MILAN AND VENICE IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY, 1402-1494
Disruption of the duchy of Milan after the death of Gian Galeazzo
Visconti—Venice acquires Eastern Lombardy as far as the Adige—Wars
between Venice and Sigismund—Filippo Maria Visconti restores the
duchy of Milan—Wars between Venice and Milan—Venetian frontier
extended to the Adda—Death of Filippo Maria—Venice and Francesco
Sforza—Peace of Lodi—Deposition and death of Francesco
Foscari—Venice and the Turks—Treaty of Constantinople—War with
Ferrara—Acquisition of Cyprus—Decline of Venice—Francesco Sforza in
Milan—His relations with France—Galeazzo Maria Sforza—His
assassination—Regency of Bona of Savoy—Ludovico il Moro—His
relations with Naples—Calls in Charles VIII. of France.
The anarchy in the duchy of Milan, which followed the death of Gian
Galeazzo Visconti in 1402, illustrates at once [Sidenote: Disruption of
the duchy of Milan.] the ability of its founder and the difficulties
which he had succeeded in overcoming. He left his dominions to his two
legitimate sons, Gian Maria and Filippo Maria, who were to rule in Milan
and Pavia respectively under the guardianship of their mother. But the
widowed duchess, Caterina, proved wholly unable to wield the power which
her husband left in her hands. The _condottieri_, who had shown such
unwonted loyalty to Gian Galeazzo, seized the opportunity to carve out
principalities for themselves. In nearly every city of Lombardy the
lordship was seized by some adventurer, who sought to make himself
independent. In Milan itself the cruelties with which Caterina sought to
put down disorder provoked an insurrection. The duchess was imprisoned
and poisoned (1404), and Gian Maria was intrusted with the government
under the guidance of a council of citizens. But Gian Maria carried the
cruelty and debauchery of his predecessors to the verge of insanity. The
only use which he made of his power was to gratify his monstrous
passions by the torture of his fellow-creatures. At last some semblance
of order was restored by Facino Cane, one of the most eminent generals
in the service of Gian Galeazzo. On the death of his employer he had
made himself master of Alessandria, Tortona, and other western towns.
Later he had assumed the regency for Filippo Maria in Pavia, and he now
reduced Gian Maria to similar submission. This authority he held till
his death, when the Milanese nobles, rather than allow Gian Maria to
recover the government, assassinated that youthful monster in 1412.
These disorders in Lombardy naturally led to the loss of the southern
acquisitions of Gian Galeazzo. The hostility [Sidenote: Losses in
Romagna and Tuscany.] of Pope Boniface IX. had to be bought off by the
restoration of Bologna and Perugia to the papal states (1403). Siena
recovered its republican liberties in 1404, and Paolo Guinigi maintained
his rule in Lucca as an independent prince. Pisa, the most important of
the Milanese conquests, had been bequeathed by Gian Galeazzo to a
bastard son, Gabriele Maria. But Gabriele, finding himself unable to
face the double danger of Pisan rebellion and Florentine attack, became
the vassal of France in order to gain the aid of Marshal Boucicault, the
French governor in Genoa. Within a year, however, he had quarrelled with
his suzerain: the policy of France ceased to be hostile to Florence: and
so the strange spectacle was seen of Boucicault and Gabriele, in mutual
enmity, selling their sovereign rights to Florence, while the Pisans
repudiated the authority of both and reclaimed their old independence
(1405). The Florentine oligarchy was prompt to seize the opportunity
that had long been looked for, and a strict blockade forced Pisa to
surrender after an obstinate resistance of many months (October 9,
1406). By the reduction of the rival republic, Florence took the first
great stride towards the formation of the later grand duchy of Tuscany.
But the most notable result of the temporary decline of Milan was the
permanent establishment of Venetian dominion in Eastern Lombardy, an
event fraught with the most momentous consequences both for Venice
[Sidenote: Venice acquires Verona and Padua.] and for Italy. Francesco
Carrara, who had recovered Padua in 1390, and had been allowed to retain
it under tribute to Milan (see p. 180), was one of the first princes to
take advantage of Gian Galeazzo’s death to obtain both freedom and
aggrandisement. In alliance with the surviving members of the house of
della Scala he seized Verona, and then got rid of his allies in order to
keep his conquest to himself (1404). From Verona he advanced to the
siege of Vicenza, but the citizens offered the lordship to Venice, while
the duchess Caterina, beset with difficulties in Milan, also appealed
for aid to the maritime republic. This double invitation, together with
the traditional enmity to the Carrara family, overcame any reluctance on
the part of the Venetians. They agreed to aid the duchess on condition
that all Milanese territory to the east of the Adige should be ceded to
them. Caterina accepted the terms, hard as they were, and in June 1404
Venice declared war against the lord of Padua. Vicenza opened its gates
to the Venetians, and in the course of 1405 both Verona and Padua were
compelled to surrender to superior forces. Francesco Carrara was carried
off to die in a Venetian prison.
Venice had now recovered and enormously extended the territories she had
lost in the war of Chioggia. Not only [Sidenote: Venice at war with
Sigismund.] Treviso, Feltre, and Belluno, but Bassano, Verona, Vicenza,
and Padua acknowledged her sway. And before long she was in possession
of another province, Dalmatia, which she had gained from Hungary, and
lost again in the previous century. Pope Boniface IX., engaged in a
quarrel with Sigismund of Hungary, had stirred up Ladislas of Naples to
revive his father’s claim to the Hungarian crown (see pp. 154 and 191).
In 1402 Ladislas had landed at Zara in Dalmatia, and was crowned king by
the papal legate. But his early success was followed by reverses, and,
discouraged by the memory of his father’s fate, Ladislas returned to
Naples. But he was not unwilling to cause annoyance to his successful
rival, and in 1409 he sold his rights in Dalmatia to Venice. This led to
a prolonged war with Sigismund, who in 1411 was recognised as king of
the Romans, and desired to gain distinction and authority in Italy. In
1411 his troops occupied Feltre and Belluno, but they were defeated in
the open field by Carlo Malatesta in the service of Venice. In 1413 a
truce put an end to hostilities for a time, and Sigismund was enabled to
concentrate his attention on ecclesiastical questions and the council of
Constance. But the possession of Dalmatia was still a subject of
dispute, and war was renewed in 1418. Sigismund, however, was occupied
with the difficulties which the execution of Hus had excited in Bohemia,
and Venice met with little efficient opposition. By 1421 the province of
Friuli and almost the whole of the Dalmatian coast were subject to
Venetian rule.
Meanwhile important events had taken place in Milan. On the murder of
his elder brother, Filippo Maria Visconti [Sidenote: Filippo Maria
Visconti.] had emerged from the obscurity in which he had previously
lived, and showed himself not unfitted to fill his father’s place. With
even greater personal cowardice, which induced him to conceal himself
almost entirely from human vision, he combined the same subtle powers of
intrigue, and the same ability to discover and make use of military
talent in others. Only two defects of character prevented him from
achieving the same measure of success as had fallen to Gian Galeazzo. He
was less resolute in the pursuit of his ends, and momentary
discouragement led him at times to relinquish an object when it was
almost within his grasp. And his inveterate habits of suspicion involved
him not infrequently in serious danger by driving into opposition the
men who were capable of rendering him the most valuable services. It was
impossible to be loyal to a prince who distrusted a victorious general
even more than he dreaded to hear of a defeat.
The first act of Filippo Maria was to marry the widow of Facino Cane,
although she was twenty years older than himself. By this means he
acquired Alessandria, Tortona, Novara, and Vercelli, and also the
control of Facino’s numerous and disciplined [Sidenote: He restores the
duchy of Milan.] troops. With their aid he made himself master of Milan
and avenged his brother’s death. Once secure in his position, he did not
scruple to rid himself of his elderly benefactress, whose age rendered
her an unsuitable spouse. In the attack upon Milan he had noted the
courage and conduct of Francesco Carmagnola, who took his name from the
village near Turin where he had been born. He raised the Piedmontese
soldier to the command of his army, and employed him to reduce to
submission the cities which had formerly owned his father’s sway. One
after another the despots who had usurped authority since the death of
Gian Galeazzo were compelled to surrender, and by 1421 the duchy of
Milan extended from Piedmont in the west to the line of the Adige in the
east. Even Genoa, which had freed itself from French rule in 1411, was
forced after a prolonged struggle to acknowledge the suzerainty of
Filippo Maria.
Thus Venice, at the very moment of her successful expansion eastwards,
found herself confronted on her western border by a prince who could
advance weighty claims to the most valuable of her recently acquired
dominions. The republic was thus called upon to [Sidenote: Parties in
Venice.] solve one of the most serious problems of her whole history.
Hitherto power on the mainland had come to her in the course of events;
it had been the product of her obvious interest in protecting her trade
routes and the sources of her supply of food. There had not as yet been
any deliberate going out of her way to seek for territories. But her
most pressing interests were now secured, and the question at once arose
whether she could or would stop at the point which she had reached in
1421. Upon this question were formed the two great parties which divided
Venice during the remainder of the century. The Doge, Tommaso Mocenigo,
who held office from 1414 to 1423, urged the maintenance of the _status
quo_ as the only means of retaining that maritime supremacy which was
essential for the defence of the overwhelming interests of Venice in the
east. To enter into Italian politics as the avowed rival of Milan for
ascendency in Lombardy would inevitably result in handing over the
Levant to the Turks. And if Venice lost her commerce, she would find
territorial dominion, which she could only gain and keep by employing
hired foreigners in place of her own citizens, a very unsatisfactory
source either of wealth or of political greatness. On the other hand,
many of the younger nobles, headed by Francesco Foscari, laid stress
upon the undoubted interests of Venice on the mainland, and upon the
certainty that the duke of Milan would never abandon his claims to
Verona and Padua. They contended with vehemence that the western
frontier as it stood was hopelessly insecure, that a state must either
advance or lose ground, and that aggression is often the only means of
defence. But the policy of this party was really inspired less by these
arguments, sound as they were in some respects, than by the instinctive
greed for territory which had become the guiding motive of the great
Italian states.
The difference between the two parties was brought to a head in 1423 by
the appearance of successive embassies [Sidenote: Appeals from
Florence.] from Florence to demand aid against the duke of Milan.
Filippo Maria had resumed his father’s schemes of aggression in Tuscany
and the Romagna. Florence was forced into war to defend her
independence, and her troops suffered one defeat after another. Nothing
but the intervention of the great northern republic seemed likely to
arrest the duke’s progress, and the appeals to Venice became more and
more pressing. The first embassy in 1423 had been repulsed by the
influence of Mocenigo, but he had died later in the year, and his place
was filled by the election of his opponent, Foscari. Still, parties in
Venice were too evenly balanced to admit of a decisive intervention in
the war, and the Florentine envoys proceeded from prayers to threats. If
Venice would give no aid, Florence would seek her own safety by joining
with Milan. ‘When we refused to help Genoa, she made Visconti lord of
the city; if you refuse to help us, we will make him king of Italy.’ At
the critical moment the Florentine appeal was reinforced by the arrival
of Carmagnola, who had incurred the jealous suspicion of Filippo Maria,
and had been driven in disgrace from his service. His announcement that
the duke would never be satisfied till he had driven the Venetians from
Lombardy, and the prospect of utilising so distinguished a general
against his former employer, turned the scale in favour of Foscari and
his party. At the end of 1425 it was decided to join Florence in open
war against the duke of Milan.
The struggle opened with notable successes for Venice. Brescia was taken
in 1426, and in December Filippo Maria confirmed its cession by a formal
treaty. But the treaty was only a device to gain time and to collect
forces. In 1427 hostilities were renewed, [Sidenote: War between Venice
and Milan.] and three of the most famous _condottieri_ of the
day—Francesco Sforza, Niccolo Piccinino, and Carlo Malatesta—commanded
the forces of Milan. But Carmagnola gained a brilliant victory at Macalo
(October 11), and in 1428 Visconti again made peace by handing over
Bergamo in addition to Brescia. Thus in two campaigns the Venetian
frontier had been extended from the Adige to the Adda. But Filippo Maria
could hardly remain satisfied with an arrangement which brought his
enemies within striking distance of Milan itself. In 1431 the war was
renewed, and Carmagnola was induced by lavish payments and promises to
remain in the service of Venice. The republic had now to face the
difficulties and dangers of employing mercenary soldiers. From the first
the practice had been adopted of sending two native nobles to the camp
as _proveditori_. Nominally they were responsible for the commissariat,
but their real function was to keep a jealous watch on the conduct of
the general. Carmagnola had already incurred the suspicion of his
employers. Except in the battle of Macalo he had taken little personal
part in the war, and had shown himself more solicitous of his own
interests than of those of Venice. He had released his prisoners without
ransom, in accordance with the etiquette of his profession, and had
openly conducted an independent intercourse with the duke of Milan. It
seemed that he had no wish to go too far in crushing a prince whom he
had formerly served and might serve again. Still, as long as their arms
were successful, the Venetian oligarchy had kept their fears and
suspicion to themselves. But in 1431 came a series of reverses.
Francesco Sforza won a victory at Soncino, and the Venetian fleet on the
Po was destroyed through the failure of Carmagnola to come to its
support. Failure was taken as a proof of treachery, and the Council of
Ten determined to inflict an exemplary punishment.
They acted with characteristic duplicity and decision. Carmagnola was
invited to Venice to discuss the next campaign, and his distrust was
removed by a triumphal reception. But he was hurried from the palace
[Sidenote: Execution of Carmagnola.] to prison, and a secret trial
resulted in his condemnation and death (May 5, 1432). In the picturesque
history of the _condottieri_ of the fifteenth century the execution of
Carmagnola is one of the most famous episodes. He had done nothing that
was not in accordance with the traditions of his craft, but one state at
any rate ventured to give striking proof that she would not allow
independence to her hired defenders. It was a dangerous dilemma from
which Venice sought to extricate herself. A too eminent and successful
general might endanger her freedom, but it was difficult in the future
to induce the ablest men to serve a state which was ready to exact such
rigorous penalties.
The war continued for nine years after Carmagnola’s death. Florence was
allied with Venice, and thus the attention of Filippo Maria was engaged
in Tuscany as well as in Lombardy. This diversion was the salvation of
Venice, which was more than once on the verge of losing not only
Brescia, but also Verona. Fortunately for her, too, her rule was more
lenient than that of Milan, and her subjects were resolutely in favour
of their new against their former master. The struggle was complicated
by the action of Francesco Sforza, who throughout played his own game
and joined one side or the other as his private interest dictated. His
desire was to force Filippo Maria to give him the hand of his natural
daughter, Bianca, and to make this marriage the foundation of a
principality in Lombardy. He was at last successful in attaining his
end. The long siege of Brescia was raised by his intervention on behalf
of Venice, and a peace in 1441 secured to Venice the possession of
Brescia and Bergamo. In the same year Venice expelled the ruling house
of Polenta from Ravenna, and took possession of that city, a step which
brought the republic southwards towards the states of the Church and
prepared the way for a prolonged struggle with the papacy.
Filippo Maria had been compelled to give his daughter with the lordship
of Cremona and Pontremoli to Francesco Sforza, but he dreaded and
disliked his son-in-law and schemed to effect his ruin. Sforza, however,
showed himself as adroit an intriguer as the duke. He defeated Niccolo
Piccinino and his two sons, and induced Venice and Florence to renew
their war with Milan. At the head of the army of the republics he
reduced his father-in-law to such straits that he must concede all
demands. Just as he was prepared to desert his employers [Sidenote:
Death of Filippo Maria.] in order to earn the succession to Milan as his
reward, the news arrived of Filippo Maria’s death (August 13, 1447).
With Filippo Maria the male line of the Visconti came [Sidenote:
Succession in Milan.] to an end. There were three possible claimants
through females—Sforza through his wife, the duke of Orleans through his
mother Valentina Visconti, and Frederick of Styria through his
grandmother Virida Visconti. But none of these claims had any legal
validity, as the investiture by Wenzel had only recognised male
succession. The citizens of Milan, not unnaturally, deemed that
despotism was at an end and restored a republican government. These
events excited the keenest interest in Venice. For more than twenty
years the Venetians had been engaged in almost continuous war with
Milan, but since 1428 they had not gained a square yard of territory in
Lombardy. Foscari and his followers urged that advantage should be taken
of the confusion following Visconti’s death to establish Venetian
ascendency, and they carried the day. It was a fatal decision from the
point of view of the policy which they advocated. If the republic of
Milan had been allowed to establish itself, the result within a few
years would have been the alienation and revolt of the subject cities,
and in the troubled waters Venice could have fished with great advantage
to herself. But the hasty attack on the part of the Venetians forced the
newly formed republic to throw itself into the arms of the person who
was most dangerous both to Milanese independence and to Venetian
ambition. Francesco Sforza undertook to defend Milan against Venice, and
he showed equal promptness and ability. He destroyed the Venetian fleet
on the Po at Casalmaggiore and defeated their army with great loss at
Caravaggio. The Venetians, having made one false step, tried to redeem
it by doing still worse. They made a treaty with Sforza, by which he
[Sidenote: Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan, 1450.] pledged himself to
hand over to them Crema and the Ghiara d’Adda on condition that they
would not oppose his designs. The wily general now turned his victorious
troops against his employers, who were wholly unprepared to cope with
such unexpected treachery. One city after another had to open its gates,
and in 1450 Milan surrendered and acknowledged its conqueror as duke.
Now the Venetians could realise the folly of their conduct. They had
found it hard enough to cope with Milan under the rule of the cowardly
Visconti, but they could have no chance of extending their rule in
Lombardy if the duchy were allowed to pass to the first soldier of the
age. They determined by a strenuous effort to overthrow Sforza before he
had securely established his authority. But they were unsuccessful in
the war which ensued, and the tragic news of the fall of Constantinople
compelled them to turn their attention from Italy to their imperilled
interests in the east. A peace was patched up with Milan at Lodi in
1454. Venice resigned her recent acquisitions, and her western frontier
was restored to the same limits as in 1428.
For half a century the history of Venice had been closely bound up with
that of Milan through their mutual rivalry for territorial expansion in
Lombardy. With the peace of Lodi this intimate connection ceased for
forty years. As long as the Sforza dynasty was secure in Milan, Venice
could not hope to do more than retain Brescia and Bergamo. And for a
time her interests in Lombardy were thrust entirely into the background
by the necessity of facing the absorbing problem of Turkish advance in
the east. The policy of Foscari, so gloriously attractive in the days of
Carmagnola’s early successes, had ended in disastrous failure. Men
forgot the annexation of Bergamo and Brescia, and remembered only that
Crema had been lost, and that while they were fighting for it
Constantinople had fallen. For some time the party hostile to the doge
had found a way of attacking him through the person of his son. Jacopo
Foscari had been condemned in 1445 for taking bribes and sentenced to
exile. Two years later the prayers of his father obtained leave for his
return. But in 1450 one of the judges [Sidenote: Deposition and death of
Foscari.] who had imposed the original sentence was murdered. Jacopo
Foscari was denounced to the Ten; and although there was no real
evidence against him, and torture failed to extract a confession, he was
again exiled. Conscious of his innocence, he made strenuous efforts to
escape, and was imprudent enough to correspond with the Turks and with
Francesco Sforza. On a charge of treason the exile was brought to
Venice, again subjected to terrible torture, and sent back to Candia,
where he died in 1457. These events shook the reason of the aged doge,
and his neglect of his official duties induced the Ten to demand his
abdication. Even the Venetians, trained by the constant fear of
denunciation to suppress their feelings, could not help murmuring as the
old man descended the steps of the palace. A few days later Foscari
died, listening, it is said, to the bells which announced the election
of his successor. He had served the state loyally, if mistakenly, for
thirty-four years, he had raised Venice to a lofty position among the
powers of Italy, and he met with the ingratitude which the instinct of
self-preservation impelled the Venetian oligarchy to show towards every
individual who exercised a commanding influence on the destinies of the
republic.
While these events were going on at home, Venice was keenly interested
in Eastern affairs. Now that Constantinople [Sidenote: Venice and the
Turks.] had fallen, it was no longer possible to pursue the old policy
of bolstering up the Eastern Empire as a buffer between the Turks and
Venetian possessions. Two alternative courses were open to the republic.
She might take the place of Constantinople and become the bulwark of
Christendom against the infidel. Or she might endeavour to secure the
continuance of Venetian commerce in the east by making an advantageous
treaty with the conquerors. The heroic policy was advocated by Foscari,
the more cautious and selfish policy by his opponents, and the declining
credit of the doge enabled them to carry the day. In April 1454 a treaty
was concluded with Mohammed II. On payment of a yearly tribute, the
Venetians were allowed to retain their ports and other possessions in
the east, and to continue their Levant trade in temporary security. A
district in Constantinople was assigned for the residence of Venetian
merchants under a Venetian bailiff. It was no small argument in favour
of this treaty that it enabled Venice to strike another blow at her old
rival Genoa. The Genoese had for some time aided the Turks in various
ways, and had received the promise of special trade privileges as their
reward. But the Sultan found it cheaper to buy off the hostility of a
possible foe than to pay the stipulated price for services already
rendered.
For a few years Venice profited by the treaty of 1454, and abstained
from giving aid to the struggling Christian populations, either of the
Balkan provinces or of Greece. But the Turkish conquests were too
extensive and rapid not to awaken serious misgivings. In spite of the
famous relief of Belgrad by Hunyadi, Servia was reduced, and Wallachia
and Bosnia were overrun without serious resistance. Only Albania, under
the heroic Scanderbeg, succeeded by desperate efforts in prolonging its
independence, and in extorting terms from the Sultan. It was more
alarming to the Venetians when the Turkish armies crossed the isthmus
into the Morea, and equipped a fleet for the conquest of Lesbos and the
other islands in the Ægean. The most strenuous opponents of war had to
admit the uselessness of a paper treaty to restrain a conqueror so
unscrupulous as Mohammed II. At this juncture, Pope Pius II. was making
strenuous efforts to rouse the princes of Western Europe to a crusade
against the Turks. Venice was convinced that the further maintenance of
peace was impossible; and if the pope could secure them allies in the
name of religion, their prospects of success would be improved. But
these hopes of assistance were doomed to disappointment, when, in 1464,
Pius proceeded to Ancona to welcome and bless the crusading host. The
Venetian fleet was the only efficient force which Christendom had
furnished in response to the demand of its ecclesiastical chief.
The war which Venice waged for sixteen years against overwhelming odds
is by no means the least heroic episode [Sidenote: Turkish war,
1463-79.] in the history of the republic. Occasionally, as when Niccolo
Canale failed to save Negropont in 1470, the Venetian commanders
hesitated to act with decision in the service of a state which allowed
little freedom to its subordinates, and was apt to punish failure as if
it were treason. But, on the whole, the war was waged with equal courage
and conduct. It could, however, have but one result. Mohammed II.
employed all the resources of Turkish diplomacy to prevent any coalition
of Italian powers, and Venice was not so popular that other states were
likely to deplore or to share her misfortunes. It is true that
Scanderbeg was induced to break his treaty with the Sultan, and to admit
Venetian garrisons into his fortresses of Kroja and Scutari. But
Scanderbeg died at the beginning of 1467, leaving the guardianship of
his son and his dominions to his ally. This proved to be a fatal
bequest. After the reduction of the Morea, a Turkish force entered
Albania and laid siege to Scutari. The fortress was heroically defended
by Antonio Loredano, Mohammed was engaged in Asia Minor, and the siege
had to be raised. But the triumph was only temporary. In 1478 Albania
was again invaded. Kroja was taken, and Scutari, though it repulsed all
attempts to storm the walls, was closely blockaded. Venice was worn out
with her prolonged and exhausting efforts, and in 1479 the peace of
Constantinople brought the war to a close. Venice gave up Scutari,
Kroja, Negropont, Lemnos, and her possessions in the Morea, but was
allowed to retain her Levant trade and her quarter in Constantinople on
payment of 150,000 ducats down and a yearly tribute of 10,000 ducats.
Two years later, the death of Mohammed II. and the accession of a
feebler sultan, freed the republic from immediate danger in the east.
The disasters of the Turkish war had a demoralising effect upon Venice.
In her eastern dominions the more ambitious and enterprising of the
Venetian nobles had found scope for an ability and an energy that at
home would be regarded with suspicion. These men had now to turn their
attention to Italian politics, and they urged the state to seek
compensation for losses in the Levant at the expense of its neighbours.
From this time the policy of Venice became far more openly grasping and
selfish than it had ever been before, and the enmities thus provoked
ultimately led to the league of Cambray. Aggression in Lombardy was
still blocked by the Sforza dynasty, and it was therefore necessary to
find some weaker power to attack. A quarrel with Ferrara about the
manufacture of salt gave the desired pretext, and Venice joined with the
turbulent pope Sixtus IV. in an alliance against Ercole [Sidenote: War
with Ferrara, 1482-84.] d’Este. Ferrara was powerless against such a
combination, and the Venetian forces seized Rovigo and the adjacent
territory. But an act of such unprovoked aggression excited the
misgivings of the other states; and Naples, Milan, and Florence formed a
league to maintain the balance of power against the attempts of Venice
and the papacy to disturb it. Alfonso of Calabria, who enjoyed an
unmerited reputation for military skill, advanced to the aid of Ferrara,
Sixtus deserted an ally who had obviously no regard for papal interests,
and Venice was compelled to conclude the peace of Bagnolo in 1484, by
which Rovigo was retained, but all other conquests were restored.
About this time Venice had the good fortune to make an acquisition in
the east, which was some set-off against her losses to the Turks. The
last king of Cyprus, James of Lusignan, had married a Venetian lady,
Catarina Cornaro. In order to exalt her to sufficient rank, the republic
of Venice had formally adopted her as a daughter of the state. The next
year, 1473, the king died, and Venice at once interfered as paternal
guardian [Sidenote: Venice acquires Cyprus.] of the widow and her
posthumous child. For some years Catarina ruled under Venetian
protection and control, but in 1488 she was half induced, half compelled
to abdicate, and the banner of St. Mark was hoisted in Famagusta.
Catarina Cornaro was allowed to retain the title of queen, and lived in
considerable magnificence at Asolo till the outbreak of war in 1508
drove her to seek a refuge in Venice, where she died in 1510.
But the insatiable greed of the Venetians for territory was by no means
appeased by the annexation of Cyprus, which [Sidenote: Venetian greed of
territory.] could not long be retained except under tribute to the
Turks. It was to Italy that the ambition of the republic was mainly
directed, and the Ferrarese war had taught her more than one lesson. If
her western boundary was to be extended, the Sforzas must be driven from
Milan; if territory was to be gained in the south, the triple league for
the maintenance of the balance of power must be broken up; and, above
all, the house of Aragon in Naples must be punished for its action in
1483, and rendered powerless for the future. How could these ends be
achieved? One solution of the problem offered itself in 1493, and that
was the intervention of a foreign state. A number of Neapolitan nobles,
driven into exile by the merciless rule of Ferrante and Alfonso, came to
Venice for advice as to how they might best overthrow the Aragonese
despots. The senate advised them to invite Charles VIII. of France to
claim Naples as representing the house of Anjou. The advice was taken,
and the invitation was acted upon in 1494. The motives of Venice are
perfectly obvious. A French invasion would weaken the house of Aragon;
it would dislocate the league of the great powers; and in the
disturbance which would follow, Venice, isolated and secure herself,
could sell her assistance for the price of ports in Apulia, which would
complete her ascendency in the Adriatic. Nor was this all. A French
prince—Louis of Orleans—was a claimant to the duchy of Milan. If the
French once entered Italy, this claim was sure to be advanced against
the Sforzas, and the dynasty, which had so long blocked any advance
towards Cremona or Milan, might be overthrown, or at any rate reduced to
comparative impotence. The reckoning was equally cold-blooded, selfish,
and astute. The immediate aims were achieved. After the first successes
of Charles VIII. Venice turned against France and received Otranto,
Brindisi, and other ports in Apulia, as a reward for helping to restore
the Aragonese line in Naples. The duke of Orleans, on becoming Louis
XII. of France, attacked Ludovico Sforza and purchased the alliance of
Venice by ceding Cremona and the Ghiara d’Adda. The fall of Cæsar Borgia
enabled Venice to annex a considerable part of the papal states, and
there was no Italian league to interfere. But Nemesis overtook
[Sidenote: Decline of Venice.] the republic a few years later, when
every state which had been at any time despoiled, combined to attack the
common enemy. The ruin of Venice, however, was not the work of the
league of Cambray, but of causes which she could not control. No
treaties with the Turks could keep the Levant trade as open as it had
been, and the people on the Atlantic seaboard set to work to find an
independent route to the east. In 1486 Bartholomew Diaz rounded the
Cape, and in 1498 Vasco da Gama continued the voyage to India. For three
centuries and a half the Mediterranean ceased to be the great highway of
commerce, and became merely a considerable inland sea. The marvellous
prosperity of Venice ceased with the conditions which had given rise to
it.
Until the invasion of Charles VIII. brought Venice and Milan once more
together, there had been little direct connection between the two states
since the treaty of Lodi gave leisure to Francesco Sforza to secure his
position [Sidenote: Francesco Sforza in Milan.] in his newly acquired
duchy. In this task he was as successful as he had been in the
unscrupulous methods by which he rose to power. From the first he
determined to sink the _condottiere_ in the prince. Peace, and not war,
became the primary object of his policy. With Cosimo de’ Medici he was
already on the most friendly terms, and as long as he or his descendants
retained their power no opposition was to be feared from Florence.
Venice had received a sharp lesson, and her attention was diverted to
the east. The popes had enough to do to maintain their recently
recovered authority in the papal states. The only other important state
in Italy was Naples. As a military leader Sforza had played a prominent
part in Neapolitan politics. He had been the champion of the house of
Anjou, and when the victory ultimately rested with Alfonso of Aragon,
Sforza had been deprived of his estates in Apulia and the Abruzzi. But
as duke of Milan, Francesco was eager to be on good terms with the king
of Naples. All his interests were now opposed to the Angevin claim on
Naples, which might easily be allied with the Orleanist claim to Milan.
A double marriage was arranged to cement the alliance between Naples and
Milan. Alfonso’s grandson, another Alfonso, was betrothed to Ippolita,
Sforza’s daughter, and one of Sforza’s sons was to marry Alfonso’s
granddaughter. When Alfonso’s death, in 1458, was followed by a renewed
attempt of the Angevins to gain Naples, Sforza gave his cordial support
to Ferrante, the natural son of the late king, and materially aided him
in defending his throne.
It was extremely fortunate for Francesco Sforza that his alliance with
the house of Aragon did not lead to a serious breach with France, which
had recovered the [Sidenote: Relations with France.] suzerainty of Genoa
in 1458. It was from Genoa that John of Calabria sailed to Naples in
1460 to maintain the cause of his father Réné, and one of the most
notable acts of Sforza in thwarting the Angevin pretensions was his
encouragement of a successful revolt of the Genoese in 1461. At this
critical moment Charles VII. of France died, and his successor, Louis
XI., not only had no love for the Anjou princes, but was an avowed
admirer and imitator of Francesco Sforza. The result was a treaty in
1464, by which the town of Savona and all French claims to Genoa were
ceded to the duke of Milan, and later in the year Sforza succeeded in
subjecting the Ligurian republic to his rule. When Louis XI. was hard
pressed in 1465 by the League of the Public Weal, Sforza not only sent
his eldest son with a considerable force to attack the duke of Bourbon,
he also repaid his obligations by the celebrated advice to Louis that he
should divide his enemies by conceding their demands and then reduce
them separately. French history tells how triumphantly the king followed
the counsel of his chosen model.
The government of Galeazzo Maria Sforza, who succeeded in Milan without
opposition on his father’s death in March [Sidenote: Galeazzo Maria
Sforza, 1466-76.] 1466, was comparatively uneventful. The external
relations were maintained by Simonetta, who had been secretary to
Francesco, and remained in office under the son, on the same lines as
under the previous duke. The connection with France was drawn closer by
Galeazzo’s marriage with Bona of Savoy, the sister-in-law of Louis XI.
It is true that for a moment the growing power of Charles the Bold
attracted Milan to an alliance with Burgundy in 1475. But on the news of
the duke’s first reverse at the battle of Granson, Galeazzo hastened to
return to the French alliance. The wanton cruelty of Galeazzo’s rule in
Milan illustrates the demoralising effect of unbridled power upon a weak
and passionate nature. To the love of bloodshed, which had characterised
so many of the Visconti, he added a lustful debauchery which outraged
the honour of the noblest families of Milan. Against a lawless despotism
the only remedy is rebellion, and the revival of classical learning
tended to glorify tyrannicide by parading the examples of Brutus and of
Harmodius and Aristogiton. Three young nobles—Girolamo Olgiati, whose
sister Galeazzo had dishonoured, Carlo Visconti, and Andrea
Lampugnani—determined to win eternal fame by the murder of the tyrant.
Sacrilege had little terrors for Italians, and Galeazzo Maria fell
beneath their daggers in the Church of St. Stephen (December 26, 1476).
But the mass of the citizens were too accustomed to subjection to
espouse the cause of the rebels. Two of the assassins were slain on the
spot, and Olgiati was executed after suffering horrible tortures, which
he endured with the stoicism of an ancient Roman.
Galeazzo Maria Sforza left an only son, Gian Galeazzo, who was only
eight years old. He was immediately acknowledged as duke of Milan, under
the regency of his mother, [Sidenote: Regency of Bona of Savoy.] Bona of
Savoy, but the real government rested in the hands of Simonetta. The
latter succeeded in overcoming the first difficulties that the regency
encountered. A rising in Genoa was suppressed, and the brothers of the
late duke, who wished to oust their sister-in-law, were driven into
exile. But in 1479 wholly unexpected problems arose. Francesco Sforza
had leant on the alliance of Florence and Naples, and as long as those
two states were on friendly terms Simonetta pursued the same policy. The
conspiracy of the Pazzi, however, involved Florence not only in a
quarrel with Pope Sixtus IV., but also in a war with Naples. Bona of
Savoy, under Simonetta’s guidance, clung to the Florentine alliance, and
prepared to send forces to aid Lorenzo de’ Medici. Ferrante of Naples
determined to prevent the intervention of Milan. He stirred up a new
rebellion in Genoa, which succeeded in expelling the Milanese garrison
from the citadel. At the same time, he urged the uncles of the young
duke to resume their attack on the regency of Bona. Aided by divisions
in the government, the brothers contrived to secure their return to
Milan and to overthrow Simonetta, who was put to death at Pavia (1480).
Ludovico il Moro, the eldest surviving son of Francesco Sforza, now
succeeded without serious difficulty in prosecuting his schemes. The
young duke was declared of age in order to terminate his mother’s
regency, and Ludovico carried on the government in his nephew’s name.
The circumstances under which Ludovico had obtained his power seemed to
bind him closely to Ferrante [Sidenote: Ludovico il Moro.] of Naples,
who was now reconciled with Lorenzo de’ Medici, so that the triple
alliance was restored, and was able to interfere decisively in the war
of Ferrara (see above, p. 257). The young Gian Galeazzo was married to
Isabella, the daughter of Alfonso of Calabria, and granddaughter of
Ferrante. All would have been well if Ludovico’s ambition had been
satisfied with actual rule. But he was resolved to supplant his nephew
in the duchy, and if necessary to get rid of him by foul means. Such a
scheme was certain to meet with the determined opposition of the rulers
of Naples; and Ludovico, without venturing upon an open rupture, sought
for means to protect himself from their hostility. The first sign of
growing mistrust was visible in the war of Ferrara, when the
half-hearted action of Ludovico allowed Venice to escape with
comparatively favourable terms in the treaty of Bagnolo. Matters became
worse when Isabella of Naples openly complained to her father and
grandfather of the way in which her husband was treated by his uncle.
Even more bitter was her ill-feeling when Ludovico married Beatrice
d’Este, and a personal jealousy grew up between the nominal and the real
duchess. Isabella was furious that she should be compelled to live in
poverty and semi-captivity while her rival was the centre of a
magnificent court.
The rulers of Naples naturally espoused the cause of Isabella and her
husband, and Ludovico was conscious that an open quarrel could not be
long delayed. It was necessary for him to strengthen his position by
alliances, either within Italy or without. Venice was not a power that
could be trusted to act unselfishly in support of Milan. Florence was
the oldest ally of the house of Sforza, but Lorenzo de’ Medici died in
1492, and his son Piero showed a perilous inclination to prefer the
Neapolitan cause to that of Ludovico. In his despair Ludovico made up
his mind to turn to France. He had already established [Sidenote:
Ludovico calls in the French.] a connection with France when, after
reducing Genoa once more to submission to Milan, he agreed in 1490 to
hold the city under the suzerainty of the French king. In 1493 he
discovered that the Neapolitan exiles, acting on the advice of Venice,
were urging Charles VIII. to attack Naples. Ludovico sent an embassy to
support this appeal and to promise his co-operation. He had no
expectation or desire that the French should conquer Naples, but he
wished to have a French army between Milan and the southern kingdom
while he established himself as duke in the place of his nephew. When
once France had served his purpose, he was confident of his ability to
rid himself and Italy of an ally who was no longer needed. But cunning
as Ludovico was, he overreached himself. It is true that Gian Galeazzo
died at the required moment, that Ludovico became duke with an imperial
investiture, which no previous Sforza had received, and that the French
invasion prevented any opposition on the part of Naples. But among the
Frenchmen who entered Italy was Louis of Orleans, who seized the
opportunity to assert his claim to the duchy of Milan as the descendant
of Valentina Visconti. Ludovico succeeded for the time in defeating the
duke, who was not well beloved by Charles VIII. But a few years later
Louis himself became king of France, and one of his first enterprises
was the expulsion of the Sforzas from Milan. Ludovico had ample time to
repent of his short-sighted policy in calling in French aid while he lay
a prisoner in the castle of Loches, where he died in 1510.