spirit of its general administration can not be wise or just when it
opposes the reference of all doubtful points to the great source of
authority, the States and the people, whose number and diversified
relations securing them against the influences and excitements which
may mislead their agents, make them the safest depository of power. In
its application to the Executive, with reference to the legislative
branch of the Government, the same rule of action should make the
President ever anxious to avoid the exercise of any discretionary
authority which can be regulated by Congress. The biases which may
operate upon him will not be so likely to extend to the representatives
of the people in that body.
In my former messages to Congress I have repeatedly urged the propriety
of lessening the discretionary authority lodged in the various
Departments, but it has produced no effect as yet, except the
discontinuance of extra allowances in the Army and Navy and the
substitution of fixed salaries in the latter. It is believed that the
same principles could be advantageously applied in all cases, and would
promote the efficiency and economy of the public service, at the same
time that greater satisfaction and more equal justice would be secured
to the public officers generally.
The accompanying report of the Secretary of War will put you in
possession of the operations of the Department confided to his care in
all its diversified relations during the past year.
I am gratified in being able to inform you that no occurrence has
required any movement of the military force, except such as is common
to a state of peace. The services of the Army have been limited to
their usual duties at the various garrisons upon the Atlantic and
in-land frontier, with the exceptions states by the Secretary of War.
Our small military establishment appears to be adequate to the purposes
for which it is maintained, and it forms a nucleus around which any
additional force may be collected should the public exigencies
unfortunately require any increase of our military means.
***
State of the Union Address
Andrew Jackson
December 5, 1836
Fellow Citizens of the Senate and of the House of Representatives:
Addressing to you the last annual message I shall ever present to the
Congress of the United States, it is a source of the most heartfelt
satisfaction to be able to congratulate you on the high state of
prosperity which our beloved country has attained. With no causes at
home or abroad to lessen the confidence with which we look to the
future for continuing proofs of the capacity of our free institutions
to produce all the fruits of good government, the general condition of
our affairs may well excite our national pride.
I can not avoid congratulating you, and my country particularly, on the
success of the efforts made during my Administration by the Executive
and Legislature, in conformity with the sincere, constant, and earnest
desire of the people, to maintain peace and establish cordial relations
with all foreign powers. Our gratitude is due to the Supreme Ruler of
the Universe, and I invite you to unite with me in offering to Him
fervent supplications that His providential care may ever be extended
to those who follow us, enabling them to avoid the dangers and the
horrors of war consistently with a just and indispensable regard to the
rights and honor of our country. But although the present state of our
foreign affairs, standing, without important change, as they did when
you separated in July last, is flattering in the extreme, I regret to
say that many questions of an interesting character, at issue with
other powers, are yet unadjusted. Amongst the most prominent of these
is that of our north east boundary. With an undiminished confidence in
the sincere desire of His Britannic Majesty's Government to adjust that
question, I am not yet in possession of the precise grounds upon which
it proposes a satisfactory adjustment.
With France our diplomatic relations have been resumed, and under
circumstances which attest the disposition of both Governments to
preserve a mutually beneficial intercourse and foster those amicable
feelings which are so strongly required by the true interests of the
two countries. With Russia, Austria, Prussia, Naples, Sweden, and
Denmark the best understanding exists, and our commercial intercourse
is gradually expanding itself with them. It is encouraged in all these
countries, except Naples, by their mutually advantageous and liberal
treaty stipulations with us.
The claims of our citizens on Portugal are admitted to be just, but
provision for the payment of them has been unfortunately delayed by
frequent political changes in that Kingdom.
The blessings of peace have not been secured by Spain. Our connections
with that country are on the best footing, with the exception of the
burdens still imposed upon our commerce with her possessions out of
Europe.
The claims of American citizens for losses sustained at the bombardment
of Antwerp have been presented to the Governments of Holland and
Belgium, and will be pressed, in due season, to settlement.
With Brazil and all our neighbors of this continent we continue to
maintain relations of amity and concord, extending our commerce with
them as far as the resources of the people and the policy of their
Governments will permit. The just and long-standing claims of our
citizens upon some of them are yet sources of dissatisfaction and
complaint. No danger is apprehended, however, that they will not be
peacefully, although tardily, acknowledged and paid by all, unless the
irritating effect of her struggle with Texas should unfortunately make
our immediate neighbor, Mexico, an exception.
It is already known to you, by the correspondence between the two
Governments communicated at your last session, that our conduct in
relation to that struggle is regulated by the same principles that
governed us in the dispute between Spain and Mexico herself, and I
trust that it will be found on the most severe scrutiny that our acts
have strictly corresponded with our professions. That the inhabitants
of the United States should feel strong prepossessions for the one
party is not surprising. But this circumstance should of itself teach
us great caution, lest it lead us into the great error of suffering
public policy to be regulated by partially or prejudice; and there are
considerations connected with the possible result of this contest
between the two parties of so much delicacy and importance to the
United States that our character requires that we should neither
anticipate events nor attempt to control them.
The known desire of the Texans to become a part of our system, although
its gratification depends upon the reconcilement of various and
conflicting interests, necessarily a work of time and uncertain in
itself, is calculated to expose our conduct to misconstruction in the
eyes of the world. There are already those who, indifferent to
principle themselves and prone to suspect the want of it in others,
charge us with ambitious designs and insidious policy.
You will perceive by the accompanying documents that the extraordinary
mission from Mexico has been terminated on the sole ground that the
obligations of this Government to itself and to Mexico, under treaty
stipulations, have compelled me to trust a discretionary authority to a
high officer of our Army to advance into territory claimed as part of
Texas if necessary to protect our own or the neighboring frontier from
Indian depredation. In the opinion of the Mexican functionary who has
just left us, the honor of his country will be wounded by American
soldiers entering, with the most amicable avowed purposes, upon ground
from which the followers of his Government have been expelled, and over
which there is at present no certainty of a serious effort on its part
to re-establish its dominion. The departure of this minister was the
more singular as he was apprised that the sufficiency of the causes
assigned for the advance of our troops by the commanding general had
been seriously doubted by me, and there was every reason to suppose
that the troops of the United States, their commander having had time
to ascertain the truth or falsehood of the information upon which they
had been marched to Nacogdoches, would be either there in perfect
accordance with the principles admitted to be just in his conference
with the Secretary of State by the Mexican minister himself, or were
already withdrawn in consequence of the impressive warnings their
commanding officer had received from the Department of War. It is hoped
and believed that his Government will take a more dispassionate and
just view of this subject, and not be disposed to construe a measure of
justifiable precaution, made necessary by its known inability in
execution of the stipulations of our treaty to act upon the frontier,
into an encroachment upon its rights or a stain upon its honor.
In the mean time the ancient complaints of injustice made on behalf of
our citizens are disregarded, and new causes of dissatisfaction have
arisen, some of them of a character requiring prompt remonstrance and
ample and immediate redress. I trust, however, by tempering firmness
with courtesy and acting with great forbearance upon every incident
that has occurred or that may happen, to do and to obtain justice, and
thus avoid the necessity of again bringing this subject to the view of
Congress.
It is my duty to remind you that no provision has been made to execute
our treaty with Mexico for tracing the boundary line between the two
countries. What ever may be the prospect of Mexico's being soon able to
execute the treaty on its part, it is proper that we should be in
anticipation prepared at all times to perform our obligations, without
regard to the probable condition of those with whom we have contracted
them.
The result of the confidential inquiries made into the condition and
prospects of the newly declared Texan Government will be communicated
to you in the course of the session.
Commercial treaties promising great advantages to our enterprising
merchants and navigators have been formed with the distant Governments
of Muscat and Siam. The ratifications have been exchanged, but have not
reached the Department of State. Copes of the treaties will be
transmitted to you if received before, or published if arriving after,
the close of the present session of Congress.
Nothing has occurred to interrupt the good understanding that has long
existed with the Barbary Powers, nor to check the good will which is
gradually growing up from our intercourse with the dominions of the
Government of growing of the distinguished chief of the Ottoman Empire.
Information has been received at the Department of State that a treaty
with the Emperor of Morocco has just been negotiated, which, I hope,
will be received in time to be laid before the Senate previous to the
close of the session.
You will perceive from the report of the Secretary of the Treasury that
the financial means of the country continue to keep pace with its
improvement in all other respects. The receipts into the Treasury
during the present year will amount to about $47,691,898; those from
customs being estimated at $22,523,151, those from lands at about
$24,000,000, and the residue from miscellaneous sources. The
expenditures for all objects during the year are estimated not to
exceed $32,000,000, which will leave a balance in the Treasury for
public purposes on the first day of January next of about $41,723,959.
This sum, with the exception of $5,000,000, will be transferred to
the several States in accordance with the provisions of the act
regulating the deposits of the public money.
The unexpended balances of appropriation on the first day of January
next are estimated at $14,636,062, exceeding by $9,636,062 the amount
which will be left in the deposit banks, subject to the draft of the
Treasurer of the United States, after the contemplated transfers to the
several States are made. If, therefore, the future receipts should not
be sufficient to meet these outstanding and future appropriations,
there may be soon a necessity to use a portion of the funds deposited
with the States.
The consequences apprehended when the deposit act of the last session
received a reluctant approval have been measurably realized. Though an
act merely for the deposit of the surplus moneys of the United States
in the State treasuries for safe-keeping until they may be wanted for
the service of the General Government, it has been extensively spoken
of as an act to give the money to the several States, and they have
been advised to use it as a gift, without regard to the means of
refunding it when called for. Such a suggestion has doubtless been made
without a proper attention to the various principles and interests
which are affected by it.
It is manifest that the law itself can not sanction such a suggestion,
and that as it now stands the States have no more authority to receive
and use these deposits without intending to return them than any
deposit bank or any individual temporarily charged with the
safe-keeping or application of the public money would now have for
converting the same to their private use without the consent and
against the will of the Government. But independently of the violation
of public faith and moral obligation which are involved in this
suggestion when examined in reference to the terms of the present
deposit act, it is believed that the considerations which should govern
the future legislation of Congress on this subject will be equally
conclusive against the adoption of any measure recognizing the
principles on which the suggestion has been made.
Considering the intimate connection of the subject with the financial
interests of the country and its great importance in whatever aspect it
can be viewed, I have bestowed upon it the most anxious reflection, and
feel it to be my duty to state to Congress such thoughts as have
occurred to me, to aid their deliberation in treating it in the manner
best calculated to conduce to the common good.
The experience of other nations admonished us to hasten the
extinguishment of the public debt; but it will be in vain that we have
congratulated each other upon the disappearance of this evil if we do
not guard against the equally great one of promoting the unnecessary
accumulation of public revenue. No political maxim is better
established than that which tells us that an improvident expenditure of
money is the parent of profligacy, and that no people can hope to
perpetuate their liberties who long acquiesce in a policy which taxes
them for objects not necessary to the legitimate and real wants of
their Government. Flattering as is the condition of our country at the
present period, because of its unexampled advance in all the steps of
social and political improvement, it can not be disguised that there is
a lurking danger already apparent in the neglect of this warning truth,
and that the time has arrived when the representatives of the people
should be employed in devising some more appropriate remedy than now
exists to avert it.
Under our present revenue system there is every probability that there
will continue to be a surplus beyond the wants of the Government, and
it has become our duty to decide whether such a result be consistent
with the true objects of our Government.
Should a surplus be permitted to accumulate beyond the appropriations,
it must be retained in the Treasury, as it now is, or distributed among
the people or the States.
To retain it in the Treasury unemployed in any way is impracticable; it
is, besides, against the genius of our free institutions to lock up in
vaults the treasure of the nation. To take from the people the right of
bearing arms and put their weapons of defense in the hands of a
standing army would be scarcely more dangerous to their liberties than
to permit the Government to accumulate immense amounts of treasure
beyond the supplies necessary to its legitimate wants. Such a treasure
would doubtless be employed at some time, as it has been in other
countries, when opportunity tempted ambition.
To collect it merely for distribution to the States would seem to be
highly impolitic, if not as dangerous as the proposition to retain it
in the Treasury.
The shortest reflection must satisfy everyone that to require the
people to pay taxes to the Government merely that they may be paid back
again is sporting with the substantial interests of the country, and no
system which produces such a result can be expected to receive the
public countenance. Nothing could be gained by it even if each
individual who contributed a portion of the tax could receive back
promptly the same portion. But it is apparent that no system of the
kind can ever be enforced which will not absorb a considerable portion
of the money to be distributed in salaries and commissions to the
agents employed in the process and in the various losses and
depreciations which arise from other causes, and the practical effect
of such an attempt must ever be to burden the people with taxes, not
for purposes beneficial to them, but to swell the profits of deposit
banks and support a band of useless public officers.
A distribution to the people is impracticable and unjust in other
respects. It would be taking one man's property and giving it to
another. Such would be the unavoidable result of a rule of equality
(and none other is spoken of or would be likely to be adopted), in as
much as there is no mode by which the amount of the individual
contributions of our citizens to the public revenue can be ascertained.
We know that they contribute unequally, and a rule, therefore, that
would distribute to them equally would be liable to all the objections
which apply to the principle of an equal division of property. To make
the General Government the instrument of carrying this odious principle
into effect would be at once to destroy the means of its usefulness and
change the character designed for it by the framers of the
Constitution.
But the more extended and injurious consequences likely to result from
a policy which would collect a surplus revenue from the purpose of
distributing it may be forcibly illustrated by an examination of the
effects already produced by the present deposit act. This act, although
certainly designed to secure the safe-keeping of the public revenue, is
not entirely free in its tendencies from any of the objections which
apply to this principle of distribution. The Government had without
necessity received from the people a large surplus, which, instead of
being employed as heretofore and returned to them by means of the
public expenditure, was deposited with sundry banks. The banks
proceeded to make loans upon this surplus, and thus converted it into
banking capital, and in this manner it has tended to multiply bank
charters and has had a great agency in producing a spirit of wild
speculation. The possession and use of the property out of which this
surplus was created belonged to the people, but the Government has
transferred its possession to incorporated banks, whose interest and
effort it is to make large profits out of its use. This process need
only be stated to show its injustice and bad policy.
And the same observations apply to the influence which is produced by
the steps necessary to collect as well as to distribute such a revenue.
About 3/5 of all the duties on imports are paid in the city of New
York, but it is obvious that the means to pay those duties are drawn
from every quarter of the Union. Every citizen in every State who
purchases and consumes an article which has paid a duty at that port
contributes to the accumulating mass. The surplus collected there must
therefore be made up of moneys or property withdrawn from other points
and other States. Thus the wealth and business of every region from
which these surplus funds proceed must be to some extent injured, while
that of the place where the funds are concentrated and are employed in
banking are proportionably extended. But both in making the transfer of
the funds which are first necessary to pay the duties and collect the
surplus and in making the re-transfer which becomes necessary when the
time arrives for the distribution of that surplus there is a
considerable period when the funds can not be brought into use, and it
is manifest that, besides the loss inevitable from such an operation,
its tendency is to produce fluctuations in the business of the country,
which are always productive of speculation and detrimental to the
interests of regular trade. Argument can scarcely be necessary to show
that a measure of this character ought not to receive further
legislative encouragement.
By examining the practical operation of the ration for distribution
adopted in the deposit bill of the last session we shall discover other
features that appear equally objectionable. Let it be assumed, for the
sake of argument, that the surplus moneys to be deposited with the
States have been collected and belong to them in the ration of their
federal representative population--an assumption founded upon the fact
that any deficiencies in our future revenue from imposts and public
lands must be made up by direct taxes collected from the States in that
ration. It is proposed to distribute this surplus--say $30,000,000--not
according to the ration in which it has been collected and belongs to
the people of the States, but in that of their votes in the colleges of
electors of President and Vice President. The effect of a distribution
upon that ration is shown by the annexed table, marked A.
By an examination of that table it will be perceived that in the
distribution of a surplus of $30,000,000 upon that basis there is a
great departure from the principle which regards representation as the
true measure of taxation, and it will be found that the tendency of
that departure will be to increase whatever inequalities have been
supposed to attend the operation of our federal system in respect to
its bearings upon the different interests of the Union. In making the
basis of representation the basis of taxation the framers of the
Constitution intended to equalize the burdens which are necessary to
support the Government, and the adoption of that ratio, while it
accomplished this object, was also the means of adjusting other great
topics arising out of the conflicting views respecting the political
equality of the various members of the Confederacy. What ever,
therefore, disturbs the liberal spirit of the compromises which
established a rule of taxation so just and equitable, and which
experience has proved to be so well adapted to the genius and habits of
our people, should be received with the greatest caution and distrust.
A bare inspection in the annexed table of the differences produced by
the ration used in the deposit act compared with the results of a
distribution according to the ration of direct taxation must satisfy
every unprejudiced mind that the former ration contravenes the spirit
of the Constitution and produces a degree of injustice in the
operations of the Federal Government which would be fatal to the hope
of perpetuating it. By the ration of direct taxation, for example, the
State of Delaware in the collection of $30,000,000 of revenue would pay
into the Treasury $188,716, and in a distribution of $30,000,000 she
would receive back from the Government, according to the ration of the
deposit bill, the sum of $306,122; and similar results would follow the
comparison between the small and the large States throughout the Union,
thus realizing to the small States an advantage which would be
doubtless as unacceptable to them as a motive for incorporating the
principle in any system which would produce it as it would be
inconsistent with the rights and expectations of the large States.