FLORENCE UNDER THE MEDICI
The period of oligarchical rule in Florence—Maso and Rinaldo degli
Albizzi—Niccolo da Uzzano—The opposition and Giovanni de’ Medici—War
with Filippo Maria Visconti—The _Catasto_—Unsuccessful attack upon
Lucca—Expulsion of the Medici—Fall of the Albizzi, and return of
Cosimo de’ Medici—Character and methods of Cosimo’s rule—Luca Pitti
and the _coup d’état_ of 1458—Cosimo’s foreign policy—Piero de’
Medici and his opponents—Victory of Piero—Accession of Lorenzo de’
Medici—Approximation to monarchy—Alienation of Naples, and quarrel
with Sixtus IV.—Conspiracy of the Pazzi—War in 1478 and 1479—Lorenzo
goes to Naples—Conclusion of peace—Constitutional changes in
1480—Lorenzo’s later years—Importance of his death—Reckless conduct
of the younger Piero.
The leaders of the Florentine democracy paid a heavy penalty for their
momentary triumph in 1378. A violent [Sidenote: Oligarchical rule in
Florence.] reaction in 1382 restored the oligarchy under the leadership
of the Albizzi, and for the next fifty years the curious machinery of
the civic constitution was carefully manipulated to secure the
ascendency of the dominant faction. Although it is by no means the most
famous, there can be no doubt that this is one of the most successful
periods in Florentine history. Under the resolute guidance of a close
oligarchy, Florence maintained a heroic struggle against the
encroachments of Gian Galeazzo Visconti until his death in 1402 saved
the city from almost inevitable submission. When the Milanese dominions
fell to pieces, Florence seized the opportunity to gain a great prize;
and the city of Pisa, which commanded the mouth of the Arno, was in 1406
compelled to surrender after an obstinate resistance (see p. 244). Then
followed a long war with Ladislas of Naples, in the course of which
Florence acquired the important town of Cortona. And in 1421 the
commercial interests of the city were strengthened by the purchase from
Genoa of a second port—Livorno.
For a long time the active leader of the victorious faction and the most
influential politician in Florence was Maso degli Albizzi, a nephew of
the Piero degli Albizzi who had been so prominent in the party strife of
the fourteenth century (see p. 164). Maso had returned from exile in
1382, and at various times held most of the chief offices of the state.
While he was gonfalonier in 1393 harsh measures were taken to complete
the defeat of the democrats. But, apart from the severity shown to the
unfortunate Alberti and their supporters, Maso showed himself a wise and
tolerant ruler. When he died in 1417, his place was, to some extent,
taken by his eldest son, Rinaldo, who displayed great industry and
integrity, but less prudence and insight than his father. The almost
hereditary prominence of these two men did much to accustom the
Florentines to that disguised despotism which was afterwards established
by the Medici. But the Albizzi never enjoyed such undivided ascendency
as was held by Cosimo and Lorenzo de’ Medici. At least as influential a
leader as Rinaldo was Niccolo da Uzzano, who is frequently spoken of by
contemporaries as the head of the party. He seems to have been a sincere
enthusiast for aristocratic rule, and it was greatly due to his
influence that the Albizzi were prevented from making themselves
absolute masters of the city. His reputation for wisdom and insight was
deservedly high, and his death in 1432 proved a fatal blow to the party
in whose counsels he had always been on the side of moderation.
In spite of the services which it rendered to the state, the
oligarchical government did not succeed in averting discontent and
hostility. The strongest political sentiment among the Florentines was
the love of equality, which found practical expression in the system of
filling offices by lot. This love of equality was more outraged by the
domination of a clique of ruling families than it would have been by the
government of a single despot. The lesser guilds and the lower classes
resented their virtual exclusion from office; and many wealthy citizens,
who had incurred the displeasure of the dominant faction, found
themselves equally left in the cold. Moreover, the militant foreign
policy of the government was extremely expensive; and the burden of
taxation, as was always the case in Florence, fell more heavily upon the
opponents than upon the supporters of the government. Gradually the
cause of the opposition came to be more and more identified with the
house of Medici. The action of Salvestro de’ Medici in 1378 had
identified the name with the popular cause, though he did not personally
profit by its short-lived victory. In 1393, when the severe measures of
Maso degli Albizzi provoked a popular rising, it was to Vieri de’
Medici, a kinsman of Salvestro, that the mob appealed for guidance, and
it was his moderate advice which checked the rebellion. But it was a
member of another branch of the family—Giovanni de’ Medici—who, in the
second decade of the fifteenth century, came to be regarded as the
leader of those who disapproved of the conduct of affairs by the ruling
party. Giovanni was a banker and money-changer, and was so successful in
his business that he became the richest citizen in Florence, if not in
Italy. He employed his wealth in extending his popularity, though he was
extremely careful to avoid any action which might give the government a
handle against him. In 1421 he was drawn as gonfalonier, and Niccolo da
Uzzano wished to cancel the appointment as dangerous. But Giovanni’s
hold on the people, and especially on the lesser guilds, made such a
step perilous, and his two months of office passed uneventfully.
Giovanni de’ Medici died in 1429, leaving two sons—Cosimo, afterwards
the ruler of Florence, and Lorenzo, whose descendants in the sixteenth
century became grand-dukes of Tuscany.
As long as the oligarchical government was successful, there was little
prospect of its overthrow, but from 1421 its credit steadily declined.
The reunion of the [Sidenote: War with Filippo Maria Visconti.] Milanese
territories under Filippo Maria Visconti constituted a serious menace to
Florence, and the imperative duty of self-defence compelled the republic
to embark once more in a desperate struggle for existence. In 1424 the
Florentine army, under Pandolfo Malatesta, was defeated with great loss
in the battle of Zagonara. A despairing appeal was made to Venice for
assistance, and the intervention of Carmagnola saved Florence from
annihilation. But the spoils of victory were monopolised by Venice, and
the aggrandisement of their ally was by no means popular with the
Florentines. The power of the oligarchy had rested upon the success of
their foreign policy, and alarming discontent was the inevitable result
of an unsuccessful war. Two important measures were resorted to in the
hope of restoring the prestige of the dominant faction. The heavy
expenses of the war had called attention to the old grievance of
arbitrary taxation, and in 1427 a reform was introduced to provide a
more [Sidenote: The Catasto of 1427.] equitable basis of assessment.
According to Machiavelli, the acceptance of the _Catasto_, as it was
called, was due to the influence of Giovanni de’ Medici. Every citizen
was to report to the gonfalonier of his district his whole income from
every source; and concealment was to be punished by confiscation. From
fixed capital the income was to be estimated at seven per cent. These
reports were to be collected into four books, one for each quarter of
the city; and henceforth the assessment of taxation was to be determined
by them instead of depending upon a man’s political position and
opinions. As wealth fluctuated rapidly in a mercantile community, a new
_catasto_ was to be made every three years. It was a notable sacrifice
on the part of the ruling clique, and probably tended to weaken their
unanimity, but it helped to pacify public opinion for a time. Rinaldo
degli Albizzi now came forward with a new scheme for restoring the
credit of his party. Ever since the days of [Sidenote: Attack upon
Lucca, 1430.] Castruccio Castracani, the annexation of Lucca had been a
darling object of Florentine ambition. Lucca was, at this time, ruled by
one of its own citizens—Paolo Guinigi—who had sided with Milan in the
recent war. Rinaldo proposed to treat this as a pretext for attacking
Lucca. It was in vain that Niccolo da Uzzano pointed out the risks of
the enterprise. Giovanni de’ Medici was dead, and his son Cosimo
supported the proposal of Rinaldo. His conduct on this occasion has
exposed him to the suspicion that he foresaw the failure of the
enterprise, and was willing to ruin his opponent even at the expense of
the state. War was declared in 1430, and Rinaldo degli Albizzi was
appointed one of the commissioners to superintend the siege of Lucca.
The enterprise was as unsuccessful as it was unjust, and its failure was
ultimately fatal to the party in power. Rinaldo, unjustly accused of
peculation, threw up his command in disgust. The duke of Milan was drawn
into the war, and the two most famous _condottieri_ of the day—Francesco
Sforza and Niccolo Piccinino—were employed in his service. After
suffering serious reverses in the field, the Florentines were glad to
accept the mediation of the emperor Sigismund, and in 1433 peace was
made, leaving things as they were before the war.
But no treaty could restore the previous conditions within the city.
Niccolo da Uzzano had died in 1432, and his death [Sidenote: Expulsion
of the Medici, 1433.] deprived his party of their strongest support,
while it removed the moderating influence on their conduct. Cosimo de’
Medici was at once more ambitious and less cautious than his father, and
he and Rinaldo degli Albizzi were now avowed rivals for ascendency. The
latter, conscious of his growing weakness, determined to have recourse
to violence. In September 1433, when the signoria was composed of
Rinaldo’s adherents, Cosimo de’ Medici was summoned to appear before the
magistrates, and was imprisoned while his fate was deliberated upon. For
some time it was generally expected that he would be put to death. But
the wealth which his father had collected stood him in good stead, and
his judges were not proof against corruption. The majority decided for a
milder sentence. Cosimo was banished for ten years to Padua, and his
brother Lorenzo for five years to Venice. Most of their prominent
adherents shared their exile, and the Medici were declared incapable of
holding any office in Florence.
The victory of Albizzi seemed to be assured when Cosimo went into exile
in October 1433. The ordinary machinery of a Florentine _coup d’état_
had been set in motion. The people had been convened in the piazza, and
had approved the appointment of a _balia_ or revolutionary committee.
But by a strange oversight on the part of so experienced a partisan,
Rinaldo had failed to obtain for this committee the right of refilling
the bags with the names of candidates for office. The result was that
the weakness of his position was only slightly modified. His own party
was divided and inclined to be mutinous because the _catasto_ was not
abolished. And the alienation of public opinion by military failures
could only be removed by some conspicuous success. In 1434 Florence
became involved in a war in Romagna between Filippo Maria Visconti and
the Pope. Again her troops were defeated in the field, and her ally,
Eugenius IV., driven from Rome by the Colonnas, was forced to seek a
refuge within her walls. In this moment of depression the accident of
lot resulted in the formation of a signoria in September 1434, which was
favourable to the Medici. Rinaldo [Sidenote: Recall of the Medici,
1434.] in his turn was summoned before a hostile magistracy, and he came
accompanied by eight hundred armed men. But he lost the favourable
opportunity for overawing his opponents by consenting to an interview
with Eugenius IV., who had offered his mediation. This delay proved
fatal. The _popolo minuto_ took up arms and surrounded the piazza; while
the signoria called in armed peasants from the country. The parliament
created a _balia_ in the interests of the party, which had for the
moment the upper hand. The Medici and Alberti families were recalled and
declared eligible for office. Rinaldo degli Albizzi with his son and
about seventy partisans were banished from Florence, and few of them
ever returned to their native city. Cosimo de’ Medici, who was in Venice
when the news of this sudden revolution reached him, re-entered Florence
on October 6, 1434. For the next three centuries the history of Florence
is bound up with the history of the house of Medici.
The ascendency which the dramatic events of 1433 and 1434 gave to Cosimo
de’ Medici was not only retained [Sidenote: Character of Medicean Rule.]
during his life, but became for a time a hereditary possession. Yet it
is impossible to point to any great apparent change in the constitution.
The old magistracies and councils continued to exist and to fulfil their
former functions. Cosimo was extremely careful to avoid any outward
signs of despotism. He continued to live in his former residence; and
nothing in his dress or his manner of life distinguished him from his
fellow-citizens. Like his defeated rival, he surrounded himself with a
sort of body-guard of allied families, whose interests he skilfully
identified with his own. To all appearance this was as much an oligarchy
as the government which it had displaced. The difference is to be found
in two points. On the one hand Cosimo was enabled, partly by his wealth,
and partly by his extensive foreign connections, to exercise a far
stronger control over his adherents and over the state than either Maso
or Rinaldo degli Albizzi had ever been able to wield. And, on the other
hand, the influential families who rose to power under Cosimo did not
represent the domination of a class as the rule of the Albizzi had done.
The Medici never forgot that they owed their original rise to their
championship of democratic equality; and they were careful to avoid any
unnecessary collision with the prejudices of the mob. Even a disguised
despotism must aim at the obliteration of classes, and this can be
clearly traced in the policy of Cosimo. He transferred several families
from the lesser to the greater guilds, and thus obscured a distinction
which had been at one time of supereminent importance. And he even
procured the repeal of the disqualifications against the old nobility on
which the foundations of the historic municipality had been built.
It is not difficult to trace the methods by which Cosimo maintained the
power which had fallen into his hands. He had two primary objects to
attain: he must prevent [Sidenote: Methods of Cosimo’s Government.] the
more important offices from falling into the hands of malcontents, and
he must diminish their number by bringing home to them the hardships and
dangers of opposition and the rewards that were to be gained by loyalty.
Cosimo boasted of the humanity of his rule, and he was always careful to
intrust to his followers the initiation of harsh proposals. But his
policy was really one of proscription. The Albizzi and their allies were
treated with the greatest severity. Not only were they banished, but
their place of exile was constantly changed, and they were hunted about
Italy like wild beasts. It was no wonder that their patriotism gave way
to a desire for revenge, and they joined the duke of Milan against their
native city. But the battle of Anghiari in 1440 destroyed all hope of
success, while their treason gave a pretext for more merciless
treatment. The financial administration was employed to the same ends.
The _catasto_ of 1427 was abolished, and the system of arbitrary
assessment was revived. This enabled Cosimo to reward his adherents and
to punish malcontents. Giannozzo Mannetti, a harmless student, whose
only offence was his popularity, was called upon to pay taxes to the
amount of 135,000 florins, and could only avoid ruin by going into
voluntary exile. It was a common saying that Cosimo employed the taxes,
as northern princes used the dagger, to rid himself of his opponents.
For the regulation of offices Cosimo employed the revolutionary
machinery which was in theory the ultimate enforcement of popular
sovereignty. The _balia_ which had recalled the Medici in 1434 had
received from the parliament full power to reform the state. Every five
years this power was renewed—in 1439, 1444, 1449, and 1454. The most
important act of the _balia_ was the appointment of ten _accoppiatori_
to superintend the filling of the bags with the names of those who were
eligible for office. This was in itself a fairly ample assurance that no
opposition to the Medici could be anticipated from the magistracy; and
to make it doubly sure, the names of the gonfalonier and priors were
selected every two months by the _accoppiatori_. They were made, as the
phrase went, not by lot, but by hand. But as time went on, this
prolonged departure from normal procedure gave rise to grumbling; and as
there were good reasons for avoiding at the moment any appearance of
disunion in the city, Cosimo determined to yield. In 1455 the _balia_,
which had been renewed the year before, was abolished, and the practice
of drawing the names of the signoria was revived. The concession was
more apparent than real; for the bags had only recently been refilled,
and three years would elapse before a new _squittinio_ would be
necessary. For that time the ascendency of the Medici party was secure,
and before it had elapsed measures might be taken to prolong it. But
that the revival of liberty was of some moment is proved by the proposal
in the signoria of January 1458 to restore the _catasto_. Cosimo’s
partisans urged him to employ energetic measures to defeat a scheme
which attacked their own pockets. But he was not unwilling to teach them
how dependent they were upon his support, and he allowed the system of
strict and impartial assessment to be revived.
There was one very obvious danger to which such a government as that of
Cosimo de’ Medici was exposed. Jealousy and ill-will might arise among
his intimate associates. It was his deliberate policy to place them in
prominent positions, and they were perforce intrusted with the secrets
of his administration. One or more of them might seek to use their
experience for their own advancement and to free themselves from the
control of their patron. This danger was partially realised in Cosimo’s
later years, and serious difficulties arose from the same source in the
time of his son. In 1458 it had become a grave question how far the
revival of republican freedom should be allowed to go. The death of
Alfonso of Naples removed one great motive for continuing the
conciliatory policy of the last three years; and the appointment to the
gonfaloniership of Luca Pitti, one of the oldest and closest of Cosimo’s
adherents, gave the opportunity for decisive action. After careful
precautions had been taken to control the avenues to the piazza and to
impress the mob, a parliament was convened by the ringing the great bell
of the Palazzo Publico. A _balia_ [Sidenote: Coup d’état of 1458.] of
350 citizens, together with the existing signoria, was endowed with full
authority. _Accoppiatori_ were appointed to fill the bags, and a
permanent committee, the _Otto di Balia_, received the control of the
civic police. By a curious irony it was announced to the people that the
priors should henceforth be called, not _priori delle arti_, but _priori
della Liberta_. The name was chosen, says Machiavelli, to designate what
had been lost.
But in this revolution to confirm the previous revolution Cosimo had
carefully abstained from taking any active share. In the eyes of the mob
the victorious politician [Sidenote: Luca Pitti.] was Luca Pitti, who
seemed to himself, as to others, to overshadow his employer. Puffed up
with ambition, he began to build the magnificent palace on the southern
side of the Arno, which, afterwards the residence of the grand-dukes of
Tuscany, and now the shrine of one of the greatest picture galleries in
the world, has done more than any political achievement to preserve to
posterity the name of its founder. Cosimo was probably convinced that
little real danger was to be dreaded from Luca Pitti, and he made no
attempt to alter or correct the popular impression. As long as his
influence was really unimpaired he cared little who had the appearance
and pomp of supremacy.
As a great banker, Cosimo de’ Medici was an important personage in many
foreign courts, quite apart from his [Sidenote: Cosimo’s Foreign
Policy.] political position in Florence. With very notable dexterity he
played his two parts so as to make each improve the other. He employed
his financial relations to strengthen his hold upon the strings of
Florentine policy, and he utilised his political influence to increase
his business and his profits. It is in foreign affairs far more than in
domestic administration that he showed himself to be the real ruler of
Florence. He inherited from the Albizzi a struggle against Filippo Maria
Visconti and an alliance with Venice. As long as the duke of Milan
threatened the independence of Florence, and especially when he espoused
the cause of the exiled Albizzi, Cosimo could not safely depart from the
traditional policy of Florence. But the death of Filippo Maria in 1447
and the establishment of a republic in Milan gave him more scope for
originality. He had to choose between the aggrandisement of Venice in
Lombardy, which must have been the inevitable result of the maintenance
of the Milanese republic, and the erection of a military power in Milan
which should hold Venice in check. Without any hesitation he decided for
the latter alternative, and the later history of Italy was vitally
influenced by his choice. The financial and other aid which he received
from Florence was one of the most potent factors in enabling Francesco
Sforza to obtain the lordship of Milan in 1450, and to conclude the
treaty of Lodi with Venice in 1454.
Another hardly less momentous question for Italy arose after the death
of Alfonso V. of Naples, when in 1460 the Angevin claim was revived in
antagonism to Ferrante. Although Florence was closely allied with France
by her Guelf traditions and her commercial interests, Cosimo was
resolute in his support of Ferrante and in urging Francesco Sforza to do
the same. Again his attitude helped to turn the scale in a struggle
where, for a time, the balance was undecided. He just lived to hear of
the retirement of John of Calabria, which secured the bastard house of
Aragon from serious attack for the next thirty years. By his action in
these two great crises Cosimo must be regarded as the real author of
that triple alliance between Naples, Milan, and Florence, of which his
grandson in later years made such a masterly use.
Cosimo’s death in 1464 left the headship of the family to his only
surviving son, Piero, who was already middle-aged [Sidenote: Piero de’
Medici and his opponents.] and in feeble health. The five years during
which he survived his father are chiefly noteworthy because they
witnessed the great split in the Medicean party, which careful observers
must have seen for some time to be inevitable. Four of the most
prominent associates of Cosimo—Luca Pitti, Diotisalvi Neroni, Angelo
Acciaiuoli, and Niccolo Soderini—were unwilling to give to the son the
deference which they had shown to the father. Luckily for the Medici,
their unanimity did not go far. The first three were actuated by motives
of personal ambition, which might easily lead them to quarrel with each
other, while Niccolo Soderini was an enthusiast for democracy, and had
no desire to humble Piero in order to exalt another in his place. Neroni
was the ablest of the leaders, but he was lacking in personal courage,
and preferred to employ intrigue and constitutional methods rather than
violence. It was only gradually that two parties were organised in
avowed opposition to each other. The anti-Medicean party received the
nickname of the Mountain, because the great palace of Luca Pitti was
rising on the hill of San Giorgio. The residence of the Medici stood on
level ground to the north of the Arno, and hence Piero’s adherents were
known as the Plain.
The first trial of strength took place in 1465, when the opposition made
a bid for popularity by proposing to abolish the _balia_ of 1458 and to
restore the constitutional method of filling offices by lot. Piero was
too cautious to oppose such a measure, and it was carried with virtual
unanimity. In November the first draw took place, and Niccolo Soderini
became gonfalonier. Disunion among the leaders prevented any use being
made of the advantage which chance had given them, and Soderini went out
of office at the end of December without having effected any further
change in the constitution. In the next year the party strife was
extended to foreign politics. Venice had never forgotten or forgiven the
part which Florence had played in establishing the Sforzas in Milan. Now
that Francesco was dead and succeeded by the more reckless Galeazzo
Maria, there was some possibility of evicting a dynasty which was a
perpetual bar to Venetian expansion in Lombardy. But to overthrow the
Sforzas it was first necessary to overthrow the Medici. And so the
leaders of the Mountain made overtures to Venice, regardless of the
consideration that a complete reversal of foreign policy might damage
the interests of Florence. The Venetians were too cautious to commit
themselves to an alliance with a faction which might fail, and moreover
they had the Turkish war on their hands. But there was a secret
understanding that if Piero de’ Medici were got rid of, either by the
dagger or by a revolution, his opponents would be aided by troops under
Bartolommeo Coleone, a _condottiere_ in the pay of Venice, and Ercole
d’Este, brother of the duke of Ferrara.
Piero knew enough of these schemes to induce him to draw closer the
alliance with Milan and Naples which his [Sidenote: Crisis of 1466.]
father had bequeathed to him. His elder son, Lorenzo, received his first
experience of diplomacy by being sent on an embassy to Ferrante. The
news that Ercole d’Este had advanced in the direction of Pistoia brought
matters to a crisis. Piero hurried to Florence from his villa at
Careggi, and is said to have escaped an ambush on the way through the
vigilance and acuteness of Lorenzo. Galeazzo Maria Sforza was invited to
send troops to the assistance of Florence, and the peasants from the
Medici estates were armed and brought into the city. On the other side
Niccolo Soderini collected two hundred men who were kept in arms in the
Pitti palace. Civil war seemed inevitable, but by a tacit agreement
active violence was postponed till the new signoria was drawn at the end
of August. Fortune or skill favoured the Medici, and a gonfalonier and
priors devoted to their interests took up office on September 1. On the
next day the great bell called the people to a parliament in the piazza.
The armed adherents of Piero commanded every entrance, and the
dissentients who obtained admission were too few or too timid to make
themselves heard. A numerous _balia_ was proposed by the signoria and
approved by acclamation. For the next ten years the priors were to be
made by hand. Neroni, Acciaiuolo, and Niccolo Soderini were banished.
Luca Pitti, who had been bribed or persuaded to desert his associates,
was allowed to remain, but his ostentation had made him unpopular, and
he spent the rest of his life in harmless insignificance. His gigantic
palace remained unfinished till it was completed by the Medici in the
next century.
There still remained the danger of foreign intervention. Neroni, who had
been banished to Sicily, defied the decree and repaired to Venice. It
was decided to carry [Sidenote: Failure of the anti-Mediceans.] out the
scheme which had been arranged in the previous year. Bartolommeo Coleone
was to conduct in the interest of the exiles what was ostensibly a
private enterprise. He was joined in the spring of 1467 by Ercole d’Este
and several of the smaller princes of Romagna. Neapolitan and Milanese
auxiliaries were sent to the aid of Florence, whose forces were under
the supreme command of Federigo da Montefeltro, duke of Urbino. Italy
watched with eager interest the progress of the campaign, which was
conducted with the punctilious precision so dear to the professional
soldier of Italy. There was a great deal of marching, but very little
fighting and very little execution. The armies never came anywhere near
Florence, whose fate was supposed to be at stake, and no decisive
advantage was gained by either side. But this was in itself decisive
enough. It was sufficient for the Medici to avoid defeat; the exiles
could hope for nothing unless they gained a great victory. In 1468 peace
was negotiated by Pope Paul II., leaving matters _in statu quo_. The
exiles lost all hope of returning to Florence. Niccolo Soderini died in
Germany in 1474; Neroni lived in Rome till 1482; Angelo Acciaiuoli
entered a Carthusian monastery in Naples.
The struggle of 1466 and 1467 removed any possible doubt as to the
position of the Medici. The whole aim of the opposition and their
supporters had been to effect their overthrow, and the attempt had
failed. They were undistinguished by any title, but they were as
obviously the rulers of Florence as if they called themselves dukes or
counts. This was made clear after the death of Piero de’ Medici on
December 3, 1469. Tommaso Soderini, Niccolo’s brother, who had remained
faithful during the recent crisis, convened a _pratica_ or [Sidenote:
Accession of Lorenzo.] informal meeting of the principal citizens. He
proposed that Lorenzo de’ Medici, who was only twenty-one, and therefore
below the legal age for holding any magistracy in the republic, should
be invited to exercise the power that had been wielded by Cosimo and
Piero. A deputation was chosen to carry the offer, which Lorenzo
accepted after a becoming show of hesitation.
Lorenzo’s conduct shows that he was fully conscious of the altered
position which events had enabled him to assume. Hitherto the Medici had
been content to intermarry with Florentine families, and thus to
recognise their equality of rank. But Lorenzo, as a prince, must seek a
foreign bride, and he married Clarice Orsini, a daughter of the famous
family of Roman nobles. Though his own tastes led him to show an
interest in art and literature, and to encourage [Sidenote:
Constitutional changes.] the amusements of the people, he was also
inspired by the wish to establish a court on the lines which had become
familiar in the principalities of Italy. In their intercourse with
Lorenzo the Florentines showed a deference and even a servility which
would have been deemed wholly out of place in the days of Cosimo and
Piero. This growth of a monarchical element within the republic is
probably the explanation of the numerous and obscure constitutional
changes which were made or attempted in the early years of Lorenzo’s
administration. Their essential object was to secure absolute control of
appointments to the signory. In 1470 it was proposed that the
_accoppiatori_ should be chosen every year by a new college of
forty-five, consisting of men who had discharged this function since the
return of the Medici in 1434. The scheme was denounced as an attempt to
subject the city to forty-five tyrants, and failed to pass the council
of a hundred. In the next year, however, the same object was attained in
a different way. The existing _accoppiatori_ were associated with the
sitting members of the signoria as a permanent committee, and the names
which they proposed were to be carried in the Hundred by a bare
majority, instead of by the usual majority of two-thirds. In the same
year the legislative functions of the old councils of the people and of
the commune were suspended for ten years. It is difficult to estimate
the precise significance of these and other changes, but their general
effect was to narrow the circle of families among whose members the more
important offices circulated. This was certain to excite
dissatisfaction; and among the malcontents we find the Pazzi, an old
noble family which had devoted itself to commerce, and now became rivals
of the Medici in business as well as in politics.
Events proved that discontent within Florence was not very formidable,
unless it was reinforced by [Sidenote: Foreign policy.] difficulties in
foreign relations. Lorenzo had been brought up by his grandfather to
regard Milan and Naples as the normal allies of Florence, Venice as a
dangerous rival of Florence and a resolute opponent of the Medici
ascendency, and the papacy as a variable force depending on the
idiosyncracies of rapidly changing popes, and requiring to be very
carefully watched. Lorenzo had learned the lesson, but with the egotism
and self-sufficiency of youth he was not disinclined to attempt a few
experiments on his own account. If he could establish friendly relations
with the papacy and with Venice, he might make his own position stronger
than ever, and might pose as mediator and almost as arbiter in the
relations of the Italian states. On the election of Sixtus IV. in 1471,
Lorenzo went in person as Florentine envoy to carry the usual
congratulations. He returned not only with a confirmation of his banking
privileges in Rome, but with the lucrative appointment of receiver of
the papal revenues. At the same time he opened negotiations with Venice,
which led in 1474 to the embassy of Tommaso Soderini and the conclusion
of an alliance between Venice, Milan, and Florence.
But these new connections were dearly purchased by the alienation of
Naples. Ferrante regarded Venice as the inveterate enemy of his kingdom
and his family. As long as the Medici had identified their interests
with his own he had been eager to uphold [Sidenote: Alienation of Naples
and quarrel with Sixtus IV.] their power in Florence. But a good
understanding of Milan and Florence with Venice threatened Naples with
isolation, and Ferrante must seek support elsewhere. Sixtus had already
allowed the Neapolitan tribute to be commuted for a formal gift; and as
the ties between Naples and the papacy were drawn closer, a coolness
grew up between Sixtus and Lorenzo. The origin of the quarrel is to be
found in the opposition of Florence to the aggrandisement of Girolamo
Riario (see p. 282). Lorenzo refused to find the money for the purchase
of Imola, and the Pope transferred the post of receiver-general from the
Medici to the Pazzi. The dispute was speedily embittered. Sixtus
appointed Francesco Salviati to the archbishopric of Pisa without
consulting Lorenzo, and in defiance of his wishes. The Florentines, on
their side, refused to admit the archbishop to his see; they supported
the Vitelli in Citta di Castello, and in many ways showed an inclination
to thwart the Pope’s schemes in Romagna. For some time, however, the
dispute did not seem likely to lead to serious results. But the death of
Galeazzo Maria Sforza in 1476, and the obvious weakness of the
government of the regent, Bona of Savoy, encouraged the opponents of the
Medici to bolder acts than they would have contemplated when Milan could
give efficient support to Florence. In 1477 Girolamo Riario and
Francesco Pazzi began to discuss in Rome [Sidenote: Conspiracy of the
Pazzi.] how to overthrow a family which stood in the way of both of
them. By the beginning of 1478 the main outlines of the conspiracy had
been agreed to. Francesco Salviati and Jacopo Pazzi, the head of the
family in Florence, had agreed to take part in the plot. It was
understood that the Pope and the king of Naples would give active
support, but they took no responsibilities for the actual means by which
the desired end was to be attained. Assassination was a recognised
weapon in Italian politics, and it was obviously difficult to effect a
revolution in Florence without it. Sixtus IV. might plead that he was
ignorant of this part of the design, but morally the plea is worthless.
If the Medici government had been unpopular in Florence, it might have
been possible to organise a rebellion and to overthrow them by means of
a parliament. But there was no widespread discontent in the city, and
the Pazzi had no strong following among either the lower or the wealthy
classes. It was decided, therefore, to kill Lorenzo and his brother
Giuliano, and to trust to the resultant confusion and foreign
intervention. A number of hired mercenaries, headed by Giovanni Battista
da Montesecco, were engaged to carry out the two immediate objects—the
murder of the brothers and the seizure of the magistrates. It says much
for the fidelity of the plotters that no one was found to betray the
design, in spite of the discouragement caused by unavoidable delays. The
great practical difficulty arose from the necessity of assassinating
Lorenzo and Giuliano at the same moment, for fear that one might receive
warning from the fate of the other. And unless both were removed, the
plot would end in failure. At last the desired opportunity was offered
by a banquet which the Medici gave in honour of Cardinal Raffaelle
Riario, a great-nephew of the Pope. But Giuliano was too unwell to
attend, and the time and place had to be altered. On Sunday, April 26,
1478, the two brothers were to be present at divine service in the
cathedral, and the elevation of the host was to be the signal to the
assassins. This gave rise to an unexpected difficulty. Montesecco, who
had undertaken to slay Lorenzo, refused to commit sacrilege by shedding
blood in a church, and two priests were chosen to take his place. But
the priests, though they did not share the scruples, also lacked the
strength and skill of the soldier. As the little altar bell tinkled,
Giuliano was struck down, and Francesco Pazzi dealt the final deathblow.
But Lorenzo was only wounded in the shoulder, and in the confused
scuffle which followed he succeeded in escaping to the sacristy, where
his friends closed the bronze doors in the face of the murderers.
Elsewhere the conspirators were equally unsuccessful. Archbishop
Salviati, who had gone to the Palazzo to superintend the seizure of the
gonfalonier and priors, excited suspicion by his obvious agitation, and
was seized with several of his followers. Jacopo Pazzi headed a
procession through the streets with shouts of ‘Liberty,’ but the people
raised the counter-cry of ‘Palle! Palle!’ in favour of the Medici, and
the leaders of the demonstration were carried by the mob to the Palazzo.
On the arrival of the news that Giuliano de’ Medici was dead, Francesco
Pazzi, the archbishop of Pisa, and several other prisoners were promptly
hanged from the windows. Vindictive severity was shown to the Pazzi and
their allies. Guglielmo Pazzi, who had married Lorenzo’s sister, was the
only member of the family who escaped. The two priests who had taken
refuge in a monastery were dragged from their sanctuary by the mob and
barbarously murdered. Montesecco had left Florence, but he was captured,
and after giving evidence which implicated the Pope in the conspiracy,
was executed. One of the murderers succeeded in reaching Constantinople,
but even there the vengeance of the Medici was able to reach him. He was
handed over by Mohammed II., and brought back to Florence, where in 1479
he shared the fate of his accomplices.
Within Florence all danger was at an end. The cowardly nature of the
attack rallied public opinion to the Medici; and [Sidenote: War with
Naples and the Papacy.] the death of a brother, who had hitherto enjoyed
the larger share of popular favour, served to exalt the survivor and to
remove from his way a possible rival. The fate of the conspirators was a
striking object-lesson to future malcontents. But Lorenzo’s signal
triumph only exasperated the foreign enemies whom his reckless policy
had alienated. He had broken up the triple alliance, in which Florence
served as a link between Milan and Naples, and had divided Italy into a
northern and a southern league. These were now brought into collision by
the failure of the Pazzi conspiracy. Both Sixtus IV. and Ferrante of
Naples had good reasons for desiring the overthrow of Lorenzo, and these
reasons were multiplied now that success had made him more formidable.
The Pope, urged on by Girolamo Riario, and infuriated by the execution
of an archbishop and the murder of priests, called upon the Florentines
to banish Lorenzo, who was to be made the scapegoat for the crime of his
opponents. The citizens refused to give up their leader, and published
the confession of Montesecco. Sixtus laid the city under an interdict,
and prepared for war. The papal troops under Federigo da Montefeltro and
a Neapolitan army under Alfonso of Calabria marched into southern
Tuscany, where the adhesion of Siena gave the invaders a convenient base
of operations. Florence appealed to her allies, and obtained assistance
from Milan under Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, and from Venice under Galeotto
Pico of Mirandola. Ercole d’Este was appointed commander-in-chief for
the republic. Great hopes were also entertained of the intervention of
France, and Louis XI. despatched Philippe de Commines to Italy to try
what diplomacy could effect in favour of Lorenzo de’ Medici.
In 1478 Florence made a creditable resistance against superior forces.
The fortification of Poggio Imperiale blocked the Val d’Elsa, the most
vulnerable approach to [Sidenote: Campaigns of 1478 and 1479.] the city;
and when the disappointed invaders turned eastwards to the valley of the
Chiana, they had only completed the preliminary operation of taking
Monte San Savino when winter put an end to operations. But in the
campaign of 1479 fortune turned decisively against the Florentines. A
revolution in Milan, which was dexterously organised by Ferrante, not
only compelled the withdrawal of the Milanese troops; but by
substituting the rule of Ludovico Sforza for that of Bona of Savoy,
detached Milan for a time from the Florentine alliance. The Turkish
attack on Scutari, which reduced Venice to such straits that it was
necessary to make the peace of Constantinople, and to refrain from any
vigorous action in Italy, was also attributed by contemporary suspicion
to the wily suggestions of the Neapolitan king. Worst of all, France
would not take action. A few hundred French lances would have been worth
far more than the threat of a general council which the Pope knew would
not be carried out. Florence found herself isolated and exposed to a
crushing attack. The plague broke out within the walls, Poggio Imperiale
was stormed, and nothing but the ponderous tactics of a mercenary army
saved the city from the necessity of an ignominious surrender. Lorenzo
de’ Medici was in a very difficult position. In a sense the city was
enduring these sufferings and risks on his behalf, and the loyalty of
the citizens might give way under an intolerable strain. He sought and
found a way out of the dilemma by an enterprise which his adherents and
apologists have agreed to consider [Sidenote: Lorenzo goes to Naples.]
heroic. In December 1479 he set out on an embassy to Naples. The fate of
Jacopo Piccinino was sufficiently recent to convince people that it was
dangerous to trust to the good faith of Ferrante, yet it is difficult to
believe that Lorenzo undertook the journey without some fairly
substantial assurance that there was less risk in it than appeared on
the surface. After all, Ferrante had originally been the cordial friend
of Lorenzo; and although he had since then taken offence, he might be
appeased by a renewal of the old understanding. Events had proved that
it was not worth while to alienate Naples in order to establish better
relations with Venice, and Lorenzo was quite willing to do penance for
his blunder. And the alliance between Naples and the Pope did not rest
upon very substantial foundations. Lorenzo could point out that Sixtus
only cared for the aggrandisement of his nephew, that he was already
preparing to expel the Ordelaffii from Forli in order to give a duchy to
Girolamo, and that a strong secular power in the papal states was by no
means likely to benefit Naples. There was an ultimate argument in the
relations of the Medici with France. The revival of the Angevin claim
was a perpetual nightmare to Ferrante and his son, and it might well
prove that the house of Aragon would find in a Florentine alliance a
substantial bulwark to their throne. At all events, whether hazardous or
not, the enterprise was successful. Lorenzo returned to Florence in 1480
with a treaty of [Sidenote: Conclusion of peace, 1480.] peace. It was
not, of course, a very glorious agreement: the southern districts of
Florentine territory were ceded to Siena, the allies in Romagna were
left at the mercy of the Pope, and there was no provision for the
restoration of the northern fortress of Sarzana, which had been seized
during the war by the Fregosi of Genoa. But anything was better than the
continuance of the war, and Lorenzo was hailed as the saviour of the
state. It is true that there was a momentary reaction, when it was found
that the Neapolitan forces were in no hurry to quit Tuscany, and that
Alfonso was apparently taking advantage of party feuds in Siena to
maintain a permanent foothold in the province. But the Turks intervened
to checkmate any such design, and the occupation of Otranto compelled
Alfonso and his troops to retire for the defence of their own territory.
Even the obstinate Pope was forced to give way by the danger from the
infidel. Sixtus ceased to insist that Lorenzo should make another more
humiliating, and perhaps more perilous journey to Rome, and withdrew the
interdict which he had launched against Florence for venturing to punish
ecclesiastics for a flagrant crime.
The conspirators had failed, and foreign enemies had failed, to
overthrow the Medici, and their failure necessarily strengthened the
dynasty against which these strenuous [Sidenote: Constitutional changes
in 1480.] attacks had been directed. In 1480 Lorenzo was able to carry
through vital changes in the constitution which for the rest of his life
secured his authority against serious attack. It is noteworthy that no
use was made of the parliament, as on previous occasions, when
revolutionary decrees had to be enacted. The proposals were made by the
signoria and carried in the ordinary way through the three councils. A
constituent body of thirty was nominated by the signory. These were to
appoint a ‘greater council’ of two hundred and ten members, afterwards
enlarged to two hundred and fifty-eight, who were to act as a temporary
_balia_, having power to legislate and to control the filling of the
bags with the names of suitable candidates for office. In order to
secure a wide distribution of influence, no family, except two specially
named, was to have more than three members on the council. By a far more
important provision the thirty were to nominate another forty, and with
them were to constitute a permanent Council or Senate, known as the
Seventy. The Seventy held office for life, and filled vacancies by
co-optation. From among them were to be chosen the two important
executive committees—the _Otto di Pratica_, who took the place of the
occasional committees of eight or ten whom it had been usual to appoint
in time of war, and the _Otto di Balia_, who superintended the police of
the city. The institution of the Seventy did not abolish any of the old
magistracies and councils; these still continued as a means of rewarding
supporters and flattering men’s love of importance. But it placed side
by side with them what Florence had not for a long time possessed, a
permanent machinery of government, and thus supplied the stability, the
want of which had been the chief cause which raised the Medici to their
anomalous and ill-defined position in the state. It was inevitable that
the Seventy, with its two standing committees, should gradually draw
into its hands the real power which could never be effectually employed
by officials who changed every two months.
The troubles of the last three years had taught Lorenzo a lesson which
he never forgot. The prompt punishment which followed his youthful
errors in statecraft had been [Sidenote: Lorenzo’s later years.] an
invaluable training to him. For the next twelve years the internal
history of Florence is absolutely uneventful, a fact which is itself the
best evidence of the capacity of its ruler. Freed from the fear of
domestic opposition, Lorenzo could concentrate his attention on external
affairs, and he became the foremost statesman in Italy. Reverting to the
sound traditions which his grandfather had handed down, he maintained an
alliance with Naples on the one side, and with Milan on the other, and
was thus enabled to check the aggressive tendencies of Venice and the
papacy, and at the same time to avert the danger of foreign
intervention. In the war of Ferrara (1482-84) he was an active member of
the coalition which saved the house of Este from annihilation, though he
was chagrined that the interested defection of Ludovico Sforza enabled
Venice not only to escape well-deserved punishment, but also to retain
the polesina of Rovigo. In 1485 a more serious difficulty arose when the
Neapolitan rebels, backed up by Innocent VIII., endeavoured to revive
the Angevin claims. Florence had no love for the house of Aragon, and
was closely connected by many ties with France. Fortunately, the appeal
was made to Réné of Lorraine instead of to Charles VIII., and so Lorenzo
could support the cause of Ferrante without any overt breach of the
French alliance. And while engaged in these questions of high policy,
Lorenzo never lost sight of the immediate interests of Florence. He took
advantage of party feuds in Siena to procure the restoration of most of
the territories which had been ceded in 1480. And he not only recovered
Sarzana from Genoa, but he added to it the neighbouring fortresses of
Pietrasanta and Sarzanella, thus giving to Florence a strong frontier on
the ridge of the Apennines, which, if properly garrisoned, would have
enabled the republic to check the invasion of Charles VIII.
In Lorenzo’s last years a new and momentous political problem was
created by the growing alienation between Naples and Milan. Ludovico
Sforza could not carry out his designs upon his nephew’s duchy without
incurring [Sidenote: Importance of Lorenzo’s death.] the hostility of
Ferrante and Alfonso; and upon Florence, as the middle state of the
league, devolved the responsibility of mediating between her two allies.
It was a task which required all Lorenzo’s tact, experience, and
patience, and it may be doubted whether even he could have ultimately
succeeded in averting a collision. It is just possible, however, that
consummate prudence on the part of Florence might have prevented French
intervention in Italy, and in that case the whole course of European
history might have been altered. But in 1492, when the fate of Italy was
trembling in the balance, Lorenzo died; and his death at this critical
moment must be ranked with those other events—the discovery of America,
the conquest of Granada, and the election of Alexander VI.—which make
1492 one of the most memorable years in the history of Europe.
Enough has been said of the Florentine constitution to show that the
power of the Medici did not rest upon very solid foundations. They had
no military force [Sidenote: Recklessness of Piero de’ Medici.] behind
them; none of the ordinary securities on which a despotism must rely for
its permanence. They ruled, partly because they supplied an element of
stability, which the civic constitution notoriously lacked, partly
because they maintained the credit and the influence of the state in
Italy and in Europe, but mainly because they had managed to conciliate
the interests and the allegiance of a majority of the citizens. But if
the Florentines once felt that their own interests and the security of
the republic were endangered by the ascendency of the Medici, that
ascendency must inevitably fall. And this was precisely the impression
which Piero, Lorenzo’s eldest son, set himself to produce. Discarding
all pretence of civic equality, he indulged in the airs and pretensions
of a prince born in the purple. And while his haughtiness disgusted the
mass of the citizens, he made no effort to retain the support of the
prominent families with whom his father had lived on familiar terms. But
his most fatal blunder was in foreign relations. His mother was an
Orsini, and his wife was an Orsini, and under the influence of his
foreign relatives he abandoned the mediating position of Lorenzo, and
allied himself unconditionally with the rulers of Naples. This action
had a double result. It completed the exasperation of the Florentines,
who had never loved the Neapolitan alliance even when their trust in the
wisdom of Cosimo or Lorenzo had convinced them that it was to their
interest to adhere to it. And it drove Ludovico Sforza into that
desperate appeal to France which was the immediate cause of Charles
VIII.’s invasion. When the French came, Piero showed himself to be
pusillanimous as well as incompetent. He took no steps to hold the
defensible passes of the Apennines against the invaders; and when they
had reached Pisa, he sought to disarm their hostility by a more ruinous
surrender than the most extreme supporter of a French alliance would
have advocated. The patience of the citizens was exhausted; and Piero’s
flight was followed by the expulsion of his family and the restoration
for a few troubled years of republican independence in Florence.