THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES, 1915
Since the exhaustion of the enemy's drive towards Ypres in November
1914, the Ypres area had not been the scene of any important
operations, although from time to time fierce struggles had raged here
and there for the possession of points of minor tactical importance.
Early in April 1915 the British lines had been extended slightly
northward, and a sector had been taken over from the French troops on
the left. On the 22nd of that month the line from Steenstraate (near
the Yser Canal) as far as the Poelcapelle Road east of Langemarck was
held by a Moroccan Division of the French Army. Thence the line took
a south-easterly turn towards the Passchendaele-Becelaere Road and
was occupied by the Canadian Division. On the right of the Canadians,
British divisions held the trenches which ran east of Zonnebeeke in the
direction of Hooge.
On the afternoon of the 22nd the French lines were subjected to a heavy
bombardment, following which at about 5 p.m. our aeroplanes reported
that they had seen thick clouds of yellow smoke issuing from the German
trenches between Langemarck and Bixschoote. These arose, as is now
well known, from poison gas, of which the effect was so terrible as to
render the troops exposed to it practically incapable of action. The
smoke and fumes at first hid everything from sight, and hundreds of
men were immediately incapacitated. Within an hour the whole position
had to be abandoned with the loss of fifty guns. This horrible and
unlooked-for attack was so overpowering in its moral effect that our
gallant allies were unable to combat it, and being totally unprovided
with means of defence against so diabolical a contrivance, were
forced--as indeed any troops would probably have been under the like
conditions--to abandon their position without offering resistance. The
confusion and moral effect were doubtless increased by the fact that
the trenches thus attacked were occupied by Africans whose firm belief
in the supernatural rendered it so much the more difficult for them to
withstand this assault.
The immediate result of this gas attack was that the left flank of the
Canadian Division was in the air and was in imminent danger of being
entirely cut off. But the Canadians stuck to their positions with
magnificent tenacity and during the night repulsed numerous German
attacks. In the disorganisation following the gas attack the Germans
had succeeded in establishing themselves on the west side of the
Yser Canal at Lizerne, thus threatening to drive a wedge between the
Canadians on the right and the French and Belgian troops on the left.
By 10 o'clock the next morning the position, though by no means
re-established, was slightly easier, touch being definitely ensured
between the Canadians' left and the French right, about 800 yards
east of the Canal; but in order to effect this junction so great an
extension of the British lines had been necessary that no reserves were
available for counter-attack. The enemy's artillery fire was severe all
day and the situation was rendered exceptionally difficult by the loss
of so many allied guns in the gas attack.
It was arranged between Sir John French and General Foch, who was in
command of the French Army on our left, that the latter should make
immediate arrangements for the recapture of the original French Line,
and for this purpose it was necessary for the British to maintain their
present position without further retirement; but it was clear that
the British troops could not be allowed to remain in the precarious
position held by them during the last twenty-four hours unless the
French attack were delivered within a reasonable time. In the meantime
such reinforcements as were immediately available from neighbouring
Corps were being rushed up into Ypres to strengthen the temporary line
between ourselves and the French.
On the 24th a heavy German attack breached our lines at St Julien. This
might have initiated an extremely critical situation but for a powerful
counter-attack organised and launched by Brig.-Gen. Hull (afterwards
G.O.C. 56th Division), who, with his own Brigade and parts of
battalions belonging to six different divisions all new to the ground,
was successful in stemming the tide of the enemy's advance, although
attempts to recapture St Julien were repulsed.
Early in the morning of the 25th the left flank of the Canadian
division was driven back after two days' magnificent fighting, and by
the evening the allied line north of Ypres ran practically east and
west from the neighbourhood of Boesinghe on the Canal to the south
outskirts of St Julien. The general tendency of this line was to bow
inwards towards Ypres. The seriousness of the threat to the whole
British position east of Ypres is obvious. It was now possible for the
enemy to shell any point in our lines from both sides of the salient,
while his positions being about two miles farther to the south than
they had been prior to the gas attack of the 22nd, he was able to keep
the arterial road from Ypres to Zonnebeeke under continuous and heavy
shell fire from guns of all calibres.
During the whole time considerable confusion was created by the
alteration of areas caused by the sudden relinquishment of the forward
positions; and by the fact that fresh troops on arrival in the Ypres
area had at once to be absorbed into the firing line to prevent
the enemy from exploiting his initial success. This confusion was
heightened by our lack of artillery, which was inadequate to keep
down the heavy German fire, and our casualties were in consequence
continuously heavy. Ypres was itself kept under very heavy shell fire
which vastly increased the difficulty of maintaining supplies of
munitions and food.
The Lahore Division was ordered on the 23rd April to move to the Ypres
area, and on the morning of the 24th orders were received by the 1/4th
Londons that the contemplated relief of the Dehra Dun Brigade on the
La Bassée Road would not take place and that the Battalion would be
ready to move--possibly by train--at 1.30 p.m. By 2 p.m. the Battalion
had joined in the Ferozepore Brigade column followed by the first
line transport. In ignorance of its destination, and quite unaware of
the bitter struggle then going on at Ypres, the Battalion expected to
entrain at Merville, and a great many packs were filled with eatables
and comforts for a long train journey.
However, when Merville, Indian Corps railhead, was passed it became
evident that whatever journey was before the column would be made
on foot. The march was an exceedingly trying one and was made under
"forced" conditions. The roads were in a bad state after the winter
rains, and a good deal of opening out in the column was inevitable,
so that the five-minute halts which took place each hour were mostly
spent in "closing up." Hour after hour the column moved on under the
burden of full marching order, now over uneven pavé, now in deep ruts
and thick mud. Merville, Vieux, Berquin, Strazeele, were passed in
succession. Daylight gave place to dusk and dusk to darkness but still
the column struggled forward. From all battalions stragglers now began
to line the sides of the road, unable after the physically weakening
experience of trench life to keep up the pace. At last about 10.30
p.m. a long halt was made just outside Godewaersvelde, a small village
at the foot of the Mont des Cats. Here a rest of some forty minutes
was obtained on the roadside while double lines of guns, ammunition
columns, and transport blocked the road.
Finally at about 10.45 p.m. the Battalion moved forward into
Godewaersvelde, but the village was packed with troops, and the
companies, therefore, had to content themselves with such shelter as
could be found beneath the parked lorries in the streets.
But the end of the march was not yet. After a hasty breakfast the
Battalion was again on parade before 6 o'clock on the morning of the
25th, and once more joining the Brigade Column struggled up the steep
hill at Boescheppe, at the top of which another delay was caused
by a cross-current of vehicular traffic. The distress of the troops
was now so evident that orders were received to lighten packs, and
garments of all sorts, principally gifts of knitted garments sent out
from ladies in England, were left by the roadside. Through Westoutre
and Reninghelst the column marched on to Ouderdom, where it arrived at
about 2.30 p.m. with orders to billet in huts. Most of the huts were
already fully occupied and the greater part of the 1/4th Londons were
compelled to bivouac in the fields adjoining. Ouderdom is about seven
miles south-west of Ypres, and the object of the forced march was at
last clear. Some little idea of the storm raging in the salient could
be gathered from the bivouacs, as throughout the afternoon and night
the air vibrated with the continuous thunder of artillery in which the
rapid and sharp rafales of the French "seventy-fives" away to the north
were plainly distinguishable.
Shortly after midnight orders were received that the Division would
be pushed into the firing line that day, the 26th April, and at dawn
the Battalion was once more formed up. Shovels and picks were issued
alternately to all the troops for the purpose of digging themselves
into such positions as they might be able to gain, and to each platoon
was issued a yellow flag for signalling its location to the artillery.
In these early days of the War no arrangements were made for the
formation of a "battle surplus," and consequently the whole available
strength of officers and men prepared to move forward. Packs were now
stacked to relieve the troops of superfluous weight, and at 4.30 a.m.
the companies began to move off at five minutes' intervals.
The exhaustion of the men made progress inevitably slow. The roads
traversed were fortunately not receiving much attention from the
enemy's artillery, though a steady bombardment of Ypres with shells of
the heaviest calibre was proceeding. By about 9.30 a.m. the Battalion
was concentrated in a field adjoining Outskirt Farm at La Brique, where
it proceeded to dig itself into assembly trenches (see map No. 3).
Meanwhile the Jullundur Brigade had concentrated farther to the east,
between St Jean and Wieltje, while the Sirhind Brigade in Divisional
Reserve had moved round the south of Ypres to a position north-west of
Potizje.
The 1/4th Londons' position[1] during the hours of waiting in the
morning was behind the crest of the spur which runs westward from St
Jean, past La Brique towards the Canal, and though out of view from the
German trenches was undoubtedly located by the enemy's Taubes, whose
reconnaissances over our lines were entirely unmolested. This, combined
with the close proximity of the Battalion's position to several British
and French batteries, brought it a fair share of German shrapnel during
the morning, the shelling being from both the north and south sides of
the salient. Happily but few casualties were sustained.
[1] It has been thought convenient in the account of this action to
designate buildings and other topographical features by the names by
which they afterwards became generally known, though they were not in
every case so named in April 1915.
Below the hillside on which the Battalion lay concealed and distant
something more than half a mile the gaunt ruins of Ypres stood out
clearly in the morning sunlight, the fast-crumbling tower of its
wonderful Cloth Hall still erect, a silent witness of the tragedy
which was being enacted. All the morning shells were falling into the
town, a steady and merciless bombardment without the least cessation
or abatement. From the centre of the town dense columns of black smoke
rose continuously, and the crash of explosions and the clatter of
falling débris followed each other without respite. The cross-roads
at which the St Jean road left the town were in particular a target
for the German heavy guns. All the morning the 50th (Northumberland)
Division T.F. was moving from Ypres along this road to St Julien, and
as each platoon passed the fatal cross-road at the double a heavy shell
fell close by thinning the ranks. It seemed to every spectator of this
horrible yet fascinating sight that the German artillery fire must
surely be directed from some point within the British lines.
At 12.40 p.m. the Brigade received orders to prepare to take part in
a divisional attack in conjunction with the French in a due northerly
direction, with the object of relieving the pressure on the left of St
Julien and of endeavouring to push the enemy back. With this attack the
50th Division would co-operate on the right of the Lahore Division in
an attempt to recapture St Julien itself.
The Ferozepore Brigade's frontage was on the right of Boundary Road
(the Ypres-Langemarck Road) and extended as far as English Farm, beyond
which the Jullundur Brigade was responsible as far as Wieltje Farm on
the extreme right, and the general line of assembly was on the forward
slope of the spur some 600 yards north of La Brique.
The Brigade's advance was led by the Connaught Rangers on the left,
the 57th Rifles in the centre, with the 129th Baluchis on the right.
The 1/4th Londons were to follow the Connaughts, while the 9th Bhopals
remained in reserve in La Brique.
At 2 o'clock the attack was launched under a heavy bombardment from all
available British and French batteries, but such was the shortage of
ammunition that this support died down for lack of supplies in about
five minutes, after which the German batteries were free to search
intensively the whole area of the Brigade advance, causing a good many
casualties in the assaulting columns.
From the line of assembly the ground subsided gently to a shallow
depression running across the direction of advance, beyond which, at a
distance of some 1000 yards from the crest on the La Brique side, the
hill swelled to a second skyline which impeded further view. Just below
the crest of the further spur an unfenced lane, Buffs Road, followed
the contour running eastwards from Boundary Road. None of this land was
intersected by trenches, the Allied trenches being several miles ahead
and to the rear of the German positions.
The 1/4th Londons moved from their position of waiting at about 2.30
p.m., and shaking out into four lines of platoons in file with B
Company (Moore) on the left, and A (Duncan-Teape) on the right of the
front line, followed by D (Saunders) and C (Clark). The German shrapnel
was now searching both slopes of the spur pretty severely and men
began to drop, but the Battalion steadily breasted the rise from which
it could overlook the shallow valley towards Buffs Road. The sight
which met their eyes defies description. The valley was covered with
a ragged crowd of agonised and nerve-racked men, both Moroccans and
Indians, who, having thrown down their arms and everything which could
impede them, were streaming back from the front trenches suffering
the tortures of poison gas. It was a revolting sight. The attack had
clearly failed and our leading troops were broken and in retirement.
But the men of the 1/4th Londons were splendid. Without wavering for
a single instant they trudged steadily forward, though indeed almost
completely exhausted, maintaining the intervals and distances between
platoons with the precision of the parade ground. Never was there a
more striking example of the results of training and discipline. The
"attack in open warfare" which had been so roundly cursed by one and
all in the days of training at Blendecques had indeed so sunk into the
minds of everyone that instinctively the troops remembering only their
orders to "follow the Connaughts at all costs" carried out under the
most trying ordeal the lessons which had been drilled into them.
The Battalion continued to advance as far as Buffs Road, where a halt,
believed at first to be temporary, was called. No trench line existed
here but the ditch on the near side of the road had been widened. This
was already filled with the remains of the 2nd K.O.S.B. (who had been
fighting continuously since the action at Hill 60 on the 17th April,
and were now reduced to under 100 all ranks) and by the reserve company
of the Connaughts. The majority of the Battalion were, therefore,
unable to obtain shelter in the ditch, and the digging of a fresh line
some fifteen yards in rear was at once put in hand.
Early in the advance Moore (B Coy.) was hit in the foot and his company
was taken over by Grimwade. Considering the severity of the enemy's
shrapnel fire the advance was made with surprisingly few casualties,
and although owing to the massing of the whole Battalion on one line
of narrow frontage some intermingling of platoons on halting was
inevitable, this was rapidly set to rights with little difficulty. The
enemy's bombardment soon died away considerably, though for a while he
maintained a steady machine-gun fire sweeping the crest of the ridge
ahead of Buffs Road.
The troops leading the attack had moved forward steadily at zero hour
and had pushed over the crest line in front of Buffs Road descending
the further slope towards Turco Farm. The front German trench north
of the Farm was reached and occupied, but before the position was
properly established dense yellow clouds of poison gas issued from
the enemy lines and, being gently wafted by the breeze, bore down on
our defenceless troops. Under the horror of this ordeal the greater
part of the line broke and a general retirement ensued which affected
most severely the French and Indian Battalions, as already described.
About 100 of the Connaughts and the Manchesters (Sirhind Brigade),
however, managed to cling gallantly to their ground under Major
Deacon, though they were shortly afterwards ejected by a strong enemy
counter-attack which followed the gas cloud. They eventually succeeded
in consolidating a line in the immediate vicinity of Turco Farm.
Shortly after the 1/4th Londons were established on Buffs Road
Lieut.-Col. Botterill became a casualty, and Major L. T. Burnett
assumed command of the Battalion. It was decided by Major Burnett that
the overcrowding of the Buffs Road alignment was so great and wasteful
of fire power, quite half the Battalion being unable to get into
position to use their rifles, that a redisposition of his forces was
desirable, and accordingly C and D companies withdrew to a position in
support some 300 yards in rear of Buffs Road, where they dug themselves
in.
During this time the Regimental Aid Post under Lieut. Hurd, R.A.M.C.,
was established at Irish Farm and the Battalion stretcher-bearers under
Corpl. Fulford worked with great coolness in evacuating the wounded
under heavy fire.
[Illustration: THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES, 1915]
At about 4.30 p.m. orders were received that the reserve company of
the Connaughts was to push forward and reinforce their two leading
companies, supported by the 1/4th Londons. But, after consultation
with Major Burnett, Major Hamilton of the Connaughts decided that the
severity of the enemy's fire was so great that there was no reasonable
probability of achieving a result commensurate with the inevitable
loss of life, and the orders for the projected advance were cancelled.
An attempt to reinforce the advanced troops was, however, actually
made at about 7.30 p.m. by the 15th Sikhs and the 1/4th Gurkhas of
the Sirhind Brigade, supported by the 9th Bhopals. This advance was
carried out in good order, the Indians passing through the 1/4th
Londons and disappearing over the ridge in front under a veritable hail
of fire; but although touch was obtained with the leading companies
of the Connaughts, the position of the German trenches could not be
ascertained in the gathering darkness, and Lieut.-Col. Hills, who was
in charge of the operation, decided to dig in on the position gained.
In conjunction with Bhopals' attempt an attack was also delivered
by the Turcos of the French Brigade Moroccaine, who passed over the
1/4th Londons' trench in the gathering dusk. They were met in the
crest line by a frightful machine-gun fire under which they advanced
steadily, suffering heavy losses. A young French officer in charge of
these Africans filled all who saw him with the deepest admiration of
his coolness. Smoking a cigarette and lightly swinging a small rattan
cane, he stood up on the sky line with his loose blue cloak thrown
negligently over his shoulders, directing the advance of his men
with all the indifference to danger of which his wonderful nation is
capable. None of these gallant fellows were seen again.
During the whole of the 26th very good work was done by 2/Lieut. A.
D. Coates, who was employed as _liaison_ officer between Brigade
Headquarters and the advanced troops. This gallant young officer
succeeded several times in passing through the enemy's barrage and was
the means of providing Headquarters with valuable information as to the
course of events at Turco Farm.
Meanwhile the 1/4th Londons remained in readiness for action on Buffs
Road, which was shelled heavily at intervals, especially at about
6 p.m., when the German shrapnel caused a great many casualties.
The enemy's fire, however, died down after the evening advance by
the Indians had been checked. The night was particularly quiet, and
Sergt.-Major Harris at La Brique was able to get rations up to the
Battalion and issue them.
The 27th April broke grey and cold and the morning was misty. During
the early hours the enemy's artillery was remarkably inactive and the
work of strengthening the Battalion's position was proceeded with
without molestation by the Germans. The signs of battle were few indeed
and it seemed almost impossible to realise the critical position of
the British troops. The sense of detachment from the serious events
of the preceding afternoon was enhanced by the unbroken state of the
countryside in the immediate neighbourhood and the presence of several
cows, which by some marvellous chance had escaped the enemy's shells
and continued to graze lazily in the field in rear of the Battalion's
position, as they had done during the battle on the previous afternoon.
The lull, however, was only the calm which proverbially precedes the
storm, for about noon the enemy's guns opened with intense violence on
the British positions and the 1/4th Londons received their full share
of these hostile attentions. Fortunately, however, its position behind
the crest secured it from heavy loss.
During this bombardment Major Burnett was ordered to report to Brigade
Headquarters, where he received orders for an attack to take place
in half an hour's time. When he got back to the Battalion under ten
minutes were left in which to explain the orders to his company
commanders and to make all preparations. The Battalion was to execute a
further advance in a north-easterly direction on to Oblong Farm, which
was given as the objective. In order to reach the assembly position,
it was necessary for the Battalion to move about 200 yards to the
right flank in order to come up on the right of the Sirhind Brigade,
who, in the early hours of the morning, had relieved the most advanced
troops of the Ferozepore Brigade.
The hurried nature of the attack precluded any possibility of
reconnaissance of the ground by the officers and allowed no time for
the explanation of the work on hand to the rank and file. The position
of the German trenches was unknown and the difficulties and obstacles
which might be met with during the advance were entirely undisclosed.
The movement of the Battalion toward its position of assembly for
this unpromising enterprise was carried out steadily although with
considerable loss. The British and Canadian artillery, which were
co-operating in giving support to the attack, were again lamentably
short of ammunition, so that an intense bombardment of some five
minutes left them unable to render further assistance. Thus as the
Battalion in moving to its flank came near the crest of the spur behind
which it had hitherto been concealed from direct observation by the
enemy, it became a very clear target for the hostile artillery, and the
German guns being no longer harassed by our artillery, were able to
pour a devastating fire upon the companies.
The actual "jumping-off" position was the ditch on the south side of
Buffs Road which, at this point, was bordered by a hedge. The Battalion
advanced in two lines of two companies in open order, each company
formed in three waves, and the leading companies were C (Clark) on
the left and D (Saunders) on the right, followed respectively by B
(Grimwade) and A (Duncan-Teape). In order to ensure that the waves in
each company should move forward together, it was necessary to collect
the whole of each wave in the ditch before it moved; and this could
only be effected by "feeding" the men along the ditch in single file,
from the western end of the Battalion's frontage, the hedge in rear
being impenetrable. The result of this slow progress was that the
remainder of the Battalion waiting its turn to go into the ditch was
compelled to wait on the hill, under a high explosive and shrapnel fire
which was both intense and accurate. The result needs no description,
but under this very trying ordeal the Battalion was perfectly steady,
each platoon grouped together and waiting its order to move with the
greatest nonchalance.
Before following the actual advance of the 1/4th Londons it will be
convenient to explain the object and scope of the operation of which it
formed part.
During the morning arrangements had been made for the Lahore Division
to co-operate in an attack which was projected by the French Brigade
Moroccaine. The general direction of the French attack was to be along
the Ypres-Langemarck Road, as on the previous day, and the Lahore
Division was to take all possible advantage of the French advance
to gain ground, but without committing itself to the attack before
the French troops had secured its left flank. The Lahore Division's
attack was to conform to the French movement but on the east side of
the Langemarck Road; the Sirhind Brigade occupying the left of the
Divisional front next the French with the Ferozepore Brigade on its
right.
The objective of the latter was, as already stated, Oblong Farm, a
moated farmstead some 1700 yards from starting-point, the attack being
led by the 1/4th Londons on the left and the 9th Bhopals on the right.
The Connaughts followed in support at a distance of 400 yards, while
the 57th Rifles and the 129th Baluchis, both of which regiments had
been seriously weakened in the action of the 26th, were in reserve.
At 12.30 p.m. the leading waves of the two assaulting battalions moved
forward under a continued heavy shell and machine-gun fire. The ground
over which the advance was to be made was for the first 700 yards
an unenclosed plateau which afforded the enemy good observation of
our movements, and then sloping gently downwards to a somewhat more
enclosed depression rose beyond it once more towards the objective. The
objective itself was not visible from starting-point, and it appears
probable that in consequence of the very hurried preparations for the
attack, its position was not fully appreciated by all concerned and
thus it was not recognised. However this may be, it is certain that the
general direction of the attack after crossing Admirals Road became
diverted too much towards the north and thus some encroachment was
made on the frontage for which the Sirhind Brigade was responsible.
This was probably accentuated by the fact that the position selected
as starting-point lay at an acute angle to the direction of advance,
so that a change of direction was necessary during the advance
itself--always an operation of great difficulty.
As far as Admirals Road cover was non-existent. On topping the crest
of the hill the Battalion came under an exceedingly severe rifle and
machine-gun fire, and losses were consequently heavy. The succeeding
waves, however, pushed on steadily as far as the near edge of the
depression described above, in the vicinity of Hampshire Farm, when it
became clearly impossible to get down the forward slope of the valley
under the raking fire of the enemy, without incurring frightful losses.
Half the leading companies were already hit, as were also Saunders,
fatally wounded, Grimwade, Stedman, Leonard, and Coates. It was,
therefore, decided by Major Burnett to hold the line gained and there
to reorganise the Battalion pending the arrival of reinforcements, when
it might be possible to carry the line forward.
A small part of C Company under Clark and of B Company under Giles,
however, were successful in gaining the bottom of the valley, but
finding himself isolated and further advance impossible without
support, Clark, who assumed command of the composite party, took up a
position to the right of Canadian Farm, where the men dug themselves in
with their entrenching tools and hung on gallantly under a murderous
fire. Splendid service was rendered by two N.C.O.'s of this party,
Sergeant A. C. Ehren and Lance-Corporal C. Badham, both of B Company,
who passed through the barrage three times unscathed with messages
between Captain Clark and Battalion Headquarters.
Excellent work was also done by the Machine-Gun Section under 2/Lieuts.
Walker and Pyper, who skilfully brought their guns into action on
the left of Hampshire Farm and assisted in no small measure to keep
down the hostile rifle fire from the enemy trenches on the further
side of the valley. Their position, however, was shortly afterwards
discovered, evidently by a Taube, which continued its reconnaissance
over our lines without let or hindrance, and the section came under
heavy shell fire and was forced to fall back on the main position, with
Walker dangerously wounded, Sergt. Phillips killed, and several other
casualties.
At about 2.30 p.m. the enemy's artillery fire abated considerably, but
by that time the advance of the whole Division had been definitely
checked on an alignment generally corresponding with that occupied by
the 1/4th Londons, and reports were received that the French also had
failed to gain their objectives.
Later in the evening the French attempted to renew their offensive, but
once more were met with clouds of poison gas which definitely broke
up their attack, and a report having been received from Col. Savy,
the French Commander, that his losses were so heavy as to preclude
all further attempts, orders were received that the Brigade would
consolidate its position.
During the evening before dusk the Ferozepore Brigade was again
subjected to violent shelling, which inflicted considerable loss on all
battalions. During this later bombardment Lieut. Coffin was buried by a
high explosive shell.
After darkness fell the 1/4th Londons were withdrawn from their
advanced line to Brigade Reserve in rear of Cross Roads Farm where
they set about digging fresh trenches. The Connaughts and the Bhopals
withdrew to the line of Admirals Road near Cross Roads Farm, in which
Brigade Headquarters were now established, while the Rifles and
Baluchis took up a position to the rear.
The night passed without incident and with very little shelling, and
the opportunity was taken to collect the wounded whom it had been
impossible to evacuate under the heavy fire of the afternoon. 2/Lieut.
E. Giles, who from many volunteers was selected for this work, set a
splendid example of devotion to duty and worked hard throughout the
night in endeavouring to relieve the sufferings of his men.
The day's losses had been heavy and the gain of ground nil, but the
bearing of the Battalion under somewhat disheartening circumstances had
been worthy of the highest traditions of regular troops. Something,
however, had been achieved as, in spite of his use of poison gas, the
enemy was no nearer Ypres and our line, though strained almost to
breaking point, was still holding. It appears indeed that the gallant
front shown by the Lahore Division was successful in deceiving the
Germans as to the extent of our resources, and deterred him from
pressing the advantages he had already gained.
The casualties of the afternoon of the 27th April were in officers:
Capt. C. R. Saunders and 2/Lieut. A. D. Coates, killed; Lieut. P.
B. K. Stedman, died of wounds; Capt. F. G. Grimwade, Lieuts.
F. A. Coffin and D. J. Leonard, and 2/Lieut. T. I. Walker,
wounded; and in N.C.O.'s and men, 32 killed (including C. S. M.
Chennels), 132 wounded, and 13 missing.
During the 28th the 1/4th Londons remained in position in rear of Cross
Roads Farm, and beyond a good deal of shelling in which gas shell was
freely used by the enemy the day passed without important incident.
Luckily the bombardment this day was not very costly to the Battalion
or, indeed, to the Brigade as a whole. The Lahore Division was
transferred from V Corps to a special counter-attack force then formed
under command of Gen. Plumer, and it was arranged that the Sirhind and
Ferozepore Brigades should be prepared to co-operate with an attack
contemplated by the French who were still on our left flank, making
such advance as might be justified by the results achieved by our
Allies. The French attack, however, did not materialise in consequence
of the very heavy losses of the preceding two days and our Allies
confined themselves to artillery action.
During the evening the enemy turned a large number of guns on to St
Jean and in a few hours the work of destruction, already far advanced,
was almost completed. In the darkness the church was clearly visible in
flames, the windows being lit up by the conflagration within: before
morning the tower had fallen, the roof had collapsed, and nothing but
smouldering ruins remained.
The 29th April found the Ferozepore Brigade still holding its trenches
and orders were again issued to it to be prepared to co-operate with
the French. But during the morning definite orders were received that
the French attack was postponed, the assault of the enemy positions
being a more formidable proposition than could be tackled by the Allied
troops in their then exhausted and numerically weak condition.
The German bombardment continued throughout the 29th, and the Battalion
remained inactive beyond the further strengthening of its trenches.
It did, however, have the satisfaction of seeing a Taube brought down
close to its lines by our anti-aircraft guns.
Before daybreak on the 30th, the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved and
marched out of the salient, the 1/4th Londons proceeding by way of
Buffs Road and La Brique to hutments at Ouderdom. While passing through
La Brique the Battalion was met by a reinforcement of about fifty
N.C.O.'s and men from the 3/4th Battalion in England, conducted by
Major E. H. Stillwell. Accompanying this draft were 2/Lieuts. L. G. Rix
and B. Rivers Smith.
The roads out of the salient were being very heavily shelled during the
relief, the cross roads at Vlamertinghe being in particular accurately
bombarded with heavy shrapnel. But Major Burnett was able to save a
great many casualties by varying the route of some platoons.
At about 7.30 a.m. on the same morning the Ferozepore Brigade moved
from the hutments to bivouacs close by to avoid the effects of the
continuous shelling to which the concentration camp was subjected,
but returned to the huts at night. The day was spent in rest and
reorganisation. The Battalion was undoubtedly a little shaken after its
rough handling and very seriously reduced in strength. Over 600 rifles
had left Ouderdom on the morning of the 26th, but at the roll call
which took place on return on the 30th only 235 names were answered,
apart from the newly arrived draft which had not been in action.
[Illustration: _St Jean Village in April 1920_]
The following awards were made for services rendered:
Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O.; Sergt. A. C. Ehren, D.C.M.; L/Corpl.
Colomb, D.C.M.; Corpl. Fulford, Médaille Militaire de France.
In this, its first serious action, the 1/4th Battalion had firmly
established its reputation by its remarkable steadiness under
unprecedented circumstances, and, though the price paid was heavy, it
had the satisfaction of having contributed materially to the undying
glory of the British defence of Ypres.
At 7.45 p.m. on the 1st May, the concentration of the Division being
now complete, the Ferozepore Brigade marched from Ouderdom _via_
Reninghelst, Westoutre, to Meteren, arriving there at 12.30 a.m. on
the 2nd. A rest was made here until the afternoon when the route was
resumed, Doulieu being reached about 10 p.m. The march was completed
the following evening, when at about 7 p.m. the Brigade returned to its
former billets in the Paradis area.