1st. Did the General enter into these engagements out of personal regard
to individuals, without a view to the public interest?
2dly. Was not the good of the public his principal object?
3dly. Under all circumstances, should not his estate be indemnified?
As to the first, I cannot think that the General, out of mere personal
regard to individuals, without a view to the public good, would have
been bail. He had been esteemed a man of prudence, and was not a person
of large fortune. How would he embarrass his family and property in such
engagements? Who, under mere motives of friendship, would have done so?
The sum was too large; he had no interest. He got no goods or money for
himself. He might have had a favorable opinion of some of the company,
but his responsibility was become necessary with a view to the public
good.
As to the second, public good must have been his principal object. The
contracts before made would not have been carried into execution,
without the aid of the contract, for which the indemnity was made in
April, 1783. A great many articles were absolutely necessary to the
army; they were connected with others; the necessaries could not at that
critical period, or for the moment, be obtained elsewhere. The
merchants, as I understand, insisted upon two conditions before they
would deliver the goods: 1st, that all the goods should go together; 2d,
that the commanding officer should become security. There was a
necessity for an additional capital to furnish the means for supporting
the army; and as most of the goods were useful and necessary, the
residue might be disposed of to the best advantage, and the money
arising from them be applied to the payment of the debt. Public
necessity and the state of things would oblige the General to agree to
the first condition. The compliance with the second condition became a
necessary consequence. The General's letter from Newport, and General
Wayne's oath, Nathaniel Pendleton's oath, and other evidence, prove the
situation of the army. As to the third point, should not his estate be
indemnified? Through his zeal for the public good, he has unfortunately
involved his estate in difficulty. Whatever the conduct of the company
might be, the creditors were not to be affected either by the fraud or
failure of Banks and the purchasers. General Greene was liable. The
General, when he hears of misconduct, does all he can to save and
indemnify himself, and through him the United States. Securities were
taken in as ample a manner as they could he obtained from the
delinquents; and General Greene never wished to call upon the public,
until every other means failed. So late as the year 1785 he had still
hopes there would be no loss; but when he found the danger, a sense of
duty obliged him to come forward to save himself and family, to ask the
protection of the public to indemnify him from a debt that he had
contracted to save an army from mutiny and disbanding; to protect a
country which otherwise would have been exposed. Many exertions had he
to make to feed the hungry and cover the naked; were not these for the
public good, and shall his private property suffer? Shall his family be
reduced to beggary, be stripped of their all, to discharge what the
United States are in honor and in justice bound to pay?
Retrospective laws, to affect rights attacked, ought never to pass; but
laws have frequently been enacted to indemnify persons for a conduct,
though not strictly legal, yet founded on the special circumstances of
the case--the safety or honor of a nation or army, where the
constitutional authority could not come forward in time. Such was the
treaty or system formed by the Duke of Marlborough and the great De
Witt. The Dutch, instead of punishing their minister, approved the
measure; it eventually tended to the safety and honor of the allies. The
individual who undertakes risks for his country's good, a magnanimous
Government will always sanctify. We should consider the case upon
substantial principles, not according to the letter, not act as the
Lacedæmonians did to one of their leaders; they fined him for the
infringement of the letter of the law, yet for the same act rewarded the
hero with a garland. The fine here ruins the General's estate, and the
garland alone, I fear, in this country, will not give his children bread
or a becoming education.
In our late contest, the common maxims of old nations could not always
be adhered to. We were obliged to act according to emergencies. In the
case of General Greene, he seems to have intended for the best. He
helped to serve and save a country. His merit stands high indeed. I need
not repeat the number of his great and glorious actions, which mark him
the General and the hero. His name will be handed down with honor to
succeeding ages.
Under all circumstances, I think his estate should be indemnified. If
the committee do not like the whole of the resolution, let there be a
division, as proposed by one of the gentlemen from South Carolina;
though I should think we might safely vote for the whole of the
resolution, and let the bill make any other provisions which it may be
thought necessary.
Mr. LEE, Mr. BARNWELL, Mr. WAYNE, and Mr. BOURNE, R. I., spoke in favor
of agreeing to the resolutions, and Mr. MACON and Mr. STURGES against
the motion. Mr. SUMTER closed the debate in sundry remarks on extracts
from letters wrote by General Greene during the late war, inserted in
Gordon's History of the American Revolution, which extracts contain
unfavorable reflections on the militia of South Carolina, and the
patriotism of the inhabitants of that State. These reflections, Mr.
SUMTER said, were gross calumnies on, and misrepresentations of the
character of that people, which he said were invalidated by facts that
at that time took place, and by the general tenor of the conduct of
South Carolina throughout the whole course of the war.
MONDAY, January 23.
_Petition of Catharine Greene._
The order of the day being called for, on the report of the Secretary of
the Treasury on the petition of Catharine Greene, several members
objected to taking up this subject, being of a private nature, while
matters of the greatest public importance demand the immediate attention
of Congress. The question being taken, the motion for going into
Committee of the Whole was carried, 21 to 16; and Mr. LIVERMORE took the
chair.
After considerable debate, the question was put for agreeing to the
first resolution, in the following words:
_Resolved_, as the opinion of this committee, That the
estate of the late Major General Greene ought to be
indemnified for the engagements entered into by that
General, with certain persons in the State of South
Carolina, for the purpose of obtaining supplies for the
Army of the United States, under his command, in the year
1783.
Which was negatived, 28 to 25.
The committee then rose, and the Chairman reported that the Committee of
the whole House had had under consideration a report of the Secretary of
the Treasury on the petition of Catharine Greene, and had come to no
resolution thereon.
Mr. MACON then moved that the Committee of the Whole should be
discharged from any further proceedings on the subject; which motion was
agreed to.
Mr. BOURNE then laid on the table a resolution for referring the
Secretary's Report, together with Mrs. Greene's petition, and the
vouchers accompanying it, to a select committee, with instruction to
inquire into the facts which rendered it necessary for General Greene to
become security to Banks & Co., and the nature, circumstances, and
amount of the original debt, and the obligation entered into by General
Greene for payment thereof; with an account of the moneys or collateral
security received by the obligees, or by General Greene in his lifetime,
or his representatives since his death, in part thereof; and the
eventual loss which his estate will sustain in consequence of the said
securities; and after examining all the circumstances and such further
evidence as may be offered relative to the transaction, to report their
opinion thereon to the House.
THURSDAY, January 26.
An engrossed bill to ascertain and regulate the claims to half-pay and
to invalid pensions was read the third time and passed.
_Protection of the Frontiers._
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the
bill for making further and more effectual provision for the Protection
of the Frontiers of the United States.
A motion being made to strike out the second section of the bill, which
contemplates the raising of three additional regiments of infantry and a
squadron of light dragoons, amounting in all to three thousand and forty
men, exclusive of commissioned officers--
It was urged in favor of the motion, that the Indian war, in which the
United States are at present involved, was, in its origin, as unjustly
undertaken as it has since been unwisely and unsuccessfully conducted;
that depredations had been committed by the whites as well as by the
Indians; and the whites were most probably the aggressors, as they
frequently made encroachments on the Indian lands, whereas the Indians
showed no inclination to obtain possession of our territory, or even to
make temporary invasions, until urged to it by a sense of their wrongs.
A proof of this unencroaching disposition on their part plainly appeared
in their conduct, after the victory they lately obtained over our
troops; for, when flushed with success, they might have swept the
country before them, and penetrated as far as Pittsburg, they contented
themselves with the advantage they had gained over their invaders, and
did not attempt to invade our territories in return, although there was
nowhere at hand a sufficient force to check their career.
The mode of treating the Indians in general was reprobated as unwise and
impolitic. The Indians are with difficulty to be reduced by the sword,
but may easily be gained by justice and moderation;[41] and, although
their cruelties are alleged as reasons for a different conduct, and the
sufferings of the white people pathetically deplored, these narratives,
it was said, are at best but _ex parte_ evidence--we hear nothing of the
sufferings of the Indians--but if Cornplanter's speech were read, it
would set the matter in a very different point of view, and furnish a
complete answer to all the charges of their accusers.
Peace, it was said, may be obtained from the Indian tribes at a much
less expense than would be necessary for the support of the war. To
persevere in hostilities would be wasting the public money to a very bad
purpose indeed; for, supposing our arms crowned with victory, what are
the advantages we may expect to reap from our success? We can only gain
possession of their lands--a possession that must long continue
unproductive of the smallest benefit, as we already possess land
sufficient--more, in fact, than we will be able to cultivate for a
century to come.
Instead of being ambitious to extend our boundaries, it would answer a
much better national purpose to check the roving disposition of the
frontier settlers, and prevent them from too suddenly extending
themselves to the Western waters. If kept closer together, and more
nearly connected with the old settlements, they would be more useful to
the community at large, and would not so frequently involve us in
unnecessary and expensive wars with the Indians; but if permitted to
rove at pleasure, they will keep the nation embroiled in perpetual
warfare as long as the Indians have a single acre of ground to rest
upon.
If the citizens of the United States were recalled within their proper
boundaries, there they might, for years to come, cultivate the soil in
peace, neither invaded nor invading. As the country progresses in
population, and our limits are found too narrow, it will then be soon
enough to contemplate a gradual extension of our frontier; but, in the
mean time, it is an idle profusion of blood and treasure to carry war
beyond our present line of forts. It is only exposing our arms to
disgrace, betraying our own weakness, and lessening the public
confidence in the General Government, to send forth armies to be
butchered in the forests, while we suffer the British to keep possession
of the posts within our territory.
As long as Britain is suffered to retain these posts, we can never hope
to succeed against the Indians; nor ought we to trace our late
misfortune to any other source than her still holding them in her
possession. Were they in our hands, the Indians could not carry on their
operations against us with the same degree of vigor as they now do; for
it is from those forts that they obtain their supplies of arms and
ammunition, with which they can be at all times plentifully furnished,
as long as things continue on their present footing.
Until those posts are in our possession, it will be in vain to send our
armies into the wilderness. A body of five thousand men, sent out
against the Indians, under the present circumstances, would be as
effectually defeated as the smaller ones have already been. In those
wilds, our troops have no friend at hand to furnish them with supplies,
or to give them intelligence of the approach and operations of the
enemy; whereas, the Indians, receiving both aid and information from
their friendly neighbors, can preconcert their plans, and choose,
according to their own convenience, the place and the hour of attack, as
they did before.
It was here observed, by an honorable gentleman on the other side of the
question, that we ought undoubtedly to get possession of those posts;
and that we might have long since obtained it, if we had only laid a
seasonable embargo on all the British shipping in our ports; though he
doubted whether it would at present be worth while to take such a step,
as the English have lost so great a portion of our carrying trade, in
consequence of the additional tonnage laid on their vessels.
In favor of the motion, it was further urged, that, supposing even the
war to have been originally undertaken with justice on our
side--supposing, also, that the national honor and interest called for a
continuance of hostilities--yet, as it was by no means either necessary
or prudent to invade the Indian territory, as this had been attempted in
two successive campaigns, and the event had, in both instances, been
such as to afford no very flattering prospect from a third expedition of
the same kind, it was thought much more advisable to content ourselves
with defending the frontier; and this might be done without making so
great an augmentation in the military establishment.
The only use of regular troops on the frontier is to garrison the forts,
and to have a standing force in the neighborhood to form a station, to
which the militia may resort either for protection or supplies; but as
to active service, the frontier militia and rangers were pronounced to
be by far preferable to the regular troops, as being more expert
woodsmen, and better habituated to the Indian mode of fighting. To
defend the forts, a small number of regulars would be sufficient. The
present establishment of two regiments would, if completed, be amply
adequate to the purpose, and, when assisted by such forces as might at
all times be collected on the frontier, would be able to repel every
inroad of the enemy.
Experience has proved that the sudden and desultory attacks of the
frontier militia and rangers are ever attended with better success than
the methodical operations of a regular force. The former are better
calculated for expedition and surprise, making unexpected sallies,
scouring the country in small bodies, harassing the Indians, and
intercepting their straggling parties, by whom their motions are
unobserved; whereas, when a body of regulars take the field, encumbered
with baggage and heavy artillery, the unavoidable slowness of their
movements affords the enemy an opportunity of watching all their
operations, collecting their whole force, and skulking in the woods
around them till they can seize the favorable moment to strike a sudden
blow, which they generally do with success, but which they could never
attempt if exposed every hour to the unforeseen attacks of our woodsmen,
who would keep their attention constantly engaged in all quarters, and
thus prevent them from uniting in large bodies.
It was further observed by some gentlemen, who even admitted the
propriety of invading the Indian territory, that, to effect this with
success, it was by no means necessary to make such an increase in the
military establishment as that contemplated in the bill. The miscarriage
of the former expeditions could not (they said) be alleged as a
sufficient reason; for it is well known that the former establishment
was far from being complete. The regulars intended for the service of
the last campaign were to have been above two thousand two hundred; the
President was, besides, empowered to raise two thousand five hundred
levies, in addition to the regulars; and these would, together, have
constituted an army of about four thousand seven hundred men. Had such a
body been employed, we might reasonably have expected much better
success against the Indians, whose numbers were so far inferior; the
whole force of the Wabash tribes not amounting to above eleven or twelve
hundred warriors, who never could keep the field for any length of time,
but must be soon obliged to disperse, without venturing an attack upon
an army of such superior strength.
Instead of this, our army consisted of only about twelve hundred men,
and of these not above four or five hundred were regular troops;
besides, had even this force been sufficient, if employed in season, the
delays that had taken place in the execution of the plan would alone
have been sufficient to defeat the intended purpose. During the winter,
the law was passed for raising the additional troops for carrying on the
war with greater vigor. The whole summer was spent in the business, and
the few men that we did enlist were not raised till late in the fall.
Collected at length at the head of the Ohio, they fruitlessly loitered
away their time, till they finally erected a monument to our eternal
disgrace and infamy.
Whatever troops are to be employed, ought to be raised with diligence
and despatch, if we wish to avoid a similar miscarriage in our next
attempt. The army ought not to enter the Indian country till their whole
force is complete. Difficulties, however, and delay, equal to those of
last year, may be expected in enlisting the men; and we shall have the
officers in pay a considerable time without any soldiers. Perhaps the
former pay of the troops was too low, and proper effective men were
unwilling to accept of it; if so, let it be raised, let the men be well
clothed and fed, and they will more readily engage in the service.
Probably, also, the term of three years was an objection with many, who
would otherwise have joined our standard. If enlisted only for six
months, the ranks will be sooner filled; and this ought to have
considerable weight with those who advocate the augmentation of the
military establishment, as they cannot but know that, if we set about
enlisting the number of men contemplated in the bill, and in the manner
there prescribed, they cannot be raised time enough to render any
service in the next campaign.
The information contained in the report on the table was not, it was
said, to be implicitly relied on. That report was made by a man who had
not personally visited the frontier. Others, who had been on the spot,
were of opinion that, if two thousand levies had been raised last year,
they would have been sufficient, not only for the defence of the
frontier, but even for any offensive operations that might have been
thought necessary. Such troops, collected in the vicinity, are more
competent to the undertaking than the troops now in contemplation. No
complaint had been made of their conduct. Whenever they were tried, they
behaved as well as the regulars, and, in the action under General St.
Clair, they gave equal proofs of their valor.
It was further urged, that the frontier militia are not only equal, but
infinitely superior to any regular troops whatever, for the defence of
the borders, and that they are, in fact, the only force that can be
effectually employed in expeditions against the hostile Indians, whose
mode of fighting is familiar to them, and does not strike them with that
degree of terror with which it inspires those men who enlist on the
regular establishment. These latter being collected in the heart of
populous cities, where the face of an Indian is seldom seen, hardly know
whether the Indian and his horse are not the same animal. And when they
approach the enemy, at the very first shout, even before he is in view,
they are terrified at the idea of savage barbarity, which they have ever
been taught to reflect on with horror, and, being incapable of
resistance, they commit their safety to flight. To prove the superiority
of the militia, gentlemen need only contrast the despatch and success of
the expedition conducted by General Scott, with the delays, disgrace,
and mortification, which attended that under General St. Clair, and
consider the difference of the expense on those two occasions.
The expense of such an army as the bill contemplates is an object well
worthy of serious consideration, especially at the present moment, when
there is scarcely a dollar in the Treasury. Gentlemen would also do well
to advert to the progress of this business, and consider where they were
likely to stop, if they went on at the present rate. At first, only a
single regiment had been raised, and the expense was about $100,000; a
second was afterwards added, which swelled the expense to about
$300,000; and now a standing force of 5,168 men is contemplated, at an
annual expense of above a million and a quarter of dollars. Can this be
justified in the present state of our finances, when it is well known
that the Secretary of the Treasury, having been requested by the members
from a particular State to build a light-house on a part of their coast,
declined the undertaking, and alleged the want of funds as the reason?
Our resources, however, might be made to answer for the support of such
a force as that which was intended for the service of the preceding
year, and there would be little complaint or dissatisfaction among the
people. Very few murmurings were heard against the former establishment;
but such a one as is now contemplated will be thought extravagant, will
breed discontent among the citizens of the United States, and perhaps
afford our neighbors in Canada an opportunity to take advantage of our
divided situation, and involve us in a war more dangerous than the
former which separated us from Great Britain.
Apprehensions, it is said, are entertained that the object contemplated
in raising these additional troops is not so much to punish and coerce
the Indians, as to have a standing regular force equal to what the
British have on this continent. This is said to amount to about six
thousand men, including those in Canada. But it is to be remarked, that
the British nation has not above _one thousand_ men within the limits of
the United States; and yet, with this handful of troops, they not only
keep the Indians in awe, but even, in opposition to the wishes of the
United States, retain possession of those posts which should have been
ceded to us pursuant to the terms of the treaty. Why, then, is it
necessary, for the purpose of establishing posts and garrisoning them,
to increase the standing force to so large a number as that contemplated
in the clause under consideration? During our late arduous struggle for
liberty, when we had to cope with the most powerful nation under heaven,
the commander-in-chief had never at any one time above ten thousand men
under his own immediate command; and if, with so small a force, we were
able to effect so glorious a revolution, there can be no necessity of
going such lengths at present, for the sake of establishing a military
character. It is strange policy, indeed, to raise five or six thousand
men to oppose a handful of Indian banditti, whose utmost amount does
not, from the documents on the table, appear to exceed twelve hundred.
We are preparing to squander away money by millions; and no one, except
those who are in the secrets of the Cabinet, knows for what reason the
war has been thus carried on for three years. But what funds are to
defray the increased expense of maintaining such a force as is now
contemplated? The excise is both unpopular and unproductive. The impost
duties have been raised as high as is consistent with prudence. To
increase them, would be but to open a door for smuggling, and thus
diminish their productiveness. And if those sources of revenue fail--if
our finances be thus exhausted in unnecessary wars--we shall be unable
to satisfy, the public creditors, unless recourse be had to new taxes,
the consequence of which may, with just reason, be deplored; whereas, if
we but keep our expenses within bounds--if we nurse our finances--we
shall be respectable among the nations of the earth, nor will any nation
dare to insult us, or be able to do it with impunity.
During the course of these observations, an honorable gentleman asked,
whether this was a day set apart for rhetorical flourishes, as the
galleries were open, and he saw the short-hand writers stationed at
their different posts?
At an early stage of the debate, an honorable gentleman had suggested,
that, instead of passing a law for raising at all events the additional
regiments, which, for his part, he did not think necessary, the House,
if they finally determined the present establishment to be insufficient,
would perhaps do better to appropriate a certain sum of money, to enable
the Executive to call in such additional aid as circumstances may
require.
To this it was objected, that it is the duty of the Representatives of
the people, in all appropriations of the public money, to make them for
certain specific purposes. To act otherwise on the present occasion
would be setting a precedent that might, in its consequences, prove
highly injurious; for, although the greatest confidence may safely be
reposed in the virtue and integrity of him who now fills the
Presidential chair, it is impossible to foresee what use may hereafter
be made of the precedent by his successors, or how far it may be
carried.
Against the motion for striking out, and in favor of the proposed
augmentation of the military establishment, it was urged: That, as to
the justice of the war carried on against the Indian tribes, that was a
question which could not admit of a doubt in the mind of any man who
would allow that self-preservation and indispensable necessity are
sufficient causes to justify a nation in taking up arms. If the present
war be not in every respect justifiable, then there never was, nor ever
will be, a just war. It was originally undertaken, and since carried on,
not for the sake of conquest, but to defend our fellow-citizens, our
friends, our dearest connections, who are daily exposed, in the frontier
settlements, to all the rage of savage barbarity, to which they, with
their wives and children, must soon fall victims, unless we speedily fly
to their assistance; and, although there are some people who utterly
deny the justice of any war whatever, this doctrine, however fine in
theory, will hardly ever obtain in practice; for, is it to be imagined,
that any set of men are of such a passive disposition as calmly to look
on whilst their friends and relations are butchered before their eyes,
and to refuse giving them every assistance in their power?
The murders and depredations which have for years past been repeatedly
committed by the savages, loudly call for redress. From various
documents of unquestionable authority, now in the hands of the Secretary
of War, signed and attested by the Executive and Legislature of
Kentucky, by the District Judge, and the Captains of the militia, it
appears, that, from the year 1783 to 1790, there have been, of the
inhabitants of that District, or of emigrants on their way thither, no
less than fifteen hundred persons either massacred by the savages, or
dragged into captivity, two thousand horses taken away, and other
property plundered or destroyed to the amount of fifty thousand dollars.
And there is good reason to suppose that on the other frontiers of
Virginia and Pennsylvania the number of persons murdered or taken
prisoners during the above-mentioned period would furnish a list of one
thousand or fifteen hundred more.
The white people, it is true, have sometimes committed depredations on
the Indians; but the instances have been rare (the honorable gentleman
who spoke did not recollect above one or two) of their making unjust
attacks upon the savages; nor did they, on those occasions, commence
hostilities against them till exasperated by the strongest provocations
that could possibly stimulate the human heart. This circumstance may be
justly allowed as some palliation of the offence. Even in these
instances, however, a few individuals only were concerned; and, when the
affair came to the knowledge of the State, ample reparation was made to
the injured party. The General Government, too, had shown an equal
disposition to do justice to the Indian tribes. Witness the affair of
the Cherokees; for, as soon as Congress had heard their complaints of an
encroachment made on them by some of the people from the frontier of the
Carolinas, immediate orders were issued for obliging the intruders to
evacuate the Indian territory.
But, notwithstanding the disposition that prevails, as well in the
Legislatures of those States whose frontiers are most exposed, as in the
General Government, to cultivate peace and amity with the neighboring
Indians, that desirable object is become utterly unattainable in the
present posture of affairs. The frontier Indians have killed a number of
whites; the whites, in their turn, have made retaliation. Both parties
are in the highest degree exasperated against each other, and likely to
continue so, in spite of every endeavor that can be made to effect a
reconciliation. With minds thus irritated, it is vain to hope for peace,
as long as they continue in each other's neighborhood. It is therefore
necessary to form a strong barrier, to keep them asunder, unless,
indeed, the advocates for a cessation of hostilities would oblige the
frontier settlers to abandon their lands. But by what new-invented rule
of right should the inhabitants of Kentucky, and the other frontier
settlers, be laid under a greater obligation than any other citizens of
the United States to relinquish a property legally acquired by their
purchase? Were it even proposed to pacify the savages, by purchasing
the lands anew, such a measure would answer no other purpose than that
of procuring a temporary peace, which would soon again be interrupted by
a war that would reproduce the necessity of again having recourse to the
same expedient. We should have to purchase the lands again and again,
without end. By thus squandering the public money, year after year, we
should swell the national debt to an amount that we cannot possibly
foresee. Better at once to make a vigorous effort, to act in a manner
becoming the national dignity, and to maintain our ground by war, since
we cannot obtain a durable or an honorable peace.
Attempts have, at various times, been made to effect treaties of peace
with the Indian tribes with whom we are now at war; and, although these
efforts have constantly proved ineffectual, they yet show, that neither
the United States nor the State of Virginia were backward on their part
to adopt conciliatory measures, and to do away that animosity which had
commenced on the part of the savages at an early period of the late war
with Great Britain, and had continued to break out at intervals ever
since. In the years, 1783, '84, '85, '87, '88, and '90, offers of peace
were made to them. On the last-mentioned occasion, when a treaty was
proposed at the Miami village, the Indians at first refused to treat.
They next required thirty days to deliberate; and, in the interim, the
inhabitants of Kentucky were expressly prohibited by the President of
the United States from carrying on any offensive operations against
them; yet, notwithstanding this forbearance on the part of the whites,
no less than one hundred and twenty persons were killed or captured by
the savages, and several prisoners roasted alive, during that short
period, at the expiration of which, the Indians refused to give any
answer at all.
On another occasion, the Indians, not content with rejecting our offers
of peace, proceeded even so far as to insult us, by telling us we have
lands within the British posts, and asking us why we did not go and take
possession of them? Will it be said that we are unable to do it? Is this
language to be used within the United States? No! We _are_ able,
abundantly able to do it, whenever we please; and if we would but
retrench our expenses in some instances, which might well admit of a
reduction, our ability would still increase; our finances are not quite
so insufficient as some gentlemen seem to imagine, nor so easily
deranged. We are still able to prove that the boasted efficiency of the
General Government is something more than an empty name--we can yet
raise both men and money sufficient to defend the nation from either
injury or insult.
It is now too late to inquire whether the war was originally undertaken
on the principles of justice or not. We are actually involved in it, and
cannot recede, without exposing numbers of innocent persons to be
butchered by the enemy; for, though we should determine to discontinue
the war, can it he said that the savages will also agree to a cessation
of hostilities? It is well known that they are averse to peace; and even
the warmest advocate of pacific measures must therefore allow that the
war is a war of necessity, and must be supported. We cannot, without
impeachment both to our justice and our humanity, abandon our
fellow-citizens on the frontier to the rage of their savage enemies. And
although the excise may be somewhat unpopular, although money may still
be wanted; what is the excise? what is money, when put in competition
with the lives of our friends and brethren?
A sufficient force must be raised for their defence; and the only
question now to be considered is, what that force shall be? Experience
has proved, that the force employed in the last campaign was inadequate.
It is true the establishment was not complete; but who will venture to
assert that, if it had been complete, it would have been sufficient for
the intended purpose? Are gentlemen who assert this so well acquainted
with the circumstances of the enemy, as to be able to give an accurate
statement of the amount of their forces on the frontier? There are
stronger opinions in favor of an augmentation of the army than can be
adduced against it--opinions given by men of judgment and experience,
who have themselves been on the spot, and are well acquainted with the
situation of affairs in that quarter. These gentlemen, who must be
allowed to be competent judges, are decidedly of opinion that the
present establishment, though completed to the last man, will not
furnish an adequate force to carry on the war with effect; and that it
will be a hopeless attempt to open another campaign, with less than
about five thousand regular troops, the number contemplated in the bill.
Nor ought that number to be deemed extravagant, under an idea that we
have only a contemptible handful of banditti to contend with. Their
numbers were, last year, from authentic documents, stated at about
twelve hundred warriors, from twenty-three different tribes: such was
the opposition then contemplated; but it is impossible to ascertain what
accessions of strength they have since received, or even what force they
had engaged in the late unfortunate action, as the very men who were in
the engagement do not pretend to form any just or accurate estimate of
the number of their assailants; but there is good reason to suppose that
they had previously entered into an association with various tribes,
that have not as yet come within our knowledge. The bows and arrows used
against our troops on that occasion, afford a convincing proof that they
had foes to encounter from distant nations, as yet unacquainted with the
use of fire-arms. Nor does the account of the bows and arrows depend,
for its authenticity, on newspaper evidence alone; gentlemen of
unquestionable veracity, who were personally engaged in the action,
have declared that they had themselves noticed the arrows flying.
When we consider the warlike disposition of the Indians in general, and
the alacrity with which the victors are ever sure to be joined by
numerous allies, we have every reason to expect a much more formidable
opposition in the next campaign. It is well known that the savages place
all their glory in deeds of war; and that, among them, a young man
cannot make his appearance in company till he has signalized his valor
by some martial achievement. When, to this powerful incentive, a new
stimulus is added by the trophies obtained in the late action, it is
presumable that numbers will crowd to their standard; and it strongly
behooves us to prepare in time for a much more vigorous effort than any
we have yet made against them.
The objections drawn from the increased expense, must entirely vanish
from before the eyes of any man who looks forward to the consequences of
one more unsuccessful campaign. Such a disaster would eventually involve
the nation in much greater expense than that which is now made the
ground of opposition. Better, therefore, at once to make a vigorous and
effectual exertion to bring the matter to a final issue, than to
continue gradually draining the Treasury, by dragging on the war, and
renewing hostilities from year to year.
If we wish to bring the war to a speedy and a happy conclusion, and to
secure a permanent peace to the inhabitants on the frontier, we must
employ such troops and adopt such measures as appear best calculated to
ensure success. If we delay our determination until the force of the
enemy be ascertained, we can make no provision at all; for the nature
and circumstances of the case preclude us from the very possibility of
obtaining a knowledge of their strength and numbers. And are we,
meanwhile, to remain inactive and irresolute, and make no efforts to
repel their intended attacks? No! Whatever their numbers may be,
prudence calls aloud for provision of some kind. And if experience is to
have any weight with us, the example of the French and of the British
points out the true mode of securing our frontier, and rendering it
invulnerable to an Indian foe. Let us occupy posts in the vicinity of
the enemy, let them be properly garrisoned and well provided, and the
business is done.
These will afford an opportunity of trading with the friendly tribes,
and will prevent all intercourse between the whites and the Indians,
except under proper regulations. Should hostilities be meditated by any
tribes who are not in amity with us, early intelligence of their
movements can be obtained; their marauding parties may either be beaten
off on their approach, or intercepted on their return; opportunities may
be taken of separately attacking the hostile tribes; their old men,
their squaws, their children, will be exposed a great part of the year,
whilst the others are out hunting. In short, if fear, hope, interest,
can be supposed to have any influence on the Indians, this mode of
defence must be allowed to be preferable to any other, as giving the
fullest scope to the operation of all those motives.
A different mode has long been pursued in Virginia, and adopted by the
inhabitants of Kentucky, but its success has not been such as to offer
any inducement to the General Government to follow the same plan.
Rangers have there been employed for a number of years to scour the
frontiers; and those rangers, too, were expert woodsmen, perfectly
inured to the Indian mode of warfare; yet, notwithstanding their utmost
vigilance, these savages still found means to commit all the murders and
depredations already enumerated. It is true, however, that a frontier
militia man, trained up in the woods, may be, in many respects,
preferable to a regular soldier, who has not the same knowledge of the
country, and of the mode of fighting; but with equal experience, (and
proper men possessed of that experience, may be enlisted on the
establishment,) regular troops will be found infinitely superior to any
militia upon earth.
Every man who has ever seen militia in the field, cannot but know that a
very trifling disaster, or a slight cause of discontent, is sufficient
to make them disband, and forget all subordination, so far as even to
neglect the means of self-defence; whereas regular troops, under proper
discipline, and acting with greater steadiness and concert, are much
more to be depended on, especially when the object of attack is distant,
and great fatigue is to be undergone. The militia, in whatever mode they
may be called out, will hardly furnish men of the proper description; if
large pay be offered, the temptation will equally prevail upon those who
are unfit for the service as it will upon good, effective men; besides,
some of the States have no militia laws; and, even in those States which
have such laws, they are gone into disuse; no dependence can therefore
be placed on militia under any laws now existing. There is, indeed, a
general militia law now before the House: but if it ever passes, it
certainly cannot be passed in due season to answer the purpose of
providing for the immediate defence of the frontier. Regular troops must
be raised, or nothing effectual can be done; and if to avoid the expense
we refuse the only aid that may prove of any real service, we render
ourselves responsible for the consequences of this parsimonious policy,
which may be attended with the ruin and destruction of our
fellow-citizens in the Western country.
The Cornplanter's speech was again mentioned and called for; but, as it
had been confidentially communicated by the President, an objection was
made to having it read, without clearing the galleries. Whereupon,
An honorable member rose, and mentioned his having read it in one of the
public newspapers in the State of New Jersey.
To this it was answered, that if any gentleman had the newspaper to
produce, the speech might be publicly read from that; otherwise,
although it might be very proper that the speech itself should be read,
yet, as it had been confidentially received from the Executive, there
would be a manifest trespass on propriety and decorum in having it read
with open galleries; it was therefore wished that the galleries might be
cleared.
The Parliamentary etiquette requiring that this should be done by the
House, and not by a committee, the committee rose for the purpose; and,
The Speaker having resumed the chair, the motion for clearing the
galleries was renewed.
An objection was here started by an honorable gentleman in favor of the
augmentation, who said that, as some gentlemen had spoken on the popular
side of the question, whilst the galleries had been open, it was unfair
to preclude those of opposite sentiments from an opportunity of
answering their arguments in the same public manner, and proving to the
people the justice and necessity of the war.
The motion, however, was persisted in, and the galleries were
cleared.[42]
[The speakers in this day's debate were Messrs. WAYNE, GOODHUE,
BOUDINOT, LIVERMORE, STEELE, PARKER, BOURNE, (Rhode Island,) WHITE, and
MOORE. Mr. WHITE and Mr. MOORE opposed the motion; they were in favor of
the augmentation proposed in the bill. The other gentlemen were in favor
of striking out the clause.]
FRIDAY, January 27.
_Protection of the Frontiers._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on
the bill for making further and more effectual provision for the
protection of the frontiers of the United States.
Mr. MERCER rose and addressed the Chair as follows:
Mr. Chairman: I originally opposed the reference of this subject to the
Secretary of the Treasury, on principles supported by the constitution,
by the theory of free government, and from practical observation on the
progress of our own, and I believe the result now before us will fully
exemplify every evil predicted.
Let any man examine this bill, and compare it with the terms of the
original reference. Let it then be asked, whether the submission to
devise ways and means to provide for the defence of the Western
frontier, authorized the plans proposed by the Treasury Department, that
we are now giving sanction to? Did it authorize a perpetual tax,
irrepealable by the whole Legislature, without a breach of faith,
according to received doctrine? At least, so far placing the
purse-strings in the hands of the Executive, who may refuse an assent to
the repeal; in the power of the Senate also, and consequently beyond the
reach of the Representatives of the people, who alone are deputized by,
and may be recalled by the great mass of society, and to whom the
constitution expressly confines the power of originating money bills.
Have we, in truth, originated this money bill? Do we ever originate any
money bill? If a reference, such as made to the Secretary, was proposed
to the Senate, who are a branch of the Legislature, nearly of equal
importance with ourselves, would it not be held a breach of the
constitution? Were they to propose such a plan as this to us, would it
not be received with indignation? Why so little jealousy of the
Executive Department, separated by the constitution with so much care
from us? Of the Treasury Department, too, which is considered in other
countries as possessing and exercising the means of corruption? It is in
my judgment a direct infraction of the letter and spirit of the
constitution, of the principles of free government, and I have heard no
attempt to defend it, but on the ground of pitiful evasion, more
dishonorable to ourselves and dangerous to the public, than an open
violation, that would rouse their resentment and ensure opposition.
But did the submission of a provision to defend the frontier authorize a
system for the encouragement of manufactures, thereby placing the
occupations and productive labor of our citizens under the direction of
Government, and rendering the living of the artist and subsistence of
the farmer, so far equally dependent on and subservient to the views of
Administration? Did it authorize an entire provision for the public
debt, past, present, and to come? Did it authorize a plan for supplying
former deficiencies, which it is admitted do not exist? Lastly, did it
authorize an extensive increase of the Sinking Fund, which we are
informed is one of the principal objects? It would be an affront to
common sense to answer one of these queries in the affirmative--it
authorized none of them. And yet these are all its offspring; these are
the great objects it produced. It is true there are in the bill two or
three little clauses that were authorized, and which relate to the
submission, and which might well have escaped my attention, and would
probably never attract the observation of the public, but for the
title--a bill for the protection of the frontiers. By these clauses five
hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars of the whole moneys to be for
ever raised from its perpetual revenue, are appropriated for this year's
campaign. After that sum is expended, we must, even the next year, look
out for new taxes, and upon the same principles, as long as the Indian
war continues (and by the enlistments it is not contemplated to be of
very short duration) new taxes must be provided, for the residue of
these taxes are by this bill appropriated to other purposes, for ever,
after five hundred and twenty-three thousand dollars are paid. This
appropriation is unalterable even by the whole Legislature, unless by a
breach of public faith, or providing other equal revenue. Should every
year's Indian war, and every national disaster excuse Government for
laying a perpetual tax, equal to the increased annual demand, it will be
selling us defeats at a very high price; and if Government are paid so
well, they may be tempted to repeat the tragical representation.
But what is the reflection that naturally arises from a contemplation of
this bill. That Administration will not even permit us to defend the
helpless women and children of the frontier from the brutal ferocity of
a savage foe, but on condition that the Representatives surrender up for
ever the sacred trust of the constitution, and place in the power and
under the control of the Executive and Senate, a perpetual tax. Unless
they throw the power of regulating the labor and industry of their
fellow-citizens into the hands of Government, and into a mean dependence
on Administration; and unless they furnish a large sum of money, under
the denomination of a Sinking Fund, for the purposes of speculation, in
order to raise and lower the price of stocks at pleasure, or as may suit
the views and interest of the band of favorites that are in the secret.
Hard and oppressive conditions! Was this the object of the reference to
the Secretary? It was not the avowed one, nor could it have been
suspected, from a simple proposition to devise ways and means to defend
the frontier. A mighty fabric has been erected on this slight
foundation, to hurry us into its adoption. We have been officially, I
suppose, informed that the money for the War Department is almost
expended; that the preparations for the Western expedition must stop,
unless we pass the bill immediately; and thus, with the tomahawk
suspended over our heads, we must give up to Administration the dearest
interests of the people, and sacrifice the most sacred rights of the
constitution.
MONDAY, January 30.
_Protection of the Frontiers._
The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on
the bill making farther and more effectual provision for the protection
of the frontiers of the United States; and, after some time spent
therein, the Chairman reported that the committee had again had the said
bill under consideration, and made several amendments thereto; when the
same being read, some were agreed to, and others disagreed to.
And then the said bill being before the House, a motion was made, and
the question being put to amend the same, by striking out the second
section thereof, in the words following:
"_And be it further enacted_, That there shall be raised
three additional regiments of infantry, each of which,
exclusively of the commissioned officers, shall consist of
nine hundred and twelve non-commissioned officers,
privates, and musicians:"
It passed in the negative--yeas 18, nays 34, as follows:
YEAS.--John Baptist Ashe, Elias Boudinot, Shearjashub
Bourne, Benjamin Bourne, Nicholas Gilman, Benjamin Goodhue,
William Barry Grove, Samuel Livermore, Nathaniel Macon,
Nathaniel Niles, Josiah Parker, Israel Smith, John Steele,
Thomas Sumter, George Thatcher, Artemas Ward, Hugh
Williamson, and Francis Willis.
NAYS.--Fisher Ames, Abraham Baldwin, Robert Barnwell,
Egbert Benson, John Brown, Jonathan Dayton, William
Findlay, Thomas Fitzsimons, William B. Giles, Andrew Gregg,
Thomas Hartley, Daniel Huger, Philip Key, Aaron Kitchell,
John W. Kittera, John Laurance, Amasa Learned, James
Madison, Andrew Moore, Frederick Augustus Muhlenberg,
William Vans Murray, John Page, Cornelius C. Schoonmaker,
Joshua Seney, William Smith, Samuel Sterrett, Jonathan
Sturges, Peter Sylvester, Thomas Tredwell, Thomas Tudor
Tucker, Abraham Venable, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Anthony Wayne,
and Alexander White.
The farther consideration of the said bill was then postponed until
to-morrow.
TUESDAY, January 31.
The Speaker laid before the House a letter from the Secretary of War,
covering his report on the petitions of James Swaine, Abraham Springer,
Timothy Mountford, sundry seamen, Samuel Wail, for himself and servant,
John Carnaghan, James Shields, Henry Skinner, and William Loring; which
were read, and ordered to lie on the table.
_Protection of the Frontiers._
The House resumed the consideration of the bill for making farther and
more effectual provision for the protection of the frontiers of the
United States; and the same being further amended, was
_Ordered_, To be engrossed, and read the third time to-morrow.
WEDNESDAY, February 1.
Mr. PAGE, from the committee to whom was referred the petition of John
Churchman, made a report; which was read, and ordered to lie on the
table.
_Protection of the Frontiers._
An engrossed bill for making farther and more effectual provision for
the protection of the frontiers of the United States, was read the
third time, and the blanks therein filled up; and on the question that
the said bill do pass,
It was resolved in the affirmative--yeas 29, nays 19.
FRIDAY, February 3.
A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate recede from
their amendments, disagreed to by this House, to the bill to establish
Post Offices and Post Roads within the United States, and do agree to
the amendments proposed by the House to their amendment to the said
bill.
_The Cod Fisheries._
The House resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the
bill sent from the Senate, entitled, "An act for the encouragement of
the Bank and other Cod Fisheries, and for the regulation and government
of the fishermen employed therein."
The first section being read as follows:
"_Be it enacted, &c._, That the bounty, now allowed upon
the exportation of dried fish of the fisheries of the
United States, shall cease on all dried fish exported after
the tenth day of June next; and in lieu thereof, and for
the more immediate encouragement of the said fisheries,
there shall be afterwards paid, on the last day of December
annually, to the owner of every vessel or his agent, by the
collector of the district where such vessel may belong,
that shall be qualified agreeably to law, for carrying on
the Bank and other cod fisheries, and that shall actually
have been employed therein at sea, for the term of four
months at least, of the fishing season next preceding
(which season is accounted to be from the last day of
February, to the last day of November in every year) for
each and every ton of such vessel's burden, according to
her admeasurement, as licensed or enrolled; if of twenty
tons and not exceeding thirty tons, one and a half dollars,
and if above thirty tons, two and a half dollars, of which
bounty three-eighth parts shall accrue and belong to the
owner of such fishing vessel, and the other five-eighths
thereof shall be divided by him, his agent or lawful
representative, to and among the several fishermen who
shall have been employed in such vessel, during the season
aforesaid, or a part thereof, as the case may be, in such
proportions as the fish they shall respectively have taken
may bear to the whole quantity of fish taken on board such
vessel during such season. _Provided_, That the bounty, to
be allowed, and paid on any vessel for one season, shall
not exceed one hundred and seventy dollars."
Mr. GILES expressed some doubt respecting the principle of the bill; and
for the purpose of collecting the sense of the committee on the subject,
he thought the most effectual means would be a motion to amend the bill,
by striking out the whole section. He accordingly made the motion,
observing at the same time, that he could not positively assert, whether
the reasons which determined him against the principle of the bill, were
well founded or not; that, in matters where a local preference is given,
it is necessary to accommodate; and he would be happy if his objections
could be removed. The present section of the bill appears to contain a
direct bounty on occupations; and if that be its object, it is the first
attempt as yet made by this Government to exercise such authority; and
its constitutionality struck him in a doubtful point of view; for in no
part of the constitution could he, in express terms, find a power given
to Congress to grant bounties on occupations: the power is neither
directly granted, nor (by any reasonable construction that he could
give) annexed to any other power specified in the constitution. It might
perhaps be brought in under a mode of construction already adopted by
the House, viz: that of "ways and ends," by which any power whatever
might be equally implied; but he wished ever to see some connection
between a specified power, and the means adopted for carrying it into
execution. There is a great difference between giving encouragement, and
granting a direct bounty. Congress have a right to regulate commerce;
and any advantage thereby resulting to a particular occupation connected
with commerce, comes within that authority; but when a bounty is
proposed to a particular employment or occupation, this is stepping
beyond the circle of commerce; and such a measure will affect the whole
manufacturing and agricultural system. In all cases, the revenue, to be
employed in this bounty, is drawn from all the sources of revenue in the
United States, and confined to a particular object. He was averse to
bounties in almost every shape, as derogations from the common right;
and he thought there would be no great difficulty in proving, that a
government is both unjust and oppressive in establishing exclusive
rights, monopolies, &c., without some very substantial merit in the
persons to whom they are granted; although even in that case, the
propriety of such grants is still questionable. Under a just and equal
government, every individual is entitled to protection in the enjoyment
of the whole product of his labor, except such portion of it as is
necessary to enable Government to protect the rest; this is given only
in consideration of the protection offered. In every bounty, exclusive
right, or monopoly, Government violates the stipulation on her part;
for, by such a regulation, the product of one man's labor is transferred
to the use and enjoyment of another. The exercise of such a right on the
part of Government can be justified on no other principle, than that the
whole product of the labor of every individual is the real property of
Government, and may be distributed among the several parts of the
community by governmental discretion; such a supposition would directly
involve the idea that every individual in the community is merely a
slave and bondman to Government, who, although he may labor, is not to
expect protection in the product of his labor. An authority given to any
government to exercise such a principle, would lead to a complete system
of tyranny.
He entertained fewer doubts, respecting the principle, as it regards
political economy. All occupations that stand in need of bounties,
instead of increasing the real wealth of a country, rather tend to
lessen it; the real wealth of every country consisting in the active
product of useful labor employed in it. It is therefore bad policy to
encourage any occupation that would diminish, instead of increasing the
aggregate wealth of the community; and if an occupation is really
productive, and augments the general wealth, bounties are unnecessary
for its support; for when it reimburses the capital employed, and yields
a profit besides, it may be said to support itself. When it fails in
these points, any forced advantage that is given to it by the
Government, only tends to decrease the wealth of the country. The
subject, however, might be considered in a more favorable point of view:
and that is, whether the provision be essential to the defence of the
United States, and whether the bounties proposed in the bill were more
than equivalent to the portion of defence that would be procured by
them. The bill does not (in his opinion) contain that kind of
encouragement, which is essential to the national defence. Any man who
takes a view of this country, must be convinced that its real support
rises from the land, and not from the sea; and the opposite mistake must
have arisen merely from a servile imitation of the conduct of Great
Britain: the inhabitants of this country heretofore thought favorably of
her Government, and the Revolution has not yet altered their former
ideas respecting it. But the circumstances of the two countries will, on
examination, be found widely different; Britain, surrounded by the sea
on every side, finds a navy necessary to support her commerce; whilst
America, possessed of an immense territory, and having yet ample room to
cultivate that territory, has no occasion to contend by sea with any
European power: her strength and her resources are all to be found
within the United States; and if she but attends to her internal
resources, the object of national defence will be much better answered.
Mr. G. next proceeded to consider whether that portion of the national
defence which might be derived from the fisheries, would not be
purchased at too high a price. Although the apparent intention of the
bill is only to convert the present existing drawbacks into a bounty;
yet the drawbacks being allowed only to the actual exportation of the
fish, and the bounty being granted on the tonnage of the fishing
vessels, there can be no comparative value between the drawback and the
bounty; they have no necessary relation to each other, and the latter
may exceed the former, or the former exceed the latter. He had made a
calculation, and upon the most favorable principles, grounded on the
Reports of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State.
Here he produced a calculation, tending to show that the proposed bounty
on the tonnage of the fishing vessels, would considerably exceed the
amount of the present drawbacks. From a comparison between the bounty,
and the number of sailors employed in the fisheries, he showed what an
expense each man would be to the United States; and, after other
remarks, observed, that even Great Britain, whose whole national support
and defence depends on her navy, had found, that the men employed in the
fisheries, though so necessary for that defence, had cost her too much;
that America, whose consequence, as a nation, does not depend on a navy,
ought to take a lesson from the experience of Britain: that he did not
wish to enter into a competition with Britain and France, in supplying
the different markets with fish; that, as those nations are able to hold
out greater encouragement to their fishermen, than we can to ours, we
would, by such a competition, only exhaust the Treasury of the United
States to no purpose; and upon this principle alone, he thought there
was some reason to doubt the policy of the measure proposed in the
section under consideration, which therefore he hoped the committee
would agree to strike out, unless his objection could be obviated.
Mr. MURRAY observed, that in order to demonstrate the propriety of the
measure, it would be incumbent on the friends of the bill, first, to
prove that the fishery trade is in a state of decay, that the stock
employed in it does not yield the ordinary profits, so as to justify the
merchants in embarking their capital in this branch of trade: that there
is a system of defence in contemplation, which the circumstances of the
country call for, and which this trade is calculated to furnish; that
other branches of trade, which do not stand in need of encouragement,
are not equally capable of furnishing seamen for the purpose: that this
particular object so peculiarly claims the attention and encouragement
of the United States, as to leave far behind every consideration of the
manufacturing interest, the agricultural, &c. All this he thought
necessary for gentlemen to prove, and to show some very strong necessity
for encouraging one particular class of men, in preference to all
others.