Mr. S. SMITH rose and said, the subject then before the committee
appeared to him to be of an importance at least equal to the great
constitutional question which agitated the House during the present
session; it has had, and he trusted would continue to have, the same
calm attention paid to its discussion. He hoped and expected that it
would ultimately be determined with a view to the real interest of the
nation, under the existing state of things.
When the Treaty was first published he had read it with attention, and
although he had not seen all those faults with which it has since been
charged, yet there was, to his view, so little good contained in it,
and so much of evil to be apprehended from it, that he had felt a hope
that the PRESIDENT would not have ratified it. He had been disappointed,
yet he had not a doubt but the PRESIDENT, after the most mature
consideration, had given his signature; being possessed, as he was, of
every information relative to a subject so very important, he could
better determine on the policy of its adoption than those who were less
informed. Still there were many articles, particularly the commercial,
which every man might judge of from the face of the instrument. On these
he did not hesitate to give an opinion: which was, that they promise not
one solitary advantage, and shackle our commerce in many important
points. He would not trouble the committee with going deeply into a
subject that has already been so ably discussed. He, however, could not
refrain from a few remarks on the right to countervail our extra duties
on tonnage of goods imported in foreign bottoms. He asked what would
this countervail be? Could any man tell? It was not specified in the
article; it was then discretionary with the British; discretionary with
a nation whose rule of right has always been the measure of its power,
whose conduct has invariably been to cramp and distress the commerce of
all other nations. To such a nation was it proper to trust a latitude of
that extent? Will she make her countervail oppressive and unjust? It is
more than probable she will, and if she should, what remedy have we?
None: for we are forbidden by the same article to legislate further on
the subject.
He said he would take leave to explain the 13th article which relates to
the East India trade, and which it has been said gives such solid
advantage as to counterbalance all the evils arising out of the Treaty.
He had taken some pains to inform himself on this subject, and he had
found that the Americans, in common with all other nations, traded to
the British and other ports of India, and were every where received with
that sort of kindness which grows out of the interest that the vender
has in selling his goods for ready money, and to a great profit; that
our trade is so much the interest of the India Company, and of all its
officers and factors, as well as of the private traders residing there;
that it was ridiculous to suppose the India Company would prevent it;
and, if they should, what would be the evil? Little or none; for there
were other ports, belonging either to other European powers or to the
natives, in the neighborhood of all the English ports, who would receive
us with open arms, and supply us for our silver, on terms equal, or
nearly so. He then stated that our ships could now carry from one port
in India to another, to China, or to Europe; an employment that had been
found very lucrative. Under the Treaty they must proceed with whatever
they purchase in an English port direct to America. The article says,
His Majesty consents to your trade to India, and this is called a boon.
It appeared to him just as ridiculous as if his Majesty had said, he
consented to our going to Great Britain to purchase its manufactures.
To enumerate the many faults he found with the Treaty, as well of
omission as commission, would take up too much of their precious time;
yet he trusted he should be excused for taking a short view of its
leading features.
When the envoy was sent to Great Britain, he was principally to demand
restitution for the cruel depredations committed on our commerce. We
find that object attended to so vaguely that our best-informed men seem
doubtful whether much will ever be recovered under the Treaty; they find
that in every instance the loser must first pursue his remedy through
their tedious and expensive Courts. We find, that by fair construction,
we have acknowledged ourselves to have been the infractors of the Treaty
of Peace; for what was the ground on which some of the States placed
legal impediments to the recovery of British debts? Why, that Lord
Dorchester had refused to deliver up or pay for the negroes which, by
that Treaty, ought to have been restored, and which slaves would have
assisted their masters by their labor to pay those debts; yet we see no
mention of them in the Treaty; and we find, to our surprise, men, since
this Treaty, defending the construction lately put on the Treaty of
Peace by the British, and which had never before been heard of; thus
acquiescing in the charge of our being the first aggressors. But this
only relates to our honor, and of course can be of little consequence to
a nation whose rule of conduct is to submit to every thing, provided,
that on the whole account, there appears to be a balance of profit in
its favor.
After having thus formed his opinion relative to the Treaty, his next
inquiry was, is the Treaty constitutional? On that point he had held
himself open to conviction, and waited its discussion. He had not heard
any gentleman declare it unconstitutional, except one, (Mr. PAGE,) who
seemed to give his opinion as if he still doubted; and having carefully
considered the subject, he was now of opinion that there was nothing
directly repugnant to the constitution in the instrument. He then
inquired whether, under the existing state of things, the Treaty ought
to be rejected? whether it contained stipulations so extremely injurious
to the United States as ought to induce the House of Representatives to
reject a compact made by the other branches of the Government? In the
ten first articles, which are permanent, he found some objections. The
third article, which, like many others, cannot be well understood, seems
to say that goods imported in British bottoms to the ports of the Lakes,
shall pay extra duty. If this be a true construction, it will then be
necessary to repeal our restraining duties, to make the Treaty by law
consistent with the constitution, which requires that all duties shall
be equal. The tenth article ties our hands against sequestration, a
power which ought not to be exercised, except on some very extraordinary
occasions; yet it was a power which, considering our relative situation
to Great Britain, it was imprudent to part with; still, on fair
consideration, he did not find that there was sufficient cause, on the
account, to reject the Treaty, in the situation we are now placed. The
residue will expire in two or three years.
TUESDAY, April 26.
_Execution of British Treaty._
Mr. DWIGHT FOSTER observed, that as the subject before the committee had
been minutely discussed, it was not to be expected any new arguments,
either on the one side or the other, would be adduced. Hitherto, he had
been silent--though silent, he had not been inattentive--he had listened
with candor to every thing which had been offered; he had formed his
opinion upon serious deliberation, and was ready to give it whenever the
question should be taken.
When the resolution requesting the PRESIDENT to lay before the House a
copy of the instructions, correspondence, and other documents relative
to this Treaty, was under consideration, Mr. F. observed, that he had
intended to have expressed his sentiments on the subject; but the great
length of time which was spent in that discussion, and the extreme
impatience discovered by many members to have the question taken,
induced him, as it might several others, to be content with expressing a
silent vote, as he did with the minority, on that occasion. This he was
the more willing to do, as it was then well known that the Treaty itself
would be before the House; that some appropriations would be requisite,
on their part, to carry it into effect; and, it was not to be doubted
but every gentleman who wished to express his opinion would have an
opportunity. The time had now arrived, and several days had been spent
already, he believed not unprofitably, in deliberating on an instrument
which had been the cause of great agitation in the United States.
He was heretofore one of those who considered the negotiation as
advisable; it appeared to him the only means by which the horrors of war
were to be avoided. He therefore rejoiced when the PRESIDENT appointed
an Envoy for the purpose of negotiation; nor did he yet find any reason
to apprehend the measure was injudicious. Far otherwise. He believed it
was right, proper, and advisable; and that the result would prove highly
advantageous and fortunate for our country. He further said, that he had
critically examined the various articles of the Treaty; that he had
weighed the arguments for and against them, jointly and severally; that
he had considered them all with the attention their importance required;
and though, in some instances, we might have wished an extension of
advantages on our side, he was bound, in conscience, to declare that he
thought the Treaty as beneficial to us as we had a right to expect.
The right of the PRESIDENT, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, is a principle clearly defined by the
constitution. Not a single power delegated by the constitution to any
one branch of the Government is defined in terms more explicit, or less
liable to be misunderstood, than those which define the Treaty-making
power of the United States; and, during the whole course of the former
and present debates, Mr. F. observed, he had not been able to raise a
doubt in his own mind on the subject. The Treaty under consideration had
been duly made and ratified by the proper authority, constituted for
this purpose by the people of the United States; as such it was now
before the committee and demanded their serious attention and respect.
The subject was allowed by all to be of importance. To him it appeared
more momentous than any other which, at any time since the establishment
of the Government, had engrossed the attention of Congress. He viewed it
not as a question of peace or war only, but as involving questions of
far greater magnitude. He meant the present unexampled prosperity of
this country, our political happiness, our excellent constitution, and
probably, in its consequences, the existence of the national Government.
Mr. KITCHELL said, he could throw no new light upon the subject under
discussion; he wished only to express a few ideas which would lead him
to support the resolution in its present form. He did not believe the
Treaty to be that box of Pandora, which was to scatter evils of every
kind upon the land. He believed there were stipulations in favor of the
United States, as well as in favor of Great Britain; and when the
Ministers of the two nations enter into contract, it must be expected
that stipulations will be agreed to on each side which will not appear
perfectly satisfactory to either, as certain concessions must be made on
both sides.
He would mention only the probable consequences of rejecting the Treaty.
The disposition of the two nations towards each other at the time of
entering into negotiation was well known. The spoliations and injuries
done to the American vessels had wound up American resentment to the
highest pitch. Happily for America, Britain saw cause to change her
system of aggression. He believed, with some other gentlemen, that
Britain had not only formed the plan of crushing the rising liberties of
France, but also of extending her views to America; but, from a reverse
of fortune, she found it necessary to employ all her resources against
France. There was another thing, the people of England were clamorous on
account of the injuries done to the vessels of America; they were seen
to be unjust, and were publicly reprobated. These circumstances were
favorable to our negotiation, and he believed they could at no time have
got a better Treaty, than at the time the present was agreed upon.
He said, they had only three alternatives. Either to give aid to the
Treaty, continue to bear the insults of Great Britain, or else to
determine resolutely on the dernier resort, war.
Mr. GRISWOLD said, that in his opinion, the extensive view which the
committee were taking of the merits of the Treaty with Great Britain was
unwarranted by the Constitution of the United States; that he did not
believe any part of the Treaty-making power had been delegated to the
House of Representatives; and that the committee might with as much
propriety examine the merits of the constitution itself, for the purpose
of deciding whether they would execute it or not, as to examine the
Treaty in the manner which had been adopted in the committee. He had, on
a former occasion, delivered his opinions on that subject, and he would
not attempt to repeat them; but since the committee had thought proper
to take an extensive view of the merits of the Treaty, he would follow
the example which had been set him, and submit a few observations upon
that subject--more particularly as he believed that no discussion would
prove injurious to that instrument. He should not, however, attempt to
take a very extensive view of the subject, as gentlemen who had preceded
him had exhausted almost every part of the subject and left little to be
said at that period of the debate.
Mr. G. said the Treaty embraced three great objects:
1. The execution of those parts of the Treaty of 1783, which remained
unexecuted.