenburg system towards Mœuvres.
The rôle of the 56th Division was to depend on the degree of success
attained by the 36th. If the latter's attack succeeded in forcing the
retirement of the enemy west of the Canal, this area would be occupied
by the brigade of the 36th Division which was on the west bank; if,
however, this success was not achieved the 56th Division was to attack
over the open with tanks, the 169th Brigade advancing on a front
between Mœuvres and Tadpole Copse, and the 167th forming a defensive
flank from the Copse to our present front line.
The enormous success which attended the initial stages of the Cambrai
battle needs no elaboration here. At 6.30 a.m. on 30th November
the dead silence was suddenly broken by the roar of a very great
concentration of batteries of all calibres up to 15-inch, and preceded
by 380 tanks the assaulting divisions swept over the first and second
systems of the Hindenburg line.
With the exception of a check due to the destruction of the Canal de
l'Escaut Bridge at Masnières, and of another at Flesquières (where
a most gallant resistance to the 51st Division was put up by a
single German officer, who continued to serve his gun after all the
team were killed and succeeded in knocking out several tanks), the
success of the day was considerable. The villages of Havrincourt,
Graincourt, Ribecourt, Marcoing and La Vacquerie were added to the
British territory, and it was obvious that the surprise effect had been
complete.
On the left the 36th Division established itself north of the Cambrai
Road, astride the Hindenburg line, and the 169th Brigade swung its
right flank northward to conform to its neighbours' movements.
The following day at an early hour the Flesquières obstacle was
overcome and the British line swept forward, the villages of Masnières,
Noyelles, Cantaing and Anneux being added to the bag, while on the
left Fontaine-Notre-Dame was entered and the line pushed up to the
southern edge of Bourlon Wood. On the left of the 36th the 169th
Brigade kept pace, one of their battalions occupying the first
Hindenburg trench about one of the roads forming the south-west exit of
Mœuvres, and beginning to bomb northwards.
The 21st November witnessed a further deep inroad into the Hindenburg
system. The 36th Division succeeded during the morning in penetrating
into Mœuvres but were not able to maintain their position. On the
extreme left the 169th Brigade continued their bombing attacks along
the enemy trenches, and were reported in the late afternoon as having
captured Tadpole Copse and the first and second Hindenburg trenches
beyond it as far as the Inchy Road.
* * * * *
In the Battalion at Frémicourt the 20th November passed without
incident, but all ranks awaited anxiously news of the battle, and
for the expected orders to move forward and join in the success. No
movement was made, however, and the day passed slowly, as such days of
keen expectancy always do.
The hour for general action by the 56th Division was approaching, and
the 1/4th Londons received orders at 3.30 p.m. on the 21st to move
forward with transport and stores to Lebucquière, which was reached at
8.15 p.m., accommodation being provided in Cinema Camp. The Battalion
was now prepared for action, and the nucleus personnel under Major
Phillips, the second in command (attached from Montgomery Yeomanry),
remained at Frémicourt.
Next morning the Battalion made all preparations for an early
participation in the fight and, in order to save fatigue to the men,
all battle impedimenta such as Lewis guns and magazines, bombs, tools
and wire cutters were sent on limbers to an open space near Doignies.
Shortly after midday the Battalion followed, arriving at Doignies
at 4 p.m., picking up its stores and bivouacking. In the meantime
Lieut.-Col. Marchment, M.C., accompanied by Capt. Maloney, the doctor,
rode forward to ascertain the situation from the London Scottish, who
were holding the old British front line opposite Tadpole Copse.
The rain, which had started early in the day, was still falling when
the Battalion arrived at Doignies. The village was a good deal knocked
about, but shelter of a sort was found, and the Battalion was just
well off to sleep when it was turned out again to move nearer the line
for the purpose of taking over the British front line from the London
Scottish early next day. About midnight the Battalion got under way in
pitch darkness, and moving through Louverval reached its assembly area
near Piccadilly and about 500 yards in rear of the line by 4.10 a.m. on
the 23rd November. As soon as the growing daylight permitted, companies
resumed their advance and took over Rook, Rabbit and Herring Trenches
from the London Scottish, Headquarters occupying a sunken road north
of the wood surrounding Louverval Château. On relief the assaulting
companies of the London Scottish moved forward to continue the bombing
attack started by the 169th Brigade.
News of the operation was slow in coming through, but by 10.17 a.m.
a report reached Brigade that the attackers had been checked on
endeavouring to emerge from Tadpole Copse. This check was due to a
peculiar omission in the British trench maps, which had shown Tadpole
Copse on the crest of a spur, and dominating all the ground in its
immediate vicinity. It was found that between the Copse and the Inchy
Road was a narrow and sharply marked depression bordered by the
declivitous banks which abound in this undulating countryside. Beyond
this unsuspected valley the Inchy Road was on an eminence just as
prominent as the Tadpole Copse hill; and this position, held by the
enemy in great strength, enabled them to overlook completely all the
northern exits from the Copse. This valley, which played an important
part in the course of the battle, was found subsequently to be
correctly marked on German maps which were captured during the action.
After a stubborn fight the London Scottish overcame this obstacle
and pushed home their attack in the Hindenburg front trench almost as
far as Adelaide Street and in the support 100 yards beyond the Inchy
Road; while a subsidiary attempt was made, without success, to capture
the Factory between this point and Inchy. At these points the enemy
had constructed blocks which he held strongly against all attempts to
dislodge him. In the meantime the 169th Brigade had been bombing up
the communications leading back to the second system of the Hindenburg
lines, with the object of isolating Mœuvres, but the resistance met
with here was exceedingly stubborn.
About 8 o'clock that night the enemy launched a heavy attack against
the London Scottish barricades, and in the support trench they
succeeded in forcing the Scottish back to the Inchy Road, though the
position in the front trench was held. The Scottish had now been
fighting for over twelve hours and had suffered rather serious losses,
and the German counter-attack caused two companies of the 1/4th Londons
to be drawn into the fight, A Company (Franks) and C (Barkworth) moving
forward to reinforce the Scottish at about 8.30 p.m.
A Company, which advanced first, took up a position, acting under the
orders of Lieut.-Col. Jackson of the London Scottish, in the old German
outpost line outside Tadpole Copse, while No. 1 Platoon (Ballance)
went forward to reinforce the Scottish company in the front Hindenburg
trench. Affairs having quieted down the services of this platoon
were not immediately necessary, and it shortly afterwards rejoined
the company. In the meantime No. 2 Platoon (Creighton) was sent to
reinforce the Scottish at the bombing block in the support trench, and
while here Corpl. Johnson and Pte. Bendelow succeeded in beating off an
enemy attack.
C Company, which also took up a preliminary position in the old
German outpost line, was first told off to replenish the supply of
bombs from the brigade dump in Houndsditch. The fresh supplies were
carried to London Scottish Headquarters; and this task completed, the
company occupied the rectangular work in the support trench to the
east of Tadpole Copse, a portion of the second Hindenburg trench in
rear of the Copse, and the communication trench connecting it with
the Hindenburg third line, 2/Lieut. Mills being responsible for this
communication trench and the advanced block about 250 yards along it.
2/Lieut. Stuckey occupied the main trench. These latter trenches were
taken over from the 2nd Londons early on the 24th.
B and D Companies meanwhile had not been idle but had passed the night
providing a covering party to a company of the Cheshire Pioneers, by
whom a chain of redoubts had been dug in the line selected for the
defensive flank.
At 5.30 a.m. on the 24th B Company (Beeby) moved forward, also coming
under the orders of the London Scottish, and at first took up a
position in support in the old outpost line outside the Hindenburg
system. Almost immediately the company was ordered forward to relieve
the 2nd Londons in the communication trench leading to the rear from
the Quadrilateral held by C Company.
The morning passed comparatively quietly though the duty of keeping
wicket behind the bombing blocks was a trying one, which entailed
the constant alertness of all ranks in readiness to meet a sudden
emergency. At noon, however, the enemy put down a heavy barrage on the
captured portions of the Hindenburg trenches, and this was followed at
2 p.m. by a most determined attack on the advanced blocks held by the
London Scottish. This met with considerable success, and though the
Scottish fought with gallantry they were overcome by the weight of the
enemy's onslaught, and by 2.45 p.m. the German bombers had reached the
block held by Mills (C Company), who put up a stout resistance, under
orders from his company commander to hold his post failing further
orders. In this he was helped by the company's Lewis guns, which gave
covering fire to Mills' platoon and the London Scottish, and also
engaged the enemy at the Inchy Road Factory. Three of the guns were
destroyed by the enemy's shell fire.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917]
The trench was already uncomfortably filled with casualties in addition
to the men who were keeping up the fight, but in a few moments the
congestion was greatly increased by the numbers of Scottish troops who
began to come back and file along the trench. At about 3 p.m. about
50 of the London Scottish were seen to leave the Hindenburg support
trench in the hidden valley referred to, with the object of making
their way over the open towards the front trench. Realising that
this vacation of the trench might enable the enemy to surge forward
along it and so cut off Mills, who was still holding his own up the
communication trench, Barkworth promptly ordered Stuckey to advance and
form a block beyond the side trench held by Mills. Stuckey's losses,
however, had been severe, and with only five men at his disposal he
was unable to cope with the task in view of the great congestion of
the trench. Rather than risk the sudden cutting off of his remaining
slender resources in men and the laying open to the enemy of the whole
Tadpole Copse position, which would inevitably result, Barkworth now
decided to withdraw his advanced positions and concentrate his company,
and accordingly Stuckey was ordered to block the support trench at the
west entrance to the Quadrilateral, Mills gradually withdrawing and
holding the enemy off till the new block was completed. In this retired
position the remnants of C Company were in touch with B Company and
also with the 2nd Londons, and here the enemy was finally held up.
This gallant little defence in which C Company put up a really good
fight and inflicted considerable loss on the enemy, cost it about 40
per cent. of its strength in casualties and, as already stated, three
of its Lewis guns.
At the same time B Company had been heavily engaged in its
communication trench, of which it held a length of some 250 yards back
from the second trench. Here the enemy, who had a bombing block about
50 yards from B Company's forward block, began to attack at about 2.30
p.m., but after a struggle his first attempt was thrown back. A little
later the Bosche returned to the charge, and this time was successful
in forcing B Company back for a short distance, but a determined
counter-attack re-established the position, which, after a third and
also abortive enemy assault, remained intact in the Company's hands.
While the 1/4th Londons had been thus heavily engaged the London
Scottish had made a successful resistance in the front Hindenburg
trench which defied all the enemy's attempts. Towards the evening the
enemy's activity both in shell fire and bombing somewhat lessened,
and at 8.30 p.m. D Company (Duthie) was also sent forward relieving C
Company in the trenches. At the same time the Rangers took over from
the Scottish in the front trench.
As the fighting on the 24th was somewhat involved, it seems desirable
to restate the positions now held by the companies of the Battalion in
the Hindenburg system:
Front Line--D Company--Quadrilateral in support trench, and
communication leading up to front trench.
B Company--Communication trench leading from the
Quadrilateral back to third trench.
Support Line--A and C Companies and Headquarters--Front
trench from west edge of Tadpole Copse to
communication trench east of it and old German
outpost line in front of the Copse.
The 25th November also witnessed very severe fighting in which the
1/4th Londons bore an important part and achieved considerable
success. The fighting this day fell to D Company who had not yet been
engaged, and the objective allotted to them was the recapture of the
lost portion of the Hindenburg support trench as far as its junction
with the communication trench, which had been defended by Mills the
previous day. At the same time the Rangers were to make good the two
communication trenches leading back from the front trench to the
support on the east side of the Inchy Road, and also the support trench
in prolongation of Duthie's attack.
We propose to narrate this gallant little action of D Company in the
words of Duthie's report on the operation:
Artillery preparation began at 12.30 p.m. It was reported to be
very short on our right. Our two blocks were removed at 12.45 p.m.
At Zero (1 p.m.) the attack commenced. The Company was disposed as
follows:
14 Platoon, 2/Lieut. E. Petrie, Bombers, Rifle Grenadiers, Riflemen
(carrying); 13 Platoon, 2/Lieut. C. W. Rowlands, with sections
in same order.[5] Lewis gun sections took up a position near our
blocks so as to fire along the trench and to prevent any movement
in the open. Company Headquarters moved with the leading platoon.
For about 50 yards very little opposition was met with but the
leading bombing section was then held up by stick bombs and
suffered eight casualties, which included the leading bombers. To
overcome this check fire was opened for several minutes with No. 23
and No. 24 Rifle Grenades, and the trench was searched forward for
about 100 yards. The shooting was very accurate and the enemy were
driven back with the loss of about 5 men killed. The advance was
continued by bounds of from 20 to 40 yards under cover of salvoes
of rifle grenades. The first two deep dugouts were unoccupied. The
third and fourth were not immediately searched but sentries were
posted. It was thought that some of the C Company men who had been
wounded the previous day might still be down there. The small C.T.
(about 100 yards from the Quadrilateral) was blocked about 120
yards up. At the entrance a good deal of bombing was overcome. This
is a shallow trench and the far end under water. Further delay was
caused by the third and fourth dugouts which were found to contain
21 of the enemy. These were finally cleared. Several were killed
and the remainder badly wounded and captured. The company then
pushed forward to trench junction at E 13 c. 15.75 (objective) and
reached it about 2.45 p.m. The Lewis gun sections were brought up
and placed in suitable positions to protect a further advance and
also the blocking party in the small C.T. None of the Rangers were
encountered and the trench appeared unoccupied, but bombing was
thought to be heard about 300 yards further along.
[5] Companies were still organised in two platoons owing to their
reduced strength, which had not been made good since the third battle
of Ypres.
A small block was made in this trench about 30 yards from the
junction. The enemy was now observed leaving the trench and
crawling over the open towards the bank at D 18 d. 90.98 (in the
unsuspected valley). Heavy rifle fire was opened and at least
30 of the enemy killed. Few, if any, got over the bank. As the
trench beyond the objective appeared to be unoccupied a party of
12 including O.C. Company, 2/Lieut. Rowlands, Sergts. Norris and
Arklay, moved on up the trench. No fire was opened and silence was
maintained. In the next bay past the trench at E 13 c. 00.85 (50
yards beyond the objective) two men were seen firing a machine-gun
which was mounted on the parapet and aimed down the bank (in the
valley). This was rushed.... The gun was dismounted and brought
in. Other guns were heard firing and two more were seen (at points
farther along the trench in the valley described in the report
by map reference). Two parties under Sergts. Norris and Arklay
moved round to a point from which fire could be brought to bear.
The crews of two men to each gun were killed and the guns brought
in. O.C. Company and Sergt. Norris continued to advance along the
trench and up to the top of the bank. Heavy bombing could be seen
in Tadpole Lane and in the front line towards the Inchy Road.
Further advance was prevented by the fire of our own guns firing
on the trench in response to S.O.S. signal which had been sent up
from the front line. The trench was very full of dead, both of
the London Scottish and of the enemy. It was impossible to walk
without treading on them. As our barrage continued the party moved
back to our original objective and blocks were made at this trench
junction. The remainder of the party carried back four wounded
London Scottish, who were found in the open near the bank. Later in
the evening when our barrage was discontinued an attack was made
on our block. The enemy was quickly silenced. At 11 p.m. D Company
were relieved by A Company.
A very successful operation, and a modest account of it by Duthie,
whose personality and leadership was an important factor in the result
achieved. The two men in charge of the first gun captured were shot
by Duthie with his revolver. The resistance offered to the Rangers
was stubborn, and but for their inability to advance it is possible a
considerable success might have been achieved, since the barrage put
down by our guns, in response to the Rangers' S.O.S., had the effect of
shelling Duthie out of part of his gains.
The remainder of the day was inactive, no further fighting taking place
till about 11.30 a.m. on the 26th, when once more the enemy attempted
to force B Company's position in the communication trench. The company,
however, repeated its gallantry of the former occasion, and the enemy
retired later without having gained any success.
At 11.30 p.m. on the 26th the Battalion was relieved by the
Kensingtons, withdrawing on relief to its former position in the
Brigade support area behind the old British front line. This relief
brought to a close the Battalion's active participation in the British
offensive, which was now practically spent. During the very trying
three days spent behind the bombing blocks in circumstances which
required particular vigilance and fortitude, all ranks had behaved
splendidly, and it is difficult to mention individuals when all had
rendered such excellent service. A few names, however, call for
outstanding mention, among these being Capt. S. J. Barkworth, M.C.,
M.M., and Capt. A. M. Duthie, the commanders of C and D Companies, on
whom the brunt of the work had fallen, and their subalterns Rowlands
and Mills. The Padre, the Rev. S. F. Leighton Green, did splendid
service throughout, being always about the Hindenburg lines and going
up to the advanced blocks. At night he was constantly visiting and
helping with casualties and administering the last rites to those who
had fallen.
The whole action as far as the Division was concerned had developed on
lines completely opposed to the original plans; for whereas it had been
proposed to employ the Division in the open with tanks, its fighting
throughout had been hand-to-hand fighting in trenches. The regularity
and sufficiency with which bomb supplies found their way to the front
indicated excellent organisation. At no time did supplies fall short of
the demand.
It was a surprise to a good many to find the much vaunted Hindenburg
line inferior to our own defences. The outpost line which the companies
first occupied was a gross delusion, for it was only six inches deep,
while the main line was poor and not over well maintained, and the
Bosche ideas of sanitation could only be described as a scandal.
The casualties sustained during the three days' fighting were light in
view of the close contact with the enemy. Two officers, 2/Lieuts. R. S.
B. Simmonds and E. Petrie, were wounded, and the total losses in other
ranks amounted to about 60, including two valuable N.C.O.'s killed,
viz.: Sergts. Barker and Gooch, and one, Sergt. Lintott, M.M., wounded
and captured.
At midnight on the 24th November the 56th Division had passed from the
IV to the VI Corps. Its position at the conclusion of the offensive
operations was one of almost dangerous extension. It had captured and
was holding over a mile of the Hindenburg line. Its right flank was
not secure so long as Mœuvres remained in the enemy's hands; its left
flank on the Tadpole Copse spur was exposed and subject to constant
counter-attacks. Two of its brigades were involved in this fighting
and in holding a defensive flank of 2000 yards, while the remaining
brigade, the 167th, was responsible for a frontage in the old British
line of 5500 yards, and had in addition to supply a battalion each
night for consolidation of the captured position. It was thus unable
to provide relief for the troops who had been fighting, and was
without any reserve for use in case of emergency. Representations
made by General Dudgeon to the Corps Commander as to the weakness of
his position resulted in a battalion of the 3rd Division being at
once placed at the disposal of the 167th Brigade for counter-attack
purposes. This temporary relief was extended a few days later, and by
the 29th the whole of the 167th Brigade had been relieved by troops of
the 3rd Division and was withdrawn at Frémicourt in Divisional reserve,
with two of its battalions lent temporarily to the 168th Brigade.
The three days following relief were spent by the Battalion in support
in providing carrying and working parties in the front line and burying
parties for the fallen. On the 29th a slight side step to the left
was made so that the Battalion's right flank rested on Piccadilly and
it became responsible for the defensive flank. A considerable amount
of work had been done in this quarter, and the flank was now provided
with a continuous belt of wire and a chain of inter-supporting posts.
A communication trench had been dug from the old line across No Man's
Land to the Hindenburg line parallel to Piccadilly, a distance of some
1300 yards, and from this T-head trenches had been sapped forward
facing north. The defensive flank positions were only occupied at
night, the trench garrison taking two companies, A and B, while C and
D Companies provided patrols along the wire to prevent any attempts of
the enemy to turn the position.
The 29th November passed quietly though a good deal of movement was
observable in rear of the enemy's lines, so that his serious attack of
the following day was not entirely unexpected.
From the Battalion's position an extensive view was obtainable over the
whole terrain as far as Bourlon Wood, and early on the 30th a strong
concentration of the enemy's forces was clearly visible north and east
of Mœuvres.
At 10.45 a.m. the S.O.S. signal went up all along the line and the
enemy attacked in dense formation under a heavy barrage. The Battalion
stood to arms all day but was not required, for the gallant defence of
the units in the line this day was one of the greatest achievements of
the 56th Division. The enemy's attack was pressed with vigour and at
one time he had driven a wedge into the Hindenburg lines and divided
the London Scottish, who were still in the line, from the 2nd Londons.
The position, however, was defended tenaciously and at the end of the
day the whole of the Division's gains in the Hindenburg front line
were maintained, while the heaps of enemy dead outside the trenches
testified to the severity of the check which he had suffered.
That night the Battalion was called on for particularly active
patrolling as it was anticipated that the enemy would renew his attempt
on the Divisional front. The whole resources of the Division were
drawn upon to meet any renewed enemy action, and Lieut.-Col. Marchment
had under him for defensive purposes, in addition to the Battalion,
a company of the 5th Cheshires, a company of the 7th Middlesex, the
512th Field Company, R.E., and two sections of the 416th Field Company,
R.E. The Engineers were employed in digging fresh redoubts in dead
ground to the rear of the defensive flank line, while the infantry
companies were kept as a reserve at Battalion Headquarters. No further
action occurred until the afternoon of the 1st December when a fresh
concentration of enemy forces about 3.30 p.m. was crushed by our guns.
The Division had now well earned a rest, and warning was received
on the 1st December that it would be relieved by the 51st Division
immediately. The relief began at 7 p.m. that evening, the Battalion
handing over its lines to the 6th Black Watch. It was evident that the
incoming troops had been pushed forward hurriedly, for the relieving
battalion arrived without Lewis guns or shrapnel helmets, and with
the officers wearing slacks, just as they had risen from dinner. The
relief took a long while to effect, and it was not until 4 a.m. on
the 2nd that Lieut.-Col. Marchment handed over command of the sector.
On relief the Battalion withdrew to billets in Beugny, but at 11 a.m.
the rearward march was continued to Beaulencourt which was reached by
4 p.m., quarters being allotted in the camp that the Battalion had
occupied on the 30th August.
While at Beaulencourt the Battalion received congratulatory messages
which had been issued to Brigade by the Corps and Divisional commanders
on the part played in the battle.
The following day the Battalion entrained at Frémicourt for the Arras
area, reaching Beaumetz-les-Loges at 12.30 p.m., whence it marched to
billets in Simencourt.
The honours awarded for services rendered in the Battle of Cambrai were
as follows:
D.S.O.--Capt. A. M. Duthie.
M.C.--2/Lieuts. C. W. Rowlands and E. L. Mills.
D.C.M.--Sergt. G. Norris and L.-Corpls. E. S. Brown and T. H.
Sankey.
Bar to M.M.--Pte. C. S. Ruel.
M.M.--Sergts. F. Arklay, A. E. Haynes and G. J. Grant, Corpls. T.
J. Court, J. W. Johnson and H. W. Wallder. L.-Corpl. T.
Hodgkins and Ptes. B. M. J. Barnett, H. Evans, W. J.
Hutchin, F. G. Senyard, G. Tyrell, J. Wickens and W. A.
Willmott.