1. The project of an expedition against New York had not been abandoned:

it was still canvassed by letter. General Washington agreed with

the French generals as to the necessity of waiting for a naval

reinforcement. The latter insisted upon having a conference with the

General and M. de Lafayette. (See especially Washington's Letter of the

21st August, vol. vii. p. 169.) That long deferred conference was at

length granted, and it was fixed that it should take place at Hartford

(Connecticut). Washington left his army the 18th of September. It will

be recollected that it was his interview with Arnold at the passage of

the Hudson, that induced the latter to take the steps which led to

the discovery of the conspiracy. (See above.) Some days after, M. de

Rochambeau wrote thus to M. de Lafayette:--

"Providence has declared itself for us, my dear marquis,--and that

important interview, which I have so long wished for, and which has

given me so much pleasure, has been crowned by a peculiar mark of the

favour of Heaven. The Chevalier de la Luzerne has not yet arrived; I

took the liberty of opening your letter to him, in which I found all the

details of that horrible conspiracy, and I am penetrated with mingled

feelings, of grief at the event itself, and joy at its discovery."

TO MADAME DE TESSÉ.

Camp, on the right side of the North River, near the Island of New York,

October 4th, 1780.

A French frigate arriving from America,--the son of M. de Rochambeau

on board! Good God, what a commotion all that will excite, and how much

trouble inquisitive people will take to discover the secrets of the

ministers. But I, my dear cousin, will confide to you our secret. The

French army has arrived at Rhode Island, and has not quitted that spot.

M. de Ternay's seven vessels have been blockaded the whole time, and the

English have nineteen vessels here under that lucky commander, Rodney.

We Americans, without money, without pay, and without provisions, by

holding out fair promises, have succeeded in forming an army, which

has been offering to fight a battle with the English for the last three

months, but which cannot without vessels reach the island of New York.

Gates, who was no favourite of mine, has become still less so since he

has allowed himself to be beaten in the south. But all this is quite as

monontonous as a European war, and catastrophes are necessary to excite

and sustain the interest of men.

You must know, then, my cousin, that a certain General Arnold, of some

reputation in the world, was our commander at West Point, a fort on

the North River, whose importance the Duke d'Ayen will explain to you.

General Washington and I, returning from Hartford, where we had held

a conference with the French generals, discovered a conspiracy of

the highest importance. We owe that discovery to an almost incredible

combination of accidents. West Point was sold by Arnold, and we were

consequently lost. The traitor has fled to join the enemy.

I received letters from you by the fleet, and by the Alliance, and I am

impatiently expecting more recent ones. The nation will not be pleased

with the state of tranquillity in which we remain. But as we have no

ships, we can only wait for the enemy's blows, and General Clinton does

not appear in any haste to attack us. As to ourselves, we republicans

preach lectures to our sovereign master, the people, to induce him

to recommence his exertions. In the mean while we practise so much

frugality, and are in such a state of poverty and nudity, that I

trust an account will be kept in the next world, whilst we remain in

purgatory, of all we have suffered here.

Poircy~[1] is here, and although he does not find a St. Germain in this

part of the world, he accustoms himself extremely well, I assure you,

to a soldier's life. I thank you from the bottom of my heart for all

the news you gave me. Although they afforded me the greatest pleasure, I

scarcely dare reply to them, from the fear that my answers may appear to

come from another world. I saw in the paper that the King of Spain was

dead: has God, then, punished him for having conferred the title of

grandee upon M. de Montbarrey?

I need not tell you that I am in good health, for that is, you know,

my usual custom. My situation here is as agreeable as possible. I am in

high favour, I believe, with the French army: the American army shew me

every possible kindness and attention. I have the command of a flying

corps, composed of the elite of the troops. My friend General Washington

continues to be everything to me that I before described to you.

Adieu, my dear cousin. When shall I again see you? I pray that God may

grant us an honourable peace, and that I may embrace my friends, and I

willingly, for my own part, will give up my share of the glory in the

hope eventually to win.

Present my affectionate regards to M. de Tesse, M. de Mun, M. Tenai, and

the baron;~[2] I was on the point of saying, embrace his daughter for

me.

Footnotes:

1. Secretary. The Marshal de Noailles had a house at Saint Germain.

2. The Baron de Tott.

TO MADAME DE LAFAYETTE.

Near Fort Lee, opposite Fort Washington, on the North River, Oct. 7th,

1780.

You must have already learnt, my dearest love, all that can interest you

relating to myself, from my arrival at Boston until my voyage to Rhode

Island, which place public affairs, and the desire of seeing my friends,

induced me to visit soon after my landing. I have been since to Hartford

in Connecticut, to be present at an interview between the French

generals and General Washington: of all my young friends, Damas ~[1] was

the only one who accompanied us. The viscount~[2] and I often write

to each other, but we do not meet, and the poor man remains shut up in

Rhode Island; the French squadron detains the army there, and is itself

detained by nineteen ships of the line and sundry other ships of war,

upon which M. Rodney proudly exhibits the British colours. So long as

our naval inferiority lasts, you need feel no anxiety about the health

of your friends in America.

I must speak to you, however, about my health; it continues excellent,

and has not been interrupted for a single moment; a soldier's mode of

living is extremely frugal, and the general officers of the rebel army

fare very differently from the French army at Newport. You have probably

heard that, on my arrival in America, I found the army of General

Washington very weak in numbers, and still more so in resources. Our

prospects were not brilliant, and the loss of Charleston was for us a

most heavy blow, but the desire of co-operating with their allies gave

new vigour to the states. General Washington's army increased more than

half in number, and more than ten thousand militia were added to it,

who would have come forward if we had acted offensively. Associations

of merchants and patriotic banks were formed to supply the army with

subsistence. The ladies made, and are still making, subscriptions, to

afford succour to the soldiers. When that idea was first proposed, I

made myself your ambassador to the ladies of Philadelphia, and you are

inscribed on the list for a hundred guineas. General Gates had in the

south an army quite sufficient for defence; but he has been completely

beaten in Carolina. The fruit of all these labours has been, to prove to

the French that the Americans desire nothing better than to second their

views upon England, to prove to the English that the flame of liberty

was not wholly extinguished in America, and to keep us, during the

whole campaign, in daily expectation of a battle, which General Clinton,

although equal to us in number, has never thought proper to accept. If

we had only had ships, we should have been enabled to do a great deal

more.

As I know that all that interests me deeply is also interesting to you,

I will tell you that we are much occupied by an important system, which

would secure to us a considerable army during the whole war, and would

bring into action all the resources which America is capable of making.

God grant that the nation may understand its true interests, and our

affairs will go on without difficulty!

M. de Rochambeau and M. de Ternay, as well as all the other French

officers, conduct themselves extremely well here. A little ebullition of

frankness gave rise to a slight altercation between those generals

and myself. As I perceived I could not convince them, and that it was

important for the public good that we should remain friends; I declared,

with due humility, that I had been mistaken, that I had committed an

error, and, in short, in proper terms, I asked their pardon, which

produced such an excellent effect that we are now on a more amicable

footing than ever.

I command a flying corps, which always forms an advance guard, and

is quite independent of the great army; this is far too grand for our

pacific situation.

On the Hackensack River, Oct. 8th, 1780.

You will learn, my dearest love, an important event, which has exposed

America to the greatest danger. A frightful conspiracy has been planned

by the celebrated Arnold: he sold to the English the fort of West Point,

which was under his command, and, consequently, the whole navigation of

the river: the plot was within an ace of succeeding, and quite as

many chances combined together to discover it as in that affair of

the _Alliance_, which I have so often described to you.~[3] After our

journey to Hartford, General Washington passed by West Point, which was

not on his road; but he was desirous of shewing me the works that had

been constructed since my departure for France. Detained by various

accidents upon the road, we arrived at the traitor's house just as he

received the letters which announced that he had been discovered. He had

not time to intercept those proofs of infamy, and consequently he could

only make his escape towards New York half an hour before our arrival.

The adjutant-general of the English army has been arrested under a

feigned name and dress. He was an important person, the friend and

confidant of General Clinton. He behaved with so much frankness,

courage, and delicacy, that I could not help lamenting his unhappy fate.

I received, with great delight, the letters of my dear sisters; I shall

write to them to-morrow; but I shall send this scrawl, as I fear the

frigate may depart. I finish my letter in this place, having begun it

rather more close to the enemy: we had approached them to protect a

small enterprise, in which a detachment of my advance-guard has been

engaged, and which only ended by capturing two officers, and fifteen

men and horses. We are now marching towards a place you will find marked

upon the map Sotawa, whither the grand army is also to repair. I shall

write to Madame d'Ayen and to my sisters.

Sotawa Bridge, October 10th, 1780.

I am closing my letter, but before sealing it, I must again speak to you

for a moment of my affection. General Washington was much pleased by the

kind messages which I delivered from you; he desires me to present to

you his tender regards; he is affectionately attached to George, and is

much gratified by the name we have given him. We often speak of you and

of the little family. Adieu, adieu.

Footnotes:

1. The Count Charles de Damas, died a peer of France under the

restoration.

2. The Viscount de Noailles.

3. The conspiracy discovered on board the frigate which brought home M.

de Lafayette, in September, 1779.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Light Camp, October 30th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--In our conversations upon military operations you have

often told me that, since the beginning of the campaign, your eyes were

turned towards a project upon which I generally agree in opinion with

you, and beg leave to offer some observations.

Far from lessening my desire of finishing the campaign by some brilliant

stroke, the project of Staten Island, though it miscarried, has

strengthened my opinions, as I have clearly seen, by the details of this

operation, that we should, in all human probability, have succeeded, and

that our men were fully equal to any enterprise of that kind.~[1]

My reasons for wishing to undertake something are these:--1st. Any

enterprise will please the people of this country, and shew them that

when we have men we do not lie still; and even a defeat (provided it

was not fatal) would have its good consequences. 2ndly. The French court

have often complained to me of the inactivity of the American army, who,

before the alliance, had distinguished themselves by their spirit of

enterprise. They have often told me, your friends leave us now to fight

their battles, and do no more risk themselves: it is, moreover, of the

greatest political importance to let them know, that, on our side, we

were ready to co-operate. Be sure, my dear general, that many people's

interest will be to let it be believed that we _were not ready_, and if

anything may engage the ministry to give us the asked for support,

it will be our proving to the nation that, on our side, _we had been

ready_. So far was the Chevalier de la Luzerne convinced of this (and on

this point the minister's interest is the same as ours) that he was made

happy by my mentioning to him the Staten Island affair. I well know

the court of Versailles, and were I to go to it, I should think it very

impolitic to go there unless we had done something. 3rdly. It is

more than probable that mediators will interfere this winter by a

negotiation. Then England will say, how can we give up people whom we

consider as half conquered; their best city has been taken by an army

not much superior to the people that were to defend it; their southern

army was routed almost as soon as looked at by the British troops

New York is so much ours, that they dare not approach it, and General

Washington's army does not exceed five thousand men. What shall France

answer? Principally now that from the letters I have received I find

the Charleston affair has brought our arms into contempt. But what

difference, if France might say, the American army has taken, sword in

hand, your best works; they have offered to you the battle upon your own

island, and, perhaps they may add (for news increases in travelling),

they are now in possession of New York.

Upon these considerations, my dear general, what I want is this, to find

an expedition which may wear a brilliant aspect, and afford probable

advantages, also an immense, though very remote one, which, if

unsuccessful, may not turn fatal to us, for the loss of two or three

hundred men, half of them being enlisted for two months, I do not

consider as a ruinous adventure.

The basis of the plan will be, that Fort Washington, being in our

possession, may, with the Fort Lee batteries, protect our crossing North

River, and be a security for our retreat, principally if some works are

added on the point of embarkation. The taking of Fort Washington we

may demonstrate to be very probable, and upon that point you are of my

opinion.

The enemy have, on the upper part of the Island from fifteen hundred

to two thousand men, who would immediately occupy all the other upper

posts. Their army on Long Island would repair to New York, and there

would also retire the troops posted at Harlem.

As soon as Fort Washington should be ours, the army would cross over

to the island, and those of West Point arrive in the same time (which

calculation may be easily done) so that we should effectually possess

all the upper posts, or cut them off from their main army. Some militia

would come to our assistance, and as these posts are not well furnished

with provisions we should take them, at least, by famine.

The enemy's army consists of nine thousand men: they must certainly

leave one thousand men in their several posts; fifteen hundred of them,

at least, will be either killed at Fort Washington or blocked up at

Laurel Hill, and they will then have between six and seven thousand men

to attack ten. The two thousand militia (in supposing that they durst

take them out) I do not mention, because we may have four thousand

militia for them: under such circumstances it is, probable that Sir

Henry Clinton will venture a battle. If he does, and by chance beat us,

we retire under Fort Washington; but, if we beat him, his works will be

at such a distance, that he will be ruined in the retreat. If, on the

contrary, he knows that the French army is coming, and if we spread

the report of a second division, or of Count de Guichen being upon the

coasts, he will keep in his works, and we will, some way or other, carry

the upper posts. When we are upon the spot we may reconnoitre New York,

and see if something is to be done. If Clinton was making a forage into

the Jerseys, I should be clear for pushing to the city.

If we undertake, the circumstances of the weather make it necessary that

we undertake immediately. I would move the army, as soon as possible,

to our position near the new bridge. This movement may invite Clinton in

the Jerseys, and bring us nearer to the point of execution.

Though my private glory and yours, my dear general, both of which are

very dear to my heart, are greatly interested, not so much for the

opinions of America, as for those of Europe, in our doing something

this campaign, I hope you know me too well to think I should insist upon

steps of this nature unless I knew that they were politically necessary,

and had a sufficient military probability.

I have the honour to be, &c.

The six hundred men of Luzerne's legion might be got in twelve days. If

our movements had no other effect but to make a diversion in favour of

the south, it would, on that footing, meet with the approbation of the

world, and perhaps impeach the operations of General Leslie.

Footnote:

1. M. de Lafayette had taken, since the 7th of August, command of the

corps of light infantry, consisting of six companies of men, selected

in different lines of the army. Those battalions were divided into two

brigades; one under the command of General Hand, the other of General

Poor. The inactivity of the army was very opposite to the character and

policy of M. de Lafayette; he endeavoured incessantly to find means of

putting an end to it, at least as far as regarded himself. The 14th of

August he had written to General Washington to ask his permission to

attempt a nocturnal surprise on the two camps of Hessians established at

New York Island. At the beginning of October, he attempted an expedition

on Italian Island, which could not be accomplished, owing to a mistake

made by the administration of the materality of the army. This letter,

and the letters of the 13th of November, allude to this circumstance.

We have been obliged to retrench ten letters, which relate solely to the

unimportant incidents of a war of observation.

FROM GENERAL WASHINGTON TO THE MARQUIS DE LAFAYETTE.

(ORIGINAL.)

Head-quarters, 30th October, 1780.

It is impossible, my dear marquis, to desire more ardently than I do,

to terminate the campaign by some happy stroke; but we must consult our

means rather than our wishes, and not endeavour to better our affairs

by attempting things which, for want of success, may make them worse. We

are to lament that there has been a misapprehension of our circumstances

in Europe; but to endeavour to recover our reputation, we should take

care that we do not injure it more. Ever since it became evident that

the allied arms could not co-operate this campaign, I have had an eye to

the point you mention, determined, if a favourable opening should offer,

to embrace it; but, so far as my information goes, the enterprise would

not be warranted; it would, in my opinion, be imprudent to throw an army

of ten thousand men upon an island against nine thousand, exclusive of

seamen and militia. This, from the accounts we have, appears to be the

enemy's force. All we can do at present, therefore, is to endeavour to

gain a more certain knowledge of their situation, and act accordingly.

This I have been some time employed in doing, but hitherto with little

success. I shall thank you for any aids you can afford. Arnold's flight

seems to have frightened all my intelligencers out of their senses. I am

sincerely and affectionately yours.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON.

(ORIGINAL.)

Light Camp, November 13th, 1780.

MY DEAR GENERAL,--In revolving in my mind the chances of discovery by

moonlight, and, on the other hand, the inconveniences of staying longer

than you wish under our tents, I have thought if there was any position

which might enable us to take advantage of the first hours of the night.

How far the sending of the Pennsylvanians towards Aquakanac, and going

ourselves to the Hukinsac~[1] position, may awaken the enemy, I cannot

pretend to say. The most difficult affair in this would be the article

of the boats. Colonel Smith will go tomorrow morning to West Point,

unless any intelligence received at head-quarters had made it useful

that the enterprise be attempted soon, in which case he would go and

reconnoitre the place. Suppose he was to bring from West Point Colonel

Gouvion, who has often examined the place with the eye of an engineer.

These ideas, my dear general, have rather started into any mind, than

become fixed, and I thought I would communicate them.

Most affectionately and respectfully yours,

LAFAYETTE.

The Marquis de Laval Montmorency, one of the most illustrious families

in France, is on his way to the camp. The Chevalier de Chastellux, a

relation and friend of mine, major-general in the French army, is also

coming. I every day expect my brother-in-law, and his friend, Count

de Charlus, only son to the Marquis de Castries, who enjoys a great

consideration in France, and has won the battle of Closter Camp. The

Duke of Lauzun has also written to me that he would come soon.~[2] These

five gentlemen may, by their existence at home, be considered as the

first people in the French army. This little history I give you before

their arrival, in consequence of what you have desired from me at the

beginning.

I write some letters to the commanding officers at Fishkill, West Point,

and King's Ferry, so that the gentlemen may be directed to come by the

best road to my quarters, from which I will present them to you. I think

the letters ought to be sent as soon as possible.

P.S. As General Heath commands in all these parts, I think, upon

recollection, that I had better write to him alone. You might also send

him a line on the subject.

Footnotes:

1. The general-in-chief projected an attack on the posts of the northern

part of New York. While General Heath was to attract, by a feint, the

attention of the enemy, Washington was to march in advance, and M. de

Lafayette to attack Fort Washington. This expedition, for which great

preparations had been made, terminated in a few reconnoitring parties.

The campaign closed without an engagement.

2. The Marquis de Laval, is the Duke de Laval, who died under the

restoration. The Chevalier de Chastellux is well known by his works.

The Count de Charlus is at present the Duke de Castries, member of the

chamber of peers. M. de Lauzun has been general in the service of the

French republic.

TO GENERAL WASHINGTON

(ORIGINAL.)

Paramus, November the 28th, 1780.

My dear General,--We arrived last night at this place, and were much

favoured by the weather in our recognising of the Island, where, I

confess, my feelings were different from what I had experienced when

looking at these forts with a hopeful eye. I saw the fatal sentry

alluded to, Colonel Gouvion, on an upper battery of Jeffery's Hook.

I also saw a small vessel playing off this Hook, but quite a trifling

thing, without guns, and but two men on board. Nothing else on the river

but the usual guards of spiting devil.

As you have been pleased to consult me on the choice of an

adjutant-general, I will repeat here, my dear general, that though I

have a claim upon General Hand, in every other point of view, his zeal,

obedience, and love of discipline, have given me a very good opinion of

him.

Colonel Smith has been by me wholly employed in that line, and I can

assure you that he will perfectly answer your purpose.

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