THE HUSSITE WARS AND THE COUNCIL OF BASEL, 1419-1449
Sigismund and Germany—Hussite parties in Bohemia—Crusades against
the Hussites—Bohemian victories—Bohemia and Poland—Attempted
reforms in Germany—The Crusade of 1427—Reforms of 1427—The Crusade
of 1431—Summons of the Council of Basel—Its procedure—Its quarrel
with Eugenius IV.—His submission—The Compacts with Bohemia—Civil
war in Bohemia—Battle of Lipan—Sigismund acknowledged king of
Bohemia—The Council of Basel and reforms—Divisions within the
Council—Negotiations with the Greeks—Quarrel of the Pope and
Council—Council of Ferrara or Florence—Attitude of France and
Germany—The Pragmatic Sanction—Deposition of Eugenius IV.—Election
of Felix V.—The Council’s prestige declines—Triumph of Eugenius
IV.—Reconciliation of Germany to Eugenius IV.—Close of the Council
of Basel—Failure of the Conciliar Movement.
The ultimate failure of the reforming party at Constance had [Sidenote:
Sigismund and Germany.] ruined all Sigismund’s schemes for the
restoration of monarchical authority in Germany. Ready as he was to form
magnificent projects, he was equally easily discouraged and turned
aside. After quitting the Council he devoted himself to personal and
dynastic interests, to the defence of Hungary against the Turks, and to
the enforcement of his claim to succeed in Bohemia. Germany and German
interests he abandoned almost as completely as his brother had done. The
result was a gradual rupture of the friendship that had hitherto existed
between himself and Frederick of Brandenburg. The latter had made it his
life’s task to restore unity to Germany, in order to save that country
from internal dissolution and foreign attack. The desertion of Sigismund
from what had been a common cause forced him to change his means, but
not his end. Hitherto he had striven to unite Germany under the
monarchy, but that was impossible when the king would not undertake to
govern. Frederick was forced to scheme for a federal union of Germany
which should be independent of, and perhaps hostile to, the monarchy.
And the necessity of some such union was made more and more manifest by
events in Bohemia.
In Bohemia the news of Hus’s death had provoked a storm of indignation,
and had intensified the national sentiment of hostility to Germany.
Sigismund was regarded [Sidenote: Hussite parties in Bohemia.] with
special loathing as a perjured traitor as well as a party to a murder.
Even the sluggish Wenzel shared the sentiments of his subjects. He
bitterly reviled his brother for breaking his safe-conduct, ordered that
no Bohemian should henceforth appear before a foreign tribunal, and
showed special favour to the party which demanded vengeance for Hus’s
death. Under the leadership of Nicolas of Husinec, lord of the village
where Hus had been born, and of John Ziska, already known as a capable
military leader, the Hussites made great strides towards ascendency in
Bohemia. The chief doctrine which they advanced was the communion in
both kinds. They held that laymen were entitled to receive the cup in
the sacrament as well as the priests, and hence, as a religious party,
they received the name of Utraquists. But though they were united in
this contention, and also in common hostility to Germany and German
influences, there were important divisions among the Hussites. The
moderate party, or Calixtines, were in favour of a gradual reform, and
wished to separate political from religious questions. They were also
called Pragers, because they were strongest in the capital and in the
University of Prague. In 1420 their demands were formulated in the ‘four
articles of Prague,’ which became the avowed creed of the party. These
were: (1) complete liberty of preaching; (2) the communion in both kinds
for all Christians; (3) the exclusion of priests from temporal affairs
and the holding of property; (4) the subjection of clergy to secular
penalties for crimes and misdemeanours. But side by side with the
Calixtines was a radical and democratic party, known as the Taborites.
Like the Lollards in England, they mixed up social and religious
questions, and advocated republican and even communistic theories.
The death of Wenzel in 1419 added a new element of bitterness to the
quarrel between the Hussites and the [Sidenote: Crusades against the
Hussites.] champions of orthodoxy. The obvious heir to the crown was
Sigismund, the only surviving male of the Luxemburg house. But Sigismund
was regarded as peculiarly responsible for Hus’s death, and as the
representative of all that was foreign and anti-Bohemian. It was
inevitable that his claim should be resisted, or only accepted on very
stringent conditions. At the moment Sigismund was engaged in a Turkish
war, and left the government in the hands of Wenzel’s widow. But as soon
as possible he patched up a truce with the Turks, and prepared to take
possession of his new kingdom. Frederick of Brandenburg urged him to
adopt a conciliatory policy, to play off one party against the other,
and to gain over the moderates by a few concessions in religious
matters. But Sigismund was eager to secure the support of the Pope, who
was resolutely opposed to any tampering with heresy; and most of his
German advisers urged that any concessions to his subjects would make
them haughty and disobedient in the future. The counsel of Frederick of
Brandenburg was rejected, and in March 1420 Martin V. published a
crusade against the Hussites. A German army was to be raised to
prosecute the religious war. No decision could have been more
disastrous. Party divisions in Bohemia were at once reconciled, and all
classes joined in maintaining a national resistance against a common
foe. And this resistance [Sidenote: Bohemian victories, 1420-22.] was
completely successful. Ziska proved to be a general of the first rank.
Not only did he give to his troops the cohesion and discipline of a
standing army, but he introduced innovations which mark an epoch in the
history of mediæval warfare. Especially prominent is the excellence of
his artillery, and the use which he made of his baggage-waggons. These
were formed into a sort of movable fortress, equally formidable both for
defence and aggression. The German armies opposed to him were the feudal
levies, collected from various states, bound together by no common
interests or enthusiasms, and recognising no common discipline or
authority. In three successive campaigns—1420, 1421, and 1422—the
Germans were routed and driven from Bohemia, until at last the mere
rumour of Ziska’s approach was sufficient to drive his enemies into
disorderly and panic-stricken flight. A contemporary says that the
Germans were inspired with such a loathing for heretics that they could
not bring themselves to strike them, or even to look them in the face.
After the failure of the third crusade in 1422, Bohemia was left to
herself for five years. Nicolas of Husinec had died in 1421, Ziska was
carried off by the plague in 1424, and the leadership of the militant
party passed to a general of hardly less ability, Prokop. With the
removal of external danger, the bond which had held parties together was
broken, the old divisions and quarrels reappeared, and the country was a
prey to the horrors of civil war. An attempt was made to identify the
common interests of the Slav race in opposition to Germany by offering
the crown to [Sidenote: Bohemia and Poland.] Ladislas of Poland. But
Ladislas was afraid of compromising his position by an alliance with
heretics, and though his nephew Korybut was for a time sent into
Bohemia, the opportunity of forming a powerful Slav monarchy on the
frontier of Germany was allowed to slip.
Meanwhile the humiliation of successive and crushing defeats had made a
profound impression in Germany. The battle of Brescia (_v._ p. 196) had
already shown the weakness of German arms; but the failure to crush the
Hussites proved that the military and political systems of Germany were
equally [Sidenote: Attempted reforms in Germany.] rotten. The more
patriotic of the princes, like Frederick of Brandenburg, were driven to
consider the necessity of some drastic reform. The restoration of
monarchical authority was the most obvious remedy for disorder, but the
general distrust of Sigismund put that out of the question. The old
alliance of the Hohenzollerns with the Luxemburg kings had now come to
an end. In 1422 Albert III., the last of the Ascanian electors of
Saxony, died, leaving no obvious heir. His only daughter was married to
the eldest son of the Elector of Brandenburg. A few years earlier
Sigismund would have welcomed the opportunity of increasing the
territorial and political influence of his chief supporter in Germany.
But things had changed since the Council of Constance, the Hohenzollern
claims were disregarded, and the vacant electorate was conferred by
Sigismund upon Frederick of Meissen, the founder of the Wettin line in
Saxony, which rules there in the present day. This marks the final
rupture between Sigismund and the Elector of Brandenburg; and in
attempting to reform the constitution of Germany the latter found
himself in opposition to his former patron. In 1422 it had been proposed
at a diet at Nürnberg to raise a mercenary army in place of the feudal
troops, and to defray the expense by levying a general imperial tax of
one per cent., ‘the hundredth penny,’ as it was called. But this project
was foiled by the opposition of the towns, who feared that they would
have to pay the money while the princes would pocket it. In 1424 the
electors formed a close league among themselves, and practically assumed
to act as if they were the joint heads of a federation. Sigismund was
furious at this open disregard of his authority, and prepared to go to
war against Frederick of Brandenburg and his associates. Hostilities had
actually broken out, when the news arrived that the Hussites, who had
hitherto been content with standing on the defensive, were invading the
neighbouring German provinces. The Pope was roused by this to make new
efforts for the success of a crusade, and he [Sidenote: The fourth
crusade, 1427.] appointed Cardinal Beaufort, the uncle of Henry VI. of
England, to act as papal legate. At the same time another attempt was
made to strengthen the military organisation of Germany. At a diet at
Frankfort (April 1427) the old mode of levying troops was abandoned, and
it was agreed that one out of every twenty adult males should be chosen
by lot. In this way it was hoped to eradicate the provincial jealousies,
which had hitherto been a fatal source of discord. Frederick of
Brandenburg was to act as commander-in-chief. But the financial
difficulty was still in the way. None of the proposed taxes could be
carried, and at last they had to fall back upon the tenths granted by
the Pope and a poll-tax on the Jews. The army collected was the largest
that had yet been employed in the war; but the result was all the more
ignominious. On the news that Prokop and his dreaded Taborites were at
hand, the crusaders fled in headlong confusion. On the frontier they
were met by Cardinal Beaufort, who implored them to return, and in his
rage tore the imperial standard to pieces, and trampled it underfoot.
But it was all in vain, and the legate was swept away with the
panic-stricken mob.
This was the most ignominious reverse yet experienced, and under the
impression which it produced a new diet at [Sidenote: Reforms of 1427.]
Frankfort hastened to adopt the most far-reaching reforms. A regular
income-tax was imposed, and a general poll-tax graduated according to
rank. The revenue thus derived was to be collected by local delegates,
and paid to the central power. But this central power was not the German
monarchy. The two commanders-in-chief, Cardinal Beaufort and Frederick
of Brandenburg, were to be aided by a council of nine, consisting of one
nominee of each of the six electors, and three representatives of the
imperial towns. This body was authorised to raise fresh troops, or to
levy additional taxes. Such an arrangement amounted to a practical
deposition of Sigismund, whose authority was transferred to this new
federal council. But the reform was little more than a paper scheme. The
forces of disunion were too strong to be readily overcome. Much of the
money remained unpaid, and in consequence the troops could neither be
raised nor equipped. Frederick of Brandenburg was forced to fall back
upon the policy of negotiation which he had always favoured. He saw
clearly that every invasion of Bohemia strengthened the extreme party,
and that the only prospect of settlement lay in gaining over the
moderates to the German side. But the negotiations were foiled by the
irresolution of Sigismund, the discord among the German princes, and the
obstinacy of the Pope. Cardinal Beaufort was ordered to lead a new
crusade in 1429, but he found it necessary to disarm domestic opponents
by sending the troops he had raised to serve in France. Martin V. was
furious but impotent. In 1430 he appointed a new legate, Cardinal
Cesarini, in [Sidenote: Fifth crusade, 1431.] place of Beaufort, and in
1431 a German army was at last collected on the principles laid down in
1427. In August it crossed the frontier, and encamped under the walls of
Tauss. But on the news of Prokop’s approach, the old panic set in, and
the troops fled in confusion. With the so-called battle of Tauss the
fifth crusade, the last effort to crush the Hussite by force of arms,
came to an end. The war had lasted twelve years, and had given
convincing proofs of the evils of provincial disunion, but it had come
two centuries too late to inspire the Germans with a sense of national
duties and interests. From this time the only hope of restoring peace in
eastern Europe lay in the proceedings of the General Council, which had
already been summoned to meet at Basel.
One of the most important decrees of the Council of Constance had
provided for the sequence of future councils; and [Sidenote: Summons of
the Council of Basel, 1431.] though Martin V. looked upon the
arrangement with profound mistrust, he dared not wholly disregard it.
The first of these assemblies met in 1423, first at Pavia and then at
Siena. It was attended only by Italian prelates, who were easily
manageable, and it was dissolved without passing any important
enactments except that its successor was to meet in 1431 at Basel. As
the time approached Martin began to be filled with dread of another
Council beyond the Alps. But the condition of Europe was too disturbed,
and the danger too great of allowing Bohemian heresy to spread, for him
to run the risk of alienating Germany by changing the place of meeting.
On February 1 he ordered the Council to meet on March 4, and appointed
Cardinal Cesarini to preside as his representative. On February 20
Martin V. died, leaving his successor Eugenius IV. to face the dangers
and difficulties which he foresaw.
Very few prelates appeared in Basel at the appointed date; but the
defeat of the Germans at Tauss suddenly gave great importance to the
Council, as offering the only prospect of the conclusion of peace. In
September Cesarini arrived from Bohemia, and from this time numbers
rapidly increased. The first matter for consideration [Sidenote:
Procedure of the Council.] was the method of procedure. It was decided
to abandon the division into nations, which had been tried at Constance,
on the ground that national jealousy weakened the unity of the Council.
Instead, the Council was to be divided into four deputations, composed
of representatives from each nation. Each deputation was to consider a
separate subject: (1) the restoration of peace; (2) matters of doctrine
and faith; (3) the reform of the Church; (4) the general business of the
Council. When a matter had been discussed in a deputation, it was to be
brought before the whole Council, and votes were to be taken by
deputations. If they were equally divided, the deputations were to be
re-formed, and the question debated afresh. A committee of twelve was
formed to arrange the division into deputations, and to decide on the
right of any individual to take part in the Council. From the first this
committee took a very broad view in this matter, and the result was that
the Council soon began to assume a democratic character. At Constance
the great prelates and university dignitaries had been the dominant
force: at Basel power tended to fall into the hands of the mass of the
clergy.
The most pressing business of the Council was to negotiate with the
victorious Hussites, and under the influence of Cesarini it was decided
to invite the Bohemians to send delegates to Basel. This gave the
greatest umbrage in Rome, where the dangers from Bohemia were less
keenly felt, and the prejudice against any dealings [Sidenote: Quarrel
with Eugenius IV.] with excommunicated heretics was strongest. Eugenius
IV., who was much less prudent and statesmanlike than his predecessor,
determined to check such dangerous proceedings at the outset. On
December 18, 1431, he issued a bull dissolving the Council, and
summoning another to meet in eighteen months at Bologna. The bull
dropped like a bomb-shell in the peaceful deliberations of Basel, where
no thought of the possible displeasure of the Pope had been entertained.
But after the first feeling of dismay, it was resolved to resist.
Cesarini was profoundly convinced that the dissolution of the Council
would result in the complete alienation of Germany and the triumph of
the Hussite heresy, and he wrote an earnest letter to explain his views.
Sigismund and all the princes whose interests demanded peace were
inclined to support the Council, which was thus emboldened to make a
firm stand against the Pope. In February 1432 it was decided that a
General Council could not be dissolved without its own consent; and in
April the Pope and cardinals were ordered to present themselves at Basel
within three months. A new schism seemed likely to break out, not as
before between rival heads of the Church, but between the Church itself
and its head. The contest was between parliamentary and despotic
authority, and it was as difficult in the Church as in the State to
reconcile their rival pretensions.
In the end the Pope was forced to give way, partly by the pressure of
secular interests, and partly by the difficulties in which he was
involved in Italy. In 1432 Sigismund came to Rome to receive the
imperial crown from the Pope, and [Sidenote: Submission of the Pope.]
refused to abandon the cause of the Council, which he hoped might secure
his tardy recognition in Bohemia. In 1433 the partiality of Eugenius for
his native city of Venice involved him in a quarrel with Filippo Maria
Visconti. The mercenary troops of Milan, aided by the Colonnas, whom
Eugenius sought to abase from the position Martin V. had given them,
laid siege to Rome, and the Pope could only save himself from
imprisonment by an ignominious flight to Florence. In these
circumstances he could hardly hope for a victory over the recalcitrant
Council, and in December 1433 he abandoned the unequal contest. He
declared the Council of Basel to be a lawful œcumenical council, and
confirmed its decrees.
The papal recognition came in time to give increased importance and
authority to the Council’s negotiations with [Sidenote: The Compacts
with Bohemia.] the Bohemians, which had been carried on without
interruption during the quarrel with Eugenius. Bohemian deputies,
including Prokop himself—as redoubtable a theologian as he was a
general—had been admitted to Basel at the end of 1432, and had carried
on for three months a disputation with the speakers of the Council. The
basis of discussion was supplied by the four articles of Prague, and,
thanks to the conciliatory temper of Cesarini, the controversy had
rarely gone beyond the decencies of orderly debate. No definite
agreement was arrived at at Basel, but it was agreed that delegates from
the Council should in their turn proceed to negotiate with the diet at
Prague. There, after infinite labour, a rudimentary compromise was
arranged in what are called the _Compactata_. On the great question of
the cup the Council had to give way, and the Bohemians and Moravians
were to be allowed to receive the communion in both kinds. Liberty of
preaching was nominally conceded, but it was added that priests must be
ordained by their ecclesiastical superiors, and that the authority of
bishops must be obeyed. Clergy were to be punished for crimes ‘according
to the law of God and the ordinances of the fathers.’ On the question of
clerical property the Council gained the day. The right of the Church to
possess and administer heritable property was fully recognised, and it
was declared sacrilege for a layman to interfere with it.
The _Compactata_ were very far from being an authoritative treaty, but
their importance lies in the fact that they secured [Sidenote: Civil war
in Bohemia.] the approval of the nobles and moderate party in Bohemia,
who had long desired the restoration of peace and order. The Taborites
and the army, on the other hand, were resolute in condemning the
proposed terms, and the quarrel developed into open war. At Lipan, in
April [Sidenote: Battle of Lipan, 1434.] 1434, the Taborites found
themselves confronted by men who had learned tactics in the same school
as themselves. They were enticed from their waggon-fortress by a feigned
flight, while a troop of cavalry cut off their retreat. Prokop himself
was slain, and the army, which had been so long the terror of Europe,
was almost wholly cut to pieces. With the downfall of the extreme party
the chief difficulty in the way of the restoration of the monarchy was
removed. But the nobles were not prepared for an unconditional
submission to Sigismund. They demanded, among other things, a complete
amnesty and the exclusion [Sidenote: Sigismund acknowledged in Bohemia.]
from office of all who refused to receive the communion in both kinds.
Sigismund found it necessary to at any rate feign compliance, and in
August 1436 he made his formal entry into Prague. As a European question
the Hussite movement may be regarded as having come to an end. Not that
Bohemia was really pacified, or that the doctrines of Hus had been
abandoned, but all danger of any general adoption of these doctrines in
central Europe had disappeared. As long as the Hussites were supported
by the forces of national enthusiasm they had been irresistible: their
defeat was due to their own dissensions.
In 1434 the Council of Basel was at the height of its power and
reputation. Eugenius IV. had been forced to recognise its authority. Its
negotiations with the Bohemians had not [Sidenote: Reforming activity of
the Council.] indeed produced a definite treaty, but they had resulted
in dividing the moderate from the extreme party, and the defeat of the
latter had brought a peaceful settlement within measurable distance.
Encouraged by these successes, the Council undertook with energy the
task of reforming the Church. A series of decrees show how strong was
the dislike of the despotic rule of the Papacy. Papal reservations, by
which the right of patrons to appoint to benefices were evaded, was
declared illegal. The establishment of diocesan and provincial synods
was recommended. Appeals from the decision of a bishop to Rome were
forbidden. But these measures were surpassed in boldness by an edict of
June 1435, which forbade the payment of annates, or the first year’s
revenue of a bishopric or benefice. This threatened to deprive the Pope
of his chief source of revenue, and provoked a violent outcry from the
cardinals and officials of the Curia. But Eugenius IV., still an exile
from Rome, did not feel strong enough to resist. He accepted the decree,
only asking that some compensation in the way of national contributions
should be given him. This pusillanimity encouraged the Council to
further attacks on the papal power. The unrestricted right of the
chapters to elect bishops was confirmed: all papal commendations were
done away with: appeals from a General Council to the Pope were declared
to be heretical.
The extreme measures of the Council were fatal to its unity. It was felt
that many of the decrees were inspired by French and German antipathy to
Italian preponderance in the Church. At the same time the numerical
[Sidenote: Divisions in the Council.] majority of the lower clergy was
regarded with growing mistrust by the bishops and other dignitaries.
Reforms might begin with the Papacy, but were not likely to stop there.
Cesarini and other moderate men, who had supported the Council as long
as the Bohemian negotiations were at a critical stage, were now inclined
to rally to the cause of the Pope. This growing papal party found an
active and unscrupulous leader in the Bishop of Taranto, whose aim was
to bring about an irreconcilable quarrel between the Pope and the
Council. On the other side, the reforming and anti-Italian party was
headed by the Cardinal Archbishop of Arles, a prelate of unquestioned
piety and learning, but a resolute antagonist of the Papacy and perhaps
a personal enemy of Eugenius IV. On the same side was a man destined to
play an important part in the history of the Council and of Christendom,
Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini. He was a native of Siena who had come to
Basel in the suite of the Bishop of Fermo, and had since acted as
secretary to various prelates. He had made a name for himself by his
oratorical powers, the purity of his Latin style, and his diplomatic
ability. He had attached himself to the reforming party, but no one
suspected him of having any firm convictions, and those who knew his
easy and pleasure-loving nature can have had little expectation that he
would one day rise to the headship of the Church. Between the two
extreme parties at the Council was a moderate section, headed by a
Spaniard, John of Segovia, but it was neither numerous nor important.
The quarrel within the Council and the growing hostility between the
Council and the Pope were both brought to a [Sidenote: Negotiations with
the Greeks.] head by the negotiations with the Greeks. The eastern
Emperor, John VI., though not actually at war with the Ottoman Turks,
felt that they were closing round him on every side, and that an attack
on Constantinople was before long inevitable. In his despair he appealed
for the assistance of western Europe, and was prepared to purchase it by
sacrificing the independence of the Greek Church. The idea of uniting
the Eastern and Western Churches had long been cherished by the Popes,
and Eugenius IV. was the more eager to take the matter up as it offered
the prospect of a triumph over the hated Council of Basel. But the
Greeks were fully aware of the divisions in the Western Church, and sent
envoys to the Council as well as to the Pope. Hence arose an eager
competition as to which should gain control of the negotiations. The
Council offered to send a fleet to bring the Greek prelates to the
coast, and to pay all the expenses of their stay at Basel. To raise the
money necessary for the fulfilment of these promises, the Council
usurped a papal prerogative and issued indulgences to those who would
contribute to the union of the Churches. Eugenius, on his side, issued a
memorial to the princes of Europe, in which he enumerated the misdeeds
of the Council, and promised to undertake the reform of the Church with
the aid of another Council, which for the sake of the Greeks would be
held in some Italian city.
Meanwhile the Greek question had provoked violent disputes in Basel. The
papal legates proposed that for the convenience of the Greeks they
should adjourn either to Florence or to Udine in the territories of
Venice. The moderate party suggested Pavia, [Sidenote: Open quarrel
between Pope and Council.] as being less dependent upon the Pope, and
this received the support of Æneas Sylvius, who was beginning to veer
round to the papal side. But the extreme party would not hear of either
proposal. The Archbishop of Arles moved that the Council should remain
at Basel or, if the Greeks preferred it, should adjourn to Avignon. The
debates were marked by the most unseemly behaviour, and it was with
difficulty that the reverend fathers could be restrained from laying
violent hands upon each other. The motion of the anti-papal party was
carried by more than three-fifths of the Council; but the next morning
it was discovered that this had been abstracted, and that the decree of
the papal minority, duly signed and sealed, had been put in its place.
This audacious piece of trickery was attributed to the Archbishop of
Taranto, and so great was the indignation against him that he found it
advisable to flee to Italy, where he was rewarded by Eugenius with the
cardinal’s hat. And the anger of the majority was not diminished when
they learned that the Greeks had been persuaded to accept the papal
invitation to attend a Council in Italy. The Council was driven to the
most extreme measures to try and discredit the Papacy. In July 1437 the
Pope and cardinals were summoned to appear at Basel within sixty days to
answer the charges brought against them. On October 1 Eugenius was
pronounced contumacious for not having obeyed the summons. The Pope, on
his side, had issued a bull (September 18) dissolving the Council at
Basel, and summoning an assembly to meet at Ferrara in order to effect
the union of the Churches. There was no longer any room in Basel for
partisans of the Papacy, and by the beginning of 1438 Cesarini and all
who were frightened by the extreme measures of the Council had crossed
the Alps.
Eugenius presided at the Council which met at Ferrara in 1438 and on the
outbreak of the plague was transferred to [Sidenote: Council of Ferrara
or Florence, 1438-9.] Florence. Months were spent in futile debates on
the differences between the two Churches. By far the most prominent
subject of discussion was the great _filioque_ controversy. The Latin
Church had added these words to the original wording of the creed as
fixed at the Council of Nicæa, while the Greek Church had never adopted
them. The other differences which gave rise to debate were the use of
leavened or unleavened bread in the sacrament, the doctrine of
purgatory, and the papal supremacy. The Greek Church, as the petitioning
body, was ultimately forced to accept, without being convinced, the
Roman views on all four questions. A decree for the union of the two
Churches was drawn up, and Eugenius thought he was celebrating the
crowning triumph of the Papacy (July 6, 1439). But, as far as actual
results went, the triumph was premature. The Greeks at home refused to
accept the decision of their representatives, and clamoured that they
had been betrayed. Nor did John VI. gain any aid to make up for the
unpopularity he had incurred. Western Europe was fatally divided against
itself, and paid little heed to the safety of Constantinople. The union
of the Greek and Latin Churches remained a mere document.
The quarrel between the Pope and the Council of Basel had become
irreconcilable when the latter was deserted by all the adherents of
Eugenius, and when Cesarini was succeeded [Sidenote: Attitude of France
and Germany.] as president by the Archbishop of Arles. The result of the
quarrel could only be decided by the adhesion of the secular states to
one side or the other. The two states to which the Council chiefly
looked for support were Germany and France, the countries from which
most of the remaining members were drawn. But these two states, instead
of warmly espousing the cause of the Council, seemed rather inclined to
take advantage of the schism to establish their own ecclesiastical
independence. In 1438 a synod of French clergy accepted the [Sidenote:
Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, 1438.] famous Pragmatic Sanction of
Bourges, the foundation of the liberties of the Gallican Church. This
measure adopted, in the special interests of France, most of the decrees
against the papal power which had been carried in the Council as
applying to the whole Church. France was beginning to recover from the
prolonged wars with Burgundy and England, and the Pragmatic Sanction
offered the supreme advantage of checking the drain of French wealth to
fill the coffers of the Pope. In Germany Sigismund had died in 1437, and
the electors and leading princes began by adopting a policy of strict
neutrality between the Council and the Papacy. But the policy adopted by
France offered temptations both to lay and clerical princes, and a diet
at Mainz drew up what was practically the German equivalent of the
Pragmatic Sanction [Sidenote: Pragmatic Sanction of Mainz, 1439.] of
Bourges. Annates were to be abolished, papal reservations and provisions
forbidden, provincial and diocesan synods organised. The conception of
national churches, which had been encouraged by Martin V.’s concordats
at Constance, seemed in 1439 to be strong enough to rend the Church in
pieces.
The loss of temporal support and the apparent success of the rival
assembly in Italy did not soothe the temper of the councillors at Basel.
In spite of the vigorous opposition of the moderate party, they
proceeded to accuse Eugenius IV. of heresy and schism, and by a decree
of June 25, 1439, he [Sidenote: Deposition of Eugenius IV., 1439.] was
formally deposed. It was now determined to proceed to a new election. As
the Archbishop of Arles was the only cardinal at Basel, it was decided
that he should be aided by thirty-two delegates from the Council. The
task of election was a difficult one, as the poverty of the Council made
it necessary to choose a Pope who could afford to defray his own
expenses. At the fifth scrutiny it was found that twenty-six votes had
been given for the Duke of Savoy, who was declared Pope, with the name
[Sidenote: Election of Felix V.] of Felix V. From the first he
disappointed the hopes of his electors. Although he had been living in
retirement since the death of his wife and had amassed a considerable
treasure, he had no intention of maintaining himself and the Council
from his private funds. He demanded that he should receive a revenue as
Pope, and the Council was forced to go back on its own decrees and to
grant him a fifth of ecclesiastical revenues for a year. This measure
was certain to alienate all who had supported the Council in the hope of
diminishing clerical taxes, and as a matter of fact the tax was only
paid within the territories of Savoy. From all points of view the
election was a very disadvantageous step. It disgusted those who had
hoped for a substantial [Sidenote: Declining prestige of the Council.]
measure of reform from the Council of Basel. As long as the dispute was
between a General Council and the Pope, there were certain principles at
stake which might induce men to give energetic support to one side or
the other. But by its last act the Council had merely revived a personal
schism, of which Europe was already profoundly weary. The Council of
Basel continued to exist for nine years after the election of Felix V.,
but every year its numbers and its influence steadily declined. Even the
Antipope quarrelled with the assembly to which he owed his appointment.
In 1444 Felix quitted Basel and took up his residence at Lausanne.
The ultimate victory of Eugenius IV. was assured by the mistakes of his
opponents. It only remained for him to [Sidenote: Triumph of Eugenius
IV.] complete his triumph by securing the support of the temporal powers
of Europe. While he resided in Florence his legates succeeded in
restoring the papal supremacy in Rome, and in 1443 he was able once more
to return to his capital city. He was careful to avoid the mistakes in
Italian politics which had cost him so dear in 1433. Even his
arch-opponent, Filippo Maria Visconti, was gained over to his side. The
recognition of France was purchased by the countenance which the Pope
gave to the Angevin cause in Naples. But when the Neapolitan war ended
in the victory of Alfonso of Aragon, Eugenius adroitly changed sides
without forfeiting the French allegiance. He had thus put an end to all
serious opposition in Italy. England and the Spanish kingdoms took
little interest in the schism, and had no motive for supporting Felix V.
There remained Germany, which had openly declared for a policy of
neutrality. Until the German king and princes could be gained over, the
revival of papal authority was incomplete. The task of effecting the
reconciliation of Germany was undertaken and accomplished by one man,
Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini.
The kingship of the Romans was transferred on the death of Sigismund to
his son-in-law, Albert of Austria. But Albert died within two years of
his elevation, and in 1440 the choice of the electors fell upon another
Hapsburg, Frederick _III._, Duke of Styria and Carinthia, and guardian
in Austria of Albert’s infant son, Ladislas Postumus. As soon as
Frederick had settled family affairs in the east, he came to Germany in
1442 [Sidenote: Reconciliation of Germany to the Roman Pope.] to receive
the crown at Aachen and to consider the question of the schism. Envoys
from Basel and from Eugenius IV. had already appeared before the German
diet, but their exhaustive arguments had not led to any decision, and
the neutrality was still observed. In 1442 Frederick III. visited Basel,
and there took into his service Æneas Sylvius. The latter was convinced
that the cause of Council and Antipope was hopeless, and determined to
win his own pardon and advancement by rendering some conspicuous service
to Eugenius IV. His diplomacy was as successful as it was unscrupulous.
By 1445 he had succeeded in arranging terms between his master and the
Pope. Frederick undertook to restore Germany to its obedience to Rome;
and Eugenius in return promised to give him the imperial crown, to allow
him the nomination to certain bishoprics and benefices, and to grant him
a substantial bribe from the ecclesiastical revenues. It was a
disgraceful treaty, and in spite of the secrecy with which it was
negotiated, it became known that some such agreement was being made. The
German princes were indignant at what they considered a betrayal, and
were resolute to vindicate their own independence of their elected king.
The electors of Trier and Köln, together with a number of electoral
princes, determined, as a protest against Frederick’s conduct, to adhere
to Felix V. Thus the policy of neutrality was abandoned, and Germany was
split into parties on the question of the schism. To make matters worse,
Eugenius IV., emboldened by his treaty with the King of the Romans,
issued a bull in February 1446 declaring the Archbishops of Köln and
Trier to be deprived of their sees as heretics and traitors. This rash
act seemed to make reconciliation impossible. But Æneas Sylvius was
equal to the occasion. The electors issued the most extreme demands:
that the Pope should withdraw his bull against the two archbishops, that
he should confirm the Pragmatic Sanction of 1439, acknowledge the
supremacy of General Councils, and summon a new council to meet in
Germany in 1447. Æneas Sylvius journeyed to Rome, where he persuaded
Eugenius to restore the two archbishops, and to return a moderate answer
to the electoral demands. Then he proceeded to Germany as papal envoy,
bribed the Archbishop of Mainz to desert the electoral league, and did
not hesitate to alter the wording of the papal answer in order to
conciliate German pride. By these means he avoided an open rupture, and
induced the diet at Frankfort to agree to terms, in spite of the
protests of the Archbishops of Köln and Trier. Then Æneas Sylvius
hurried back to Rome, with envoys from the diet, in order to explain and
justify his conduct to the Pope. He found Eugenius IV. on his death-bed,
and it was necessary to hasten matters in order to avoid the
complications that might arise with a new election. A provisional
concordat was patched up. A new council was to meet in some German town,
but only if the German princes were agreed. The supremacy of a council
was recognised, but in the most general terms, so as to avoid any
reference to the assembly at Basel. The Pragmatic Sanction and the
suspension of annates were temporarily confirmed, until some final
arrangement could be agreed upon. These terms were accepted by Eugenius
on February 23, 1447, and four days later he died. His successor was the
famous scholar and collector, Thomas of Sarzana, who took the name of
Nicolas V. He was wise enough to follow the recent policy of his
predecessor in German affairs. Æneas Sylvius returned to Germany to
complete his work. The malcontent princes were gained over by separate
negotiations. When the obstinate Archbishop of Trier was induced to
acknowledge Nicolas V., opposition in Germany was at an end. The final
concordat was arranged in 1448, and was based upon the provisional terms
of the previous year. The clauses about the Council were accepted as
they stood, but on the other points the Pope gained substantial
advantages. Annates were restored, and the restrictions which had been
placed upon papal patronage by the Pragmatic Sanction were for the most
part repealed.
It only remained to get rid of the moribund Council of Basel. A few
bishops from Savoy and some clergy of humble [Sidenote: End of the
Council of Basel, 1449.] rank were the only members left. Frederick III.
sent an order for the dissolution of the Council to the civic
magistrates. The exiled members proceeded to Lausanne, and there, by the
mediation of France, made terms with the Papacy. Felix V., who had never
received the homage of a temporal sovereign, resigned the papal title in
exchange for the cardinal’s hat. The Archbishop of Arles returned to his
see, where he was universally beloved. He died in 1450, and in the next
century was canonised by Clement VII.
With the Council of Basel ended the conciliar movement for reform, which
had resulted from the scandal of the great [Sidenote: Failure of the
Conciliar Movement.] schism. It had failed, not from any lack of honest
purpose, or from the blunders of its adherents, but because it was out
of harmony with the conditions of the age. A few centuries earlier it
might have been possible to reform the Church, and at the same time to
retain its unity. But by the fifteenth century such a scheme was too
late. Political division had advanced so far as to bring with it
ecclesiastical divisions. The sentiment that was recognised in the
concordats of Martin V. and asserted in the Pragmatic Sanctions of
Bourges and Mainz, was stronger than the theory of the supremacy of a
general council over the Pope. The Reformation of the sixteenth century
was a series of national revolts against papal domination, and it owed
its success to its harmony with political conditions and interests.
The failure of the conciliar movement brought with it a revival of papal
authority. The reaction which had commenced under Martin V. seemed to be
complete under Nicolas V. The great jubilee which was held in Rome in
1450 was a fitting celebration of the papal triumph. But it proved to be
only a Pyrrhic victory. The Papacy learned neither wisdom nor toleration
from the trials through which it had passed. While continuing to trample
on the spirit of individual freedom, the Popes, in their greed for
temporal dominion, gave rise to scandals far more glaring from the moral
point of view than the senile bickerings of the schism. The Protestant
revolution more than avenged the defeat of the Councils of Constance and
Basel.