_Arrêt_, which has lately appeared, for prohibiting the importation
of whale-oils and spermaceti, the produce of foreign fisheries. This
prohibition, being expressed in general terms, seems to exclude the
whale-oils of the United States of America, as well as of the nations
of Europe. The uniform disposition, however, which his Majesty and his
ministers have shown to promote the commerce between France and the
United States, by encouraging our productions to come hither, and
particularly those of our fisheries, induces me to hope, that these were
not within their view, at the passing of this _Arrêt_. I am led the more
into this opinion, when I recollect the assiduity exercised for several
months, in the year 1785, by the committee appointed by government to
investigate the objects of commerce of the two countries, and to report
the encouragements of which it was susceptible; the result of that
investigation, which his Majesty’s Comptroller General did me the
honor to communicate, in a letter of the 22nd of October, 1786, stating
therein the principles which should be established for the future
regulation of that commerce, and particularly distinguishing the article
of whale-oils by an abatement of the duties on them for the present,
and a promise of farther abatement after the year 1790; the thorough
re-investigation with which Monsieur de Lambert honored this subject
when the letter of 1786 was to be put into the form of an _Arrêt_; that
_Arrêt_ itself, bearing date the 29th of December last, which ultimately
confirmed the abatements of duty present and future, and declared
that his Majesty reserved to himself to grant other favors to that
production, if, on further information, he should find it for the
interest of the two nations; and finally, the letter in which Monsieur
de Lambert did me the honor to enclose the _Arrêt_, and to assure me,
that the duties which had been levied on our whale-oils, contrary to the
intention of the letter of 1786, should be restored. On a review, then,
of all these circumstances, I cannot but presume, that it has not
been intended to reverse, in a moment, views so maturely digested, and
uniformly pursued; and that the general expressions of the _Arrêt_ of
September the 28th had within their contemplation the nations of Europe
only. This presumption is further strengthened by having observed, that
in the treaties of commerce, made since the epoch of our independence,
the _jura gentis amicissimcæ_ conceded to other nations, are expressly
restrained to those of the ‘most favored European nation’: his Majesty
wisely foreseeing that it would be expedient to regulate the commerce of
a nation, which brings nothing but raw materials to employ the industry
of his subjects, very differently from that of the European nations,
who bring mostly what has already passed through all the stages of
manufacture.
On these circumstances, I take the liberty of asking information from
your Excellency, as to the extent of the late _Arrêt_: and if I have not
been mistaken in supposing it did not mean to abridge that of December
the 29th, I would solicit an explanatory _Arrêt_, to prevent the
misconstruction of it, which will otherwise take place. It is much to be
desired too, that this explanation could be given as soon as possible,
in order that it may be handed out with the _Arrêt_ of September the
28th. Great alarm may otherwise be spread among the merchants, and
adventurers in the fisheries, who, confiding in the stability of
regulations, which his Majesty’s wisdom had so long and well matured,
have embarked their fortunes in speculations in this branch of business.
The importance of the subject to one of the principal members of our
Union, induces me to attend with great anxiety the re-assurance from
your Excellency, that no change has taken place in his Majesty’s views
on this subject; and that his dispositions to multiply, rather than
diminish, the combinations of interest between the two people, continue
unaltered.
Commerce is slow in changing its channel. That between this country
and the United States is as yet but beginning; and this beginning has
received some checks. The _Arrêt_ in question would be a considerable
one, without the explanation I have the honor to ask. I am persuaded,
that a continuation of the dispositions which have been hitherto
manifested towards us, will insure effects, political and commercial, of
value to both nations.
I have had too many proofs of the friendly interest your Excellency is
pleased to take in whatever may strengthen the bands and connect the
views of the two countries, to doubt your patronage of the present
application; or to pretermit any occasion of repeating assurances of
those sentiments of high respect and esteem, with which I have the honor
to be
your Excellency’s most obedient
and most humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
LETTER CX.--TO JOHN JAY, November 3, 1787
TO JOHN JAY.
Paris, November 3, 1787.
Sir,
My last letters to you were of the 8th and 27th of October. In the
former? I mentioned to you the declaration of this country, that they
would interpose with force, if the Prussian troops entered Holland; the
entry of those troops into Holland; the declaration of England, that if
France did oppose force, they would consider it as an act of war; the
naval armaments on both sides; the nomination of the Bailli de Suffrein
as Generalissimo on the ocean; and the cold reception of Mr. Grenville
here, with his conciliatory propositions, as so many symptoms which
seemed to indicate a certain and immediate rupture. It was indeed
universally and hourly expected. But the king of Prussia, a little
before these last events, got wind of the alliance on the carpet between
France and the two empires: he awaked to the situation in which
that would place him: he made some application to the court of St.
Petersburg, to divert the Empress from the proposed alliance, and
supplicated the court of London not to abandon him. That court had also
received a hint of the same project; both seemed to suspect, for the
first time, that it would be possible for France to abandon the Turks,
and that they were likely to get more than they had played for at
Constantinople: for they had meant nothing more there, than to divert
the Empress and Emperor from the affairs of the west, by employing them
in the east, and, at the same time, to embroil them with France as
the patroness of the Turks. The court of London engaged not to
abandon Prussia: but both of them relaxed a little the tone of their
proceedings. The King of Prussia sent a Mr. Alvensleben here, expressly
to explain and soothe: the King of England, notwithstanding the cold
reception of his propositions by Grenville, renewed conferences here
through Eden and the Duke of Dorset. The minister, in the affection of
his heart for peace, readily joined in conference, and a declaration and
counter-declaration were cooked up at Versailles, and sent to London for
approbation. They were approved, arrived here at one o’clock the 27th,
were signed that night at Versailles, and on the next day, I had the
honor of enclosing them to you, under cover to the Count de Moustier,
whom I supposed still at Brest, dating my letter as of the 27th, by
mistake for the 28th. Lest, however, these papers should not have got to
Brest before the departure of the Count de Moustier, I now enclose you
other copies. The English declaration states a notification of this
court, in September, by Barthelemy, their minister at London, ‘that
they would send succors into Holland,’ as the first cause of England’s
arming; desires an explanation of the intentions of this court, as to
the affairs of Holland, and proposes to disarm; on condition, however,
that the King of France shall not retain any hostile views in any
quarter, for what has been done in Holland. This last phrase was to
secure Prussia, according to promise. The King of France acknowledges
the notification by his minister at London, promises he will do nothing
in consequence of it, declares he has no intention to intermeddle with
force in the affairs of Holland, and that he will entertain hostile
views in no quarter, for what has been done there. He disavows having
ever had any intention to interpose with force in the affairs of that
republic. This disavowal begins the sentence, which acknowledges he had
notified the contrary to the court of London, and it includes no apology
to soothe the feelings which may be excited in the breasts of the
Patriots of Holland, at hearing the King declare he never did intend to
aid them with force, when promises to do this were the basis of those
very attempts to better their constitution, which have ended in its
ruin, as well as their own.
I have analyzed these declarations, because, being somewhat wrapped up
in their expressions, their full import might escape, on a transient
reading; and it is necessary it should not escape. It conveys to us the
important lesson, that no circumstances of morality, honor, interest, or
engagement, are sufficient to authorize a secure reliance on any nation,
at all times, and in all positions. A moment of difficulty, or a moment
of error, may render for ever useless the most friendly dispositions
in the King, in the major part of his ministers, and the whole of his
nation. The present pacification is considered by most, as only a short
truce. They calculate on the spirit of the nation, and not on the aged
hand which guides its movements. It is certain, that from this moment
the whole system of Europe changes. Instead of counting together
England, Austria, and Russia, as heretofore, against France, Spain,
Holland, Prussia, and Turkey, the division will probably be, England,
Holland, and Prussia, against France, Austria, Russia, and perhaps
Spain. This last power is not sure, because the dispositions of its heir
apparent are not sure. But whether the present be truce or peace, it
will allow time to mature the conditions of the alliance between France
and the two empires, always supposed to be on the carpet. It is thought
to be obstructed by the avidity of the Emperor, who would swallow a good
part of Turkey, Silesia, Bavaria, and the rights of the Germanic body.
To the two or three first articles, France might consent, receiving in
gratification a well rounded portion of the Austrian Netherlands, with
the islands of Candia, Cyprus, Rhodes, and perhaps Lower Egypt. But
all this is in embryo, uncertainly known, and counterworked by the
machinations of the courts of London and Berlin. The following solution
of the British armaments is supposed in a letter of the 25th ultimo,
from Colonel Blachden of Connecticut, now at Dunkirk, to the Marquis
de la Fayette. I will cite it in his own words. “A gentleman who left
London two days ago, and came to this place to-day, informs me that
it is now generally supposed that Mr. Pitt’s great secret, which has
puzzled the whole nation so long, and to accomplish which design, the
whole force of the nation is armed, is to make a vigorous effort for
the recovery of America. When I recollect the delay they have made in
delivering the forts in America, and that little more than a year ago,
one of the British ministry wrote to the King a letter, in which were
these remarkable words, ‘If your Majesty pleases, America may yet be
yours;’ add to this, if it were possible for the present ministry in
England to effect such a matter, they would secure their places and
their power for a long time, and should they fail in the end, they would
be certain of holding them during the attempt, which it is in their
power to prolong as much as they please, and at all events, they would
boast of having endeavored the recovery of what a former ministry had
abandoned, it is possible.” A similar surmise has come in a letter from
a person in Rotterdam to one at this place. I am satisfied that the
King of England believes the mass of our people to be tired of their
independence, and desirous of returning under his government; and that
the same opinion prevails in the ministry and nation. They have hired
their news-writers to repeat this lie in their gazettes so long, that
they have become the dupes of it themselves. But there is no occasion
to recur to this, in order to account for their arming. A more rational
purpose avowed, that purpose executed, and when executed, a solemn
agreement to disarm, seem to leave no doubt, that the re-establishment
of the Stadtholder was their object. Yet it is possible, that having
found that this court will not make war in this moment for any ally, new
views may arise, and they may think the moment favorable for executing
any purposes they may have, in our quarter. Add to this, that reason is
of no aid in calculating their movements. We are, therefore, never safe
till our magazines are filled with arms. The present season of truce, or
peace, should, in my opinion, be improved without a moment’s respite,
to effect this essential object, and no means be omitted, by which money
may be obtained for the purpose. I say this, however, with due deference
to the opinion of Congress, who are better judges of the necessity and
practicability of the measure.
I mentioned to you, in a former letter, the application I had made to
the Dutch ambassadors and Prussian envoy, for the protection of Mr.
Dumas. The latter soon after received an assurance, that he was put
under the protection of the States of Holland; and the Dutch ambassador
called on me a few days ago, to inform me, by instruction from
his constituents, ‘that the States General had received a written
application from Mr. Adams, praying their protection of Dumas: that they
had instructed their greffier, Fagel, to assure Mr. Adams, by letter,
that he was under the protection of the States of Holland; but to inform
him, at the same time, that Mr. Dumas’s conduct, out of the line of
his office, had been so extraordinary, that they would expect _de
l’honnêteté de Mr. Adams_, that he would charge some other person with
the affairs of the United States, during his absence.’
Your letter, of September the 8th, has been duly received. I shall pay
due attention to the instructions relative to the medals, and give any
aid I can, in the case of Boss’s vessel. As yet, however, my endeavors
to find _Monsieur Pauly, avocat au conseil d’état, rue Coquilliere_,
have been ineffectual. There is no such person living in that street.
I found a _Monsieur Pauly, avocat au parlement_, in another part of
the town; he opened the letter, but said it could not mean him. I shall
advertise in the public papers. If that fails, there will be no other
chance of finding him. Mr. Warnum will do well, therefore, to send some
other description by which the person may be found. Indeed some friend
of the party interested should be engaged to follow up this business,
as it will require constant attention, and probably a much larger sum of
money than that named in the bill inclosed in Mr. Warnum’s letter.
I have the honor to enclose you a letter from O’Bryan to me, containing
information from Algiers, and one from Mr. Montgomery at Alicant.
The purpose of sending you this last, is to show you how much the
difficulties of ransom are increased since the Spanish negotiations.
The Russian captives have cost about eight thousand livres apiece, on an
average. I certainly have no idea that we should give any such sum; and,
therefore, if it should be the sense of Congress to give such a price, I
would be glad to know it by instruction. My idea is, that we should not
ransom but on the footing of the nation which pays least, that it may be
as little worth their while to go in pursuit of us, as any nation. This
is cruelty to the individuals now in captivity, but kindness to the
hundreds that would soon be so, were we to make it worth the while of
those pirates to go out of the Streights, in quest of us. As soon as
money is provided, I shall put this business into train. I have taken
measures to damp, at Algiers, all expectations of our proposing to
ransom, at any price. I feel the distress which this must occasion to
our countrymen there, and their connections; but the object of it is
their ultimate good, by bringing down their holders to such a price as
we ought to pay, instead of letting them remain in such expectations as
cannot be gratified. The gazettes of France and Leyden accompany this.
I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the most perfect esteem and
respect, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,
Th: Jefferson.
[The annexed are translations of the declaration and
counter-declaration, referred to in the preceding letter.]
DECLARATION.
The events which have taken place in the republic of the United
Provinces appearing no longer to leave any subject of discussion, and
still less of dispute, between the two courts, the undersigned are
authorized to ask, if it be the intention of his Most Christian Majesty
to act in pursuance of the notification given, on the 16th of last
month, by the Minister Plenipotentiary of his Most Christian Majesty,
which, announcing his purpose of aiding Holland, has occasioned maritime
armaments on the part of his Majesty, which armaments have become
reciprocal.
If the court of Versailles is disposed to explain itself on this
subject, and on the conduct adopted towards the republic, in a manner
conformably to the desire, evinced by each party, to preserve a good
understanding between the two courts, it being also understood, at
the same time, that no hostile view is entertained, in any quarter,
in consequence of the past; his Majesty, always eager to manifest his
concurrence in the friendly sentiments of his Most Christian Majesty,
agrees forthwith that the armaments, and, in general, all preparations
for war, shall be mutually discontinued, and that the marines of the two
nations shall be placed on the footing of a peace establishment, such as
existed on the first of January of the present year.
Signed. Dorset Wm. Eden.
At Versailles, the 27th of October, 1787.
COUNTER-DECLARATION.
It neither being, nor ever having been, the intention of his Majesty
to interpose by force in the affairs of the republic of the United
Provinces, the communication made to the court of London by M.
Barthelemy having had no other object than to announce to that court an
intention, the motives of which no longer-exist, especially since the
King of Prussia has made known his resolution, his Majesty makes no
difficulty in declaring, that he has no wish to act in pursuance of the
communication aforesaid, and that he entertains no hostile view in any
quarter, relative to what has passed in Holland.
Consequently, his Majesty, desiring to concur in the sentiments of his
Britannic Majesty, for the preservation of a good understanding between
the two courts, consents with pleasure to the proposition of his
Britannic Majesty, that the armaments, and, in general, all preparations
for war, shall be mutually discontinued, and that the marines of the two
nations shall be replaced upon the footing of the peace establishment,
as it existed on the first day of January of the present year.
Signed. Montmorin.
At Versailles, the 27th of October, 1787.
LETTER CXI.--TO JOHN JAY, November 3, 1787
TO JOHN JAY.
(Private.) Paris, November 3, 1787.
Dear Sir,
I shall take the liberty of confiding sometimes to a private letter,
such details of the small history of the court or cabinet, as may be
worthy of being known, and yet not proper to be publicly communicated.
I doubt whether the administration is yet in a permanent form. The Count
de Montmorin and Baron de Breteuil are, I believe, firm enough in their
places. It was doubted whether they would wait for the Count de la
Luzerne, if the war had taken place: but at present I suppose they will.
I wish it also, because M. de Hector, his only competitor, has on some
occasions shown little value for the connection with us. Lambert, the
Comptroller General, is thought to be very insecure. I should be sorry
also to lose him. I have worked several days with him, the Marquis de
la Fayette, and Monsieur du Pont (father of the young gentleman gone to
America with the Count de Moustier), to reduce into one _Arrêt_ whatever
concerned our commerce. I have found him a man of great judgment and
application, possessing good general principles on subjects of commerce,
and friendly dispositions towards us. He passed the _Arrêt_ in a very
favorable form, but it has been opposed in the Council, and will,
I fear, suffer some alteration in the article of whale-oil. That
of tobacco, which was put into a separate instrument, experiences
difficulties also, which do not come from him. M. du Pont has rendered
us essential services on these occasions. I wish his son could be so
well noticed, as to make a favorable report to his father; he would, I
think, be gratified by it, and his good dispositions be strengthened,
and rendered further useful to us. Whether I shall be able to send you
these regulations by the present packet, will depend on their getting
through the Council in time. The Archbishop continues well with his
patroness. Her object is, a close connection with her brother. I suppose
he convinces her, that peace will furnish the best occasion of cementing
that connection.
It may not be uninstructive to give you the origin and nature of
his influence with the Queen. When the Duke de Choiseul proposed the
marriage of the Dauphin with this lady, he thought it proper to send a
person to Vienna, to perfect her in the language. He asked his friend,
the Archbishop of Toulouse, to recommend to him a proper person. He
recommended a certain Abbe. The Abbe, from his first arrival at Vienna,
either tutored by his patron, or prompted by gratitude, impressed on
the Queen’s mind the exalted talents and merit of the Archbishop, and
continually represented him as the only man fit to be placed at the helm
of affairs. On his return to Paris, being retained near the person of
the Queen, he kept him constantly in her view. The Archbishop was named
of the _Assembly des Notables_, had occasion enough there to prove his
talents, and Count de Vergennes, his great enemy, dying opportunely, the
Queen got him into place. He uses the Abbe even yet, for instilling all
his notions into her mind. That he has imposing talents and patriotic
dispositions, I think is certain. Good judges think him a theorist only,
little acquainted with the details of business, and spoiling all his
plans by a bungled execution. He may perhaps undergo a severe trial. His
best actions are exciting against him a host of enemies, particularly
the reduction of the pensions, and reforms in other branches of economy.
Some think the other ministers are willing he should stay in, till he
has effected this odious, yet necessary work, and that they will then
make him the scape-goat of the transaction. The declarations too, which
I send you in my public letter, if they should become public, will
probably raise an universal cry. It will all fall on him, because
Montmorin and Breteuil say, without reserve, that the sacrifice of the
Dutch has been against their advice. He will, perhaps, not permit these
declarations to appear in this country. They are absolutely unknown:
they were communicated to me by the Duke of Dorset, and I believe no
other copy has been given here. They will be published doubtless in
England, as a proof of their triumph, and may from thence make their way
into this country. If the Premier can stem a few months, he may remain
long in office, and will never make war if he can help it. If he should
be removed, the peace will probably be short. He is solely chargeable
with the loss of Holland. True, they could not have raised money by
taxes to supply the necessities of war; but could they do it were their
finances ever so well arranged? No nation makes war now-a-days, but by
the aid of loans: and it is probable, that in a war for the liberties
of Holland, all the treasures of that country would have been at their
service. They have now lost the cow which furnishes the milk of war.
She will be on the side of their enemies, whenever a rupture shall
take place: and no arrangement of their finances can countervail this
circumstance.