suit better than any other in the world. Hamilton is, I confess,
the officer whom I should like to see in that station. With equal
advantages, his services deserve from you the preference to any other.
His knowledge of your opinions and intentions on military arrangements,
his love of discipline, the superiority he would have over all the
others, principally when both armies shall operate together, and his
uncommon abilities, are calculated to render him perfectly agreeable
to you. His utility would be increased by this preferment; and on other
points he could render important services. An adjutant-general ought
always to be with the commander-in-chief. Hamilton should, therefore,
remain in your family, and his great industry in business would render
him perfectly serviceable in all circumstances. On every public or
private account, my dear general, I would advise you to take him.
I shall, on my arrival at Philadelphia, write you how those matters are
going, upon which I build my private schemes. But I heartily wish that
some account or other from Europe may enable you to act this winter on
maritime operations. I hate the idea of being from you for so long a
time; but I think I ought not to stay idle. At all events, I must return
when your army takes the field.
I flatter myself with the hope of meeting Mrs. Washington on the road.
Adieu, my dear general, most affectionately and respectfully yours.
TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL WASHINGTON.~[1]
(ORIGINAL.)
Philadelphia, December 5th, 1780.
MY DEAR GENERAL,--By my letter of yesterday I have mentioned to you that
a Spanish expedition was intended against St. Augustine. They mean to
set out at the end of December, which will certainly delay them till
the middle of January. It consists of twelve ships of the line, some
frigates, bomb ketches, and a large number of troops. I have advised the
minister to communicate officially to you this intelligence, and also to
Count de Rochambeau, that proper means, if convenient, may be taken to
improve it.
For my part, my dear general, I have conducted myself agreeably to what
you said to me in our last conversations, that if, in the course of the
winter, a naval superiority was obtained, our business should be to
push for the southward, and that you would take for that purpose four
thousand French and two thousand Americans. Nothing against New York
can be undertaken before the end of May. Anything, therefore, that could
employ us during February, March, and April, is worthy of our attention.
The confederacy was going to sail for some clothing which we have in
the West Indies. No time was left to wait for an answer from you. I knew
perfectly your sense of this affair. I therefore, with the advice of
Chevalier de la Luzerne, wrote him a letter dated from Camp, wherein
I explained to him that something might be done in conjunction for
the public good. My opinion is strengthened by your sentiments on this
matter, without, however, bringing myself, and still less yourself, to
make any formal application to the Spanish generals.
Inclosed you will find a copy of this letter, the first part of which
mentions that if, after having landed their troops in Florida, they
would send their ships of the line for us, we might, at three weeks
notice before the departure of the squadron, have in readiness six
thousand men for a powerful diversion in Carolina. Their own interest is
the only thing I seem to consider in this business, and I endeavour to
invite Spanish caution in this measure; but, unless a more particular
application is made, I do not believe that this part of my letter will
have any effect.
The second part will, I hope, be productive of some good for America.
I urge the necessity immediately to open a correspondence with General
Greene that he may, by his manoeuvres, facilitate the operation of
Spain. I tell them, that unless they land a corps of troops on the
boundaries of Georgia, with a view at least to threaten Augusta and
Savannah, their expedition will run a great risk. I advise the measure
of cruizing off Charleston Harbour, the whole under the idea of their
own interest.
I have also written to the naval French commander in the West Indies,
advising him to succour Chevalier de Ternay, which I know he will not
do. But I take this opportunity of condemning their foolish neglect, in
not appearing on our coasts when they return to Europe; and I do also
advise that, in their cruizes from St. Domingo, they may sometimes
appear off Savannah and Charlestown Harbour. Inclosed you will find a
copy of this letter.
Though I always speak of the beginning of February, it is, however,
certain, that any time in February would be convenient to go to the
southward. March and April are more than sufficient for the taking of
Charlestown; and in all cases, I know, from our last conversations, that
you wish for a naval superiority this winter, in order to succour the
southern states.
I had this morning, my dear general, a long conversation with the
Chevalier de la Luzerne, relating to a southern operation. He is, as
well as myself, clearly of opinion, that unless a formal application and
a plan of campaign be proposed to them, they will not send their ships
to us. In this last case their coming ought still to be questioned.
But if you thought it better to try, you might propose to the French
generals to send a frigate there, and see, with them, what might be done
in conjunction. Suppose they were to take four thousand men, leaving
some, and the militia, at Rhode Island. We could on our part muster two
thousand Americans. However, the Spaniards are so positive and strict
in following literally their instructions that I do not believe anything
will engage them to come. But my letter, which I look upon as a mere
cipher on the first proposition, will, I hope, engage, them to impart
their projects to General Greene, and of course this diversion will
become useful to us.
Suppose Count de Rochambeau and Chevalier de Ternay were to send to
Havanna a copy of your letter, I think they ought to intrust it to
Viscount de Noailles, who will soon return to Rhode Island, and whose
name is highly respected by the court of Spain for many particular
reasons, too long to be mentioned here.
I have seen Mr. Ross, and find that very little clothing is to be for
the present expected. They have some arms on board the _Alliance_,
and, I think, a hundred bales of cloth on board a vessel under Jones's
convoy. The remainder will come with the _Serapis_. Unless the storm
has forced Jones to put in some French harbour, he may be expected every
minute.
The assembly of Pennsylvania have before them the affair of the
recruits; but proper arrangements are not properly supported. They are
fond of voluntary enlistments. I have an appointment for to-morrow with
General Mifflin, where I will debate this matter with him.
To-morrow, my dear general, I will go to Brandywine with Chevalier de
Chastellux, and also to Red Bank, Fort Mifflin, &c. On my return I hope
to find news from France, and I will write you my determination about my
going to the southward.
Inclosed you will find a newspaper, wherein congress have printed a
letter from General Gates, relating to a new success of Sumpter.
Congress have lately received letters from Mr. Jay and Mr. Adams,
but nothing very particular. They have more fully written by other
opportunities that are expected. Portugal has entered into the
convention of neutrality, and with such conditions as to shew their
partiality to our side of the question.
Adieu, my dear general, most respectfully and affectionately.
Footnote:
1. The winter, according to custom, causing the dispersion of the army,
M. de Lafayette repaired to Philadelphia to be nearer arrivals and
intelligence from Europe. It was there he first conceived the project
of going to serve in the south under General Greene, who was to make a
winter campaign. As regards the project of making a division in Florida,
with the co-operation of the Spaniards, he seconded it with ardour, and
to General Washington, M. de la Luzerne, and the Spanish commanders, he
wrote long letters on the subject, which have but little interest, owing
to the project not having been attended with any important result: those
letters have been omitted.
FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.
(ORIGINAL.)
New Windsor, 14th December, 1780.
My dear Marquis,--Soon after despatching my last letter to you, your
favour dated at Paramus was put into my hands by Colonel Gouvion. The
Chevalier de la Luzerne's despatches came in time for the post, which is
the only means left me for the conveyance of letters; there not being so
much money in the hands of the quartermaster-general (I believe I might
go further, and say in those of the whole army,) as would bear the
expense of an express to Rhode Island. I could not get one the other day
to ride so far as Compton.
I am now writing to the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Ternay,
on the subject of your several letters. When their answer arrives, I
will communicate the contents to you. You must be convinced, from what
passed at the interview at Hartford, that my command of the French
troops at Rhode Island stands upon a very limited scale, and that
it would be impolitic and fruitless in me to propose any measures of
co-operation to a third power, without their concurrence; consequently
an application from you, antecedently to an official proposition from
the minister of France, the gentlemen at the head of the French armament
at Rhode Island, congress, or myself, could only be considered as coming
from a private gentleman; it is, therefore, my advice to you to postpone
your correspondence with the Spanish generals, and let your influence
come in hereafter, as auxiliary to something more formal and official.
I do not hesitate to give it clearly as my opinion to you, (but this
opinion and this business should be concealed behind a curtain,) that
the favourable moment of the Spanish operations in the Floridas ought to
be improved to the utmost extent of our means, provided the Spaniards,
by a junction of their maritime force with that of his most Christian
Majesty, under the command of the Chevalier de Ternay, will give us a
secure convoy, and engage not to leave us until the operations shall be
at an end, or it can be done by consent of parties.
I am very thankful to the minister for permitting, and to you for
communicating to General Greene, intelligence of the Spanish movement
towards the Floridas. It may have a happy influence on his measures,
and it may be equally advantageous to the Spaniards. Your expressions of
personal attachment and affection to me are flattering and pleasing, and
fill me with gratitude. It is unnecessary, I trust, on my part, to give
you assurances of mutual regard, because I hope you are convinced
in your own choice to go to the southern army or to stay with this,
circumstances and inclination alone must govern you. It would add to my
pleasure if I could encourage your hope of Colonel Nevill's exchange.
I refused to interest myself in the exchange of my own aide. General
Lincoln's were exchanged with himself, and upon that occasion, for I
know of no other, congress passed a resolution, prohibiting exchanges
out of the order of captivity.
Under one general head, I shall express my concern for your
disappointment of letters, our disappointment of clothes, and
disappointment in the mode of raising men; but I shall congratulate you
on the late change of the administration of France,~[1] as it seems to
be consonant to your wishes, and to encourage hope. I am much pleased
at the friendly disposition of Portugal. Much good, I hope, will result
from the combination of the maritime powers. I am in very confined
quarters; little better than those at Valley Forge, but such as they are
I shall welcome into them your friends on their return to Rhode Island.
I am, &c.
Footnote:
1. Footnote 1: The Marquis de Castries had succeeded, as minister of the
navy, to M. de Sartine. This change gave rise to the hope that France
would send the promised succours, and that expectation induced M. de
Lafayette to renounce his journey to the south.
TO M. DE VERGENNES.~[1]
New Windsor, on the North River, Jan. 30th, 1781.
The letters which I had the honour of writing to you, sir, and which
were dated the 20th May, 19th July, 4th and 16th December, have, I hope,
reached you safely. Since the arrival of the squadron, your despatch
of the 3rd of June is the only one I have received. The Chevalier de la
Luzerne has only received one letter of the same month, and none have
yet reached the officers of the army and squadron.
The first copy of this letter will be delivered to you by
Lieutenant-Colonel Laurens, aide-de-camp to General Washington, who is
charged by congress with a private mission. Permit me to recommend
to you this officer as a man who, by his integrity, frankness, and
patriotism, must be extremely acceptable to government.
According to the instructions of congress, he will place before you the
actual state of our affairs, which demand, I think more than ever, the
most serious attention. As to the opinions which I may allow myself
to express, sir, they entirely correspond with those I have hitherto
expressed, and the very slight alterations observable in them have been
occasioned by a change of time, prejudices, and circumstances.
With a naval inferiority, it is impossible to make war in America. It
is that which prevents us from attacking any point that might be carried
with two or three thousand men. It is that which reduces us to defensive
operations, as dangerous as they are humiliating. The English are
conscious of this truth, and all their movements prove how much they
desire to retain the empire of the sea. The harbours, the country, and
all the resources it offers, appear to invite us to send thither a naval
force. If we had possessed but a maritime superiority this spring, much
might have been achieved with the army that M. de Rochambeau brought
with him, and it would not have been necessary to have awaited the
division he announced to us. If M. de Guichen had stopped at Rhode
Island, on his way to France, Arbuthnot would have been ruined, and not
all Rodney's efforts could have prevented our gaining victories. Since
the hour of the arrival of the French, their inferiority has never for
one moment ceased, and the English and the Tories have dared to say that
France wished to kindle, without extinguishing the flame. This calumny
becomes more dangerous at a period when the English detachments are
wasting the south; when, under the protection of some frigates, corps of
fifteen hundred men are repairing to Virginia, without our being able to
get to them. On the whole continent, with the exception of the Islands
of Newport, it is physically impossible that we should carry on an
offensive war without ships, and even on those Islands the difficulty
of transportation, the scarcity of provisions, and many other
inconveniences, render all attempts too precarious to enable us to form
any settled plan of campaign.
The result, sir, of all this is, that the advantage of the United States
being the object of the war, and the progress of the enemy on that
continent being the true means of prolonging it, and of rendering it,
perhaps, even injurious to us, it becomes, in a political and military
point of view, necessary to give us, both by vessels sent from France,
and by a great movement in the fleet in the Islands, a decided naval
superiority for the next campaign; and also, sir, to give us money
enough to place the American forces in a state of activity; fifteen
thousand of the regular army, and ten thousand, or, if we choose it, a
still greater number of militia in this part of the country; a southern
army, of which I cannot tell precisely the extent, but which will be
formed by the five southern states, with all means of supporting in this
country such a considerable force. Such, sir, are the resources that
you may employ against the common enemy; immense sums of money could not
transport resources of equal value from Europe to America, but these,
without a succour of money, although established on the very theatre
of war, will become useless; and that succour, which was always very
important, is now absolutely necessary.
The last campaign took place without a shilling having been spent; all
that credit, persuasion, and force could achieve, has been done,--but
that can hold out no longer: that miracle, of which I believe no similar
example can be found, cannot be renewed, and our exertions having been
made to obtain an army for the war, we must depend on you to enable us
to make use of it.
From my peculiar situation, sir, and from what it has enabled me to know
and see, I think it is my duty to call your attention to the American
soldiers and on the part they must take in the operations of the
next campaign. The continental troops have as much courage and real
discipline as those that are opposed to them. They are more inured to
privation, more patient than Europeans, who, on these two points, cannot
be compared to them. They have several officers of great merit, without
mentioning those who have served during the last wars, and from their
own talents have acquired knowledge intuitively; they have been formed
by the daily experience of several campaigns, in which, the armies being
small, and the country a rugged one, all the battalions of the line were
obliged to serve as advance-guards and light troops. The recruits whom
we are expecting, and who only bear, in truth, the name of recruits,
have frequently fought battles in the same regiments which they are
now re-entering, and have seen more gun-shots than three-fourths of the
European soldiers. As to the militia, they are only armed peasants,
who have occasionally fought, and who are not deficient in ardour and
discipline, but whose services would be most useful in the labours of a
siege. This, sir, is the faithful picture that I think myself obliged to
send you, and which it is not my interest to paint in glowing colours,
because it would be more glorious to succeed with slighter means. The
Chevalier de la Luzerne, who, having himself seen our soldiers, will
give you a detailed and disinterested account of them, will doubtless
tell you, as I do, that you may depend upon our regular troops. The
result of this digression, sir, is, to insist still more earnestly on
the necessity of sending money to put the American troops in movement,
and to repeat that well-known truth, that a pecuniary succour and
a naval superiority must be the two principal objects of the next
campaign.
It would take us too long to examine the faults that have been
committed, and the efforts that the states may still endeavour to make:
we must return to the former point, that, under present circumstances,
money is requisite to derive any advantage from the American resources;
that the means which have been substituted for funds are almost
completely worn out; that those to which we are at present reduced, do
not fulfil the proposed end, and are opposed to the ideas which induced
the nation to commence the revolution; that, consequently, we require
money to restore to the army that degree of activity without which it
cannot operate in an efficacious manner. Clothes, arms, ammunition, are
comprised in the same article, and Colonel Laurens carries with him a
copy of the former list, from which some deductions have been made. I
will content myself with saying, that nothing of any importance has
been sent us, that it is necessary to clothe the American army, that
it requires arms, and, to be enabled to besiege places, a great
augmentation of powder. As these expenses relate to the pecuniary
succours, and are those which will strike most forcibly individuals,
both of the army and nation, I think it important that the government
should prepare them with promptness, and send them in a secure manner.
If it should appear strange, sir, to call that completion of the army
a great effort, I would beg to observe, that hunger, cold, nudity, and
labour, the certainty of receiving no pay, clothes, or necessary food,
being the prospects held out to the American soldier, they must be but
little inviting to citizens who are, generally speaking, accustomed to
live at home with some degree of comfort; and the English having had
sufficient time to think of all the naval points, the attacks of
next year will be anything rather than surprises, and our forces must
increase in proportion to their precautions. I could have wished that
there had been some French troops, and my confidence in the decrease
of prejudice has been even greater than that of congress, General
Washington, or your minister at that time. The advance-guard of the
Count de Rochambeau, although inactive itself from want of ships, by its
presence alone has rendered an essential service to America: if it had
not arrived, the campaign would have been a ruinous one. When I consider
the present state of feeling, my opinion, as I have had the honour of
telling you before, would be to send hither, for the expedition of New
York, a division of about ten thousand Frenchmen.
In our conference at Hartford, sir, the calculations were of course
made, not according to the fortifications actually existing, but
according to those they might intend erecting. The answers General
Washington thought proper to make to the questions put by the Count
de Rochambeau, have been long since carried to you by the _Amazon_. A
proposal to ask for a corps of fifteen thousand Frenchmen could only be
acceptable to the commander-in-chief. But if that surplus were to lessen
the sum of money by means with which fifteen thousand regular troops,
ten thousand militia, and a southern army should be put into motion; if
it were to lessen the number of ships that would enable us to act in
all places, and with a decided superiority;--I must again repeat, that
pecuniary succours and a naval superiority are the two most essential
points; that the same quantity of money would, put into action here,
double that number of American soldiers; and that, without ships, a few
thousand men more would be but of little use to us.
The admirable discipline of the French corps, in addition to the honour
it confers on M. de Rochambeau and the soldiers under his command,
fulfils a still more important aim, by impressing on the minds of the
Americans the highest idea of our nation.
The wisdom of the government, in placing that corps under the orders of
General Washington, allows me only to repeat how essential it is that
his authority should be complete, and without any sort of restriction.
The talents, prudence, delicacy, and knowledge of country, which are
all united in him in the greatest degree of perfection, are qualities
of which one only would suffice to ensure the rigid observance of the
instructions which I bear; and the longer I remain here, the more frilly
am I convinced that each of them is equally necessary to the harmony and
success of the whole affair.
We have had, lately, sir, an important mutiny, of which Colonel Laurens
will give you the details.~[2] A corps of Pennsylvanian troops, almost
wholly composed of strangers, and stationed at Morristown (Jersey),
unanimously rose against their officers, and, under the direction of
one of their sergeants, marched on to Princetown. The civil authorities
repaired thither, to afford them the justice they demanded. To be in
want of food and clothes, to serve for more than a year without pay,
some of them, indeed, having been forced to serve a whole year beyond
their engagement, are evils to which no army would submit. It is
singular enough that those mutineers should have hung up the envoys of
General Clinton. The greatest part of the soldiers are disbanded, but
they are to re-enter the service, and to join the recruits in different
regiments of the state. I am not less positive as to the number of men
we shall have in our continental army. Some troops belonging to the
Jerseys, seduced by example, and being those next to the Pennsylvanians,
which were composed of the greatest number of foreigners, wished to take
the same method of obtaining justice; but General Washington, having
taken the management of this affair in his own hands, sent forward a
detachment; the mutineers submitted, and their chiefs were punished. It
is impossible to pass too high encomiums upon the New England troops,
almost all national ones, whose cause was at bottom the same, and who,
in spite of their nudity, crossed heavy snows to march against the
mutineers. This proves, sir, that human patience may have some limits,
but that soldier citizens will endure far more than strangers. These
events furnish another argument for the necessity of obtaining money.