NAPLES AND THE PAPAL STATES IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY
The Papal States during the Schism and Ladislas of Naples—Martin V.
returns to Rome—Succession question in Naples—Troubles of Eugenius
IV.—War in Naples between Réné of Anjou and Alfonso of
Aragon—Victory of Alfonso V.—Last years of Eugenius IV.—Nicolas
V.—Calixtus III.—Death of Alfonso V. of Naples—Pius II.—Congress of
Mantua—War in Naples between Ferrante and John of Calabria—Death of
Pius II. at Ancona—Paul II.—Sixtus IV. and his nephews—War with
Florence—Relations with Ferrara and Venice—Disorders in
Rome—Innocent VIII.—Rising against Ferrante in Naples—Election of
Alexander VI.—His alliance with Naples.
Boniface IX. was the ablest and most successful of the Roman popes
during the Schism. The impotence into which [Sidenote: The Papal States
and Ladislas of Naples.] the temporal authority of the papacy had fallen
may be judged by the fact that Boniface found it advisable or necessary
to sell the vicariate, _i.e._ the right to exercise authority in the
Pope’s name, to the despots who had usurped lordship in the various
cities. Yet this very sale, though it seemed to legalise acts of
violence and rebellion, brought with it some advantages besides filling
the Pope’s coffers. The purchase of rights was in itself an
acknowledgment that the Pope possessed them, and this could be employed
some day against the purchasers. And in several ways Boniface directly
increased his power. He induced the citizens of Rome, always as greedy
of papal wealth as they were jealous of papal rule, to invite him to
take up his residence in his capital on terms which ruined the
foundations of republican liberties. He aided Ladislas of Naples to gain
his final victory over Louis II. of Anjou in 1399 (_vide_ p. 155), and
Ladislas repaid his obligation by helping the Pope to suppress
formidable risings of the Roman barons. On the death of Gian Galeazzo
Visconti, he succeeded in recovering for the papacy the towns of
Bologna, Perugia, and Assisi, which had fallen under the sway of the
duke of Milan. But Boniface bequeathed to his successors one very
serious difficulty. Ladislas of Naples, who owed his crown to papal
support, conceived the plan of extending his kingdom at the expense of
the papacy, and even of reducing the papal states under his personal
rule. His first attempt to stir up rebellion in Rome, in order that he
might intervene for his own profit in the struggle, resulted in the
expulsion of Innocent VII. and the sack of the Vatican, but the citizens
hastened to come to terms with the Pope when they discovered that the
only alternative to his rule was subjection to Naples (1405). Another
opportunity offered itself in 1407, when Gregory XII. left Rome in order
to simulate willingness to confer with Benedict XIII. for the closing of
the schism. Ladislas had no wish that the schism should end, not only
because its continuance facilitated his schemes of aggression, but also
because it strengthened his position in Naples. The movement for union
had its chief strength in France, and any successful intervention of
France in Italy would lead to a new attempt to gain Naples for the
younger house of Anjou. In 1408 Ladislas seized Rome, and practically
made himself master of the papal states. But to some extent his plan
miscarried. Gregory XII., it is true, pleaded events in Rome as a reason
for avoiding a conference, but his cardinals deserted him and joined
with those of Benedict to hold a council at Pisa (_vide_ p. 199). The
attempt of Ladislas to disperse the Council by invading Tuscany was
foiled by the resistance of Florence, and the Assembly proceeded to
depose the two existing popes and to elect Alexander V. Baldassare
Cossa, the papal legate in Bologna, who combined the training and habits
of a _condottiere_ with the office of cardinal, undertook the task of
recovering Rome and of punishing the prince who still adhered to the
cause of Gregory XII. Rome was captured at the beginning of 1410, but
Alexander V. died in May, and the all-powerful Cossa was elected to
succeed him as John XXIII. The new pope entered Rome in triumph in 1411,
and his first act was to despatch a powerful army under Braccio, Sforza,
and other famous generals, to support the cause of Louis of Anjou in
Naples. A great victory was won at Rocca-Secca (May 19, 1411), but the
delay of the conquerors enabled Ladislas to rally his forces, and before
long to gain the upper hand. Louis II. abandoned the enterprise in
despair. Attendolo Sforza deserted to the side of the Neapolitan king,
and John XXIII. made peace with his enemy in 1412, the one abandoning
the cause of Gregory XII., the other promising to disown the duke of
Anjou. But Ladislas had no intention of observing the peace. As soon as
his preparations were completed, he again marched upon Rome in 1413, and
drove John XXIII. in hasty and undignified flight to Florence. This
crushing disaster forced the Pope into those appeals for aid to
Sigismund, which ultimately led to the summons of the Council of
Constance and to his own ignominious deposition. But in August 1414,
before the Council had begun its session, Ladislas died, leaving his
crown to his sister, Joanna II., and the scheme of subjecting the papal
states to Naples perished with him. The citizens of Rome expelled Sforza
and his troops from the city, and welcomed the return of a papal legate.
When unity was at last restored to the Church by the election of Martin
V., the new Pope had a very cheerless prospect [Sidenote: Martin V.,
1417-1431.] before him. His obvious task was to restore to the papacy
some measure of the authority and influence which had been forfeited by
its experiences during the last hundred years. To do this he must find a
residence in which he would be more secure than his recent predecessors
from the dictation of secular rulers. Sigismund urged him to reside in
some German city, and the French would have welcomed him to Avignon. But
Martin, himself a Roman by birth, refused to find a home except in the
ancient capital of the world. Rightly or wrongly, he decided that
temporal dominion in a state of his own was necessary to secure the
independence of the Pope, and that to attain this he must recover and
consolidate the papal provinces in Italy. The whole history of the
papacy during the fifteenth century was moulded by this decision. The
popes became more and more absorbed in the extension of their temporal
power, even when their spiritual authority was weakened by it. Nepotism
and other evils were the result of this devotion to secular interests,
and a revolt of outraged and alienated opinion became inevitable.
But Martin had many difficulties to overcome before he could carry out
his intention of taking up his abode in Rome. [Sidenote: Martin returns
to Rome.] The departure of John XXIII. to Constance had left the papal
states in the condition of anarchy which had become chronic. Neapolitan
influence was still strong, but the policy of Naples was no longer
directed by the strong will of Ladislas. His sister and successor,
Joanna II., was devoid of political capacity, and abandoned herself to
sensual indulgence and the guidance of favourites. Through her
incompetence the chief influence over the destinies of Naples was
allowed to fall into the hands of the two great _condottieri_, Braccio
da Montone and Attendolo Sforza, who had been brought into rivalry by
their connection with Neapolitan affairs during the previous reign.
Braccio, who had quarrelled with Ladislas, and joined John XXIII., had
been left by that Pope as governor of Bologna. After the departure of
his employer he seized his native city of Perugia and set himself to
carve a private principality out of the states of the Church. In 1417 he
actually made himself master of Rome, and was besieging the castle of
St. Angelo, when Sforza was despatched from Naples to compel his
retirement. These events forced Martin V. on his accession to ally
himself with Joanna and Sforza, and a treaty was arranged in 1419 by
which Naples was to restore all that had been occupied in the papal
states. But a quarrel between Joanna and Sforza deprived this treaty of
all importance, and Martin determined to coerce and distract Naples by
encouraging internal feuds in that kingdom. As Joanna was childless, the
question of the succession to a crown [Sidenote: Succession question in
Naples.] which had already been so hotly disputed was certain to give
rise to difficulties. Louis II. of Anjou, the rival of Ladislas, had
died in 1417; but his eldest son, Louis III., was eager to enforce his
father’s claim and to purchase the support of the papacy. Martin V. and
Sforza declared their recognition of Louis as heir to the kingdom. But
Joanna, indignant at this attempt to force a successor upon her, turned
to a family whose rivalry with her own dynasty was older than that of
the younger house of Anjou. Alfonso of Aragon had become king of Sicily
in 1409, and was not likely to refuse the prospect of a notable increase
of his power in the Mediterranean by the acquisition of Naples. He
eagerly accepted the offer of Joanna to adopt him as her heir, and he
induced Braccio to enter his service in order to oppose Sforza. Thus
civil war was kindled in Naples, and its outbreak gave the Pope the
opportunity for which he had been waiting. Leaving Florence, where he
had resided since his departure from Constance, he made his way to Rome
in September 1420. There he set himself to put an [Sidenote: Rule of
Martin V.] end to disorders and to strengthen the foundations of papal
rule. The exhaustion of the combatants in Naples, and the successive
deaths of Braccio and Sforza in 1424, freed him from the danger of any
intervention from the south. Alfonso abandoned the contest for a time,
and Joanna agreed to recognise the claim of Louis of Anjou to be
regarded as her successor. Perugia and the other territories of Braccio
returned on his death to their allegiance to the Pope. In Rome itself
Martin had one source of strength in the support of his own family of
Colonna, though their advancement to places of dignity and importance
was certain to create difficulties for his successor. Once secure in his
temporal dominions, the Pope was free to turn his attention to the
general affairs of the Church. The first council which he was bound to
summon by the decrees of Constance met at Siena, and was adroitly
managed so as to avoid any further limitation of papal authority. By
putting himself at the head of the movement to crush the Hussites, and
by appointing a papal legate to lead the armies against the heretics,
Martin tried to recover for the papacy the position which it had enjoyed
in the time of the great crusades of the Middle Ages. But the crusading
spirit was dead in Europe, and the successive victories of the Bohemians
not only frustrated his designs, but also compelled him to summon a
Council to meet at Basel shortly before his own death on February 20,
1431.
Eugenius IV., who was unanimously elected to succeed Martin V., had a
troubled pontificate of sixteen years. He [Sidenote: Troubles of
Eugenius IV.] at once set himself to deprive the Colonna family of the
predominance which they had acquired in Rome through the favour of his
predecessor; but he could only accomplish this by an alliance with the
Orsini, and he thus revived the old feuds among the Roman barons which
it was the interest and the duty of the popes to check. Very soon after
his accession he engaged in a bitter quarrel with the Council of Basel,
and he completely failed in his endeavour to detach Sigismund from the
cause of the Council as the price of conferring the imperial crown upon
that prince. To make matters worse, he allowed his sympathies with his
native city of Venice to involve him in a quarrel with Filippo Maria
Visconti of Milan. In 1433 the climax of his misfortunes seemed to be
reached, when a combination of Milanese hostility with domestic
discontent drove him to fly in disguise from Rome, and to seek refuge in
Florence. These accumulated disasters compelled him to adopt a humbler
tone towards the Council of Basel, which was conducting negotiations
with the Bohemians as if its authority completely superseded that of the
Pope.
About this time the succession dispute in Naples gave rise to a
prolonged war. Louis III. of Anjou died in 1434, but [Sidenote: War of
Angevins and Aragonese in Naples.] Joanna made a new will in favour of
his younger brother Réné of Provence. Soon afterwards the queen herself
died, on February 2, 1435. Alfonso V. at once came forward to assert his
own claims against those of Réné, and the Neapolitan baronage was
divided into the factions of Anjou and Aragon. It was impossible for the
papacy to remain neutral in a struggle which so intimately concerned its
own interests. Eugenius began by claiming the kingdom as a fief which
had lapsed to its suzerain on the extinction of the line of papal
vassals. But he soon dropped this claim and reverted to the normal
policy of supporting the Angevin candidate. At first, events seemed to
turn decisively in favour of Réné. A Genoese fleet, fighting on his
side, won a great naval victory off the island of Ponza, in which
Alfonso himself was taken prisoner. But in a personal interview with
Filippo Maria Visconti, who claimed the captive by virtue of his
suzerainty over Genoa, Alfonso convinced him that it would be impolitic
either to strengthen the papacy which was allied with Venice, or to
establish French influence in Southern Italy. By these arguments he not
only secured his own release, but also laid the foundations of a durable
alliance between his own dynasty and the dukes of Milan. From this time
the fortunes of war turned steadily in favour of the Aragonese party,
though it was not till 1442 that Réné finally abandoned the contest, and
Alfonso V. was formally recognised as king of Naples. His accession
reunited for a time the crowns of Naples and Sicily, which had been
separated since the Sicilian Vespers in 1282 (see p. 25).
So far Eugenius had met with little but failure and disappointment. He
gained an apparent victory over the Council of Basel when he induced the
Greeks to conduct the negotiations for a union of eastern and western
churches at a rival council which met first at Ferrara, [Sidenote: Later
years of Eugenius IV.] and later in Florence. But the treaty which was
settled at the Council was repudiated by public opinion in Greece, and
the Pope gained little real advantage from the parade of negotiations
which proved abortive. Yet the later years of his pontificate were more
successful than seemed likely from the beginning. Rome did not long
enjoy the republican liberty which the citizens claimed to have
recovered on the Pope’s departure. The warlike Cardinal Vitelleschi
succeeded by 1435 in reducing the capital to submission. So successful
were the rigorous and cruel measures of the legate that Eugenius
suspected him of a design to establish his own power in the papal
states. In 1440 Vitelleschi was imprisoned and died, either from poison
or from the wounds he received in the struggle with his captors.
Scarampo, who took his place, maintained his authority by the same means
as his predecessor had employed. In 1443 Eugenius was able to quit
Florence and to return to Rome in perfect security. He gained the
alliance of Naples by recognising the title of Alfonso V. But his
greatest triumph was the inauguration of the negotiations with Germany,
through the medium of Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, which led to the
failure and humiliation of the Council of Basel. The final treaty was
practically concluded, though still unsigned, when Eugenius died, on
February 23, 1447.
Thomas of Sarzana, who succeeded to the papacy as Nicolas V., had
already won a considerable reputation as a [Sidenote: Nicolas V.,
1447-1455.] student of ancient literature. Though he was rather a
diligent collector of manuscripts and works of art than an original
scholar, his patronage made Rome for a time the centre of humanist
culture. His greatest work was the foundation of the Vatican library. As
a politician Nicolas showed less ability and interest than as a student,
but he was a sincere lover of peace, and he was able to maintain the
position which Eugenius had won in his later years. He concluded the
concordat with Germany, which put an end to the revolt originating with
the Council of Basel, and the Council itself came to an ignominious end
in 1449. In 1450 Nicolas celebrated the restoration of unity, and
conciliated the Roman people, by a grand jubilee which brought the
wealth of Europe to the eternal city. In spite of this general
rejoicing, the next year witnessed a famous conspiracy against the
secular authority of the Pope. Stefano Porcaro was a Roman noble who had
won the favour of Nicolas by his devotion to ancient literature. But
these studies led Porcaro, as they had previously led Rienzi, to an
enthusiastic admiration of republican liberty. When he endeavoured to
inspire the people with his opinions he was banished by the Pope to
Bologna. Thence he returned secretly to Rome and organised a plot to
imprison the Pope and cardinals, and to restore the republic, with
Porcaro as tribune. More than four hundred persons were engaged in the
scheme, and the number proved fatal to secrecy. Porcaro and nine of his
followers were imprisoned in the castle of St. Angelo and executed
without trial. After an interval of a few days harsh measures were
resumed, and a number of suspected persons shared the same fate. This
severity extinguished the last active desire to restore Roman liberty.
Papal rule was strengthened by the failure of the plot; but Porcaro’s
name, like that of Rienzi, lived long in the affections of the people.
No sooner was this crisis passed than the news came that Constantinople
had been taken by Mohammed II. in 1453. The empire had long ceased to
possess any general authority in Europe, but the papacy still claimed to
represent that unity of Christendom, whose disappearance had rendered
such a catastrophe possible. It was upon the papacy, therefore, that the
chief discredit fell of so notable a triumph for the infidel. But
Nicolas V. had no ability to cope with such a vast problem as was
involved in the union of the jarring interests of European states for
the purpose of joint resistance to the Turks. Unable to devise any
practical scheme, he gave himself up to despair, lamented that fate had
raised him from a private station, and died in 1455.
After the death of Nicolas V. the choice of the cardinals fell upon
Alfonso Borgia, who took the name of Calixtus III. [Sidenote: Calixtus
III., 1455-1458.] He was a native of the Aragonese province of Valencia,
and had been rewarded with the cardinalate for services rendered to the
papacy in negotiations with Alfonso V. Although over seventy years of
age, Calixtus showed creditable energy in urging the princes of Europe
to war against the Turks, and he had the consolation of hearing of the
signal victory of John Hunyadi, when Mohammed II. was repulsed from the
walls of Belgrad in 1456. But the pontificate of Calixtus is mainly
noteworthy for the elevation of a relative who was destined to involve
the papacy in the gravest scandals. Nepotism was a natural result of the
secular aims of the fifteenth century popes. As long as the popes had
been the active heads of Christendom their energies were fully employed
in carrying out a great task. But they were now little more than
temporal princes, and their position differed from that of other princes
in the impossibility of transmitting their power to a dynasty, and in
the brief period of rule which was possible for men elected in advanced
years. Hence there was a serious temptation to the popes to aggrandise
their relatives at the expense of the Church or of neighbouring princes,
and thus to confer those advantages upon their family which a secular
prince could bring about by the normal action of hereditary succession.
Calixtus had three nephews, the sons of a sister and a man called
Lenzuoli. These young men were allowed to take the maternal name of
Borgia, and their interests were vigorously forwarded by their uncle.
Two were appointed cardinals, to the great scandal of the College and of
Roman opinion; and one of these, Rodrigo Borgia, became the notorious
Pope Alexander VI. The third nephew received the title of duke of
Spoleto, and the offices of Gonfalonier of the Church and prefect of
Rome.
Before the death of Calixtus important events had taken place in Naples.
Alfonso V., after the prolonged war which secured him the throne, had
enjoyed a singularly peaceful reign. The personal charm which had
enabled him to gain over Filippo Maria Visconti also served to win the
affection of his subjects; and his court was rendered famous not only by
its magnificence, but also by the eminence of the scholars who were
attracted to Naples by royal patronage. But Alfonso’s death, in June
1458, threatened a revival of dynastic struggles in southern Italy. As
he had no lawful issue, his hereditary kingdoms of Aragon and Sicily
passed to his brother, John II. But Alfonso claimed the right to dispose
of Naples as a private acquisition of his own, and bequeathed the
kingdom to his illegitimate son, Ferrante. The Neapolitans themselves
were not at first inclined to resent an arrangement which freed them
from a connection with Aragon and Sicily which might be regarded as
subjection. But it was obvious that the accession of a bastard would
encourage the house of Anjou to revive its claim, while the legitimate
line in Aragon could always assert the same right to Naples which had
been vindicated by Alfonso himself. It was therefore of great importance
to Ferrante to obtain recognition from the Pope, who claimed to be
suzerain of Naples, and he had some right to demand it with confidence
from Calixtus, who was born a subject of Aragon. But the Pope, whether
he remembered the traditional Angevin alliance of the papacy, or whether
he sought in the spoils of Naples for new means of advancing his
nephews, refused to recognise Ferrante, and claimed to dispose of the
kingdom as a vacant papal fief. Before, however, he could make any
efficient opposition to the new king, he was removed by death on August
6, 1458.
The choice of the cardinals now fell upon the most remarkable Pope of
the century, Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini, who adopted the Virgilian
epithet of Pius as his papal [Sidenote: Pius II., 1458-64.] name. In his
youth Æneas Sylvius had lived a gay and not too decorous life. The
author of the novel of _Euryalus and Lucretia_, and the confidant of the
amours of princes, he had first achieved political distinction at the
Council of Basel. There his literary and oratorical ability had given
him a position of recognised eminence; but when the cause of the Council
began to decline, he had entered the service of Frederick III., and had
played by far the most prominent part in effecting a reconciliation
between Germany and the papacy. For these services he had been rewarded
by Nicolas V. with the bishopric of Siena, his native city, and by
Calixtus III. with the cardinal’s hat. Raised to the papacy, he set
himself to destroy the last traces of conciliar opposition to Roman
supremacy, and with this object in view he strained every nerve to put
himself at the head of a great crusading movement against the Turks. His
career is full of strange contradictions, and the contrast has often
been drawn between his unscrupulous youth and early manhood and the
austere enthusiasm which he displayed as Pope. He himself was fully
sensible of the incongruity, and in his famous recantation he urged his
hearers to cast away Æneas and take Pius in his place: _Æneam rejicite,
Pium accipite_.
As peace was absolutely necessary for any action against the Turks, the
first act of Pius was to reverse the policy of his predecessor, and to
recognise Ferrante as _de facto_ king of Naples, though he was careful
to avoid any formal decision on the question of legal right. In 1459 he
summoned a congress of Western princes to meet at [Sidenote: Congress of
Mantua.] Mantua, in the confident hope that his eloquence would prove as
effective as that of Peter the Hermit in the eleventh century. On the
appointed date the Pope and his personal followers found themselves
alone in Mantua. After a month’s anxious delay, some ambassadors and a
few German and Italian princes appeared, and the Congress was declared
open. But the Pope soon discovered that his hopes had been far too
sanguine; and after much eloquence had been expended in invectives
against the Turks, the Congress broke up without achieving anything.
There is no need to seek far for the causes of the failure of the
Mantuan Congress. The growth of nations, with separate and often
conflicting interests of their own, had destroyed all the conditions
which had rendered possible the crusades of the Middle Ages. There were
also special causes at the time which rendered it difficult for Pius II.
to gain any real support for his schemes. The French were angry with the
Pope for having prejudiced the Angevin claims to Naples by his
recognition of Ferrante. Pius replied to the remonstrances of the French
envoys by attacking the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges; and though he
might claim a dialectical victory, such discussions were not conducive
to a good understanding with France. Even Frederick III., the old patron
of Æneas Sylvius, was at this time dissatisfied with the Pope for
refusing to support his claims to the Hungarian crown, which had gone to
the son of John Hunyadi, Mathias Corvinus. In Germany there were still
traces of that spirit of opposition to the papacy which had been both a
cause and a result of the conciliar movement; and Pius II. chose this
moment to exasperate the German princes who shared these opinions by
issuing from Mantua the bull _Execrabilis_, by which he condemned as
detestable heresy any future appeal from the bishop of Rome to a general
council.
Just at this very time there broke out the war in Naples, which the Pope
had endeavoured to avert. The Neapolitan [Sidenote: War in Naples.]
barons revolted against the harsh rule of Ferrante, and appealed for aid
to the house of Anjou. Réné le Bon was unwilling to quit his luxurious
life in Provence; but his son John, titular duke of Calabria, was at
once more capable and more ambitious. From Genoa, which was at this time
under French suzerainty, John sailed to the Neapolitan coast, and was
speedily joined by a large number of partisans. Hostilities in Naples
were fatal to the crusading schemes of Pius II. In spite of his desire
to avoid a quarrel with France, he could not withdraw his support from
Ferrante, and he was further attached to the Aragonese cause by the
influence of Francesco Sforza, who feared that an Angevin triumph in the
south might encourage the duke of Orleans to advance a claim to Milan.
But in spite of the aid of the Pope and of Sforza, the cause of Ferrante
did not at first prosper. John gained an important victory at Sarno on
July 7, 1460; and his general, Jacopo Piccinino, also succeeded in
defeating the Aragonese forces. But in the next year there was a very
decided turn of fortune. The death of Charles VII. gave the French
throne to Louis XI., who was ill disposed towards his Angevin relatives,
while he was a warm admirer of Francesco Sforza. Genoa had already
repudiated the French control, and before long Louis agreed to transfer
his claims over Genoa to the duke of Milan. Thus John of Calabria, who
had brought with him few men and little money, was deprived of the
prospect of aid from France. His Neapolitan supporters began to desert
him after his first reverse in 1462, and in 1464 John was compelled to
abandon the enterprise as hopeless and return to France. His brief but
adventurous career is full of incident. He sought to punish Louis XI.
for his desertion by joining the League of the Public Weal. When that
war was over, he carried on his quarrel with the house of Aragon by
joining the Catalans in their revolt against John II. In that quarrel he
met his death in 1469. Four years later his only son, Nicolas, also
died, and the male descendants of Réné of Provence came to an end. The
house of Anjou was now represented only by Réné himself; by his
daughters, Yolande and Margaret, who had married respectively Frederick
of Vaudemont and Henry VI. of England; and by his brother’s son, Charles
of Maine. Of the two daughters, Margaret had lost her only son, Edward,
at Tewkesbury in 1471; but Yolande had a son, called Réné after his
grandfather, who was engaged in defending the duchy of Lorraine against
the attacks of Charles the Bold of Burgundy. When the old Réné died in
1480, he disinherited this grandson, who was then his only descendant,
in favour of his nephew Charles of Maine, with the further provision
that on the extinction of the latter’s line the inheritance should pass
to the French crown. In the next year Charles of Maine died without
children, and by virtue of this will Provence and Bar were seized by
Louis XI. At a later date Charles VIII. was induced to found upon his
succession to the house of Anjou a claim to the crown of Naples, which
inaugurated a new epoch, not only in the relations between France and
Italy, but also in the international politics of Europe.
During the war in Naples Pius II. had despaired of a crusade, and with
characteristic ingenuity and self-confidence he devised a new scheme for
securing the victory of the cross over the crescent. The eloquence which
had failed to arouse the princes of Europe might prove more successful
with their heathen opponent. He drew up and despatched a lengthy epistle
to Mohammed II., urging him to become a Christian, and promising on that
condition to confirm him in possession of the eastern empire, as his
predecessors had given the empire of the west to Charles the Great. As
far as we know the Sultan returned no answer to this unique proposal.
But the pacification of Naples by the victory of Ferrante, and the
growing uneasiness of Venice at the continuance of Turkish aggression in
Greece and the Archipelago, encouraged the Pope to resume his more
warlike plans. In 1463 he concluded an alliance with the Venetians and
Mathias Corvinus of Hungary. He renewed his exhortations to a general
crusade, and declared his intention of leading it in person. In 1464 he
went to Ancona, which had been fixed for the meeting of the crusading
forces. Again the aged Pope met with a bitter disappointment. The only
crusaders at Ancona were a few adventurers who had nothing to lose, and
hoped to make their profit out of the papal treasures. At last, on
August 12, the Venetian fleet approached the harbour, and Pius was
carried to the window to witness its entry. This effort was [Sidenote:
Death of Pius II. at Ancona.] his last, and two days later he died,
straining his eyes eastward, and with his last breath urging the
prosecution of the crusade. The poignant contrasts of his career were
conspicuous to the last. Æneas Sylvius, careless, light-hearted, and
untroubled by moral scruples, had faithfully represented the new epoch
in which he lived. Pius II., enthusiastic, gloomy, and passionate, seems
to be the ghost risen from the Middle Ages, which were dead.
The pontificate of Paul II. was short and comparatively uneventful. He
belonged to the Venetian family of the [Sidenote: Paul II., 1464-71.]
Barbi, and his election seemed likely to cement that alliance between
the papacy and the maritime republic on which Pius II. had ultimately
relied for resistance to the Turkish advance. But Paul acquiesced
without much protest in the failure of his predecessor’s plans; and by
urging Hungary into war with the heretical George Podiebrad of Bohemia,
he rendered impossible even a league of eastern princes against the
infidel. Paul’s name is also associated with a so-called persecution of
the humanists, because he imprisoned some members of the Roman academy
who had talked vaguely and irresponsibly of a restoration of the
republic. But it is absurd to treat a simple measure of internal police
as evidence of a definite and far-reaching policy, or as marking a
reaction from the patronage of letters by Nicolas V. The whole episode
has attracted more attention than it deserves through the interested
emphasis of the chronicler, Platina, who has exaggerated both his own
sufferings and his own importance. Paul II. was a true Pope of the
Renaissance, looking at affairs from an intellectual rather than from a
spiritual point of view, and exulting both in his own handsome figure,
which led him to desire the name of Formosus, and in the beauty of the
jewels and carvings of which he was an industrious and intelligent
collector. But he was free from the grosser vices and crimes which have
given notoriety to his successors.
The name of Sixtus IV. might well have been handed down to posterity as
typifying the extreme degradation in which the [Sidenote: Nepotism of
Sixtus IV.] papacy was involved in this century by its absorption in
temporal interests, but that the bolder and more picturesque crimes of
Cæsar Borgia have secured that pre-eminence for the pontificate of
Alexander VI. The aims and actions of Sixtus were those of a secular
prince, and display that cynical disregard of moral considerations which
has been portrayed as the characteristic of the age in the pages of
Machiavelli. No previous Pope had ventured to show so reckless a
determination to use his office for the advancement of his relatives,
and to employ his relatives as a means of strengthening the temporal
power of the papacy. Three of his nephews were the sons of his brother,
Raffaelle della Rovere. The eldest, Lionardo, was made prefect of Rome,
and was married to a natural daughter of Ferrante of Naples. Giuliano
della Rovere, the most capable and vigorous of the family, was raised by
his uncle to be cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula. After playing a
prominent part as the opponent of the two succeeding popes, he gained
the tiara himself as Julius II. The third son, Giovanni, succeeded
Lionardo as prefect of Rome, and Sixtus obtained for him the hand of
Joanna, daughter of Federigo da Montefeltro, duke of Urbino, a marriage
which in the next generation gave the duchy to a della Rovere dynasty.
But the Pope’s most lavish favours were conferred upon the two sons of a
sister, Piero and Girolamo Riario. Piero was made a cardinal at the age
of twenty-five, and received so many preferments, including the
archbishopric of Florence, that he drew a princely revenue from the
Church. He only lived three years after his uncle’s accession, but
during that time he succeeded in startling Europe by the stories of the
extraordinary pomp and debauchery on which he squandered his wealth. The
promotion of Girolamo Riario, a layman, was effected within the papal
states, and had more lasting results. The papal treasure was employed to
purchase for him the lordship of Imola; he was married to Caterina, a
natural daughter of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, and on the extinction of the
Ordelaffi in 1480 his uncle’s support gained for him the city of Forli
with the title of duke. The whole policy of the Pope was directed for
years to the aggrandisement of a youth who proved no more worthy of his
elevation than his brother had been. In 1488 the people of Forli rose
and murdered him, and only the heroism of his widow secured for a time
the continuance of his dynasty.
The obvious intention of the Pope to extend his temporal power and to
abuse it for the aggrandisement of his nephew excited the misgivings of
the neighbouring states, and especially of Florence, which was at this
time under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici. In order to remove this
obstacle from their way, Sixtus and Riario organised the famous
conspiracy of the Pazzi for the overthrow of the Medici rule. The Pope
asserted his ignorance of any scheme of assassination, but he must have
known that success could hardly be achieved without bloodshed, and his
denial of complicity was a merely formal attempt to save the credit of
the holy see. The plot very narrowly missed its aim: Giuliano de’ Medici
was killed in the cathedral of Florence, but Lorenzo escaped with a
severe wound, and the chief conspirators, including the archbishop of
Pisa, fell victims to the popular fury. Enraged at the failure of his
scheme, Sixtus excommunicated the Florentines for laying violent hands
upon a dignitary of the Church, and formed a league with Ferrante of
Naples for the overthrow of the republic. The disorder in Milan
following the death of [Sidenote: War with Florence.] Galeazzo Maria
Sforza, and the fact that Venice was still engaged in the Turkish war,
deprived Florence of her natural allies, and in 1479 the city was
exposed to serious peril. Lorenzo de’ Medici, however, not only averted
the danger, but dexterously employed it to strengthen his authority. At
considerable personal risk, he undertook a journey to Naples, and
succeeded in negotiating a peace with Ferrante. Sixtus was at first
inclined to continue the war; but the occupation of Otranto by a Turkish
force in 1480 constituted such a serious menace to Italy, that the
obstinate Pope was forced to come to terms with his opponents and to
withdraw the bull of excommunication against Florence.
The Turkish invasion compelled Ferrante of Naples and his son Alfonso to
withdraw their troops from Tuscany, and [Sidenote: Relations with
Ferrara and Venice, 1482-84.] to concentrate their attention on the
recovery of Otranto. Fortunately for Italy, the death of Mohammed II. on
May 3, 1481, and a dispute as to the Turkish succession, led to the
withdrawal of the invaders, and enabled the Neapolitan rulers to claim a
military triumph which they had done little or nothing to bring about.
But the alliance between Naples and the papacy had been completely
annulled, and Sixtus, as restless as ever, did not scruple to form a new
coalition, which was destined to have momentous results to Italy. Venice
had concluded the treaty of Constantinople with the Turks in 1479, and
was eager to obtain upon Italian soil compensation for its losses in the
east. Hence arose in 1482 an unscrupulous and unprecedented alliance
between the papacy and Venice for the spoliation of Ercole d’Este of
Ferrara. The danger to the balance of power in Italy led to the
formation of a hostile coalition between Naples, Florence, and Milan.
Sixtus IV. soon discovered that he had gained nothing by his change of
allies. Venice had seized the district of Rovigo from Ferrara, but had
obviously no intention of handing over any share of the spoils to
Girolamo Riario. At the same time, Neapolitan troops entered the papal
states and threatened Rome, and there was a risk that the misdeeds of
the papacy might result in the meeting of another general council. The
Pope, whose policy was entirely selfish, did not hesitate to avert the
danger by a sudden and complete change of front. In 1483 he made peace
with Naples and Ferrara, excommunicated the Venetians for disturbing the
peace of Italy, and prepared to seize the cities which Venice had
acquired within the papal dominions. But his restless greed was again
doomed to disappointment. Venice adroitly ended the war by the treaty of
Bagnolo, in which the only loser was the unfortunate duke of Ferrara,
and Sixtus was chagrined to find that he had gained absolutely nothing
by his ill-faith. Soon afterwards he died on August 12, 1484, and
contemporary lampoons declared that he died of peace.
‘Nulla vis potuit sævum extinguere Sixtum:
Audito tantum nomine pacis, obit.’
In Rome itself the pontificate of Sixtus IV. had been as turbulent as
his foreign relations. The great families, and especially the Colonnas,
had opposed the advancement of the Pope’s nephews, and had thus drawn on
themselves the wrath of Sixtus. A long civil war ensued, [Sidenote:
Disorders in Rome.] in which the barons allied themselves with the
foreign enemies of the Pope, at one time with Florence, at another with
Naples or with Venice. In this war Sixtus displayed all his cold-blooded
cruelty and treachery. The stronghold of his enemies was the castle of
Marino, which was surrendered by Lorenzo Colonna on condition that he
should be restored to his family. Sixtus fulfilled his promise by
sending them his corpse. The mother appeared at the papal court, and
producing her son’s head, exclaimed, ‘See how a Pope keeps faith!’ It
was a graphic picture of the terrible degradation of Rome by the Pope’s
abandonment of spiritual aims for temporal ambition. Directly the Pope’s
death was known, the Colonnas headed a rising which sacked the palaces
of the Riarios and drove their adherents from Rome.
The character of Innocent VIII. has been painted by some historians in
blacker colours than it deserves. It is true that [Sidenote: Innocent
VIII., 1484-92.] he was the first Pope who recognised his own children,
but they seem to have been born before he took orders, and his devotion
to them did not involve him in such scandals as disgrace his predecessor
and his successor. The principality of Anguillara was purchased for his
son, Franceschetto Cibo, but the latter was more interested in gaining
money than power, and his first act after his father’s death was to sell
his territories to Virginio Orsino. Innocent himself had little capacity
and little interest in politics. He spent great part of his time in a
state of lethargy, which not infrequently gave the appearance of death.
Among those who exercised a dominant influence over the feeble Pope was
Lorenzo de’ Medici, who married his daughter Maddalena to Franceschetto
Cibo, and as a part of the bargain, obtained the cardinal’s hat for his
second son, Giovanni, at the age of fourteen. It was under Innocent
VIII. that the Medici obtained that position at the papal court which
enabled them to produce two almost successive popes, Leo X. and Clement
VII., and enabled these popes to use the power of the Church to suppress
the liberties of their native city.
By far the greatest difficulty of Innocent VIII.’s pontificate was
connected with Naples. Ever since the withdrawal of [Sidenote: Rising of
Neapolitan barons.] John of Calabria in 1464, the bastard house of
Aragon had enjoyed undisputed possession of the Neapolitan throne.
Jacopo Piccinino, the _condottiere_, who had been formidable in the
previous struggle, was enticed to Naples by Ferrante with the aid of
Francesco Sforza, and was treacherously put to death in 1465. At the
time of his alliance with Sixtus IV. against Lorenzo de’ Medici,
Ferrante had succeeded in reducing his tribute to his papal suzerain to
the annual gift of a white horse. The freedom from external danger
enabled the king to make the royal authority despotic, and to annul the
independence of the feudal nobles. His son, Alfonso of Calabria, gained
an undeserved military reputation by the withdrawal of the Turks from
Otranto, and from that time was associated with his father in the
government. Under his influence the royal rule became even more
tyrannical and oppressive, and in 1485 the barons determined to rebel.
Innocent VIII., who desired to extort the old tribute from Naples which
his predecessor had commuted, espoused their cause, and Venice, always
hostile to the house of Aragon, gave secret assistance. It was decided
to revive the Angevin pretensions, and Réné of Lorraine, the grandson of
Réné le Bon, was invited to come to Italy as a claimant of the crown for
which his ancestors had so long contended. But the rebellion ended in
complete failure. Neither Florence nor Milan would consent to such a
disturbance of the normal relations of Italy as would be involved in
French intervention. The military force of the Neapolitan rulers was
overwhelming, and Alfonso, for the second time, led an army against
Rome. To complete the disasters of the Pope and his allies, Réné of
Lorraine, who was engaged in prosecuting a hopeless claim upon Provence
at the French court, allowed the opportunity of gaining Naples to slip
from his hands. But the mere threat of a French invasion was enough to
induce Ferrante and Alfonso to come to terms. The Pope was bought off by
the restoration of the former tribute, and the Neapolitan barons,
deprived of all hope of assistance, submitted on the understanding that
a full amnesty should be granted to them. The promise was broken with
that cynical disregard of good faith which marked the politics of Italy
in the fifteenth century. The nobles who returned to Naples were
imprisoned, and were never again seen alive. The sole survivors were
those who preferred to remain in exile rather than trust the rulers whom
they had endeavoured to depose. These men eagerly watched for an
opportunity which might enable them at once to avenge the death of their
associates and to regain their own confiscated territories. In 1493 they
were at last enabled to act. The death of Lorenzo de’ Medici, and the
growing alienation of Ludovico Sforza from Naples, removed some of the
chief securities for peace in Italy. By the advice of Venice the
Neapolitan exiles petitioned for the intervention, not of the duke of
Lorraine, but of the French king, Charles VIII. Before any final
decision had been come to at the French court, Ferrante had died on
January 25, 1494, and Alfonso II. was left to face the danger of which
his own violence and misrule had been the principal cause.
Innocent VIII. had not lived to witness this new crisis in the history
of Naples. His death in 1492 had been followed by a very important
election. The most prominent candidates for the suffrages of the
conclave were Ascanio Sforza, the brother of Ludovico, and Giuliano
della Rovere, the nephew of Sixtus IV. But neither could obtain the
requisite majority, and in the end Ascanio Sforza was bribed to support
the candidature of the wealthiest of the Roman cardinals, Rodrigo
Borgia, a nephew of Calixtus III. The well-known fact that he had
several natural children, born to him not only since he was a priest,
but since he had been a cardinal, seems to have been completely
disregarded. [Sidenote: Election of Alexander VI.] A lavish expenditure
of money and promises secured his election, and he assumed the title of
Alexander VI. The first great problem which the new Pope had to solve
concerned the approaching struggle in Naples. In spite of his
obligations to Ascanio Sforza, and his antagonism to the Orsini, who
were closely connected at this time with the house of Aragon, Alexander
allowed himself to be drawn in 1493 into an alliance with Ferrante, and
on his death he recognised the title of Alfonso II. The French invasion,
which the Pope was thus pledged to resist, threatened the papacy for
some time with serious dangers; but in the end it proved one of the
chief circumstances which enabled Alexander himself, and afterwards
Julius II., to erect the temporal power upon firmer foundations than any
of their predecessors had been able to construct.