Mr. HILLHOUSE rose and said, the subject now under consideration was one
of the first in magnitude he had ever been called to deliberate upon,
and that the circumstances under which it came up were peculiar, for
previous to the Treaty's being either promulgated or known, a
hue-and-cry had been raised, and the prejudices of the people as much as
possible excited against it, and he confessed it had not been without
its effect upon his own mind. When the Treaty came out, therefore, he
was led to examine it with attention, compare it with our Treaties with
other nations, and those between Great Britain and other nations; the
result of this inquiry was, that he found that no privilege or advantage
given by Great Britain to the other nations was withheld from us; that
advantages were secured to us which were enjoyed by no other nation, nor
even by her own subjects: that we gave her little that was not enjoyed
by every other nation; and, on the whole, that it was as good a Treaty
as we had a right to expect, and as he had ever expected to obtain. He
was sensible that prejudice, which, like a sentinel at the door of the
human mind to keep out truth and argument, had induced many good
citizens of the United States at first to be opposed to the Treaty, who,
upon being prevailed on to give it a more candid examination, had
declared in favor of it; but he hoped the Representatives of the people,
called to decide on a question which might affect the dearest interests
of millions, would, as much as possible, divest themselves of prejudice
and passion: to do it entirely, he believed, was impossible.
The first, and, if well-founded, the most important objection which he
had heard made against the Treaty was, that a claim for negroes and
other property carried away from New York had been wholly overlooked or
given up by our Minister. Here, he said, he was sensible any argument he
might adduce would be opposed by the party opinions formed at the
time--when judging in our own case, and when we felt a great degree of
sensibility for the losses and injuries we had recently experienced. He
was not unapprised that Congress had claimed that the construction of
the 7th article of the Treaty was such as to require the delivering up
of the negroes, and had passed the resolution read by the gentleman from
Virginia, (Mr. HEATH,) and that that opinion had, without examination,
been implicitly followed by many respectable characters; but he hoped at
this distance of time, he might expect a candid hearing, whilst he
examined their arguments and the law of nations, to which alone resort
can be had to decide differences between sovereign and independent
nations. To his mind they were conclusive that we had not a well-founded
claim; to every mind, he believed, they would render the claim at least
doubtful.
His first inquiry, he said, should be, whether negroes were to be
considered as property? This, he believed, must be admitted: they were
thus recognized by the article itself, which says "negroes or other
property." Negroes being mentioned amounts only to a specification of
one kind of property; as, in the constitution, it says "capitation or
other direct taxes," which is a conclusive recognition that a capitation
tax is a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution. Upon no
other ground than that of property could the United States claim them;
as men, they had a right to go where they pleased. Our commissioners, at
the time of the embarkation, had no hesitation in declaring that they
considered "negroes, horses, and other property," as being precisely on
the same footing, and selected a claim for a horse as one of the
strongest that could be found to enforce a compliance with this
construction of the article. The claim was in these words:
"Mr. Vanderburgh had a horse stolen from him, out of his
stable in Beekman's Precinct, in Dutchess County, 26th
February, 1780, and the horse was conveyed by the person
who stole him to a then British post, in Westchester
County, where he has since been detained; so that Mr.
Vanderburgh could not recover him again. The horse is now
in the possession of Col. James De Launcy, of this city,
from whom Mr. Vanderburgh has demanded him, and who refuses
to deliver him to Mr. Vanderburgh."
In the letter of the Commissioners to General WASHINGTON, on this
subject, they say:
"In the interview between the 15th and 24th, numbers
applied to us for a restitution of their negroes and other
property in the possession of others, but we supposed it
most eligible to defer a requisition till a clear
unequivocal case, similar to that of Mr. Vanderburgh's,
where the proofs were at hand and not embarrassed with the
circumstances of a capture in war or other pretences under
which property is withheld here, should present itself;
sensible that if restitution was denied in such an
instance, it would inevitably be in every other."
It therefore appears clear that negroes, horses, and other property,
were, by this article, placed upon the same footing, and that it was as
much a violation of the Treaty to carry away a horse as a negro.
He next proceeded to inquire what was the situation of this property,
and in whom, according to the law of nations, it was vested at the time
of executing the Treaty? This point, he said, Mr. JEFFERSON had fully
settled to his hand, and read out of his collection the following
extracts:
"We now come together (says Mr. Jefferson) to consider that
instrument which was to heal our wounds, and begin a new
chapter in our history. The state in which they found
things is to be considered as rightful; so says the Law of
Nations.--_Vattel._ The state in which things are found at
the moment of the Treaty, should be considered as lawful,
and if it is meant to make any change in it, the Treaty
must expressly mention it. Consequently, all things about
which the Treaty is silent, must remain in the state in
which they are found at its conclusion.--_Bynk._ Since it
is a condition of war that enemies may be deprived of all
their rights, it is reasonable that every thing of an
enemy's, found among his enemies, should change its owners,
and go to the Treasury. It is moreover usually directed, in
all declarations of war, that the goods of enemies, as well
those found among us as those taken in war, shall be
confiscated."
These authorities, he said, clearly proved that all negroes and other
property which in the course of the war had been taken, or in any way
had fallen into the hands of the British, had shifted their owner, and
were no longer the property of the American inhabitants. In the case of
negroes, the British Commander-in-Chief had exercised the highest act of
ownership, by manumitting such of them as should conform to certain
stipulations, pointed out in his proclamation. If any change was
intended to have been made by the Treaty in the circumstances of these
negroes, and it had been intended they should be again returned into
bondage, there would have been some express stipulation to that effect
in the Treaty. The words are, "and without causing any destruction, or
carrying away any negroes or other property of the American inhabitants,
withdraw all his armies," &c. There is nothing that indicates the least
intention that this article should have a retrospective operation. It
can only relate to property then belonging to the American inhabitants.
Wherever any article was intended to have a retrospective operation,
some expression is used that clearly shows such intention. In this same
article, speaking of delivering up records, deeds, &c., these words are
added, "which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands of
his officers," &c. In the 4th article, "debts heretofore contracted."
Any other construction would have required the restoration of vessels
which had been taken from the Americans, and were then in New York,
under the term "other property," as well as negroes and horses. If any
negroes or other property, in the possession of the American inhabitants
at or after signing the preliminary articles, were carried off, it was
no doubt a violation of the Treaty, but he had not understood that they
refused to deliver up property of that description, or that such
property was carried off to any great amount.
But this matter does not rest only on there being no words in the Treaty
which can be construed to have a retrospective operation, but it is
fairly to be inferred from the papers contained in this same collection
of Mr. JEFFERSON, that it was so understood by the negotiators; for, in
the course of that negotiation; it appears to have been a primary object
with the British Minister to obtain restitution of the Tory estates, or
compensation for them. They almost made a _sine qua non_, and a refusal
to comply had well-nigh broken off the negotiation; and to induce the
British Minister to relinquish that article, our commissioners brought
in a claim for negroes and other property which had been taken, and
towns and villages which had been destroyed during the war. He here read
the following letter from Mr. Oswald, the British Minister, to our
commissioners, viz:
"You may remember, that from the very beginning of our
negotiation for settling a peace between Great Britain and
America, I insisted that you should positively stipulate
for the restoration of the property of all those under the
denomination of Loyalists or Refugees, who have taken part
with Great Britain in the present war; or if the property
had been resold, and passed into such variety of hands as
to render the restoration impracticable, (which you assert
to be the case in many instances,) you should stipulate for
a compensation or indemnification to those persons adequate
to their losses. To those propositions, you said, you could
not accede. Mr. Stachey, since his arrival at Paris, has
most strenuously joined me in insisting upon the said
restitution, compensation, or indemnification, and in
laying before you every argument in favor of the demands,
founded on national honor, and upon the true principles of
justice. Those demands you must have understood to extend,
not only to all persons of the above-mentioned description
who have fled to Europe, but likewise to all those who may
now be in any part of North America, dwelling under the
protection of His Majesty's arm, or otherwise. We have also
insisted on a mutual stipulation for a general amnesty on
both sides, comprehending thereby an enlargement of all
persons who, on account of offences committed, or supposed
to be committed, since the commencement of hostilities, may
now be in confinement, and for an immediate repossession of
their properties and peaceable enjoyment thereof, under the
Government of the United States. To this you have not given
a particular and direct answer. It is, however, incumbent
on me, as Commissioner of the King of Great Britain, to
repeat the several demands, and without going over those
arguments upon paper, which we have so often urged in
conversation, to press your immediate attention to these
subjects, and to urge you to enter into proper stipulations
for their restitution, compensation, and amnesty, before we
proceed further in this negotiation."
To which our commissioners returned the following answer:
"In answer to the letter you did us the honor to write on
the 4th instant, we beg leave to repeat what we often said
in conversation, viz: that the restoration of such of the
estates of the refugees as have been confiscated, is
impracticable, because they were confiscated by laws of
particular States, and in many instances have passed by
legal titles through several hands. Besides, sir, as this
is a matter evidently appertaining to the internal policy
of the separate States, the Congress, by the nature of our
constitution, have no authority to interfere with it. As to
your demand of compensation to those persons, we forbear
enumerating our reasons for thinking it ill-founded. In the
moment of conciliatory overtures, it would not be proper to
call certain scenes into view, over which a variety of
considerations should induce both parties at present to
draw a veil. Permit us, therefore, only to repeat, that we
cannot stipulate for such compensation, unless on your part
it be agreed to make restitution to our citizens for the
heavy losses they have sustained by the unnecessary
destruction of private property. We have already agreed to
an amnesty more extensive than justice required, and full
as extensive as humanity would demand; we can therefore,
only repeat, that it cannot be extended further. We should
be sorry, if the absolute impossibility of our complying
further with your propositions, should induce Great Britain
to continue the war, for the sake of those who caused and
prolonged it; but, if that should be the case, we hope that
the utmost latitude will not be again given to its rigors.
Whatever may be the issue of this negotiation, be assured,
sir, that we shall always acknowledge the liberal, manly,
and candid manner, in which you have conducted it."
In consequence of information from our commissioners that the claim was
made and pertinaciously insisted on by the British Minister, Congress
passed the following resolutions, viz:
"_Resolved_, That the Secretary for Foreign Affairs be, and
he is hereby, directed to obtain, as speedily as possible,
authentic returns of the slaves and other property which
have been carried off or destroyed in the course of the war
by the enemy, and to transmit the same to the Ministers
Plenipotentiary for negotiating peace.
"_Resolved_, That, in the mean time, the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs inform the said Minister, that many
thousands of slaves, and other property to a very great
amount, have been carried off or destroyed by the enemy,
and that, in the opinion of Congress, the great loss of
property which the citizens of the United States have
sustained by the enemy, will be considered by the several
States as an insuperable bar to their making restitution or
indemnification to the former owners of property which has
been or may be forfeited to, or confiscated by, any of the
States."
Dr. FRANKLIN, in a letter to the British Minister, says:
"I must repeat my opinion, that it is best for you to drop
all mention of the refugees. We have proposed, indeed,
nothing but what we think best for you as well as
ourselves. But if you will have them mentioned, let it be
in an article which may provide that they shall exhibit
accounts of their losses to commissioners hereafter to be
appointed, who shall examine the same, together with the
accounts now preparing in America of the damages done by
them, and state the account; and that if a balance appears
in their favor, it shall be paid by us to you, and by you
divided among them, as you shall think proper. And if the
balance is found due to us, it shall be paid by you. Give
me leave, however, to advise you to prevent so dreadful a
discussion, by dropping the article, that we may write to
America and stop the inquiry."
The following article was accordingly drawn up and proposed to be
inserted in the Treaty, viz:
"It is agreed that His Britannic Majesty will earnestly
recommend it to his Parliament to provide for and make
compensation to the merchants and shopkeepers of Boston,
whose goods and merchandise were seized and taken out of
the stores, warehouses, and shops, by order of General
Gage, and others of his commanders or officers there; and
also the inhabitants of Philadelphia, for the goods taken
away by his army there; and to make compensation also for
the tobacco, rice, indigo, negroes, &c., seized and carried
off by his armies under Generals Arnold, Cornwallis, and
others, from the States of Virginia, North and South
Carolina, and Georgia: And also for all vessels and cargoes
belonging to the inhabitants of the said United States,
which were stopped, seized, or taken, either in the ports
or on the seas, by his Governors, or by his ships of war,
before the declaration of war against the said States. And
it is further agreed that His Britannic Majesty will also
earnestly recommend it to his Parliament to make
compensation for all the towns, villages, and farms, burnt
and destroyed by his troops or adherents in the said United
States."
After pressing the matter to the utmost extent, we find, by Mr. ADAMS's
journal, that on the evening previous to signing the Treaty, Ministers
on both sides came to the following result:
"Upon this I recounted the history of Gen. Gage's agreement
with the inhabitants of Boston, that they should remove
their effects, upon condition that they would surrender
their arms; but as soon as the arms were secured, the goods
were forbid to be carried out, and were finally carried off
in large quantities to Halifax. Dr. Franklin mentioned the
case of Philadelphia, and the carrying off effects there,
even his own library. Mr. Jay mentioned several other
things; and Mr. Laurens added the plunder in Carolina, of
negroes, plate, &c. After hearing all this, Mr.
Fitzherbert, Mr. Oswald, and Mr. Stachey, retired for some
time, and returning Mr. Fitzherbert said, that upon
consulting together, and weighing every thing as maturely
as possible, Mr. Stachey and himself had determined to
advise Mr. Oswald to strike with us according to the terms
we had proposed, as to our ultimatum respecting the
fishery, and the loyalists. Accordingly we all sat down,
read over the whole Treaty and corrected it, and agreed to
meet to-morrow at O.'s house, to sign and seal the
Treaties."
Will any candid man say, after reviewing these circumstances, that the
7th article was meant to secure the restitution of negroes and other
property taken in the course of the war? If that had been meant, would
it not have been improper to have urged it as an argument against the
introduction of an article which would have subjected this country to
immense embarrassment and expense?
It is true that the United States did challenge negroes and other
property, which had fallen into the hands of the British previous to
signing the Treaty. This circumstance, for the reason he had mentioned,
and others that might be suggested, ought to have very little weight,
for it is well known that recrimination of a violation of the Treaty
soon commenced on both sides, and each mustered up every tolerable
claim; many of which have since been admitted on both sides to be
groundless. A circumstance which strongly corroborated what he said was,
Sir Guy Carlton's letter on that subject had also been so grossly
misunderstood and misrepresented, from that time to this, and now
advanced by a gentleman on this floor, (Mr. GILES,) and even by Mr.
JEFFERSON--in this instance departing from that candor which is so
conspicuous in almost every other part of this excellent
performance--for, when speaking on this subject, he says, "here there
was a direct, unequivocal, and avowed violation of this part of the 7th
article, in the first moment of its being known." Mr. JEFFERSON has
given us a copy of Sir Guy Carlton's letter to General WASHINGTON, which
is relied on to support this assertion, which is so far from speaking
such a language, that in his opinion, it was directly the reverse, and
that in a very pointed manner. His words are:
"I must confess, that the mere supposition that the King's
Minister could deliberately stipulate in a Treaty an
engagement to be guilty of a notorious breach of the public
faith towards people of any complexion, seems to denote a
less friendly disposition than I could wish, and I think
less friendly than we might expect. After all, I only give
my own opinion. Every negro's name is registered, the
master he formerly belonged to, with such other
circumstances as serve to denote his value, that it may be
adjusted by compensation, if that was really the intention
and meaning of the Treaty. Restoration was inseparable from
a breach of public faith, and is, as I think all the world
must allow, utterly impracticable."
Gen. WASHINGTON, at that time, seemed disinclined to give an opinion on
that subject, but intimated the propriety of leaving any doubtful clause
of the Treaty to be settled by future negotiation; for in a letter from
him to our commissioners in New York, dated June, 1783, who had written
to him for particular and pointed instructions on this very subject,
there is this passage:
"It is exceeding difficult for me, not being a witness to
the particular cases, or acquainted with the particular
circumstances which must fall under your view in the course
of the evacuation, to give you a precise definition of the
acts which you are to represent as infractions of the
Treaty; nor can I undertake to give an official
construction of any particular expression or terms of the
Treaty, which must, in cases of ambiguity or different
interpretations, be explained by the Sovereignties of the
two nations, or their commissioners appointed for that
purpose."
A letter drawn up with great caution and extremely characteristic of
that great man, who has always been extremely careful never to commit
himself, but upon mature deliberation and upon sure ground. Here, Sir
Guy Carlton, as a public officer of Great Britain, had made an explicit
declaration on the subject, and that was directly against our claims;
for his directing an inventory of the negroes, was only an evidence of
his being disposed to conduct candidly in the matter, and give us an
opportunity to recover a compensation, if we could afterwards make out
our construction of the Treaty to be right.
Both in the United States and Great Britain it is admitted, as a sound
rule of construction, that where any law or instrument is doubtful, and
the liberty of any one, even of a slave, to be affected by it, that
construction was to be preferred which was favorable to liberty. Under
this rule, ought this Treaty to be so construed as to reduce to slavery
three thousand persons who had obtained their liberty, by putting
themselves under the protection of the British arms, unless there was
some positive unequivocal stipulation in the Treaty which could admit of
no other construction, he hoped, for the honor of America, they would
make no such challenge. There was another circumstance which he had
never seen mentioned, which, in his opinion, greatly weakened our
claims, which was the doubts he entertained of our right to demand of a
foreign nation the restitution of a runaway slave. The United States are
now at peace with all the world; suppose a slave should escape into the
dominions of a foreign nation, and on demand they should refuse to
deliver him up? he very much doubted whether we should have just ground
of complaint. On the other hand, if any of our citizens may be so
unfortunate as to be reduced to slavery by any of the Barbary powers in
Africa, should make their escape into the dominions of any of the
European nations, and upon being claimed by such powers, should be
delivered up, he did believe we should have good ground of complaint
against such nation, as being unjust and inhumane. And, so far as
principle is concerned, what difference does it make whether the
citizens of the United States are carried into slavery in Africa, or the
inhabitants of Africa are brought into slavery in the United States? He
knew of no principle that made a difference between the natural rights
of a white or black man. The first principle that is laid down in the
rights of man, is, that all men are born free and equal; it does not say
all _white_ men. He did not believe, he said, that the House would ever
admit so absurd a doctrine, as that the different shades in a man's
complexion would increase or diminish his natural rights. He hoped no
gentleman would take any exception to what he had said on this point; he
did not mean to give offence, or to throw any reflection on any part of
the Union, on account of their having a larger proportion of slaves. It
was an evil which existed at the commencement of our Revolution, and he
trusted every part of the Union would get rid of the evil as soon as it
should be practicable and safe. What he had said, was only what he felt
himself bound to do in justification of our Minister for his having
given up that claim.
Mr. HILLHOUSE requested gentlemen to pause a moment, and reflect what
will be our situation if this Treaty is rejected. The peace of 1783 is
agreed on both sides to have been infracted, since that Great Britain
has committed depredations on our commerce to an immense amount. Is it
supposed that all this matter can go off without any noise or
combustion? As to treating again, no one can suppose that we could do it
to any advantage, after such rejection. What may Great Britain expect,
if we will not settle our differences by negotiation? Will she not
expect that we shall resort to more violent measures--such as reprisal,
sequestration, or stopping of intercourse? And to guard herself against
such measures, may we not expect she will lay her hand upon all our
property on the ocean? He said he looked upon such events as the natural
consequences of our rejecting the Treaty. What may we expect will be the
conduct of our own citizens? Will they tamely submit to be robbed of
their property, when they lose all hope of aid or protection from the
Government? They will not; they will defend it even to the shedding of
blood; and not only so, but they will also take every opportunity they
have to make reprisal for the property they have already lost upon those
who did them the injury, whether they belong to one nation or another.
What, he asked, could be the end of all these things but war?
WEDNESDAY, April 20.
_Treaty with Great Britain._
The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the
state of the Union, and the resolution for carrying the British Treaty
into effect, being under consideration,
Mr. PAGE said, that he had heard no arguments in favor of the resolution
before the committee, but such as might be used to influence a vote at
any other time, and upon almost any occasion; for we are told that war,
or popular discontent, and great inconvenience and distress to
merchants, underwriters, and others, will be the consequence of its
rejection. If such threats can influence this House upon the present
occasion, an unhappy and mortifying comparison may be made between the
Congress of 1776, and that of the present day. They despised and
encountered the dangers of war actually commenced. He wished, when
members were disposed to mention their fears of such dangers, they would
first clear the galleries; for such communications ought to be secret.
Did members really believe that Great Britain will declare war against
the United States, if this House should refuse to be accessary to the
violation of the constitution, the destruction of their own rights, of
the rights of neutral nations, and of the interests of their
constituents? If they do believe this, is their belief founded on
conjecture alone, or on the negotiator's declaration, that the British
Ministers threatened him with war, declaring that war should be the
consequence of a rejection of the Treaty? If the latter be the case, and
nothing less can justify such repeated assertion that war will be the
consequence of a refusal to carry the Treaty into effect, the Treaty
ought to be deemed null and void on account of that threat; and if the
former, they may be assured that they are mistaken, and that Britain is
not so frantic as to engage in a war with the United States upon such
slight grounds. The citizens of the United States wish not to be at war
with the British nation; nor can the people of Britain desire a war with
them. Both must wish for peace, and a full commercial intercourse upon
liberal terms; and as the Executive authority of both countries are well
disposed to each other, and have, as far as in their power, carried the
Treaty into execution, what reason can be assigned why we should be
involved in a war? It has been said that the United States will be
obliged to declare war, on account of the British refusal (which may be
expected) to deliver up the posts, and to make compensation for
spoliations of our commerce; but I see no necessity for such conduct.
For my part, should Britain never give up the posts, I would not vote
for war, nor be at the expense of a single regiment to take them; nor
would I go to war to recover losses sustained by spoliations. For, if we
reject the resolution before you, sir, we may be at liberty to pass such
a bill as we I passed in the year 1794, by a majority of twenty-four
members, and for which thirteen Senators then voted; and should the
Senate concur with us in passing it, we might use it more effectually
than a declaration of war for the recovery of the posts, and reparation
of wrongs. As to war, as my colleague yesterday said, I have reason to
deprecate it, for the sake of my constituents, and for my own sake; for
I have experienced enough of its evils; but I cannot think that I ought
to sacrifice their dearest interests merely from an apprehension of the
dangers of war. The arguments, therefore, which I have heard, cannot
induce me to vote for the resolution before you. Indeed, sir, I must
vote against it; because I think that the Treaty is unconstitutional and
pernicious; and even if it were constitutional in every respect, and as
advantageous to the United States as it has been represented, I should
think it impolitic and dishonorable in this House to lend its aid to
carry it into effect during the present war, and a continuance of the
British depredations on our commerce, and impressment of our seamen. The
Treaty appears to me unconstitutional, because it takes from Congress
that very power with which it was invested by the constitution, and to
invest them with which, the constitution itself was expressly formed; a
power which I think should be held as precious and unalienable. I mean
the power of regulating the commerce of the United States with Great
Britain; so as to induce her to fulfil all the conditions of the Treaty
of Peace, and to put the trade of the United States with her upon a
footing of reciprocity. It appears also unconstitutional, because it
violates a solemn act of Congress passed in conformity to the express
words, and I may say, in obedience to the injunction of the spirit of
the constitution: I mean the act for establishing a uniform rule of
naturalization, and this violation, too, operates partially, and in
favor of British subjects alone. It is moreover unconstitutional,
because it interferes with the authority of the Judiciary, by
establishing a Court of Commissioners, a kind of supreme court of
appeals, within the United States, with powers to proceed, unknown to
our laws; with temptations to defendants to make no defence; with a
right to bind the United States to pay debts which they owe not, and to
any extent or amount which that court may think fit to decree; and it is
unconstitutional, because it authorizes the PRESIDENT to create certain
offices, and annex salaries thereto. In these instances, at least, I
think the Treaty unconstitutional; for I think that Congress cannot
authorize the PRESIDENT to do away the power of Congress or to establish
a court of appeals superior to the Federal Supreme Court; that,
whatever would be unconstitutional, if done by Congress, cannot be
constitutional if done by the PRESIDENT and British King. But, sir, if
the Treaty were not unconstitutional, that is, if the PRESIDENT and
Senate had a right to deprive Congress of the power it claims, and to
interfere with the Judiciary, yet the exercise of that right in the
present case, ought to be viewed as so pernicious to the United States
as to render the Treaty null and void; or, at least, it ought to be
viewed as an argument of sufficient weight to induce this House to
refuse their aid towards carrying this Treaty into operation. And were
it even constitutional and advantageous to the United States in every
article, yet, as it acquiesces in a violation of the rights of neutral
nations in favor of Great Britain, and in some instances, to such a
degree as to be thought even by the PRESIDENT himself, to afford just
ground for discontent on the part of our allies, it will be dishonorable
and highly impolitic in this House to be in any manner instrumental in
carrying it into effect. As it has not been in the power of the United
States to assist their Republican allies, when fighting in fact their
battles, the least they can do, or the least that the world and those
allies can expect from them, must be, that they will not put the enemies
of those allies into a better condition than they were by making
Treaties with them during the present war.
Mr. FINDLAY said he should not think it necessary to resume any of the
arguments relative to a principle which had already been settled in that
House; yet, he observed, that every gentleman who spoke on the subject
seemed to argue what were the rights of that body upon the subject of
Treaties, as if no question had already been had on the occasion.
It had been insisted upon, notwithstanding the decision which had been
had, that a Treaty was a law when it came before that House, and they
had no power but to appropriate to carry it into effect. He said this
opinion was directly contrary to the opinion held on the constitution at
the time it was accepted in Pennsylvania. Moral discretion, he said, was
necessary to be exercised in every decision of that House, except the
constitution had prescribed to them some positive rule of action. In
ratifying the constitution in the State of Pennsylvania, this was the
understanding of it. The minority in the convention did not wish so much
power placed in the Executive, and he appealed to gentlemen in that
convention, if this was not the doctrine asserted by the majority in
answer to the objections of the minority. Indeed, if they were not to
have exercised a moral obligation upon the Treaties, the constitution
would have expressly said so, as in the case of the PRESIDENT's salary,
the pay of the Judges, Army appropriations, &c. If they had not been
limited in these articles by the constitution, they certainly would have
had the power to have changed them if they had thought proper.
But, passing over this consideration, there had been pretty large views
taken of the manner in which the Treaty came before them. The gentlemen
from New York and Virginia had entered into the subject. He must beg
leave to differ from the gentleman from New York as to the matter of
fact relative to that House in the concerns of Government two years ago.
He had no apprehensions at the time the Envoy was sent to Britain to
negotiate a Treaty, that Britain would have commenced a war if that
measure had not been adopted; so far from it, that a majority of that
House thought differently. He had no doubt that war, and the destruction
of liberty altogether, had been meditated by Great Britain; but before
the negotiation was commenced, circumstances occurred which caused her
to give up this extravagant design. Before the negotiator was appointed,
it is well known that the plundering Order of the 6th November was
revoked. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) had given a very good
narrative of events in Europe, which fully showed the cause of this
change of conduct. That gentleman had also gone through the Treaty,
article by article, in a manner so much to his satisfaction, that he
should not attempt to follow him. Before the negotiation took place, we
had suffered considerably by British spoliations, and that House thought
of various means to make it the interest of that power not to continue
their depredations. First one plan was proposed and then another. It
need not be mentioned that amongst these was the plan of sequestration,
the future power of doing which this Treaty proposed to deprive them of.
It was discussed in the House, but no question taken on it, to show that
negotiation was not thought necessary. He mentioned a conversation which
had taken place betwixt a gentleman then in the Cabinet (now no more)
and himself, which confirmed his opinion of the propriety of the
measures. A bill for regulating commerce in such a manner as to make it
the interest of Britain to refrain from injuring us, and redress the
wrongs we had suffered by spoliations, was agreed to by the House, but
negatived in the Senate. So far from being then afraid of war, they were
more and more convinced that it was in their power to make it the
interest of Britain to refrain from their acts of violence towards us.
Mr. MOORE.--Mr. Chairman, I rise with diffidence to give my sentiments
on so important a question as that now before you, especially as I have
been preceded by gentlemen whose superior abilities have enabled them to
investigate the subject with more accuracy than I am capable of. I
consider the object as important of itself. It is rendered more so by
the warmth with which it has been discussed--the irritation it has
produced, both in this House and on the public mind. I lament that
improper motives should be imputed to gentlemen on either side. I am
disposed to believe, that gentlemen aim at doing what will best promote
the public interest. I entertain no suspicion of designs against the
Government by any member of this House, or any branch of the Government.
Gentlemen have predicted a war and dissolution of the Government, if
provision is not made for carrying the Treaty into effect. I have no
apprehensions of either. It is highly improper to attempt to influence
the votes of members by such declarations. I hope gentlemen will believe
that members who differ from them in opinion, are equally zealous with
themselves in discharging their duty, and have firmness enough to repel
every attempt to intimidate. For myself, I have equal confidence in
every part of the Union, that they have no wish to dissolve it. The
suggestion is unfounded, and ought not to be made.
Mr. Chairman, the vote which I shall give on the question before us,
will, in some degree, be influenced by a constitutional principle, which
I consider as involved in the decision. On the resolution calling for
the instructions given to Mr. Jay, and other papers relative to the
Treaty, it was insisted on by members of this House, that the Executive
has a right, by Treaty, to supersede all Legislative powers vested in
Congress by the constitution. The Executive gives the same construction
to the constitution. If, under these circumstances, I vote for the
resolution before you, I consider myself as admitting, as recognizing
the principle contended for. This I cannot do. On the admission, or
rejection of this principle, I am of opinion, the future course, the
future operations of Government materially depend. By this it will be
decided, whether it is wholly Executive or not: whether this House
depends on the courtesy of the Executive for their right to interfere in
legislation.
It has been argued, that this extensive, unlimited power, was
necessarily vested in the Executive, subject only to the control of the
Senate. In order to support the sovereignty and independence of the
small States, I do conceive that a branch of the Legislature in which
the States are equally represented, was all that could be claimed. Can
it be conceived to be necessary, just, or proper, that the regulation of
all the important interests of the Union should be at the disposal of
the Executive? Can gentlemen seriously believe that the citizens of the
United States, who opposed, at so great an expense of blood and
treasure, the claim of Great Britain to tax us unrepresented, would
admit all their interest to be represented by so unequal a
representation as that contended for? It has been asked, Is not the
Senate as worthy of the confidence of the citizens of the United States
as this House? I will ask, are they more? This Legislative power is
restrained and checked by the constitution; particular modes and
restrictions are prescribed, but no checks are imposed on the Executive.
Were the people jealous of this House, and not of the other branches?
Did they suspect the Legislature of doing wrong? When this House was
connected with the other branches, were they to regulate their
interests; and have they reposed unlimited confidence in the other
branches when acting without this? Did they consider this House as the
only branch from which any danger was to be apprehended? It is
impossible, yet this must have been the fact, if the construction given
to the constitution is a just one.
A gentleman from Connecticut has said, that gentlemen had prejudged the
Treaty; they come forward with prejudices against it, determined to vote
against it. It is not so with me. I was strongly inclined to vote for
it; to make some degree of sacrifice rather than defeat it.
Gentlemen, on reflection, must be convinced that the question has not
been prejudged. The Envoy was appointed at the moment when this House
was deliberating on means for preventing further spoliations on our
commerce. Commercial regulations were proposed, and other means from
which they might have been forced to abandon their unjust and oppressive
system. I remember well the arguments then used were convincing to my
mind; that those were the only weapons of defence within our power; that
they would be effectual. But these were arrested by the despatch of an
Envoy Extraordinary. Some of the leading features of the Treaty were
then predicted; the event has corresponded with those predictions.
Principles were then discussed, which the Treaty contains, before the
negotiator was appointed.
This shows there was no prejudging in the manner gentlemen have stated.
By this Treaty all the measures then contemplated by the Legislature are
arrested; an eternal veto is imposed against our ever carrying the
measures then contemplated into effect. This shows that the Executive
claims not only the constitutional right of forcing this House to pass
what laws they please, but also, by Treaty, to declare what they shall
not do.
We have passed a resolution, which is now on your files, declarative of
the sense of this House as to their constitutional rights. The question
is, however, undecided. The Executive and Senate will proceed to act on
their own construction. They may, on their own construction, make a
Treaty, which will imply a still more imperious and commanding necessity
to provide for its execution, than even the present case. This necessity
may force a relinquishment of the right contended for by this House. It
may force an acquiescence in the Executive regulating all the interests
of the Union. I believe it was not the sense of the framers of the
constitution. It is not the sense of the people who adopted it. It never
can be mine.
The merits of the Treaty have been ably and accurately discussed. I will
make but a few remarks on it. I must disagree with the gentleman from
Connecticut, who mentioned, as a well-known principle in judging of
Treaties, that all property, (by fair construction, and by the
established law of nations,) if not excepted particularly in a Treaty,
remains in the same state in which it was found when the Treaty was
made. Those in possession retain the possession. From this he has
concluded, that negroes, taken during the war, had become the property
of the captors, or rather, were emancipated. The words of the Treaty of
Peace are, "negroes and other property."
This plainly shows, in his opinion, that, by negroes, was not meant
those taken during the war; they were not American property. The
property was changed. It could only be intended, such negroes as were
taken after the peace. I will ask, was it ever known in a Treaty, that a
stipulation was made to give up property plundered after the peace? Is
it not an established principle amongst all civilized nations, that
plundered property shall be given up? Is it necessary, or was it ever
thought so, to make it a stipulation by Treaty? I believe, if his
construction is a just one, it is a new case, the provision was at least
nugatory.
But if the principle he lays down is a just one, how does it happen that
debts due to British subjects, paid by the debtors into the Treasury
under the sanction of a law, and appropriated to the use of the State,
are now recoverable by the British creditor? An important case of this
kind has been decided in the Federal Court, and judgment given for the
British creditor. Was the property less changed by the law of a
sovereign and independent State, than by the proclamation of a British
commander? This cannot be. The fact is, however, that in two cases,
found in the same instrument, there are claims founded on the same
principle; the one, a British claim, is established, the other, a claim
of the United States, is rejected. This involves in it an absurdity. By
those opposed modes of construction, an important claim of the citizens
of the United States is given up by the Treaty, a claim against them to
a great amount is established.
The claim as against us is admitted; our claim is rejected, in cases
where the same principle fairly applies, and where, by gentlemen's own
showing, there is no dissimilarity which can justify such opposite
constructions. There is another provision of the Treaty, by which an
important interest has been sacrificed. British subjects held lands
within the United States before the war; many of those claims were
barred; the claimant being an alien could not recover; his being an
alien was the only bar. It was effectual--such has been the decision of
the Courts. But by the Treaty, being aliens shall not bar the claim of
British subjects--thus, many of the extensive claims are restored. In
some of the States more than half their territory will be revested in
proprietors. What could induce this grant? What equivalent do we receive
for this sacrifice? Sir, I am constrained to think the Treaty a bad one,
in those instances I have mentioned, more so than in any others. And
when I connect with the Treaty itself the important constitutional
question which has been discussed, I cannot vote for the resolution
before you.
Mr. KITTERA.--Since the 4th of July, 1776, the Councils of America have
not been agitated by so momentous a question as that at present before
the committee. At the period to which I allude, the question was,
whether we should tamely submit to an abject and disgraceful slavery,
with all its concomitant evils, or, by a Declaration of Independence, an
exertion of our internal strength, with the advantages of foreign aid,
make a bold and manly effort to obtain the blessings of freedom--the
solid rewards of well-earned liberty. The present question is, whether
we shall supply the means of carrying into execution a Treaty of
Commerce and Amity with a powerful nation, entered into by a Minister of
the United States, and solemnly ratified by the authorities constituted
by the people for such purposes; or, by refusing, perhaps
unconstitutionally refusing those means, hazard the peace, interrupt the
prosperity, and tarnish the honor of the country? In a question of such
magnitude, prudence calls me to pause, duty to reflect. My country's
faith is plighted, a solemn contract is made; it would therefore be
unwise and impolitic, as it concerns the interest, and dishonorable, as
it regards the character, of this nation, in the infancy of its
existence, to violate so solemn a contract.
Two causes have contributed much to prejudice the American mind against
the Treaty. 1st. An enthusiasm for France, struggling in the cause of
liberty, against the combined Monarchs of Europe, in which combination,
the very power with whom the Treaty was made, formed a prominent part.
2dly. Strong resentment against Britain, for injuries received during a
tedious and cruel war, and those injuries renewed by a detention of our
Western posts, exciting and aiding the savage Indian tribes in the
commission of hostilities on our frontiers, with strong indication of a
design to contract our boundaries, and their lawless depredations on our
commerce. I will not add, that there are amongst us some irreconcilable
enemies to this Government, who opposed its adoption, predicted its
downfall, and whose pride and political consequence are suspended on the
fulfilment of this prediction. For the honor of human nature, and for
the character of my country, I hope there are few to answer this
description; if, however, there are any, the poet's execration is to
them peculiarly applicable: "Cursed be the man who owes his greatness to
his country's ruin?"
There are some things in which the candid part of those who hear me will
not disagree. 1st. That our Envoy was a wise and honest man; he was a
tried patriot, skilled in diplomatic life, and rendered to his country
important services during the late war. The tale of his receiving
British gold was made for children and fools, and need only to be told,
to be disbelieved. 2dly. He made the best bargain he could. I will not
mention, in proof of this, the ratification of the contract, eight
months afterwards, by the PRESIDENT, (in whom this country has
certainly an unbounded confidence,) with the advice of two-thirds of the
Senate; but I have proof positive. The letter of Mr. Pinckney, our
Minister resident at London, and conversant with every part of the
negotiation, in strong and decided terms advises Mr. Jay to accept the
contract as the best that could be procured, and as one that would
promote the interests of this country. 3dly. If negotiations had been
unsuccessful; if the Treaty, on the terms offered, had been rejected,
war must have ensued. Our national honor would have forbidden a tame
submission under so many insults and injuries; such submission would
have invited new insults, and our own safety would have made resistance
and retaliation necessary.
The Treaty naturally presents itself under two general heads: 1st. Such
parts of it as are permanent, to wit, the first ten articles. 2dly. Such
parts of it as are temporary, to continue for two years after the
expiration of the war in which Great Britain is now engaged. Three great
points are embraced under the first arrangement: a surrender of our
Western posts, compensation for the spoliations committed on our
commerce, and the payment of British debts. However lightly my colleague
from the western part of Pennsylvania (Mr. FINDLAY) spoke yesterday of
the Western posts, I consider the acquisition as an important treasure
to this country. It will not only increase the value of our Western
lands, and open to us a new source of commerce, but it will relieve us
from the expense and horrors of an Indian war. Those were the sentiments
of the gentleman himself, on this floor, two years ago. The spoliation
on our commerce has generally been estimated at five millions of
dollars. On a rejection of the Treaty, I wish the gentlemen in the
opposition to point out how the American merchants are to be reimbursed
for their loss. Nothing can be expected from new negotiations. It would
be a solemn mockery of justice to the claim of those citizens. Payment
out of the Treasury has been talked of, and a resolution to that effect
is now on your table. This can never be done. It would be without a
precedent, and Congress has heretofore refused the claim. And how can
you discriminate such claims from those rising from savage depredations
on your frontier settlers? The protection of the Government was, at
least, as much due to the peaceable farmer as the speculating merchant;
and if losses have arisen for want of such protection, compensation is
as justly due in the one case as in the other. But why are we to subject
the Government to this payment, or our citizens to this loss, when
compensation is offered by the nation that has done the wrong? As to
British debts, the committee have had various calculations of their
amount.
I believe some of the estimates have been exceedingly exaggerated. If
they are even half the enormous sum that has been stated on the other
side, we have not much difficulty in accounting for the extraordinary
opposition to the administration of this Government that has appeared
in a certain quarter of the Union. Whatever may be the amount, the
nation is bound by the strongest ties of justice and national honor to
secure the payment.
Mr. HOLLAND said, he would submit some considerations to the committee,
that, together with those which had been given, would influence his vote
upon the resolution on the table; a subject, as had been said by all who
advocated the resolution, of the first importance--an issue on which
depended peace or war. He said, he considered the question of some
importance, particularly as it related to their constitutional powers;
but the conceptions of gentlemen had exaggerated the result of the
present question. It was nothing more or less than, would they or would
they not now appropriate moneys to carry the British Treaty into effect?
He said, he had ever felt a disposition to that purpose; not because the
faith of the nation, as had often been said, was pledged; not because
they were under moral obligations, as had been contended for--neither of
which he could admit; but because a respect was due to the negotiator,
to the Senate who advised, and to the PRESIDENT who ratified it; for, it
was to be presumed, until the contrary appeared, that they exercised
their judgments for the good of the nation. But it was possible the
means they have adopted may not produce the end intended; they may have
been mistaken.
When he first examined the instrument, he was in hopes that there was
something extrinsic existing, which, when communicated to him, would do
away the exceptions on the face of the instrument, and therefore he was
silent and suspended his judgment. It was for that purpose he had voted
for the papers relative to the negotiation to be laid on the table, in
hopes of obtaining further information, previous to his being called
upon to carry it into effect. But, unfortunately for him, no further
information was to be obtained. The useful papers, an innocent and
humble request, were not granted. He was not possessed of any other
information than could be drawn from the instrument, from the writers on
that subject, and the arguments that had been advanced by the gentlemen
who had advocated the resolution; to the whole of which he had with
candor attended, and with regret informed the committee, that nothing
had been advanced, that had convinced him of the reason, propriety,
necessity, or fitness, of the stipulations contained in the instrument.
Those gentlemen, instead of reasoning, have endeavored to alarm. They
have said that, if we do not carry this Treaty into effect, that we
shall be plunged in a war; that Britain is a proud and haughty nation;
that they will lay their hands upon all our property, &c. This was an
address to our fears and not our reason, and were our fears once on the
wreck, there is no knowing the result, or where we should land. But, in
this instance, we would not be governed by panic, or dread of the power
of that haughty nation, as they had been called; but as the
Representative of a free and independent nation, he felt himself
perfectly at liberty to exercise his reason in the most cool and
deliberate manner. Not apprehending any danger, the time has been, and
now is, that we are perfectly secure in asserting our equal and
reciprocal rights with that nation. We have done it in a state of
infancy and inexperience, at a time much more unfavorable, taking each
side of the question into view, than the present. And shall we now
hesitate, and tamely suffer them to dictate to us? And are we bound to
accept the Treaty, lest they should be offended and treat us with
contempt for not accepting, as it is said, a more favorable offer than
they have given to other nations? Are we not the sole judges; have we
not a right to determine for ourselves? And as this is a mere naked
stipulation, they can receive no damage, nor, on this early notice, can
they charge with deception, or have any right to complain. One thing is
certain; so long as Great Britain finds it for her interest to be
pacific, she will adopt measures calculated to preserve peace; but when
interest dictates the contrary, her invention will not seek a pretext
for a different conduct. The history of that nation gives abundant proof
of this.
Mr. SWANWICK objected that his colleague (Mr. KITTERA) had charged him
with a want of candor. He was liable to mistake, he said, equally with
any other man; but he trusted he should not be charged with knowingly
misstating any thing with respect to the East India trade; he had
reserved to himself a future opportunity of speaking on that subject,
which, however, the length of debate seemed likely to prevent. He had
said that the American vessels were permitted to trade to the East
Indies as all other nations were, but that they were obliged to land
their goods in the United States, whilst the Danes, Swedes, &c., could
go there and carry the goods which they purchased from thence to any
part of the world, except to the British dominions; and that was the
situation of America antecedent to the present Treaty. A ship of his,
some time ago, earned a good freight from Bengal to Ostend, and another
he knew had lately made one to Hamburg; but, by the Treaty before the
House, whatever advantages might be made by going to a foreign port
their vessels were deprived of, and must return direct to the ports of
the United States. These, he said, were stipulations which no other
nation lay under; and though, perhaps, no nation had special leave
stipulated by Treaty to go there, yet they all, nevertheless, did go,
and never met with any opposition.
FRIDAY, April 22.
_Execution of British Treaty._
After the presentation of several petitions on this subject, the House
resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union,
when the resolution for carrying into effect the British Treaty being
under consideration--
Mr. COIT said, that the importance of the resolution before the
committee would preclude all necessity of analogy for any member's
asking their attention to his observations. He should only add to it,
that he should endeavor not to repeat what had been already said.
He observed, that the discussion of the merits of the Treaty came before
the committee under peculiar disadvantages, for, besides the prejudices
against it that might be supposed to have been caused by extraneous
circumstances, the agitation of the important constitutional question
relative to the right of the Legislature to concur in giving validity to
this Treaty, which was claimed to be valid and complete without that
concurrence, and the refusal of a call for papers had very naturally a
tendency to give a bias to the minds of some gentlemen against the
Treaty; for himself, he was fully satisfied the Legislature had no
constitutional connection with the business of making Treaties.
Mr. C. said he should attempt to run through the objections which had
been made to the Treaty, and consider its merits independently of the
peculiar circumstances under which it was now presented to the
committee, and then give his own view of it as relative to those
peculiar circumstances.
The objects of the negotiation, he said, very naturally were divided
into three parts--the inexecution of the Treaty of 1783; mutual
complaints between the United States and Great Britain relative to
transactions independent of the Treaty; and arrangements for the
intercourse between the two nations, commercial and political. But as
gentlemen had made their objections generally in the order in which the
several articles of the Treaty had been arranged, he should follow the
same order in his observations in answer to them.
The first objection which had been made was, that no compensation had
been stipulated to the United States for the supposed breach of the
Treaty of 1783, in carrying off the negroes. This objection, he had
supposed, was so completely answered by his colleague, (Mr. HILLHOUSE,)
who had been up the day before, that he should not have added on that
head, but that he had since found gentlemen still insisting on that
objection. He was particularly surprised to hear the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. FINDLAY) stating that he conceived the negro article
to have been put into the Treaty expressly as a compensation or set-off
for the engagement to pay the British debts. This pretension, he
thought, had been fully refuted by the extract from Mr. Adams's journal,
quoted by Mr. Jefferson in his correspondence with Mr. Hamilton, and
which had been read by his colleague. From that extract, it appeared
that a claim for negroes and other property which had been plundered,
carried off, and destroyed by the British, was made by our
commissioners, as a set-off against a claim made by the British
commissioners for restoration of confiscated estates; and that the one
of those claims was abandoned with the other. Had the gentleman from
Pennsylvania taken the pains to examine the journal of Mr. Adams, which
might be seen by any member of the committee at the office of the
Secretary of State, he would have found how the article came to be
inserted.
Before the _signing of the Treaties_ with which the extract made by Mr.
Jefferson is closed, stands in the original the history of this article
in these words:
"Mr. Laurens said, there ought to be a stipulation that the
British troops should carry off no negroes or other
property; we all agreed. Mr. Oswald consented, and _then
the Treaties were signed_," _&c._
This, Mr. COIT said, was all the mention he could find respecting this
article, except in a subsequent part of the same letter, in which Mr.
Adams observes:
"I was very happy that Mr. L. came in, although it was the
last day of the conferences, and wish he could have been
sooner. His apprehension, notwithstanding his deplorable
affliction under the recent loss of so excellent a son, is
as quick, his judgment as sound, and his heart as firm as
ever. He had an opportunity of examining the whole, and
judging and approving; and the article which he caused to
be inserted at the very last, that no property should be
carried off, which would most probably, in the multiplicity
and hurry of affairs, have escaped us, was worth a longer
journey, if that had been all, but his name and weight is
added, which is of much greater consequence."
From these extracts, it appeared, the article was not a subject of
negotiation, but inserted at the close of the transaction, without
discussion, as a matter of course, and which Mr. Adams supposes might,
in the multiplicity and hurry of affairs, have been omitted, if Mr.
Laurens had not suggested it.
Mr. C. said, he would candidly acknowledge that it was very
extraordinary to him, that the construction which had been generally put
on the article in America, should have so universally prevailed, if it
was not the true one, that Congress should have adopted it; and that
such should have been the idea of the commissioners appointed to
superintend the embarkation at New York, in the year 1783. Still more
extraordinary was it to him, to find Mr. Jay himself, when Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, in the year 1786, in a report he then made to Congress
on the subject, considering the carrying off of those negroes as a
violation of the Treaty, and saying further, that he understood from Mr.
Adams, then at the Court of London, that the British Minister had no
objections to making compensation for them. Still he believed, the true
construction of the article was, that it was designed only to prevent
plunder by the British troops, and carrying off of American property,
according to the ordinary agreements in Treaties, which stipulate for
the giving up of conquered countries. True, it might be asked, why say
negroes or other property? The expression, he agreed, was not correct,
unless a doubt might have been entertained whether negroes were
property; but the word negroes must be qualified by other property, with
which it is connected, and could operate only as if it had said horses
or other property, which no person would contend amounted to a
stipulation not to carry off what had once been, but by the laws of war
and nations, before the close of the war, had ceased to be the property
of American inhabitants. Four gentlemen from Virginia had insisted on
this objection, and not one of them had deigned to remark on the
construction of the article itself. They had all relied upon the common
understanding of it. That this understanding could not change the sense
of the article, if it was not doubtful, could not be denied. Their
leaving the article and resorting to the common understanding of it, he
conceived to be a tacit acknowledgment of the gentlemen, that the
instrument itself would not bear the construction they wished to give
it.
Whether the negotiator had urged this construction of the article, and
found he could not obtain its admission, or even an arbitration upon it,
he did not know; from his opinion of the good sense and understanding of
Mr. Jay, however, he was for himself satisfied that, whatever might have
been his former opinions, on attending to the subject, he had found what
had been called the American construction was not the just one, and had
therefore abandoned it.
Mr. C. said, he was aware that the construction he contended for had
been called the British construction, and _Camillus's_ construction;
that he had himself, however, adopted more than two years ago, the first
time he had paid any attention to the article, upon no other impulse or
authority than his own judgment, on the perusal of it, and even before
he had ever heard of any other construction of it than that he contended
against, he was aware that there was a kind of patriotism which claimed
every thing for one's country, whether consistently with truth, justice,
and candor, or not; for himself, he had no pretensions to such
patriotism. He believed Mr. Jay had none, and if he was convinced that
the American construction of this article was unfounded, he thought it
for his honor, and the honor of this country, that he had abandoned it.