THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN FRANCE--OPERATIONS AT NEUVE CHAPELLE
The Gulf of Lyons has an evil reputation and in January 1915 its
achievement did not belie its notoriety. The _Avon_ was a fine ship of
some 12,000 tons but being in ballast rolled unmercifully for three
days; and the smooth waters of Marseilles harbour, which were reached
early on the morning of the 5th January, were never more heartily
welcome than to the 1/4th Londons.
Disembarkation took place the following afternoon at about 4 p.m. and
the Battalion, after forming up on the quay, marched straight to the
railway siding, where a train stood in readiness to carry it into the
war area. To British soldiers who have served in the French theatre
of war there is, we imagine, no recollection more vivid than that
conveyed by the words "40 Hommes--Chevaux en long!" The fourth class
French railway carriage, which is employed with fine impartiality for
the conveyance of men or horses as occasion demands, is now too well
known to call for lengthy comment; it is a subject over which we prefer
to pass hurriedly! Into these abominations on wheels the Battalion was
inserted at the standard rate of 40 men to each truck and rations for
two days were issued. After a delay, which seemed to the troops as
interminable as it was certainly inexplicable to them, the train at
about 9.30 p.m. rumbled sedately out of Marseilles in the leisurely
manner of all troop trains.
Dawn next morning found the train at Avignon where a five minutes' halt
was made. The enthusiastic reception accorded to the Battalion all
along the line by the French civilians and also by the military was
most impressive; and the obvious satisfaction with which the arrival
of fresh British troops was hailed by one and all in the Rhone Valley
could not fail to impress the dullest sense with the strength of the
common cause which bound us to our gallant allies.
A "Halte Repas," that is a halt just not long enough to enable the
troops to detrain and cook dinners, was made at Macon, after which
the journey, which resolved itself practically into a triumphal
progress, was resumed. At one wayside station, the name of which has,
unfortunately, passed from our recollection, a military guard of honour
saluted the arrival of the Battalion, while the ladies of the district
appeared with offerings of milk, coffee, and bouquets. So great, in
fact, was the enthusiasm that M. le Maire sent for a cask of wine in
which to assert his faith in the Entente Cordiale! Unhappily the French
railway authorities were not stirred by such intense emotion and the
train moved on before the wine arrived.
By the morning of the 8th the train was skirting Paris, and that day
the first signs of war were reached. Near Chantilly (the famous French
racecourse) reserve lines of trenches forming the outer ring of the
Paris Defences were passed, while at Creil some buildings severely
damaged by shell fire stood as stern remembrances of the great retreat
three months earlier.
This amusing though very tedious railway journey terminated at 9 p.m.
on the 7th January, when the Battalion detrained some ten miles south
of Boulogne at Etaples, at that date a small, muddy, and evil-smelling
fishing village. Etaples, which at a later stage of the war became such
an important base camp, with accommodation for some thirty thousand
men and many hospitals, was, in January 1915, not used as a British
military station, and the 1st London Brigade were the first troops
to be quartered there. Accommodation was provided under canvas in an
exposed situation, and the severity of the weather, which was intensely
cold and windy with occasional falls of snow, formed a contrast to the
sub-tropical climate in which the Battalion had been basking ten days
previously, which can only evoke surprise at the comparatively small
amount of sickness which ensued.
The Battalion had, it will be remembered, left its rifles, equipment,
and transport in Malta, and the refitting and equipment of the troops
was taken in hand at once. The first step was the reorganisation of the
Battalion in four companies, as follows:
New A Company--Old A and C Companies;
Captain H. J. Duncan-Teape in command.
Captain W. G. Clark second in command.
New B Company--Old B and F Companies;
Captain W. Moore in command.
Captain F. C. Grimwade second in command.
New C Company--Old D and E Companies;
Captain G. H. M. Vine in command.
2/Lieut. W. H. Weathersbee second in command.
New D Company--Old G and H Companies;
Captain C. R. Saunders in command.
Captain H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine second in command.
The Company Sergeant-Majors were respectively Edwards, Elsom,
Chennels, and Cornwall.
In addition to this reorganisation the Battalion was issued with new
rifles of the long charger-loading type, with four Vickers guns, and
with new equipment of the 1914 pattern (webbing); and a refit of
clothing and necessaries was effected. Steps were also taken to dispose
of the surplus baggage and personal belongings acquired by all ranks
in Malta, and to reduce all to the scales of weight permissible in the
field.
Command of the Regimental Transport was assumed by 2/Lieut. R. L.
Herring, who proceeded with his section to Abbeville, and returned by
road with the full war scale of 1st and 2nd Line Transport and the
Battalion chargers.
These preparations which occupied the Battalion until the 25th January
were interspersed with such training as the state of the weather
permitted, the training being carried out on the sand dunes north of
Etaples. A warning order was received on the 25th to proceed to billets
near St Omer to join G.H.Q. Reserve.
The following day the Battalion moved by train from Etaples to St
Omer, and thence by march route to the billeting area which had been
allotted to it in two small straggling villages called Helfaut and
Bilques, where it arrived about midnight. At this point the Battalions
of the 1st London Brigade parted company until once more reassembled by
the formation of the 56th Division a year later.
Billeting in the early days of the war was not the simple matter
which it became at a later stage. For one thing, in most villages
neither wire beds, cook-houses, nor ablutions existed for the troops,
and the accommodation of barns and stables had not been tabulated by
Town-Majors ready for the use of billeting officers. All negotiations
for billets had therefore to be conducted by the billeting officer
direct with the communal authorities, through whom also straw and fuel
were drawn.
After a few days in Helfaut and Bilques the Battalion was driven from
its billets by an epidemic of measles which attacked the civilian
inhabitants, and it found fresh quarters slightly nearer St Omer in a
more important village called Blendecques.
The 1/4th Londons now embarked on a course of very severe training
under the immediate supervision of the Inspector of Infantry,
Brigadier-General Oxley. This was, indeed, a strenuous three weeks,
with breakfasts at 7.30 a.m. and dinners at 5 p.m., the hours between
being occupied in tactical exercises. Usually a march of five miles in
each direction to and from the training ground was involved and the
exercise itself was almost invariably the "Attack in Open Warfare." In
every conceivable formation, over every conceivable sort of ground,
did the Battalion attack every one of the villages within reach of
Blendecques, till at last it was entirely weary of the attack in any
shape or form! But the grounding in field work thus obtained was
excellent and so completely were the lessons rubbed into the mind
of every member of the Battalion that this wearisome training bore
excellent fruit as we shall see later.
Once or twice a slight variation of training was obtained in work on
a new reserve line of trenches then being constructed east of St
Omer. This work was carried out under R.E. supervision. The design of
these trenches was strange. Their like was indeed never met with in
any sector of the line held by the Battalion in the whole of its war
service, and we can only be thankful that this reserve line never came
into active use.
Throughout the training period the weather was continuously wet and
cold, and these adverse conditions, added to the long hours without
food, imposed a serious physical strain on all, and the news that the
Battalion had been passed fit to join a brigade was therefore received
by all ranks with extreme satisfaction.
At Blendecques the Battalion was joined by Lieut. A. Hurd, R.A.M.C.,
medical officer, vice Captain Casey to hospital. 2/Lieut. E. W.
Bottomley was also evacuated to hospital.
On the 19th February the 1/4th Londons left the many good friends they
had made in Blendecques and marched through Wittes, where it halted for
the night, to Ham-en-Artois, arriving at 12.30 p.m. on the 20th, and
joined the Ferozepore Brigade of the Lahore Division.
The Indian Corps (Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Willcocks, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.,
K.C.S.I., D.S.O.) had arrived in France in the preceding October and
comprised the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions, the former
including the following units:
LAHORE DIVISION
Major General H. D'U. KEARY, C.B., D.S.O.
DIVISIONAL CAVALRY
15th Lancers.
ENGINEERS
20th and 21st Sappers and Miners.
34th Sikh Pioneers.
JULLUNDUR BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. E. P. Strickland, C.M.G., D.S.O.
1st Manchesters.
1/4th Suffolks.
40th Pathans.
47th Sikhs.
59th Scinde Rifles (F.F.).
SIRHIND BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. W. R. Walker, V.C.
1st Highland Light Infantry.
4th King's Liverpools.
15th Ludhiana Sikhs.
1/1st Gurkha Rifles.
1/4th Gurkha Rifles.
FEROZEPORE BRIGADE--Brig.-Gen. R. G. Egerton, C.B.
1st Connaught Rangers.
1/4th Londons.
9th Bhopals.
57th Wilde's Rifles (F.F.).
129th Baluchis (Duke of Connaught's Own).
During the months of December and January the Indian Corps had been
heavily engaged in a local operation which had raged with terrific
intensity between the small village of Givenchy and the extreme right
of our line; but our struggles to press forward along the canal to La
Bassée had been checked by a particularly vigorous defence on the part
of the enemy. The casualties suffered by the Brigades of the Indian
Corps in the fighting had been so severe that it was necessary to
withdraw some of them for a time from the line for the purpose of rest
and reorganisation.
On joining its Brigade the strength of the 1/4th Londons was 25
officers and 828 other ranks. The Battalion was fortunate in being
posted to the Division at this juncture as it had an opportunity
before going into action of becoming acquainted with its neighbouring
battalions with whom it was destined to share the fortunes of war
during the ensuing eleven months, and of gaining some insight into the
ancient, but at that date recently revived, sciences of bombing and
trench mortar work. And here let us remark for the benefit of those
members of the Battalion who joined the Service at a later stage and
found Mills Bombs and the Stokes Mortar ready for their use, that
in February 1915 the only bombs in use were those of the "jam-tin"
variety, that is to say, were roughly constructed out of old tins by
the troops who were to use them, filled with explosives, plugged with
clay, and fused with ordinary time fuse which had to be ignited before
the bomb was thrown; while the trench mortar of the day is perhaps best
described as a glorified rainwater pipe bound with copper wire, and
which threw a "jam-tin" bomb and was quite as dangerous to the team
which manned it as to the Germans.
With their unfailing adaptability to circumstances the men of the
Battalion rapidly became friends with the Indian troops whom they
held in the greatest admiration. The Gurkhas in particular seemed
to exercise an irresistible attraction for the men of London, who
were especially impressed with the Gurkhas' playful way of throwing
their murderous Kukri knives. Indeed, to such lengths did this
admiration--which took the form of imitation--lead them that a
Battalion order was very quickly necessary to the effect that "the
game known as 'Gurkhas' played with unsheathed bayonets must cease
forthwith!"
Throughout this period the weather was intensely cold and several falls
of snow occurred. The billets were passably good, however, and the
Battalion's bill of health remained clean.
The Battalion was unfortunate at this period in losing Sergeant-Major
Dudley, who had done excellent work since mobilisation and now left for
a commission in the Royal Fusiliers. He was killed a fortnight after
joining his regiment. His duties were taken by Col.-Sergt. Instr. M.
Harris, who filled this important position with success for nearly
three years.
On the 22nd February the undermentioned officers, being the first
reinforcement received by the Battalion, joined as follows:
Lieuts. F. A. Coffin, H. M. Lorden, D. J. Leonard, and A. D. Coates.
It is now necessary for a moment to look at the course which events
were taking on the wide field of the Western Theatre.
At the period with which we are dealing, the Front held by the British
troops extended from the Béthune-La Bassée Road, on the right to just
north of the Ypres Salient on the left, and General Headquarters
(Field-Marshal Sir John French in command) were at St Omer. The
British troops were divided into two Armies, of which the First Army
under Sir Douglas Haig, consisting of the I Corps (Gough), IV Corps
(Rawlinson), and Indian Corps (Willcocks), held the right or southern
end of the line; the left being entrusted to the Second Army (Sir H.
Smith-Dorrien), which comprised the II Corps (Fergusson), the III Corps
(Pulteney), and the V Corps (Plumer).
The moving warfare of the autumn of 1914, which had ended by the
opposing armies gradually extending their flanks until the sea
was reached and had culminated in the First Battle of Ypres in
October--November 1914, had given way to a siege warfare in which
the belligerents were confined in continuous lines of trenches which
were gradually being more heavily fortified. After the force of the
German drive toward Ypres had exhausted itself, a lull in active
operations ensued, hostilities flaring up here and there along the
line in the shape of minor operations of terrible intensity, in which
the possession of a few yards of ground was contested with ferocity by
both sides. In the intervals between these small struggles, however,
the battle line had been comparatively quiet during the winter months,
and not materially changed, the nett result being perhaps a slight gain
of ground to the British at the southern end of the line, which was
balanced by a tendency to lose ground in the north.
Since the bitter struggle at Ypres in November 1914, the enemy had, in
the opinion of Sir John French, shown certain signs of weakening on the
Western Front, and this was attributed by him to the success which was
attending the Russian offensive in East Prussia, and to the consequent
withdrawal of German troops from the West. In order to assist our
Russian Allies as far as possible it was necessary to have resort to
active operations with the main object of holding as many of the German
reserves as possible in the West, and efforts to this end were already
being made by the French at Arras and in Champagne.
The ravages caused during the winter trench warfare by sickness and
"trench-foot," which had had especially disastrous effects on those
regular divisions composed of troops withdrawn from tropical garrisons,
rendered necessary the early cultivation of a vigorous offensive
spirit, and these combined considerations led Sir John French to the
decision to take the offensive as soon as the condition of the ground
in Flanders should afford such an undertaking a reasonable prospect
of success. By the beginning of March the conditions were considered
sufficiently favourable, and the terrain selected for the proposed
offensive was the German positions opposed to the First Army and
defending the lower slopes of the Aubers Ridge.
The objective of the First Army's attack was the advancement of our
line to the high ground about Illies and Hermies as a prelude to the
occupation of La Bassée, and this involved as a first local objective
the capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle. The Aubers Ridge is a
strongly marked hill feature, which runs in a south-westerly direction
from Lille until it loses itself in the marshlands in the neighbourhood
of La Bassée. Neuve Chapelle, which had already changed hands several
times in the fighting of the previous autumn, is a small village, the
immediate surroundings of which are much intersected with orchards and
fences, about 1000 yards from the lowest slopes of the Ridge, which,
immediately opposite to it, are covered by a considerable wood called
the Bois du Biez.
The German defensive position skirted in front (or to the north-west)
of Neuve Chapelle and then making a sharp turn southwards, followed
the line of the Estaires-La Bassée Road, for some 600 yards, from its
junction with Foresters Lane (Rue des Berceaux) to its junction with
the Rue du Bois, where once more turning slightly to the west it left
the hamlet of Richebourg L'Avoué in the British lines, and finally made
a wide sweep once more to the south in the direction of Festubert (see
Map No. 1). The front of attack allotted to the Indian Corps was that
part which followed the alignment of the La Bassée road between Rue
du Bois and Foresters Lane, the actual capture of the greater part of
Neuve Chapelle being entrusted to the 8th Division.
The attack was to be preceded by a heavy artillery bombardment, which
on the Corps front would be conducted by the divisional artillery of
both the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and the Corps heavy artillery, and
this was to be directed towards destroying the enemy's front trenches
and entanglements and certain strong posts, the searching of the
Bois du Biez, in order to disperse the concentration of the enemy's
counter-attack troops, and finally the building up of a "curtain of
fire" (subsequently though less descriptively termed a "barrage") east
of the captured positions, with the object of assisting the work of
consolidating them.
The direction of the Indian Corps' attack being almost easterly
converged towards that of the IV Corps on their left (this being
south-easterly), and it was, therefore, necessary after the first
German positions had been carried and touch with the IV Corps secured,
to swing the direction of attack round more to the south, and to
establish a fire position facing south in order to guard against the
danger of a German flanking counter-attack from that quarter. The
position selected for this was a German sap, which had been thrown out
from the enemy lines towards the British strong point, Port Arthur, at
the corner of La Bassée Road and Rue du Bois.
The troops holding the line of the Rue du Bois front, outside the limit
of the general attack, would thus be responsible for the defence of the
Indian right flank. It was hoped that the first bound would carry our
line forward to the old II Corps line first occupied by Smith-Dorrien's
troops in October 1914, east of Neuve Chapelle village.
The assaulting troops detailed for this task were the Gharwal and Dehra
Dun Brigades of the Meerut Division, the Bareilly Brigade being in
close support; while the Lahore Division (less artillery) was placed in
Corps reserve, the Ferozepore Brigade being allotted to Army Reserve.
In accordance with these orders the Ferozepore Brigade moved forward
from Ham-en-Artois to the Zelobes area on the 7th March, the 4th
Londons marching to Calonne-sur-Lys about eight miles north-west of
Neuve Chapelle, where it remained in billets in a constant state of
readiness to move. On the eve of the outbreak of our offensive the
order was relaxed to one of readiness to move at twelve hours' notice.
On the 10th March Lieut.-Col. Botterill was granted seven days' leave
of absence on urgent private affairs, and command of the Battalion
devolved temporarily on Major L. T. Burnett, who remained in command
until after the termination of the Neuve Chapelle operations.
In addition to the Brigades of the Meerut Division already mentioned,
on the right of the line, the troops detailed for the assault comprised
the 25th Brigade of the 8th Division opposite Neuve Chapelle village,
with the 23rd Brigade of the same Division on the extreme left.
An enormous concentration of artillery had been quietly effected on
this front, including many of our newly arrived heavy batteries, and
at 7.30 a.m. on the 10th March, some 300 guns opened a devastating
bombardment on the German trenches along the frontage of attack.
The severity of this bombardment was unprecedented. Trenches were
obliterated, machine-guns and Germans were literally blown into the
air, and so dazed were the enemy by the appalling ordeal that our men
were able to stand on their parapets to watch the inferno in front
of them. At 8.5 a.m. the range of the guns was lengthened on to the
enemy's support trenches and our assaulting columns dashed forward.
The Indians and the 25th Brigade met with little resistance, but the
23rd Brigade on the left found itself faced with a practically unbroken
wire entanglement, from beyond which a deadly fire was poured into it
by the enemy machine-guns. By 8.35 a.m. the right and centre brigades
had effected a lodgment in the village, but the 23rd, being still held
up and suffering terrible losses, the 25th Brigade swung to its left
and turned the flank of the German troops who were opposing the 23rd.
By this means our left was able to advance and by 11 a.m. the village
of Neuve Chapelle was completely in our hands, and consolidation of
the ground won was begun under cover of our artillery barrage, which
effectually carried out its task of preventing the enemy bringing
forward reinforcements for a counter-attack.
The street fighting, however, had resulted in considerable
disorganisation of units, so that valuable hours were lost in the
necessary reorganisation, and it was not until 3.30 p.m. that the
advance could be resumed. The attack so far had proved--as was
intended--a complete surprise, and the enemy's resistance seems to have
been paralysed except on the extreme left where our troops were still
under heavy fire.
The only local counter-attack which developed during the morning of the
10th was on the extreme right of the attack, where the enemy succeeded
along the Rue du Bois in temporarily ejecting the Indian troops from
the captured trenches, and in effecting a strong lodgment in the
Orchard Trench in front of Richebourg L'Avoué. During the morning the
Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades moved forward to Richebourg St Vaast and
Vieille Chapelle respectively.
The afternoon advance was made on the right by the Dehra Dun Brigade,
supported by the Jullundur Brigade of the Lahore Division, and the
objective assigned to it was the Bois du Biez. Between Neuve Chapelle
and the wood runs the little Rivière des Layes, and at a point where
this stream is spanned by a road bridge the enemy had established a
strong machine-gun post. The Indians made a gallant advance over 1000
yards of open country, and succeeded in penetrating the wood, but their
line was enfiladed by the machine-guns on the bridge and they were
unable to hold the line of their furthest advance. On the left the
attack was renewed by the 25th and 24th Brigades, the hard-hit 23rd
being held back, their objective being the cluster of houses at Moulin
de Pietre, about a mile east of Neuve Chapelle; but their efforts also
were frustrated by the machine-guns on the bridge, which our artillery
was unable to dislodge. Further left still the front of attack had been
extended and the 21st Brigade (Watts) of the 7th Division was also
directed on Pietre; but in its advance encountered a line of undamaged
German trenches which effectually barred its efforts to progress.
The position, therefore, when darkness intervened was that an average
advance of over a thousand yards had been gained and held, while
practically no effort had been made by the enemy to regain possession
of the lost ground.
Preparations were made for a renewal of the advance on the following
day, but the 11th dawned misty and the day proved to be one of
equilibrium. A further advance was, attempted but the mist rendered
aircraft observation impossible and artillery co-operation with the
infantry extremely difficult owing to the constant breaking of our
forward lines of communication by the enemy shell fire. Our troops,
therefore, clung to their positions opposite the Bois du Biez and
Pietre under a murderous shell fire which caused many casualties; while
the enemy, by a stroke of ill fortune, was accorded a for him lucky
respite, in which he was able to prepare his counter-attack.
On the evening of the 11th the exhaustion of the troops after two days'
fighting rendered a relief desirable, as it was hoped that weather
conditions would favour a prosecution of the offensive on the next day.
The Meerut Division consequently handed over its newly won positions
to the Lahore Division, the Dehra Dun Brigade being replaced by the
Sirhind Brigade, while arrangements were completed for relieving the
Gharwal Brigade on the night of the 12th/13th by the Ferozepore Brigade.
The same evening the 4th London moved at 6 p.m. from Calonne to Lestrem
where it arrived at midnight and went into billets. Its stay there,
however, was short as within two hours it was turned out in order to
move further forward to Lacouture, about four miles west of Neuve
Chapelle, reaching there about 7.30 a.m. on the 12th March. Similar
forward moves were made by the remainder of the Brigade in view of its
impending occupation of the line.
When the 4th Londons reached Lacouture the village was under shell fire
from the enemy's heavy guns and the behaviour of all ranks under fire
for the first time was highly commendable. But here also the hopes
of rest on which the thoughts of all had been centred far more than
on the German shells, were dashed, for almost immediately on arrival
the Battalion received fresh orders to move forward to Richebourg St
Vaast, in which village Brigade headquarters were then operating. The
exhaustion of all ranks on arrival was considerable as the Battalion
had been almost continuously on the move in full marching order for
about eighteen hours. Richebourg was a village of some importance and
a considerable number of our heavy batteries supporting the Neuve
Chapelle attack were stationed in its vicinity, with the result that it
received a generous share of the enemy's counter-battery bombardment
and also a good deal of attention due, apparently, to the prominence of
its church tower, to the existence of which the Germans objected.
Here at last the Battalion was allotted billets in which it remained
until about 7 p.m., being under heavy shell fire the whole time and
sustaining its first battle casualties of seven men wounded.
The mist continued during the 12th and our main operation could not
be pursued. The hostile shell fire increased in intensity, but the
Germans were equally with ourselves embarrassed by the difficulties of
accurate observation and their bombardments were not very disastrous
to us. Local advances were attempted by our troops in various parts
of the line and the houses at Pietre were actually reached by the
Guards of the 20th Brigade, but the ground gained was heavily swept by
hostile fire and could not be retained. All day counter-attacks in mass
formation were attempted by the Germans, and costly as the day was to
us, our casualties must have been far exceeded by theirs, their ranks
being literally mown down by our rifle, machine-gun and shrapnel fire.
By dusk the enemy's attempts had exhausted themselves and for the first
time in the war the Germans gave up attempts to recapture ground they
had lost.
As it had been hoped that the 12th would witness the continuance of
our successes it had been impossible to arrange beforehand the details
of the relief of the Gharwal Brigade by the Ferozepore Brigade until
the result of the intended operations should be known, and it was not,
therefore, until late in the afternoon that the Brigade received orders
to move forward at once in order to take part in an attack that evening
on the Bois du Biez, which position it was proposed to carry at all
costs. For this operation the 41st Dogras of the Bareilly Brigade, then
in the trenches, were to be lent to the Brigade and relieved in their
position in line by the 4th Londons. This relief, however, could not
be effected in time to enable the 41st Dogras to join the Ferozepore
Brigade, which consequently advanced short of one battalion.
The Brigade was not assembled in front of Neuve Chapelle until darkness
had fallen, and in order to allow time for the necessary dispositions
to be made, General Egerton, who for this operation commanded not only
the Ferozepore, but also the Jullundur and Sirhind Brigades, arranged
for the attack to commence at 10.30 p.m. At 9.30 p.m., however, orders
were received cancelling the attack and indicating that the offensive
had closed, and the Brigade returned to billets in Vieille Chapelle and
Lacouture.
Meanwhile the 4th Londons proceeded with the relief of the 41st Dogras,
and although they occupied the line only for a few hours, perhaps we
may be pardoned for a rather more detailed record of the night's work
than the importance of the operation warrants in view of the fact that
this was the first tour of duty done by the Battalion in trenches.
The sector to be occupied lay at an interval of about 300 yards from
the right limit of the Neuve Chapelle attack as already described,
and consisted of a frontage of some 400 yards, in front of the Rue du
Bois. The line in this part did not consist of a continuous line of
trenches. In the first place, the ground here, as for miles in each
direction, was too waterlogged to admit of a trench being dug, and the
defences, therefore, consisted of a breastwork built up above ground
level, and in most parts of this sector the breastwork did not exceed
three feet in height and was entirely without parados. As a result,
moreover, of the recent fighting the defensive line consisted rather of
a series of short breastworks with gaps between them which could only
be crossed under cover of darkness. Communication trenches to the rear
were non-existent and the breastwork had to be approached from the Rue
du Bois, to which it ran parallel at a distance of about fifty yards,
"overland." It may be of interest to those who served in this area
with the regiment in the winter of 1916/17 to state that this feeble
breastwork was almost in the position of the support line subsequently
known as Guards' Trench.
[Illustration: NEUVE CHAPELLE--RICHEBOURG L'AVOUÉ]
This position perhaps was not an ideal one for the first introduction
of a raw Battalion to trench warfare, and the situation was not
improved by the exhaustion of the men or the fact that the Rue du
Bois was subject to a great deal of heavy shelling which had not died
down since the German counter-attacks of the day, but which continued
through the night. The Battalion moved forward by platoons past Windy
Corner, where it came under a heavy burst of shrapnel, and Edward Road,
skirting behind the ruined factory at the corner of the Rue du Bois,
and led by Indian guides, whose vague acquaintance with the language
of London did not assist matters to any appreciable extent. Be it
remembered also that no maps had been issued and no reconnaissance
of the line had been possible to any company officer. However, the
Battalion succeeded in occupying its breastwork and remained there
during the night, somewhat isolated as touch with the units on its
flanks was difficult to maintain owing to the breaks in the line, and
all ranks acquitted themselves in an exemplary manner. The shrapnel and
machine-gun fire maintained by the Germans during the night cost a few
casualties, amounting to 14 N.C.O.'s and men wounded. In addition to
these was 2/Lieut. A. R. Moore, who was hit in the leg on the way up to
the line. This officer, however, stuck to his duty and remained with
his platoon until after relief of the Battalion the next morning. He
was awarded the Military Cross for his gallant conduct.
The Ferozepore Brigade attack not having materialised, the 41st Dogras
returned to the trenches, and before daybreak the 4th Londons were
relieved and withdrew to billets in Vieille Chapelle.
With these incidents ended the battle of Neuve Chapelle in which,
although the gain of ground was much less than had been hoped for,
yet some solid success had been achieved. Our line had been carried
forward for about 1000 yards on a front of about two miles, and the
prisoners captured amounted to 1650 all ranks. The British casualties
had reached the serious total of 12,811, but the enemy's far exceeded
this number. The outstanding result of the action, however, was an
immense accession of moral strength to the British troops, for it had
been clearly established that where we could meet the Germans on terms
of equality in men and material, we were able to beat them, and the
confirmation of this, supplied by the battle of Neuve Chapelle, sent a
thrill of triumph in the hearts of our men all along the line.
On the night 13/14 March, the Ferozepore Brigade relieved the Bareilly
Brigade on the Rue du Bois, the front line being occupied by the 57th
Rifles, 129th Baluchis and 1st Connaught Rangers, the 4th Londons
moving to Richebourg St Vaast in Brigade reserve.
The sector now taken over extended from Chocolat Menier Corner on the
right to Port Arthur on the left, and during the tour proved to be
fairly quiet, except in the left subsection held by the Connaughts,
where two strong points, Port Arthur and the Orchard Redoubt, and also
the Crescent Trench, a circular trench connecting them, were daily
subjected to heavy bombardments.
The 4th Londons in reserve provided garrisons for the forward area as
follows:
D Company (Cart de Lafontaine) to the Orchard Redoubt, which it
held in company with a party of the Connaughts.
One Platoon of each of A, B and C Companies to the left subsection,
under instruction in trench warfare by the Connaughts.
Two Platoons each of B and C Companies (Moore and Vine) to Redoubts
D5 and D6 respectively. These redoubts were close to Windy
Corner on Forresters Lane, and were subsequently known as Dogs
and Edward Posts.
Machine-Gun Detachment to Port Arthur Keep, and Trench Mortar
Section to the left subsection.
The platoons under instruction were relieved every forty-eight hours
in order to ensure that during the tour of duty the companies were all
given a certain amount of trench experience. The remaining platoons,
not for the moment employed in garrison duty, were billeted with
Battalion Headquarters in Richebourg, and provided working and carrying
parties each night for the line.
The line was still not fully organised after the battle, and the
Crescent Trench was not properly connected either to the Orchard on
its right or to Port Arthur on the farther side of the La Bassée Road
on its left; and as the construction of communication trenches in this
area had not yet been seriously undertaken, the various companies
holding those works were isolated during the hours of daylight, as were
also the detached listening posts pushed forward in front of them into
No Man's Land. There was thus a very considerable amount of trench work
required to bring the defences to a proper state of organisation and
also in the completion of the wire entanglements in front of the new
advanced line, and the 4th Londons were called upon for heavy duties in
this direction in conjunction with the Sappers and Miners.
The tower of Richebourg church still proved a great attraction to the
enemy's heavy guns, and the village was daily subjected to severe shell
fire during daytime. On 21st March it became evident that the Germans
were determined to destroy the church tower, and a steady bombardment
with heavy shells began, which caused infinite damage to the church
itself and the surrounding houses. During this bombardment a direct
hit was obtained on a billet occupied by a platoon of Highland Light
Infantry, causing casualties of 12 killed and 30 wounded. Later three
direct hits were registered on the church tower, which fell about noon,
and this achievement was followed by a complete cessation of hostile
fire, which indicated sufficiently clearly what the intention of the
bombardment had been.
All ranks of the Battalion were now settling down to their duties
in the trenches, showing great keenness to increase their value as
fighting troops and exhibiting the greatest steadiness under the
numerous heavy bombardments to which they had been exposed, and it was,
therefore, gratifying to receive a word of appreciation as to their
behaviour from the Divisional Commander during a visit which he paid to
Battalion Headquarters on the 17th.
The Battalion was now again under command of Lieut.-Col. G. P.
Botterill, and Major L. T. Burnett resumed his duties as second in
command.
On the 17th also a further reinforcement of officers was received as
follows:
Major E. H. Stillwell and 2/Lieuts. E. P. M. Mosely and F. F. Hunt.
The Machine-Gun and Trench Mortar Sections were now carrying out their
full duties in the front trenches, and did exceedingly good work during
this tour, which, for the latter section, was their first experience of
working their mortars in action. During the bombardment of the 19th,
2/Lieut. J. T. Sykes, in charge of the trench mortars, was wounded by
shrapnel while "spotting" for a mortar shoot, and evacuated to hospital.
On the night of the 23/24 March the relief of the Ferozepore Brigade
by the 2nd Brigade began, and the forward garrisons of the 4th London
being withdrawn, the Battalion on the following evening marched back
to billets at Paradis, a small village near Merville. The Connaughts
were relieved in the line on the following night, and the Brigade being
concentrated in the Paradis area came into Army Reserve at two hours'
notice to move.
The total casualties sustained by the Battalion during this tour of
trench duty were 17, a very small number having regard to the severity
of the bombardments to which it had been subjected.
From the 26th March until the 2nd April, Lieut.-Col. Botterill was in
temporary command of the Brigade during the absence on leave of the
Brigadier; and command of the Battalion for this period was assumed by
Major G. H. M. Vine.
The rest billets at Paradis were retained until the 30th March, the six
days being occupied in company training and route marches, and viewing
of arms by the Brigade Armourer-Sergeant. On the 28th a parade service
was held by Captain Cart de Lafontaine, this being the first Church
Service which the Battalion had had the opportunity of attending since
the middle of February.
The Battalion was now firm friends with its Indian comrades whose
soldierly qualities it was learning to appreciate from actual
experience. Difficulties of language formed a barrier to close
intercourse, but a sort of war-cry was evolved which, being exchanged
between Indian and Cockney, formed a guarantee of friendship. A shout
of "Anglais-bon! Indian-bon! Allemand-NO BON!!" exchanged in passing
became a frequent form of greeting.
On the night of the 31st March the Brigade returned to the trenches,
relieving the Sirhind Brigade in a sector north of Neuve Chapelle
village, the right boundary of which was Sign Post Lane, a road running
through the lines in the direction of the Bois du Biez.
The 4th London was again in Brigade Reserve, and moved from Paradis
at 7 a.m. to Les Huit Maisons, where it remained in temporary billets
until dusk when it advanced to Croix Barbée, Battalion Headquarters
occupying a house at the corner of Loretto and Edward Roads. This house
will be in the recollection of those who served in this area in 1917
as the site of St Vaast R.E. dump. Here the Battalion was again under
instruction in trench duties with the Connaughts, who were in the right
subsection of the new Brigade sector, but on this occasion companies
went into the line in turn as a whole, the companies not actually in
trenches occupying reserve posts at Loretto, Green Barn, and St Vaast.
The right subsection was defended by breastworks and was immediately
facing Pietre, the hamlet which had stood between our troops and
success on the afternoon of the 10th March. It included the peculiar
feature of the Duck's Bill, in regard to which a word of description
may not be out of place. The name Duck's Bill brings to the minds of
most 4th London men the picture of a large defended mine crater quite
close to the German line, and approached by a defended sap which was
generally full of water. Such it was in the winter of 1916/17, but in
the spring of 1915 the Duck's Bill was a ruined farmhouse standing on
a knoll just in front of the cross-road connecting Sign Post Lane with
Sunken Road. This ruin was surrounded by a horseshoe trench, the points
of the horseshoe resting on the cross-road, which was barricaded and
connected with the front line by a rough breastwork. The defences
here were still in an unfinished condition as the farmhouse was the
extreme point of our advance in this sector in the battle, and the road
barricades were under the continual watch of German snipers in Pietre.
On the night of our entry into this sector the farmhouse had just
been demolished by German incendiary shells and the ruins were still
smouldering.
"A Bosche had been buried," writes Captain Moore, "in the hastily
constructed parapet, face downward, and with his booted feet sticking
into our trench. They were Bosche boots, so presumably were on Bosche
feet, and every time one passed in the dark one knocked them--a truly
gruesome spot."
The Duck's Bill farmhouse was finally disposed of when the mine crater
was blown in 1916.
The reserve posts to which the companies in reserve were detailed were
defended keeps forming with others the Croix Barbée line of defence.
The aftermath of the battle, which had taken the form of such vigorous
shelling by the enemy, now exhausted itself and this tour proved
particularly quiet. The enemy's attention was paid principally to the
roads and communications in rear of our trenches, but his shelling was
sporadic and harmless.
On the 11th April the Battalion moved out of Croix Barbée, marching
at 5 p.m. for Paradis, where it was joined the following day by the
remaining units of the Brigade, now in Divisional reserve.
Of the rest in Paradis little need be said. The twelve days were spent
in training under company arrangements and in bathing, completing
issues of deficiencies in clothing, etc. On the 16th and 17th April,
however, practice attacks on trenches were carried out as a brigade
exercise, and although no definite information was, at the time,
conveyed to the units as regards the purpose of the practice, the
exercise was in preparation for the rôle which the Brigade would
be called upon to play during its next tour in the line. It was,
therefore, with the greater satisfaction that the 4th Londons carried
out the exercises in leading the assaulting columns beside the
Connaught Rangers.
The novitiate of the Battalion was now over, and it was accepted as
being in every way able to do its full duty as a unit of the Ferozepore
Brigade, and the knowledge that it had "found itself" was in itself the
best possible incentive to all ranks to uphold worthily the honour of
their regiment. The weather was of the most perfect spring type, and
the ground and dykes were once more in their normal condition for the
time of year. Speculation was rife, therefore, as to the task which was
destined to be set the Brigade on its return to the line.
A warning order was received that the Brigade would relieve the
Dehra Dun Brigade on Saturday, the 26th April, in a sector in front
of Neuve Chapelle village, extending from the La Bassée Road on the
right to Sign Post Lane on the left. The 4th Londons were to take over
the left centre subsection, the other front line battalions being
the Connaughts, the 9th Bhopals and the 57th Rifles, with the 129th
Baluchis in Brigade reserve. But this relief was destined not to take
place.
During the day disquieting rumours went round--started as inexplicably
as such rumours always are--that things were not well in the north near
Ypres: rumours of heavy fighting, of defeat, and of dastardly crimes on
the part of the enemy. That the incredible brutality of the Germans was
indeed an accomplished fact all the world now knows, and we must now
review the tremendous happenings in the Ypres salient which caused the
outbreak of a storm destined to rage with ever-increasing fury for the
next three weeks.