Mr. BOURNE, of Massachusetts--

Mr. Chairman: I think little can be added after so full a discussion of

the subject before you. The object of the first section in this bill is

intended for the relief of the fishermen and their owners. They complain

that the law now in force was meant for their benefit, by granting a

drawback on the fish exported; this they find by experience is not the

case, for they say, that neither the fishermen who catch the fish, nor

the importer of the salt, receive the drawback; and I rather suppose,

sir, it is the case. The owners of the greater part of the fishing

vessels are not merchants, neither do they import the salt they consume;

but when the fish they take are cured for market, they are sold at the

market price; and it frequently happens that those persons who purchase

the fish are not the exporters of them, or the importers of the salt,

but a third person, who purchases with a prospect of selling them at a

profit, is the exporter; and when it so happens, neither the fisherman

who catches the fish, nor the importer of the salt, receives any benefit

from the drawback, unless the purchaser (the third person) give a

greater price in contemplation of the drawback, which I think is not to

be supposed.

Is it worthy the attention of Government that the cod fishery should be

preserved? It appears to me that it is. When we consider the labor and

assiduity bestowed on this object by our Ministers, at the settlement of

peace between us and Great Britain, and the care then taken to secure

this privilege, as appears by the treaty--[here Mr. B. read that part of

the treaty which secures to us the fishery, he then proceeded]--and

consider the struggle made to deprive us of this inestimable branch of

commerce, I cannot suppose that any one would, at this day, voluntarily

relinquish it, and suffer Great Britain to monopolize this branch, and

supply the Mediterranean, French, and other markets. Great Britain, at

present, enjoys a sufficient portion of this commerce, while France is

confined to the narrow limits of St. Peters and Miquelon. If we

relinquish this branch of the cod fishery, what is left us? Our whale

fishery is nearly at an end, and unless Government speedily interpose,

by granting relief, we shall totally lose it. Does not the British

Government wish to deprive us of this branch also? Have not letters of

agents been sent to the island of Nantucket, as well as New Bedford,

where this branch of business is principally prosecuted, inviting the

whale fishermen to remove, and offering them permanent settlements at

Milford-Haven, at the expense of their Government? This must be viewed

as a great encouragement, in addition to their bounties on oil, to a

class of poor men employed in that business. If the cod fishery is

relinquished, the fishermen have only to remove to the opposite shore of

Nova Scotia, where they will find encouragement fully adequate to their

services--of all which they are not unapprised. By encouraging this

class of men, your revenue will be increased; for in return for the fish

exported, you will receive sugar, coffee, cocoa, indigo, molasses,

pimento, cotton, dye-woods, rum, wine, salt, fruit, and other articles

subject to duty, and consumed in the country. And again, your Treasury

will receive an excess by the provision in this bill; for I presume the

greater proportion of vessels employed in this business are from twenty

to forty tons; the town of Marblehead, perhaps, has principally large

ones. Suppose, then, a vessel of thirty tons obtains, in a season, six

hundred quintals of fish? (a very moderate voyage indeed,) her tonnage

is seventy-five dollars; the drawback on exportation would be

seventy-eight dollars; so that your Treasury retains three dollars gain

by this bill, which would be a loss on the drawback.

Mr. Chairman, I think, upon the whole, that granting the encouragement

to the fishermen and their owners, held out in the bill, would prove

very beneficial to the United States; I hope, therefore, the section

before you will not be struck out.

At this point, the committee rose, and had leave to sit again.

TUESDAY, February 7.

_Ordered_, That the petitions of the tanners of the town of Newark, in

the State of New Jersey, which was presented yesterday, be referred to

Mr. BOUDINOT, Mr. WHITE, Mr. THATCHER, Mr. BOURNE, of Rhode Island, and

Mr. NILES; that they do examine the matter thereof, and report the same,

with their opinion thereupon, to the House.

Mr. BENSON, from the committee appointed, presented a bill for an

apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to

the first enumeration, and making provision for another enumeration, and

apportionment of Representatives thereon, to compose the House of

Representatives after the third day of March, 1797; which was received

and read the first time.

The SPEAKER laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of the

Treasury, accompanying his report stating the amount of the

subscriptions to the loans proposed by the act making provision for the

public debt, as well in the debts of the respective States as in the

domestic debt of the United States, and of the parts which remain

unsubscribed, together with such measures as are, in his opinion,

expedient to be taken on the subject, pursuant to an order of this House

of the 1st of November last; which were read, and ordered to be

committed to a Committee of the whole House on Monday next.

_The Fishery Bill_

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on

the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of

the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government

of the fishermen employed therein."

Mr. PAGE said no man in this House was more heartily disposed to

encourage the fisheries of the United States than he was; nor could any

one more sincerely wish to encourage the bold, active, and enterprising

adventurers in that branch of our commerce to persevere in it, than he

did; being sensible of the importance of their traffic in peace, and of

their defence of their country and annoyance of their enemies in war.

But, sir, (said Mr. P.,) I much doubt whether Congress can give that

encouragement to the fisheries to which they are entitled, and which

policy would lead the General Government to give, were it not restricted

by the constitution. I consider, sir, the constitution as intended to

remedy the defects of the Confederation to a certain degree; so far only

as would secure the independence and general welfare of the Confederated

States, without endangering the sovereignty and independence of the

individual States. Congress, therefore, was authorized to pay the debts

of the Union, and to regulate commerce, partly for that purpose, and

partly to prevent improper and dangerous commercial combinations,

jealousies, and altercations between the States. But Congress was not

intrusted with any regulation of exports which could admit of an

interposition which might be dictated by partiality; nor was Congress

permitted to lay any tax which could by any possibility operate

unequally on the States in general. It is said, indeed, that, if a

drawback be not allowed on the salt used in salting fish, there will be,

in fact, a duty on the exportation of the fish. But to this I think it

may be replied, that the constitution guards the exports of each State

against the possibility of a _partial_ restriction by Congress, or even

by the States themselves; that Congress cannot lay a duty on the

exportation of rice, indigo, tobacco, &c., or any other article exported

from any State, because this might be done to the injury of the State

where such duty would operate, and to the advantage and aggrandizement

of some particular States, its competitors more favored by the General

Government, or possessing more influence in the debates of Congress; and

that the States are also individually restrained from laying such duties

without the consent of Congress, to prevent acts which might produce

jealousies, commercial combinations, and, perhaps, at length, civil

dissensions. That this restriction, if it be intended to prevent

partiality, therefore, cannot extend to authorize drawbacks, which may

be productive of partial preferences and their consequent jealousies;

that if drawbacks be granted at all, they ought to be universally

extended to every article which is or can be exported from any of the

States, having in its composition a dutiable ingredient; that hence,

ships and other vessels, &c., should have drawbacks on the sails,

cordage, iron, &c.; but it may also be said that, as to the duty on

salt, that is amply repaid to the merchant by the price annexed to his

fish; the sums laid out in salt and fish together form a capital on

which he takes care to have a sufficient profit. Those merchants

employed in this traffic, if allowed a drawback, would have a preference

to other merchants, who import largely, pay heavy duties, and have no

other advantage than the usual advance on their goods. The exporter of

any article, with a drawback, must have an advantage over his

fellow-citizens, who purchase through necessity many dutiable articles,

and are obliged to consume them, without any other benefit than the use

of them. I mention this because it has been said (by Mr. AMES) that,

having made the men of Marblehead pay for salt, they have a right to

demand the money expended in that salt on the exportation of their fish;

for it would be as reasonable for the man who had ate his fish on which

his salt was expended, or who had used any other article for which he

had paid a duty, to claim of Congress a return of his money expended

therein, as the exporter of fish. The only difference is, that, if both

were paid the exact sum so expended by them, the exporter of fish would

get twice paid. The purchaser or consumer of his fish would pay him for

his salt therein, as if it were substantial fish, and the State for it

as mere salt. Here, then, is a field for partiality, discontent, and

complaints, which the constitution wisely guards against. It cannot,

therefore, be to any purpose to tell us that a bounty, or allowance, as

it is now called, is preferable to a drawback, as there is not so great

room for fraud in the one as in the other; nor can it be of importance

to show that the fishermen have not the profits to which they are

entitled. That their services in the last war deserve rewards, &c.,

their country shared with them the glory of their gallant behavior; but

they alone received the rewards they aimed at. The twelve hundred ships

they took were a compensation for services and a reward for those

exploits. It is true, they annoyed the enemy; it is certain their prizes

sometimes fed, armed, and clothed our armies; but it is not said that

they did not receive payment for furnishing those things.

But here we are asked, Is it not of great consequence to the United

States to employ those bold, skilful seamen in our service, that we may

enjoy the commercial advantage they give us in peace, and their powerful

assistance in war? To this I reply, that it ought first to be proved

that Congress has the power and authority to give them the encouragement

demanded; and even if Congress have that power, it ought to be shown

that it can be extended to the benefit of the sailors of some of the

States, and not to those of every State. It may be said that Congress

may with as much propriety give bounties to our hunters in the Western

country, to raise up a nursery of soldiers as a barrier against the

Indians, and to promote the fur trade, as to give drawbacks and bounties

to the fishermen of the Eastern States, with a view to encourage

fisheries, and to raise a nursery of seamen for their defence against

enemies who may invade our Eastern frontiers. Indeed, if defence be the

object in view, we might as well give bounties to sturdy landsmen to be

in readiness and constant training for war.

Indeed, sir, I confess I am not altogether convinced, that, if Congress

have this power, it ought to be thus exerted; because it is not clear to

me that those fishermen would not be more profitable to the United

States, if they were cultivating the lands which now lie waste, and

raising families, which would be of ten times more value than their

fisheries. A nursery of virtuous families, which will produce soldiers,

sailors, husbandmen, and statesmen, must be preferable to a mere nursery

of sailors, who generally live single, and often perish at sea. I always

look upon the loss of a crew to an infant Republic as the loss almost of

a new State.

I speak of this question, however, as a citizen of the United States, as

a member of this House. Were I to discuss it as a citizen of

Massachusetts, and in their Legislature, I should say, as the State is

nearly filled with inhabitants, and our fishermen increase our commerce

in peace, protect us in war, and, indeed, even enrich us by their

prizes, it is our interest to encourage them to the utmost, and to

prevent their going into the service of other countries. I might,

therefore, as a member of the Legislature of that State, do all in my

power to procure bounties for them, and indeed for all the sailors

belonging to that State; but I should not think of applying to Congress

for their assistance; not only because I doubt their right to afford it,

but because I should look upon it as in some degree derogatory to the

sovereignty and independence of the State. I should look upon such an

interference of Congress as a step towards swallowing up the powers of

the State Governments, and as consolidating the different States into

one Government, which the wise and virtuous in every State always

protested against as dangerous to their liberties; the fear of which

consolidation prevented many good men from voting for the adoption of

the new Government.

The framers of the constitution guarded so much against a possibility of

such partial preferences as might be given, if Congress had the right to

grant them, that, even to encourage learning and useful arts, the

granting of patents is the extent of their power. And surely nothing

could be less dangerous to the sovereignty or interests of the

individual States than the encouragement which might be given to

ingenious inventors or promoters of valuable inventions in the arts and

sciences. The encouragement which the General Government might give to

the fine arts, to commerce, to manufactures, and agriculture, might, if

judiciously applied, redound to the honor of Congress, and the splendor,

magnificence, and real advantage of the United States; but the wise

framers of our constitution saw that, if Congress had the power of

exerting what has been called a royal munificence for these purposes,

Congress might, like many royal benefactors, misplace their munificence;

might elevate sycophants, and be inattentive to men unfriendly to the

views of Government; might reward the ingenuity of the citizens of one

State, and neglect a much greater genius of another. A citizen of a

powerful State, it might be said, was attended to, whilst that of one of

less weight in the Federal scale was totally neglected. It is not

sufficient to remove these objections, to say, as some gentlemen have

said, that Congress is incapable of partiality or absurdities, and that

they are as far from committing them as my colleagues or myself. I tell

them the constitution was formed on a supposition of human frailty, and

to restrain abuses of mistaken powers. The constitution has been said by

some one to be, like answers of the oracles of old, capable of various

and opposite constructions; that it has been ingeniously contrived, like

some of them, to suit two events--a republican or a monarchical issue. I

will not pretend to say that this is not, in some instances, too just an

observation; nor will I undertake to deny that it was not the intention

of some of the Convention that such ambiguities might be in their

constitution, to correspond with the critical and ambiguous state of the

American mind respecting government; but I will boldly affirm, that,

whatever the theories of that day might lead some to think respecting

the application of monarchical principles to the Government of the

United States, no one can, at this day, pretend that they are applicable

to their circumstances, their dispositions, or interests, or even are

agreeable to the wishes of the people. Even before the adoption of the

constitution, when the rights of men had not been so thoroughly

investigated as they since have been, it must be remembered that whole

States, and large and respectable minorities in other States complained

of and objected to the aristocratical and monarchical features of the

new Government. In vain did the friends of the new Government--friends

of order, of union, or of liberty--contend that the powers granted by

the constitution which appeared so alarming were such as would never be

exerted but when all good men would acknowledge the necessity of

exercising them, and that, indeed, they would be explained or restrained

by some future amendments. The sagacious and eloquent HENRY shook his

head at such promises, sighed and submitted to the will of the

majority--a small one indeed--but foretold, from his knowledge of the

human heart, what would be done and said in justification of every

measure which might extend the power of Congress.

Is it politic and wise, then, Mr. Chairman, to exert the power contended

for, even if it be authorized by the constitution? May not the

interferences of Congress in the business of regulating the trade of the

Eastern States, excite, if not envy on account of a supposed partiality,

a jealousy lest Congress undertake to intermeddle in the commercial

regulations of other States? May not Congress with equal propriety,

undertake to regulate the tobacco, the rice, and indigo trade, as well

as that of the fisheries? If they intermeddle in the business of

sailors, why not in that of manufacturers and farmers? Where, I may ask

with my colleague, may they not go on in their zeal, and, I may add, in

their laudable pursuit, of promoting the general welfare--and how

totally may they be mistaken? If jealousy of rival States, instead of

mutual satisfaction and pleasure--if distrust and suspicion of Congress,

instead of confidence in their measures, be the consequence--how will

the Union be promoted, or the General Government secured? However

virtuously disposed the present members may be, (and I am ready to

applaud their honest intentions,) let them consider, sir, that they had

better suppress their patriotic emotions, than give a pretext for their

successors to abuse the powers which they now wish to exert for the

public good. I know they will quote the opinion of as wise and virtuous

a citizen as is in the United States. I know his patriotism, and know

well his true Republican principles; but, sir, with the freedom of a

fellow-citizen, I take the liberty of saying, that his honest zeal, like

that of the friends of the bill, has led him into a mistake.[43] That

able statesman and virtuous citizen, like the eloquent advocates of the

bill, has considered the acts now quoted as a full sanction for the one

before the committee. But I am of opinion, that those acts had better be

repealed than give a sanction to the enacting of a law which goes to the

establishing of bounties, or drawbacks, or by whatever other name they

are called, which may be used to the partial encouragement of any branch

of trade or employment whatsoever. I shall therefore vote against the

bill before us, and, to get rid of it shall vote for striking out of it

the first section, according to the motion now before the committee. As

a member of this House, I shall think it my duty to protect the

fisheries, and every other branch of our commerce, the fisherman as well

as every other citizen, as far as may be within my ability; but I am not

permitted, as a member of Congress, I humbly conceive, to select the

fisheries and fishermen as objects of more consequence than any other

branches of trade, or persons employed in them, lest Congress should not

only show a mistaken attachment, or, even if judiciously placed, excite

jealousies and discontents between the States, and distrust, destructive

of their weight and influence. My constant wish has been to see Congress

confined to such acts as would form a more perfect union, promote the

general welfare, ensure domestic tranquillity, and engage the confidence

of our fellow-citizens.

My wish is, that the members of Congress would leave their respective

States in the full enjoyment of every right and privilege they held

before their adoption of the new constitution, which can be exercised

without prejudice to the General Government. Let the Legislatures of the

different States encourage, as far as in their power, the commerce,

agriculture, or manufactures of their respective States? and let

Congress, as far as can be consistent with the most steady impartiality,

patronize their patriotic exertions, by wise regulations of their

commerce with foreign nations, such as may open as full an intercourse

with those nations as the States may desire. The emulation of the sister

States in commerce, manufactures, or agriculture, would lead to the

early establishment of that branch of either to which each State might

be best adapted. This rivalship could produce no jealousy, no general

national discontent in the States, no localities in Congress. Virginia

would not attempt to rival Massachusetts in her fisheries or carrying

business, nor will South Carolina and Georgia rival the manufactories of

New Jersey and Pennsylvania. Each State may rejoice to see its sister

States enjoying the advantages with which Heaven has blessed them; and

Congress, if confined to subjects which admit not of local

considerations, may debate with temper and decide with unbiased

judgment. I confess I have wished that Congress possessed the power that

the friends of the bill tell us we do possess, and tell us we have

exerted; but, on examining the constitution with a view to my wish, I

found reason to think, not only that Congress has not that power, but

that it ought not to possess it, unless the constitution was intended to

establish a consolidated Government on the ruin of the State

Legislatures; but this, I conceive, cannot be the case, because the

constitution guarantees to the States their respective Republican

Governments. The general powers of Congress, no doubt, ought to be (as

they are) adequate to the purpose of forming a more _perfect union_ than

subsisted under the Confederation, to establish justice, &c.; but, as

they are bound to guarantee to the States their respective Republican

forms of Government, I cannot conceive how any of these powers can be

employed, consistently with the ends for which they were given, in

diminishing the power and sovereignty of the State Legislatures. How

Congress can interfere in the regulations respecting the merchants and

their sailors at Marblehead with more propriety than with those at

Philadelphia, Norfolk, or Charleston, I cannot conceive; nor how this

interference could take place without alarming those States, I know not.

Viewing the bill before us in this light, Mr. Chairman, I shall vote

against it, and, as I said before, to get rid of it, shall vote to

strike out the first section, according to the motion now before the

committee.

The question on striking out the first section was taken, and

negatived--32 to 26.

WEDNESDAY, February 8.

A message was received from the President of the United States, together

with a statement of certain articles of expense, which have occurred in

the Department of Foreign Affairs, and for which no provision is made by

law. [The expense alluded to was incurred for the relief of a number of

American sailors, impressed in England to serve on board the British

navy.] The message and accompanying papers were referred to a select

committee, to examine and report.

The SPEAKER laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of War,

accompanying certain communications with the Executive of Virginia

relative to the existing temporary defensive protection of the exposed

frontiers of that State, pursuant to the orders of the President of the

United States; which were read, and ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. WHITE, from the committee appointed, presented a bill providing for

the settlement of the claims of persons under particular circumstances

barred by the limitations heretofore established; which was read twice

and committed.

Mr. BENSON, from the committee to whom was referred the report of the

Secretary of the Treasury on the petition of Comfort Sands, and others,

made a report; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

_The Cod Fisheries._

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, on

the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of

the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government

of the fishermen employed therein."

On a motion to strike out the words "bounty now allowed," and insert

_allowance now made_, &c.--

Mr. GILES observed, that he conceived the vote of yesterday against

striking out the first section, was a decision in favor of the policy of

granting Governmental aid to the fisheries; the inquiry of to-day will

be on what terms this aid shall be granted? He felt but little regret at

the decision of yesterday, because he had himself previously

contemplated some reasons, not unimportant, to justify that decision,

and others had been suggested by several gentlemen in the course of the

debate. The principles of this policy, he thought, however, might be

combated by reasons of at least equal, and as far as he was able to

judge, of paramount importance; but as he admitted considerable weight

in the reasons on each side of the question, he was not particularly

tenacious of the preference which his own opinion suggested. When he

first mentioned his doubts respecting the principle of the bill, it was

with diffidence, and those doubts in some measure arose from an idea

that the bill contained a direct bounty upon occupation; upon a more

minute examination, he thought the term bounty unnecessarily introduced

into the bill, and that the object of it could be answered without the

use of terms, which might hereafter be deemed to contain a decision upon

the general principle of the constitutional right to grant bounties; it

was to avoid any thing which might wear the appearance of such a

decision, that induced him to make the present motion.

He proceeded to remark, that as great a difference of opinion often

existed respecting the precise meaning of the terms used, as the

consequences which flow from them after attaining such precision of

meaning; and it is of importance to the present discussion that an

accurate definition of the terms used in the bill, and those proposed to

be used, should be had. The avowed object of the bill is not to

increase, but to transmute the sum, or a portion thereof, now allowed to

the fisheries in lieu of the drawback upon salt, from the merchant who

is now supposed to receive the sole benefit, to the fishermen really

employed in the fishing vessels. This is a mere chimerical project, but

if it be admitted that this is the object to be effected by the bill,

the term bounty is improperly applied.

A gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. AMES,) who rests the defence of

this bill almost solely upon this position, that those who receive the

benefit intended by it, are of right entitled to such benefit in

consideration of a previous advancement in value, and that this bill

contains a mere permission to them to retain their own, has at the same

time declared, that he thought the term bounty the most proper and

technical, to convey this idea. In this, the gentleman appears to have

deviated from his usual accuracy. A bounty is the granting a benefit

without a correspondent return in value; a drawback is the retaking of

something in consideration of a previous advancement; this is always

founded upon a consideration previously received--that is a grant of

favor _ex mero motu_. But the great characteristic distinction between

bounties and drawbacks as they essentially relate to the administration

of this Government consists in the governmental objects to which they

may severally be applied: drawbacks are necessarily confined to

commercial regulations; bounties may be extended to every possible

object of Government, and may pervade the whole minutiæ of police. They

may not only be extended to commerce, but to _learning_, _agriculture_,

_manufactures_, and even the _sacredness_ of religion will be found too

feeble to furnish complete protection from their influence. The people

of the United States have always been scrupulously tenacious of a

constitutional security for the most free and equal exercises of this

right, but through the medium of bounties, even this right may be

invaded, and the only security against such invasion must be

_governmental discretion_. The same characteristic distinction will

attend that _species_ of bounty which may incidentally result from

commercial regulations; and direct bounties upon occupation founded upon

the broad basis of discretionary right. The specification in the

constitution of the right to regulate commerce, may possibly in some

cases give rise to this indirect species of bounty, not from any right

in the constitution to grant bounties, but as the necessary result from

the specified right to make commercial regulations; and this

specification can be the only foundation of justification to this

indirect species of bounty; but there is no specification in the

constitution of a right to regulate _learning_, or _agriculture_,

_manufactures_, or _religion_, and so far as the sense of the

constitution can be collected, it rather forbids than authorizes the

exercise of that right.

Arguments used to deduce any given authority from the term _general

welfare_, abstractedly from the specification of some particular

authority, are dangerous in the extreme to rights constitutionally

reserved, and ought ever to be viewed with great caution and suspicion.

They serve directly to show that this Government is not only

consolidated in all its parts, but that it is a consolidated Government

of unlimited discretion; that it contains no constitutional limitation

or restriction. If any given authority be inferred from the term

_general welfare_ in the abstract, any other authority is equally

deducible from it, because the term is applicable to every possible

object of Government, and differs only in degree, as to the several

Governmental objects.

He could not see the force of the novel and curious distinction taken by

a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. HILLHOUSE) between _general welfare_

and _particular welfare_; for every particular welfare, however minute,

may be in a degree for the general welfare, and if the decision

respecting the existence of this distinction, have no other limitation

than Congressional discretion, it is equally destructive of all

constitutional restraint. Gentlemen who have advocated this principle of

construction, appear startled at some consequences suggested to result

from it, and have denied that they have made the admission of such

consequences. This is true, nor have those in reply so asserted, but

they have taken up the principles of construction furnished by its

advocates, and made the application of it to the consequences which they

themselves infer; and if the principle be admitted, it is undeniable

that the conclusions drawn from it will necessarily follow in their

utmost latitude.

A gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. BARNWELL) confidently spoke of the

inherent rights of this Government; this is a new source of authority,

and totally inapplicable to this Government. If there be inherent rights

in governments at all, they must belong to governments growing out of a

state of society, and not to a government deriving all its authorities

by charter from previously existing governments, or the people of those

governments. In such a government, the exercise of every authority not

contained in the instrument, or deducible from it by a fair and candid

construction, is an unjustifiable assumption and usurpation. He did not

mean to analyze this subject further at this time, and had been led into

these general remarks, because the impatience of the committee to have

the question upon striking out the section had caused him to refrain

from delivering these sentiments at that time.

He would remark further, that bounties in all countries and at all

times, have been the effect of favoritism; they have only served to

divert the current of industry from its natural channel, into one less

advantageous or productive; and in fact, they are nothing more than

governmental _thefts_ committed upon the rights of one part of the

community, and an _unmerited_ governmental _munificence_ to the other.

In this country, and under this Government, they present an aspect

peculiarly _dreadful_ and _deformed_.

To contemplate the subjects upon which bounties are to operate in the

United States, the nature of the Government to dispense them, the State

preferences which now do and will for ever, more or less, continue to

exist, the impossibility of an equal operation of bounties throughout

the United States, upon any subject whatever, should be considered; and

one of these two effects will necessarily follow the exercise of them;

either the very existence of the Government will be destroyed, or its

administration must be radically changed, it must be converted into the

most complex system of tyranny and favoritism.

He observed, that it is not unfrequent at this time to hear of an

Eastern and Southern interest, and he had for some time silently and

indignantly seen, or thought he saw, attempts by this means to influence

the deliberations of this House upon almost every important question.

So far as he was the insulted object of these attempts, he felt that

contempt for their authors, which appeared to him to be the

correspondent tribute to the impurity of their designs; yet he thought

that this had been the most formidable and effectual _ministerial

machine_ which had been yet used in the administration of Government.

But one great mischief he apprehended from establishing the principle of

the unrestrained right to grant bounties, will be, that it will make the

difference of interest between Eastern and Southern, so far as they

differ in their respective States of manufacture and agriculture, real,

which is now only ideal. It will make that party real, which is now

artificial. The jealousies and suspicions arising from _party_, will

then have a substantial foundation, which now have no foundation in

fact, but are ingeniously stimulated by a few, for the purpose of

effecting particular objects; as long as the Government shall be

administered liberally and impartially, as long as the principle of

reciprocal demand and supply between East and South shall remain

inviolate, so long there can exist no essential distinct interest

between them; but the instant bounties or governmental preferences are

granted to occupation, that instant is created a separate and distinct

interest, not wholly between East and South, but between the

manufacturer and the cultivator of the soil. There will still exist a

community of agricultural interests throughout the United States, and he

hoped the time was not far distant, when a common sympathy will be felt

by the whole of that class of the community. For these reasons, he hoped

the motion would prevail.

The bill having been gone through with, and amended, the committee rose

and reported it with amendments which the House immediately took into

consideration and adopted. The bill was then further amended and the

House adjourned.

THURSDAY, February 9.

_The Cod Fisheries._

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of

the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government

of the fishermen employed therein," together with the amendments

thereto, was read the third time; and the question being put that the

same do pass, it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 38, nays 21, as

follows:

YEAS.--Messrs. Fisher Ames, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson,

Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne,

Abraham Clark, Jonathan Dayton, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge

Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon,

Andrew Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Thomas Hartley, James

Hillhouse, Daniel Huger, John W. Kittera, John Laurance,

Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee, Samuel Livermore, James

Madison, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg Nathaniel Niles,

Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith,

William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan Sturges, Peter

Sylvester, George Thatcher, Thomas Tredwell, John Vining,

Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.

NAYS.--Messrs. John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, John

Brown, William B. Giles, William Barry Grove, Daniel

Heister, Philip Key, Nathaniel Macon, John Francis Mercer,

Andrew Moore, William Vans Murray, John Page, Josiah

Parker, Joshua Seney, John Steele, Thomas Sumter, Thomas

Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, Alexander White, Hugh

Williamson, and Francis Willis.

_Resolved_, That the title of the said bill be, "An act concerning

certain fisheries of the United States, and for the regulation and

government of the fishermen employed therein."

Mr. LAURANCE presented a petition from the tanners and curriers of the

city of New York, praying relief from the hardships they labor under, in

consequence of the exportation of tanners' bark. Referred to a select

committee.

WEDNESDAY, February 22.

_Indemnity to Gen. Greene's Estate._

On a motion made and seconded, that the House do come to the following

resolution:

"Whereas the late Major General Nathaniel Greene, on the

eighth day of April, one thousand seven hundred and

eighty-three, the more effectually to procure rations, and

supplies for the Southern Army of the United States, became

bound as surety for John Banks & Company to Newcomen &

Collet, merchants in Charleston, for the payment of eight

thousand seven hundred and forty-three pounds fifteen

shillings and sixpence, sterling money, being the condition

of said bond:

"And whereas, on the first day of May, one thousand seven

hundred and eighty-six, the balance of principal and

interest of said bond, being then eight thousand six

hundred and eighty-eight pounds six shillings sterling, was

paid by the said General Greene: Therefore,

"_Resolved_, That the United States shall indemnify the

estate of the said General Greene for the said sum last

mentioned, and the interest thereof: _Provided_, The

Executors of the said General Greene shall account for a

sum, being about two thousand pounds, be the same more or

less, received of John Ferrie, one of the partners of the

said Banks & Company, to be in part of the indemnification

aforesaid; and also shall make over, for the use of the

United States, all mortgages, bonds, covenants, or other

counter-securities whatsoever, now due, which were obtained

by the said General Greene in his lifetime, from the said

Banks & Company on account of his being surety for them as

aforesaid, to be sued for in the name of the said

executors, for the use of the United States:"

_Ordered_, That the said resolution be committed to a Committee of the

whole House immediately.

The House accordingly resolved itself into a Committee of the whole

House on the said resolution; and, after some time spent therein, the

committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again.

SATURDAY, March 10.

_Courtesies to France._

On a motion made and seconded, that the House do come to the following

resolution:

"_Resolved_, That this House hath received, with sentiments

of high satisfaction, the notification of the King of the

French, of his acceptance of the constitution presented to

him in the name of the Nation; and that the President of

the United States be requested, in his answer to the said

notification, to express the sincere participation of the

House in the interests of the French Nation, on this great

and important event; and their wish that the wisdom and

magnanimity displayed in the formation and acceptance of

the constitution, may be rewarded by the most perfect

attainment of its object, the permanent happiness of so

great a people."

It was moved and seconded that the said motion be committed. And on the

question for commitment, it passed in the negative--yeas 17, nays 35.

And then debate arising on the said motion, a division thereof was

called for. Whereupon,

The question being put, that the House do agree to the first part of the

said motion, in the words following:

"_Resolved_, That this House has received, with sentiments

of high satisfaction, the notification of the King of the

French, of his acceptance of the constitution presented to

him in the name of the Nation: And that the President of

the United States be requested, in his answer to the said

notification, to express the sincere participation of the

House in the interests of the French Nation, on this great

and important event:"

It was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 50, nays 2, as follows:

YEAS.--Fisher Ames, John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin,

Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, William Findlay, Thomas

Fitzsimons, William B. Giles, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin

Goodhue, James Gordon, Andrew Gregg, Thomas Hartley, Daniel

Heister, James Hillhouse, Israel Jacobs, Philip Key, Aaron

Kitchell, John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned,

Richard Bland Lee, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon, James

Madison, John Francis Mercer, William Vans Murray,

Nathaniel Niles, John Page, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker,

Theodore Sedgwick, Joshua Seney, Jeremiah Smith, Israel

Smith, William Smith, John Steele, Samuel Sterrett,

Jonathan Sturges, Thomas Sumter, George Thatcher, Thomas

Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham Venable, John

Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Artemas Ward, Anthony Wayne,

Alexander White, Hugh Williamson, and Francis Willis.

NAYS.--Robert Barnwell and Egbert Benson.

On the question, that the House do agree to the second part of the said

motion, in the words following:

"And their wish that the wisdom and magnanimity displayed

in the formation and acceptance of the constitution, may be

rewarded by the most perfect attainment of its object, the

permanent happiness of so great a people:"

It was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 35, nays 16.

_Ordered_, That Mr. TUCKER, Mr. MADISON, Mr. MERCER, Mr. VINING, and

Mr. PAGE, be appointed a committee to wait on the President of the

United States, with the said resolution.

SATURDAY, March 24.

_Establishment of a Mint._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the

bill sent from the Senate, entitled, "An act establishing a Mint, and

regulating the coins of the United States." The following amendment

being under consideration, viz:

"In the tenth section, strike out the words, '_Or

representation of the head of the President of the United

States for the time being, with an inscription, which shall

express the initial or first letter of his Christian or

first name, and his surname at length, the succession of

the Presidency numerically_,' and, in lieu thereof, insert,

'Emblematic of Liberty,' with an inscription of the word

LIBERTY."

Mr. PAGE, in support of this motion said, that it had been a practice in

monarchies to exhibit the figures or heads of their kings upon their

coins, either to hand down, in the ignorant ages in which this practice

was introduced, a kind of chronological account of their kings, or to

show to whom the coin belonged. We have all read, that the Jews paid

tribute to the Romans, by means of a coin on which was the head of their

Cæsar. Now as we have no occasion for this aid to history, nor any

pretence to call the money of the United States the money of our

Presidents, there can be no sort of necessity for adopting the idea of

the Senate. I second the motion, therefore, for the amendment proposed;

and the more readily because I am certain it will be more agreeable to

the citizens of the United States, to see the head of Liberty on their

coin, than the heads of Presidents. However well pleased they might be

with the head of the great man now their President, they may have no

great reason to be pleased with some of his successors; as to him, they

have his busts, his pictures every where; historians are daily

celebrating his fame, and Congress have voted him a monument. A further

compliment they need not pay him, especially when it may be said, that

no Republic has paid such a compliment to its Chief Magistrate; and when

indeed it would be viewed by the world as a stamp of royalty on our

coins: would wound the feelings of many friends, and gratify our

enemies.

Mr. WILLIAMSON seconded the motion also, and affirmed that the Romans

did not put the heads of their Consuls on their money; that Julius Cæsar

wished to have his on the Roman coin, but only ventured to cause the

figure of an elephant to be impressed thereon; that by a pun on the

Carthaginian name of that animal, which sounded like the name of Cæsar,

he might be said to be on the coin. He thought the amendment consistent

with Republican principles, and therefore approved of it.

Mr. LIVERMORE ridiculed, with an uncommon degree of humor, the idea

that it could be of any consequence to the United States whether the

head of Liberty were on their coins or not; the President was a very

good emblem of Liberty; but what an emblematical figure might be, he

could not tell. A ghost had been said to be in the shape of the sound of

a drum, and so might Liberty for aught he knew; but how the President's

head being on our coins could affect the liberty of the people, was

incomprehensible to him. He hoped, therefore, that the amendment would

be rejected.

Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, agreed with Mr. LIVERMORE in opinion;

adding, that the President representing the people of the United States,

might with great propriety represent them on their coins. He denied that

Republics did not place the images of their Chief Magistrates on their

coins; and said, he was surprised that a member who so much admired the

French and their new constitution, should be so averse to a practice

they have established; the head of their King is by their constitution

put upon their money. Besides, it was strange that for a circumstance so

trivial we should lose time in debating, and risk the loss of an

important bill.

The said amendment was again read, and a division of the question

thereon called for: Whereupon,

The question being taken, that the House do agree to the first part of

the said amendment, for striking out the words "or representation of the

head of the President of the United States for the time being, with an

inscription, which shall express the initial or first letter of his

Christian or first name, and his surname at length, the succession of

the Presidency numerically:"--it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas

26, nays 22.

And then the question being taken that the House do agree to the second

part of the said amendment, for inserting, in lieu of the words stricken

out, the words, "Emblematic of liberty, with an inscription of the word

Liberty:"--it was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 42, nays 6.

MONDAY, March 26.

_Establishment of a Mint._

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate disagree to

the amendment proposed by this House to the bill entitled "An act

establishing a Mint, and regulating the coins of the United States;" and

agree to the amendment proposed by this House to the bill entitled "An

act supplemental to the act for making further and more effectual

provision for the protection of the frontiers of the United States."

It was moved that the House should recede from their amendment to the

bill entitled "An act establishing a Mint, and regulating the coins of

the United States."

Mr. LIVERMORE supported the motion. He said, he did not conceive it

possible that and friend to the President of the United States, the

Chief Magistrate, that great and good man, would have refused to pay

every tribute of respect which was justly due to him. We have now a

favorable opportunity of complimenting him, without any shadow of

flattery, and without any expense. But, instead of this, what is

proposed? An emblematical figure of Liberty. But what is this liberty

which some appear to be so fond of? He had no idea of such liberty as

appears to possess the minds of some gentlemen. It is little better than

the liberty of savages--a relinquishment of all law that contradicts or

thwarts their passions or desires. His idea of liberty was that which

arose from law and justice, which secured every man in his proper and

social rights. Some gentlemen may think a bear broke loose from his

chain a fit emblem of liberty; others may devise a different emblem; but

he could not conceive that any of them would be applicable to the

situation of the United States, which justly boasted of being always

free. If any idea of an emblem is necessary, he thought it might be

applied to the head of the President of the United States. The present

occasion affords the best opportunity of doing honor to the man we love;

instead of which, we offer him an affront. He could not reconcile this

conduct to propriety or consistency; for, while it is proposed to raise

a monument to the memory of the President, which will cost fifty

thousand guineas, a proposition to honor him in a more effectual manner,

and in a way which will be satisfactory to the people, without any

expense, and with perfect security to their liberties, is objected to.

He hoped the House would recede.

Mr. MERCER replied to Mr. LIVERMORE with some degree of asperity. He

observed that there was a rule in the British House of Commons that the

name of the King should never be mentioned in any debate. He thought

some such rule might be introduced with advantage into this House. In

the course of his remarks, to show that the circumstance of having the

President's head stamped on the coin could not be justly considered as

doing him an honor, he said, that persons of no better character than a

Nero, a Caligula, or a Heliogabalus, may enjoy it as well as a Trajan,

&c.

Mr. SENEY animadverted with severity on the remarks offered by Mr.

LIVERMORE, and on the conduct of the Senate; particularly in returning

the bill with a negative to the amendment of the House, within a period

that left them no time to deliberate on the reasons which might have

influenced the House.

Mr. GILES opposed the motion for receding. He adverted to the ideas

which are connected with the subject in European countries. The

President's head will not designate the Government. There is to be but

one head; but does not our Government consist of three parts? Is there

any other head proposed to be on the coin but the President's? He said

this circumstance was of a piece with the first act of the Senate. It

had a near affinity to titles, that darling child of the Senate, which

has been put to nurse, with an intention that it shall be announced at

some future period in due form.

Mr. BENSON said, he supposed he should be extremely disorderly were he

to mention the motives which influenced the Senate in their discussions.

He knew not what they were, nor was it of importance that he should. He

then observed, that plain pieces of metal will not answer for money;

some impression is necessary to guard against counterfeits. The Senate

have determined what the device shall be; but the House, by their

amendment, have left the matter entirely to the judgment of the artist,

who may form such an emblem as suits his fancy. Mr. B. ridiculed the

idea of the people's being enslaved by their Presidents, and much less

by his image on their coin.

Mr. PAGE replied that he was sorry to find that some gentlemen

endeavored to ridicule Republican cautions. He thought it both

indelicate and inconsistent with their situations, as well as highly

impolitic. He confessed that, as long as the people were sensible of the

blessings of liberty, and had their eyes open to watch encroachments,

they would not be enslaved; but if they should ever shut them, or become

inattentive to their interests and the true principles of a free

government, they, like other nations, might lose their liberties; that

it was the duty of the members of that House to keep the eyes of their

constituents open, and to watch over their liberties. It was therefore

unbecoming a member to treat with levity and to ridicule any sentiment

which had that tendency. For his part, he thought it the peculiar duty

of the Representative of a free people to put them upon their guard

against any thing which could possibly endanger their liberties. That

with this view he warned his constituents of the danger, not merely of

imitating the flattery and almost idolatrous practice of Monarchies with

respect to the honor paid to their Kings, by impressing their images and

names on their coins, but he wished to add as few incentives as possible

to competitors for the President's place. He warned his country against

the cabals, the corruption, and animosities, which might be excited by

the intrigues of ambitious men, animated with the hope of handing their

names down to the latest ages on the medals of their country. But this

indiscriminate honor is unworthy of the President's acceptance. A Nero,

a Caligula, a Heliogabalus, it has been observed, (by Mr. MERCER,) may

enjoy it as well as a Trajan. To apply it to the present Chief

Magistrate, alone, would be less exceptionable. But this would be highly

improper; for, if he should pass an act for this purpose, it might blast

his reputation. I am of opinion that the Senate knew his delicacy would

not permit him to pass such a one. They have therefore extended the

compliment to all his successors. We are under obligations to the great

man now our President; but a lover of liberty and friend to the rights

of man would be cautious how he showed his sense of that obligation. As

a friend to the President, I am unwilling to offer him a compliment

which, if accepted, might damn his reputation. Were I in his place, I

would cut off my hand rather than it should sign the act as it now

stands. Were I his greatest enemy, I should wish him to pass it as it

was passed by the Senate. Sir, I am as much his friend as the member

from New Hampshire, and have shown, at proper times and places, that I

was so. I am too sensible of the honor our President has acquired to

suppose that an unbecoming compliment can in any degree contribute to

its increase. I hope, therefore, the amendment which the House has made

will not be receded from.

The question being now put, that this House doth recede from the said

amendment, it passed in the negative--yeas 24, nays 32, as follows:

YEAS.--Fisher Ames, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, Elias

Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Thomas

Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin

Goodhue, Thomas Hartley, James Hillhouse, Daniel Huger,

Israel Jacobs, John W. Kittera, Amasa Learned, Samuel

Livermore, Theodore Sedgwick, William Smith, Jonathan

Sturges, Peter Sylvester, George Thatcher, Jeremiah

Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.

NAYS.--John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, John Brown,

Abraham Clark, William B. Giles, James Gordon, Andrew

Gregg, Samuel Griffin, William Barry Grove, Daniel Heister,

Philip Key, Aaron Kitchell, Richard Bland Lee, Nathaniel

Macon, James Madison, John Francis Mercer, Andrew Moore,

William Vans Murray, Nathaniel Niles, John Page, Josiah

Parker, Joshua Seney, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, John

Steele, Thomas Sumter, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor

Tucker, Abraham Venable, John Vining, Alexander White, and

Hugh Williamson.

_Resolved_, That this House doth adhere to the said amendment.

_Ordered_, That the Clerk of this House do acquaint the Senate

therewith.

TUESDAY, March 27.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate recede from

their disagreement to the amendment adhered to by this House to the bill

entitled "An act establishing a Mint, and regulating the coins of the

United States."

WEDNESDAY, April 4.

_General Nathaniel Greene._

The House proceeded to consider the resolution reported from the

Committee of the whole House on the 24th of February last, to indemnify

the estate of the late General Nathaniel Greene for a certain suretyship

entered into by the said Nathaniel Greene, in his lifetime, on the

public behalf. Whereupon, the said resolution being read at the Clerk's

table, as follows:

"Whereas, the late Major General Nathaniel Greene, on the

8th day of April, 1783, the more effectually to procure

_rations_ and supplies for the Southern Army of the United

States, became bound as surety for John Banks & Co., to

Newcomen & Collet, merchants in Charleston, for the payment

of £8,743 15_s._ 6_d._, sterling money, being the condition

of the said bond:

"And whereas, on the 1st of May, 1786, the balance of

principal and interest of said bond, being then £8,688

6_s._ sterling, was paid by the said General Greene.

Therefore,

"_Resolved_, That the United States shall indemnify the

estate of the said General Greene for the said sum last

mentioned, and the interest thereof, or for such sum as,

upon due investigation by the officers of the Treasury of

the transactions between John Banks & Co., with Messrs.

Newcomen & Collet, in which General Greene was security for

said Banks & Co., it shall appear that neither General

Greene nor his executors shall have received any payment or

compensation for: _Provided_, The executors of the said

General Greene shall account for a sum being about £2,000,

be the same more or less, recovered by John Ferrie, one of

the partners of the said John Banks & Co., to be in part of

the indemnification aforesaid; and also shall make over for

the use of the United States, all mortgages, bonds,

covenants, or other counter-securities whatsoever, now due,

which were obtained by the said General Greene, in his

lifetime, from the said Banks & Co., on account of his

being surety for them as aforesaid, to be sued for in the

name of the said executors, for the use of the United

States."

The previous question thereon was called for by five members, to wit:

"Shall the main question, to agree to the said resolution, be now put?"

And on the previous question, "Shall the main question be now put?" it

was resolved in the affirmative. And then the main question, "That the

House do agree to the said resolution?" being put, it was resolved in

the affirmative--yeas 29, nays 26, as follows:

YEAS.--Fisher Ames, Abraham Baldwin, Robert Barnwell,

Egbert Benson, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, William

Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry, Andrew Gregg,

Thomas Hartley, Daniel Heister, Philip Key, John W.

Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Richard Bland Lee,

Samuel Livermore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William

Vans Murray, John Page, Theodore Sedgwick, Upton Sheridine,

William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, George Thatcher, John

Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Francis Willis.

NAYS.--John Baptist Ashe, Elias Boudinot, John Brown,

Abraham Clark, William B. Giles, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin

Goodhue, James Gordon, William Barry Grove, James

Hillhouse, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, Nathaniel Macon,

Andrew Moore, Nathaniel Niles, Joshua Seney, Jeremiah

Smith, Israel Smith, John Steele, Jonathan Sturges, Thomas

Sumter, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Artemas Ward,

Alexander White, and Hugh Williamson.

_Ordered_, That a bill or bills be brought in pursuant to the said

resolution, and that Mr. LIVERMORE, Mr. PAGE, and Mr. BARNWELL, do

prepare and bring in the same.

THURSDAY, April 5.

_Apportionment Bill._

A message was received from the President of the United States returning

to the House the bill passed by the two Houses entitled "An act for an

Apportionment of Representatives among the several States according to

the first Enumeration," and presented to the President for his

approbation on Monday, the 26th of March; to which bill the President

having made objections, the said objections were read, and ordered to be

entered at large on the Journal, as follows:

"UNITED STATES, _April 5, 1792_."

_Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:_

"I have maturely considered the act passed by the two

Houses entitled 'An act for an Apportionment of

Representatives among the several States, according to the

first Enumeration;' and I return it to your House, wherein

it originated, with the following objections:

"First. The constitution has prescribed that

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several

States according to their respective numbers; and there is

no one proportion or divisor which, applied to the

respective numbers of the States, will yield the number and

allotment of Representatives proposed by the bill.

"Second. The constitution has also provided that the number

of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty

thousand; which restriction is, by the context, and by fair

and obvious construction, to be applied to the separate and

respective numbers of the States; and the bill has allotted

to eight of the States more than one for every thirty

thousand.

"G. WASHINGTON."

_Resolved_, That to-morrow be assigned for the reconsideration of the

said bill, in the mode prescribed by the Constitution of the United

States.

FRIDAY, April 6.

_Apportionment Bill._

The House proceeded to reconsider the bill passed by the two Houses

entitled "An act for an Apportionment of Representatives among the

several States, according to the first Enumeration," which was presented

for approbation on Monday, the 26th of March, and returned by the

President yesterday, with objections.

The said bill was read, and is as follows:

"An act for an Appointment of Representatives among the

several States, according to the first Enumeration.

"_Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives

of the United States of America in Congress assembled_,

That, from and after the 3d day of March, in the year one

thousand seven hundred and ninety-three, the House of

Representatives shall be composed of one hundred and twenty

members, elected within the several States, according to

the following apportionment, that is to say: Within the

State of New Hampshire, five; within the State of

Massachusetts, sixteen; within the State of Vermont, three;

within the State of Rhode Island, two; within the State of

Connecticut, eight; within the State of New York, eleven:

within the State of New Jersey, six; within the State of

Pennsylvania, fourteen; within the State of Delaware, two;

within the State of Maryland, nine; within the State of

Virginia, twenty-one; within the State of Kentucky, two;

within the State of North Carolina, twelve; within the

State of South Carolina, seven; and within the State of

Georgia, two.

"JONATHAN TRUMBULL,

"_Speaker of the House of Representatives._

"JOHN ADAMS,

"_Vice President U. S. and President of Senate._"

The President's objections were also read; and, after debate on the

subject-matter of the said bill, the question "That the House, on

reconsideration, do agree to pass the bill," was determined in the mode

prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and passed in the

negative--yeas 23, nays 33, as follows:

YEAS.--Fisher Ames, Egbert Benson, Shearjashub Bourne,

Benjamin Bourne, Abraham Clark, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge

Gerry, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon,

Thomas Hartley, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W.

Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, Samuel Livermore,

Nathaniel Niles, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Theodore

Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, John Steele, George

Thatcher, Thomas Tredwell, John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth,

and Artemas Ward.

NAYS.--John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, Robert Barnwell,

John Brown, William Findlay, William B. Giles, Andrew

Gregg, Samuel Griffin, Wm. Barry Grove, Daniel Heister,

James Hillhouse, Daniel Huger, Philip Key, Richard Bland

Lee, Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Francis Mercer,

Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans

Murray, John Page, Josiah Parker, Joshua Seney, Upton

Sheridine, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan

Sturges, Thomas Sumter, Thomas Tudor Tucker, Abraham

Venable, Alexander White, Hugh Williamson, and Francis

Willis.

And so the bill was rejected, two-thirds of the House not agreeing to

pass the same.

MONDAY, April 9.

_Apportionment Bill._

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the

bill for an Apportionment of Representatives among the several States,

according to the first Enumeration; at the ratio of one for every ----

thousand persons, in the respective States.

Mr. GILES observed, that, although this subject has been heretofore

thoroughly discussed, and the minds of gentlemen probably fatigued with

the discussion, yet he could not help trespassing upon the patience of

the committee, by mentioning some of the principal reasons which would

influence his vote against the motion, and in favor of that ratio which

will afford the greatest number of Representatives authorized by the

constitution. He was induced to do this from an opinion that, in the

usual course of things, arguments will have an effect upon the public

mind in some measure proportioned to their own solidity, and the purity

of the motives which actuate them. That the compound of these qualities

form a common standard, by which all arguments would and ought to be

measured by the great majority of the people; and he had no objections

to submitting his reasons to the application of this common standard; he

meant, however, to confine himself to general remarks, and not to

fatigue the committee unnecessarily with minute exemplification of them.

He proceeded by observing, that the expression in the constitution

induced and justified the general expectation among the people of the

United States, that one Representative for every thirty thousand persons

was secured to them by the constitution; that a definitive certainty in

the number of Representatives, as well as the manner of procuring them,

is, in its nature, of constitutional and not of legislative provision,

and affords a reason against varying the ratio mentioned in the

constitution, although that ratio be expressed in terms of latitude;

that Congress had confirmed the general expectation in the public mind

by the proposed amendments to the constitution, and had at least given a

solemn opinion in favor of the ratio of one to thirty thousand, until

the number of Representatives should amount to one hundred, after

acquiring which number by that rule only, a qualified discretion is

admitted; that the opinions of the great bulk of the people of America

were in favor of an increased representation, at least as far as the

utmost limits prescribed by the constitution; that this circumstance was

evidenced by the conventions which adopted the constitution; that it was

further evidenced by the several Legislatures which adopted the proposed

amendments before alluded to; that it was still further evidenced by the

number of Representatives in the respective State Legislatures; that

this last circumstance is rendered peculiarly forcible by a comparative

view of the objects of legislation chartered to the Government of the

United States, and those retained to the State Governments. The objects

of legislation chartered to the Government of the United States, are

wholly national and important; the objects of legislation retained to

the State Governments are comparatively local and subaltern: those

peculiarly prompt temptation and invite corruption--these offer no

inducements to either. In the Government of the United States, the

constituents of the Representative body are complex and diversified; in

the State Governments they are comparatively simple and assimilated.

That a sympathy with the feelings of the people should characterize this

branch of the Government; wisdom is the expected characteristic of the

Senate; and despatch of the Executive.

To the inequality of representation relatively to States suggested to

result from the application of this rule, Mr. G. replied that the

inequality complained of is rather ideal than real; that to determine

how far this consideration really ought to exist among States, it is

right and proper to ascertain the whole comparative Government: and the

issue of this inquiry will be, that those States in whose favor the rule

is said to operate, possess the least governmental influence in the

Senate, proportioned to numbers; and that the casual gain here is no

equivalent for the certain loss there. As far, therefore, as the

governmental influence of States in relation to numbers is to operate,

it will furnish a motive of preferment for the rule he contended for.

It has been said (continued Mr. G.) that the representation of the

States in the Senate is strictly defined by the constitution, and that

therefore the consideration of the relative influence of the States,

then, should not be resorted to as an argument in the apportionment of

Representatives to this House. But, it should be observed, that the rule

contended for, though not so strictly defined, is equally within the

pale of the constitution; and the most extended use to be made of this

consideration is, to manifest the impropriety of resorting to the

pretended inequality among States, as a conclusive argument to vary that

ratio of representation for this House which is admitted to be the most

proper, upon its intrinsic merits, and when viewed without a reference

to that consideration. This particular subject suggests a peculiar

equity and propriety, in taking into consideration the comparative

governmental influence of the States in the Senate, proportioned to

numbers; because, it is in consequence of a representation by States,

there, that they gain this unequal influence: and nothing more is

contended for by this rule than a representation of the people through

the medium of the several States, here. The rule of representation is

not the cause of the present inequality, as far as it may appear to

exist; it is a mere contingent circumstance, depending upon arbitrary

facts and numbers, which cannot be rendered subservient to any general

rule. It should also be remarked, that most of the States supposed to be

favored by the operation of this rule, have, heretofore, been unequally

represented in the extreme; and from the extent and rapid population of

these States, it may be concluded, with certainty, that previously to

the expiration of the present apportionment, the real inequality of

representation in this House, as well as in the Senate, will continue to

bear particularly hard upon them. Perfect equality is unattainable; and

the proposed ratio is, in the principle, equally subject with any other

to all the inconveniences which it is intended to remedy.

The inconveniences of the rule he contended for, in their utmost extent,

can never be very great, because the same rule is applied in the same

manner to the respective States; and the most extended scope for its

unequal operation must be confined to the casual result of the

fractional numbers within the several States. In reflecting upon this

argument of inequality of representation in relation to States, an idea

had presented itself to his mind which seemed to him both novel and

important; and that is, that a quality exists in the Government, from

its peculiar organization which enables a minority of constituents,

through the medium of a majority of Representatives, to give law to a

majority of constituents, absolutely against the will of their minority

of Representatives. This quality of the Government arises from the State

representations in the Senate; and it exists not merely in speculation

or idea--it has been sensibly felt in practice, and there is a real

tendency in the Government to make it still more so. The very bill now

under consideration will probably furnish one strong evidence of its

efficacy in practice; it would have passed very differently from the

present proposition, if it had not met with this unnatural check; and I

am concerned, said he, to remark, that almost in every important measure

of the Government, the minority of the people of the Union had given law

to the majority of the people, against their consent, as far as this can

be evidenced through the medium of their Representatives. This, it is to

be feared, is a radical evil in the Government, and its magnitude would

be in a great measure proportioned to the extension of the objects of

legislation by this Government. If the people be the only legal source

of governmental authority, and this right of individuals be equal, this

is certainly a heterodox principle in the Government. He would not

pretend to say, however, that this was a cancer upon the body politic

too inveterate and vital to admit of a cure; but he conceived it to be a

sore of that sort which it would be unwise to irritate or tamper with:

and he conceived, also, the present proposition not to be without its

irritating qualities.

Mr. G. then proceeded to consider, upon general principles, of

increasing the representation in this House to the full extent

authorized by the constitution, and particularly with a view to the

necessity of establishing, in this branch of the Government, a permanent

sympathy with the landed interest. He observed, that all Representative

Governments appeared to possess a natural tendency from Republicanism to

Monarchy; that, great inequalities in the distribution of wealth among

individuals, consequent upon the progress of all governments, appeared

to be the cause of their political evolutions; that no competent remedy

against this evil had been heretofore discovered, or at least

practically applied by any Government; that perhaps this great political

light may first shine forth through the medium of the American

constitutions, and serve, as some others have previously done, to

illumine not only the American, but the European world.

The peculiar circumstances of the United States, however, since the late

Revolution, and in the infancy of the American Governments, favored

extremely this natural principle of the growing inequality in the

distribution of wealth amongst individuals. An extensive, unexhausted,

fertile country furnished full scope for agriculture, the plenty and

cheapness of provisions and rude materials for manufactures, and an

unshackled commerce for the merchant; and to these were added the

blessings of peace, and laws securing to the individual the exclusive

possession of the fruits of his own industry, however abundant. There

were intrinsic circumstances; there was a contingent one. A public

debt--the price of the Revolution itself and its consequent

blessings--had been incurred, and, from the imbecility of the then

existing Confederacy, and other causes, was depreciated considerably

below its nominal value; but it was then in small masses, and not very

unequally spread amongst the individuals throughout the whole United

States. The Government of the United States, instead of managing this

contingent circumstance with caution, and declaring so in its

ministration, seized upon it with its fiscal arrangement, and applied it

as the most powerful machine to stimulate this growing inequality in the

distribution of wealth--a principle perhaps too much favored by other

existing causes. The Government, not satisfied with the debts contracted

by the former Confederacy, assumed the payment of a great proportion of

the debts contracted by the respective State Governments, and

established funds for paying the interest of the whole. This measure

produced two effects, not very desirable amongst individuals. It

gathered these scattered debts, at a very inferior price, from the hands

of the many, and placed them in the hands of the few; and it stimulates

the value of them. Thus collected into greater masses, beyond all

calculation, by the artificial application of fiscal mechanism, it

produced a variety of serious effects with respect to the Government. In

opposition to the agricultural or republican, it enlisted a great

moneyed interest in the United States, who, having embarked their

fortunes with the Government, would go all lengths with its

Administration, whether right or wrong, virtuous or vicious, by

rendering the debt but partially redeemable, passing perpetual tax laws,

and mortgaging their products to the payment of the interest of this

perpetually-existing debt. It gave the Executive a qualified control

over the best moneyed resources of the United States, not contemplated

by the constitution, nor founded in wisdom. It gave rise to an

unauthorized incorporation of the moneyed interest, and placed it as far

as possible from the reach of future Legislative influence. It

established the doctrine that one systematic financier was better able

to originate money bills and tax the people of the United States, than

the whole collected wisdom of their Representatives, with the aid of a

reciprocity of feeling. It gave rise to the idea of a Sinking Fund,

without limitation as to amount, to be placed in the hands of a few

trustees, and there to be protected from Legislative control by all the

sanctions and securities annexed to private property. In short, it

established the doctrine that all authority could be more safely

intrusted to, and better executed by a few, than by many; and, in

pursuance of this idea, made more continual drafts of authority from

the Representative branch of the Government, and placed it in the hands

of the Executive; lessening, by this mechanism of administration, the

constitutional influence of the people in the Government, and

fundamentally changing its native genius and original principle. He (Mr.

G.) knew of no competent remedy against the abominable evils to be

apprehended from the future operation of these unhallowed principles,

but a permanent establishment of the candid or Republican interest in

this House; and the best chance of effecting this great object he

conceived to be a full representation of the people. His alarms

respecting these fashionable, energetic principles were greatly

increased by a perspective view of some of the proposed measures of

Government. He saw systems introduced to carve out of the common rights

of one part of the community privileges, monopolies, exclusive rights,

&c., for the benefit of another, with no other view, in his opinion, but

to create nurseries of immediate dependants upon the Government, whose

interest will always stimulate them to support its measures, however

iniquitous and tyrannical, and, indeed, the very emoluments which will

compose the price of their attachment to the Government will grow out of

a tyrannical violation of the rights of others. He would forbear to

mention a variety of other circumstances, to prove that principles

having a tendency to change the very nature of the Government, have

pervaded even the minutest ramifications of its fiscal arrangements, nor

would he dwell upon the undue influence to be apprehended from moneyed

foreigners, who had become adventurers in the funds, nor the various

avenues opened to facilitate the operation of corruption. He would

merely remark, that, acting under impressions produced by these

considerations, and strengthened by others not less pertinent and

important, suggested by a number of gentlemen, in the course of the

discussion of this subject, and believing that a full representation of

the people will furnish the only chance of remedy for the existing, and

a competent protection against future evils, he should feel himself

criminal if by his vote he should give up a single Representative

authorized by the constitution. The same impressions would have induced

him to have voted for the proposition which gave one hundred and twenty

members, had it not been for a conscientious and paramount regard for

the preservation of the constitution. The difference of the position of

the members throughout the United States, which would have been assumed

by the difference in the manner of making the apportionment, never

amounted to the minimum of a consideration with him against the

proposition; for he felt a conviction that the agricultural or

equalizing interest was nearly the same throughout all parts of the

United States; and he hoped that the increased representation would

furnish strong testimonies of the truth of the position. He would

remark, generally, the Government of America was now in a state of

puberty, that is, at this time. She is to assume a fixed character, and

he thought it in some degree rested upon the vote now to be given,

whether she would preserve the simplicity, chastity, and purity of her

native representation and Republicanism, in which alone the true dignity

and greatness of her character must consist; or whether she will, so

early in youth, prostitute herself to the venal and borrowed artifices

and corruptions of a stale and pampered Monarchy? Whatever his own

opinions or suspicions may be respecting the tendency of the present

Administration, and whatever may be the discussion of to-day, he should

still preserve a hope that the increased representation, supported by

the enlightened spirit of the people at large, will form an effectual

resistance to the pressure of the whole vices of the Administration, and

may yet establish the Government upon a broad, permanent, and Republican

basis.

When Mr. GILES had concluded, the committee rose, and reported an

amendment, viz: to fill up the blank with the word "thirty-three;" which

was carried in the affirmative--yeas 34, nays 30, as follows:

YEAS.--Fisher Ames, Robert Barnwell, Egbert Benson, Elias

Boudinot, Shearjashub Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Abraham

Clark, Jonathan Dayton, Thomas Fitzsimons, Elbridge Gerry,

Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue, James Gordon, Andrew

Gregg, Thomas Hartley, Daniel Heister, James Hillhouse,

Daniel Huger, Israel Jacobs, Aaron Kitchell, John W.

Kittera, Amasa Learned, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Niles,

Theodore Sedgwick, Jeremiah Smith, Israel Smith, William

Smith, Jonathan Sturges, Peter Sylvester, George Thatcher,

John Vining, Jeremiah Wadsworth, and Artemas Ward.

NAYS.--John Baptist Ashe, Abraham Baldwin, John Brown,

William Findlay, William B. Giles, Samuel Griffin, William

Barry Grove, Philip Key, John Laurance, Richard Bland Lee,

Nathaniel Macon, James Madison, John Francis Mercer, Andrew

Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg, William Vans Murray,

John Page, Josiah Parker, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker, Joshua

Seney, Upton Sheridine, John Steele, Samuel Sterrett,

Thomas Sumter, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor Tucker,

Abraham Venable, Alexander White, Hugh Williamson, and

Francis Willis.

_Ordered_, That the said bill, together with the amendments, be

engrossed and read the third time to-morrow.

FRIDAY, April 20.

_Publication of the Debates._