OPERATIONS DURING THE SUMMER OF 1915
In spite of the severe tax placed on his resources by the
ever-increasing weight of the enemy's assaults at Ypres, and the
consequent difficulty of finding sufficient reserves of men and
material to embark on a new attack on a large scale, Sir John French
decided early in May to adopt the bold course of launching a fresh
offensive at the southern extremity of the British front. He was led
to this resolve partly by the hope of diverting the enemy's attention
towards the south and thereby easing the pressure against Ypres,
and partly by the desire to assist the French who were launching an
offensive south of the La Bassée Canal.
The ultimate objective of this new undertaking was the opening of
the road to Lille, and the necessary preliminary to this was the
expulsion of the enemy from his defences on the Aubers Ridge and the
establishment of the British troops on the La Bassée-Lille Road.
This attack was entrusted to the First Army, whose operations were
divided into two separate zones. In the north the assault was to be
made by the IV Corps at Rouges Bancs with the object of turning the
Aubers defences from that flank; while farther south the I and Indian
Corps were to secure the line Ligny-le-Grand--La Clicqueterie Farm.
The Indian Corps attack was to be carried out by the Meerut
Division--the Lahore Division still being weak after its recent
fighting in the salient--on a front from the right of the Corps sector
near Chocolat Menier Corner to Oxford Road (on the left of La Bassée
Road). The rôle of the Lahore Division, which would occupy the line in
front of Neuve Chapelle with the Jullundur Brigade, was to support the
Meerut Division's attack with artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire,
and particularly to secure the left flank of the assaulting columns
during their advance by being prepared to operate as occasion might
arise against the Bois du Biez.
The attack was launched on the 9th May at 5.40 a.m. after a forty
minutes' bombardment of the enemy lines by all available guns.
The assaulting columns advanced with the greatest valour, but were
met by a murderous machine-gun and rifle fire, under which they were
literally mown down. The survivors struggled on in spite of the
frightful losses they were suffering, but practically none of the 1st
or Meerut Divisions reached the enemy's front trench. Farther north the
8th Division effected a lodgment in the enemy's trenches, but after
hanging on gallantly throughout the day were forced at night to return
to their original positions after suffering appalling casualties. From
all along the line came reports of what amounted to total failure. The
surprise effect which had proved so valuable at Neuve Chapelle in March
was wanting this day, and our artillery had been inadequately supplied
with high explosive shells to enable them to destroy the German
machine-gun emplacements.
Meanwhile reports were received from the French of some considerable
degree of success. On the following day Sir John French decided not to
pursue his offensive in the north, but to limit his further efforts to
the area south of the La Bassée Road, and accordingly preparations were
made for the resumption of operations on the 12th.
The Lahore Division had reached the Neuve Chapelle area after its march
back from Ypres on the evening of the 4th May, the Ferozepore Brigade
finding accommodation in its former billets at Paradis, which it left
the following day for Riez Bailleul.
On the evening of the 8th the Brigade moved forward to take up its
prearranged position of assembly in support to the Jullundur Brigade.
The position taken up by the 1/4th Londons and the 9th Bhopals was in
shallow assembly trenches in the orchards about the junction of Sign
Post Lane with Rue Tilleloy. These trenches were hastily dug and very
shallow, without either traverses or any sort of shelter; and it was
therefore fortunate that the weather was unusually warm and fine for
the time of year. The Connaughts and the 57th Rifles occupied the old
British front line (as it had been before the battle of Neuve Chapelle)
astride Sign Post Lane.
During the whole of the 9th, 10th and 11th May the 1/4th London
remained in these trenches under continual heavy shell fire: though
owing to the lack of success with which the main operation had met it
was not called upon to advance.
On the evening of the 11th it was withdrawn with the rest of the
Brigade to billets at Riez Bailleul. On return to billets great
discomfort was caused to all ranks by the discovery that the billet
in which the packs had been deposited during the three days spent in
trenches had been burnt to the ground, involving the total destruction
of its contents together with a mail from home. The following day the
Indian Corps Commander (Sir James Willcocks) visited the Battalion and
expressed his deep appreciation of its conduct at Ypres.
The 12th May dawned dull and misty and artillery observation was
exceedingly difficult; and for this and other causes the renewal of
the attack was again postponed until the 15th. The Meerut Division was
again responsible for the Indian Corps attack. The Lahore Division
adopted a role similar to that which it had played on the 9th, and the
Ferozepore Brigade moved forward once more on the evening of the 15th
May to its former assembly positions about Sign Post Lane.
In order to endeavour to secure the surprise effect which had been
lacking on the 9th it was decided this time to deliver the attack at
night, and after a preliminary bombardment the assaulting columns
dashed forward at 11.30 p.m. on the 15th. On the right of the attack
in the region of Festubert and La Quinque Rue considerable success was
achieved by the 7th Division, and some advance was also made by the 2nd
Division which was operating on the immediate right of the Indians.
The Meerut Division, however, was again faced with a hail of lead from
the enemy lines under which it was impossible to live, and though the
troops did all that men could do, by 4 a.m. on the 16th, after two
gallant efforts, the attempts of the Indians to advance were definitely
checked and the remains of the assaulting columns were once more back
in their original trenches.
From this date onwards operations were confined to the southern area
in the neighbourhood of Festubert, and though the battle continued to
rage until the 25th May, the Indian Corps was no longer concerned in
it beyond the preparations necessary to enable it to conform to the
advance on its right flank.
During the early part of the month the 1/4th Londons received further
officer reinforcements as follows:
Capt. A. A. N. Haine.
Lieut. S. G. Monk.
Lieut. D. C. Cooke.
2/Lieut. J. S. B. Gathergood.
The Battalion remained in its shallow trenches until the 18th May under
less favourable conditions of weather than previously, and the exposure
caused a large number of casualties through sickness, including Lieuts.
Rivers, Smith and Cooke, and 2/Lieut. Gathergood, who were evacuated to
hospital.
On the evening of the 18th May the Ferozepore Brigade took over the
front line from the Jullundur Brigade, the 1/4th Londons relieving the
4th Suffolks on the right, between the La Bassée Road and Oxford Road,
the subsection including Port Arthur Keep where Battalion Headquarters
were established. This tour of duty was uneventful and the troops were
occupied principally in repairing the damage done to the entanglements
and defences by the enemy's shell fire during the days of the battle.
A certain amount of shell fire was, however, experienced causing a few
casualties, including Captain Haine, who was hit on the 22nd. The enemy
also paid a good deal of attention to the back areas and the regimental
transport now established at Rouge Croix was heavily shelled on the
25th, and again on the 26th, with such severity that it was compelled
to change position to Riez Bailleul.
During this period also the issue of gas masks to all ranks was
completed.
On the 30th the Sirhind Brigade, which had been in divisional reserve
during the battle, came forward and took over the line from the
Ferozepore Brigade, the 1/4th Londons handing over their trenches to
the 1st Manchesters and withdrawing to billets at Riez Bailleul.
After the end of May no further attempt was made on the Indian Corps
front to conduct operations on a large scale. The difficulties
under which the Indian battalions were labouring in the supply
of reinforcements to replace casualties were extreme. The Indian
concentration camp at Marseilles was continually receiving
reinforcements from India, but of these an increasing proportion was
found to be unfit for despatch to the front, and as the summer wore
on the native regiments of the Corps gradually ebbed in numbers until
amalgamations began to be effected to maintain units at anything
approaching war strength. In these circumstances offensive operations
against so strongly defended a position as the Aubers Ridge were out
of the question, especially having regard to the continued shortage
in the supply of shells. At the same time the general situation did
not permit of the Indian Corps being entirely withdrawn from the line
for a prolonged rest and reorganisation. The story of the next three
months is, therefore, one of unceasing hard work in and out of the
line without any of those opportunities of distinction which are as
necessary to the well-being of a battalion--and especially a native
battalion--as a regular supply of rations.
This increasing numerical weakness of the native battalions threw a
greater burden of work and responsibility on the British units, both
Regular and Territorial, though even they experienced the greatest
difficulty in obtaining the regular supplies from home of that fresh
blood which was so earnestly desired. The 1/4th London returned from
Ypres in May at a strength well under 300 all ranks, and at no period
during the remainder of its attachment to the Indian Corps did its
strength approach even 450; in other words, for months on end, in
sentry-go, working and carrying parties, and patrols, every man was
doing two men's work; and this with a very scanty proportion of rest
behind the line. Out of 126 days from the end of May to the beginning
of October the 1/4th Londons spent 92 days in trenches, and of the
remaining 34 in billets not one was spent beyond the reach of the
enemy's guns.
With the exception of one tour of duty in the Min House Farm sector
the 1/4th Londons spent this summer on the right of the La Bassée Road
either in the trenches in front of the Rue du Bois, which included
the well-remembered positions of the Orchard Redoubt and Crescent
Trench, or in reserve, usually in Lansdowne Post, a large redoubt on
Forrester's Lane. The summer months saw very great improvements in the
Rue du Bois trenches. The isolated listening posts, like grouse-butts,
which had formed the advanced positions in March were now joined into
a continuous line of breastwork, connected with the Rue du Bois by
numerous communication trenches. Shelters for the trench garrisons
were also constructed, but these gave protection against nothing more
serious than rain--and not always that. In this waterlogged area the
sinking of a deep dugout was an impossibility, and the shelters were
in consequence mere "rabbit-hutches" built into the breastwork and
covered with corrugated iron and a few sandbags, which imbued the
occupants with an entirely unjustified sense of security. At the same
time the wire entanglements in No Man's Land were constantly extended
and strengthened. With all these defences steadily growing, the duties
of the Battalion on working parties, both when occupying the line and
when in reserve billets, were onerous and unceasing. Patrolling work by
night was vigorously prosecuted as being practically the only available
means of fostering the growth of the "offensive spirit." Trench routine
in 1915 was marked by a feature which in subsequent years almost
entirely vanished--the constant employment of rifle fire. At this
period the infantryman had not succumbed to the insensate craze for
bombs which later ruined his powers as a rifleman; and every night, in
one part of the trenches or another, saw something in the nature of an
organised shoot by the infantry, bursts of rapid fire being directed
on the enemy's parapet. These practices were of great value, not only
in keeping the men skilful with their rifles, but also in maintaining
their moral superiority over the enemy which might otherwise have
become seriously impaired through their knowledge of the inequality of
our strength in artillery.
The enemy's activity during this summer was for the most part confined
to artillery fire which at times attained serious proportions and
inflicted severe loss; indeed throughout the period under review the
toll of casualties was steady and continuous.
Out of the trenches the 1/4th Londons withdrew to reserve billets
either at Pont du Hem, L'Epinette, or La Fosse, and while in reserve
were invariably called upon for working parties in the forward area,
so that the opportunities available for training and repairing the
damage inevitably caused to parade discipline by long-continued
trench life were almost entirely wanting. At this period, moreover,
"back-of-the-line" organisation had not reached the high pitch attained
in later years. Baths were an infrequent luxury, concert parties--of
an organised type--unheard of, recreational training still without its
proper recognition. Such infrequent rests as were granted to the troops
were thus of comparatively small recuperative value.
But in spite of these numerous difficulties the Battalion was steadily
increasing its military efficiency and its morale throughout the summer
was high.
[Illustration: _Rouge Croix, La Bassée Road_]
[Illustration: _The Doll's House, La Bassée Road_]
One of the most unpleasant tours of duty was at Min House Farm, already
alluded to, a sector on the left of Neuve Chapelle, facing Mauquissart,
which the Battalion took over for a week in July as a temporary measure
during a readjustment of Brigade boundaries. The breastworks here were
especially weak and very much overlooked from the Aubers Ridge. Wire
was embryonic and communication trenches poor. Moreover, the area
appeared to be the subject of particular hatred on the part of the
Bosche, who shelled it frequently and heavily. Min House (or Moated
Grange) Farm, where Headquarters were established, was perched on the
crest of a little knoll which afforded the Headquarters staff a good
view over the sector, but, probably for this very reason, the Hun
objected to it. In fact before the tour of duty came to an end the farm
was totally destroyed by shell fire and Battalion Headquarters had been
forced to make a hasty exit to Ebenezer Farm, which, being outside the
sector and unprovided with signal communications, was not ideal for the
purpose of a Headquarters.
An extraordinary incident occurred during the last week of June, which
seems worth recording. One night a patrol of the 129th Baluchis left
the British lines to investigate the condition of the enemy's wire.
On its return one man, Ayub Khan, was missing and all endeavours to
recover his body were fruitless. The following evening Ayub turned up
again, and being taken before his company commander related how he had
entered the German trenches and passed himself off as a deserter. As is
well known the Germans were always anxious to secure the defection of
the native troops, and Ayub Khan's arrival was therefore hailed with
enthusiasm. He was taken to the rear and examined carefully. Having
kept his eyes open and seen all he could, Ayub Khan persuaded the
Germans to let him return to our trenches in order to bring more of
his friends over. In a weak moment the Germans agreed to let him go;
but instead of greeting Ayub and his party of fellow-deserters, they
were faced a few days later with a notice board which was displayed on
our parapet commenting on the incident in suitable terms. Not being
a humourist, the Hun lost his temper, and it is at this point in the
story that the 1/4th Londons become concerned. The luckless notice
board was displayed on Crescent Trench then occupied by D Company.
At 8.30 a.m. on the 27th June the enemy opened on the board with 5.9
howitzers, and almost the first shell hit Capt. Cart de Lafontaine's
Headquarters, causing him a severe attack of shell-shock and killing
his subaltern 2/Lieut. F. F. Hunt. All the morning the "hate" was
continued with great loss to D Company, and by midday the Crescent
Trench was practically obliterated. Company Sergt.-Major Risley showed
great coolness in controlling his men and withdrawing them as far as
was practicable out of the zone of fire, and set an excellent example
of steadiness under a most trying ordeal. He was subsequently awarded
the D.C.M.
On the 16th June Major L. T. Burnett, who had been in temporary command
of the 1/4th Londons since the 26th April, was promoted Lieut.-Colonel
and appointed to command, Major G. H. M. Vine assuming the duties of
second in command.
At the beginning of September, however, the Battalion was exceedingly
unfortunate in losing Major Vine, who was sent to hospital with eye
trouble, and Lieut.-Col. Burnett being on leave at the time the command
of the Battalion was assumed until his return by Lieut.-Col. Murray of
the 89th Punjabis.
Early in August Capt. and Adjt. G. B. Scott also said farewell to
the Battalion on taking up an extra-regimental employment, and the
Adjutancy was given to Capt. W. G. Clark, D.S.O., and subsequently to
Capt. E. Giles.
The following officers joined during August and September:
Lieuts. R. V. Gery, D. J. Leonard, C. Gaskin.
2/Lieuts. S. E. Lyons, H. B. A. Balls, H. Jones, C. C. Spurr, A. G.
Sharp, R. Johnstone, W. J. Boutall, F. C. Fanhangel, S. E. H.
Walmisley, A. S. Ford, G. L. Goodes and H. J. M. Williams.
In N.C.O.'s and men the Battalion was less fortunate, and up to the end
of September 3 N.C.O.'s and 14 men, all veterans of Neuve Chapelle or
Ypres, were the only reinforcements from home.
The casualties in officers for the same period were:
2/Lieut. F. F. Hunt, killed.
Capt. H. P. L. Cart de Lafontaine, wounded (shell-shock).
Capts. H. W. Weathersbee and H. M. Lorden, and 2/Lieut. A. G.
Sharp, to hospital.
Arrangements had now been completed for the launching of an offensive
on the high ground south of La Bassée Canal in the direction of Loos
and Hulluch. The opening day of the offensive had been fixed for the
25th September, and as the Indian Corps was not concerned with the main
action it will be needless for us here to review the course of events
south of the Canal.
North of the Canal, however, a subsidiary operation of some magnitude
had been organised with the strategic object of increasing the pressure
on the German defences north of La Bassée to such an extent that he
would be compelled under the strain of our main offensive in the south
to relinquish the La Bassée line altogether and retire to the east of
the Aubers Ridge.
To this end an ambitious programme had been drawn up for the Indian
Corps which temporarily included the newly arrived 19th Division. The
preliminary attack was to be made by the Meerut Division under cover
of a smoke and gas attack to the north of Neuve Chapelle, with the
object of establishing a new line in the first instance along the road
from the Ducks Bill to Mauquissart. The experience of previous actions
having clearly shown that initial success had frequently been converted
into subsequent failure by a delay in following up the first advance,
it was arranged that the Jullundur and Ferozepore Brigades and the 19th
Division should be prepared immediately to exploit whatever success
should be gained by the Meerut Division by pushing forward at once to
the line Moulin d'Eau--La Tourelle--east edge of Bois du Biez, while
the Sirhind Brigade "leap-frogged" through them to Lorgies. It was
hoped that considerable moral effect might be obtained by the use of
poison gas against the Germans, and to magnify this as much as possible
arrangements were made for the building up of smoke screens, one by the
Meerut Division to cover the left flank of its attack and one by the
Jullundur Brigade on the right of the attack; for the projection of a
heavy smoke cloud by the Ferozepore Brigade on the Rue du Bois and by
the 19th Division (holding the extreme Southern Section, south of the
Boar's Head salient); and for an attempt simultaneously to set fire to
the Bois du Biez by means of incendiary bombs.
Systematic wire cutting on either side of the La Bassée Road was
begun on the 21st September, and a feint attack was conducted by the
Ferozepore Brigade late in the afternoon of the 22nd in conjunction
with the divisional artillery. This feint attack took the form of a
heavy bombardment of the enemy's front line by all available guns,
starting at about 5 p.m. After five minutes the guns lifted on to the
enemy's support line and the infantry in the line (Connaughts and 57th
Rifles) by means of rifle fire, lifting dummies on to the parapet and
flashing their bayonets, endeavoured to produce an impression among
the Germans that an attack was imminent. In the midst of the confusion
caused to the Germans by this demonstration our artillery once more
shortened its range, firing shrapnel on the enemy's front line. It was
believed that this feint attack had the desired effect: the fire of
our guns was certainly accurate and well distributed, and elicited but
little reply from the enemy. The hostile machine-gun fire, moreover,
betrayed some perturbation inasmuch as it was extremely erratic, the
bullets passing high over the Rue du Bois and doing no damage. The
1/4th Londons were at this period in Lansdowne Post.
On the 23rd the weather changed, and the favourable dry season which
had given such promise of success for our schemes gave way to heavy
rains. The wind, too, veered round to the south-east so that it blew
towards our lines instead of towards the enemy's. This was particularly
disastrous as it would nullify the effect of the smoke screens and
render the use of gas impossible. It was determined, however, to do
all possible to carry the offensive through to success, and the Lahore
Division was ordered to be completely ready to move forward by 6 a.m.
on the 25th September.
Once more, however, the attempt to advance on this front was foiled.
Possibly the feint attack on the 22nd had been somewhat too theatrical
to impress the enemy and had merely indicated our intentions to him.
Certain it was, however, that on the 25th he was holding his trenches
in particular strength and there remained stolidly throughout the day
in spite of our smoke screens and demonstrations, to which he replied
with vigorous machine-gun and shell fire. The attempt of the Meerut
Division to push forward proved abortive, and the Lahore Division was
unable to get forward, there being not the least sign of weakening on
the enemy's front opposite to them. There is no doubt that this failure
was in part at least due to the treachery of the elements. The smoke
screen was utterly ineffective; gas could not be used at all.
The 26th saw the general situation unchanged and the enemy still
sitting in his front line and showing not the least disposition to
leave it.
On the evening of the 26th the 1/4th Londons relieved the 57th Rifles
in a line of reserve posts on the Rue du Bois in the vicinity of
Chocolat Menier Corner (Dog, Cat, Pall Mall and "Z" Orchard Posts).
The weather had now definitely broken and heavy rains fell, reducing
the trenches to veritable seas of mud. The Battalion continued to
occupy the Keeps until the evening of the 30th, the duty having passed
quietly with the exception of a small amount of enemy shell fire; but a
large proportion of the shells being "blind" no casualties were caused.
On relief on the 30th the 1/4th Londons once more withdrew to Lansdowne
Post. On the 2nd October the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved by the
19th Division and moved out to billets in the La Gorgue-Riez Bailleul
area. Here it remained resting and training for a week, throughout
which the weather remained vile in the extreme.
On the 11th October the Ferozepore Brigade once more took over the
Neuve Chapelle sector from the Jullundur, the 1/4th Londons occupying
the right subsector with a detachment of the 89th Punjabis[2] in Hills
Redoubt and Battalion Headquarters in Sandbag Alley. On the left of the
1/4th Londons the Brigade sector was taken up as far as Château Road by
the 57th Rifles while the Connaughts were on the extreme left as far as
Sunken Road.
[2] The 89th Punjabis reached France in June and replaced the 9th
Bhopals in the Ferozepore Brigade.
Two days later the Ferozepore Brigade conducted a second feint attack
in conjunction with other operations which it is not necessary to
detail. On this occasion the feint was timed to take place shortly
after midday, the morning being occupied by our guns in a systematic
wire-cutting shoot, which was followed by a heavy bombardment of the
enemy trenches during the projection of the smoke screen. Following
the smoke screen, smoke barrages were formed on the flanks of the
feint attack at 1.45 p.m., and simultaneously with them the infantry
in the line operated with rifle fire and demonstrations similar to
those employed on the former occasion to give the illusion of a
pending attack. The wind again was unfavourable, this time blowing
the smoke along No Man's Land between the lines instead of over the
enemy's trenches; and owing to the strength of the wind the smoke
screen never became dense enough to conceal the bomb guns by which it
was delivered. During the whole period of the operation our front and
rear lines were subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery,
which caused very great damage to our breastworks and wire, guns as
heavy as 8-inch being employed with great intensity between 12.45 and
1.30 p.m. This bombardment caused large numbers of casualties in the
1/4th Londons, it being impossible to clear, even temporarily, the
bombarded trenches owing to the necessity of maintaining as intensely
as possible the bursts of rifle fire in accordance with the scheme.
It is a matter of grave doubt as to whether these demonstrations were
worth the casualties they cost; and it seems abundantly evident that no
useful purpose can have been served by carrying through a prearranged
scheme essentially dependent on the weather when the conditions on
the appointed day were unfavourable. Perhaps the best comment on the
undertaking is to be found in the orders for the operation, which
included a warning to the effect that "dummies must not be raised too
high so as to show the sticks, as they were before"!
After the disturbance caused by this operation the sector relaxed to
a condition of remarkable calmness, which was maintained during the
remainder of the tour of duty. This came to an end on the night of the
27th October when the Ferozepore Brigade was relieved for the last time
in France by the Jullundur. The 1/4th Londons were relieved by the 4th
Suffolks and withdrew to billets on the Merville Road at Estaires, the
remainder of the Brigade concentrating in the same area.
The casualties for the month of October included Lieuts. C. Gaskin and
D. J. Leonard, both wounded, the latter accidentally. During this rest
a reinforcement of about fifty N.C.O.'s and men joined the Battalion.
Rumour had been active for some time as to the possible transference
of the Indian Corps to another theatre of operations, and on the 31st
notification was received that the Lahore Division would embark at
Marseilles early in November, but that the Territorial units would not
accompany it. The gradual withdrawal of the Division from the line
had in fact begun, and when the 1/4th Londons returned to the reserve
trenches in Loretto Road on the 4th November it had said good-bye to
its good friends of the Ferozepore Brigade and was temporarily attached
to the Jullundur. The following day its attachment was transferred
to the Sirhind Brigade, the Jullundur having also made its final
withdrawal from the line.
On the 7th the Battalion relieved the 27th Punjabis (Sirhind) at
Ludhiana Lodge, and provided detachments to hold Church and Hills
Redoubts and Curzon Post, the front line being held by the 4th King's.
The three Territorial battalions of the Division, the 4th Londons,
4th King's, and 4th Suffolks were all now unattached and were handed
over to XI Corps, who were taking over the line from the Indians with
the Guards and 46th Divisions, and a few days of constant change of
positions ensued during the progress of the relief.
On the 8th the 1/4th Londons withdrew to Loretto Road. This day the
long connection of the Battalion with the Indian Corps, with which
it had passed through pleasant and rough times alike on terms of the
closest friendship, was finally severed. Lieut.-Col. Burnett, Capt. W.
G. Clark, D.S.O., and a detachment of the Battalion marched to Croix
Barbée to bid good-bye to the divisional commander, Major-Gen. Keary.
In the course of an address to the detachment the General said that on
the occasion of the departure of the Indian Corps from France and the
consequent severance of the Battalion from the Division, he wished to
express his thanks to the regiment for the good work they had done.
Their loyalty and devotion to duty had been worthy of all praise, their
bearing in action left nothing to be desired, and their discipline had
been excellent throughout. On conclusion of this address the General
handed Lieut.-Col. Burnett a written Order of the Day.
On the 10th the Battalion moved forward into Brigade reserve at Pont
Logy, and this day was attached to the 137th Brigade of the 46th
Division. The weather was still exceedingly wet, the trenches full of
water, and the conditions in the line owing to the lack of dugouts
were unusually uncomfortable. On the evening of the 14th the Battalion
finally left the Neuve Chapelle area, billeting at Croix Barbée for
the night and continuing its journey the following day by motor-bus
to Lillers, where it became attached to the 140th Brigade of the 47th
(London) Division.
This concludes the first phase of the 4th London Regiment's service in
France. The year 1915 all along the line had been one of equilibrium
after the defensive battles of 1914.
We have said enough of the Battalion's life in the Indian Corps to
indicate that the year 1915 was one of very hard work and continued
strain on all ranks. Out of 255 days spent in the Lahore Division the
Battalion was actually in trenches for 142 days, in reserve billets
providing working parties for 76 days, and at rest only for 37 days;
and although it was worn out and weak when it withdrew to Lillers in
November it was a thoroughly seasoned fighting battalion, every officer
and man of which was an experienced soldier.