3. Stipulations for regulating the commercial and other intercourse
between the two nations.
He said that it would be agreed on every side of the House that these
objects were important; and if they had been justly and fairly secured
by the stipulations of the Treaty, it would not be said that the
committee ought to feel dissatisfied with that instrument. He believed
that this was really the case, and that the United States had no just
cause to complain of the terms therein contained.
Several objections, however, had been made to that part of the Treaty
which provided for the execution of the Treaty of 1783. It had been said
that this Treaty did not provide for every part of the Treaty of Peace
which remained unexecuted; and that conditions were annexed to the
execution of those parts of that Treaty which had been provided for
highly injurious to the interest of the United States. He said, if those
objections were well founded, they formed a very serious objection to
the present Treaty: but he could not find them by comparing or examining
the two Treaties. The only article of the Treaty of Peace which it was
said had been violated by the British Government, and was not provided
for by the present Treaty, was that which respected the negroes and
other property of the American inhabitants. He said he would not detain
the committee with many remarks on this part of the subject, as it had
been very fully and ably explained by gentlemen who had gone before him:
he only mentioned it for the purpose of reading that part of the journal
of Mr. Adams, one of the American negotiators of the peace, which
immediately related to this subject. The same journal had been already
read by different gentlemen, in detached parts, but he wished to bring
the whole journal at one view before the committee. He said, however,
that he ought to repeat what had been already said on the floor, that
the article in question did not want any exterior aid to assist the
committee with an explanation. The words of the article were certain and
explicit; they declared that the evacuation should be made "without
carrying away any negroes or other property belonging to the American
inhabitants;" and as it was universally agreed that the negroes who had
been carried away consisted either of those who had fled from their
masters during the war, on a promise of emancipation, or of those who
had been taken as plunder in the period of hostility, no doubt could
exist but that in all those cases the property in the negroes was
changed; that they were no longer the property of American inhabitants,
and of course it was no violation of the Treaty to carry them away. And
whatever might have since been said on that subject, he was convinced
that the American Commissioners, at the close of the negotiation, had no
idea of including in the Treaty of Peace a stipulation to secure a
restoration of negroes then in the possession of the British army. To
evince this fact, he said he would now read the journal he had before
alluded to. [He read some paragraphs from that journal.]
Mr. G. said that it appeared, from the journal he had read, on what
ground the negotiation respecting the negroes stood. The British agent
claimed a restitution of confiscated estates. To rebut this demand, the
American Commissioners, among other things, claimed compensation for
negroes and other property which had been taken as plunder in different
periods of the war. Finding, however, that no agreement could be
obtained on these contested points, they were all relinquished as
impracticable; and the claim for negroes, which had been made for no
other purpose than to rebut the claim for confiscated estates, was given
up of course, and, at the moment of signing the Treaty, the article in
question was inserted--not to secure a restitution of property which had
been changed by the events of the war, but to secure by stipulation,
that the evacuations should be made without any destruction, or carrying
away property really belonging to the American inhabitants. He said that
it had always been a matter of surprise to him that any gentleman had
put a different construction on this article; and he thought the parties
had done wisely in excluding from the present Treaty a claim which did
not possess even the shadow of justice.
Mr. GALLATIN said he would not follow some of the gentlemen who had
preceded him, by dwelling upon the discretion of the Legislature--a
question which had already been the subject of their deliberation, and
been decided by a solemn vote. Gentlemen who had been in the minority
on that question might give any construction they pleased to the
declaratory resolution of the House; they might again repeat that, to
refuse to carry the Treaty into effect, was a breach of the public
faith, which they conceived as being pledged by the PRESIDENT and
Senate. This had been the ground on which a difference of opinion had
existed since the beginning of the discussion. It was because the House
thought the faith of the nation could not, on those subjects submitted
to the power of Congress, be pledged by any constituted authority other
than the Legislature, that they had resolved that, in all such cases, it
was their right and duty to consider the expediency of carrying a Treaty
into effect. If the House thought the faith of the nation already
pledged, they could not claim any discretion; there would be no room
left to deliberate upon the expediency of the thing. The resolution now
under consideration was merely "that it was expedient to carry the
British Treaty into effect," and not whether they were bound by national
faith to do it. He would, therefore, consider the question of expediency
alone; and, thinking as he did, that the House had full discretion on
the subject, he conceived that there was as much responsibility in
deciding in the affirmative as in rejecting the resolution; that they
would be equally answerable for the consequences that might follow from
either.
It was, however, true that there was a great difference between the
situation of this country in the year 1794, when a negotiator was
appointed, and that in which we were at present; and that consequences
would follow the refusal to carry into effect the Treaty in its present
stage, which would not have attended a refusal to negotiate, and enter
into such a Treaty. The question of expediency, therefore, assumed
before them a different and more complex shape than when before the
negotiator, the Senate, or the PRESIDENT. The Treaty, in itself, and
abstractedly considered, might be injurious; it might be such an
instrument as, in the opinion of the House, ought not to have been
adopted by the Executive; and yet, such as it was, they might think it
expedient, under the present circumstances, to carry it into effect. He
would, therefore, first take a view of the provisions of the Treaty
itself, and in the next place, supposing it injurious, consider, in case
it was not carried into effect, what would be the natural consequences
of such refusal.
The provisions of the Treaty relate either to the adjustment of past
differences or to the future intercourse of the two nations. The
differences now existing between Great Britain and this country arose
either from the non-execution of some articles of the Treaty of Peace,
or from the effects of the present European war. The complaints of
Britain in relation to the Treaty of 1783 were confined to the legal
impediments thrown by the several States in the way of the recovery of
British debts. The late Treaty had provided adequate remedy on that
subject; the United States were bound to make full and complete
compensation for any losses arising from that source, and every ground
of complaint on the part of Great Britain was removed.
Having thus done full justice to the other nation, America had a right
to expect that equal attention should be paid to her claims arising from
infractions of the Treaty of Peace, viz: compensation for the negroes
carried away by the British; restoration of the Western posts, and
indemnification for their detention.
On the subject of the first claim, which had been objected to as
groundless, he would observe, that he was not satisfied that the
construction given by the British Government to that article of the
Treaty was justified even by the letter of the article. That
construction rested on the supposition that slaves came under the
general denomination of booty, and were alienated the moment they fell
in the possession of an enemy, so that all those who were in the hands
of the British when the Treaty of Peace was signed, must be considered
as British, and not American property, and were not included in the
article. It would however appear by recurring to _Vattel_, when speaking
of the right of _postliminium_, that slaves were not considered as part
of the booty which was alienated by the act of capture, and that they
were ranked rather with real property, to the profits of which only the
captors were entitled. Be that as it may, there was no doubt that the
construction given by America was that which had been understood by the
parties at the time of making the Treaty. The journals of Mr. Adams,
quoted by a gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. COIT) proved this fully;
for when he says that the insertion of this article was alone worth the
journey of Mr. Laurens from London, can it be supposed that he would
have laid so much stress on a clause which, according to the new
construction now attempted to be given, meant only that the British
would commit no new act of hostility? would not carry away slaves at
that time in possession of Americans? Congress had recognized that
construction by adopting the resolution which had been already quoted,
and which was introduced upon the motion of Mr. Alexander Hamilton; and
it had not been denied that the British Ministry, during Mr. Adams's
embassy, had also agreed to it.
But when our negotiator had, for the sake of peace, waived that claim;
when he had also abandoned the right which America had to demand an
indemnification for the detention of the posts, although he had conceded
the right of a similar nature, which Great Britain had for the detention
of debt; when he had thus given up every thing which might be supposed
to be of a doubtful nature, it might have been hoped that our last
claim--a claim on which there was not and there never had been any
dispute--the Western posts should have been restored according to the
terms of the Treaty of Peace. Upon what ground the British had
insisted, and our negotiator conceded, that this late restitution should
be saddled with new conditions, which made no part of the original
contract, Mr. G. was at a loss to know. British traders were all
allowed, by the new Treaty, to remain within the posts without becoming
citizens of the United States, and to carry on trade and commerce with
the Indians living within our boundaries, without being subject to any
control from our Government. In vain was it said, that if that clause
had not been inserted we would have found it our interest to effect it
by our own laws. Of this we were alone competent judges; if that
condition was harmless at present, it was not possible to foresee
whether, under future circumstances, it would not prove highly
injurious; and, whether harmless or not, it was not less a permanent and
new condition imposed upon us. But the fact was, that by the
introduction of that clause, by obliging us to keep within our
jurisdiction, as British subjects, the very men who had been the
instruments used by Great Britain to promote Indian wars on our
frontiers,--by obliging us to suffer those men to continue their
commerce with Indians living in our territory, uncontrolled by those
regulations, which we had thought necessary, in order to restrain our
own citizens in their intercourse with these tribes, Great Britain had
preserved her full influence with the Indian nations; by a restoration
of the posts under that condition, we had lost the greatest advantage
that was expected from their possession, viz: future security against
the Indians. In the same manner had the British preserved the commercial
advantages which resulted from the occupancy of these posts, by
stipulating as a permanent condition a free passage for their goods
across our portages, without paying any duty.
The remaining provisions of the Treaty had no connection with past
differences; they made no part of the Convention which had been the
avowed object of Mr. Jay's mission; they applied solely to the future
intercourse of the two nations as relating to commerce and navigation;
and had they been entirely omitted, our differences would have been
nevertheless adjusted. It was agreed on all hands, that so far as
related to our commerce with Great Britain, we wanted no Treaty. The
intercourse, although useful perhaps to both parties, was more
immediately necessary to England, and her own interest was a sufficient
pledge of her granting us at all times a perfect liberty of commerce to
her European ports. If we want to treat with her, it must be in order to
obtain some intercourse with her colonies, and some general security in
our navigation.
The twelfth and thirteenth articles had been obtained by our negotiator
with a view to the first object. The twelfth article, however, which
related to our intercourse with the West Indies, was found, upon
examination, to be accompanied by a restriction of such a nature, that
what had been granted by Great Britain as a favor, was rejected by the
Senate as highly injurious. The thirteenth article, which related to the
East Indies, and remained part of the Treaty, was, like the twelfth,
conferring a favor limited by restrictions, and so far as he could
depend upon the opinion of the best-informed judges on that subject,
those restrictions put the trade in a more disadvantageous situation
than it was before the Treaty. As the West India article had declared
that we should not re-export any produce of those islands to Europe, so
the East India article, at the same time it granted us the privilege,
which we enjoyed before, and which we enjoyed because it was the
interest of the East India Company to grant it to us, that of being
admitted in the British seaports there, had forbidden our carrying any
articles from thence to any place except to America; which regulation
amounted to a total prohibition to export East India articles to China,
or to obtain freights back to Europe; and, upon the whole, he could not
help thinking, from what had fallen on that floor, and what he had heard
elsewhere from gentlemen of great commercial knowledge, that if the East
India commerce had been as generally understood in America as the West
India trade, that so much boasted of article would have met the same
fate in the Senate with the twelfth article.
During the American war, in the year 1780, so fully convinced were the
neutral nations of the necessity of introducing that doctrine of free
bottom making free goods, that all of them, excepting Portugal, who was
in a state of vassalage to, and a mere appendage of Great Britain, had
united in order to establish the principle, and had formed for that
purpose the alliance known by the name of the Armed Neutrality. All the
belligerent powers, except England, had recognized and agreed to the
doctrine. England itself had been obliged, in some measure, to give for
a while a tacit acquiescence. America had completely, at the time,
admitted the principle, although they were then at war, [Mr. G. quoted
on this subject the Journals of Congress of the year 1780, page 210, and
of the year 1781, page 80,] and it had been introduced in every other
Treaty we had concluded since our existence as a nation. Since the year
1780, every nation, so far as his knowledge went, had refused to enter
into a Treaty of Commerce with England, unless that provision was
inserted. Russia, for that reason, would not renew their Treaty, which
had expired in 1786, although he believed that, during the present war,
and in order to answer the ends of the war, they had formed a temporary
convention, which he had not seen, but which, perhaps, did not include
that provision. England had consented to it in their Treaty with France
in 1788, and we were the first neutral nation who abandoned the common
cause, gave up the claim, and, by a positive declaration inserted in our
Treaty, had recognized the contrary doctrine. It had been said, that
under the present circumstances, it could not be expected that Great
Britain would give up the point: perhaps so; but the objection was not,
that our negotiator had not been able to obtain that doctrine, but that
he had consented to enter into a Treaty of Commerce (which we did not
want, and which had no connection with an adjustment of our differences
with Great Britain) without the principle contended for making part of
that Treaty. Unless we could obtain security for our navigation, we
wanted no Treaty; and the only provision which could give us that
security, should have been the _sine qua non_ of a Treaty. On the
contrary, we had disgusted all the other neutral nations of Europe,
without whose concert and assistance there was but little hope that we
should ever obtain that point, and we had taught Great Britain that we
were disposed to form the most intimate connections with her, even at
the expense of recognizing the principle the most fatal to the liberty
of commerce, and to the security of our navigation.
Mr. G. was not going to enter into a discussion of the immorality of
sequestering private property. What could be more immoral than war? or
the plundering of the high seas legalized under the name of
privateering? Yet self-defence justified the first, and the necessity of
the case might, at least in some instances, and where it was the only
practicable mode of warfare left to a nation, apologize even for the
last. In the same manner the power of sequestration might be resorted
to, as the last weapon of self-defence, rather than to seek redress by
an appeal to arms. It was the last peace-measure that could be taken by
a nation; but the Treaty, by declaring that in case of national
differences it should not be resorted to, had deprived us of the power
of judging of its propriety, had rendered it an act of hostility, and
had effectually taken off that restraint which a fear of its exercise
laid upon Great Britain.
Thus it appeared that, by the Treaty, we had promised full compensation
to England for every possible claim they might have against us, that we
had abandoned every claim of a doubtful nature, and that we had
consented to receive the posts, our claim to which was not disputed,
under new conditions and restrictions never before contemplated. That,
after having obtained, by those concessions, an adjustment of past
differences, we had entered into a new agreement, unconnected with those
objects, which had heretofore been subjects of discussion between the
two nations; and that, by that Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, we had
obtained no commercial advantage which we did not enjoy before; we had
obtained no security against future aggressions, no security in favor of
the freedom of our navigation, and we had parted with every pledge we
had in our hands, with every power of restriction, with every weapon of
self-defence, which was calculated to give us any security.
From the review he had taken of the Treaty, and the opinions he had
expressed, Mr. G. said, it was hardly necessary for him to add that he
looked upon the instrument as highly injurious to the interests of the
United States, and that he earnestly wished it never had been made; but
whether, in its present stage, the House ought to refuse to carry it
into effect, and what would be the probable consequences of a refusal,
was a question which required the most serious attention, and which he
would now attempt to investigate.
Should the Treaty be finally defeated, either new negotiations would be
more successful, or Great Britain would refuse to make a new
arrangement, and leave things in the situation in which they were, or
war would be the consequence. Mr. G. said that he would, in the course
of his observations, make some remarks on the last supposition; he did
not think that the first would be very probable at present, and he was
of opinion that, under the present circumstances, and until some change
took place in our own or in the relative political situation of the
European nations, it was to be apprehended that, in such a case, new
negotiations would either be rejected or prove unsuccessful. Such an
event would have perhaps followed a rejection of the Treaty even by the
Senate or by the PRESIDENT. After the negotiator employed by the United
States had once affixed his signature, it must have become very
problematical, unless he had exceeded his powers, whether a refusal to
sanction the contract he had made would not eventually defeat, at least
for a time, the prospect of a new Treaty. He conceived that the hopes of
obtaining better conditions, by a new negotiation, were much less in the
present stage of the business than they had been when the Treaty was in
its inchoate form before the Executive; and in order to have a just idea
of the consequences of a rejection at present, he would contemplate them
upon that supposition which appeared to him most probable, viz: that no
new Treaty would take place for a certain period of time.
As he was not sensible that a single commercial advantage had been
obtained by the Treaty, he could not mention the loss of any, as a
mischief that would attend its rejection. If, however, the East India
article was supposed to be beneficial, it must, on the other hand, be
conceded that we had enjoyed every benefit arising from it for a number
of years, without Treaty, and consequently, because it was the interest
of the East India Company that we should enjoy them; and that it was not
probable that circumstances would so far change there, during the short
period to which that article was limited, as to induce that Company to
adopt a different policy towards us.
But it was said that war must be the consequence of our delaying to
carry the Treaty into effect. Did the gentlemen mean that, if we
rejected the Treaty, if we did not accept the reparation there given to
us, in order to obtain redress, we had no alternative left but war? If
we must go to war in order to obtain reparation for insults and
spoliations on our trade, we must do it, even if we carry the present
Treaty into effect; for the Treaty gives us no reparation for the
aggressions committed since it was ratified, has not produced a
discontinuance of those acts of hostility, and gives us no security that
they shall be discontinued. But the argument of those gentlemen, who
supposed that America must go to war, applied to a final rejection of
the Treaty, and not to a delay. He did not propose to refuse the
reparation offered by the Treaty, and to put up with the aggressions
committed; he had agreed that that reparation, such as it was, was a
valuable article of the Treaty; he had agreed that, under the present
circumstances, a greater evil would follow a total rejection than an
acquiescence to the Treaty. The only measure which had been mentioned in
preference to the one now under discussion, was a suspension, a
postponement whilst the present spoliations continued, in hopes to
obtain for them a similar reparation, and assurances that they would
cease.
But, was it meant to insinuate that it was the final intention of those
who pretended to wish only for a postponement, to involve this country
in a war? There was no period of the present European war at which it
would not have been weak and wicked to adopt such measures as must
involve America in the contest, unless forced into it for the sake of
self-defence; but, at this time, to think of it, would fall but little
short of madness. The whole American nation would rise in opposition to
the idea; and it might, at least, have been recollected that war could
not be declared except by Congress, and that two of the branches of
Government were sufficient to check the other in any supposed attempt of
that kind.
But to the cry of war, the alarmists did not fail to add that of
confusion; and they had declared, even on this floor, that if the
resolution was not adopted, Government would be dissolved. Government
dissolved in case a postponement took place! This idea was too absurd to
deserve a direct answer. But he would ask those gentlemen, by whom the
Government was to be dissolved? Certainly not by those who would vote
against the resolution; for, although they were not, perhaps, fortunate
enough to have obtained the confidence of the gentleman who voted
against them, still, it must be agreed, that those who succeeded in
their wishes, who defeated a measure they disliked, would not wish to
destroy that Government, which they held, so far, in their hands, as to
be able to carry their own measures. For them to dissolve the Government
would be to dissolve their own power. By whom, then, he would ask again,
was the Government to be dissolved? The gentlemen must answer, by
themselves, or they must declare that they meant nothing but to alarm.
Was it really the language of those men, who professed to be, who
distinguished themselves by the self-assumed appellation of friends to
order, that if they did not succeed in all their measures, they would
overset the Government? And had all their professions been only a veil
to hide their love of power? a pretence to cover their ambition? Did
they mean, that the first event which would put an end to their own
authority should be the last act of Government? As to himself, he did
not believe that they had such an intention; he had too good an opinion
of their patriotism to permit himself to admit such an idea for a single
moment; but he thought himself justifiable in entertaining a belief,
that some amongst them, in order to carry a favorite, and what they
thought to be an advantageous measure, meant to spread an alarm, which
they did not feel; and he had no doubt that many had contracted such a
habit of carrying every measure of Government as they pleased, that they
really thought that every thing must be thrown into confusion the moment
they were thwarted in a matter of importance. He hoped that experience
would, in future, cure their fears. But, at all events, be the wishes
and intentions of the members of this House what they may, it was not in
their power to dissolve the Government. The people of the United States,
from one end of the continent to the other, were strongly attached to
their constitution; they would restrain and punish the excesses of any
party, of any set of men in the Government, who would be guilty of the
attempt; and on them he would rest as a full security against every
endeavor to destroy our Union, our constitution, or our Government.
But, although he was not afraid of a dissolution, he felt how highly
desirable a more general union of sentiment would be; he felt the
importance of an agreement of opinion between the different branches of
Government, and even between the members of the same branch. He would
sacrifice much to obtain that object; it had been one of the most urging
motives with him to be in favor, not of a rejection, but only of a
suspension, of a delay. But even as a matter of opinion, it was
difficult to say which mode of proceeding, in this House, would best
accord with the general sentiments of the people. So far as related to
the petitions before them, the number of signatures against the Treaty
exceeded, at the moment he was speaking, the number of those in favor of
the Treaty.
True it was, that an alarm which had produced a combination, had lately
taken place amongst the merchants of this and some other seaports. What
effect it would have, and how successful they would eventually be, in
spreading this alarm amongst the people at large, he could not tell; but
there were circumstances accompanying their petition, which, in his
opinion, much diminished the weight they otherwise might have had. They
had, undoubtedly, a right to petition upon every public measure, where
they thought themselves interested, and their petitions would deserve
equal regard, with those of their fellow-citizens throughout the United
States. But on this occasion, in order to create an alarm, in order to
induce the people to join them, in order to force the House to pass the
laws relative to the Treaty, they had formed a dangerous combination,
and affected to cease insuring vessels, purchasing produce, and
transacting any business. A gentleman from New York (Mr. WILLIAMS) had
been so much alarmed himself, that he had predicted a fall in the price
of every kind of produce, and seems, indeed, to have supposed, that the
clamors of a few individuals here would either put an end to, or satisfy
the wants of those nations which depended on us for supplies of
provisions. Yet, it had so happened, and it was a complete proof that
the whole was only an alarm, that whilst they were debating, the price
of flour, which was of very dull sale two weeks ago, had risen in equal
proportion with the supposed fears of the purchasers.
He could not help considering the cry of war, the threats of a
dissolution of Government, and the present alarm, as designed for the
same purpose, that of making an impression on the fears of this House.
It was through the fear of being involved in a war, that the negotiation
with Great Britain had originated; under the impression of fear, the
Treaty had been negotiated and signed; a fear of the same danger, that
of war, had promoted its ratification; and now, every imaginary mischief
which could alarm our fears, was conjured up, in order to deprive us of
that discretion, which this House thought they had a right to exercise,
and in order to force us to carry the Treaty into effect.
_The Son of the Marquis Lafayette._
Mr. LIVINGSTON, Chairman of the committee for carrying into effect a
resolution respecting the son of the Marquis LAFAYETTE, reported that he
had arrived in this country; that he had received the patronage of the
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; that he was in New Jersey for education,
and to show that he had no occasion for pecuniary assistance, the
committee subjoin a well-written, affecting letter to the Chairman of
the committee, in answer to one from him, expressive of his gratitude
for the kind attention shown to him by the Legislature of the United
States, by the PRESIDENT, and to every person to whom he was made known;
that he had no wants; that he was as happy as he could be; that if he
should in future have occasion for assistance, he would apply to
Congress, who had been so kind and attentive to his welfare.[77]
THURSDAY, April 28.
_Execution of British Treaty._
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the
state of the Union; when, the resolution for carrying the British Treaty
into effect being under consideration----
Mr. PRESTON rose and spoke as follows: Mr. Chairman, I voted for the
question yesterday, for the first time since this discussion began. I
was then prepared to give my opinion, but, since the House has thought
proper to devote another day to this important subject, I will take the
liberty to offer my sentiments, and claim the indulgence of the
committee for this purpose. I make this claim for their indulgence with
the more confidence, as I have heretofore occupied but little of the
time of the House on any occasion, and as I mean to be short on the
present--not intending to take that comprehensive view of the subject
which many gentlemen have done who have preceded me. With this apology I
will proceed, conceiving, however that no apology is necessary on this
or any other occasion where our duty impels us to come forward. But I
must confess it has been painful to me to hear the recriminations that
have taken place on this occasion. I had hoped, on a subject so
important, on which it is said the peace and happiness of this our
common country rests--whose welfare must be equally dear to all--that
temperance and calmness would have marked our deliberations; that all
our efforts would have been made to enlighten the minds and convince the
judgments of each other, instead of lessening one another in our
estimation, and that of our constituents, by dishonorable imputations,
and which, I trust, every member would spurn. As to myself, Mr.
Chairman, I stand here regardless of any imputations that ill-nature may
cast upon me in this House, or abuse which may be conferred without
doors. I shall not be deterred from pronouncing that opinion which my
best reflections have enabled me to form.
Sir, in considering this subject, I had hoped every information
possessed by any of the departments of Government would have been freely
afforded us; and I cannot but lament that the PRESIDENT, by a too
strict adherence to what he has supposed to be his constitutional duty,
refused the request of this House for certain papers, which request
seemed to me not only proper, but innocent--proper, because they might
have afforded information that would reconcile many of the objections
entertained of the Treaty, and finally produce its adoption; it was
innocent, because, if there was no unfair procedure respecting this
business, why not publish the transaction to the world--at all events to
the Representatives of the people, who, it is acknowledged by all, were
not only to act on the Treaty in some way, but were intrusted with the
management of some of the dearest rights of their fellow-countrymen? If,
then, the people confide in us such important concerns, might not the
Executive have reposed some degree of confidence, and complied with a
request so decorously and respectfully made? But he has told us his duty
forbids it. We are then reduced to the necessity to judge of the thing
from the face of it, without the wished-for information. And I must
confess it has always presented such a hideous and deformed aspect to my
mind, that I have ever disliked it--which, together with the unfriendly
sentiments of my constituents to it, has produced my prejudices. But I
had determined, as the PRESIDENT and Senate had ratified it, and many
approved it, to keep my mind open for every information the subject was
capable of. As, then, none has been offered to operate a change of my
opinion, and as the most likely source is shut against us, my
prejudices, instead of being lessened, have become firmly fixed in the
opposition.
But we are told the British committed no infraction of the Treaty of
1783, by withholding the posts; for we, having thrown legal impediments
in the way of the recovery of their debts, became the first infractors
thereof, whereby they were left free to comply or not. Let us, for a
moment, inquire into this fact. By the 4th article of that Treaty,
creditors on either side were to meet with no legal impediment to the
recovery of their debts. By the 7th article of the same Treaty, His
Majesty was, with all convenient speed, to withdraw his armies and
garrisons from every post and place. Now, sir, on comparing these
articles, can it be presumed by any one that the latter stipulation was
to remain unexecuted until the creditors recovered their debts? Was it
to remain as a pledge for the performance of the other? No one can
entertain the idea for a moment. Suppose the creditors had gone on in
the collection of their debts without interruption, would it be said
that the stipulations of the 7th article would be suspended until all
the creditors were wholly satisfied? It is absurd, particularly when we
reflect that the commissioners who negotiated that Treaty must have
contemplated the recovery of those debts by lawsuits; therefore, if the
latter clause was intended to coerce the former, we would certainly not
have had the insertion of the words "with all convenient speed," which
implies an early compliance. If the opposite construction was just, I
would venture to say, the British Government would never have agreed to
surrender the posts, but in consequence of such concessions as it now
gets; for it would have the advantages of the fur trade, and the faith
of this country pledged for the payment of the debts, which were
accumulating by interest. This was a pleasing situation; but what was
the situation of the British debtors? Deprived of their negroes, which
were to be returned by the Treaty; deprived of the advantages of the
trade with the Indians, whereby they might be enabling themselves to
discharge those debts; harassed and worn down with taxation, to support
the Indian wars excited by their creditors. In this situation of things,
was it not natural for them to look around for security or indemnity
against these evils; and would any thing more naturally present itself,
than withholding the payment of the money to the very cause of these
evils? None, sir; and I cannot conceive it so dishonorable as some
gentlemen pretend to view it.
But, sir, I will endeavor to show that the laws which were enacted by
States for prohibiting the recovery of the British debts, were not an
infraction of the Treaty of 1783. By the little book, which the
gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. HILLHOUSE) says is so precious, and
which he hopes will be preserved for some time to come, we find that Mr.
JEFFERSON has, in consequence of complaints from the British Minister,
respecting the impediments to the recovery of British debts, inquired
into the facts, in those States where the complaints originated; the
result of these inquiries was, that though there were State laws
prohibiting, yet a number of gentlemen, of the first abilities and great
integrity,--generally professional characters, and who have been engaged
in proceedings of this kind,--certify, that wherever attempts were made
to recover these debts, they have met with no more obstruction than
other creditors. Besides, those gentlemen were generally of opinion
that, on the final ratification of the Treaty of 1783, it repealed all
laws at variance with it. If, then, it had such a powerful attribute as
to repeal former laws, it follows as a consequence, that subsequent laws
opposing it were mere nullities. These opinions were cited the other day
by a gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. SEDGWICK,) and relied on. I hope
they will have their due weight on the application now to be made of
them. So that, on the whole, it does appear to me the British creditor
had nothing more to struggle with than other creditors had, except the
well-founded prejudices imbibed by our countrymen against that nation,
which, though the laws might in some measure correct, they could never
eradicate. That these prejudices have produced irregularities in many
instances and delay of collections, I have no doubt; but from the nature
of things it is well known no foresight or protection could guard
against it. Indeed, they might have been expected, for can it be
supposed that men would stand calmly and see their families reduced to
penury and want by an unrelenting British creditor, who had aided to
impair the very means of his debtor to pay, and whose Government was by
their acts daily increasing the evils, by exciting the Indians to war
against us, whereby our citizens were borne down with burdens to defend
themselves? I say, would not such reflections, with ruin before our
eyes, produce a degree of irritation in the most calm amongst us? I owe
none of these debts, I never did, and I never will, if I can help it. I
spurn the idea of involving my country in a debt of an incalculable
amount, when millions of them never received any benefit thereby. It is
wrong, it is unjust. I again repeat, that it does appear to me, on an
impartial view of this subject, that the United States are not
chargeable with the first infraction of the Treaty of 1783, and that
therefore, we are not bound now to enter into a compact which appears to
me to be warranted neither by the principles of reciprocity nor justice.
But I undertake to say, and with some confidence too, that Great Britain
committed the first infraction of that Treaty, by withholding the posts,
and also carrying away the negroes, which she had expressly stipulated
to give up; and, to my astonishment, it is now contended that the taking
away the negroes was not a violation of the Treaty, as they came into
their possession by the rights of war, and being deemed property were
vested in the captors. Admit, for a moment, they were that kind of
property, and they became as much the property of their captors as any
they had possessed themselves of in the same way, what then? Certainly,
that it followed of course, they had a right to dispose of them in any
way they chose, either to emancipate them, retain them in slavery for
their own use, or return them to their original owners. Which of these
alternatives have they elected to do? [Here he read the following
sentence from the Treaty of 1783.] "And His Britannic Majesty shall,
with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction or
carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants,
withdraw all his armies," &c., &c. Now, sir, was not the carrying away
the negroes a violation of this article? All America once thought so. No
other construction ever entered the head of man till this Treaty
appeared; owners so construed it, and in virtue thereof made demands.
Congress, and even "_Camillus_," once thought so, and so they declared
it in the most solemn manner. And so it would be construed by all
descriptions of people, from the schoolboy to the Senator, to use the
expression of the gentleman from New York, (Mr. COOPER,) had our minds
remained in the same state they were in a dozen years ago. Sir, if there
be modern constructions of the constitution, I will venture to say there
is the same of Treaties. But another clause of the same article
justifies my construction, to wit: the leaving in all fortifications
the American artillery that may be therein. Gentlemen will hardly say
this means fortifications garrisoned by American soldiery; this would be
absurd, for it is pretty well known that American artillery guarded
itself better than British Treaties did. Was not this artillery, which
had fallen into the hands of the enemy, a vested property, till the
chances of war or the Treaty had made a disposal thereof? Unquestionably
it was. Were not the archives, records, deeds, &c., which had also
fallen into the hands of the enemy, their property? There can be no
doubt of it. Yet we find these things stipulated to be given up.
If, then, they chose to yield one species of property, might they not
another? But, it is said, the negroes were not our property at the time
of signing the Treaty; so neither did the archives, records, &c., belong
to the States--they were the property of the enemy; but certainly the
British Minister had as much right to stipulate for the return of the
one as for the other, and he has in as explicit terms. This must have
been the understanding of the commissioners who negotiated that Treaty,
although one of them has been traced to his slumbers, the evening before
the sealing the Treaty, for a different construction. So that, in this
instance, the British have certainly committed the first infraction, by
carrying off the negroes. And is it not extraordinary that,
notwithstanding this, no claim is made for them, and yet we are bound to
pay the British debts, when the very means of doing it are taken from
the debtor by the creditor? Sir, this is a serious oppression, and
though not of a very great magnitude, will nevertheless be felt in an
interesting manner, and if submitted to will be so under much
disquietude.
But the rejection of the Treaty is tremendously alarming, indeed. War,
and war's alarms, are echoed on all sides. We shall be attacked on one
side by savage barbarity; up the Mediterranean by Algerine cruelty; our
commerce prostrated, and our cities laid under contribution by the
British. In short, the dogs of war let loose on us, and America, once
happy America, will become the scene of bloodshed and desolation. Great
God! What man is there here that can be wicked enough to involve his
country in such incalculable miseries? Who has firmness enough to meet
so foul a deed? Particularly when we reflect on the dreadful act we are
about to do, that will produce such scenes of horror and devastation!
namely, refuse to accept a bargain derogatory to our national honor!
This, sir, is to produce the dreadful catastrophe. But the measure of
woe is not yet filled. There will be disunion; and American citizens
will become American enemies, imbruing their hands in each other's
blood. Civil wars will rend our happy country. Heavens! What a shock to
suffering humanity here will be! And all about some commercial
regulations and political differences with a foreign nation, who, I
believe, in principle, is our inveterate enemy.
Mr. Chairman, I am one who, though I have but little confidence in the
British Government, yet I cannot believe that she, or any other nation
on earth, is so arrogant, and lost to every principle of humanity, as to
go into such dreadful excesses, because we will not enter into a
contract that will suit her interest. I fear war as much as any man,
when a pretext is given; but can it be seriously said a rejection of
this Treaty is a cause of war? I cannot believe that such can possibly
be the event.
As to disunion, it is idle to talk of it; for I do believe if, instead
of a minority of this House, every man in it were to return home full of
spleen and disappointment, and were to use every exertion, every
artifice in their power, to bring about a disunion, they would fail in
so traitorous an attempt. The people, sir, would scoff them, would turn
them out of office, and place therein more deserving characters.
As then, Mr. Chairman, I cannot believe that war or disunion will be the
result of a rejection of the Treaty, and as I think it is one from which
we ought to withhold our assent, I must give it my negative. And if, in
this, time shall prove me wrong, I shall lament the error with the
greatest sincerity, but I shall have the pleasing consolation to know it
was an error of the head, and not of the heart.