Mr. AMES rose, and addressed the Chair as follows:
Mr. Chairman: I entertain the hope, perhaps a rash one, that my strength
will hold me out to speak a few minutes.
In my judgment, a right decision will depend more on the temper and
manner with which we may prevail on ourselves to contemplate the
subject, than upon the development of any profound political principles,
or any remarkable skill in the application of them. If we should succeed
to neutralize our inclinations, we should find less difficulty than we
have to apprehend in surmounting all our objections.
The suggestion, a few days ago, that the House manifested symptoms of
heat and irritation, was made and retorted as if the charge ought to
create surprise, and would convey reproach. Let us be more just to
ourselves, and to the occasion. Let us not affect to deny the existence
and the intrusion of some portion of prejudice and feeling into the
debate, when, from the very structure of our nature, we ought to
anticipate the circumstance as a probability, and when we are admonished
by the evidence of our senses that it is a fact.
How can we make professions for ourselves, and offer exhortations to the
House, that no influence should be felt but that of duty, and no guide
respected but that of the understanding, while the peal to rally every
passion of man is continually ringing in our ears.
Our understandings have been addressed, it is true, and with ability and
effect; but, I demand, has any corner of the heart been left unexplored?
It has been ransacked to find auxiliary arguments, and when that
attempt failed, to awaken the sensibilities that would require none.
Every prejudice and feeling have been summoned to listen to some
particular style of address; and yet we seem to believe, and to consider
a doubt as an affront, that we are strangers to any influence but that
of unbiased reason.
It would be strange that a subject which has roused in turn all the
passions of the country, should be discussed without the interference of
any of our own. We are men, and, therefore, not exempt from those
passions; as citizens and Representatives, we feel the interest that
must excite them. The hazard of great interests cannot fail to agitate
strong passions: we are not disinterested, it is impossible we should be
dispassionate. The warmth of such feelings may becloud the judgment,
and, for a time, pervert the understanding; but the public sensibility
and our own, has sharpened the spirit of inquiry, and given an animation
to the debate. The public attention has been quickened to mark the
progress of the discussion, and its judgment, often hasty and erroneous
on first impressions, has become solid and enlightened at last. Our
result will, I hope, on that account, be the safer and more mature, as
well as more accordant with that of the nation. The only constant agents
in political affairs are the passions of men--shall we complain of our
nature? Shall we say that man ought to have been made otherwise? It is
right already, because He, from whom we derive our nature, ordained it
so; and because thus made, and thus acting, the cause of truth and the
public good is the more surely promoted.
But an attempt has been made to produce an influence of a nature more
stubborn and more unfriendly to truth. It is very unfairly pretended
that the constitutional right of this House is at stake, and to be
asserted and preserved only by a vote in the negative. We hear it said
that this is a struggle for liberty, a manly resistance against the
design to nullify this assembly, and to make it a cypher in the
Government. That the PRESIDENT and Senate, the numerous meetings in the
cities, and the influence of the general alarm of the country, are the
agents and instruments of a scheme of coercion and terror, to force the
Treaty down our throats, though we loathe it, and in spite of the
clearest convictions of duty and conscience.
It is necessary to pause here and inquire, whether suggestions of this
kind be not unfair in their very texture and fabric, and pernicious in
all their influences? They oppose an obstacle in the path of inquiry,
not simply discouraging, but absolutely insurmountable. They will not
yield to argument; for, as they were not reasoned up, they cannot be
reasoned down. They are higher than a Chinese wall in truth's way, and
built of materials that are indestructible. While this remains, it is in
vain to argue; it is in vain to say to this mountain, be thou cast into
the sea. For, I ask of the men of knowledge of the world, whether they
would not hold him for a blockhead that should hope to prevail in an
argument whose scope and object it is to mortify the self-love of the
expected proselyte? I ask, further, when such attempts have been made,
have they not failed of success? The indignant heart repels a conviction
that is believed to debase it.
The self-love of an individual is not warmer in its sense, or more
constant in its action, than what is called in French, _l'esprit de
corps_, or the self-love of an assembly; that jealous affection which a
body of men is always found to bear towards its own prerogatives and
power. I will not condemn this passion. Why should we urge an unmeaning
censure, or yield to groundless fears that truth and duty will be
abandoned, because men in a public assembly are still men, and feel that
spirit of corps which is one of the laws of their nature? Still less
should we despond or complain, if we reflect that this very spirit is a
guardian instinct that watches over the life of this assembly. It
cherishes the principle of self-preservation; and, without its
existence, and its existence with all the strength we see it possess,
the privileges of the Representatives of the people, and immediately the
liberties of the people, would not be guarded, as they are, with a
vigilance that never sleeps, and an unrelaxing constancy and courage.
If the consequences, most unfairly attributed to the vote in the
affirmative, were not chimerical, and worse, for they are deceptive, I
should think it a reproach to be found even moderate in my zeal to
assert the constitutional powers of this assembly; and, whenever they
shall be in real danger, the present occasion affords proof that there
will be no want of advocates and champions.
Indeed, so prompt are these feelings, and when once roused, so difficult
to pacify, that, if we could prove the alarm was groundless, the
prejudice against the appropriations may remain on the mind, and it may
even pass for an act of prudence and duty to negative a measure which
was lately believed by ourselves, and may hereafter be misconceived by
others, to encroach upon the powers of the House. Principles that bear a
remote affinity with usurpation on those powers will be rejected, not
merely as errors, but as wrongs. Our sensibilities will shrink from a
post where it is possible they may be wounded, and be inflamed by the
slightest suspicion of an assault.
While these prepossessions remain, all argument is useless; it may be
heard with the ceremony of attention, and lavish its own resources, and
the patience it wearies, to no manner of purpose. The ears may be open,
but the mind will remain locked up, and every pass to the understanding
guarded.
Unless, therefore, this jealous and repulsive fear for the rights of the
House can be allayed, I will not ask a hearing.
I cannot press this topic too far--I cannot address myself with too much
emphasis to the magnanimity and candor of those who sit here, to
suspect their own feelings, and while they do, to examine the grounds of
their alarm. I repeat it, we must conquer our persuasion, that this body
has an interest in one side of the question more than the other, before
we attempt to surmount our objections. On most subjects, and solemn ones
too, perhaps in the most solemn of all, we form our creed more from
inclination than evidence.
Let me expostulate with gentlemen to admit, if it be only by way of
supposition and for a moment, that it is barely possible they have
yielded too suddenly to their alarms for the powers of this House; that
the addresses which have been made with such variety of forms, and with
so great dexterity in some of them, to all that is prejudice and passion
in the heart, are either the effects or the instruments of artifice and
deception, and then let them see the subject once more in its singleness
and simplicity.
It will be impossible, on taking a fair review of the subject, to
justify the passionate appeals that have been made to us to struggle for
our liberties and rights, and the solemn exhortation to reject the
proposition, said to be concealed in that on your table, to surrender
them for ever. In spite of this mock solemnity, I demand, if the House
will not concur in the measure to execute the Treaty, what other course
shall we take? How many ways of proceeding lie open before us?
In the nature of things there are but three--we are either to make the
Treaty--to observe it--or break it. It would be absurd to say we will do
neither. If I may repeat a phrase, already so much abused, we are under
coercion to do one of them, and we have no power, by the exercise of our
discretion, to prevent the consequences of a choice.
By refusing to act, we choose. The Treaty will be broken, and fall to
the ground. Where is the fitness, then, of replying to those who urge
upon this House the topics of duty and policy, that they attempt to
force the Treaty down, and to compel this assembly to renounce its
discretion, and to degrade itself to the rank of a blind and passive
instrument in the hands of the Treaty-making power? In case we reject
the appropriation, we do not secure any greater liberty of action, we
gain no safer shelter than before, from the consequences of the
decision. Indeed, they are not to be evaded. It is neither just nor
manly to complain that the Treaty-making power has produced this
coercion to act. It is not the art or the despotism of that power, it is
the nature of things that compels. Shall we, dreading to become the
blind instruments of power, yield ourselves the blinder dupes of mere
sounds of imposture? Yet that word, that empty word, coercion, has given
scope to an eloquence that, one would imagine, could not be tired, and
did not choose to be quieted.
Let us examine still more in detail the alternatives that are before us,
and we shall scarcely fail to see, in still stronger lights, the
futility of our apprehensions for the power and liberty of the House.
If, as some have suggested, the thing called a Treaty is incomplete, if
it has no binding force or obligation, the first question is, Will this
House complete the instrument, and by concurring, impart to it that
force which it wants?
The doctrine has been avowed, that the Treaty, though formally ratified
by the Executive power of both nations, though published as a law for
our own, by the PRESIDENT's Proclamation, is still a mere proposition
submitted to this assembly no way distinguishable in point of authority
or obligation from a motion for leave to bring in a bill, or any other
original act of ordinary legislation. This doctrine, so novel in our
country, yet so dear to many, precisely for the reason that, in the
contention of power, victory is always dear, is obviously repugnant to
the very terms, as well as the fair interpretation of our own
resolutions, (Mr. BLOUNT's.) We declare that the Treaty-making power is
exclusively vested in the PRESIDENT and Senate, and not in this House.
Need I say that we fly in the face of that resolution when we pretend
that the acts of that power are not valid until we have concurred in
them? It would be nonsense, or worse, to use the language of the most
glaring contradiction and to claim a share in a power which we, at the
same time, disclaim as exclusively vested in other departments.
What can be more strange than to say, that the compacts of the PRESIDENT
and Senate with foreign nations are Treaties, without our agency, and
yet those compacts want all power and obligation until they are
sanctioned by our concurrence? It is not my design in this place, if at
all, to go into the discussion of this part of the subject. I will, at
least for the present, take it for granted that this monstrous opinion
stands in little need of remark, and, if it does, lies almost out of the
reach of refutation.
But, say those who hide the absurdity under the cover of ambiguous
phrases, have we no discretion? And, if we have, are we not to make use
of it in judging of the expediency or inexpediency of the Treaty? Our
resolution claims that privilege, and we cannot surrender it without
equal inconsistency and breach of duty.
If there be any inconsistency in the case, it lies, not in making
appropriations for the Treaty, but in the resolution itself, (Mr.
BLOUNT's.) Let us examine it more nearly. A Treaty is a bargain between
nations binding in good faith; and what makes a bargain? The assent of
the contracting parties. We allow that the Treaty power is not in this
House; this House has no share in contracting, and is not a party; of
consequence, the PRESIDENT and Senate alone may make a Treaty that is
binding in good faith. We claim, however, say the gentlemen, a right to
judge of the expediency of Treaties--that is the constitutional province
of our discretion. Be it so--what follows? Treaties when adjudged by us
to be inexpedient, fall to the ground, and the public faith is not hurt.
This, incredible and extravagant as it may seem, is asserted. The amount
of it, in plainer language, is this--the PRESIDENT and Senate are to
make national bargains, and this House has nothing to do in making them.
But bad bargains do not bind this House, and, of inevitable consequence,
do not bind the nation. When a national bargain, called a Treaty, is
made, its binding force does not depend upon the making, but upon our
opinion that it is good. As our opinion on the matter can be known and
declared only by ourselves, when sitting in our Legislative capacity,
the Treaty, though ratified, and, as we choose to term it, made, is hung
up in suspense, till our sense is ascertained. We condemn the bargain,
and it falls, though, as we say, our faith does not. We approve a
bargain as expedient, and it stands firm, and binds the nation. Yet,
even in this latter case, its force is plainly not derived from the
ratification by the Treaty-making power, but from our approbation. Who
will trace these inferences, and pretend that we may have no share,
according to the argument, in the Treaty-making power? These opinions,
nevertheless, have been advocated with infinite zeal and perseverance.
Is it possible that any man can be hardy enough to avow them, and their
ridiculous consequences?
Let me hasten to suppose the Treaty is considered as already made, and
then the alternative is fairly presented to the mind, whether we will
observe the Treaty, or break it. This, in fact, is the naked question.
If we choose to observe it with good faith, our course is obvious.
Whatever is stipulated to be done by the nation, must be complied with.
Our agency, if it should be requisite, cannot be properly refused. And I
do not see why it is not as obligatory a rule of conduct for the
Legislature as for the Courts of Law.
I cannot lose this opportunity to remark, that the coercion, so much
dreaded and declaimed against, appears at length to be no more than the
authority of principles, the despotism of duty. Gentlemen complain that
we are forced to act in this way, we are forced to swallow the Treaty.
It is very true, unless we claim the liberty of abuse, the right to act
as we ought not. There is but one way open for us, the laws of morality
and good faith have fenced up every other. What sort of liberty is that
which we presume to exercise against the authority of those laws! It is
for tyrants to complain that principles are restraints, and that they
have no liberty so long as their despotism has limits.
The consequences of refusing to make provision for the Treaty are not
all to be foreseen. By rejecting, vast interests are committed to the
sport of the winds, chance becomes the arbiter of events, and it is
forbidden to human foresight to count their number, or measure their
extent. Before we resolve to leap into this abyss, so dark and so
profound, it becomes us to pause and reflect upon such of the dangers
as are obvious and inevitable. If this assembly should be wrought into a
temper to defy these consequences, it is vain, it is deceptive, to
pretend that we can escape them. It is worse than weakness to say, that
as to public faith our vote has already settled the question. Another
tribunal than our own is already erected. The public opinion, not merely
of our own country, but of the enlightened world, will pronounce
judgment that we cannot resist, that we dare not even affect to despise.
Well may I urge it to men who know the worth of character, that it is no
trivial calamity to have it contested. Refusing to do what the Treaty
stipulates shall be done, opens the controversy. Even if we should stand
justified at last, a character that is vindicated is something worse
than it stood before, unquestioned and unquestionable. Like the
plaintiff in an action of slander, we recover a reputation disfigured by
invective, and even tarnished by too much handling. In the combat for
the honor of the nation, it may receive some wounds, which, though they
should heal, will leave some scars. I need not say, for surely the
feelings of every bosom have anticipated, that we cannot guard this
sense of national honor, this ever-living fire, which alone keeps
patriotism warm in the heart, with a sensibility too vigilant and
jealous. If, by executing the Treaty, there is no possibility of
dishonor, and if by rejecting there is some foundation for doubt and for
reproach, it is not for me to measure, it is for your own feelings to
estimate the vast distance that divides the one side of the alternative
from the other. If, therefore, we should enter on the examination of the
question of duty and obligation with some feelings of prepossession, I
do not hesitate to say, they are such as we ought to have; it is an
after inquiry to determine whether they are such as ought finally to be
resisted.
To expatiate on the value of public faith, may pass with some men for
declamation; to such men I have nothing to say. To others I will urge,
can any circumstance mark upon a people more turpitude and debasement?
Can any thing tend more to make men think themselves mean, or degrade to
a lower point their estimation of virtue and their standard of action?
It would not merely demoralize mankind, it tends to break all the
ligaments of society, to dissolve that mysterious charm which attracts
individuals to the nation, and to inspire in its stead a repulsive sense
of shame and disgust.
What is patriotism? Is it a narrow affection for the spot where a man
was born? Are the very clods where we tread entitled to this ardent
preference because they are greener? No, sir; this is not the character
of the virtue, and it soars higher for its object. It is an extended
self-love, mingling with all the enjoyments of life, and twisting itself
with the minutest filaments of the heart. It is thus we obey the laws of
society, because they are the laws of virtue. In their authority we see
not the array of force and terror, but the venerable image of our
country's honor. Every good citizen makes that honor his own, and
cherishes it not only as precious but as sacred. He is willing to risk
his life in its defence, and is conscious that he gains protection while
he gives it. For what rights of a citizen will be deemed inviolable when
a State renounces the principles that constitute their security? Or, if
his life should not be invaded, what would its enjoyments be in a
country odious to the eyes of strangers and dishonored in his own? Could
he look with affection and veneration to such a country as his parent?
The sense of having one would die within him; he would blush for his
patriotism, if he retained any, and justly, for it would be a vice. He
would be a banished man in his native land.
I see no exception to the respect that is paid among nations to the law
of good faith. If there are cases in this enlightened period when it is
violated, there are none when it is decried. It is the philosophy of
politics--the religion of governments. It is observed by barbarians that
a whiff of tobacco-smoke or a string of beads gives not merely binding
force, but sanctity, to Treaties. Even in Algiers, a truce may be bought
for money, but when ratified, even Algiers is too wise or too just to
disown and annul its obligation. Thus, we see neither the ignorance of
savages, nor the principles of an association for piracy and rapine,
permit a nation to despise its engagements. If, sir, there could be a
resurrection from the foot of the gallows; if the victims of justice
could live again, collect together, and form a society, they would,
however loth, soon find themselves obliged to make justice--that justice
under which they fell--the fundamental law of their State. They would
perceive it was their interest to make others respect, and they would
therefore soon pay some respect themselves to the obligations of good
faith.
The refusal of the posts (inevitable, if we reject the Treaty) is a
measure too decisive in its nature to be neutral in its consequences.
From great causes we are to look for great effects. A plain and obvious
one will be, the price of the Western lands will fall. Settlers will not
choose to fix their habitation on a field of battle. Those who talk so
much of the interests of the United States, should calculate how deeply
it will be affected by rejecting the Treaty--how vast a tract of wild
land will almost cease to be property. This loss, let it be observed,
will fall upon a fund expressly devoted to sink the National Debt. What
then are we called upon to do? However the form of the vote and the
protestations of many may disguise the proceeding, our resolution is in
substance (and it deserves to wear the title of a resolution) to prevent
the sale of the Western lands and the discharge of the public debt.
Will the tendency to Indian hostilities be contrasted by any one?
Experience gives the answer. The frontiers were scourged with war till
the negotiation with Britain was far advanced, and then the state of
hostility ceased. Perhaps the public agents of both nations are innocent
of fomenting the Indian war, and perhaps they are not. We ought not,
however, to expect that neighboring nations, highly irritated against
each other, will neglect the friendship of the savages. The traders will
gain an influence, and will abuse it; and who is ignorant that their
passions are easily raised, and hardly restrained from violence. Their
situation will oblige them to choose between this country and Great
Britain, in case the Treaty should be rejected. They will not be our
friends, and at the same time the friends of our enemies.
But am I reduced to the necessity of proving this point? Certainly the
very men who charged the Indian war on the detention of the posts will
call for no other proof than the recital of their own speeches. It is
remembered with what emphasis--with what acrimony--they expatiated on
the burden of taxes, and the drain of blood and treasure into the
Western country, in consequence of Britain's holding the posts. "Until
the posts are restored," they exclaimed, "the Treasury and the frontiers
must bleed."
If any, against all these proofs, should maintain that the peace with
the Indians will be stable without the posts, to them I will urge
another reply. From arguments calculated to produce conviction, I will
appeal directly to the hearts of those who hear me, and ask whether it
is not already planted there? I resort especially to the convictions of
the Western gentlemen, whether, supposing no posts and no Treaty, the
settlers will remain in security? Can they take it upon them to say that
an Indian peace, under these circumstances, will prove firm. No, sir; it
will not be peace, but a sword; it will be no better than a lure to draw
victims within the reach of the tomahawk.
On this theme, my emotions are unutterable. If I could find words for
them--if my powers bore any proportion to my zeal--I would swell my
voice to such a note of remonstrance it should reach every log-house
beyond the mountains. I would say to the inhabitants, Wake from your
false security! Your cruel dangers--your more cruel apprehensions--are
soon to be renewed; the wounds, yet unhealed, are to be torn open again.
In the day-time, your path through the woods will be ambushed; the
darkness of midnight will glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. You
are a father: the blood of your sons shall fatten your corn-field! You
are a mother: the war-whoop shall wake the sleep of the cradle!
On this subject you need not suspect any deception on your feelings. It
is a spectacle of horror which cannot be overdrawn. If you have nature
in your hearts, it will speak a language compared with which all I have
said or can say will be poor and frigid.
Will it be whispered that the Treaty has made me a new champion for the
protection of the frontiers? It is known that my voice, as well as my
vote, have been uniformly given in conformity with the ideas I have
expressed. Protection is the right of the frontier: it is our duty to
give it.
Who will accuse me of wandering out of the subject? Who will say that I
exaggerate the tendencies of our measures? Will any one answer by a
sneer, that all this is idle preaching? Will any one deny that we are
bound--and I would hope to good purpose--by the most solemn sanctions of
duty for the vote we give? Are despots alone to be reproached for
unfeeling indifference to the tears and blood of their subjects? Are
Republicans irresponsible? Have the principles on which you ground the
reproach upon Cabinets and Kings no practical influence--no binding
force? Are they merely themes of idle declamation, introduced to
decorate the morality of a newspaper essay, or to furnish pretty topics
of harangue from the windows of that State-house? I trust it is neither
too presumptuous, nor too late to ask, can you put the dearest interest
of society at risk without guilt, and without remorse?
It is vain to offer as an excuse, that public men are not to be
reproached for the evils that may happen to ensue from their measures.
This is very true, where they are unforeseen or inevitable. Those I have
depicted are not unforeseen; they are so far from inevitable, we are
going to bring them into being by our vote. We choose the consequences,
and become as justly answerable for them as for the measure that we know
will produce them.
By rejecting the posts, we light the savage fires--we bind the victims.
This day we undertake to render account to the widows and orphans whom
our decision will make; to the wretches that will be roasted at the
stake; to our country; and I do not deem it too serious to say, to
conscience, and to God--we are answerable; and if duty be any thing more
than a word of imposture, if conscience be not a bugbear, we are
preparing to make ourselves as wretched as our country.
There is no mistake in this case; there can be none. Experience has
already been the prophet of events, and the cries of our future victims
have already reached us. The Western inhabitants are not a silent and
uncomplaining sacrifice. The voice of humanity issues from the shade of
their wilderness. It exclaims that while one hand is held up to reject
this Treaty, the other grasps a tomahawk. It summons our imagination to
the scenes that will open. It is no great effort of the imagination to
conceive, that events so near are already begun. I can fancy that I
listen to the yells of savage vengeance, and the shrieks of torture.
Already they seem to sigh in the west wind; already they mingle with
every echo from the mountains.
Are the posts to remain for ever in the possession of Great Britain? Let
those who reject them, when the Treaty offers them to our hands, say,
if they choose, they are of no importance. If they are, will they take
them by force? The argument I am urging would then come to a point. To
use force, is war. To talk of Treaty again, is too absurd. Posts and
redress must come from voluntary good will, Treaty, or war.
Such a state of things will exist, if we should long avoid war, as will
be worse than war. Peace without security, accumulation of injury
without redress, or the hope of it, resentment against the aggressor,
contempt for ourselves, intestine discord and anarchy. Worse than this
need not be apprehended, for if worse could happen, anarchy would bring
it. Is this the peace gentlemen undertake, with such fearless
confidence, to maintain? Is this the station of American dignity, which
the high-spirited champions of our national independence and honor could
endure; nay, which they are anxious and almost violent to seize for the
country? What is there in the Treaty that could humble us so low? Are
they the men to swallow their resentments, who so lately were choking
with them? If in the case contemplated by them, it should be peace, I do
not hesitate to declare it ought not to be peace.
Let me cheer the mind, weary no doubt and ready to respond on this
prospect, by presenting another, which it is yet in our power to
realize. Is it possible for a real American to look at the prosperity of
this country without some desire for its continuance, without some
respect for the measures which, many will say, produced, and all will
confess, have preserved it? Will he not feel some dread that a change of
system will reverse the scene? The well-grounded fears of our citizens
in 1794 were removed by the Treaty, but are not forgotten. Then they
deemed war nearly inevitable, and would not this adjustment have been
considered at that day as a happy escape from the calamity? The great
interest, and the general desire of our people, was, to enjoy the
advantages of neutrality. This instrument, however misrepresented,
affords America that inestimable security. The causes of our disputes
are either cut up by the roots, or referred to a new negotiation, after
the end of the European war. This was gaining every thing, because it
confirmed our neutrality, by which our citizens are gaining every thing.
This alone would justify the engagements of the Government. For, when
the fiery vapors of the war lowered in the skirts of our horizon, all
our wishes were concentered in this one, that we might escape the
desolation of the storm. This Treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the
cloud, marked to our eyes the space where it was raging, and afforded at
the same time the sure prognostic of fair weather. If we reject it, the
vivid colors will grow pale; it will be a baleful meteor, portending
tempest and war.
Let us not hesitate, then, to agree to the appropriation to carry it
into faithful execution. Thus we shall save the faith of our nation,
secure its peace, and diffuse the spirit of confidence and enterprise
that will augment its prosperity. The progress of wealth and improvement
is wonderful, and, some will think, too rapid. The field for exertion is
fruitful and vast, and, if peace and good government should be
preserved, the acquisitions of our citizens are not so pleasing as the
proofs of their industry, as the instruments of their future success.
The rewards of exertion go to augment its power. Profit is every hour
becoming capital. The vast crop of our neutrality is all seed wheat, and
is sown again to swell, almost beyond calculation, the future harvest of
prosperity: and in this progress, what seems to be fiction, is found to
fall short of experience.
FRIDAY, April 29.
_Execution of British Treaty._
Mr. DAYTON (the Speaker) declared that he did by no means intend to
follow the gentlemen who had conceived it advisable to enter into a
discussion of the merits of the Treaty, article by article.
To those, he said, who regarded this second Treaty with Great Britain
with disagreeable sensations--to those who believed that it did not
contain in it such terms as the United States had reason to expect, and
even a right to demand--to all those whose indignation had been excited
at the unwarrantable outrages committed by that nation upon the rights
of our neutral powers, who had seen their high-handed acts with
astonishment, and the whole conduct of their administration towards this
country with abhorrence--to those whose attachment for the French, nobly
struggling for their liberties, was sincere, and who ardently wished
that their revolution might terminate in the establishment of a good and
stable government:--to all of this description, he could, with
propriety, address himself, and say, that he harmonized with them in
opinion, and that his feelings were in perfect unison with theirs. But
if, he said, there should be found in that assembly one member, whose
affection for any other nation exceeded that which he entertained for
this, whose Representative he was--if there could even be found a single
man whose hatred to any other country was greater than his love for
America--him, he should consider as his enemy, hostile to the interests
of the people who sent him there, utterly unqualified to judge rightly
of their concerns, and a betrayer of the trust reposed in him. But, Mr.
D. said, he could not believe it possible, that there were any such
amongst them, and he was convinced that every one must see and feel the
necessity of divesting himself of all his hatred, all his prejudices,
and even all attachments that were in the least degree inconsistent with
an unbiased deliberation and decision. The good and the prosperity of
the people of the United States ought to be the primary object. It was
that alone which their Representatives were delegated and commissioned
more immediately to promote, and who would deny that it was intimately
connected with, and involved in the vote they were about to give?
That the defects of this instrument of compact with Britain greatly
exceeded its merits, was a truth which was strongly impressed upon his
mind, long before he had heard the reasoning of the gentleman from
Virginia, (Mr. MADISON,) who had opened the debate. Although that
gentleman had sketched its deformities in strong colors, and had in some
instances, perhaps, exaggerated them; yet, Mr. D. said, he should not
have contested the justice of the picture he had exhibited, if he had,
at the same time, presented to their view, in true and faithful
coloring, the other side of it also. Yet, this was surely necessary in
order to enable them to form a right judgment. That member had declared
that the House were now called upon to approve the Treaty, but Mr. D.
was far from believing such a declaration warranted by the language or
nature of the propositions on the table, to which all might assent,
without pledging themselves to be the approvers of the instrument
itself.
So firmly convinced was he of this, that, if he could subscribe to the
truth and force of every objection that had been urged by that
gentleman, he should, nevertheless, by no means conclude with him, that
the House ought to withhold the appropriations, but, on the contrary,
they ought to grant them. This would be his course of conduct, because
difficulties and inconveniences alone presented themselves to their view
and choice, and he thought he should act unfaithfully, if he endeavored
to shun those on the one side only, without regarding the wide scene of
dangers into which he might plunge his country on the other. What would
be thought of that man, who, because the road he was travelling proved
to be an uneven and rough one, should considerately betake himself to an
opposite path without exploring the precipice that awaited him there? In
the individual it would be deemed an evidence of madness, and such
heedless conduct in that House could not escape the imputation of
blindness. Under impressions of this sort, as to the importance of the
vote he was about to give, he conceived himself bound to extend his
views beyond the mere intrinsic merits of the Treaty, and to estimate
the evils which must flow from a rejection of it. What, he asked, were
these? Would a foreign war, and the dissolution of the Government be the
certain fruits of a rejection, as had been represented by some gentlemen
whose opinions he respected? These would certainly be amongst the most
dreadful calamities which could befall a country, and, especially, one
made up of Confederacies like this; and although he did not think them
probable, yet, they must be admitted to be possible, and as such,
justify those who allow them to influence their minds. But he appealed
to those gentlemen who seemed to treat such apprehensions as perfectly
chimerical, whether there might not be others, which, though less
alarming than a foreign war and dissolution of the Union, would yet
exceed--nay, very far exceed, those which are to follow the operation of
the Treaty. The first fruit of a rejection would be, Mr. D. said, a
claim from the merchants who had suffered by spoliations, to be fully
indemnified from the Treasury. He called upon the members who, like
himself, represented agricultural States; and he called, also, upon
those who represented the landed and agricultural interests in the
commercial States, to declare, whether they were prepared to burden
their constituents with a tax of five millions of dollars to be thus
applied?
He did not fear that he should be charged, as others had been, with
sounding a false alarm. A proposition to that effect had already been
laid on the table, and, what was not a little singular, it was founded
on a presumption that the Treaty was to be annulled by a vote of the
House, and was to derive its support from that very circumstance. Mr. D.
thought it his duty to remind gentlemen of the doctrine uttered by the
member from New York, (Mr. LIVINGSTON,) when he moved it, as well as of
the extent of the principle contained in it. It is an established
principle, said the mover, that protection is equally due to the person
and property of all citizens, and that where the Government fails to
protect, it is bound to indemnify for all the losses that may be
sustained by every individual in consequence of such failure. They were,
therefore, Mr. D. said, if they rejected the Treaty, to be immediately
called upon to recognize a principle which would not only pledge them to
tax their fellow-citizens for the five millions, at which the British
spoliations were estimated, but, also, to make compensation for every
depredation that might hereafter be made upon their trade; nay, more,
for every injury that any American citizen might suffer through want of
protection. He was aware that he might be told that the resolution
embraced only merchants who had suffered, but he contended that the
principle, when established, must extend to all; for he challenged any
gentleman to show what better title they who inhabited the frontier next
the sea, had to claim Governmental protection and indemnification, than
they who inhabited a frontier on the land side? If, therefore, they were
determined to compensate from the Treasury the merchant for his
plundered cargo, they were equally bound to pay the frontier settler for
his stolen horse; and there would be no bounds to such claims, or means
to satisfy them.
It had been asked what would be the conduct of Britain, when they should
learn that the House of Representatives had refused to make
appropriations for the Treaty. He was disposed to think that they would
not consider it a cause, or make it a pretext, for the war. Having in
their hands the fur trade, the Western posts, and about five millions of
dollars, of which they had despoiled the people of these States, they
might probably sit down contented with the spoils they had made, after
this Government had, by its own act, dissolved the stipulations they had
entered into to make restitution and compensation. But what, in this
state of things, would restrain their piratical cruisers in the West
Indies? They, whether hoping that a war would be the consequence of
annulling the Treaty, or that, as the two nations were no longer under
that tie, they might again rob with impunity; and would probably seize
on American vessels wherever they could meet them, and carry them into
those ports in which corrupt Judges stood ready to condemn them.
So far as this question respected a dissolution of the present
Government, it was certainly a very delicate one. Important as the
subject under debate unquestionably was, he was free to declare it to be
his opinion that no decision, however unfavorable it might seem, could
justify, or would produce a separation of the States. He lamented that
it had been conceived or mentioned by any one, for he should, whilst he
had strength, resist such an event as the most fatal that could befall
his country, and would cling to the Union as the rock of their political
salvation. But he would not say, nor would any one else seriously say,
that there was no room to apprehend that a rejection might produce
suspicions, jealousies, distrusts, and discord between the one part of
the Union and the other, and such a general fermentation in the public
mind as never before prevailed.
He could not here refrain from making a serious appeal to the candor and
good sense of the gentleman from Virginia. Having served with him many
years in public life--in the old Congress, under the Confederation, in
the Federal Convention, and for nearly six years under the present form
of Government, he had, upon many and various occasions, witnessed the
display of his superior talents, and the efforts of his patriotism, and
derived from thence a conviction that, as at no former moment, so
neither at the present, could he appeal to those qualities in that
gentleman in vain. Mr. D. requested him to turn his attention to the
last article of the British Treaty, and particularly that part of it
which is in the words following, viz:
"This Treaty, when the same shall have been ratified by His
Majesty and by the President of the United States, by and
with the advice and consent of their Senate, and the
respective ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be
binding and obligatory on His Majesty and on the said
States, and shall be by them respectively executed and
observed with punctuality and the most sincere regard to
good faith," &c.
He called upon the gentleman from Virginia to show in what line or word
of it the PRESIDENT had exceeded his authority, or, if that was not
pretended, and he believed it was not by any one, he wished that
gentleman to reflect for a moment how it was possible to refuse
appropriations, and yet preserve inviolate the faith of this country, so
solemnly pledged in that article.
Mr. D. concluded with observing that, although he was not pleased with
many parts of the Treaty--although he had never felt any strong
predilection for an intimate connection with Britain--although he had
never seen their encroachments on the rights, nor their depredations
upon the property of American citizens with an indulgent eye, or in the
temper of tame submission, and although he had long ceased to entertain
any respect for the negotiator, yet he should vote for the resolution,
because he loved his country, and to that love, would sacrifice every
resentment, every prejudice, every personal consideration. He should
vote to carry the Treaty into effect with good faith, because he
sincerely believed that the interests of his fellow-citizens would be
much more promoted by that, than by the opposite line of conduct.
The question was then put on the resolution, which is in substance as
follows:
_Resolved_, That it is expedient to make the necessary appropriations
for carrying the Treaty with Great Britain into effect.
The House divided, forty-nine for the resolution, forty-nine against it.
It remained for the Chairman, Mr. MUHLENBERG, to decide.
He said, he did not feel satisfied with the resolution as it now stood;
he should, however, vote for it, that it might go to the House, and
there be modified.
The resolution was consequently agreed to, and reported to the House.
[The following statement will show the true sense of the House as to the
expediency of carrying the British Treaty into effect:
Forty-nine voted for this expediency.
Forty-nine against it.
The Chairman, Mr. MUHLENBERG, to give an opportunity further to consider
the resolution, voted for it.
Mr. PATTON from Delaware was ill, and was necessarily absent. It is,
however, well understood, that he is opposed to the Treaty.
Mr. VARNUM was accidentally absent. He is no friend to the Treaty.
Messrs. FREEMAN, SHERBURNE, and VAN CORTLANDT are absent on leave.
Mr. DUVALL has resigned, and his successor has not yet taken his seat.
From which it is evident that there is an actual majority of the House
against the expediency of carrying the Treaty into execution.]
SATURDAY, April 30.
_Execution of British Treaty._
The House then took up the resolution yesterday passed in a Committee of
the Whole, for carrying into effect the Treaty lately negotiated with
Great Britain: when
Mr. DEARBORN said, as it appeared that a majority of that House was in
favor of carrying into effect the British Treaty, notwithstanding
several of those gentlemen who had declared their intention of voting
for it, had declared they thought it a bad Treaty, and as he wished to
see the opinion the House entertained of the Treaty entered upon their
journals, he took the liberty of proposing an amendment to the
resolution in the following words:
"_Resolved_, That, although in the opinion of this House the Treaty is
highly objectionable, and may prove injurious to the United States, yet,
considering all the circumstances relating thereto, and particularly,
that the last eighteen articles are to continue in force only during the
present war, and two years thereafter, and confiding also in the
efficacy of measures that may be taken for bringing about a
discontinuance of the violations committed on our neutral rights, in
regard to our vessels and seamen, therefore, &c."
Mr. COIT hoped the yeas and nays would be taken upon the question; which
was agreed to.
Mr. GOODHUE hoped the House would not agree to the resolution; he, for
one, would never agree to it.
Mr. SWANWICK hoped the amendment would be agreed to; for whatever some
gentlemen's opinion might be with respect to the propriety of carrying
the Treaty into effect, very few thought it a good Treaty. An amendment,
therefore, declaring the motives which actuated that House in passing
the resolution for carrying the Treaty into effect was very desirable;
it would induce some gentlemen to vote for it, who would otherwise vote
against it, and it ought not to excite objection. He appealed to the
recollection of gentlemen, the arguments which had been used to enforce
the necessity of the appropriations, which laid great stress upon the
shortness of time which the most objectionable part of the Treaty was to
be in force. He hoped, therefore, these arguments would not be objected
to in the form of a resolution.
Mr. HILLHOUSE said, when he prepared the resolution on the table, he
thought he had done it in such general terms that every gentleman might
vote for it, without expressing a sentiment contrary to what he
entertained respecting the Treaty. The amendment proposed, he thought
very objectionable. It appeared as if it was intended to force gentlemen
to vote against carrying the Treaty into effect rather than vote for the
Treaty. For his own part, he could not vote for it, as it would be in
direct contradiction to the sentiments which he had before expressed. He
thought candor itself could not expect gentlemen who approved of the
Treaty to vote for the amendment. It was also a rule to avoid expressing
particular sentiments in resolutions of this kind. One part of the
proposition, if it was brought forward separately, would be assented to
generally, respecting the confidence placed in the PRESIDENT, with
respect to future spoliations and impressments of men. In this
proposition, it was said, the Treaty was injurious; he did not believe
it was so. He believed it would be beneficial to the United States. It
would not only be agreeing to an opinion which was contrary to the
sentiments of gentlemen, but it would be passing a censure on the other
branches of Government. Gentlemen were not required to say it was a good
Treaty, and he hoped no one would be forced to say it was a bad one.
[The SPEAKER informed the House that it was then twelve o'clock, and as
they had yesterday ordered that there should be a call of the House
to-day at that hour, he should direct the Clerk to make the call. It was
accordingly done. Messrs. BRENT, HARPER, and PATTON were absent. The two
former came to the House soon after the call, and, on making apologies,
were excused. Mr. PATTON was indisposed.]
Mr. GREGG said he should vote for the resolution in its present state.
He did so, not because he thought the Treaty a good one, but because he
believed the interest of the United States would be promoted by making
the necessary appropriations, and because he was apprehensive worse
consequences might arise from defeating it than from carrying it into
effect.
Mr. MOORE considered himself as called upon to choose between two evils.
He considered the Treaty to be bad. On the other hand, he was
apprehensive that evils might arise, if it was not carried into effect,
out of the control of that House. He had resolved not to vote for the
resolution on the table; but he felt unwilling to take upon himself the
responsibility of rejecting the Treaty, which had been sanctioned by the
PRESIDENT and Senate. In deciding upon the amendment proposed, he wished
the sense of the House to be taken; and if he considered that a single
individual would be influenced to vote against the resolution who would
otherwise have voted for it, he should wish them to be separated. It was
his opinion the Treaty was a bad one, and he believed it was the opinion
of a decided majority of that House. He wished the resolution to be so
amended that the Treaty might go into effect by a considerable majority,
as it would tend to lessen the irritation which had been raised
respecting it.
Mr. DEARBORN said, in offering the amendment which he had proposed, he
had no intention of taking any thing like an unfair advantage, or of
producing what might be thought uncandid or unfair. His own sentiments
relative to the Treaty were such as would prevent his consenting to do
any thing to carry it into effect, unless with such a provision as he
had brought forward. It appeared to him of such a nature, that he was
not sure that he could bring his mind to vote to carry it into effect at
all. He had supposed there could be nothing improper in taking the
opinion of the House relative to the thing itself. If it might be
presumed that there were but few gentlemen in that House who thought the
Treaty a good one, he, indeed, thought there were none of that opinion,
until then, though some gentlemen had praised it in their speeches, but
which he had merely considered as adding weight to their arguments, he
believed such an amendment was desirable.
As he, therefore, took it for granted that a considerable majority of
the House were of the same opinion with himself, he saw no impropriety
in having that opinion expressed. The propositions would not interfere
with any bill which might be brought in, and gentlemen would have the
discretion to vote for it or not. If a majority of the House thought
differently from him, and chose to negative the amendment, he should be
satisfied. Until he heard something further on the business, to convince
him of the impropriety of doing so, he should wish to see a decision of
the House upon the proposition as he had offered it.
Mr. HARPER said he was of the number who thought the measure of passing
the resolution on the table a very expedient one; but whilst this was
his opinion, he knew there were many, both within and without their
walls, of a different opinion. He had no objection to gentlemen's
expressing their opinions, but he wished also to be at liberty to
express his. He should, therefore, propose that the mover should form
his resolution as a preamble. This would answer the purpose of the
gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. MOORE.)
He said, when it was so formed, every one would have an opportunity of
voting for it, and, if negatived, the resolution would stand as before.
He hoped, therefore, the proposal would be agreed to.
Mr. DEARBORN said he considered his motion in the nature of a preamble;
and he had no objection to any alteration that would make it more
properly so.
Mr. KITTERA appealed to the candor of the gentleman who brought forward
the amendment, with respect to the propriety of making his proposition a
distinct one. He thought it would be extremely improper to pass a
resolution which would say, "We pass this law, though we believe it to
be a very bad one." He thought it also directly charging another branch
of the Government with improper conduct.
Mr. NICHOLAS had no objection to the amendment being inserted by way of
preamble. He urged the propriety of the opinions of members being fairly
taken on this important business.
Mr. GREGG wished to offer an amendment, as a substitute to that before
the committee. It was, in substance, as follows: "_Resolved_, That under
a consideration of existing circumstances, without reference to the
merits or demerits of the Treaty, and in confidence that measures will
be taken by the Executive to maintain our neutral rights, it is
expedient," &c.
This was declared out of order until the amendment was decided on.
Mr. VENABLE had no objection to the propositions being taken separately,
as gentlemen would be then left at liberty to vote as they pleased. He
conceived there were gentlemen who would vote for the proposition with
the amendment, who would not vote for it without it. He did not know
that any amendment would reconcile the resolution to him; for, though he
should vote for the amendment, he would not bind himself to vote for
carrying into effect the Treaty.
Mr. MURRAY said he had not spoken on the subject before. He was stating
that the PRESIDENT was armed only with reason; he was stripped of all
the symbols of power, and if the Treaty before them was carried into
effect, with such a clog as the amendment proposed, he would be
debilitated indeed. Their Executive had, in his opinion, done great
things, and what would have covered any European Minister with
untarnished laurels, by means of reason and policy; for, however
wickedly courts act, they calculate upon the force of the powers with
whom they treat. When a Minister goes to negotiate, they inquire into
the naval and military force of his country, their appropriations for
the army and navy, &c., &c. The Envoy of the United States would be a
blank upon such an occasion. What was their interest, then? It was to
give energy to their Government. Should they then pass the law in such a
manner as almost to warrant the people in resisting it? The only thing
which remained for them to do, was, not only to carry the Treaty into
effect, but to carry it into effect with good faith. The object was not
merely the posts--it was a conciliation of the differences long existing
between the two nations; and it was their duty to execute it so as to
produce the greatest advantage; whereas, if they were to agree to the
amendment proposed, so covered with odium, it would weaken the power of
the Executive, already too feeble.
Mr. S. SMITH said he had never seen any cause of gloom. He never doubted
that the members of that House would come to right conclusions. They did
right yesterday, and he was not afraid of their doing wrong to-day. In
their decision yesterday, the Chairman had doubts. He decided in favor
of the resolution, in hopes of its undergoing some modification--that
modification was now brought forward. It did not entirely please him;
but he thought it might be so amended as to please every one. He moved
that the words "and may prove injurious to the United States," be struck
out. Consented to.
Mr. MUHLENBERG said, when he gave his vote yesterday, he did it in the
hope of a modification of the resolution taking place in the House. A
modification was now brought forward, and he was ready to vote for some
such modification. Whilst he made this declaration, he must add, that he
was willing also to vote for the original resolution. He wished the
sense of the House to be taken upon the two propositions separately.
Mr. DEARBORN consented to the propositions being taken separately.
Mr. S. SMITH moved to strike out the word "highly," so as to read
_objectionable_, instead of "highly objectionable."
The sense of the House was taken, when there were 48 for the striking
out, and 48 against it. The SPEAKER gave his vote in the affirmative.
Mr. KITCHELL said, he should vote against the proposition now brought
forward, because he thought it wrong to hold up an idea which would have
a tendency to weaken the Government. He looked upon it as injurious. The
people would judge upon the Treaty from the instrument itself, and what
had been said of it. They ought never to alarm the people unnecessarily.
It was not from any fear of going to war, or any other apprehension but
what he had mentioned, which caused this opposition in him.
Mr. GALLATIN said, if the propositions could be divided, no gentleman
could reasonably object to the sense of the House being taken upon them.
Mr. PARKER said, he had not yet spoken upon this business. He would now
say, he disapproved of the amendment, and should not vote for it. He
thought the Treaty a bad one, and would not agree to vote for it by
means of any modification.
Mr. HEISTER said, he should vote for the amendment, because, if the
Treaty went into operation, he should wish the reasons which induced the
House to agree to it to appear, on the Journals. When, however, the
resolution for carrying the Treaty into effect was put, he should vote
against it.
The motion was then put on the preamble, and decided in the negative, as
follows: yeas, 49, nays 50:
YEAS.--Theodorus Bailey, Abraham Baldwin, David Bard,
Lemuel Benton, Thomas Blount, Richard Brent, Dempsey
Burges, Samuel J. Cabell, Gabriel Christie, John Clopton,
Isaac Coles, Henry Dearborn, Samuel Earle, Jesse Franklin,
Albert Gallatin, William B. Giles, James Gillespie,
Christopher Greenup, Andrew Gregg, William Barry Grove,
Wade Hampton, Carter B. Harrison, John Hathorn, Jonathan N.
Havens, Daniel Heister, James Holland, George Jackson,
Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke, William Lyman, Samuel
Maclay, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Milledge,
Andrew Moore, Frederick A. Muhlenberg, Anthony New, John
Nicholas, Alexander D. Orr, John Page, Francis Preston,
Robert Rutherford, Israel Smith, John Swanwick, Absalom
Tatom, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, Abraham
Venable, and Richard Winn.
NAYS.--Fisher Ames, Benjamin Bourne, Theophilus Bradbury,
Nathan Bryan, Daniel Buck, Thomas Claiborne, Joshua Coit,
Wm. Cooper, Jeremiah Crabb, George Dent, Abiel Foster,
Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Nicholas Gilman, Henry
Glenn, Benjamin Goodhue, Chauncey Goodrich, Roger Griswold,
George Hancock, Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Hartley, John
Heath, Thomas Henderson, James Hillhouse, William Hindman,
Aaron Kitchell, John Wilkes Kittera, George Leonard, Samuel
Lyman, Francis Malbone, William Vans Murray, Josiah Parker,
John Read, John Richards, Theodore Sedgwick, Samuel
Sitgreaves, Jeremiah Smith, Nathaniel Smith, Isaac Smith,
Samuel Smith, William Smith, Thomas Sprigg, Zephaniah
Swift, George Thatcher, Richard Thomas, Mark Thompson,
Uriah Tracy, John E. Van Allen, Peleg Wadsworth, and John
Williams.
From this list it appears that the question was lost by one vote. The
clerk, however, through mistake, reported the votes to be equal, viz:
49 for and 49 against the question, and the SPEAKER gave his vote in the
negative, but the above was afterwards found to be the true statement.
Mr. W. SMITH was glad the motion was negatived. He did not wish either
blame or praise to be cast upon the Treaty by the resolution passed to
carry it into effect. He would, therefore, move to add the following
words to the original resolution: "Without reference to the merits of
the Treaty."
Mr. GILES opposed this amendment. He said, it would be an indirect mode
of passing a censure upon the House for having undertaken to judge of
the merits of the Treaty. He did not know whether it struck the
gentleman in the same way, but he would agree it was improper to pass a
censure upon the House. He hoped, therefore, the motion would either be
withdrawn or voted against.
The motion was withdrawn.
Mr. WINN said, as it was his opinion, and the opinion of the generality
of his constituents, that the Treaty was a bad one, he should vote
against it.
The question was then taken by yeas and nays, and determined in the
affirmative--yeas 51, nays 48, as follows:
YEAS.--Fisher Ames, Theodorus Bailey, Benjamin Bourne,
Theophilus Bradbury, Daniel Buck, Gabriel Christie, Joshua
Coit, William Cooper, Jeremiah Crabb, George Dent, Abiel
Foster, Dwight Foster, Ezekiel Gilbert, Nicholas Gilman,
Henry Glenn, Benjamin Goodhue, Chauncey Goodrich, Andrew
Gregg, Roger Griswold, William Barry Grove, George Hancock,
Robert Goodloe Harper, Thomas Hartley, Thomas Henderson,
James Hillhouse, William Hindman, Aaron Kitchell, John
Wilkes Kittera, George Leonard, Samuel Lyman, Francis
Malbone, Frederick A. Muhlenberg, Wm. Vans Murray, John
Read, John Richards, Theodore Sedgwick, Samuel Sitgreaves,
Jeremiah Smith, Nathaniel Smith, Isaac Smith, Samuel Smith,
William Smith, Zephaniah Swift, George Thatcher, Richard
Thomas, Mark Thompson, Uriah Tracy, John E. Van Allen,
Philip Van Cortlandt, Peleg Wadsworth, and John Williams.
NAYS.--Abraham Baldwin, David Bard, Lemuel Benton, Thomas
Blount, Richard Brent, Nathan Bryan, Dempsey Burges, Samuel
J. Cabell, Thomas Claiborne, John Clopton, Isaac Coles,
Henry Dearborn, Samuel Earle, Jesse Franklin, Albert
Gallatin, William B. Giles, James Gillespie, Christopher
Greenup, Wade Hampton, Carter B. Harrison, John Hathorn,
Jonathan N. Havens, John Heath, Daniel Heister, James
Holland, George Jackson, Edward Livingston, Matthew Locke,
William Lyman, Samuel Maclay, Nathaniel Macon, James
Madison, John Milledge, Andrew Moore, Anthony New, John
Nicholas, Alexander D. Orr, John Page, Josiah Parker,
Francis Preston, Robert Rutherford, Israel Smith, Thomas
Sprigg, John Swanwick, Absalom Tatom, Joseph B. Varnum,
Abraham Venable, and Richard Winn.
_Ordered_, That a bill or bills be brought in, pursuant to the said
resolution, and that Mr. HILLHOUSE, Mr. SEDGWICK, and Mr. GALLATIN, do
prepare and bring in the same.
[RECAPITULATION.