almost entirely confined to the State of Massachusetts; and they furnish
a considerable, a principal portion of our export trade. As we are a
part of the United States, the United States in general are interested
in the prosperity of that branch of business, so far at least as it
contributes to the national defence: it furnishes a copious nursery of
hardy seamen, and offers a never-failing source of protection to the
commerce of the United States. If we engage in a war with any European
power, those seamen will be excluded from their ordinary employment, and
must have recourse to privateering. During the late war with Great
Britain, we annoyed the enemy more in that line than in all others; and
had it not been for privateering, it would often have been impossible to
keep together our armies, who frequently, in the hour of need, were
supplied by the privateers with ammunition and clothing, of which they
were wholly destitute. All that we wish to obtain by this bill is, that
we may not be burdened with duties. An opinion has been entertained,
that no drawbacks ought to be allowed on the re-exportation of articles
imported from foreign countries; but if this opinion were to obtain in
practice, and no drawbacks were to be admitted, we must confine our
importation to articles for our own consumption. The drawback allowed by
the existing law, on the exportation of salt fish, was calculated to be
only equal to the duty beforehand paid on the quantity of salt used in
curing the fish; but the fishermen complain that, as the act now stands,
they are wholly excluded from any participation in the benefit, which
centres entirely in the coffers of the merchants. The object of the
present bill is, only to repay the same money into the hands of those
persons who are immediately concerned in catching the fish; and there
can no reasonable objection be made to such a transfer of the drawback,
as Government will not lose a single dollar by the change. The gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. GILES) talks of the unconstitutionality of granting
bounties; but no bounty is required. We only ask, in another mode, the
usual drawback for the salt used on the fish. If we can make it appear
that the bill does not contemplate any greater sums to be drawn from the
Treasury, than are already allowed, it is to be hoped that no further
opposition will be made to the measure; and that this is really the
case, can be proved by documents from the Treasury office. Here he read
a statement and calculation to prove his assertion; and to show that the
United States will probably pay one thousand dollars per annum less in
the proposed bounties on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, than they
would in the drawbacks on the exportation of the fish. The fishermen, he
continued, are now under no control; and in consequence of this want of
a proper restraint, they often take whims into their heads and quit the
vessels during the fishing season. To prevent the inconveniences of this
practice, the bill contemplates their exclusion from the bounty, unless
they enter into such contracts and regulations, as may be found
necessary for the proper and successful conducting of the business,
which, from our advantageous situation, would be entirely in our hands,
if we did not meet with such opposition and discouragement from foreign
nations, whose bounties to their own fishermen, together with the duties
laid upon our fish, would, to persons less advantageously situated than
us, amount almost to a total prohibition.
In the Report from the Secretary of State, a drawback is contemplated of
the duties on all foreign articles, used by the seamen employed in the
fishing trade, such as coffee, rum, &c.; but we ask it on the salt
alone; nor is it asked as a bounty, but merely as a transfer from the
hand of the merchant to that of the fishermen.
Mr. WHITE had no objection to give the trade a proper degree of
encouragement; but he did not relish the idea of granting bounties; if
any gentleman would prepare an amendment, so as to make them drawbacks
in fact, as well as in words, he would consent to the measure.
Mr. AMES, after some introductory observations, adverted to the
necessity of fixing some point in which both sides would agree.
Disputes, he said, could not be terminated--or, more properly, they
could not be managed at all, if some first principles were not conceded.
The parties would want weapons for the controversy.
Law is in some countries the yoke of government, which bends or breaks
the necks of the people; but, thank Heaven, in this country, it is a
man's shield--his coat of mail--his castle of safety. It is more than
his defence: it is his weapon to punish those who invade his rights--it
is the instrument which assists--it is the price that rewards his
industry.
If I say that fishermen have equal rights with other men, every
gentleman feels in his own bosom a principle of assent. If I say that no
man shall pay a tax on sending his property out of the country, the
constitution will confirm it; for the constitution says, _no duty shall
be laid on exports_. If I say, that on exporting dried fish, the
exporter is entitled to drawback the duty paid on the salt, I say no
more than the law of the land has confirmed. Plain and short as these
principles are, they include the whole controversy. For I consider the
law allowing the drawback as the right of the fishery, the defects of
that law as the wrong suffered, and the bill before us as the remedy.
The defects of the law are many and grievous. Supposing 340,000 quintals
exported----
The salt duty is $42,744
The drawback is only 34,000
--------
Loss to the fishery 8,744
Whereas Government pays $45,900, at
13-1/2 cents, including charges, which are
3-1/2 cents on a quintal: which is beyond
what the fishery receives 11,900
--------
Being a clear loss to the Government of 3,156
So that, though the whole is intended for the benefit of the fishery,
about one-fourth of what is paid is not so applied: there is a heavy
loss both to Government and the fishery. Even what is paid on the export
is nearly lost money; the bounty is not paid till the exportation, nor
then, till six months have elapsed; whereas the duty on salt is paid
before the fish is taken: it is paid to the exporter, not to the
fisherman. The bounty is so indirect, that the poor fisherman loses
sight of it. It is paid to such persons, in such places, and at such
periods, as to disappoint its good effects; passing through so many
hands, and paying so many profits to each, it is almost absorbed. The
encouragement, too, is greatest in successful years, when least needed;
and is least in bad fishing seasons, when it is most needed. It is a
very perplexed, embarrassing regulation to the officers of Government
and to the exporter; hence the great charge: and, with all this charge
and trouble, it is liable to many frauds. Four hundred miles of coast,
little towns, no officer. All these defects the bill remedies; and,
besides, gives the money on condition that certain regulations are
submitted to, which are worth almost as much as the money.
The bill is defended on three grounds. First, it will promote the
national wealth; second, the national safety; third, justice requires
it: the last is fully relied on.
To show that the fishery will increase the wealth of the nation, it
cannot be improper to mention its great value. The export before the war
brought more than a million of dollars into this country; probably it is
not less at present, and no small part in gold and silver. It is
computed that thirty thousand persons, including four thousand seamen,
subsist by it. Many say, very composedly, if it will not maintain
itself, let it fall. But we should not only lose the annual million of
dollars which it brings us; an immense capital would be lost. The
fishing towns are built on the naked rocks, or barren sands, on the side
of the sea. Those spots, however, where trade would sicken and
die--which husbandry scorns to till--and which nature seems to have
devoted to eternal barrenness, are selected by industry to work miracles
on. Houses, stores, and wharves, are erected, and a vast property
created, all depending on this business. Before you think it a light
thing to consign them to ruin, see if you can compute what they cost; if
they outrun your figures, then confess that it would be bad economy, as
well as bad policy, to suffer rival nations to ruin our fishery. The
regulations of foreign nations tend to bring this ruin about. France and
England equally endeavor, in the language of the Secretary of State, to
mount their marine on the destruction of our fishery. The fishers at
Newfoundland are allowed liberal bounties by the English Government;
and, in the French West Indies, we meet bounties on their fish and
duties on our own, and these amount to the price of the fish. From the
English islands we are quite shut out; yet such is the force of our
natural advantages, that we have not yielded to these rivals. The
Secretary of State has made these statements in his Report.
The more fish we catch, the cheaper; the English fish will need a
greater bounty: whereas if we should yield, the English would probably
need no bounty at all; they would have the monopoly. For example;
suppose the English can fish at two dollars the quintal--we catch so
much that we sell at one dollar and two-thirds: the loss to them is
one-third of a dollar on each quintal. They must have that sum as a
bounty. Whereas, if we increase our fishery, a greater and a greater
bounty is needed by foreign nations. The contest so painfully sustained
by them must be yielded at last, and we shall enjoy alone an immense
fund of wealth to the nation, which nature has made ours; and though
foreigners disturb the possession, we shall finally enjoy it peaceably
and exclusively. If the lands of Kentucky are invaded, you drive off the
invader; and so you ought. Why not protect this property as well? These
opinions are supported by no common authority. The State of
Massachusetts having represented the discouragements of the fishery, the
subject has received the sanction of the Secretary of State; he confirms
the facts stated in the petition; he says it is too poor a business to
pay any thing to Government.
Yet, instead of asking bounties, or a remission of the duties on the
articles consumed, we ask nothing but to give us our own money back,
which you received under an engagement to pay it back, in case the
article should be exported. If nothing was in view, therefore, but to
promote national wealth, it seems plain that this branch ought to be
protected and preserved; because, under all the discouragements it
suffers, it increases, and every year more and more enriches the
country, and promises to become an inexhaustible fund of wealth.
Another view has been taken of the subject, which is drawn from the
naval protection afforded, in time of war, by a fishery. Our coasting
and foreign trade are increasing rapidly; but the richer our trade
becomes, the better prize to the enemy: so far from protecting us, it
would be the very thing that would tempt him to go to war with us. As
the rice and the tobacco planter cheerfully pay for armies, and turn out
in the militia to protect their property on shore, they cannot be so
much deceived as to wish to have it left unprotected when it is afloat;
especially when it is known that this protection, though more effectual
than the whole revenue expended on a navy could procure, will not cost a
farthing; on the contrary, it will enrich while it protects the nation.
The coasters and other seamen, in the event of a war, would be doubly in
demand, and could neither protect themselves nor annoy the enemy to any
considerable degree; but the fishermen, thrown out of business by a war,
would be instantly in action. They would, as they formerly did, embark
in privateers; having nothing to lose, and every thing to hope, they
would not dishonor their former fame. Their mode of life makes them
expert and hardy seamen. Nothing can be more adventurous. They cast
anchor on the banks, three hundred leagues from land, and with a great
length of cable ride out the storms of winter. If the gale proves too
strong they often sink at their anchors, and are food for fish which
they came to take: for ever wet, the sea almost becomes their element.
Cold and labor in that region of frost, brace their bodies, and they
become as hardy as the bears on the islands of ice: their skill and
spirit are not inferior: familiar with danger, they despise it. If I
were to recite their exploits, the theme would find every American heart
already glowing with the recollection of them; it would kindle more
enthusiasm than the subject has need of. My view is only to appeal to
facts, to evince the importance of the fishery as a means of naval
protection. It is proper to pass over Bunker's Hill, though memorable by
the valor of a regiment of fishermen; nor is it necessary to mention,
further, that five hundred fishermen fought at Trenton.
It is known, that the privateers manned by fishermen, in want of every
thing, not excepting arms, which they depended on taking from their
enemies, brought into port warlike stores of every kind, as well as
every kind of merchandise sufficient for the army and country: the war
could not have been carried on without them. Among other exploits almost
beyond belief, one instance is worth relating: these people, in a
privateer of sixteen guns, and one hundred and fifty men, in one cruise
took more than twenty ships, with upwards of two hundred guns, and
nearly four hundred men. The privateers from a single district of
Massachusetts, where the fishery is chiefly seated, took more than two
thousand vessels, being one third of the British merchant vessels, and
brought in near one thousand two hundred. A hundred sail of privateers,
manned by fishermen, would scour every sea in case of a war.
The first question is, how much does Government receive by the duty on
the salt used in curing the fish which is exported? The quantity of fish
must be known. Several ways of information are to be explored. The
Secretary of State supposes the fish of 1790 to be 354,276 quintals. A
Treasury return of fish exported from August 20, 1789, to September 30,
1790, which is thirteen and one-third months, is 378,721 quintals. For a
year, equal to 340,849 quintals.
Foreign dried fish imported from August 15, 1789, to August, 1790, 3,701
quintals; five per cent. drawback thereon is only three hundred and ten
dollars, at one dollar and sixty-six cents per quintal. Mr. GILES is
mistaken in supposing that foreign fish deducts $16,000 from our
estimate. Return of fish in seven months, from May 30, to December,
1790, exported, all fish of the United States, 197,278 quintals: which,
for a year, is 338,184 quintals. The medium may be fairly taken for the
time past at 340,000 quintals a year.
Six gentlemen of Marblehead certify, that 5,043 hogsheads, or 40,344
bushels of salt, were used on 38,497-1/2 quintals; which, for 340,000
quintals, gives 356,200 bushels. The duty, at twelve cents, is $42,744,
which Government receives. But the charge to the United States, is, at
thirteen and a half cents per quintal
$45,900
Whereof the fishery receives ten cents
on each quintal exported 34,000
------
Charges as the law stands 11,900
Further, this is but an estimate made up from what the last year proved.
The next may be very different, and probably it will be. If more money
should be demanded than $44,000, we must not be accused of misleading
Congress. But in that case an increase would be made by law; for the
more fish is exported, the more thirteen and a half cents must be paid;
so that the bill creates no burden in that way. But the increase of the
export of fish will probably operate in favor of Government. For it is
known that the economy, skill, and activity of the fishery are making
progress. Its success has progressed. The more fish to a vessel, the
cheaper the allowance on the tonnage. Therefore, the tonnage of vessels
will not increase in a ratio with the increase of the fish.
The very objections prove this. For they deem the encouragement too
great. But any encouragement must have the effect.
The difference of the agreements for distributing the fish according to
the present practice, or by this bill, makes a great one in the quantity
taken. The bill reforms the practice in this point. Marblehead vessels
take less than those from Beverly. The former throw the fish into a
common stock, which is afterwards divided upon a plan very unfriendly to
exertion. A man works for the whole--perhaps twelve hours, and they take
about eight hundred quintals to a vessel. But in Beverly, the exertion
is as great as can be made; eighteen hours a day, because each man has
what he catches, and they catch eleven hundred quintals.
Marblehead seamen sailing from other towns, and dividing as last
mentioned, which the bill establishes, seldom fail to catch two or three
hundred quintals more than vessels and men from Marblehead on the first
plan. Accordingly, I assert on good authority, that the increase in
Marblehead only may be computed at fifteen thousand quintals, merely in
consequence of the reform by the bill. The best informed persons whom I
have consulted, entertain no doubt that the export, in case the bill
should pass, would not be less than four hundred thousand quintals,
probably more; but at four hundred thousand quintals, it would add seven
thousand two hundred dollars more to the salt duty; a sum more than
equal to any estimate of the actual tonnage, or any probable increase of
it
$42,744
7,200
------
Salt duty on 400,000 quintals 49,944
Other facts confirm the theory, that skill and exertion are increasing
in this business.
In 1775, 25,000 tons, 4,405 seaman. Fish sold for $1,071,000. In 1790,
three-fourths of the seamen and three-fourths of the tonnage take as
much fish. It is owing to this that our fishery stood the competition
with foreign nations.
Finally, the average in future may be relied on not to be less than
350,000 quintals.
Salt duty on which $43,944
Bounties 44,000
------
Wanted 56
The calculations first made will answer the purpose,
340,000 quintals pay salt duty $42,744
Tonnage bounty 44,000
------
Wanted 1,256
This is the mighty defect. Observe the authentic return of the export of
fish may be, and we can almost prove it to be, below the future export.
Whereas, to banish all doubt, we go to the top of the scale for the
tonnage, we take what we know to be the utmost. This we might have
represented more favorably if we had chosen to conceal any thing. But
even this will answer our purpose.
For two hundred tons are wanting in the estimate of the bounties, being
nineteen thousand eight hundred, not twenty thousand, which will take
off one-third of the deficient sum.
The tonnage over sixty-eight, which receives nothing, is not mentioned;
and which probably is not less than another third.
The boats under five tons, though trifling, are to be noticed--they
receive nothing.
But, above all, the chances of non-compliance with the regulations are
in favor of the remainder of the twelve hundred and fifty-six dollars
being stopped. Boats may not get twelve quintals to the ton, or vessels
may have their voyages broken up, and not stay four months on the
fishing ground; in either case they would receive nothing. Take all
these together, is it not to be doubted that twelve hundred and
fifty-six dollars will remain of the forty-four thousand in the
Treasury?
But these are trifles which I cannot believe gentlemen are anxious
about.
For the event cannot be reduced to a certainty. What quantity of fish
will be exported, no man can tell now. But as Government may receive
more than it will pay, the chance may turn the other way, and it may
have to pay a few hundred dollars more than it will have received. We
have seen that the chance is most in favor of Government. But one chance
must balance the other. This answer is sincerely relied on as a good
one.
I barely mention that the wear of cordage, cables, sails, and anchors,
is very great. These articles, on being imported, pay duties. So that it
is probable the extra duty paid by the fishery on their extra
consumption, will overbalance any little sums supposed to exceed in the
bounty.
It has been asked, as if some cunning was detected, why if the money
received in the Treasury to pay the drawbacks is equal to the proposed
bounties, a further appropriation should be made? This cunning question
admits of several very simple answers.
The bill being for seven years, the average product is the proper sum to
be calculated. But the three first years may fall short of the bounties,
say two thousand dollars a year, which is six thousand dollars.
The four last may exceed two thousand dollars, say eight thousand
dollars.
Shall a poor fisherman wait for the whole, or if he takes his part
according to the money in the Treasury--for a twenty-fourth part of the
bounty on his vessel, from 1792 to 1795?
2d. This delay would happen after a bad year, the very time when he
would most need prompt pay.
3d. But fish taken this year will not be exported till December next.
Therefore the money will not be stopped by the drawback as the law
stands, till six months after.
A substitute has been proposed for the clause, to appropriate the
drawback only.
This is absolutely improper. For the ten cents allowed as drawback is
but a part of the duty paid on salt. It is not easy to see any reason
why a part stopped at the Treasury should be equal to the whole paid
there long before. The drawback falls near nine thousand dollars short
of the salt duty received by the Government. The expense of the drawback
would be very heavy and useless.
Nor may gentlemen apprehend that Government, by paying next December,
will advance money to the fishery. The salt duty will have been paid,
and Government will have the use of the money many months before the
fishermen will have a right to call for the bounties.
It is left to the candor of the gentlemen who have urged this objection,
whether a better or further answer is desired.
After having laboriously gone through the estimate of the probable
export of fish, it will not be necessary to be equally minute as to the
quantity or kind of vessels which are to receive the bounty.
The estimate we believe to be very high. That it is high enough, we
suppose very probable from the estimate of the Secretary of State, which
is only nineteen thousand one hundred and eighty-five tons.
This mode of paying the bounty on the tonnage is very simple and safe.
The measurement is already made and costs nothing; and as it was made to
pay a duty on tonnage, we are very sure that Government will not be
cheated by an over-measure. The mode of paying the drawback, as the law
now stands, is expensive, perplexed and embarrassing; liable to frauds
and delays.
This intricate and disgusting detail of calculations was necessary to
satisfy the committee that each of the three grounds of defence on which
the bill rests, is tenable.
Instead of impoverishing the nation by scattering the treasures of the
whole to benefit a part, it appears that we are preserving a mine of
treasure. In point of naval protection, we can scarcely estimate the
fishery too highly. It is always ready, always equal to the object; it
is almost the only sufficient source of security by sea. Our navigation
is certainly a precious interest of the country. But no part of our
navigation can vie with the fishery in respect to the protection it
affords. There is no point which regards our national wealth or national
safety, in respect to which it seems practicable to do so much with so
little.
We rely on the evidence before you, that the public will not sustain the
charge of a dollar. Those ought not to doubt the evidence who cannot
invalidate it. If then the fishermen ask you to restore only their own
money, will you deny them? Will you return to every other person
exporting dutied goods the money he has paid, and will you refuse the
poor fisherman?
If there must be an instance of the kind, will you single out for this
oppressive partiality, that branch which is described by the Secretary
of State as too poor even to bear its own part of the common burden;
that branch which nevertheless has borne the neglect of our nation, and
the persecution of foreign prohibitions and duties; a branch which,
though we have received much and expect more, both of money and
services, urges no claims but such as common justice has sanctioned?
Mr. GERRY having moved to strike out the words "bounty allowed" in order
to insert _allowance made_, by way of accommodation,
Mr. MURRAY observed, that the question was, whether a bounty should be
given for the encouragement of the fishery: the amendment proposed by
the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. GERRY) did not alter the
principle--it was still "_the old cocked hat_" on the one hand, and on
the other, "_the cocked old hat_:" the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr.
FITZSIMONS) had asserted, that Congress have a right to alter the
drawbacks, and allow them in any other mode, by which the citizens may
receive back their own money; but this is not a case of that nature; for
the bill says, "in case the moneys appropriated (_for the payment of the
duties_) shall be inadequate, the deficiency shall be supplied from the
Treasury;" here the Treasury is pledged for the payment of the bounties;
and the question is, not on the principle of changing the drawback, but
the giving encouragement to a particular branch, at the expense of the
community at large.
Mr. BARNWELL observed, that those who are best acquainted with the
fisheries, look on the proposed mode of encouragement as the best; and
that they ought to be allowed to use the gifts of the public in the most
advantageous manner: that, if he were himself concerned in the
cultivation of any particular commodity, for the encouragement of which
a sum were granted, he would be much surprised to meet a refusal, in
case he should come forward and propose some more effectual mode of
applying that grant: that even if the bounties should happen to exceed
the drawbacks, by eight or ten thousand dollars, the number of seamen to
be maintained would be well worth that sum: that whenever the two Houses
of Congress and the President of the United States are of opinion that
the general welfare will be promoted by raising any sum of money, they
have undoubted right to raise it, provided that the taxes be uniform;
that although it may not at present be an object of great consequence to
America to become a maritime power, yet it is of some importance to have
constantly at hand a nursery of seamen, to furnish our merchants with
the means of transporting their commodities across the sea; that,
whatever allowance or bounty is granted upon any particular commodity,
must ever be paid by the whole, for the advantage of a part, whether it
be upon cotton to the Southward, upon fish to the Eastward, or upon
other commodities to the Middle States; that if the people cannot have
so much confidence in their Representatives, as to trust them with the
power of granting bounties, the Government must be a very paltry one
indeed. The object of the bill was only to allow to the fishermen, in
the manner that would be most beneficial to them, the same sum that
would otherwise be allowed. If, however, from time and experience, it
should appear that this bounty proved an imposition on Government, he
would not hesitate to revoke it.
Mr. GERRY.--The State of Massachusetts asks nothing more than equal
justice. We do not come forward to request favors from the United
States, we only wish that the same system which is applied to other
parts of the Union, may be applied to us. But, in examining this
question, we wish that gentlemen would not make distinctions which will
not admit of a difference.
The proposed allowance has been called a bounty on occupation, and is
said to be very different from that encouragement, which is the
incidental result of a general commercial system; but in reality it is
no bounty: a bounty is a grant, made without any consideration whatever,
as an equivalent; and I have no idea of a bounty, which admits of
receiving from the person, on whom it is conferred, the amount of what
is granted. We have imposed a duty on salt, and thereby draw a certain
sum of money from the fishermen; the drawback is, in all instances, the
amount of the money received; this is all we ask; and we ask it for a
set of men who are as well entitled to the regard of Government as any
other class of citizens.
It has been supposed, that the allowance made to the fishermen, will
amount to a greater sum than the drawback on the exportation of the
fish; but I think it has been clearly shown that this will not be the
case: on the contrary, it is presumable, that the drawback on the fish
would on the whole exceed the sum which is proposed to be allowed to the
fishermen; sometimes it might be more, sometimes less. The calculation
is made on general principles; and it is impossible to calculate to a
single cent: the quantity of salt to be expended on the fish, cannot be
minutely ascertained; but this was not heretofore considered as a
sufficient reason why Congress should refuse to allow the drawback; they
allowed it, though in a different shape. It is now proposed to make a
further commutation: gentlemen call this a bounty on occupation; but is
there any proposition made for paying to the fishermen, or other persons
concerned in the fishery, any sums which we have not previously received
from them? If this were the case, it would indeed be a bounty; but if we
beforehand receive from them as much as the allowance amounts to, there
is no bounty granted at all.
If, however, it really was a bounty on occupation, it would after all be
only an indulgence similar to what has been granted to the landed and
agricultural interest. We have laid on hemp a duty of fifty-four cents
per hundredweight; and on beer, ale, and porter, five cents per gallon.
Now, I ask gentlemen, whether the professed design of those duties was
to raise a revenue, or to prevent the importation of those articles?
They were laid for no other purpose, than to prevent foreigners from
importing them, and thereby to encourage our own manufactures; and was
not that encouragement a bounty to the persons concerned in producing
such articles in this country? If the duties had not been laid, the
importer could sell much cheaper than he now can; and the landed
interest would be under a necessity of selling cheaper in proportion. If
those prohibitory duties operate as a bounty in favor of raising hemp,
and of brewing beer, ale, and porter, I ask, whether, if a bounty were
proposed on every quintal of fish, it might not, with the same
propriety, be granted? If we have not a right to grant a bounty in the
one case, we have as little right to grant it in the other.
A calculation has been offered to show that the proposed allowance will
exceed the amount of the present drawbacks, by ten thousand dollars a
year; but that calculation has been proved to be erroneous. Suppose,
however, that this was the fact, what comparison is there between such a
tax on the citizens of the United States, and the tax borne by the
citizens of Massachusetts, for the defence of the Western frontier? A
commercial war is waged against the American fisheries, by foreign
nations, who lay heavy duties on the American fish, and apply the
produce of those duties in bounties to their own fishermen; and their
fisheries being less extensive than ours, the duty thus imposed on our
fish, and bestowed in bounties to their vessels, operate in a twofold
proportion to the discouragement of our fishermen, and the encouragement
of theirs.
I wish to know on what principle gentlemen can expect, that the citizens
of Massachusetts should contribute two hundred thousand dollars, or
perhaps a greater sum, for the protection of the Western frontier
against the Indians, when no contribution is made to support the
commerce of Massachusetts, which, without this support, will be as
effectually ruined, as if their vessels were captured by an enemy. The
principle is carried farther with respect to the protection of the
frontier: we have voted large sums as presents to the savages, to keep
them friends to the frontier settlers; there is, however, no clause in
the constitution that will authorize a measure of this kind: it is true,
indeed, we have a power to regulate trade and commerce with the Indian
tribes; but does that give us a power to render the United States
tributary to the savages? and if we make them such grants every year, do
we not in fact become tributary to them?
The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. GILES) says that although this plan of
encouraging the fisheries may be wise policy in Britain, as being on all
sides surrounded by the sea, yet the United States will not equally find
their account in pursuing the same plan. The State of Virginia is, in
point of exposure from the sea, very differently circumstanced from the
State of Massachusetts: _we_ have a vast extent of country four hundred
and fifty miles of sea-coast, exposed; the citizens of all the towns
along the coast are obliged to pursue marine occupations and I hope the
gentleman does not wish that the country should be depopulated, and the
inhabitants driven off to settle the Western territory.
The State of Virginia is very happily circumstanced with respect to a
marine war: should such an event take place, that State is pretty secure
from depredations; but when we consider how much the inhabitants of
Massachusetts are exposed in a case of that kind, we ought to look
forward, and make some provision for their defence: they have as good a
right to expect that Government will make some arrangements for their
protection, as that they shall be obliged to contribute for the defence
of the Western frontier.
But their commerce, it seems, must not be supported! Taxes however must
be laid; and those taxes applied to encourage the former, and to bribe
the Indians into peace! Is this fair? Is this pursuing a liberal system
of politics? Will this reconcile the minds of our people to the General
Government? If so reasonable a proposition be neglected by the House, it
will convince the citizens of that State, that it is the object of
Government to destroy their commerce, and to make them entirely
dependent on the agricultural interest.
Here Mr. GERRY read a statement, to show the diminution of the revenue
in consequence of the failure of the fisheries; and added,
To support the fisheries, is to support the revenue: by that staple, the
citizens of Massachusetts are enabled to pay the revenue that is
expected from them; and, by an attempt to save ten thousand dollars,
Government will probably sacrifice a hundred thousand; and besides, lose
the confidence of the citizens of that State.
The only question now is, whether this be a direct bounty, or simply a
commutation of the allowance already granted by Congress? If the latter
be the case, I can see no reason why we should refuse our assent to a
proposition, which is only calculated to do justice to the people
concerned, and to give encouragement to a very important branch in the
United States; especially as the proposition will even have a tendency
to increase the revenue.
Mr. WILLIAMSON.--It has been urged with great propriety, in favor of the
bill now submitted to our consideration, that the operation of our laws
should in all cases tend to encourage useful industry; that while we are
giving back the duties on all other foreign goods which are exported,
it would be unjust and cruel to refuse a full drawback of the duties on
salt which may be exported, especially when the circumstances of its
exportation are attended with an increase of riches and strength to the
nation. Impressed as I am with the force of these arguments, and
desirous as I am to protect and encourage the native seamen of America,
by all prudent, practicable, and constitutional means, I shall
nevertheless find it my duty to vote for striking out the first section
of the bill, because it proposes to give a bounty for the encouragement
of the vessels employed in the fisheries.
We have been told that the name is improper; that it is simply a
drawback of the duty upon salt; and gentlemen have produced a very
ingenious calculation, by which they attempt to prove, that in some
years it may happen that the whole duty on the salt will not be repaid;
but they admit that in some years the drawback or bounty will exceed the
duty. It is certainly their opinion--and in this we are perfectly
agreed--that the money to be paid will be more than that received, else
there had been no use for so large an appropriation. We shall not
trouble the committee with calculations on this subject. It is conceded,
that the encouragement to be given, probably will exceed the full
drawback of the duty on salt. In other words, a douceur or a proper
bounty is to be given: let us call it one thousand dollars per annum. Is
it within the powers of this Congress to grant bounties? I think not;
and on this single position I would rest the argument.
In the constitution of this Government there are two or three remarkable
provisions, which seem to be in point. It is provided, that direct taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States according to their
respective numbers. It is also provided, that all duties, imposts, and
excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States; and it is
provided, that no preference shall be given, by any regulation of
commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another.
The clear and obvious intention of the articles mentioned was, that
Congress might not have the power of imposing unequal burdens; that it
might not be in their power to gratify one part of the Union by
oppressing another. It appeared possible, and not very improbable, that
the time might come, when, by greater cohesion, by more unanimity, by
more address, the Representatives of one part of the Union might attempt
to impose unequal taxes, or to relieve their constituents at the expense
of other people. To prevent the possibility of such a combination, the
articles that I have mentioned were inserted in the constitution.
Suppose a poll-tax should be attempted; suppose it should be enacted
that every poll in the Eastern States shall pay a tax of half a dollar,
and every poll in the Southern States should pay a tax of one dollar. Do
you think we should pay the tax? No certainly. We should plead the
constitution, and tell you that the law was impotent and void.
But we have been told, that Congress may give bounties for useful
purposes; that is to say, they may give bounties for all imaginable
purposes; because the same majority that votes the bounty will not fail
to call the purpose a good one. Establish the doctrine of bounties, and
let us see what may follow. Uniform taxes are laid to raise money, and
that money is distributed--not uniformly; the whole of it may be given
to the people in one end of the Union. Could we say, in such a case,
that the tax had been uniform? I think not. There is certainly a
majority in this House who think that the nation would be stronger and
more independent, if all our labor was performed by free men. This
object might be promoted by a bounty. Let a poll-tax be laid, according
to the constitution, of one dollar per poll: in this case, sixty cents
must be paid for each slave; and the number of slaves being 680,186,
their tax would amount to $334,911. To encourage the labor of citizens,
let Congress then give an annual bounty of one dollar to every free man
who is a mechanic, or who labors in the field. We might be told that the
bounty was small, and the object was good; but the measure would be most
oppressive, for it would be a clear tax of rather more than three
hundred thousand dollars on the Southern States.
Perhaps the case I have put is too strong--Congress can never do a thing
that is so palpably unjust--but this, sir, is the very mark at which the
theory of bounties seems to point. The certain operation of that measure
is the oppression of the Southern States, by superior numbers in the
Northern interest. This was to be feared at the formation of this
Government, and you find many articles in the constitution, besides
those I have quoted, which were certainly intended to guard us against
the dangerous bias of interest, and the power of numbers. Wherefore was
it provided that no duty should be laid on exports? Was it not to defend
the great staples of the Southern States--tobacco, rice, and
indigo--from the operation of unequal regulations of commerce, or
unequal indirect taxes, as another article had defended us from unequal
direct taxes?
I do not hazard much in saying, that the present constitution had never
been adopted without those preliminary guards in it. Establish the
general doctrine of bounties, and all the provisions I have mentioned
become useless. They vanish into air, and like the baseless fabric of a
vision, leave not a trace behind. The common defence and general
welfare, in the hands of a good politician, may supersede every part of
our constitution, and leave us in the hands of time and chance.
Manufactures, in general, are useful to the nation; they promote the
public good and general welfare. How many of them are springing up in
the Northern States? Let them be properly supported by bounties, and you
will find no occasion for unequal taxes. The tax may be equal in the
beginning--it will be sufficiently unequal in the end.
We are told, that a nursery of seamen may be of great use to the nation,
and the bounty proposed is a very small one. These, sir, are the reasons
why I have marked this as a dangerous bill; the most dangerous
innovations are made under these circumstances. To begin with a great
bounty would be imprudent, and to give a small bounty for a doubtful
purpose, might deserve a worse epithet. Half a million of dollars per
annum would have been too much for a beginning, and perhaps a bounty on
the use of sleighs, though they are convenient for travelling in winter;
or a bounty on stone fences, though they are durable, would not at this
time be prudent. The object of the bounty, and the amount of it, are
equally to be disregarded in the present case; we are simply to consider
whether bounties may safely be given under the present constitution. For
myself, I would rather begin with a bounty of one million per annum than
one thousand. I wish that my constituents may know whether they are to
put any confidence in that paper called the constitution.
You will suffer me to say, that the Southern States have much to fear
from the progress of this Government, unless your strength is governed
by prudence. The operation of the funding system has translated at least
two millions of dollars from the Southern States, that is to say, from
Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia, to the Northern States. The
interest of that sum, when it shall be six per cent., will be $120,000;
but the quota of those States is at least one-third of the whole; whence
it follows, that they must pay forty thousand dollars every year, in the
form of interest to the Northern States. This, it seems, is not
sufficient, and other measures are to be adopted for draining the
Southern States. Bounties to promote the general welfare are already
brought forward. We shall not hear of a bounty for raising rice, or
preparing naval stores. If that was the question, the general welfare
would not have such prominent features. Unless the Southern States are
protected by the constitution, their valuable staples, and their
visionary wealth, must occasion their destruction. Three short years has
this Government existed--it is not three years--but we have already
given serious alarms to many of our fellow-citizens. Establish the
doctrine of bounties, set aside that part of the constitution which
requires equal taxes and demands similar distributions, destroy this
barrier, and it is not a few fishermen that will enter, claiming ten or
twelve thousand dollars, but all manner of persons--people of every
trade and occupation--may enter at the breach, until they have eaten up
the bread of our children.
Perhaps I have viewed this project in too serious a light; but if I am
particularly solicitous on the subject of finance, that we do not even
seem to depart from the spirit of the constitution, it is because I wish
that the Union may be perpetual. The several States are now pretty well
relieved from their debts, and our fellow-citizens in the Southern
States have very little interest in the national funds; press them a
little with unequal taxes, and the remedy is plain.
While I would shun bounties, as leading to dangerous measures, I am not
inattentive to every argument that has been advanced by the honorable
member who first rose in defence of the bill. That gentleman tells us,
that more than a bushel of salt is used in curing a quintal of fish. If
this fact be established, the former act should be amended, by giving a
greater drawback. He says the drawback, as it is now paid to the
merchant, does not operate so as to encourage the seamen, who have most
need of such assistance. This is very probable, and the parties may be
relieved by dividing the drawback in the very manner that is proposed by
the bill. If it is true that the proposed bounties will not exceed the
average of the drawback that should be paid on salt, why do they contend
about names, unless they are solicitous about the precedent? If our
object is to encourage industry, and to increase our commerce, by
sending fish to a foreign market, we must adhere to the drawback; for,
according to the terms of the bill, the bounty is to be paid, though
every fish that is caught should be consumed in the country; in which
case we should be paying a visionary drawback, when nothing was
exported. According to the terms of the bill, there is no proportion
between the labor and the reward, so far as the bank fishery is
concerned; the bounty in all cases being the same.
Having exercised your patience in objecting to this new system of
bounties, and having hinted on some objections to the general operations
of the bill, so far as industry and enterprise may be desired, I shall,
in a few words, submit the outline of a plan that seems to comprehend
all the useful parts of the bill, without any speculation upon bounties.
If the drawback on dried fish exported, is not equal to the duty on the
salt used in curing such fish, let the drawback be increased to eleven
cents or twelve cents, as the case may be. Let us suppose that the
drawback for the next year will be equal to the drawback on the last
year; and let that sum of money, being the expected drawback, be divided
between the seamen and owners, according to the terms of the bill. The
accounts must be made up annually. If the drawback exceeds the allowance
that had been made, the difference will be considered as advanced to the
fishery, and the allowance for the next year must be somewhat reduced,
according to the actual amount of the drawback. If the fishermen are
more fortunate or more active, and the exports are increased, the
allowance for the next year must be raised. The rule being fixed by law,
all that remains, being pure calculation, may be done from year to year
by the Executive. Every important object of this bill, that has been
presented to our view, may be obtained by safe and constitutional steps.
Why should a man take a dangerous and a doubtful path, when a safe one
presents itself? If nothing more is desired than to regulate and protect
the fishery, the bill may be altered and accommodated to that purpose.
If the theory of bounties is to be established, by which the Southern
States must suffer while others gain, the bill informs us what we are to
expect.
The committee now rose, without taking any question.
MONDAY, February 6.
A member from Maryland, to wit, JOHN FRANCIS MERCER, returned to serve
in the room of WILLIAM PINKNEY, resigned, appeared, and took his seat in
the House.
A petition of the tanners of the town of Newark, in the State of New
Jersey, was presented to the House and read, stating the inconveniences
they suffer from the erection of mills for the purpose of grinding
tanners' bark for exportation, and praying that Congress will adopt such
measures for their relief as may appear just and right. Ordered to lie
on the table.
_The Cod Fisheries._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on
the bill sent from the Senate, entitled "An act for the encouragement of
the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government
of the fishermen employed therein."
Mr. GOODHUE.--The gentleman last up (Mr. WILLIAMSON) says, that an
appropriation of money being made by the bill now before us, and the
Treasury standing pledged for the payment, therefore a direct bounty is
granted. At present, we pay in drawbacks about $45,000; but we cannot
say that this sum will be adequate to the payment of the drawbacks next
year; for, if a greater quantity of fish be taken, a greater sum, of
course, must be allowed; and, as the sum depends entirely on the
quantity of fish, it is impossible to ascertain beforehand the precise
amount. There is not, however, in the whole bill, any thing of a bounty
except the bare name. The gentleman allows that we may commute the
present drawbacks, and give them to the fisherman instead of the
merchant; but it is impossible to do this with safety in any other mode
than that pointed out in the bill. Shall we leave it to the fisherman,
to be determined by his oath? This would not be advisable.
The plan proposed is a much less exceptionable one. It is founded on a
calculation that a certain quantity of tonnage is employed in taking a
certain quantity of fish. On this calculation the allowance is
apportioned to the tonnage. If gentlemen think the allowance too high,
let the sum be reduced; but let it not be stigmatized as a bounty. It is
no such thing. The word "bounty" is an unfortunate expression, and I
wish it were entirely out of the bill.
Mr. LIVERMORE.--The bill now under consideration has two important
objects in view. The one is, to give encouragement to our fishermen,
and, by that encouragement, to increase their numbers; the other is to
govern those fishermen by certain laws, by which they will be kept under
due restraint. Both these objects are of great importance to such
persons as choose to employ their capitals in the fishery business. And
I believe it will not be disputed that the business itself is of
considerable importance to the United States, insomuch as it affords a
certain proportion of remittance or exportation to foreign countries,
and does not impoverish the country, but enriches it by the addition of
so much wealth drawn from the sea.
It is the object of those gentlemen who favor the bill that the
fishermen should have some encouragement, not given to them at the
expense of the United States, but directed to them out of what was in
the former law called a drawback of the duty on salt. The calculation,
as I understand it, has been made as nearly as possible to give that
drawback, not to the merchants who export the fish, but to the fishermen
who take it, in order to increase that description of men, without whose
assistance it is vain to expect any benefit from the fisheries; for, if
the merchants at present engaged in that branch possessed the whole
capital of the United States, yet, if they cannot get fishermen, they
cannot carry on the fishery. This is done by a particular class of men,
who must be not only expert seamen, but also accustomed to taking the
fish and curing it. If these men cannot be had, the capital cannot be
employed, and those who undertake the business cannot carry it on, or
reap any profit from it.
Whilst the drawback is payable only to the merchant who exports the
fish, it is impossible to convince the fishermen that they reap from it
any advantage whatever; or, if the more discerning among them do
perceive any advantage in it, the others who are not so clear-sighted
cannot discern it, and are therefore not disposed to undertake the
business. It is, however, of considerable importance to the merchants
that the fisherman should receive a proper encouragement, even if they
were obliged to allow him a bounty out of their own pocket.
The government of the fishermen, after their engagement in this
business, is also necessary to be provided for; otherwise, frequent
instances may occur among that class of men of quitting one vessel to
embark on board another, or of shipping themselves for a foreign voyage,
before the expiration of the fishing season. In the latter case, the
vessel lies useless on the owner's hands, and he, together with the
whole expense of the outfit, loses all his prospects of future gain.
The two objects here mentioned are fully provided for in the bill.
Still, however, it is objected to. But what is the objection? It is,
that the word "_bounty_" is twice used in this clause. Let us now see
what advantage will result from striking out this obnoxious "_bounty_."
None at all. The bill says it shall cease; and have gentlemen any
objection to the bounty's ceasing? Since the bounty is to cease by this
bill, what advantage in striking it out? The sense would still remain
the same; and I do not know why we should make a law expressly to strike
out the word "bounty," but to strike out the bounty itself.
It is strange to me that any gentleman, whether he is for giving a great
bounty or no bounty at all, should quarrel with this unfortunate word.
There is, indeed, one part of the section which I will readily consent
to strike out, and I believe every other gentleman who is in favor of
the bill will consent to it likewise; and that is the clause which
provides that the bounty to be allowed and paid on every vessel for one
season, shall not exceed one hundred and seventy dollars. If, when the
vote is taken on the section, there does not appear a majority of the
House in favor of striking out the whole, we may then move for striking
out the _proviso_, if it be offensive to any gentleman. If it be not
offensive, it may remain.
If gentlemen are disputing only because the word "_bounty_" is in the
bill, they may be perfectly relieved from their uneasiness on that
score; for the bill expressly says, "that the bounty now allowed upon
the exportation of dried fish of the fisheries of the United States
shall cease, and in lieu thereof," a different kind of encouragement is
to be given. Here is no reason to dispute about a word. If gentlemen are
disposed to consent to the principle of the bill, that the drawback of
the duties on salt shall be commuted for a certain sum, to encourage the
fishermen, they will vote in favor of the bill; if not, they will vote
against it. But it is impossible for me to conceive why any gentleman
under heaven should be against it. It is only fixing, for the merchants
engaged in this branch, a clear and equitable ratio for distributing
among the fishermen that encouragement which they think necessary in
order to attach those people to the business, and to prevent them from
going to other occupations on land. The bill is an important one, and
will increase that branch of business, which is very useful to the
community. It does not lay a farthing of bounty or duty on any other
persons than those who are immediately concerned in it. It will serve
them, and will not injure any body.
Mr. LAURANCE said, from examining the section, he conceived it
contemplated no more than what the merchant is entitled to by existing
laws. The merchant is now entitled to the drawback; but it is found by
experience that the effect has not been to produce that encouragement to
the fishermen which was expected; and he presumed the way was perfectly
clear to give a new direction to the drawback, and this is all that is
aimed at in the bill. He supposed that the clause had no necessary
connection with the question which had been started respecting the right
of the Government to grant bounties; but, since the question has been
brought forward, it may be proper to consider it. In discussing the
question, he inquired, What has Congress already done? Have we not laid
extra duties on various articles, expressly for the purpose of
encouraging various branches of our own manufactures? These duties are
_bounties_ to all intents and purposes, and are founded on the idea only
of their conducing to the _general interest_. Similar objections to
those now advanced were not made to these duties. They were advocated,
some of them, by gentlemen from the Southward. He traced the effects of
these duties, and showed that they operated fully as indirect bounties.
Mr. L. then adverted particularly to the constitution, and observed that
it contains _general_ principles and powers only. These powers depend on
_particular_ laws for their operation; and on this idea, he contended
that the powers of the Government must, in various circumstances, extend
to the granting bounties. He instanced, in case of a war with a foreign
power, will any gentleman say that the General Government has not a
power to grant a bounty on arms, ammunition, &c., should the general
welfare require it? The general welfare is inseparably connected with
any object or pursuit which in its effects adds to the riches of the
country. He conceived that the argument was given up by gentlemen in
opposition to the bill, when they admit of encouragement to the
fishermen in any possible modification of it. He then adverted
particularly to the fisheries, stated the number of men employed, the
tons of shipping necessary to export the fish taken, and inferred the
sound policy of encouraging so important a branch of business.
Gentlemen say that we do not want a navy. Grant it; but can they say
that we shall never have a war with any European power? May not the time
arrive when the protection to the commerce of this country, derived from
this source, may be of the utmost necessity to its existence? Adverting
to Mr. WILLIAMSON's objection from the unequal operation of bounties,
and who had referred to the article of the constitution which says that
taxes shall be equal in all the States, Mr. L. observed, that this
article in the constitution could only respect the _rates_ of the
duties, and that the _same_ duties should be paid in Virginia that are
paid in New York--at the Northward as at the Southward. It surely could
not mean that every individual should pay exactly the same sum in every
part of the Union. This was a provision that no law could possible
contemplate.
He concluded by a summary recapitulation of his arguments, and saying he
hoped the section would be retained.
Mr. MADISON.--In the conflict I feel between my disposition on one hand
to afford every constitutional encouragement to the fisheries, and my
dislike, on the other, of the consequences apprehended from some clauses
of the bill, I should have forborne to enter into this discussion, if I
had not found, that over and above such arguments as appear to be
natural and pertinent to the subject, others have been introduced which
are, in my judgment, contrary to the true meaning, and even strike at
the characteristic principles of the existing constitution. Let me
premise, however, to the remarks which I shall briefly offer, on the
doctrine maintained by these gentlemen, that I make a material
distinction, in the present case, between an allowance as a mere
commutation and modification of a drawback, and an allowance in the
nature of a real and positive bounty. I make a distinction also, as a
subject of fair consideration at least, between a bounty granted under
the particular terms in the constitution, "a power to regulate trade,"
and one granted under the indefinite terms which have been cited as
authority on this occasion. I think, however, that the term "bounty," is
in every point of view improper as it is here applied, not only because
it may be offensive to some, and in the opinion of others carries a
dangerous implication, but also because it does not express the true
intention of the bill, as avowed and advocated by its patrons
themselves. For if, in the allowance, nothing more is proposed than a
mere reimbursement of the sum advanced, it is only paying a debt; and
when we pay a debt, we ought not to claim the merit of granting a
bounty.
It is supposed by some gentlemen, that Congress have authority not only
to grant bounties in the sense here used, merely as a commutation for
drawbacks, but even to grant them under a power by virtue of which they
may do any thing which they may think conducive to the "general
welfare." This, sir, in my mind, raises the important and fundamental
question, whether the general terms which had been cited, are to be
considered as a sort of caption or general description of the specified
powers, and as having no further meaning, and giving no further power
than what is found in that specification; or as an abstract and
indefinite delegation of power extending to all cases whatever; to all
such, at least, as will admit the application of money, which is giving
as much latitude as any government could well desire.
I, sir, have always conceived--I believe those who proposed the
constitution conceived, and it is still more fully known, and more
material to observe that those who ratified the constitution
conceived--that this is not an indefinite Government, deriving its
powers from the general terms prefixed to the specified powers, but a
limited Government, tied down to the specified powers which explain and
define the general terms. The gentlemen who contend for a contrary
doctrine are surely not aware of the consequences which flow from it,
and which they must either admit or give up their doctrine.
It will follow, in the first place, that if the terms be taken in the
broad sense they maintain, the particular powers afterwards so carefully
and distinctly enumerated would be without any meaning, and must go for
nothing. It would be absurd to say, first, that Congress may do what
they please, and then that they may do this or that particular thing;
after giving Congress power to raise money, and apply it to all purposes
which they may pronounce necessary to the general welfare, it would be
absurd, to say the least, to superadd a power to raise armies, to
provide fleets, &c. In fact, the meaning of the general terms in
question must either be sought in the subsequent enumeration which
limits and details them, or they convert the Government from one
limited, as hitherto supposed, to the enumerated powers, into a
Government without any limits at all.
It is to be recollected, that the terms "common defence and general
welfare," as here used, are not novel terms, first introduced into this
constitution. They are terms familiar in their construction, and well
known to the people of America. They are repeatedly found in the old
Articles of Confederation, where, although they are susceptible of as
great latitude as can be given them by the context here, it was never
supposed or pretended that they conveyed any such power as is now
assigned to them. On the contrary, it was always considered as clear and
certain, that the old Congress was limited to the enumerated powers, and
that the enumeration limited and explained the general terms. I ask the
gentlemen themselves, whether it ever was supposed or suspected that the
old Congress could give away the moneys of the States in bounties, to
encourage agriculture, or for any other purpose they pleased? If such a
power had been possessed by that body, it would have been much less
impotent, or have borne a very different character from that universally
ascribed to it.
The novel idea now annexed to these terms, and never before entertained
by the friends or enemies of the Government, will have a further
consequence, which cannot have been taken into the view of the
gentlemen. Their construction would not only give Congress the complete
Legislative power I have stated--it would do more--it would supersede
all the restrictions understood at present to lie on their power with
respect to the Judiciary. It would put it in the power of Congress to
establish courts throughout the United States, with cognizance of suits
between citizen and citizen, and in all cases whatsoever. This, sir,
seems to be demonstrable; for if the clause in question really
authorizes Congress to do whatever they think fit, provided it be for
the general welfare, of which they are to judge, and money can be
applied to it, Congress must have power to create and support a
Judiciary Establishment, with a jurisdiction extending to all cases
favorable, in their opinion, to the general welfare, in the same manner
as they have power to pass laws and apply money, providing in any other
way for the general welfare. I shall be reminded, perhaps, that
according to the terms of the constitution, the Judicial Power is to
extend to certain cases only, not to all cases. But this circumstance
can have no effect in the argument, it being presupposed by the
gentlemen that the specification of certain objects does not limit the
import of general terms. Taking these terms as an abstract and
indefinite grant of power, they comprise all the objects of Legislative
regulation, as well such as fall under the Judiciary article in the
constitution, as those falling immediately under the Legislative
article; and if the partial enumeration of objects in the Legislative
article does not, as these gentlemen contend, limit the general power,
neither will it be limited by the partial enumeration of objects in the
Judiciary article.
There are consequences, sir, still more extensive, which, as they follow
clearly from the doctrine combated, must either be admitted, or the
doctrine must be given up. If Congress can apply money indefinitely to
the general welfare, and are the sole and supreme judges of the general
welfare, they may take the care of religion into their own hands; they
may establish teachers in every State, county, and parish, and pay them
out of the public Treasury; they may take into their own hands the
education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout
the Union; they may undertake the regulation of all roads, other than
post roads. In short, every thing, from the highest object of State
legislation, down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown
under the power of Congress; for every object I have mentioned would
admit the application of money, and might be called, if Congress
pleased, provisions for the general welfare.
The language held in various discussions of this House, is a proof that
the doctrine in question was never entertained by this body. Arguments,
wherever the subject would permit, have constantly been drawn from the
peculiar nature of this Government, as limited to certain enumerated
powers, instead of extending, like other Governments, to all cases not
particularly excepted. In a very late instance--I mean the debate on the
Representation bill--it must be remembered, that an argument much urged,
particularly by a gentleman from Massachusetts, against the ratio of one
for thirty thousand, was, that this Government was unlike the State
Governments, which had an indefinite variety of objects within their
power; that it had a small number of objects only to attend to, and
therefore that a smaller number of Representatives would be sufficient
to administer it.
Several arguments have been advanced to show, that because, in the
regulation of trade, indirect and eventual encouragement is given to
manufactures, therefore Congress have power to give money in direct
bounties, or to grant it in any other way that would answer the same
purpose. But surely, sir, there is a great and obvious difference, which
it cannot be necessary to enlarge upon. A duty laid on imported
implements of husbandry, would, in its operation, be an indirect tax on
exported produce; but will any one say, that by virtue of a mere power
to lay duties on imports, Congress might go directly to the produce or
implements of agriculture, or to the articles exported? It is true,
duties on exports are expressly prohibited; but if there were no article
forbidding them, a power directly to tax exports could never be deduced
from a power to tax imports, although such a power might directly and
incidentally affect exports.
In short, sir, without going further into the subject, which I should
not have here touched on at all but for the reasons already mentioned, I
venture to declare it as my opinion, that were the power of Congress to
be established in the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very
foundation, and transmute the very nature of the limited Government
established by the people of America; and what inferences might be
drawn, or what consequences ensue from such a step, it is incumbent on
us all well to consider.
With respect to the question before the House, for striking out the
clause, it is immaterial whether it be struck out, or so amended as to
rest on the avowed principle of a commutation for the drawback; but as a
clause has been drawn up by my colleague, in order to be substituted, I
shall concur in a vote for striking out, reserving to myself a freedom
to be governed in my final vote by the modification which may prevail.