"In the new National Assembly there was only one powerful and

active party--that of the Gironde. ... When we use the term

'parties' in reference to this Assembly, nothing more is meant

by it than small groups of from 12 to 20 persons, who bore the

sway in the rostra and in the Committees, and who alternately

carried with them the aimless crowd of Deputies. It is true,

indeed, that at the commencement of their session, 130

Deputies entered their names among the Jacobins, and about 200

among the Feuillants, but this had no lasting influence on the

divisions, and the majority wavered under the influence of

temporary motives. The party which was regarded as the 'Right'

had no opportunity for action, but saw themselves, from the

very first, obliged to assume an attitude of defence. ...

Outside the Chamber the beau ideal of this party,--General

Lafayette,--declared himself in favour of an American Senate,

but without any of the energy of real conviction. As he had

defended the Monarchy solely from a sense of duty, while all

the feelings of his heart were inclined towards a Republic, so

now, though he acknowledged the necessity of an upper Chamber,

the existing Constitution appeared to him to possess a more

ideal beauty. He never attained, on this point, either to

clear ideas or decided actions; and it was at this period that

he resigned his command of the National guard in Paris, and

retired for a while to his estate in Auvergne. ... The

Girondist Deputies ... were distinguished among the new

members of the Assembly by personal dignity, regular

education, and natural ability; and were, moreover, as ardent

in their radicalism as any Parisian demagogue. They

consequently soon became the darlings of all those zealous

patriots for whom the Cordeliers were too dirty and the

Feuillants too luke warm.

{1274}

External advantages are not without their weight, even in the

most terrible political crises, and the Girondists owe to the

magic of their eloquence, and especially to that of Vergniaud,

an enduring fame, which neither their principles nor their

deeds would have earned for them. ... The representatives of

Bordeaux had never occupied a leading position in the

Girondist party, to which they had given its name. The real

leadership of the Gironde fell singularly enough into the

hands of an obscure writer, a political lady, and a priest who

carried on his operations behind the scenes. It was their

hands that overthrew the throne of the Capets, and spread

revolution over Europe. ... The writer in this trio was

Brissot, who on the 16th of July had wished to proclaim the

Republic, and who now represented the capital in the National

Assembly, as a constitutional member. ... While Brissot shaped

the foreign policy of the Girondist party, its home affairs

were directed by Marie Jeanne Roland, wife of the quondam

Inspector of Factories at Lyons, with whom she had come the

year before to Paris, and immediately thrown herself into the

whirlpool of political life. As early as the year 1789, she

had written to a friend, that the National Assembly must

demand two illustrious heads, or all would be lost. ... She

was ... 36 years old, not beautiful, but interesting,

enthusiastic and indefatigable; with noble aims, but incapable

of discerning the narrow line which separates right from

wrong. ... When warned by a friend of the unruly nature of the

Parisian mob, she replied, that bloodhounds were after all

indispensable for starting the game. ... A less conspicuous,

but not less important, part in this association, was played

by the Abbé Sieyès. He did what neither Brissot nor Mad.

Roland could have done by furnishing his party with a

comprehensive and prospective plan of operations. ... Their

only clearly defined objects were to possess themselves of the

reins of government, to carry on the Revolution, and to

destroy the Monarchy by every weapon within their reach."

_H. von Sybel,

History of the French Revolution,

book 3, chapter 1 (volume 1)._

ALSO IN:

_H. A. Taine,

The French Revolution,

book 4, (volume 2)._

See, also, below.

FRANCE: A. D. 1791-1792.

Growth and spread of anarchy and civil war.

Activity of the Emigrés and the ejected priests.

Decrees against them vetoed by the King.

The Girondists in control of the government.

War with the German powers forced on by them.

"It was an ominous proof of the little confidence felt by

serious men in the permanence of the new Constitution, that

the funds fell when the King signed it. All the chief

municipal posts in Paris were passing into the hands of

Republicans, and when Bailly, in November, ceased to be Mayor

of Paris, he was succeeded in that great office by Pétion, a

vehement and intolerant Jacobin. Lafayette had resigned the

command of the National Guard, which was then divided under

six commanders, and it could no longer be counted on to

support the cause of order. Over a great part of France there

was a total insecurity of life and property, such as had

perhaps never before existed in a civilised country, except in

times of foreign invasion or successful rebellion. Almost all

the towns in the south--Marseilles, Toulon, Nîmes, Arles,

Avignon, Montpellier, Carpentras, Aix, Montauban--were centres

of Republicanism, brigandage, or anarchy. The massacres of

Jourdain at Avignon, in October, are conspicuous even among

the horrors of the Revolution. Caen in the following month was

convulsed by a savage and bloody civil war. The civil

constitution of the clergy having been condemned by the Pope,

produced an open schism, and crowds of ejected priests were

exciting the religious fanaticism of the peasantry. In some

districts in the south, the war between Catholic and

Protestant was raging as fiercely as in the 17th century,

while in Brittany, and especially in La Vendée, there were all

the signs of a great popular insurrection against the new

Government. Society seemed almost in dissolution, and there

was scarcely a department in which law was observed and

property secure. The price of corn, at the same time, was

rising fast under the influence of a bad harvest in the south,

aggravated by the want of specie, the depreciation of paper

money, and the enormously increased difficulties of transport.

The peasantry were combining to refuse the paper money. It was

falling rapidly in value. ... In the mean time the stream of

emigrants continued unabated, and it included the great body

of the officers of the army who had been driven from the

regiments by their own soldiers. ... At Brussels, Worms, and

Coblentz, emigrants were forming armed organisations."

_W. E. H. Lecky,

History of England in the 18th century,

chapter 21 (volume 5)._

"The revolution was threatened by two dangerous enemies, the

emigrants, who were urging on a foreign invasion, and the

non-juring bishops and priests who were doing all in their

power to excite domestic rebellion. The latter were really the

more dangerous. ... The Girondists clamoured for repressive

measures. On the 30th of October it was decreed that the count

of Provence, unless he returned within two months, should

forfeit all rights to the regency. On the 9th of November an

edict threatened the emigrants with confiscation and death

unless they returned to their allegiance before the end of the

year. On the 29th of November came the attack upon the

non-jurors. They were called upon to take the oath within

eight days, when lists were to be drawn up of those who

refused; these were then to forfeit their pensions, and if any

disturbance took place in their district they were to be

removed from it, or if their complicity were proved they were

to be imprisoned for two years. The king accepted the decree

against his brother, but he opposed his veto to the other two.

The Girondists and Jacobins eagerly seized the opportunity for

a new attack upon the monarchy. ... Throughout the winter

attention was devoted almost exclusively to foreign affairs.

It has been seen that the emperor was really eager for peace,

and that as long as he remained in that mood there was little

risk of any other prince taking the initiative. At the same

time it must be acknowledged that Leopold's tone towards the

French government was often too haughty and menacing to be

conciliatory, and also that the open preparations of the

emigrants in neighbouring states constituted an insult if not

a danger to France. The Girondists, the most susceptible of

men, only expressed the national sentiment in dwelling upon

this with bitterness, and in calling for vengeance. At the

same time they had conceived the definite idea that their own

supremacy could best be obtained and secured by forcing on a

foreign war.

{1275}

This was expressly avowed by Brissot, who took the lead of the

party in this matter. Robespierre, on the other hand, partly

through temperament and partly through jealousy of his

brilliant rivals, was inclined to the maintenance of peace.

But on this point the Feuillants were agreed with the Gironde,

and so a vast majority was formed to force the unwilling king

and ministers into war. The first great step was taken when

Duportail, who had charge of military affairs, was replaced by

Narbonne, a Feuillant. Louis XVI. was compelled to issue a

note (14 December, 1791) to the emperor and to the archbishop

of Trier to the effect that if the military force of the

emigrants were not disbanded by the 15th of January

hostilities would be commenced against the elector. The latter

at once ordered the cessation of the military preparations,

but the emigrants not only refused to obey but actually

insulted the French envoy. Leopold expressed his desire for

peace, but at the same time declared that any attack on the

electorate of Trier would be regarded as an act of hostility

to the empire. These answers were unsatisfactory, and Narbonne

collected three armies on the frontiers, under the command of

Rochambeau, Lafayette, and Luckner, and amounting together to

about 150,000 men. On the 25th of January an explicit

declaration was demanded from the emperor, with a threat that

war would be declared unless a satisfactory answer was

received by the 4th of March. Leopold II. saw all his hopes of

maintaining peace in western Europe gradually disappearing,

and was compelled to bestir himself. ... On the 7th of

February he finally concluded a treaty with the king of

Prussia. ... On the 1st of March, while still hoping to avoid

a quarrel, Leopold II. died of a sudden illness, and with him

perished the last possibility of peace. His son and successor,

Francis II., who was now 24, had neither his father's ability

nor his experience, and he was naturally more easily swayed by

the anti-revolutionary spirit. ... The Girondists combined all

their efforts for an attack upon the minister of foreign

affairs, Delessart, whom they accused of truckling to the

enemies of the nation. Delessart was committed to prison, and

his colleagues at once resigned. The Gironde now came into

office. The ministry of home affairs was given to Roland; of

war to Servan; of finance to Clavière. Dumouriez obtained the

foreign department, Duranthon that of justice, and Lacoste the

marine. Its enemies called it 'the ministry of the

Sansculottes.' ... On the 20th of April [1792] Louis XVI.

appeared in the assembly and read with trembling voice a

declaration of war against the king of Hungary and Bohemia."

_R. Lodge,

History of Modern Europe,

chapter 22, section 20-21._

The sincere desire of the Emperor Leopold II. to avoid war

with France, and the restraining influence over the King of

Prussia which he exercised up to the time when Catherine II.

of Russia overcame it by the Polish temptation, are set forth

by H. von Sybel in passages quoted elsewhere.

See GERMANY: A. D. 1791-1792.

ALSO IN:

_A. de Lamartine,

History of the Girondists,

books 6-14 (volume l)._

_A. F. Bertrand de Moleville,

Annals of the French Revolution,

part 2. chapters 1-14 (volume 5-6)._

_F. C. Schlosser,

History of the Eighteenth Century,

5th period, 2d division, chapter 1 (volume 6)._

FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (April).

Fête to the Soldiers of Chateauvieux.

See LIBERTY CAP.

FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (April-July).

Opening of the war with Austria and Prussia.

French reverses.

"Hostilities followed close upon the declaration of war. At

this time the forces destined to come into collision were

posted as follows: Austria had 40,000 men in Belgium, and

25,000 on the Rhine. These numbers might easily have been

increased to 80,000, but the Emperor of Austria did no more

than collect 7,000 or 8,000 around Brisgau, and some 20,000

more around Rastadt. The Prussians, now bound into a close

alliance with Austria, had still a great distance to traverse

from their base to the theatre of war, and could not hope to

undertake active operations for a long time to come. France,

on the other hand, had already three strong armies in the

field. The Army of the North, under General Rochambeau, nearly

50,000 strong, held the frontier from Philippeville to

Dunkirk; General Lafayette commanded a second army of about

the same strength in observation from Philippeville to the

Lauter; and a third army of 40,000 men, under Marshal Luckner,

watched the course of the Rhine from Lauterbourg to the

confines of Switzerland. The French forces were strong,

however, on paper only. The French army had been mined, as it

seemed, by the Revolution, and had fallen almost to pieces.

The wholesale emigration of the aristocrats had robbed it of

its commissioned officers, the old experienced leaders whom

the men were accustomed to follow and obey. Again, the passion

for political discussion, and the new notions of universal

equality had fostered a dangerous spirit of license in the

ranks. ... While the regular regiments of the old

establishment were thus demoralised, the new levies were still

but imperfectly organised, and the whole army was unfit to

take the field. It was badly equipped, without transport, and

without those useful administrative services which are

indispensable for mobility and efficiency. Moreover, the

prestige of the French arms was at its lowest ebb. A long and

enervating peace had followed since the last great war, in

which the French armies had endured only failure and

ignominious defeat. It is not strange, then, that the foes

whom France had so confidently challenged, counted upon an

easy triumph over the revolutionary troops. The earliest

operations fully confirmed these anticipations. ... France

after the declaration of war had at once assumed the

initiative, and proceeded to invade Belgium. Here the Duke

Albert of Saxe-Teschen, who commanded the Imperialist forces,

held his forces concentrated in three principal corps: one

covered the line from the sea to Tournay; the second was at

Leuze; the third and weakest at Mons. The total of these

troops rose to barely 40,000, and Mons, the most important

point in the general line of defence, was the least strongly

held. All able strategist gathering together 30,000 men from

each of the French armies of the Centre and North, would have

struck at Mons with all his strength, cut Duke Albert's

communications with the Rhine, turned his inner flank, and

rolled him up into the sea. But no great genius as yet

directed the military energies of France. ... By Dumouriez's

advice, the French armies were ordered to advance against the

Austrians by several lines. Four columns of invasion were to

enter Belgium; one was to follow the sea coast, the second to

march on Tournay, the third to move from Valenciennes on Mons,

and the fourth, under Lafayette, on Givet or Namur.

{1276}

Each, according to the success it might achieve, was to

reinforce the next nearest to it, and all, finally, were to

converge on Brussels. At the very outset, however, the French

encountered the most ludicrous reverses. Their columns fled in

disorder directly they came within sight of the enemy.

Lafayette alone continued his march boldly towards Namur; but

he was soon compelled to retire by the news of the hasty

flight of the columns north of him. The French troops had

proved as worthless as their leaders were incapable; whole

brigades turned tail, crying that they were betrayed, casting

away their weapons as they ran, and displaying the most abject

cowardice and terror. Not strangely, after this pitiful

exhibition, the Austrians--all Europe, indeed--held the

military power of France in the utmost contempt. ... But now

the national danger stirred France to its inmost depths.

French spirit was thoroughly roused. The country rose as one

man, determined to offer a steadfast, stubborn front to its

foes. Stout-hearted leaders, full of boundless energy and

enthusiasm, summoned all the resources of the nation to stem

and roll back the tide of invasion. Immediate steps were taken

to put the defeated and disgraced armies of the frontier upon

a new footing. Lafayette replaced Rochambeau, with charge from

Longwy to the sea, his main body about Sedan; Luckner took the

line from the Moselle to the Swiss mountains, with

head-quarters at Metz. A third general, destined to come

speedily to the front, also joined the army as Lafayette's

lieutenant. This was Dumouriez, who, wearied and baffled by

Parisian politics, sought the freedom of the field."

_A. Griffiths,

French Revolutionary Generals,

chapter 1._

FRANCE: A. D. 1792 (June-August).

The King's dismissal of Girondist ministers.

Mob demonstration of June 20.

Lafayette in Paris.

His failure.

The Country declared to be in Danger.

Gathering of volunteers in Paris.

Brunswick's manifesto.

Mob attack on the Tuileries, August 10.

Massacre of the Swiss.

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