Mr. Duvall, resigned, 1

The Speaker, 1

----

Whole number of members, 105

FRIDAY, April 15.

_The Treaty with Great Britain._

The House then resolved itself into a committee of the Whole on the

state of the Union, when, having read the resolution for carrying the

British Treaty into effect--

Mr. BUCK rose, and wished the question to be taken upon Mr. MACLAY's

resolution.[76] This was opposed by Mr. MADISON and Mr. HILLHOUSE, and

then Mr. MADISON addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. M. said, on a subject of such extent and importance, he should not

attempt to go through all the observations that might be applicable to

it. A general view of the subject was all that he meant at present. His

omissions would be more than supplied by others who might enter into the

discussion.

The proposition immediately before the committee was, that the Treaty

with Great Britain ought to be carried into effect by such provisions as

depended on the House of Representatives. This was the point immediately

in question. But it would be proper in examining it to keep in view

also the proposition of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MACLAY)

which had been referred to the committee, and which would be taken up,

of course, if the immediate question should be decided in the negative.

If the proposition for carrying the Treaty into effect be agreed to, it

must be from one of three considerations: either that the Legislature is

bound by a constitutional necessity to pass the requisite laws without

examining the merits of the Treaty, or that, on such examination, the

Treaty is deemed in itself a good one, or that there are good extraneous

reasons for putting it into force, although it be in itself a good one,

or that there are good extraneous reasons for putting it into force,

although it be in itself a bad Treaty.

The first consideration being excluded by the decision of the House,

that they have a right to judge of the expediency or inexpediency of

passing laws relative to Treaties; the question first to be examined

must relate to the merits of the Treaty. He then proceeded to consider

the Treaty under three aspects: first, as it related to the execution of

the Treaty of Peace in 1783; secondly, as it determines the several

points in the law of nations; thirdly, as it respects the commerce

between the two nations.

First. He would not inquire on which side the blame lay, of having first

violated the Treaty of 1783, or of having most contributed to delay its

execution, although he did not shrink from the task under any

apprehension that the result could be disadvantageous to this country.

The Treaty itself had waived this inquiry, and professed to adjust all

controversies on this subject, without regard to the mutual complaints

or pretensions of the parties. It was, therefore, justly and naturally

to be expected, that the arrangements for carrying that Treaty into

effect would have been founded in the most exact and scrupulous

reciprocity. Was this the case? He was sorry, that on the contrary, the

arrangements were founded on the grossest violation of that principle.

There were two articles which had not been executed by Great Britain;

that which related to the negroes and other property carried away, and

that which required a surrender of the posts. The article unexecuted by

the United States was, that which required payment of all _bona fide_

debts, according to the Treaty now in question: this article is now to

be carried into the most complete effect by the United States, and

damages to the last fraction are to be paid for the delay. Is there a

reciprocal stipulation by Great Britain with respect to the articles

unexecuted by her? Nothing like it. She is wholly absolved from the

obligation to fulfil one of the articles, viz: that relating to the

negroes, &c., and she is to make no compensation whatever for delaying

to fulfil the other, viz: the surrender of the posts.

It has been urged in apology for those very unequal stipulations, that

the injury resulting from a forbearance to surrender the posts, was not

susceptible of any precise liquidation into pecuniary damages. However

plausible this might appear, it was by no means satisfactory.

Commissioners, such as were appointed, with full discretion for other

purposes, might have been charged with this subject, and if they could

not have done exact justice, might have mitigated the injustice of doing

nothing.

Apologies have been attempted also for the very extraordinary

abandonment of the compensation due for the negroes, &c. It was said to

be at least doubtful whether this claim was authorized by the seventh

article of the Treaty of Peace, and that Great Britain had uniformly

denied the meaning put by the United States on that article. In reply he

made two remarks. First, that it was not true that Great Britain had

uniformly denied the American construction of that article; on the

contrary, he believed, it could be proved, that till of late, Great

Britain had uniformly admitted this construction, and had rejected the

claim on no other ground than the alleged violation of the fourth

article on the part of the United States.

But had it been true that Great Britain had uniformly asserted a

different construction of the article, and refused to accede to ours,

what ought to have been done? Ought we to have at once acceded to hers?

By no means. Each party had an equal right to interpret the compact; and

if they could not agree, they ought to have done in this what they did

in other cases where they could not agree; that is, have referred the

settlement of the meaning of the compact to an arbitration. To give up

the claim altogether, was to admit, either that Great Britain had a

better right than the United States to explain the controverted point,

or that the United States had done something which in justice called for

a sacrifice of their equal right.

It was evident, he thought, from this view of the subject, that the

arrangements with respect to the Treaty of Peace were frequently wanting

both in justice and reciprocity.

Besides the omissions in favor of Great Britain, already pointed out

with respect to the execution of the Treaty of Peace, he observed, that

conditions were annexed to the partial execution of it in the surrender

of the Western posts, which increased the general inequality of this

part of the Treaty, and essentially affected the value of those objects.

The value of the posts to the United States was to be estimated by their

influence, 1st. on the Indian trade; 2d. on the conduct and temper of

the Indians towards the United States.

Their influence on the Indian trade depended principally on the

exclusive command they gave to the several carrying places connected

with the posts. These places were understood to be of such importance in

this respect, that those who possessed them exclusively would have a

monopoly, or nearly a monopoly, of the lucrative intercourse with a

great part of the savage nations. Great Britain having hitherto

possessed these places exclusively, has possessed this advantage. It

was expected that the exclusive transfer of them would transfer the

advantage to the United States. By the Treaty now concluded, the

carrying places are to be enjoyed in common, and it will be determined

by the respective advantages under which British and American traders

will engage in the trade, which of them is to share most in it. In this

point of view he thought the regulation highly impolitic and injurious.

He would say little of the advantage which the British would have in

their superior capital: that must be encountered in all our commercial

rivalships. But there was another consideration which ought to have

great weight on this subject. The goods imported for the Indian trade

through Canada pay no duties. Those imported through the United States

for that trade, will have paid duties from seven to ten per cent., and

every one must see that a drawback is impracticable, or would be

attended with an expense which the business would not bear. So far,

then, as the importance of the posts is to be considered in a commercial

view, they are, in a very great measure, stripped of it by the condition

annexed to the surrender of them. Instead of a monopoly in our favor,

the carrying places are made common under circumstances which may leave

a monopoly in the hands of Great Britain. And this is done, too, by an

article which is to last for ever.

Second. The influence of the posts on the general conduct of the

Indians, is well known to depend chiefly on their influence on the

Indian trade. In proportion, therefore, as the condition annexed to the

surrender of posts affects the one, it must affect the other. If the

British should continue to enjoy the Indian trade, they would continue

to influence the Indian conduct; if not in the same degree as

heretofore, at least in so great a degree as to condemn the article in

question.

He took notice also of the inequality of the stipulation which opened

all the ports of the United States, as the condition of having those of

an unimportant province of Great Britain opened in return.

With respect to the Mississippi he could not but consider the clause

relating to it as being singularly reprehensible. Happily the adjustment

of our claims with Spain had been brought about before any evil

operation of the clause had been experienced. But the tendency of it, he

thought, could not be doubted. It was the more remarkable, that this

extension of the privileges of Great Britain on the Mississippi beyond

those in the Treaty of Peace, should have been admitted into the new

Treaty, because it is supposed by the Treaty itself, that Great Britain

may be deprived, by her real boundary, of all pretensions to a share in

the banks and waters of the Mississippi.

Secondly. With respect to the great points in the law of nations,

comprehended in the stipulations of the Treaty, the same want of real

reciprocity, and the same sacrifice of the interests of the United

States, were conspicuous.

It was well known to have been a great and favorite object with the

United States, "that free ships make free goods." They have established

this principle in all their other Treaties. They have witnessed with

anxiety the general effort, and the successful advances towards

incorporating this principle into the law of nations; a principle

friendly to all neutral nations, and particularly interesting to the

United States. He knew that at a former period it had been conceded on

the part of the United States that the law of nations stood as the

present Treaty regulates it. But it did not follow that more than

acquiescence in that doctrine was proper. There was an evident

distinction between silently acquiescing in it, and giving it the

support of a formal and positive stipulation. The former was all that

could have been required, and the latter was more than ought to have

been unnecessarily yielded.

The article prohibiting sequestration was next considered by Mr. M. He

said he should probably be among the last who would be disposed to

resort to such an expedient for redress. But he could not approve of a

perpetual and irrecoverable abandonment of a defensive weapon, the

existence of which might render the use of it unnecessary. The situation

of this country in relation to Great Britain was a peculiar one. As we

had not fleets and armies to command a respect for our rights, we ought

to keep in our hands all such means as our situation gave us. This

article was another instance in which no regard was paid to reciprocity.

British subjects, it was well known, had and were likely to have in this

country a great deal of the property of the King made sacred. American

citizens, it was as well known, had little, and were likely to have

little of the kind in Great Britain. If a real reciprocity had been

intended, why were not other kinds of private property, as vessels and

their cargoes, equally protected against violation? These, even within

the jurisdiction of Great Britain, are left open to seizure and

sequestration, if Great Britain finds it expedient. And why was not

property on the high seas under the protection of the law of nations,

which is said to be a part of the law of the land, made secure by a like

stipulation? This would have given a face of equality and reciprocity to

the bargain. But nothing of the sort makes a part of it; where Great

Britain had a particular interest at stake, the Treaty watchfully

provides for it; when the United States have an equal interest at stake

and equally entitled to protection, it is abandoned to all the dangers

which it has experienced.

After taking this brief notice of the positive evils in this part of the

Treaty, he might, he said, add the various omissions which were

chargeable on it. But as he should not pretend to exhaust the subject,

he would mention one only: the not providing for the respect due to the

exhibition of sea papers. He could not but regard this omission as truly

extraordinary, when he observed that in almost every modern Treaty, and

particularly all our other Treaties, an article on this subject was

regularly inserted. Indeed, it had become almost an article of course in

the Treaties of the present century.

Thirdly. The commercial articles of the Treaty presented the third

aspect under which he was to consider it. In the free intercourse

stipulated between the United States and Great Britain, it could not be

pretended that any advantage was gained by the former. A Treaty was

surely not necessary to induce Great Britain to receive our raw

materials and to sell us her manufactures. On the other hand, consider

what was given up by the United States.

When the Government came into operation, it is well known that the

American tonnage employed in the British trade bore the most

inconsiderable proportion to the British tonnage. There being nothing on

our side to contract the influence of capital and other circumstances on

the British side, that disproportion was the natural state of things. As

some balance to the British advantages, and particularly that of her

capital, our laws had made several regulations in favor of our shipping,

among which was the important encouragement resulting from the

difference of ten per cent. in the duties paid by American and foreign

vessels. Under this encouragement the American tonnage has increased in

a very respectable proportion to the British tonnage. Nor has Great

Britain ever deemed it prudent to attempt any countervailing measures

for her shipping, well knowing that we could easily keep up the

differences by further measures on our side. But by the Treaty, she has

reserved to herself the right to take such countervailing measures

against our existing regulations; and we have surrendered our rights to

pursue further defensive measures against the influence of her capital.

It is justly to be apprehended, therefore, that under such a restoration

of the former state of things, the American tonnage will relapse to its

former disproportion to the British tonnage.

When he turned his attention to the West India branch of the subject,

there was still greater cause for wonder and dissatisfaction. As the

Treaty now stood, Great Britain was left as free as she ever had been to

continue the entire monopoly of the intercourse to British vessels.

Recollecting, as he did, and as every member of the committee must do,

the whole history of this subject from the peace of 1783, through every

subsequent stage of our Independence down to the mission of the late

Envoy, it was impossible for him to express his astonishment that any

Treaty of Commerce should have ever been acceded to which abandoned the

very object for which such a Treaty was ever contemplated. He never

could have believed that the time was so near when all the principles,

claims, and calculations, which have heretofore prevailed among all

classes of people, in every part of the Union, on this interesting

point, were to be so completely renounced. A Treaty of Commerce with

Great Britain, excluding a reciprocity for our vessels in the West India

trade, is a phenomenon which had filled him with more surprise than he

knew how to express.

He then pointed to the clause which restrains the United States from

imposing prohibitions or duties in any case on Britain which did not

extend to all other nations; observing that the clause made it

impossible to operate on the unreasonable policy of that nation, without

suspending our commerce at the same time with all other nations whose

regulations with respect to us might be ever so favorable and

satisfactory.

The fifteenth article had another extraordinary feature, which must

strike every observer. In other Treaties, putting the parties on the

footing of the most favored nation, it was stipulated that where new

favors were granted to a particular nation in return for favors

received, the party claiming the new favor should pay the price of it.

This was just and proper where the footing of the most favored nation is

established at all. But this article gives to Great Britain the full

benefit of all privileges that may be granted to any other nation,

without requiring from her the same or equivalent privileges with those

granted by such nation. Hence it would happen that if Spain, Portugal,

or France, should open their Colonial ports to the United States in

consideration of certain privileges in our trade, the same privileges

would result gratis, and _ipso facto_, to Great Britain. He considered

this stipulation as peculiarly impolitic, and that it could not fail, in

the view of the committee, to form a very solid and weighty objection to

the Treaty.

He was not unaware of the stress that would be laid on the article

relating to the East Indies. He should leave to others better acquainted

than himself with this branch of the subject to explain it. He made two

observations, however: one was, that judicious and well informed

gentlemen, equally judicious and well informed with any who could be

consulted, considered the article as offering not a shadow of advantage

to the United States. The other was, that no privilege was stipulated

which had not been uniformly heretofore granted without stipulation; and

as the grant could have proceeded from no motive but a pure regard to

the British interest in that country, there was every reasonable

security that the trade would continue open as it had been, under the

influence of the same consideration.

Such being the character of the Treaty, with respect to the execution of

the Treaty of Peace, the great principles of the Law of Nations, and the

regulations of commerce, it never could be viewed as having any claim to

be carried into effect on its own account.

He should conclude, he said, with taking notice of two considerations

which had been much used as inducements to carrying the Treaty into

effect.

1. It was said that the greater part of the Treaty was to continue two

years only after the present war in Europe; and that no very great evils

could grow out of it within that period. To this he replied, in the

first place, that ten of the articles containing many very objectionable

stipulations were perpetual. In the next place, that it would be in the

power of Great Britain, at the expiration of the other articles, to

produce the same causes for a renewal of them, as are now urged in their

favor. If we are now to enforce the Treaty, lest Great Britain should

stir up the Indians, and refuse to pay the merchants for the property of

which she has plundered them, can she not at the end of two or three

years plunder them again to the same or a greater amount? cannot the

same apprehensions also be then revived with respect to the Indians, and

will not the arguments then be as strong as they are now, for renewing

the same Treaty, or making any other equal sacrifice that her purposes

may dictate?

2. It was asked, what would be the consequence of refusing to carry the

Treaty into effect? He answered, that the only supposable consequence

was, that the Executive, if governed by the prudence and patriotism

which he did not doubt would govern that department, would, of course,

pursue the measures most likely to obtain a reconsideration and

remodification of the offensive parts of the Treaty. The idea of war, as

a consequence of refusing to give effect to the Treaty, was too

visionary and incredible to be admitted into the question. No man would

say that the United States, if an independent people, had not a right to

judge of their own interests, and to decline any Treaty that did not

duly provide for them. A refusal, therefore, in such cases, could give

no cause, nor pretext, nor provocation, for war or for any just

resentment. But apart from this, was it conceivable that Great Britain,

with all the dangers and embarrassments which are thickening upon her,

would wantonly make war on a country which was the best market she had

in the world for her manufactures, which paid her an annual balance in

specie of ten or twelve millions of dollars, and whose supplies were

moreover essential to an important part of her dominions? Such a degree

of infatuation ought not to be ascribed to any nation. And at the

present crisis, for reasons well known, an unprovoked war with Great

Britain, on this country, would argue a degree of madness greater than

under any other circumstances that could well be imagined.

With all the objections therefore to the Treaty which he had stated, he

hoped that it would not now be carried into effect; and that an

opportunity would take place for reconsidering the subject on principles

more just and more favorable to the United States.

When Mr. MADISON had concluded,

Mr. S. LYMAN rose.--I do not rise, said Mr. L., with an intention to go

into a detail upon this subject, or to exhibit a comparative view of

the advantages and disadvantages which may attend the operation of this

Treaty, but only to make a few remarks, which may be considered as

preparatory to a more minute discussion.

Although I believe a discussion of this Treaty is not strictly in order,

because it does not come before us immediately as a subject of debate

and legislation, but as a piece of information from the Executive, yet I

have no doubt but that a thorough discussion of its principles may

produce a happy effect; for I believe the more it is understood, the

less various will be Our sentiments, the greater the degree of unanimity

among ourselves, so much the greater will be the unanimity among our

constituents. This unanimity is an object of the greatest magnitude, not

only as the source of national respectability and honor, but as the only

true source of national happiness and prosperity; it is therefore the

indispensable duty of Government to maintain internal peace and

tranquillity, and upon this ground alone it is I am willing the Treaty

should be thoroughly discussed. I am sensible this Treaty presents

itself with an unfavorable aspect, and what is the reason? Is it not

because we have entertained too exalted ideas of our own national

importance? A generous and noble pride we ought to entertain as a

nation, and without this pride we should be guilty of ingratitude to

Heaven, for Providence has placed within our reach all the resources of

national strength and greatness, but we are yet among the nations in a

state of minority--a minor must solicit favors, he cannot challenge

them. Did we go to the Emperor of Morocco, or to the Dey of Algiers, and

challenge a passage for our ships up the Mediterranean? No; but we

solicited, and pay dear for that passage; or did we go to the King of

Spain, and demand a free navigation of the Mississippi? No; but we

negotiated, and success has attended that negotiation; or could we have

gone to the King of England, and challenged a participation with his

subjects in the commerce of the East and West Indies? Certainly we could

not. What then should we have done? Would it have been best to have

traded with them upon sufferance, and so to have maintained a precarious

kind of commerce? Certainly this would not have done, for in that case

we should have been constantly dependent upon the caprice of a

capricious Court; this would be extremely mortifying indeed. Commerce,

like all other kind of business, ought to be carried on upon generous

and open principles, otherwise we establish a system of deceit that

would be favorable to pirates and freebooters.

Under those circumstances what could we have done? We could not have

carved for ourselves, for our strength and greatness were not

sufficient; we therefore had to go with the modesty of a minor, and to

solicit; and what was the natural consequence of this solicitation? Why,

at the first interview with the British Minister, he determined to exact

of us at least a complete fulfilment of all that a former Treaty

required; and what was that? It was a payment of our _bona fide_ debts;

what could we do? He produced our contract, and we said nothing; moral

rectitude required a fulfilment of this: it was in vain to say, you have

interrupted our commerce, you have carried off our negroes, you have

retained the Western posts, and thereby occasioned an expensive and

bloody war with the Indians. Some of this language, perhaps, would have

had weight with the British Minister, if he had been acting in his

private capacity, but he felt and acted like the Minister of a great and

powerful nation; interest and glory are their objects, and moral

considerations are too apt to vanish before these. It is true, by the

law of nature, commerce ought to be free and uninterrupted, but by the

law of nations it is otherwise; and what nation shall gainsay this law?

We certainly cannot, our strength and greatness are not yet fully ripe;

and if they were, we should, in practice, deny this law of nature, and

should ratify and confirm this law of nations. Thus, Mr. Chairman, we

see that interest and force govern among the nations. I have made these

preliminary observations in order that we might contemplate the Treaty

upon its true ground, for a want of reciprocity has been a heavy charge

brought against it.

I have read this Treaty with care and attention, and I am free to own

that upon the first perusal of it I had a prejudice against it; it

appeared to me that some of its stipulations were too favorable for

Britain, and too disadvantageous to ourselves; but we certainly had an

able negotiator, and I verily believe he did his utmost to serve his

country; the more I have attended to the subject, the more I am

reconciled to it. I find the gentlemen who are interested in commerce

are almost universally satisfied with the commercial regulations; but

there is a more weighty charge brought against it than of a want of

reciprocity; it is even said by some to be unconstitutional. This is a

heavy charge indeed, and if it is well founded we ought to prevent its

operation, for we are sent here as the guardians of the rights of our

fellow-citizens, and for that purpose are sworn to support their

constitution; if it is unconstitutional, it is a nullity; it is not

binding upon the nation; we ought to reject it; but if it is

constitutional, and not extremely pernicious, it becomes the supreme law

of the land, and we are in that case bound to obey it.

When Mr. LYMAN had taken his seat,

Mr. SWANWICK addressed the Chair:--One of the most characteristic and

strong points of difference that exists between republican and despotic

forms of government, said Mr. S., consists in their greater or lesser

degree of haste in making or adopting laws. Where the will of a despot

is the only law, his simple volition is sufficient to call for the

prompt obedience of the subject; but in our happy government, the

numerous checks and balances it prescribes every where oppose

themselves to haste, to error, or inadvertency, in the formation of

laws. In acts of the smallest importance, we see daily that after they

have undergone every possible chance of fair and impartial discussion in

the House, they are transmitted to another, who equally proceed to

revise, correct, and amend them; and even this not being deemed

sufficient to secure, as it were, against all possibility of danger,

they are sent to the PRESIDENT, who has ten days to consider, and who

may return them with his objections. These we are bound respectfully to

inscribe on our journals; and if we disagree in opinion with the

PRESIDENT, the majority of two-thirds of both branches is requisite to

give validity to the law. Do not we discover in all this infinite

caution, and a wish rather not to act at all, by the difference of the

branches among each other, than to act imprudently or precipitantly; and

can we imagine that a constitution thus guarded with respect to laws of

little consequence, hath left without a check the immense power of

making Treaties, embracing, as in the instrument before us, all our

greatest interests, whether they may be of territory, of agriculture,

commerce, navigation, or manufacture, and this for an indefinite length

of time? No. By one of the guards of that constitution relative to

appropriations of money, this Treaty hath, in the last stage of its

progress, come before us; we have resolved according to our best

judgment of the constitution, and, as we have seen above, according to

the meaning and spirit of it, that we have a right to judge of the

expediency or inexpediency of carrying it into effect. This will depend

on its merits; and this is the discussion now before us. If, in the

event, we shall be found to differ in opinion with the other branches as

to this subject, it will involve no more animosity or crimination

against them than if we differed as to an ordinary law. To what purpose

then to sound the alarm, and to ring the tocsin from Georgia to New

Hampshire? Do we impeach the Executive? Do we charge bribery or

corruption? No, sir.

These preliminary remarks I have thought essential, previously to going

into a consideration of the merits of the Treaty itself, which hath

already been so ably considered by the gentleman last up from Virginia,

(Mr. MADISON,) whose mildness of manner and suavity of address were

certainly calculated to inspire any thing else than the angry passions

so greatly deprecated by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. S.

LYMAN.) These, I hope, will be carefully avoided on all sides, and the

debate be concluded with the same good temper and moderation in which it

is begun.

I must confess, Mr. Chairman, that the first point of view in which this

Treaty struck me with surprise was, the attitude Great Britain assumes

in it of dictating laws and usages of reception and conduct different

towards us, in every different parcel of her empire, while the surface

of our country is entirely laid open to her in one general and

advantageous point of admission. In Europe, we are told we may freely

enter her ports. In the West Indies, we were to sail in canoes of

seventy tons burden. In the East Indies we are not to settle or reside

without leave of the local government. In the seaports of Canada and

Nova Scotia, we are not to be admitted at all; while all our rivers and

countries are opened without the least reserve; yet surely our all was

as dear to us as the all of any other nation, and not to have been

parted with but on equivalent terms.

But let us consider the articles distinctly:--first, as to the

Mississippi; Great Britain is admitted as freely to navigate on this

river, and to frequent the ports on its banks, as we are to go to those

on the Thames; yet, it is strange to remark, that, at the time we made

the stipulation, we had not ourselves obtained the right we gave. We

have since obtained it by Treaty with Spain, and on terms absolutely

contradictory to those contained in the British Treaty.

The next of the permanent articles I shall notice, is that which

respects British debts. It is somewhat remarkable, that the

commissioners, who are to judge of these, are permitted the power of

adjournment from place to place--a very favorable stipulation for the

creditors, whilst the Commissioners on Spoliations, by article 7, are to

act only in London, whereby the American claimant must pass with his

papers, or send them across the Atlantic, and engage lawyers in a

country where law is unusually dear; a circumstance which will deter

many from applying at all, and occasion great loss to the United States.

I observe, too, that the awards of the Commissioners of British debts

are to be paid out of the treasury as awarded by the commissioners. I am

surprised not to find in the Report of the Secretary of State, on

appropriations to carry this Treaty into effect, some calculation as to

the probable amount of these debts, or some provision for lodging, for

this purpose, money in the treasury. Gentlemen would then have known the

extent to which they were going; but, at present, they can form no

judgment on the subject of the money wanted, or of the funds from whence

that money is to come.

Much hath been said about the tenth article, relative to the

sequestration of debts. To be against the adoption of this article, hath

been supposed to imply an unwillingness to pay debts lawfully

contracted, and very copious abuse hath been thrown on the largest and

most populous State in this Union, as having for motive of its

opposition, this principle. To say nothing of the degrading nature of

such an admission, with respect to the honor of our own country, which

ought always to induce us to think the most favorably of it, is it true?

Is it true, that an unwillingness to pay debts hath been the principal

cause of opposition to this Treaty? Among the names opposed to it, are

to be found some as respectable for independence and fortune as any on

the Continent. To instance only one of a number, I may cite the

celebrated Pennsylvania farmer, John Dickenson, Esq., one of the richest

men in these parts of the country, attached to no party, living in great

retirement, with a name honorable for the most virtuous efforts in the

American Revolution. Can it be supposed that such a character as this is

influenced by such a motive? Surely not. Whence arises, then, the

opposition? It arises from a conviction that the admission of this

article is degrading to the national character. During a late session of

Congress an honorable member from New Jersey, (Mr. DAYTON, the present

Speaker) fired by a laudable indignation at the robberies committed on

our commerce by the British, moved for a provisional sequestration of

their property. No sooner was this done, than we saw a report from the

Secretary of the Treasury, dated the 16th of January, 1795, recommending

the United States to pass a permanent law against sequestration of

property in the funds. Congress not having acted on this part of the

report, though they adopted other parts, we now see the clause attempted

to be brought into a law by way of a Treaty. And it is more singular,

as, at the very time the article was agreed to in England, all the

European nations were actually sequestering the property of each other.

After having thus reviewed the first ten or permanent articles, I think

it must appear obvious that the result is, that we have ceded the right

to navigate the Mississippi on terms different to those on which we

received it from Spain; that we have consented to receive the Western

posts on terms that afford too much danger of disturbances by a mixed

intercourse of our people, British subjects and Indians; that we have

provided, certainly, for an indefinite amount of British debts: whilst

our claim for spoliations is left to be decided by commissioners at

London, who meet without power of adjournment, and under very extensive

latitude of judging according to what may appear to them to be the law

of nations, in a country where that law his been twisted so as always to

serve as a pretext for spoliations against us; and we have agreed never,

in future, to consent to sequestrations, or confiscations, in case, by

war or national difference, our property afloat should be confiscated or

sequestered by Great Britain to any amount. Let any impartial mind,

then, judge of the expediency, on our part, of voting efficacy to so

ruinous a contract.

I come now to consider the remaining articles of a more temporary

nature. The 12th article merits consideration, because, though not

included in the general arrangement as ratified, being only suspended,

its principles are not wholly abandoned, but left, like a cloud, still

to hang over us. This 12th article was intended to regulate our

intercourse with the British West Indies, and contemplated the singular

provision that we should only navigate thither in vessels of seventy

tons burden, whilst the British themselves might put in the employ

vessels of any size. How degrading such a stipulation, it is not

difficult to conceive! We supply these islands with what the inhabitants

have always acknowledged they could get so well nowhere else, and yet

our tonnage is to be thus restricted, while theirs is left open to

employ vessels of any description. But this is not all: for the sake of

getting admission into a few inconsiderable British ports in the West

Indies, we are to give up the carriage in our own shipping of cotton,

one of our own staple articles, and of sugar, coffee, and indigo, the

produce of the French, Spanish, Danish, Swedish, or Dutch islands. How

strange a mistake as to the geography of this Western Archipelago, in

which the carriage of the produce of St. Domingo alone is worth more

nearly than the entire admission to all the other islands put together!

The principle contained in this 12th article, thus suspended, ought to

have been utterly contradicted or annulled. While existing even in its

suspended form, it will prevent my voting for this Treaty, of whose

chains it is only an absent link.

But we are told whatever may be our fate in the West, all our losses are

to be balanced in the East Indies; and we are carried from our own

neighborhood, to be sure, to a great distance, in order to have repaid

all our sacrifices. Let us examine this 13th article respecting the East

India trade, and see if it does not bear a very strict analogy to the

West India article that has been exploded.

We are to be admitted, it is true, in vessels of any size, but not

suffered to settle or reside without leave of the local Government--that

is, of the British East India Company. Of all the despotisms in the

world that of a mercantile monopolizing company is the worst; yet into

such hands we are to fall, and from them to solicit leave to reside or

travel in the country. What security can there be for a commerce thus

precariously conducted, in which your rivals are your judge?

The consumption of India goods being in a great degree out of the

question in England, the Company, who have an annual revenue of a

million and a half sterling to receive from their possessions in India,

have hitherto sold them at vendue in Leadenhall street; and I believe,

considering the credit our merchants usually obtained in London on those

goods, and the low price the Company sold them at, they could afford to

supply us cheaper in England than we could get them from India in time

of peace. I find the East India Company themselves state, in 1788, that

seventeen-twentieths of the calicoes imported by them were exported, and

twelve-twentieths of the muslins also exported, thereby realizing, as

they term it, the tribute which India pays to Great Britain through the

medium of its commerce. In 1793 the Company state the internal

consumption of India calicoes and muslins to be reduced in Britain to

almost nothing. They add, every shop offers British muslins for sale,

equal in appearance, and of more elegant patterns than those of India,

for one-fourth, or perhaps more than one-third less in price. They say

nine-tenths of all muslins and calicoes are sold for exportation.

The 15th article is one of the most objectionable of the whole Treaty,

because it fundamentally contradicts all the provisions heretofore made

by our Government for the encouragement and protection of the navigation

of this country. By it it is settled that, so far as respects us, no

tonnage duties shall be laid on British vessels but what shall be laid

on those of all other nations; no duties on British articles but what

shall be laid on those of every other nation; no embargo to affect

Britain but what affects all other nations alike; American bottoms are

left exposed to be charged, in the European British ports, tonnage

duties equal to those laid on British bottoms here; countervailing

duties may be laid in England to equalize the difference of duties on

European or Asiatic goods imported here in British or American vessels;

and no additional difference in tonnage or duties of this kind is to be

made hereafter.

These principles deserve to be separately examined. They virtually

repeal all the laws heretofore made as to navigation and impost, by

indirectly equalizing the tonnage and duties on the British and American

vessels; and they restrain, in future, the powers of Congress on some of

the most important regulations of foreign commerce that could come

before them.

On a review, then, of the commercial articles, they may be summed up as

follows: West India trade left blank by the suspension of the 12th

article. East India trade subjected to a condition of residence,

rendering it precarious, and restricted to a landing of the goods

exported in the United States, not known to have ever been imposed in

any way similar, on any other nation trading to Bengal, while all

nations are constantly allowed an equal liberty of trading there with

ourselves. European, and both these trades, liable to an equalization of

tonnage and duties, that cannot but operate unfavorably to the American

navigation. Should the countervailing duties take place in the British

ports in Europe on American vessels, they will probably be shut out of

them altogether. In time of foreign war, our ships deprived of the

neutral rights of carrying allowed them by Treaty with France and Spain,

and exposed to be captured and detained on suspicion, as now daily

happens. Naval stores exposed to confiscation by England, when shipped,

at a time when she is at war, to the ports of her enemies.

In all these instances our navigation is materially endangered and

exposed, without any equivalent advantages. May it not now well be

asked, Whence it comes that this interest of navigation hath become less

an object of care to us than at the time we passed the laws of duty and

impost on foreign ships and goods imported into them? I stated the other

day my ideas of the immense importance of navigation. Mr. Burke gave

the following opinion of a branch of it in 1775:

"As to the wealth which the Colonies have drawn from the

sea by their fisheries, you had all that matter fully

opened at your bar. You surely thought those acquisitions

of value, for they seemed even to excite your envy; and yet

the spirit with which that enterprising employment has been

exercised, ought rather, in my opinion, to have raised your

esteem and admiration. And pray, sir, what in the world is

equal to it? Pass by the other parts, and look at the

manner in which the people of New England have of late

carried on the whale fishery. Whilst we follow them among

the tumbling mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating

into the deepest frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and

Davis's Straits; whilst we are looking for them beneath the

Arctic Circle, we hear that they have pierced into the

opposite region of Polar cold, that they are at the

antipodes, and engaged under the frozen Serpent of South

Falkland Island, which, seeming too remote and romantic an

object for the grasp of national ambition, is but a stage

and resting place in the progress of their victorious

industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more discouraging to

them than the accumulated winter of both the poles. We know

that whilst some of them draw the line and strike the

harpoon on the coast of Africa, others run the longitude,

and pursue their gigantic game along the coast of Brazil.

No sea but what is vexed by their fisheries, no climate

that is not witness to their toils. Neither the

perseverance of Holland, nor the activity of France, nor

the dexterous and firm sagacity of English enterprise, ever

carried this most perilous mode of hardy industry to the

extent to which it has been pushed by this recent people--a

people who are still, as it were, but in the gristle, and

not yet hardened into the bone of manhood. When I

contemplate those things, when I know that the Colonies in

general owe little or nothing to any care of ours, and that

they are not squeezed into this happy form by the

constraints of watchful and suspicious governments, but

that through a wise and salutary neglect a generous nature

has been suffered to take her own way to perfection--when I

reflect upon these effects, when I see how profitable they

have been to us, I feel all the pride of power sink, and

all presumption in the wisdom of human contrivance melt and

die away within me."

Since then our navigation has had the growth of a man arrived at full

age, (twenty-one,) and become extended to an immense size; yet was it so

unprotected that, in this year, the United States wanting to remit, out

of some cargoes of sugar and coffee shipped on private account, money to

pay the interest of their debts in Holland, they were under the

necessity of asking passports for these cargoes of the French and

British Ministers, to let this property pass in safety over the

Atlantic; and I have seen it boasted in some of our papers, that orders

were issued by the British Government to their Port Admirals to respect

these passports thus given by their minister or agent here; so the

United States left their own merchants to carry their sugar and coffee

as they might, but obtained passes for ships, in the proceeds of whose

sales they were interested. What a strange circumstance, this! The

American Government sailing secure under passes--the private merchant

exposed!

But it is asked, if this Treaty be so unfavorable to commerce, why are

the merchants so much in favor of it?

They explain the reason themselves. They are influenced by the present

rather than future interests. Five millions of spoliations they look to

the Treaty to repay; their property afloat, they fear to be taken, and

war they dread; but is there really weight in these arguments? I am as

largely interested as any individual among them in shipping, and have

suffered the loss of one of my cargoes at Bermuda, for which my

underwriters have made me only a partial allowance; but I neither dread

any war on the part of England, situated as she now is, nor expect any

payment of my loss from the Treaty. To a nation to whom she offers

bounties to carry her provisions, and who is so excellent a customer for

her manufactures, she will not be easily induced to offer hostilities

that shall go to the extent of war; and the Commissioners on Spoliations

are to act in London merely as arbitrators of the law of nations, on

whom our claim of spoliations is at best but a very uncertain

dependence. The merchants in sundry parts of the United States having

thought it so, have claimed the interference of Congress in advancing

them the money, they rather doubted getting any where else.

Considering, then, this Treaty as merely a bargain exhibiting little or

no profit and much to lose, I separate it from all considerations

foreign to itself. I judge it on its own merits, and these must lead me

to vote for the proposition to suspend appropriations, especially in a

moment when our seamen continue to be impressed and our ships to be

taken.

SATURDAY, April 16.

_Execution of British Treaty._

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the

state of the Union, and took up the resolution for carrying into effect

the Treaty with Great Britain.

Mr. NICHOLAS said, he was sorry to find gentlemen unwilling to go into a

discussion of the merits of the Treaty, as he anticipated considerable

benefits to the community from a fair investigation. He did not know, as

had been said, that it could have no effect on the minds of members of

the House, but he thought it necessary that the people should be enabled

to form a just opinion of the merits of this compact, that neither

opposition nor their attachment, should go beyond just bounds; that fair

investigation was the most likely means of producing that calm in the

public mind which he wished to see produced whenever Government had

finally decided, and he would venture to say, there was no place which

could be resorted to for more sound information.

In considering the merits of the Treaty itself, Mr. N. said, he would

consider the subjects which pressed themselves on the negotiator and

demanded provision. These were chiefly the disputes arising under the

Treaty of 1783, late depredations on our trade, and the settlement of

contested principles to guard us against future misunderstandings.

The cases arising under the Treaty of 1783, as heretofore contested,

were negroes and other property carried away contrary to its

stipulations; the territorial claim under it, and on the part of Great

Britain, an interference in the recovery of private debts.

Of the negroes, nothing is said in the present Treaty. It is to be

expected in negotiations, that some concessions are to be made for the

sake of accommodation, and this sacrifice of private interests becomes

sometimes unavoidable. This claim was of considerable importance to a

class of the citizens of the United States, but it was of still greater

importance, as it justified the United States from the charge of

breaking the Treaty of Peace. In this respect it was highly incumbent on

the negotiator to procure satisfaction. It will not be contended that it

should have been a _sine qua non_ in the negotiation, and it would not

now be mentioned, if it was not necessary to a fair estimate of some of

the stipulations of the Treaty, and if there had not been so uniform a

surrender of the interests of the United States as to compel a

calculation. It is now said, indeed, that the meaning of the Treaty of

1783 was mistaken, and that the engagement was only to refrain from

carrying away negroes, &c., which should be found in possession of the

inhabitants at the time peace should take place. It is not necessary now

to go into a construction of the words of the article, as its meaning

has certainly been fixed by the interpretation of the parties in the ten

years which elapsed after it. In all that time the United States have

asserted the claim, and it cannot be shown that Great Britain ever

contested the construction of the article. It is said, that one of the

Commissioners, (Mr. Adams,) who concluded the Treaty of 1783, in behalf

of the United States, informed the Senate, in their deliberations on

this Treaty, that it was the unquestionable meaning of the article, to

save all negroes and other property then in the hands of the British;

that the article was inserted after all other points had been settled at

the instance of Mr. Laurens, who just then arrived from his confinement

in London, and the reason assigned by him was, that many of the people

of the United States would be disabled from complying with the part of

the Treaty which respects debts unless this provision was made; that the

same gentleman, who was afterwards Ambassador from the United States to

the Court of London, also informed the Senate that, during his embassy,

this construction of the article was never denied, and that it seemed to

be understood by the Ministry, that, on a settlement with the United

States, compensation must be made. This subject was fully investigated

by the negotiator of the Treaty (Mr. Jay) while he was Secretary of

Foreign Affairs; all the reasons which now arm the friends of the

Treaty against this claim were examined by him, and then his decision

was, that we were entitled to compensation. The reputed author of the

best defence of the Treaty, (Mr. Hamilton,) in the year 1783, introduced

a resolution into Congress, declaring that the negroes, &c., had been

carried away by the British armies, contrary to the true intent and

meaning of the Treaty. Mr. N. thought it too late to extort a meaning

from a contract after it had existed more than ten years; and he did not

doubt every candid mind would be satisfied by the acquiescence of

Britain, and the evidence which he had produced of a perfect

understanding between the two countries on the subject. If the new

construction of the article could not be established, the first

infraction of the Treaty of 1783 remained indisputable. Before the

Treaty became binding, Great Britain, by carrying away the negroes, put

it out of her power to execute the contract which she had made, while,

on the part of the United States, no act had been done which was

inconsistent with the Treaty, provided the acts of the States did not

continue to operate after the ratifications were exchanged.

Before he examined the cases provided for in this Treaty, it was

necessary to remark, that the Treaty declares its intention to be to

settle the disputes of the two countries without regard to former

criminations, and all the writers in favor of the Treaty, declare that

it was necessary to waive the first infraction of the former Treaty.

This was a proper principle, and he only asked that it should have been

pursued. This spirit of conciliation must have meant to put both parties

on the same footing, either by agreeing that neither party had been the

cause of the Treaty not being executed, or that both had been equally

guilty. He would examine whether either of these concessions had been

pursued.

To obtain a surrender of the posts, and the territory withheld from us,

we have sanctioned the subsequent alienations of land by the King of

Great Britain. We have confirmed the claims of the inhabitants and

dispensed with their allegiance, by permitting them to remain subjects

of Great Britain; we have opened our frontier to all their citizens, and

permitted them to retain a share of the Indian trade. Mr. N. did not

pretend to judge of the commercial effect of the intercourse between the

frontiers, but he apprehended that, in another respect, this concession

would destroy the whole value of the acquisition. The traders would be

enabled to maintain their accustomed influence over the Indians, and

would have more inducements than when they had a monopoly of the trade

to embroil them with the United States. Formerly, they were interested

in their continuing in peace, as war prevented the acquisition of skins

and furs; but when American traders shall embark in the trade, they will

have an obvious interest in war as the certain means of banishing their

rivals. It appears, then, that the Treaty of 1783, in this respect, is

not revived--that there is a new contract with respect to the posts,

and much less will be obtained than if that Treaty had been executed.

When the claims of Great Britain, under the Treaty of 1783, became the

subject of the present Treaty, the stipulations discover a different

principle. The United States give up the claim for negroes, and agree to

receive the posts on terms which greatly diminish their value; but, when

the debts due from citizens of the United States to subjects of Great

Britain are to be provided for, there is not a stipulation that they may

now be pursued without hindrance, but there is an engagement, on the

part of the United States, to pay all losses which have arisen from the

infraction of the Treaty of Peace, so far as it respects them. On what

ground could this assumption have been made? Why is this penalty imposed

on the United States? There can be but one justification, and that is,

that they had been guilty of the first infraction of the Treaty of

Peace, and must make amends; but there was to be no concession of this

kind, so that if damages were to be given at all, they should be given

on both sides. It seems clear, then, whatever pretences are made by the

Treaty or its advocates, that the first infraction of the Treaty of

Peace is fixed on the United States, and that they are to make

compensation for an injury. Where does the conciliating temper of Great

Britain manifest itself? Had she a claim under the Treaty of 1783, which

is forgotten? Does she not receive every thing which she could have

demanded in relation to that Treaty? The United States are to indemnify

her citizens completely for the non-execution at the time, and are to

receive less than was promised them without the least compensation for

the delay. But it is somewhere said, that the damages could not be

demanded for withholding the posts, because they could not be computed.

It will be agreed by those who press the acceptance of this Treaty in

order to obtain the posts, that they are important to the United States.

If of the consequence which they are represented to be, twelve years

dispossession must have been a real injury, and the claim on Great

Britain will be indisputable, although the amount may not be certain.

This might be a good pretext for evading a payment to the United States,

if this claim stood unconnected with any other; but it must be

considered as a very shameless suggestion to enforce the payment of

damages incurred by them. It is certainly a sufficient justification for

retaining what is in their hands until Great Britain shall offer

something on this account; otherwise she will be screened by her cunning

in causing the subject of injury. Again, it has been said that this

inequality in the Treaty was proper, because the right to recover debts

returned with the peace, and did not depend merely on the Treaty. It is

to be remembered, that the United States justify it as a retaliation for

breach on the part of Great Britain, and that, in forming this Treaty,

it was agreed to waive the right to retaliate: or, rather, the

question, who first infringed the Treaty. It is only to be inquired,

then, whether this was a proper subject of retaliation? and if it was,

the United States ought to escape all penalty for using it, or Great

Britain must be equally subject to compensation for her infractions.

(For this, see _Marten's_ Law of Nations, page 268, where it is said

that it matters not, in this respect, whether rights are innate, or

whether they have been acquired by express or tacit covenant, or

otherwise.)

Another class of claims which may fall on the United States is still

more alarming--those for war-interest. The Treaty has explicitly

authorized the commissioners to judge of all claims of British subjects

lost by legal impediments, whether of principal or interest, and they

are to determine according to justice, equity, and the law of nations.

In the correspondence on this subject between the two Governments, the

right has been asserted and denied; and it will depend on the

commissioners to say whether war-interest is due or not; and it being to

be supposed that the commissioners will advocate the principles of their

respective Governments, the United States are to depend on the chance

election of the fifth commissioner for safety. If it shall be determined

that it is due, the mischief will be insufferable. It will not merely be

recovered in those cases where the principal is unpaid, nor will it be

confined to those cases where it has been lost by actual judgment of a

court, but will extend to all cases of private settlement, where the

decision of the Judiciary of the State had previously settled the

principle.

It appears, then, that on the subject of the disputes arising under the

Treaty of 1783, there is no cause for congratulation. The claims for

negroes carried off are abandoned; the posts are to be delivered up, on

terms not unusual and dishonorable, but extremely dangerous to the

future peace of the United States, and to obtain them in this manner we

incur an obligation to pay a sum which probably will not fall short of

five millions of dollars, and which may possibly amount to fifteen

millions. When it is remembered that these claims commenced with our

independence, and that they were the concessions to our infant

struggles, what American is there who will not feel the disgrace to our

manhood in abandoning them? All must blush at a comparison of the Treaty

we obtained with our arms, with that which has been dictated by fear.

The next subject which claimed the attention of a negotiator was the

injury recently sustained in the commerce of the United States; and on

this subject it will be proper to review the circumstances in which the

negotiator left this country. The losses sustained had been considered

here as outrages of so serious a nature that all parties had concurred

in demanding reparation; some had attempted at once to use coercion, and

those who approved the mission declared that war must follow a failure.

In this situation, where the sense of Government and people was

decided, and where the injury was not only intolerable in itself but was

likely to be repeated, it seems astonishing that a man could be found

who would conclude a Treaty which gives to the United States no

compensation, but more astonishing that partisans could be found here

who approved his conduct. It may be asserted that no compensation is

secured by the Treaty, and that under its operation it is equally

probable that none will be received. See the article. It has been

doubted, and is, perhaps, very doubtful, whether the Courts of Great

Britain are not made the judges of irregular and illegal captures and

condemnations, and whether the orders of the King are not admitted as

good cause of seizure; but it never has been contended that compensation

is promised in any particular case, or that any principles are

established by the Treaty which are to govern the commissioners. In the

construction of their powers, insisted on by the advocates of the

Treaty, their guides are justice, equity, and the laws of nations.

Nobody can complain of these principles, if their fair operation was

secured; but a moment's attention will show that this was nothing but an

evasion of the subject.

It will not be understood that I suppose it was in Mr. Jay's power to

make his own terms, but I complain of his treating at all on the terms

he did. It is said that it was not in his power to extort what he

wished, but I complain that he yielded to the extortion of Great

Britain. What has he left her to ask, what has he not surrendered? While

professing, as the Treaty does, that there were important points of our

commerce left for future negotiation, why bind us to continue to Great

Britain the fullest share of our commercial privileges? If the Treaty

had been the most complete and satisfactory, would it not be necessary

to leave something to enforce its execution? What weapons have we which

can reach her? The Treaty makes war indispensable, as the only redress

of injuries, and how will war from the United States reach Great

Britain? It was certainly improper to give up all power of restricting

her commerce until the same instrument contained the fullest

satisfaction as to our own. It was improper to give up all the power of

seizing on the debts of her subjects, for this, when the power of

restricting her commerce was bartered for equal privileges, would be the

only means of maintaining respect. It is not necessary that weapons of

any sort should be used, but it is more dangerous to surrender them. I

am no friend to interference in private contracts, and I can truly say,

I never was willing to resort to this remedy till all others had been

tried; but if there was an impossibility of doing it, the want of the

power would immediately be felt. The impolicy and immorality of

sequestration have been dwelt on. Contrast it with war, for which it is

a substitute, and it will be found in both respects unequal to it. All

national remedies are attended with great mischiefs to those who use

them, and they must be adopted only on comparison in this respect, and

with regard to their effects on the enemy. In this last respect there

seems to be no choice to the United States; they have no other weapon

that can reach Great Britain, and I greatly fear that, when this is

lost, we are completely disarmed.

MONDAY, April 18.

_Treaty with Great Britain._

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the

state of the Union; when the resolution for carrying the British Treaty

into effect being under consideration--

Mr. GILES said it was much to be regretted that all the information

which could throw light upon the subject of discussion should not be

before the committee. A sense of responsibility arising from the

peculiarly delicate nature of the question had induced the House to take

every step with more than a common degree of caution. Before they

proceeded to deliberate upon the expediency or inexpediency of providing

for carrying the Treaty into effect, they made a request to the

PRESIDENT for the papers which attended the negotiation. This request

has been refused; not because the call itself contained any thing

unconstitutional; not because the contents of the papers called for were

of such a nature as to render the disclosure thereof at this time

improper. Neither of these causes being intimated in the Message, but

because principles were advocated by individual gentlemen in the course

of the argument inducing the call which the PRESIDENT thought not

warranted by the constitution. Mr. G. said, he did not propose to

animadvert upon the conduct of the Executive in departing from the

resolution itself, and in noticing the arguments of individual members,

nor upon any other part of the proceedings of the Executive relative to

the call of the House and his refusal. He only meant to remark, that

being perfectly convinced of the propriety of the call itself, of the

utility of the information embraced by it, and not being satisfied by

the arguments of the PRESIDENT of the propriety of withholding the

papers called for, he should have been willing to have suspended all

further proceeding respecting the provision for the Treaty, until the

papers should be laid before the House. He would have firmly placed

himself on that ground, and in that position hazarded his

responsibility. The extreme sensibility excited on the public mind by

the agitation of the Treaty question, he had supposed, would have

furnished an irresistible argument in favor of complying with the

request of the House, provided no inconvenience would have attended the

disclosure; and in his opinion, under all the circumstances of the case,

the House would have been completely justified in suspending all further

proceeding upon the question of providing for the Treaty, until they

received that information which they deemed necessary to guide their

deliberations. But as the House had thought proper to take a different

course, and had proceeded to the consideration of the question, with

such lights as they possessed, he would explain the motives which would

probably finally influence his vote.

Mr. G. said he should discuss the subject in two points of view. He

would first examine the contents of the Treaty itself, and then the

probable consequences of refusing or of giving it efficacy.

In examining the contents of the instrument itself, he proposed to go

through it article by article, unless the task prescribed to himself

should exceed the bounds usually allowed to members for the delivery of

their sentiments. He should do this, because he wished to treat the

subject with the utmost candor, and to avoid any possible imputation of

intending to exhibit the bad and avoid the good parts of the Treaty, if

any such there were. He meant, however, to state merely the purport of

many of the articles, without any animadversion, and to dwell only upon

such as appeared to him the most material.

The first object of the negotiation respected the inexecution of the

Treaty of Peace.

On the part of Great Britain, two articles had been unexecuted: The

restoration of certain property in possession of the British at the

close of the war, and the surrender of the Western posts. On the part of

the United States, one article was suggested to remain unfulfilled; it

respected the promise that no legal impediment should be thrown in the

way to the recovery of debts due to British subjects.

The claim of compensation for the property carried away in contravention

of the Treaty of Peace is wholly abandoned, and the value of the

surrender of the posts very much lessened by the annexation of

conditions which made no part of the stipulations of surrender in the

Treaty of Peace. The United States are more than bound to fulfil the

article heretofore unfulfilled by them; for instead of continuing the

courts open for the recovery of debts in the usual way, as was the

promise in the Treaty of Peace, they are made to assume the payment of

all debts, interests, and damages in cases of insolvencies, and a mode

of adjustment is proposed for ascertaining the amount which furnishes

the greatest latitude for frauds against the United States which could

be devised. This will appear in the future examination of the subject.

Hence it is obvious that the stipulations of the Treaty abandoned the

very principle of adjustment assumed by a gentleman from Connecticut

(Mr. SWIFT.)

Mr. G. would first premise, that if the article did not intend the

restoration of property mentioned in it, the insertion of it in the

Treaty was not only unnecessary, but mischievous, as it would

necessarily produce embarrassment to the parties to the instrument.

The British army, at the termination of the war, was at New York; the

negroes, which constituted the species of property in question, were in

the Southern States; so that if the article did not include that species

of property taken in the course of the war, and in the possession of the

British at the end of it, it was worse than nonsense. It never could

have been supposed that, upon the first dawn of peace, the British

would have left New York and invaded the Southern country, for the

purpose of plundering the inhabitants of their negroes. The peace

article itself was a sufficient security against this conduct, and of

course no specific provision could have been necessary for that purpose.

This was not only the uniform construction of the article by the United

States, but, as he always understood and believed, Great Britain had

acquiesced in the construction until the negotiation of the present

Treaty. As an evidence of these facts, Mr. G. observed, that American

commissioners were permitted to make a list of the negroes in the

possession of the British at the close of the war by the British

commander; that the list was entered upon the files of Congress; that

there were resolutions of Congress claiming compensation for the

property carried away in contravention of that article in the Treaty of

Peace, perhaps without even the intimation of a doubt as to the

construction; that, during the administration of Lord Caermarthen, he

had always understood that the claim of compensation for property

carried away, was admitted, whenever British subjects were indemnified

for the debts due to them from citizens of the United States. But here

he had to regret the want of the papers called for by this House, as

they contained all the evidence upon which this important fact depends.

Hence it appears that Great Britain herself had yielded her assent to

this construction, and ought not to have been permitted to have

withdrawn it afterwards. These circumstances seemed to him to be

conclusive, and ingenuity itself would pause for arguments against facts

so stubborn and irresistible.

Mr. G. then proceeded to the examination of the articles of the Treaty.

The first article, he said, was declaratory of peace, &c., between the

two countries, which, he said, was a very desirable thing, provided it

could be established upon principles compatible with the national honor

and the national interests. The second and third articles contained the

stipulations for the surrender of the Western posts, and the conditions

accompanying the surrender.

The surrender of the Western posts, he said, would be an extremely

desirable object, if conformable with the Treaty of Peace, and it were

unattended with any conditions.

Here, he said, he was desirous of giving credit to every part of the

instrument which would admit of it, and was not disposed to exaggerate

its imperfections. He was willing to admit that the surrender of the

posts, even with the conditions annexed, was of some importance; but he

would assert that the surrender lost a great portion of its value to the

United States, in consequence of the conditions attached to it. He

observed, two objects of primary importance were to be effected by the

unqualified surrender of the posts. The one was to obtain the influence

over the Indians in their neighborhood, which the British now possessed.

The other, the participation, at least, in the fur trade carried on

with those Indians. The conditions accompanying the surrender, will, in

his opinion, very much impede the one, and completely defeat the other

object.

The stipulation in the second article, which authorizes British subjects

who are now living within the precincts or jurisdiction of the posts,

still to continue and to reside there, with the free use of their

property; and to elect either to remain British subjects or to become

American citizens at pleasure, will, in his opinion, very much impede,

if not wholly obstruct, the salutary influence of the United States over

the numerous tribes of Indians in that quarter; which is one great

object hoped for from the possession of those posts. The effects of the

stipulation will appear more obvious, when it is compared with the

stipulations in the next article, by which the trade with the Indians is

regulated. The second object, to wit, the participation in the fur

trade, he believed, would be completely defeated by the regulation of

that trade in the third article; that article stipulates an equality of

duties between American citizens and British subjects, a free

communication through that country, upon an equality of portages and

ferriages. These conditions, in his opinion, would secure a complete

monopoly of the fur trade to Great Britain; because the superiority of

the British capital employed in that trade, and the inferiority of

duties paid upon goods imported for that trade into Canada, would, in

his judgment, wholly exclude American citizens from a participation in

that trade, through any channel in the United States. The United States

had no mode left to counteract this monopoly but by a system of

drawbacks, which appeared to him, from the nature and trade of the

country, to be almost impracticable; or if not absolutely impracticable,

it would compel us to purchase the trade at a price greater than it was

worth. It appeared to him that Great Britain had foreseen these

consequences, and that these articles are as well calculated to produce

them, and to obstruct the views of the United States, as sagacity itself

could have devised. Hence it appears to him that the value of an

unqualified surrender of the posts is very much lessened by the

accompanying conditions. The gentleman from Connecticut observed, that

the surrender of the posts was absolute, and that no conditions were

annexed to it. It is a sufficient answer to say that his observation is

a mere criticism upon terms. If they be not conditions of the surrender,

they are accompanying engagements, and are to be executed with good

faith by the United States.

The sixth article was, in his judgment, highly objectionable. This

article assumes the payment of all debts, interests, and damages, due

from American citizens to British subjects, previous to the Revolution,

in all cases where insolvencies have ensued, and where legal impediments

to the recovery of the debts have existed. He would remark, that this

was an assumption of debt by the public, which they did not owe, and

never promised to pay, and that it is bettering the condition of the

British creditor under the Treaty of Peace, without any obligation on

the United States to do so. He said that, as, amongst the fashionable

calumnies of the day, this article had been a fertile source of

misrepresentation against the State he had the honor to represent, he

was anxious to place this subject in its true light; and, as he

professed to be well acquainted with it, he hoped to be indulged with

some minutiæ of explanation. He said, this subject presented two aspects

to the public; the one, as it respected States, the other, as it

respected individuals of the United States. As to the first, he admitted

that if a greater proportion of debts of this description were due from

Virginia than from other States, which had not, however, been

ascertained, and which he doubted, in the same proportion, as a State,

Virginia would receive an advantage over the rest of the States, by a

common assumption of the debts; but as it respected the individuals in

that State who were not debtors, they stood precisely on the same

footing with individuals in other States, because they were, in common

with others, to contribute to the payment of debts which they never

owed. It is of very little consolation to them that they live in the

neighborhood of those whose debts they are to contribute to pay; for

propinquity or distance can make no difference in the state of interest

between the individuals who do not owe, but who are to contribute to

pay. As a very small proportion of the inhabitants of Virginia come

under this description of debtors, the phenomenon of an opposition of

that State, to this particular article, is thus explained.

It is to be remarked, that this article contains no limits as to the

amount of debts assumed by it, nor are there any precise data furnished

for calculation. But it has been said, that if the debts be due, they

ought to be paid, be the amount what it may. He said, that gentlemen

should reflect, that the amount would depend very much upon the mode of

adjustment, and that the mode adopted by the Treaty was the most

objectionable that could be devised.

He observed, that the principle established for the adjustment of the

debts, instead of preserving the conflicting interests of debtor and

creditor, would produce a complete union of interests; and of course

would furnish the greatest temptations to frauds against the United

States from both debtor and creditor. Hence the amount of debts assumed

by the United States would probably be greatly increased beyond what

would be the amount, if the debtor and creditor should be left to the

ordinary course of judicial proceedings to adjust their own differences,

under the principle of opposing interests. To entitle the creditor to a

claim upon the United States, it is necessary for him first to establish

his demand against his debtor, and then to show that his debtor was

solvent at the commencement of the late war, and has since become

insolvent; and that some legal impediment had intervened to prevent the

recovery of the debt. Hence it becomes the interest of both debtor and

creditor to establish these facts, because the debtor will be relieved

from his debt, by the assumption of the United States, and the claim of

the creditor will be transferred from the individual to the United

States, which he would, in all cases, prefer, particularly as the

assistance of the debtor will often become necessary to facilitate the

establishment of the debt. This, he said, was the natural operation of

the union of interest produced by the assumption of the debts by the

United States, and there was more danger to be apprehended from it, from

the impossibility of checking it, by any vigilance on the part of the

United States, and from the peculiar circumstances attending those

debts.

The greatest proportion of debts remaining unpaid, he believed, stood

upon open accounts. In many cases, when the debts were evidenced by

specialties, payments had been obtained, either by the usual course of

judicial process, or by compromise between the parties. There were two

circumstances attending the open accounts which would give great scope

to the fraudulent combinations between the debtor and creditor. The one

respected the evidence, the other the substantial causes of difference

in the accounts of the creditor and debtor. In the reign of George II.

an act was passed for the more easy recovery of debts due to His

Majesty's subjects from His Majesty's plantations in America. This act

authorized the merchant in Great Britain to establish his debt against a

colonist by affidavits taken before the commencement of the suit, and

authenticated in the usual mode. This deprived the defendant of all

opportunity of cross-examination, so essential to the discovery of

truth, and the jury of all knowledge of the character and credibility of

the deponent.

In Virginia, the affidavits taken in pursuance of this act, have been

deemed incompetent to the establishment of the debt, because the act

itself destroys the very nature and properties of evidence. Hence, in

all disputed claims founded upon this act, judgments have been rendered

for the defendants. If this should be deemed a legal impediment to the

recovery, this whole description of debts would probably come under the

description of debts assumed. He observed, that the words used in the

Treaty were calculated, in his opinion, with a view to this

construction, and must have been dictated by persons better informed of

the nature of this business than he presumed the Envoy Extraordinary of

the United States could have been.

The other circumstances arose from the nature of the remittances. These

were generally made in tobacco. The sales of this article were intrusted

solely to the merchant residing in Great Britain, and the American

shipper had no check whatever upon the merchant making the sale. Upon

tendering these accounts, the tobacco is often set down at a price very

inferior to the average price of that article in Europe, at the time of

making the sale. A great number of controversies have taken place upon

this ground, which remain unsettled; but, if the United States should

assume the debts of the individuals thus circumstanced, they would have

no inducement to contest these accounts in a course of judicial

proceedings, and the promise of exoneration from the creditor, will

often induce the debtor to facilitate the establishment of the claims

against the United States. He said he had not overlooked the clause in

this article of the Treaty, which compels an assignment of the claim

from the creditor to the United States, but that would have little or no

operation to check the practice invited by this article, because the

debtor is presumed to be insolvent before the assignment is made, and he

believed the United States would be but unsuccessful collectors from

insolvent debtors.

From these circumstances, he concluded, that this assumption of debt,

without any obligation for so doing, was extremely improper,

particularly when it is recollected that this article sweeps away all

acts of limitation, and relates to the whole extensive scene of business

carried on in the United States, from the extremes of New Hampshire to

the extremes of Georgia, for an unlimited time before the Revolution. He

observed, if he were to make a conjecture as to the amount, it would be

a loose one; but if he were to choose between indemnification to the

American merchants for recent spoliations committed upon their commerce,

or the payment of these debts, he should not hesitate to prefer the

first alternative; because, to that there were known limits; to the

other there were not, nor any data for calculation under the mode of

adjustment prescribed by the Treaty. He, therefore, cautioned gentlemen

against the assumption of this unascertained debt, for he believed it

would be attended with a responsibility which they could not answer to

their constituents, nor would the responsibility be alleviated by the

recollection of the merits of the individuals for whose benefit it is

made. The increase of the debt of the United States by these artificial

means, without any obligation to do so, he thought highly objectionable.

The 10th article, he said, was of a very extraordinary complexion. It

was remarkable, both as to the matter it contained, and the manner in

which it was expressed. It is in the following words:

"Neither the debts due from individuals of the one nation

to individuals of the other, nor shares, nor moneys which

they may have in the public funds, or in the public or

private banks, shall ever in any event of war, or national

differences, be sequestered or confiscated, it being unjust

and impolitic that debts and engagements contracted and

made by individuals having confidence in each other and in

their respective Governments, should ever be destroyed or

impaired by national authority on account of the national

differences and discontents."

Mr. G. remarked, that this article also had assumed the resemblance of

reciprocity; but no reciprocity in fact.

British subjects have great sums, both in public and private funds, in

the United States. American citizens have little or no property in

public or private funds in Great Britain. Hence the evident and

substantial inequality of this reciprocal stipulation. On the other

hand, American citizens have a great share of property on the water,

with very little naval protection, and of course subject to the naval

superiority of Great Britain.

If, therefore, Great Britain had stipulated, in case of war, that in

consideration of a refusal on the part of the United States, to

sequestrate property of British subjects upon land, she would not molest

the property of American citizens upon water, there would then have been

a substantial, instead of a nominal reciprocity; as the article now

stands there is an important right conceded, and no compensation

obtained.

This article, however, has been highly applauded by a particular

description of persons interested in it, in consequence of the

affectation of morality professed by it.

It has been said to be dishonest and immoral to take the property of

individuals for the purpose of compensating national wrongs. He

observed, that he could see no difference between the morality of taking

the property of individuals upon water, and the property of individuals

upon land. The difference of the element could make no difference in the

morality of the act. However strongly, therefore, this moral impulse was

operating upon the American Envoy whilst engaged in the construction of

this article, it had entirely dissipated before he had arrived at the

25th article; for, in that article, the principle of privateering is not

only admitted, but its operation facilitated; so that, unless the

interest of Great Britain is to be the criterion of the Envoy's

morality, what he has gained by the morality of the 10th article must be

at least balanced by the immorality of the 25th. But, Mr. G. remarked,

that sequestration was always admitted as part of the law of nations,

and hence he presumed it was not immoral under certain circumstances. He

said it appeared to be the opinion of some, that where the property of

an individual was sequestered on account of the act of his nation, that

the individual was to sustain the loss, but that was not the case. The

sequestration itself imposes upon the government, to which the

individual belongs, an obligation of reimbursement. Hence the

sequestration does not ultimately rest upon the individual, but upon the

Government, for whose wrong the property was taken. This is also

conformable to the laws of nations. It was the course pursued by Great

Britain for all sequestrations made during the American war, and is the

course which would be pursued by all nations.

Mr. G. said, that war itself was immoral in most cases; and justified,

in his opinion, only in the case of self-defence; but if a stipulation

had been inserted in this Treaty, which prohibited the United States

from declaring war, it would have been justly and universally

reprobated. The present article prohibits the United States from

resorting to the best means not only of preventing war, but the most

efficacious means of supporting it. Hence, the surrender of the right

was the most impolitic concession, and is infinitely aggravated by its

being a voluntary concession; no equivalent being received in return.

Mr. G. said, it was dishonorable to the United States because it

evidenced a want of confidence in the discretion of the constituted

authorities. The right of sequestration is admitted to be essential to

national sovereignty; but, lest it should be indiscreetly used by the

United States, its guardianship is transferred to Great Britain. Mr. G.

said, he viewed sequestration as an extraordinary remedy, to be resorted

to only on extraordinary occasions. And although he would admit that but

few cases would justify a resort to it, yet it was one of our best

instruments of defence, considering our relationship to Great Britain,

and ought not therefore to have been surrendered. He said, too, that

this restraint was imposed upon the United States for an unlimited time,

and was the more objectionable, as it was a species of legislation

against the discretion of legislation.

Upon the whole, he conscientiously believed the Treaty to be a bad one.

He believed it contained the most complete evidence of British

interference in our internal affairs, and had laid the foundation for

the further extension of British influence. It has restricted the

exercise of some of the important rights of national sovereignty. It has

voluntarily hazarded the neutrality of the United States in the present

European war, and destroyed all pretensions to its character of

impartiality. It has not afforded protection to our neutral rights,

which was amongst its great objects; and in the adjustment of the

differences resulting from the inexecution of the Treaty of Peace, it is

unequal and unjust. All these important circumstances considered, and

when it is also considered that the British persevere in impressing our

seamen and seizing our vessels, in violation of the clearest rights of

neutral nations, even since the signing of the Treaty, he could not

consent to be the instrument of giving it efficacy. He believed that it

was one of those extraordinary cases which justified strong and

extraordinary resistance.

When Mr. GILES had concluded his speech,

Mr. GOODHUE addressed the Chair as follows: Mr. Chairman: Much noise has

been made, and every art has been practised to prejudice the people

against the Treaty now under consideration. I mean to look at it and see

if it be the horrid thing it is represented to be, and particularly to

examine the commercial part, to know whether we have made a good bargain

or not, I will take notice of some objections that have been made, and

then touch on the great evils that may justly be apprehended, if we

refuse to carry it into effect. And here let me observe, the subject is

the most momentous that ever came before this House, and I mean to put

no false colors on it, or to paint any evils that will follow a

rejection, beyond what, in such an event, I most conscientiously believe

will be realized. I will now state what new sources of commerce are

opened to us by the Treaty that we had not before, and then see what we

have given for them. 1st. We have got by the Treaty a perfectly free

trade across the land, and by means of the lakes with Canada, that we

had not before, and on the same terms with British subjects, which I

estimate as a great advantage to this country; for it is evident, that

we can introduce into Canada--up the North river and across the

Lakes--almost any kind of goods, at less expense and on better terms

than the British can up the river St. Lawrence, which is very lengthy,

and frozen up six or seven months in the year. Having this advantage,

can it be doubted that we have not industry and enterprise to improve

it? No, sir, the enterprise of our people is such, that we shall

unquestionably carry on almost all the trade of Upper Canada, and that

great Western country which will be opened to us; by which means we

shall have at least an equal share in their fur trade also with them,

which we have so long wanted. But it is said, the portages or carrying

places being common to both, they will run away with the greater part of

the trade. Why so? I am not afraid but the citizens of the United

States, if they are put on an equal footing with others, will make their

way equal with any people on earth. But it is said, by way of lessening

the advantages of this trade, that goods imported into Canada pay little

or no duty, and the goods that we import are by our laws subject to high

duty, and that no drawback of the duty can be established upon their

being sent into Canada, and therefore, we cannot supply them on equal

terms. To this, I reply, that I do not know what duty they impose on

goods when imported into Canada, but I believe it is considerable; and I

do not believe but it is possible to devise a plan for a drawback of the

duty which may have been paid on our goods when they are sent into

Canada, and that at any rate the ease by which we can send them there up

the North river, compared with their being introduced by the St.

Lawrence, will more than compensate for any difference of duty, in case

a drawback should not be admitted.

2. We have got established by the Treaty, a right to trade with all

their settlements in India on the same terms with their own subjects,

and thus we have laid open to us a free trade with those vast

possessions of theirs in that quarter of the globe, which, it is said,

contains twenty or thirty millions of inhabitants. Let me inform the

committee, that our trade to India is already very great and profitable.

In the town of Salem only, in which I live, we have thirty sail of

Indiamen, and doubtless, in the United States, the whole amount must be

nearly a hundred; and the number will increase in such a manner, as by

our superior enterprise, industry and economy, that we shall not only

supply our own wants, but those of the West Indies and Europe, in a

great measure, with India articles; for though, by the Treaty which

gives us this free trade, we are not permitted to carry India goods from

their settlements directly to Europe, yet there is no doubt, in my mind,

but we can export from hence thither cheaper than they can get them any

other way, for this obvious reason, because their trade to India is

carried on by their companies, in which despatch and economy is by no

means so much attended to, as it is when managed by an individual. But

it is said we had this trade before the Treaty. I answer, it is true we

had, but it was only by way of indulgence, subject to be deprived of it

whenever they thought fit; and let me ask, is it not vastly better to

have it secured as a right, than to have it rest on the precarious

tenure of indulgence? Here, Mr. Chairman, let me remark, that they have

granted to us this free trade to India, which their own subjects (except

the India Company) are entirely shut out from. What must be the feelings

of British subjects when they see their Government has given to

strangers a perfect freedom of trade to their India settlements, and

shut them out from it altogether? And what must be their astonishment

when they hear that some people amongst us think that Great Britain has

conferred no favor upon us by doing it? Hear what the famous Mr.

Grattan, the great Irish patriot, said in the Irish Parliament, on the

subject:

"This very America, which the British Minister insulted and

then crouched to, had, by the late Treaty of Commerce, been

admitted to all the British settlements in the East and

West Indies, to the latter of which Ireland was only

conditionally admitted, and from the former unconditionally

excluded; yet Ireland was a loyal, attached nation, and

America an alien."

These are the commercial acquisitions we have obtained by the Treaty;

and let me ask, what have we given to Britain in return for them? I

answer, nothing more than they have all along enjoyed in our ports, by

the laws of the United States, in common with other foreign nations. No

new commercial advantages have we given them; they can come here now on

no better terms than before. But, it is said, we have tied our hands by

the Treaty, that we will not lay any greater duties on their commerce

than we do on all other foreign nations. Pray, let me ask, if Great

Britain have not equally tied their hands? And can we be so unreasonable

as to suppose that they would ever consent to a Treaty that had not such

terms of reciprocity?

It is again said, by way of objection, that they have reserved to

themselves the right of countervailing the difference of duty, which we,

by our laws, have established between our own citizens and foreigners,

and that she will now exercise that right by imposing equal duties on

our vessels in the ports of Great Britain. Let me answer this objection

to the Treaty, by asking if she had not this same right, and even an

unlimited one, of imposing what duties she saw proper on our vessels in

her ports before the Treaty? She did not see fit to exercise it then,

neither is it probable she will now. And, lest it should be said she

will now do it, because we are restrained by the Treaty from increasing

the duty on her ships beyond what it now is, and, therefore, she has not

the same fear operating to prevent it that she had before, let me

remark, that if she was restrained by any such considerations, this same

restraint would be in force again in two years after the present war

ceased, being the period of the existence of those articles of the

Treaty--a time so short as to render it highly probable she will not

think it worth while to make the experiment.

A great cry has been made against the commercial part of the Treaty, and

I must confess I never could see on what ground, for it is a certain

fact we have given Great Britain no new privileges in our Atlantic ports

by the Treaty, and no other in their intercourse by the way of Canada,

than they have given us; and, therefore, it may fairly be said that, by

the Treaty, we have given them no new commercial privileges they were

not before enjoying in our ports; and they, on their part, have given us

considerable; and consequently, on our side, the bargain must be a good

one.

Let me ask, why there is for ever so much complaint against Great

Britain because she does not open all her colonies freely to us? Does

Portugal open the Brazils? No; she shuts out all foreigners. Did

Holland, before the present war, open to us all her rich possessions in

the East Indies? No. Does Spain open her rich islands in the East and

West Indies, and her immense possessions in South America? No. Does she,

in the Treaty lately made, open even Florida, as Great Britain has

Canada? No. Did France before this war give us free trade to her

colonies? No. And do not all those nations, as well as every other, come

into our ports on the same terms with the British? Why, then, make this

rant about the British? Let them fare as well in our ports as other

foreigners, inasmuch as they certainly grant as much to us as most

others do, is all I contend for. I do not wish they should fare better.

The impressment of our seamen by the British is made use of as an

objection to our carrying the Treaty into effect. It is, to be sure, a

mortifying circumstance, and must excite our utmost detestation of such

conduct. But let not our passions get the better of our judgment. We

have no kind of evidence that such conduct is countenanced by their

Admiralty, but the evidence we have is of a contrary nature, for, upon

our Minister's remonstrating to the British Ministry on this point, they

assured him that orders had been issued, and should be repeated to the

commanders of their ships, not to commit such violences on our rights,

at the same time observing, that, speaking the same language as we do,

it was difficult in all cases to distinguish their seamen from ours. In

this situation let us believe that a firm and spirited remonstrance will

be made by our Executive against such outrages; and let us hope that it

may have the desired effect. But, let me ask, if the Treaty should not

be carried into effect, will that relieve that deserving class of our

citizens? Will it not have probably a contrary effect, and be the means

of increasing the evil tenfold more than it exists at present?

TUESDAY, April 19.

_Execution of British Treaty._

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the

state of the Union, on the motion for making provision for carrying into

effect the Treaty with Great Britain; when

Mr. HEATH rose and addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. Chairman: In the discussion of this so momentous and important a

subject, and so big at the same time with the dearest interests of our

common country, I shall not attempt any critical analysis upon the good

and bad parts of the instrument, as the gentlemen preceding me in this

debate have already done, but only confine myself to a few remarks, to

justify my conduct to God and my country for the vote I shall give in

the ultimate decision of the question. Mr. Chairman, permit me here to

remark, that during the recess of the last Congress, when the American

mind was roused with so much irritation and sensibility through all

parts of the Union against this paper, after its first appearance in

public print, I was one of those who kept aloof from the storm,

suspended my opinion, became of no party, considering myself hereafter

bound to discharge the important duties of an American Representative on

the occasion. And now since the commencement of the present session,

though two-thirds of my time overwhelmed with disease, and daily

languishing in the bed of pain, even under such a dreadful personal

calamity, my reflections were not turned aside from the awfulness of the

subject before us; which before and during this discussion, I confess,

as often as I have revolved in my mind, with a review of the situation

of my country, I have frequently paused, not knowing the best expedient

to pursue to avoid impending evils.

Mr. Chairman, I have strange forebodings on this occasion. By the second

and third articles of the instrument before you, in the surrender of the

posts, British subjects have a right to reside with us; Indians have a

right to pass and repass from post to post from our district to their

portages and ferriages free, all in the vicinity within gun-shot. Will

not their traders continue their old acquaintanceship with them in

spite of us? Are not their capitals for trade larger than ours? Where,

then, are the real profits anticipated? All visionary, like the beggar's

dream, grasping mountains of gold, and when the morning sun shakes off

his slumber, it dissipates the delusion. But time will make more

converts than reason. Further, before I quit this subject of inequality,

I wish to remark, by way of reply to my much respected friend from

Connecticut, who was up a few days ago, in language nearly similar, and

the same sort of ingenuity of a celebrated champion, who has dedicated

much labor in favor of this instrument, under the signature of

_Camillus_, that Great Britain had never violated the seventh article of

the Treaty of Peace in not restoring the slaves and other property; that

they were taken in war, and their freedom offered to them by the British

commanders, and were not taken after a cessation of hostilities; and,

therefore, were not proper objects of surrender. Oh, the deceit, the

sophistry of this construction! I shall just answer it by reading from

the Journals of the old Congress what the real _Camillus_, or, in other

words, the learned Mr. HAMILTON, thought of that article at that time.

He read the Journals of 1783, where Mr. HAMILTON moved in Congress for

commissioners to be sent to New York to the British commander to request

an explanation respecting an infraction of that article. So was Mr.

HAMILTON's opinion at that time, so was the prevalent opinion of all

America at that time. My second point, the want of reciprocity in the

instrument, has been so well explained by my worthy colleague from

Virginia, that I confess I am curtailed in my sentiments a little here.

But, suffice it to say, that the local circumstances of this country

will make the suspension of the law of alienage more advantageous by

tenfold, than could be reaped by American citizens over the other side

of the water. Witness the great disproportion between American citizens

holding lands in Britain and British subjects in this country. I wish it

may not revive old proprietary rights, with its long train of tenure,

fealty, and vassalage. Perhaps my fears may ensue from residing in that

of Virginia, where this tenure once prevailed. I now come to the third

objection, and the most important. Other objections, though they have

their weight in my mind, yet perhaps they might yield their force, were

it not for this the more insurmountable. This might be said with

propriety to be the foundation of the call for papers from the Executive

respecting the Treaty.

By the various articles embracing this subject, the House of

Representatives of the United States, in the Treaty-making power, have

lived to see the day, which I am sure no human sagacity could have ever

divined, that they may be considered as a perfect collective cypherical

body of men in legislation, reduced to a mere Committee of Ways and

Means, subservient to Executive policy, just called together, for

voting the necessary supplies of money for foreign negotiation, or for

the current annual expenses of Government. America is here totally

disarmed of every alternative to resort to in the hour of distress--to

prevent the horrors of war, no sequestration, no embargo, no commercial

restriction, can be the subject of future legislation against the tender

and humane people of Britain.

Is this right, is this just, that all our rights should be thus bartered

away under a Treaty-making power? If it is so, and it must be borne,

dreadful, dreadful, indeed, must be the calamity of future generations

of America, under the operation of this Government; for any one of them,

or all together, I would resort to an awful national crisis, sooner than

sound the trumpet of war, and let the banners of blood loose upon the

earth.

Mr. WILLIAMS said, that various opinions had been delivered upon the

various subjects involved in the Treaty. He should take the liberty of

stating to the committee his sentiments on the occasion, and then

inquire into the policy or impolicy of carrying the Treaty into effect.

But, in the first place, he conceived it to be necessary to take a view

of its origin, the division, and party dissensions which then

prevailed--the critical posture of our affairs, the depredations

committed on our commerce, and the probability of a war.

Let us, said Mr. W., take a view of the debates of that House in the

year 1793 and 1794, and he believed it would be discovered that if the

business of negotiation had not taken place, this country must have been

involved in a war. It would be remembered, that a gentleman from

Virginia, (Mr. MADISON,) on the 3d of January, 1794, laid on the table

of this House seven resolutions. The object of which was to compel

Britain to come to some terms of accommodation, and to prevent further

depredations on our commerce.

After a discussion of several weeks, the first resolution, which was for

imposing an additional duty on the importation of a great variety of

manufactures from nations having no Commercial Treaty with the United

States was agreed to by a small majority. Britain had, said he, ever

since the end of the war, declined entering into any Commercial Treaty

with us. In the mean time, the danger from British depredations

augmented with such rapidity that those resolutions became insufficient,

by reason of the seizure of an immense number of our vessels, in

consequence of instructions that had been given by the British Ministry

on the 6th of November, 1793; and other resolutions were then moved for

the sequestration of British property, but the result was an embargo and

negotiation.

Was it not then urged by members of that House that the British nation

refused to negotiate with them? It was, indeed, supposed it would be

attended with considerable difficulties, and that a considerable class

of citizens, let the consequences be what they might, would not be

satisfied with the result. However, it was thought best to adopt the

measure.

But, said Mr. W., let us waive this subject, and inquire if negotiation

had failed, whether war would not have been the consequence? Can it be

supposed that, after the British had committed certain spoliations on

our commerce; after their Order of the 6th of November, 1793; after the

declaration of Lord Dorchester to the Indians, that war would not have

followed? The national pride of Great Britain could not have yielded to

compulsion without self-degradation; and it would be remembered, too,

that from the relation in which the two countries have stood to each

other, it must have cost more to the pride of Britain to have received

the law from us than from any other power. And if war had been the

consequence, how were we to have recovered the amount of the spoliations

committed on the property of our merchants? How were we to act? Were we

to demand satisfaction? We have no protection to our commerce, and

therefore the British can at any time arrest it without additional

expense to themselves, having near 500 vessels of war at command.

What had been our situation ever since the negotiation? Have we not,

said he, been one of the happiest nations upon earth? Yet we are about

to oppose the necessary appropriations to carry into effect that Treaty

which hath been the means of keeping us in a neutrality, and thereby

hazard a war which may be our ruin.

But, if we arrest the Treaty by refusing to make the necessary

appropriations, can we suppose Great Britain will carry the Treaty into

effect on her part? It would be inconsistent to think so. Great Britain

was certainly acquainted with what was going on within these walls, and

would refuse to give up the posts at the time specified. Who had been

the cause of the posts being so long kept from the United States? The

State of New York had been too long kept from its just due; that State

had not prevented the British from obtaining their debt, and the people

now looked with anxious expectation to the time when the posts were to

be given up. They were, at present, considerably alarmed, lest the

British Treaty should not be carried into effect. He had received

letters that morning, from some of his constituents, who were at New

York, endeavoring to sell their produce (for a number of the farmers in

that part of the country which he came from, did not sell their produce

to the merchants, but attended the market with it themselves.) They

write the price of flour had already fallen three dollars a barrel, and

wheat four shillings per bushel. Who were to be the losers, under these

circumstances? The farmers. Who had the most produce to sell? The

farmers in the State of New York. The other day a resolution was laid

upon our table, proposing to lay an embargo on the exportation of corn.

This, if it had been agreed to, would have had an immediate effect on

the State of New York.

What was the effect of the embargo in 1794? The farmers were obliged to

sell their produce for what they could get. Whatever loss was

experienced, fell upon the farmer; and so it will be with respect to

their present proceedings. If merchants cannot get insurance, will they

send their vessels out? No; and they will certainly give no more produce

than they can sell their articles for, with a trade profit.

The great objection against the Treaty was, that payment for the negroes

which were carried away by the British, at the close of the war, was not

provided for. It appears that this, at best, was a doubtful point.

General Carlton, previous to his leaving New York at the close of the

war, and when the negroes were demanded of him, said, that many slaves

had been declared free by his predecessors before his own arrival; over

these, he said, he neither possessed nor could assume any control. He

considered them as at liberty to go to any part of the world which they

thought proper. He was unwilling to suppose that the British Ministry

could stipulate, by any Treaty, to make themselves guilty of a notorious

breach of public faith to people of any color. He considered

restoration, where inseparable from a violation of that faith, as, in

itself, utterly impracticable.

It was acknowledged by every gentleman that the Treaty of 1783 was

broken by the United States; and, if so, what could their negotiator do?

The British Government would not come into the same terms as the Treaty

of 1783, in the sense and meaning of the gentleman from Virginia, nor

would they admit that that Treaty compelled them to give up or make

restitution for the negroes. Their negotiator, thus situated, no doubt

concluded that the amount of the negroes was not an object which ought

to prevent a negotiation so desirable at that time, and agreeable to the

law of nations. The Treaty of 1783 had been violated. Here Mr. W. quoted

several authorities, among which was _Marten's_ Law of Nations: "The

violation of one article only of a Treaty, by one party, may, at least

successively, give the other a right to violate the whole Treaty, unless

this right has been formally renounced."

The United States having violated that Treaty, there was no other way

than commencing a negotiation. And would gentlemen say that the

negotiation had not been attended with beneficial consequences to this

country? Was not peace the most to be desired, especially in our present

situation? Had not the managers of our Government kept a watchful eye on

our affairs? Had not our neutrality been the occasion of our wealth and

prosperity? And having now entered into a Treaty with Spain, Algiers,

and Natives, let us carry that with Great Britain into effect, and

secure to us peace with all the world.