daily expected. That it may be favorable is my sincere wish. France
having now, through all the branches of her Government, acknowledged
the validity of our claims and the obligation of the treaty of 1831,
and there really existing no adequate cause for further delay, will at
length, it may be hoped, adopt the course which the interests of both
nations, not less than the principles of justice, so imperiously
require. The treaty being once executed on her part, little will remain
to disturb the friendly relations of the two countries--nothing,
indeed, which will not yield to the suggestions of a pacific and
enlightened policy and to the influence of that mutual good will and of
those generous recollections which we may confidently expect will then
be revived in all their ancient force.
In any event, however, the principle involved in the new aspect which
has been given to the controversy is so vitally important to the
independent administration of the Government that it can neither be
surrendered nor compromitted without national degradation. I hope it is
unnecessary for me to say that such a sacrifice will not be made
through any agency of mine. The honor of my country shall never be
stained by an apology from me for the statement of truth and the
performance of duty; nor can I give any explanation of my official acts
except such as is due to integrity and justice and consistent with the
principles on which our institutions have been framed. This
determination will, I am confident, be approved by my constituents. I
have, indeed, studied their character to but little purpose if the sum
of 25,000,000 francs will have the weight of a feather in the
estimation of what appertains to their national independence, and if,
unhappily, a different impression should at any time obtain in any
quarter, they will, I am sure, rally round the Government of their
choice with alacrity and unanimity, and silence for ever the degrading
imputation.
Having thus frankly presented to you the circumstances which since the
last session of Congress have occurred in this interesting and
important matter, with the views of the Executive in regard to them, it
is at this time only necessary to add that when ever the advices now
daily expected from our charge d'affaires shall have been received they
will be made the subject of a special communication.
The condition of the public finances was never more flattering than at
the present period.
Since my last annual communication all the remains of the public debt
have been redeemed, or money has been placed in deposit for this
purpose when ever the creditors choose to receive it. All the other
pecuniary engagements of the Government have been honorably and
promptly fulfilled, and there will be a balance in the Treasury at the
close of the year of about $19,000,000. It is believed that after
meeting all outstanding and unexpended appropriations there will remain
near $11,000,000 to be applied to any new objects which Congress may
designate or to the more rapid execution of the works already in
progress. In aid of these objects, and to satisfy the current
expenditures of the ensuing year, it is estimated that there will be
received from various sources $20,000,000 more in 1836.
Should Congress make new appropriations in conformity with the
estimates which will be submitted from the proper Departments,
amounting to about $24,000,000, still the available surplus at the
close of the next year, after deducting all unexpended appropriations,
will probably not be less than $6,000,000. This sum can, in my
judgment, be now usefully applied to proposed improvements in our navy
yards, and to new national works which are not enumerated in the
present estimates or to the more rapid completion of those already
begun. Either would be constitutional and useful, and would render
unnecessary any attempt in our present peculiar condition to divide the
surplus revenue or to reduce it any faster than will be effected by the
existing laws.
In any event, as the annual report from the Secretary of the Treasury
will enter into details, shewing the probability of some decrease in
the revenue during the next seven years and a very considerable
deduction in 1842, it is not recommended that Congress should undertake
to modify the present tariff so as to disturb the principles on which
the compromise act was passed. Taxation on some of the articles of
general consumption which are not in competition with our own
productions may be no doubt so diminished as to lessen to some extent
the source of this revenue, and the same object can also be assisted by
more liberal provisions for the subjects of public defense, which in
the present state of our prosperity and wealth may be expected to
engage your attention.
If, however, after satisfying all the demands which can arise from
these sources the unexpended balance in the Treasury should still
continue to increase, it would be better to bear with the evil until
the great changes contemplated in our tariff laws have occurred and
shall enable us to revise the system with that care and circumspection
which are due to so delicate and important a subject.
It is certainly our duty to diminish as far as we can the burdens of
taxation and to regard all the restrictions which are imposed on the
trade and navigation of our citizens as evils which we shall mitigate
when ever we are not prevented by the adverse legislation and policy of
foreign nations or those primary duties which the defense and
independence of our country enjoin upon us. That we have accomplished
much toward the relief of our citizens by the changes which have
accompanied the payment of the public debt and the adoption of the
present revenue laws is manifest from the fact that compared to 1833
there is a diminution of near $25,000,000 in the last two years, and
that our expenditures, independently of those for the public debt, have
been reduced near $9,000,000 during the same period. Let us trust that
by the continued observance of economy and by harmonizing the great
interests of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce much more may be
accomplished to diminish the burdens of government and to increase
still further the enterprise and the patriotic affection of all classes
of our citizens and all the members of our happy Confederacy. As the
data which the Secretary of the Treasury will lay before you in regard
to our financial resources are full and extended, and will afford a
safe guide in your future calculations, I think it unnecessary to offer
any further observations on that subject here.
Among the evidences of the increasing prosperity of the country, not
the least gratifying is that afforded by the receipts from the sales of
the public lands, which amount in the present year to the unexpected
sum of $11,000,000. This circumstance attests the rapidity with which
agriculture, the first and most important occupation of man, advances
and contributes to the wealth and power of our extended territory.
Being still of the opinion that it is our best policy, as far as we can
consistently with the obligations under which those lands were ceded to
the United States, to promote their speedy settlement, I beg leave to
call the attention of the present Congress to the suggestions I have
offered respecting it in my former messages.
The extraordinary receipts from the sales of the public lands invite
you to consider what improvements the land system, and particularly the
condition of the General Land Office, may require. At the time this
institution was organized, near a quarter century ago, it would
probably have been thought extravagant to anticipate for this period
such an addition to its business as has been produced by the vast
increase of those sales during the past and present years. It may also
be observed that since the year 1812 the land offices and surveying
districts have been greatly multiplied, and that numerous legislative
enactments from year to year since that time have imposed a great
amount of new and additional duties upon that office, while the want of
a timely application of force commensurate with the care and labor
required has caused the increasing embarrassment of accumulated arrears
in the different branches of the establishment.
These impediments to the expedition of much duty in the General Land
Office induce me to submit to your judgment whether some modification
of the laws relating to its organization, or an organization of a new
character, be not called for at the present juncture, to enable the
office to accomplish all the ends of its institution with a greater
degree of facility and promptitude than experience has proved to be
practicable under existing regulations. The variety of the concerns and
the magnitude and complexity of the details occupying and dividing the
attention of the Commissioner appear to render it difficult, if not
impracticable, for that officer by any possible assiduity to bestow on
all the multifarious subjects upon which he is called to act the ready
and careful attention due to their respective importance, unless the
Legislature shall assist him by a law providing, or enabling him to
provide, for a more regular and economical distribution of labor, with
the incident responsibility among those employed under his direction.
The mere manual operation of affixing his signature to the vast number
of documents issuing from his office subtracts so largely from the time
and attention claimed by the weighty and complicated subjects daily
accumulating in that branch of the public service as to indicate the
strong necessity of revising the organic law of the establishment. It
will be easy for Congress hereafter to proportion the expenditure on
account of this branch of the service to its real wants by abolishing
from time to time the offices which can be dispensed with.
The extinction of the public debt having taken place, there is no
longer any use for the offices of Commissioners of Loans and of the
Sinking Fund. I recommend, therefore, that they be abolished, and that
proper measures be taken for the transfer to the Treasury Department of
any funds, books, and papers connected with the operations of those
offices, and that the proper power be given to that Department for
closing finally any portion of their business which may remain to be
settled.
It is also incumbent on Congress in guarding the pecuniary interests of
the country to discontinue by such a law as was passed in 1812 the
receipt of the bills of the Bank of the United States in payment of the
public revenue, and to provide for the designation of an agent whose
duty it shall be to take charge of the books and stock of the United
States in that institution, and to close all connection with it after
the 3d of March, 1833, when its charter expires. In making provision in
regard to the disposition of this stock it will be essential to define
clearly and strictly the duties and powers of the officer charged with
that branch of the public service.
It will be seen from the correspondence which the Secretary of the
Treasury will lay before you that not withstanding the large amount of
the stock which the United States hold in that institution no
information has yet been communicated which will enable the Government
to anticipate when it can receive any dividends or derive any benefit
from it.
Connected with the condition of the finances and the flourishing state
of the country in all its branches of industry, it is pleasing to
witness the advantages which have been already derived from the recent
laws regulating the value of the gold coinage. These advantages will be
more apparent in the course of the next year, when the branch mints
authorized to be established in North Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana
shall have gone into operation. Aided, as it is hoped they will be, by
further reforms in the banking systems of the States and by judicious
regulations on the part of Congress in relation to the custody of the
public moneys, it may be confidently anticipated that the use of gold
and silver as circulating medium will become general in the ordinary
transactions connected with the labor of the country.
The great desideratum in modern times is an efficient check upon the
power of banks, preventing that excessive issue of paper whence arise
those fluctuations in the standard of value which render uncertain the
rewards of labor. It was supposed by those who established the Bank of
the United States that from the credit given to it by the custody of
the public moneys and other privileges and the precautions taken to
guard against the evils which the country had suffered in the
bankruptcy of many of the State institutions of that period we should
derive from that institution all the security and benefits of a sound
currency and every good end that was attainable under the provision of
the Constitution which authorizes Congress alone to coin money and
regulate the value thereof. But it is scarcely necessary now to say
that these anticipations have not been realized.
After the extensive embarrassment and distress recently produced by the
Bank of the United States, from which the country is now recovering,
aggravated as they were by pretensions to power which defied the public
authority, and which if acquiesced in by the people would have changed
the whole character of our Government, every candid and intelligent
individual must admit that for the attainment of the great advantages
of a sound currency we must look to a course of legislation radically
different from that which created such an institution.
In considering the means of obtaining so important an end we must set
aside all calculations of temporary convenience, and be influenced by
those only which are in harmony with the true character and the
permanent interests of the Republic. We must recur to first principles
and see what it is that has prevented the legislation of Congress and
the States on the subject of currency from satisfying the public
expectation and realizing results corresponding to those which have
attended the action of our system when truly consistent with the great
principle of equality upon which it rests, and with that spirit of
forbearance and mutual concession and generous patriotism which was
originally, and must ever continue to be, the vital element of our
Union.
On this subject I am sure that I can not be mistaken in ascribing our
want of success to the undue countenance which has been afforded to the
spirit of monopoly. All the serious dangers which our system has yet
encountered may be traced to the resort to implied powers and the use
of corporations clothed with privileges, the effect of which is to
advance the interests of the few at the expense of the many.
We have felt but one class of these dangers exhibited in the contest
waged by the Bank of the United States against the Government for the
last four years. Happily they have been obviated for the present by the
indignant resistance of the people, but we should recollect that the
principle whence they sprung is an ever-active one, which will not fail
to renew its efforts in the same and in other forms so long as there is
a hope of success, founded either on the inattention of the people or
the treachery of their representatives to the subtle progress of its
influence.
The bank is, in fact, but one of the fruits of a system at war with the
genius of all our institutions--a system founded upon a political creed
the fundamental principle of which is a distrust of the popular will as
a safe regulator of political power, and whose great ultimate object
and inevitable result, should it prevail, is the consolidation of all
power in our system in one central government. Lavish public
disbursements and corporations with exclusive privileges would be its
substitutes for the original and as yet sound checks and balances of
the Constitution--the means by whose silent and secret operation a
control would be exercised by the few over the political conduct of the
many by first acquiring that control over the labor and earnings of the
great body of the people. Wherever this spirit has effected an alliance
with political power, tyranny and despotism have been the fruit. If it
is ever used for the ends of government, it has to be incessantly
watched, or it corrupts the sources of the public virtue and agitates
the country with questions unfavorable to the harmonious and steady
pursuit of its true interests.
We are now to see whether, in the present favorable condition of the
country, we can not take an effectual stand against the spirit of
monopoly, and practically prove in respect to the currency as well as
other important interests that there is no necessity for so extensive a
resort to it as that which has been heretofore practiced. The
experience of another year has confirmed the utter fallacy of the idea
that the Bank of the United States was necessary as a fiscal agent of
the Government. Without its aid as such, indeed, in despite of all the
embarrassment it was in its power to create, the revenue has been paid
with punctuality by our citizens, the business of exchange, both
foreign and domestic, has been conducted with convenience, and the
circulating medium has been greatly improved.
By the use of the State banks, which do not derive their charters from
the General Government and are not controlled by its authority, it is
ascertained that the moneys of the United States can be collected and
disbursed without loss or inconvenience, and that all the wants of the
community in relation to exchange and currency are supplied as well as
they have ever been before. If under circumstances the most unfavorable
to the steadiness of the money market it has been found that the
considerations on which the Bank of the United States rested its claims
to the public favor were imaginary and groundless, it can not be
doubted that the experience of the future will be more decisive against
them.
It has been seen that without the agency of a great moneyed monopoly
the revenue can be collected and conveniently and safely applied to all
the purposes of the public expenditure. It is also ascertained that
instead of being necessarily made to promote the evils of an unchecked
paper system, the management of the revenue can be made auxiliary to
the reform which the legislatures of several of the States have already
commenced in regard to the suppression of small bills, and which has
only to be fostered by proper regulations on the part of Congress to
secure a practical return to the extent required for the security of
the currency to the constitutional medium.
Severed from the Government as political engines, and not susceptible
of dangerous extension and combination, the State banks will not be
tempted, nor will they have the power, which we have seen exercised, to
divert the public funds from the legitimate purposes of the Government.
The collection and custody of the revenue, being, on the contrary, a
source of credit to them, will increase the security which the States
provide for a faithful execution of their trusts by multiplying the
scrutinies to which their operations and accounts will be subjected.
Thus disposed, as well from interest as the obligations of their
charters, it can not be doubted that such conditions as Congress may
see fit to adopt respecting the deposits in these institutions, with a
view to the gradual disuse, of the small bills will be cheerfully
complied with, and that we shall soon gain in place of the Bank of the
United States a practical reform in the whole paper system of the
country. If by this policy we can ultimately witness the suppression of
all bank bills below $20, it is apparent that gold and silver will take
their place and become the principal circulating medium in the common
business of the farmers and mechanics of the country. The attainment of
such a result will form an era in the history of our country which will
be dwelt upon with delight by every true friend of its liberty and
independence. It will lighten the great tax which our paper system has
so long collected from the earnings of labor, and do more to revive and
perpetuate those habits of economy and simplicity which are so
congenial to the character of republicans than all the legislation
which has yet been attempted.
To this subject I feel that I can not too earnestly invite the special
attention of Congress, without the exercise of whose authority the
opportunity to accomplish so much public good must pass unimproved.
Deeply impressed with its vital importance, the Executive has taken all
the steps within his constitutional power to guard the public revenue
and defeat the expectation which the Bank of the United States indulged
of renewing and perpetuating its monopoly on the ground of its
necessity as a fiscal agent and as affording a sounder currency than
could be obtained without such an institution.
In the performance of this duty much responsibility was incurred which
would have been gladly avoided if the stake which the public had in the
question could have been otherwise preserved. Although clothed with the
legal authority and supported by precedent, I was aware that there was
in the act of the removal of the deposits a liability to excite that
sensitiveness to Executive power which it is characteristic and the
duty of free men to indulge; but I relied on this feeling also,
directed by patriotism and intelligence, to vindicate the conduct which
in the end would appear to have been called for by the interests of my
country. The apprehensions natural to this feeling that there may have
been a desire, through the instrumentality of that measure, to extend
the Executive influence, or that it may have been prompted by motives
not sufficiently free from ambition, were not over-looked. Under the
operation of our institutions the public servant who is called on to
take a step of high responsibility should feel in the freedom which
gives rise to such apprehensions his highest security. When unfounded
the attention which they arouse and the discussions they excite deprive
those who indulge them of the power to do harm; when just they but
hasten the certainty with which the great body of our citizens never
fail to repel an attempt to procure the sanction to any exercise of
power inconsistent with the jealous maintenance of their rights.
Under such convictions, and entertaining no doubt that my
constitutional obligations demanded the steps which were taken in
reference to the removal of the deposits, it was impossible for me to
be deterred from the path of duty by a fear that my motives could be
misjudged or that political prejudices could defeat the just
consideration of the merits of my conduct. The result has shewn how
safe is this reliance upon the patriotic temper and enlightened
discernment of the people. That measure has now been before them and
has stood the test of all the severe analysis which its general
importance, the interests it affected, and the apprehensions it excited
were calculated to produce, and it now remains for Congress to consider
what legislation has become necessary in consequence.
I need only add to what I have on former occasions said on this subject
generally that in the regulations which Congress may prescribe
respecting the custody of the public moneys it is desirable that as
little discretion as may be deemed consistent with their safe-keeping
should be given to the executive agents. No one can be more deeply
impressed than I am with the soundness of the doctrine which restrains
and limits, by specific provisions, executive discretion, as far as it
can be done consistently with the preservation of its constitutional
character. In respect to the control over the public money this
doctrine is peculiarly applicable, and is in harmony with the great
principle which I felt I was sustaining in the controversy with the
Bank of the United States, which has resulted in severing to some
extent a dangerous connection between a moneyed and political power.
The duty of the Legislature to define, by clear and positive
enactments, the nature and extent of the action which it belongs to the
Executive to superintend springs out of a policy analogous to that
which enjoins upon all branches of the Federal Government an abstinence
from the exercise of powers not clearly granted.