In other ways the European powers have shown that, with a little
willingness to do so, they can work together in the interests of peace.
We have an illustrative instance of this in the DANUBE COMMISSION,
which, since 1856, has watched over the traffic in the Delta of the
Danube, neutralized by the Treaty of Paris.
This commission, which is composed of members from all the great powers
and Turkey and Roumania, and was originally appointed only for a short
time, has, in consideration of its great value as an international
institution, been renewed from year to year, and has had its power
gradually extended. The commission possesses its own flag, its customs
and pilotage, its police, its little fleet, and so on. It has for
thirty years exercised an almost unlimited power over the mouths of the
Danube, has made laws, raised a loan, carried out works, and in many
other respects given evidence of the possibility of united co-operation
amongst the powers under many changing and intricate international
relations.
In the so-called EUROPEAN CONCERT is seen a commencement of an extended
co-operation in a similar direction. The war between Servia and
Bulgaria was confined within certain limits by the united will of the
powers, and Greece was obliged to subdue her fierce military ardour.
Again, so far as concerns such coalitions as it is evident are not
formed for the whole of Europe, but are said to aim at securing peace
by accumulating forces, it could hardly be expected, from their very
nature, that they would fulfil the alleged design in themselves.
But, on the other side, it would be short-sighted to overlook their
importance as a link in the gradually progressive development of the
interests of various nations in the common concerns of Europe. One
token in this direction is the proposal which was brought forward
in the beginning of 1888 by a number of deputies in the Austrian
Parliament, urging the Government, after procuring the consent of
the Hungarian Government, to initiate negotiations with Germany for
the purpose of getting a GERMANO-AUSTRIAN ALLIANCE adopted by the
Parliaments of both realms, and constitutionally incorporated in the
fundamental law of both States. This proposal may have hardly any
practical result, but it is worth notice as one of the small rays of
light which from time to time point the way to a common goal.
Thither point too, though indeed from afar, those propositions for
DISARMAMENT which now and then crop up, but which, quite naturally,
fade away as quickly as they come, so long as the principle of
arbitration does not prevail in Europe.
"Europe's only salvation is a general disarmament," cries the
illustrious Frenchman Jules Simon, and yet louder the Italian
ex-minister, Bonghi. The latter a distinguished Conservative statesman,
utters these powerful words in the _International Review_ (Rome).
"The ideas of peace, which I have just expressed and which are also
entertained by the masses, sound almost like a jest in the menaces of
war which we hear around us. And they are ridiculous if the policy
which the Government follows is considered serious. The great thing
is to be able to guess how long the ludicrous shall be regarded as
serious, and the serious as ludicrous; and how long a proceeding so
devoid of sound reason as that of the great European powers will be
counted as sense. I, for my part, am persuaded that such a confusion
as to the meaning of the words cannot endure continually, and that the
present condition of things, whether people will or not, must soon
cease. But we ought not to wait until the change is brought about by
violence, nor indeed till it comes by violence from--below. Dynasties
must give heed to this, and must hold me responsible for saying it--I,
who am a royalist by conviction."
In the English House of Commons, Mr. A. Illingworth, May 30th, 1889,
questioned the First Lord of the Treasury, Mr. W.H. Smith, "Whether the
Government had recently made a proposal to the continental Governments
that they should agree upon a considerable and early reduction of
armaments? and with what result? And if not, whether Her Majesty's
Government would without delay initiate such negotiations, having for
their object to lessen the military burdens and the dangers which
menace the peace of Europe."
In his answer the First Lord of the Treasury[27] said: "If any
favourable opportunity manifested itself, the Government would have
pleasure in using its influence in the direction indicated by the
honourable member. But the questioner should bear in mind, that an
interference in a question of this sort often does more harm than good
to the object he wishes to attain. I can assure him that the Government
is as deeply impressed with this question as himself, and it has often
expressed its view in the House, that the present armed condition of
Europe is a great misfortune and a danger to the peace of the world."
In the German Parliament, also, similar utterances may be heard; in
the latest instance from one of the Centre, Reichensperger, who in the
military debate, June 28th, 1890, expressed the wish that they could
set in motion a general disarmament. The speaker had certainly spoken
in favour of the Government bill for adding 18,000 men to the peace
footing of the army. But he wished alongside of that to say, that as
the decision of the Emperor in summoning a conference of working men
from all parts of Europe had been greeted with applause, so would the
civilized world, with still greater applause greet the tidings that
William II. had advocated a general disarmament.
* * * * *
Many entertain the belief that the first condition of such a
disarmament must be to absolve the rulers themselves from the dangerous
power they possess in being able at their discretion to declare war,
conclude peace, and make alliances one with another for warlike aims.
In our country many propositions have been brought forward for limiting
this power especially with regard to the concluding of treaties without
so much as consulting the whole Swedish Cabinet.
As is well known, even in the time of Gustavus Adolphus, the royal
power did not extend beyond the king having to consult the Riksdag, and
to obtain its consent, whether he were engaging in a war or entering
into an alliance with foreign powers. The absolute monarchs seized
upon greater power, and the law-makers of 1809 simply ratified this
dangerous extension of it.
Now we are unceasingly told, when the subject of defence is on, about
sacrifices. They declare to us that no sacrifice should be esteemed too
great. The State has the right of enlisting soldiers by compulsion,
fathers, husbands and sons, for the defence of the country; and not
only when it is really a question of defence, but when it is a matter
of preparation for defence, that is drill, even if this extend to years
of barrack life in time of peace.
These are the sacrifices demanded from the people.
There are those who think, would it not be much better if the people,
on their side, demanded a little security that the country should not
be far too thoughtlessly plunged into war--war which can no longer be
carried on by paid volunteers, but with members of families conscripted
by force, by means of compulsory service?
Such security could be effected by changing the formulas of government
§§ 12 and 13, and the constitutional law § 26, partly so that the
conclusion of treaties should require the confirmation of a united
meeting of the Swedo-Norse cabinet councils, and partly also,
that certain treaties, namely such as include a greater political
intricacy, should be subjected to the confirmation of the Riksdag
and the Storting, as has been the case with certain treaties of
commerce--bagatelles in comparison with the entanglement of the
kingdoms in war.
It is simply an assertion, refuted by experience, that the king cannot
make use of the law here treated of.
During the Crimean war, according to a treaty, we should have been
entangled in the war, had not the Peace of Paris intervened. So also
during the last Dano-German war, when interference on our part, as the
result of a treaty, would have taken place, had not the death of King
Frederic VII. occurred.
The same thing would have happened during the last Franco-German war,
if the battle of Wörth had not thrown out the reckoning, according to
a treaty which entailed our interference. Into all these treaties the
king could enter without giving the whole Cabinet the opportunity of
expressing its opinion.
The danger of such a power begins to be increasingly felt, especially
in England. In 1886, Henry Richard raised in the House of Commons
the question of abolishing the right of the sovereign to declare war
without the consent of Parliament. The proposition was certainly
rejected, but with the large minority of 109 against 115 votes. That
the proposition could gather round it such a minority may certainly
be regarded as a remarkable sign of the times. In 1889, W.R. Cremer
made a similar motion in the House. He proposed that a "parliamentary
committee should be chosen to examine and arrange foreign matters,
which were then to be laid before Parliament." This proposal fell
through but progress was made, and Mr. Cremer still awaits a suitable
occasion for renewing it.
A characteristic expedient is pointed out by the well-known Belgian
professor of political economy, de Molinari, in an article published in
the _Times_.
He shows, in the first place, how solidarity among the civilized States
of the world has lately increased in a marvellous degree, for not long
ago the foreign trade of a civilized nation and the capital invested in
other States was of very small importance. Each country produced nearly
all the requisites for its own consumption, and employed its capital
in its own undertakings. In 1613, the whole of England's imports and
exports amounted to only five million pounds sterling. A hundred years
later, indeed, the united foreign trade of the whole of Europe did not
amount to so much as the present foreign trade of little Belgium.
Still more unimportant were the foreign loans. Holland was the only
country whose capitalists lent to foreign Governments, and persons were
hardly to be found who ventured to put their money into industrial
undertakings in foreign lands, or even beyond the provinces in which
they dwelt. Consequently at that time a neutral State suffered little
or no injury when two States were at war. A quarrel between France and
Spain or Germany then did no more harm to English interests than a war
between China and Japan would do now.
At present it is quite otherwise. Trade and capital have in our day
become international. While the foreign traffic of the civilized world
two hundred years ago did not exceed one hundred millions sterling, it
runs up now to about five thousand millions; and foreign loans have
augmented in the same degree. In every country there is a constantly
increasing portion of the population dependent for its subsistence upon
relations with other peoples, either for the manufacture or exportation
of goods, or for the importation of foreign necessaries. In France a
tenth part of the population is dependent in this way upon foreign
countries, a third in Belgium, and in England probably not far from a
third.
So long as there is peace, this increasing community of interests is a
source of well-being, and advances civilization; but if a war breaks
out, that which was a blessing is turned into a common ill. For, not
to mention the burden which preparations for defence impose upon the
neutral nations, they suffer from the crisis which war causes in the
money market, and from the cessation or curtailing of their trade with
the belligerent powers.
From these facts, de Molinari deduces a principle of justice--NEUTRAL
STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO FORBID A WAR, as it greatly injures their own
lawful interests.
If two duellists fight out their quarrel in a solitary place, where
nobody can be injured by their balls or swords, they may be allowed
without any great harm to exercise their right of killing. But if they
set to work to shoot one another in a crowded street, no one can blame
the police if they interfere, since their action exposes peacable
passers-by to danger. It is the same with war between States. Neutral
States would have small interest in hindering war, if war did not do
them any particular harm; and under those circumstances their right
to interfere might be disputed. But when, as is now the case, war
cannot be carried on without menacing a great and constantly increasing
portion of the interests of neutrals, yes, even their existence, their
right to come in and maintain order is indisputable.
The worst is that, after all, the belligerent nation itself never
decides its own fate. That is settled by a few politicians and military
men, who have quite other interests than those of business. It is
often done by a single man; and it may be said without exaggeration,
that the world's peace depends upon the pleasure of three or four men,
sovereigns or ministers, who can any day, at their discretion, let
slip all the horrors of war. They can thereby bring measureless misery
and ills upon the whole civilized world's peaceable industries, not
excepting even those of neutral nations, with whom they have nothing to
do. The most absolute despots of the rude old times had no such power.
Self-interests of purely political nature give the neutral States,
especially the smaller ones, the right to do what they can to prevent
war between other powers; because it is an old experience that war
among the great powers readily spreads itself to the little ones.
De Molinari states further that the neutral States may so much the more
easily ward off all this evil, as they have not only the right, but
also the power, if they would set themselves to do it.