THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
I. _The 1/4th Battalion on the Menin Road_
By the middle of May 1917 the British efforts on the Arras front had
achieved the success which had been aimed at; and the offensive having
been sufficiently prolonged to assist the French in their operations
on the Chemin des Dames, the Commander-in-Chief was free to turn his
attention to the northern area of the British lines.
The first phase of the operation was opened on the 7th June, when a
brilliant attack by the Second Army (Plumer) carried the British line
forward over the Messines and Wytschaete Ridges, from which the Germans
had dominated our positions since October 1914. This operation, which
was one of the most completely successful of the whole War, resulted by
the 14th June in the advancement of practically the whole Second Army
front from the River Warnave to Klein Zillebeeke.
One by one the points of vantage held by the enemy since the beginning
of siege warfare were being wrested from his grasp. In succession the
Thiepval Ridge, the Bucquoy Ridge, the Vimy Ridge and finally the
Messines-Wytschaete Ridge had fallen into our hands, and there remained
of this long series of heights only the series of ridges which from
Zillebeeke to Passchendaele dominate Ypres on the east and north sides.
It was towards these hills that the British offensive efforts were now
directed.
The opening day of the offensive had originally been fixed for the
25th July 1917, but owing to the intensity of our bombardment the
enemy in anticipation of attack had withdrawn his guns, and the attack
was therefore postponed in order that the British guns might be
correspondingly advanced. Combined with the systematic bombardment of
the enemy's trenches, strong points and communications, a definite air
offensive which ensured our local supremacy in this respect, and also
severe gas shelling, were undertaken.
The front of attack extended for some fifteen miles from Deulemont
on the right to Boesinghe on the Yser Canal--the main attack being
entrusted to the Fifth Army (Gough) on a front of about seven miles
from the Zillebeeke-Zandvoorde Road to Boesinghe. The Second Army on
the right was to make only a limited advance with the chief objects of
widening the front of attack and distributing the enemy's resistance.
At the same time the French on the extreme left (or north) would
co-operate in the marshes of the Yser.
The offensive was finally launched on the 31st July 1917. The weather,
which for a fortnight previously had been fine and dry and had seemed
to predict success, broke on the day of the battle, and a merciless
rain which changed the whole area of operations to a sea of mud fell
without cessation for several days. The Corps in line on the 31st July
were from left to right the XIV (Cavan), the XVIII (Maxse), the XIX
(Watts), the II (Jacob) and the X (Morland). On the whole the day was
one of marked success, the deepest advance being made in the northern
sector of the attack. From Westhoek to St Julien the second German
line was carried, while north of the latter village the assaulting
troops passed the second line and gained the line of the Steenbeek as
far as the junction with the French, whose attack had also met with
complete success. South of Westhoek the enemy's resistance had been
more stubborn, and his positions in Inverness Copse and Glencorse Wood
which were strongly held by machine-gun posts proved an impassable
obstacle. In this region, however, the German first line was carried,
and our troops managed to maintain themselves far enough forward on
the Westhoek Ridge to deny the enemy observation over the Ypres plain;
the position gained running almost due south from Westhoek east of the
line Clapham Junction--Stirling Castle--Bodmin Copse, and thence to
Shrewsbury Forest, south of which the German second line was occupied
as far as the Ypres-Comines Canal. South of the Canal also the Second
Army achieved considerable success.
The rain, which began to fall in the afternoon, had a most disastrous
effect on the British plan of attack. Movement over the shell-torn
ground, which was transformed into a series of bogs, rapidly became
impossible apart from a few well-defined tracks, and these naturally
became marks for the enemy's guns. The labour of moving forward
guns, relieving troops and completing the forward dumps and other
preparations for the next bound was increased tenfold. The inevitable
delay which ensued was of the greatest service to the enemy, who
thereby gained a valuable respite in which he was able to bring up
reinforcements.
The fighting of the next few days was, therefore, local in character
and consisted in clearing up the situation and improving the
British positions at various points in the line, in the course of
which operations the capture of Westhoek was completed. Numerous
counter-attacks by the enemy were successfully resisted, and the line
gained on the 31st July was substantially held.
* * * * *
The 56th Division moved from the Third Army area on the 24th July to
the St Omer area. The 1/4th Londons entrained at Petit Houvin for St
Omer and marched to billets at Houlle, in the Eperlecques area, some
five miles north-west of St Omer. The Division was now attached to
the V Corps. Its training was continued during the opening phase of
the battle, after which the Division moved on the 6th August to the
II Corps area, the Battalion occupying billets at Steenvoorde, where
the routine was resumed. On the 8th Major-Gen. D. Smith, C.B. (who had
commanded the Division since 24th July, when Gen. Hull fell sick), left
to command the 20th Division and, two days later, command was assumed
by Major-Gen. F. A. Dudgeon, C.B.
The same day a warning order was received that the Division would
shortly move into the line to take part in the second phase of the
battle, which was to be renewed as soon as weather conditions should
permit.
[Illustration: THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES, 1917 (1/4TH BATTALION)]
On the night of the 12th/13th August the Division moved forward into
the line opposite Glencorse Wood, which had been the centre of the
enemy's resistance on the first day of the battle, and took over from
portions of the 18th and 25th Divisions a sector between the Menin Road
at Clapham Junction and the cross-roads at Westhoek, the 169th Brigade
occupying the right of this front with the 167th Brigade on its left.
The 53rd Brigade of the 18th Division remained in line on the right of
the 169th Brigade, between Clapham Junction and Green Jacket Road, and
came under the orders of Gen. Dudgeon.
On the morning of the 12th the 168th Brigade in Divisional reserve
embussed at Steenvoorde for Canal Reserve Camp, Dickebusch.
The chain of machine-gun posts still held by the enemy in Inverness
Copse, Glencorse Wood and Nonne Boschen was of immense importance
to the Germans at this juncture; as they screened the long Spur
which, running north-east from the Menin Road Ridge between the
Polderhoek-Gheluvelt Ridge and the Zonnebeeke Road, formed an important
_point d'appui_ in the Langemarck-Gheluvelt line of defence. Their
capture by the British would, therefore, drive such a wedge towards the
enemy third line as to cause a serious menace to his communications
along the Menin and Zonnebeeke Roads. No one was more keenly alive to
the essential value of this position than the Germans, who spared no
efforts to frustrate attempts to launch a further attack in this area.
The continual severity of his shell and machine-gun fire against our
outpost line served his purpose well, as it not only inflicted severe
loss on the trench garrisons of the divisions in the line and seriously
impeded the task of advancing ammunition and other stores incidental
to an attack--a task already difficult enough by reason of the wet
state of the ground--but also precluded efficient reconnaissance of the
ground over which the attack was to be launched.
The 56th Division was the extreme right of the attack. The advance
allotted to it was to be carried out by the 167th and 169th Brigades,
whose objective was a line beyond the third German line of defence,
and which may be roughly described as running north and south through
Polygon Wood. The southernmost point of this advance was to be Black
Watch Corner, and from this point it would be necessary to connect
the southern extremity of the final objective with the line on the
Division's right, on which no advance would be attempted. This meant
the formation of a defensive flank facing nearly south.
This vital work of forming the flank was originally entrusted to the
53rd Brigade, and the importance of their rôle will be readily grasped,
since on the manner in which it was carried out would hang in large
measure the fortunes of the 169th and 167th and successive Brigades
on the left, for the German machine-guns in Inverness Copse, if not
silenced, would be free to enfilade the whole advance. The 53rd Brigade
which had been in the line since the opening of the battle on the 31st
July was, however, now exhausted, and so seriously reduced in strength
by the tireless activity of the German machine-gunners that it was not
in a condition to renew the offensive. Its task was therefore handed
over to the 1/4th Londons, on whom devolved the difficult operation
above described of covering the right flank of the whole attack. The
only troops of the 53rd Brigade who would be actively employed would
be a detachment of the 7th Bedfords, who were made responsible for
capturing the machine-gun nests which, from the north-west corner of
Inverness Copse, dominated the whole situation.
The 1/4th Londons were detailed for this attack on the morning of the
14th August, and it is important in view of what subsequently occurred
to bear this date in mind. It must also be remembered that at this time
the Battalion was some seven miles from the field of battle and that no
officer, N.C.O. or man belonging to it had ever set eyes on the ground
over which the battle was to be fought.
During the morning Lieut.-Col. Campbell, the Adjutant and the four
company officers went forward to reconnoitre the forward area, visiting
in turn 169th Brigade Headquarters at Dormy House, and Headquarters of
the Battalion in line of the 53rd Brigade at Stirling Castle. It had
been intended also to reconnoitre the ground over which the advance was
to be made, but such was the intensity of the enemy's artillery and
machine-gun fire that this was impossible, and the company commanders
were compelled to return to their companies in ignorance of what lay
before them. Later in the day Lieut.-Col. Campbell was ordered to
report to 53rd Brigade Headquarters, but was unluckily hit on his way
back, near Zillebeeke Lake. Although badly hit he made his way back
to the Battalion, but being unable to carry on was succeeded in the
command by Major A. F. Marchment, M.C. (1/1st Londons).
At seven that night the Battalion moved forward from Dickebusch to
Château Segard, the move being completed by 11 p.m. Shortly after dawn
on the 15th the forward move was continued to Railway Dugouts, in the
cutting between Shrapnel Corner and Zillebeeke Lake, and here the
Battalion remained during the day.
The 15th August was occupied in issuing battle equipment and rations
to the companies, while Lieut.-Col. Marchment took the opportunity of
conducting a reconnaissance of the forward area and communications,
and of issuing his operation orders. These were explained to company
commanders as adequately as time permitted, but it must be borne
in mind that when the Battalion moved forward to the assault the
following morning no company or platoon officer had been able to see
the ground over which he was to lead his men. At 6.30 p.m. the 1/4th
Londons left Railway Dugouts in battle order for the assembly area at
Clapham Junction with guides supplied from the 53rd Brigade. A great
deal of heavy shelling, in which four men of B Company were hit, was
experienced during the advance, and in breasting a ridge near Sanctuary
Wood the Battalion had to pass through a barrage put down by the
Germans. Aided by the excellent discipline of the troops, however,
company commanders were able to split up their companies within a
few seconds, and no loss was sustained. By ten o'clock the Battalion
was concentrated with A, B and C Companies in the tunnel under the
Menin Road, and D Company in the trench south of the road. Battalion
Headquarters and part of C Company were in the trench on the north side
of the tunnel. There was no defined line of trenches in this area, the
front being held by isolated shell hole posts, and the assembly was to
be made on tape lines laid down under staff arrangements. The lack of
shelter thus made it necessary to keep the Battalion under such cover
as was obtainable till the last possible moment. During the evening an
officer of each company reconnoitred the route from the concentration
area to the tape lines, assistance being rendered by the 6th Royal
Berkshires, and No Man's Land in front of the line of assembly was
patrolled until shortly before zero hour.
The intention was to advance in a practically due east direction, while
at stated points in the line of advance platoons would halt one by one,
each establishing itself in a strong point, until finally, when the
last platoon reached its halting point, the whole Battalion would be
deployed in a line of outposts, all of which would turn to their right
and face south. This advance, being made on a front of two companies,
would result in a double line of posts of which the left flank would
rest on Black Watch Corner in touch with the 169th Brigade, while the
right flank would join hands with the 7th Bedfords in the corner of
Inverness Copse.
At 3.15 a.m. on the 16th August companies began to form up on the tape
lines, the assembly being completed by 4.20 a.m., when the troops were
lying down in the open under a continuous and fairly heavy shell fire
and a galling machine-gun fire from the direction of Inverness Copse.
About 22 casualties occurred under this fire before zero hour at 5.45
a.m. The order of battle was as follows: A. Company (Spiers) on the
right and B Company (Stanbridge) on the left in front; with D Company
(H. N. Williams) on the right and C Company (Rees) on the left in
support.
The attack was to be delivered along the whole battle front at 5.45
a.m. under cover of a creeping barrage, supported by machine-gun
barrage and heavy gun fire on the enemy back areas. At zero hour the
British barrage came down, well distributed and of terrific intensity.
It was hoped that the danger points in Inverness Copse would be put
out of action by our artillery, so that the task of the 7th Bedfords
would be an easy one, but calculations in this respect were soon found
to have been mistaken. The leading companies of the 1/4th Londons got
away from the mark at zero, in good order and well up to the barrage,
but almost immediately came under a hail of lead from Inverness Copse.
The attack of the 7th Bedfords, of such vital importance to the success
of the whole operation, had failed. The artillery fire had not produced
the expected effect on the enormously strong enemy posts over which the
barrage had passed harmlessly, and the 7th Bedfords were repulsed with
loss, thereby leaving the 1/4th Londons completely exposed to the full
force of the enemy's nest of machine-guns on their right flank.
Within a few minutes 5 officers and 40 N.C.O.'s and men of A and B
Companies were casualties, but the survivors pushed forward steadily,
though a certain amount of delay caused by the gaps so suddenly torn in
their ranks was inevitable. The gallantry displayed by all ranks under
this devastating machine-gun fire, to which was added enemy shell fire
of great intensity, was unsurpassed, but under such a storm of bullets
at close range nothing could live, and the Battalion was brought to a
standstill about 200 yards from starting-point, in an old German trench
which skirted a ruined farmhouse about midway between Inverness Copse
and Glencorse Wood.
A party of some 60 men of all companies managed to gain shelter in
Jap Avenue. Here they were organised by 2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman,
under whom a strong post was consolidated and an attempt made to
push forward along the trench. This proved unsuccessful owing to the
continued intensity of the enemy machine-gun fire and the accuracy of
his sniping. Further attempts by other companies to advance were also
fruitless, and the Battalion was forced to content itself with hanging
on to these small gains, from which at intervals it was able to engage
with Lewis gun and rifle fire small bodies of the enemy in the open
near the east end of Glencorse Wood.
An attempt was made to re-establish the situation by an attack, for
which the 53rd Brigade was called upon, through Inverness Copse from
south to north, but so terribly reduced in numbers were its battalions
that Brigade reserve was limited to two weak platoons and further
action was found to be for the moment impossible.
In the centre the leading waves of the 169th, after some resistance in
Glencorse Wood which they overcame, succeeded in penetrating Polygon
Wood, where they probably gained their objective. The second waves on
approaching the Wood were, however, met with intense fire from front
and flanks, and a few minutes later a heavy counter-attack developed
which drove back the assaulting troops to the middle of Glencorse Wood.
A further counter-attack in the evening forced the Brigade back to its
assembly line.
On the left the 167th Brigade met with but little greater success. The
advance was steadily conducted as far as a line level with the eastern
edge of Nonne Boschen, where trouble was first encountered by a sea
of mud--an extensive bog caused by the springs in the source of the
Hanebeek--which forced the attacking battalions to edge away to their
left and thus lose touch with the 169th Brigade on their right. In
this position they came under heavy machine-gun fire, and the British
barrage having got far ahead, were forced to fall back. By 9 a.m. this
Brigade also was back in its assembly area.
Early in the afternoon enemy artillery fire over the 1/4th Battalion's
front became very heavy, and retaliatory fire was directed by our
artillery into Inverness Copse. No infantry action developed, and
during the night the Battalion was relieved by the 12th Middlesex and
withdrew, in support, to the tunnel under Crab Crawl Trench in the old
British system south of Sanctuary Wood.
Here the 1/4th Londons remained during the whole of the 17th August,
which passed uneventfully, and in the evening was relieved by the 8th
K.R.R.C. of the 14th Division, which took over the 56th Division
front. On relief, the Battalion withdrew to Mic Mac Camp, Ouderdom.
Reviewing the Battalion's work on the 16th August it must be at once
admitted that it, and indeed the whole Division, failed completely to
perform its allotted task. That all ranks did all that was possible to
achieve it is reflected in the length of the casualty list, and it is
perhaps due to those who fell to comment briefly on what appear to be
the causes of failure.
In the first place the operation itself was far from easy. The sea of
mud and ooze to which the line of advance had been reduced must in
any case have rendered the recognition by platoon commanders of the
spots at which they were in turn to halt and form their post a matter
of some difficulty. But the circumstances in which the Battalion
became responsible for the attack effectually precluded it from the
preparations for the operation which the difficulty of the task
warranted. The change of command was a further stroke of bad luck.
Lieut.-Col. Marchment was already known to the Battalion, but the
disadvantages under which he laboured in assuming command on the eve
of battle are obvious. The issue of orders was inevitably delayed as
Lieut.-Col. Campbell's reconnaissance had to be repeated by Lieut.-Col.
Marchment on the morning of the 15th, and it was not till the evening
of that day that the scheme could be explained to companies, and then
only by officers, who themselves had not seen the ground or even the
assembly position. In fact the operations of reconnaissance, issue
of orders and assembly of the Battalion had all to be disposed of in
twenty-two hours. In addition to these preliminary difficulties the
progress of the operation itself revealed further circumstances, to
which also a share of the responsibility for failure may be attributed.
The extraordinary strength of the German machine-gun posts was such
that the most intense barrage which the excellent Corps and Divisional
artillery was capable of producing passed harmlessly over them, and
only a direct hit was sufficient to disturb the occupants.
The very serious casualties at the outset of the attack--half an
hour after zero, three company commanders were the only officers left
standing--produced inevitably a certain degree of disorganisation,
though the fact that despite these heavy losses the Battalion was able
to establish and maintain itself throughout the day until relief,
speaks wonders for the discipline of the troops and the efficiency
and initiative of the N.C.O.'s. Further causes of failure lay in the
previous exhaustion of the men owing to the bad state of the ground,
which also made extremely difficult the preparation beforehand of
forward supply dumps, and the reinforcement of the attacking troops
during the battle.
Defeat is not always inglorious, and we feel that the 16th August may
fairly be written down as a day on which the 1/4th Londons failed
without loss of reputation in any single particular.
The casualties sustained were as follows:
In officers--Lieut.-Col. H. Campbell, D.S.O., wounded; Lieuts. C.
A. Speyer, L. B. J. Elliott, L. W. Wreford and A. G. Davis,
killed; Capt. H. W. Spiers, Lieuts. A. S. Ford and E. G. Dew,
and 2/Lieuts. L. W. Archer, H. T, Hannay, N. Nunns and H.
E. Jackman, wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men 182 killed and
wounded.
2/Lieut. H. E. Jackman was awarded the M.C. for his excellent work and
devotion to duty this day.
Throughout the Division casualties were heavy and 6 commanding officers
and nearly 4000 all ranks fell on this unfortunate day.
On the remainder of the battle front varying success was obtained. In
the north a considerable advance was made and the German third line
was broken on a wide front. The French attack on the extreme left was
crowned with complete success. In the southern area, however, the enemy
resistance was everywhere more stubborn, and south of St Julien the
line remained unchanged as a result of the day's fighting. The Division
being concentrated in the Ouderdom area remained there training and
reorganising for several days.
On the 22nd August its move to the Eperlecques area began, and on the
24th the 1/4th Londons entrained at Reninghelst siding for Watten,
where it detrained and marched to Houlle.
[Illustration: _Inverness Copse_]
The 56th Division had been so badly handled on the 16th August that
its return to the battle area without considerable reinforcement was
out of the question and it was, therefore, moved from the Ypres area
to Bapaume. The Battalion accordingly entrained at Arques in the early
hours of the 30th August and arrived in huts in the Beaulencourt area
at 8 p.m. the same day.