unsuccessful applicant to the justice of France for the satisfaction of
claims the validity of which was never questionable, and has now been
most solemnly admitted by France herself. The antiquity of these
claims, their high justice, and the aggravating circumstances out of
which they arose are too familiar to the American people to require
description. It is sufficient to say that for a period of ten years and
upward our commerce was, with but little interruption, the subject of
constant aggression on the part of France--aggressions the ordinary
features of which were condemnations of vessels and cargoes under
arbitrary decrees, adopted in contravention as well of the laws of
nations as of treaty stipulations, burnings on the high seas, and
seizures and confiscations under special imperial rescripts in the
ports of other nations occupied by the armies or under the control of
France. Such it is now conceded is the character of the wrongs we
suffered--wrongs in many cases so flagrant that even their authors
never denied our right to reparation. Of the extent of these injuries
some conception may be formed from the fact that after the burning of a
large amount at sea and the necessary deterioration in other cases by
long detention the American property so seized and sacrificed at forced
sales, excluding what was adjudged to privateers before or without
condemnation, brought into the French treasury upward of 24,000,000
francs, besides large custom house duties.
The subject had already been an affair of 20 years' uninterrupted
negotiation, except for a short time when France was overwhelmed by the
military power of united Europe. During this period, whilst other
nations were extorting from her payment of their claims at the point of
the bayonet, the United States intermitted their demand for justice out
of respect to the oppressed condition of a gallant people to whom they
felt under obligations for fraternal assistance in their own days of
suffering and peril. The bad effects of these protracted and unavailing
discussions, were obvious, and the line of duty was to my mind equally
so.
This was either to insist upon the adjustment of our claims within a
reasonable period or to abandon them altogether. I could not doubt that
by this course the interests and honor of both countries would be best
consulted. Instructions were therefore given in this spirit to the
minister who was sent out once more to demand reparation.
Upon the meeting of Congress in December, 1829, I felt it my duty to
speak of these claims and the delays of France in terms calculated to
call the serious attention of both countries to the subject. The then
French ministry took exception to the message on the ground of its
containing a menace, under it was not agreeable to the French
Government to negotiate. The American minister of his own accord
refuted the construction which was attempted to be put upon the message
and at the same time called to the recollection of the French ministry
that the President's message was a communication addressed, not to
foreign governments, but to the Congress of the United States, in which
it was enjoined upon him by the Constitution to lay before that body
information of the state of the Union, comprehending its foreign as
well as its domestic relations, and that if in the discharge of this
duty he felt it incumbent upon him to summon the attention of Congress
in due time to what might be the possible consequences of existing
difficulties with any foreign government, he might fairly be supposed
to do so under a sense of his own Government, and not from any
intention of holding a menace over a foreign power.
The views taken by him received my approbation, the French Government
was satisfied, and the negotiation was continued. It terminated in the
treaty of July 4th, recognizing the justice of our claims in part and
promising payment to the amount of 25,000,000 francs in six annual
installments.
The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged at Washington on the
second of February, 1832, and in five days thereafter it was laid
before Congress, who immediately passed the acts necessary on our part
to secure to France the commercial advantages conceded to her in the
compact. The treaty had previously been solemnly ratified by the King
of the French in terms which are certainly not mere matters of form,
and of which the translation is as follows: WE, approving the above
convention in all and each of the dispositions which are contained in
it, do declare, by ourselves as well as by our heirs and successors,
that it is accepted, approved, ratified, and confirmed, and by these
presents, signed by our hand, we do accept, approve, ratify, and
confirm it; promising, on the faith and word of a king, to observe it
and to cause it to be observed inviolably, without ever contravening it
or suffering it to be contravened, directly or indirectly, for any
cause or under any pretense whatsoever. Official information of the
exchange of ratifications in the United States reached Paris whilst the
Chambers were in session. The extraordinary and to us injurious delays
of the French Government in their action upon the subject of its
fulfillment have been heretofore stated to Congress, and I have no
disposition to enlarge upon them here. It is sufficient to observe that
the then pending session was allowed to expire without even an effort
to obtain the necessary appropriations; that the two succeeding ones
were also suffered to pass away without anything like a serious attempt
to obtain a decision upon the subject, and that it was not until the
fourth session, almost three years after the conclusion of the treaty
and more than two years after the exchange of ratifications, that the
bill for the execution of the treaty was pressed to a vote and
rejected.
In the mean time the Government of the United States, having full
confidence that a treaty entered into and so solemnly ratified by the
French King would be executed in good faith, and not doubting that
provision would be made for the payment of the first installment which
was to become due on the second day of February, 1833, negotiated a
draft for the amount through the Bank of the United States. When this
draft was presented by the holder with the credentials required by the
treaty to authorize him to receive the money, the Government of France
allowed it to be protested. In addition to the injury in the nonpayment
of the money by France, conformably to her engagement, the United
States were exposed to a heavy claim on the part of the bank under
pretense of damages, in satisfaction of which that institution seized
upon and still retains an equal amount of the public money.
Congress was in session when the decision of the Chambers reached
Washington, and an immediate communication of this apparently final
decision of France not to fulfill the stipulation of the treaty was the
course naturally to be expected from the President. The deep tone of
dissatisfaction which pervaded the public mind and the correspondent
excitement produced in Congress by only a general knowledge of the
result rendered it more than probable that a resort to immediate
measures of redress would be the consequence of calling the attention
of that body to the subject. Sincerely desirous of preserving the
pacific relations which had so long existed between the two countries,
I was anxious to avoid this course if I could be satisfied that by so
neither the interests nor the honor of my country would be
compromitted. Without the fullest assurances on that point, I could not
hope to acquit myself of the responsibility to be incurred in suffering
Congress to adjourn without laying the subject before them. Those
received by me were believed to be of that character.
That the feelings produced in the United States by the news of the
rejection of the appropriation would be such as I have described them
to have been was foreseen by the French Government, and prompt measures
were taken by it to prevent the consequence. The King in person
expressed through our minister at Paris his profound regret at the
decision of the Chambers, and promised to send forthwith a ship with
dispatches to his minister here authorizing him to give such assurances
as would satisfy the Government and people of the United States that
the treaty would yet be faithfully executed by France.
The national ship arrived, and the minister received his instructions.
Claiming to act under the authority derived from them, he gave to this
government in the name of his the most solemn assurances that as soon
after the new elections as the charter would permit the French Chambers
would be convened and the attempt to procure the necessary
appropriations renewed; that all the constitutional powers of the King
and his ministers should be put in requisition to accomplish the
object, and he was understood, and so expressly informed by this
Government at the time, to engage that the question should be pressed
to a decision at a period sufficiently early to permit information of
the result to be communicated to Congress at the commencement of their
next session. Relying upon these assurances, I incurred the
responsibility, great as I regarded it to be, of suffering Congress to
separate without communicating with them upon the subject.
The expectations justly founded upon the promises thus solemnly made to
this Government by that of France were not realized. The French
Chambers met on the thirty-first of July, 1834, soon after the
election, and although our minister in Paris urged the French ministry
to bring the subject before them, they declined doing so. He next
insisted that the Chambers, of prorogued without acting on the subject,
should be reassembled at a period so early that their action on the
treaty might be known in Washington prior to the meeting of Congress.
This reasonable request was not only declined, but the Chambers were
prorogued to the 29th of December, a day so late that their decision,
however urgently pressed, could not in all probability be obtained in
time to reach Washington before the necessary adjournment of Congress
by the Constitution. The reasons given by the ministry for refusing to
convoke the Chambers at an earlier period were afterwards shewn not to
be insuperable by their actual convocation on the first of December
under a special call for domestic purposes, which fact, however, did
not become known to this Government until after the commencement of the
last session of Congress.
Thus disappointed in our just expectations, it became my imperative
duty to consult with Congress in regard to the expediency of a resort
to retaliatory measures in case the stipulations of the treaty should
not be speedily complied with, and to recommend such as in my judgment
the occasion called for. To this end an unreserved communication of the
case in all its aspects became indispensable. To have shrunk in making
it from saying all that was necessary to its correct understanding, and
that the truth would justify, for fear of giving offense to others,
would have been unworthy of us. To have gone, on the other hand, a
single step further for the purpose of wounding the pride of a
Government and people with whom we had so many motives for cultivating
relations of amity and reciprocal advantage would have been unwise and
improper.
Admonished by the past of the difficulty of making even the simplest
statement of our wrongs without disturbing the sensibilities of those
who had by their position become responsible for their redress, and
earnestly desirous of preventing further obstacles from that source, I
went out of my way to preclude a construction of the message by which
the recommendation that was made to Congress might be regarded as a
menace to France in not only disavowing such a design, but in declaring
that her pride and her power were too well known to expect anything
from her fears. The message did not reach Paris until more than a month
after the Chambers had been in session, and such was the insensibility
of the ministry to our rightful claims and just expectations that our
minister had been informed that the matter when introduced would not be
pressed as a cabinet measure.
Although the message was not officially communicated to the French
Government, and not withstanding the declaration to the contrary which
it contained, the French ministry decided to consider the conditional
recommendation of reprisals a menace and an insult which the honor of
the nation made it incumbent on them to resent. The measures resorted
to by them to evince their sense of the supposed indignity were the
immediate recall of their minister at Washington, the offer of
passports to the American minister at Paris, and a public notice to the
legislative Chambers that all diplomatic intercourse with the United
States had been suspended.
Having in this manner vindicated the dignity of France, they next
proceeded to illustrate her justice. To this end a bill was immediately
introduced into the Chamber of Deputies proposing to make the
appropriations necessary to carry into effect the treaty. As this bill
subsequently passed into a law, the provisions of which now constitute
the main subject of difficulty between the two nations, it becomes my
duty, in order to place the subject before you in a clear light, to
trace the history of its passage and to refer with some particularity
to the proceedings and discussions in regard to it.
The minister of finance in his opening speech alluded to the measures
which had been adopted to resent the supposed indignity, and
recommended the execution of the treaty as a measure required by the
honor and justice of France. He as the organ of the ministry declared
the message, so long as it had not received the sanction of Congress, a
mere expression of the personal opinion of the President, for which
neither the Government nor people of the United States were
responsible, and that an engagement had been entered into for the
fulfillment of which the honor of France was pledged. Entertaining
these views, the single condition which the French ministry proposed to
annex to the payment of the money was that it should not be made until
it was ascertained that the Government of the United States had done
nothing to injure the interests of France, or, in other words, that no
steps had been authorized by Congress of a hostile character toward
France.
What the disposition of action of Congress might be was then unknown to
the French cabinet; but on the 14th day of January the Senate resolved
that it was at that time inexpedient to adopt any legislative measures
in regard to the state of affairs between the United States and France,
and no action on the subject had occurred in the House of
Representatives. These facts were known in Paris prior to the 28th of
March, 1835, when the committee to whom the bill of indemnification had
been referred reported it to the Chamber of Deputies. That committee
substantially re-echoed the sentiments of the ministry, declared that
Congress had set aside the proposition of the President, and
recommended the passage of the bill without any other restriction than
that originally proposed. Thus was it known to the French ministry and
Chambers that if the position assumed by them, and which had been so
frequently and solemnly announced as the only one compatible with the
honor of France, was maintained and the bill passed as originally
proposed, the money would be paid and there would be an end of this
unfortunate controversy.
But this cheering prospect was soon destroyed by an amendment
introduced into the bill at the moment of its passage, providing that
the money should not be paid until the French Government had received
satisfactory explanations of the President's message of the second
December, 1834, and, what is still more extraordinary, the president of
the council of ministers adopted this amendment and consented to its
incorporation in the bill. In regard to a supposed insult which had
been formally resented by the recall of their minister and the offer of
passports to ours, they now for the first time proposed to ask
explanations. Sentiments and propositions which they had declared could
not justly be imputed to the Government or people of the United States
are set up as obstacles to the performance of an act of conceded
justice to that Government and people. They had declared that the honor
of France required the fulfillment of the engagement into which the
King had entered, unless Congress adopted the recommendations of the
message. They ascertained that Congress did not adopt them, and yet
that fulfillment is refused unless they first obtain from the President
explanations of an opinion characterized by themselves as personal and
inoperative.
The conception that it was my intention to menace or insult the
Government of France is as unfounded as the attempt to extort from the
fears of that nation what her sense of justice may deny would be vain
and ridiculous. But the Constitution of the United States imposes on
the President the duty of laying before Congress the condition of the
country in its foreign and domestic relations, and of recommending such
measures as may in his opinion be required by its interests. From the
performance of this duty he can not be deterred by the fear of wounding
the sensibilities of the people or government of whom it may become
necessary to speak; and the American people are incapable of submitting
to an interference by any government on earth, however powerful, with
the free performance of the domestic duties which the Constitution has
imposed on their public functionaries.
The discussions which intervene between the several departments of our
Government being to ourselves, and for anything said in them our public
servants are only responsible to their own constituents and to each
other. If in the course of their consultations facts are erroneously
stated or unjust deductions are made, they require no other inducement
to correct them, however informed of their error, than their love of
justice and what is due to their own character; but they can never
submit to be interrogated upon the subject as a matter of right by a
foreign power. When our discussions terminate in acts, our
responsibility to foreign powers commences, not as individuals, but as
a nation. The principle which calls in question the President for the
language of his message would equally justify a foreign power in
demanding explanations of the language used in the report of a
committee or by a member in debate.
This is not the first time that the Government of France has taken
exception to the messages of American Presidents. President Washington
and the first President Adams in the performance of their duties to the
American people fell under the animadversions of the French Directory.
The objection taken by the ministry of Charles X, and removed by the
explanation made by our minister upon the spot, has already been
adverted to. When it was understood that the ministry of the present
King took exception to my message of last year, putting a construction
upon it which was disavowed on its face, our late minister at Paris, in
answer to the note which first announced a dissatisfaction with the
language used in the message, made a communication to the French
Government under date of the 29th of January, 1835, calculated to
remove all impressions which an unreasonable susceptibility had
created. He repeated and called the attention of the French Government
to the disavowal contained in the message itself of any intention to
intimidate by menace; he truly declared that it contained and was
intended to contain no charge of ill faith against the King of the
French, and properly distinguished between the right to complain in
unexceptionable terms of the omission to execute an agreement and an
accusation of bad motives in withholding such execution, and
demonstrated that the necessary use of that right ought not to be
considered as an offensive imputation.
Although this communication was made without instructions and entirely
on the minister's own responsibility, yet it was afterwards made the
act of this Government by my full approbation, and that approbation was
officially made known on the 25th of April, 1835, to the French
Government. It, however, failed to have any effect. The law, after this
friendly explanation, passed with the obnoxious amendment, supported by
the King's ministers, and was finally approved by the King.
The people of the United States are justly attached to a pacific system
in their intercourse with foreign nations. It is proper, therefore,
that they should know whether their Government has adhered to it. In
the present instance it has been carried to the utmost extent that was
consistent with a becoming self-respect. The note of the 29th of
January, to which I have before alluded, was not the only one which our
minister took upon himself the responsibility of presenting on the same
subject and in the same spirit.
Finding that it was intended to make the payment of a just debt
dependent on the performance of a condition which he knew could never
be complied with, he thought it a duty to make another attempt to
convince the French Government that whilst self-respect and regard to
the dignity of other nations would always prevent us from using any
language that ought to give offense, yet we could never admit a right
in any foreign government to ask explanations of or to interfere in any
manner in the communications which one branch of our public councils
made with another; that in the present case no such language had been
used, and that this had in a former note been fully and voluntarily
state, before it was contemplated to make the explanation a condition;
and that there might be no misapprehension he stated the terms used in
that note, and he officially informed them that it had been approved by
the President, and that therefore every explanation which could
reasonably be asked or honorably given had been already made; that the
contemplated measure had been anticipated by a voluntary and friendly
declaration, and was therefore not only useless, but might be deemed
offensive, and certainly would not be complied with if annexed as a
condition.
When this latter communication, to which I especially invite the
attention of Congress, was laid before me, I entertained the hope that
the means it was obviously intended to afford of an honorable and
speedy adjustment of the difficulties between the two nations would
have been accepted, and I therefore did not hesitate to give it my
sanction and full approbation. This was due to the minister who had
made himself responsible for the act, and it was published to the
people of the United States and is now laid before their
representatives to shew how far their Executive has gone in its
endeavors to restore a good understanding between the two countries. It
would have been at any time communicated to the Government of France
had it been officially requested.
The French Government having received all the explanation which honor
and principle permitted, and which could in reason be asked, it was
hoped it would no longer hesitate to pay the installments now due. The
agent authorized to receive the money was instructed to inform the
French minister of his readiness to do so. In reply to this notice he
was told that the money could not then be paid, because the formalities
required by the act of the Chambers had not been arranged.
Not having received any official information of the intentions of the
French Government, and anxious to bring, as far as practicable, this
unpleasant affair to a close before the meeting of Congress, that you
might have the whole subject before you, I caused our charge d'affaires
at Paris to be instructed to ask for the final determination of the
French Government, and in the event of their refusal to pay the
installments now due, without further explanations to return to the
United States.