had six infantry brigades. There are indications in the telegrams of a
reorganisation and redistribution of battalions among the brigades, so
that it is hardly safe to speak with certainty as to the present
composition and distribution of the commands. Apparently the left wing
under Warren consists of three or four infantry brigades, the cavalry
brigade, and most of the mounted infantry, and five or six batteries.
Sir Charles Warren himself appears to keep the general direction of this
wing in his own hands. Sir F. Clery either commands a division (two
brigades), the third brigade being led by its brigadier, under Sir
Charles Warren's direction, or Sir F. Clery is supervising the whole of
the infantry advance. Lyttelton has his own brigade, and Barton's
brigade covers the railhead at Chieveley. That accounts for five of the
six brigades. The sixth is Coke's, of Warren's division. We do not at
present know whether this is with Warren on the left wing or with Duller
as a general reserve to be put in to the fight at the decisive moment.
The great difficulties of day-after-day fighting, which has been
regarded for some years as the normal character of future battles, is to
secure for the men the food and rest without which they must soon
collapse, and to ensure the continuous supply of ammunition. If these
difficulties can be overcome Sir Redvers Bullers has a good chance of
success in his endeavour to relieve Ladysmith. Once driven from the
plateau by Warren, the Boers must retire several miles before they can
reach a second defensive position, and their retirement may be hastened
by pressure on their flanks, which is to be expected from Dundonald's
mounted infantry and cavalry, probably now on the right or northern
flank of the Boer line, as well as from Lyttelton on their left. A small
reinforcement would give a fresh impetus to the British advance. If
Coke's brigade has not yet been engaged Sir Redvers Buller will know
when and where to use it--either to reinforce Lyttelton for a blow
against the Boer line of retreat or to reinforce Warren's left. The
arrival of the _Kildonan Castle_ at Durban this morning, as far as we
know, with drafts for some of the battalions, is better than nothing,
for the drafts will give fresh vigour to the bodies that receive them.
They cannot reach the fighting line before Saturday, but their arrival
then may be most opportune. Still better would it be if a fresh brigade
should arrive while the struggle continues. There was at least a brigade
available at Cape Town a few days ago, and it could not have been better
employed than in strengthening Buller at any point where he can feed it,
at Chieveley if not as a reinforcement to Warren or Lyttelton, for a
fresh brigade at Chieveley would enable Barton to put pressure on the
Boers in his front.
Supposing that Warren has by this time compelled the retreat of the
Boers from the plateau for which he has been fighting, what can the
Boers do to resist Buller's further advance? They must try to hold a
second position. Two such positions appear to be open to them, if we may
judge by the not very full maps available. The line of hills from
Bulbarrow Hill on the north to the hill near Arnot Hill Farm on the
south might give good opportunities for defence; it blocks the road to
Ladysmith, for the Boers occupying the line would be right across these
roads. Another plan would be for the Boers to retreat to the north-east
on to the east and west ridge, which commands from the north the Acton
Homes--Dewdrop road. If the Boers took this position the roads to
Ladysmith, or to the rear of the investing lines, would be open. But Sir
Redvers Buller could not advance along them with the Boer forces
menacing his flank, and he would be obliged either to attack them or to
contain them by extending a force along their front to hold its ground
against them while he pushed the rest of his force towards Ladysmith.
Whether this would be a prudent plan for the Boers depends upon their
numbers, and if they are strong enough they might combine both plans.
It is, however, by no means certain that Lord Dundonald is unable to
prevent the Boers from crossing the Blaauwbank Spruit. He has not been
heard of for a week, and has had plenty of time to have his force in
position to the north of Clydesdale Farm, unless, indeed, he has been
kept in hand behind Warren's left flank ready for pursuit after the
capture of the great plateau.
The situation continues to be critical, and must be so until the fate
of Ladysmith is decided. Our own men are justifying to the full the
confidence reposed in them; what men can do they will accomplish. But
the Boers are fighting stubbornly, and may be able to wear out Sir
Redvers Buller's force before their own resistance collapses. We at home
must wait patiently, hoping for the best but prepared for fresh efforts.
At least we ought all now to realise that the splendid behaviour of our
soldiers in the field lays upon us as citizens the duty of securing for
the future the best possible treatment of those who are so generous of
their lives.
THE ELEVENTH HOUR
_February 1st_, 1900
If on Tuesday the Bank of England had announced that it could not meet
its obligations I imagine that there would have been a certain amount of
uneasiness in the City and elsewhere, and that some at least of the rich
men to be found in London would have put their heads together to see
what could be done to meet a grave emergency.
On Tuesday a failure was indeed announced--a failure which must involve
the Bank of England and most of the great banking and trading
corporations of this country. But no one seems to have taken action upon
it, and I see no visible sign of general alarm. The Prime Minister,
speaking in his place in the House of Lords and on behalf of the
National Government, said: "I do not believe in the perfection of the
British Constitution as an instrument of war ...it is evident there is
something in your machinery that is wrong." That was Lord Salisbury's
explanation and defence of the failure of his Government in the
diplomacy which preceded the war, in the preparations for the war, and
in the conduct of the war. It was a declaration of bankruptcy--a plain
statement by the Government that it cannot govern. The announcement was
not made to Parliament with closed doors and the reporters excluded. It
was made to the whole world, to the British Nation, and to all the
rivals of Great Britain. Parliament did not take any action upon the
declaration. No committee of both Houses was formed to consider how
without delay to make a Government that can govern. The ordinary normal
routine of public and private life goes on. Thus in the crisis of the
Nation's fate we are ungoverned and unled, and to all appearance we are
content to be so, and the leader-writers trained in the tradition of
respectable formalism interpret the Nation's apathy as fortitude.
Lord Salisbury's confession of impotence was true. From the beginning
to the end of this business the Government has lacked the manliness to
do its plain duty. In the first half of July, before the official
reports of the Bloemfontein conference were published, everyone but the
disciples of Mr. Morley knew that the only honourable course, after the
Government's declaration prior to the conference and after what there
took place, was to insist on the acceptance by the South African
Republic of the Bloemfontein proposals and to back up that insistence by
adequate military preparations. It is admitted that this was not done,
and what is the excuse now made? Mr. Balfour told the House of Commons
on Tuesday, January 30th, that if in August a vote of credit had been
demanded "we should not have been able to persuade the House that the
necessity for the vote was pressing and urgent." The Government charged
with the defence of the Empire excuses itself for not having made
preparations for that task on the ground that perhaps the House of
Commons would not have given its approval. Yet the Government had a
great majority at its back, and there is no instance in recent times of
a vote of credit having been rejected by the House of Commons. This
shameful cowardice was exhibited although, as we now know but could not
then have imagined, the Government had in its possession the protest of
the Government of Natal against the intention of the Imperial Government
to abandon the northern portion of that colony. The Natal Ministers on
July 25th confidentially communicated their extreme surprise at learning
that in case of sudden hostilities it would not be possible with the
garrison and colonial forces available to defend the northern portion of
the colony.
After shilly-shallying from May to September the Government began its
preparations, and the Boers as soon as they were ready began the war. Of
the conduct of the war the readers of _The London Letter_ have had an
account week by week, as to the truth of which they can judge for
themselves, for the facts are there by which it can be tested. The
attempt has been made to refrain from any criticism which could hurt the
feelings of the generals, who are doing their duty to the best of their
power in most trying circumstances. But is it not plain that the British
Army has been hampered by a lack of sound strategy and of sound tactics
such as indicate prolonged previous neglect of these branches of study
and training? Who is responsible to the Nation for the training of the
Army? The Government and the Government alone. If any military
officer has not done his work effectively--if, for example, the
Commander-in-Chief has not taught his generals rightly or not
selected them properly--who is responsible to Parliament for that?
Not the officer, even if he be the Commander-in-Chief, for the
Commander-in-Chief is the servant of the Cabinet and responsible to the
Cabinet, which if it were dissatisfied with him ought to have dismissed
him. Authority over the Army is in the hands of the Secretary of State
for War as the delegate of the Cabinet. Lord Lansdowne has held his post
only since 1895, and cannot be held responsible for the training of the
older generals; but before him came Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who for
some years had charge of the preparation of the Army for war as the
delegate of the late Cabinet. For the state of the Army, for the
strategical and tactical training which has resulted in so many
failures, the politicians of both front benches, who in turn have
neglected these vital matters, are responsible.
Here we are, then, in the middle of the war, without a Government, but
with a body of men who fill the place of a Government while admitting
themselves incompetent to do the work entrusted to them and for which
they are paid. The war so far has consisted of a succession of repulses,
which at any moment may culminate in disaster. Sir Redvers Buller has
twice led his Army to defeat and is about to lead it a third time--to
what? Possibly to victory; we all hope that it may be to victory. But
possibly to a third defeat which would mean not merely the loss of the
force at Ladysmith; it would mean that Sir Redvers Buller's Army in its
turn would need succour, and that the plan, so much favoured by the
strategists of the Army, of a march through the Free State would be
hampered. For the final and decisive defeat of Sir Redvers Buller would
be followed by the long-deferred general rising of the Cape Dutch, and
probably enough by the action of one or more of the European Powers.
_The Times_ of to-day announces that a foreign Government has ordered a
large supply of steam coal from the Welsh collieries. That can mean but
one thing, that some foreign Power is getting its Navy ready for action.
What, then, is the situation to-day? That any day may bring the gravest
news from South Africa, to be followed possibly by an ultimatum from a
foreign coalition. In that event the Nation will have to choose between
abandoning its Empire in obedience to foreign dictation, an abandonment
which would mean National ruin, and a war for existence, a war for which
no preparation has been made, which the Government is incompetent to
conduct, and which would begin by a naval conflict during which it would
be impossible to assist the Army in South Africa. That is the situation.
It may take a turn for better; you cannot be quite sure that a storm
which you see brewing may not pass off, but the probabilities are that
the struggle for existence is at hand. What then is our duty, the duty
of every one of us? To support the Government which cannot govern? Not
for a moment, but to get rid of it as soon as possible and to make at
once a Government that will try. Lord Rosebery at least sees the
situation and understands the position. There is no other public man who
commands such general confidence, and it is practically certain that if
the Cabinet were compelled to resign by an adverse vote of the House of
Commons Lord Rosebery would be the first statesman to be consulted by
the Queen. Lord Rosebery could make a Government to-morrow if he would
ignore parties and pick out the competent men wherever they are to be
found. Any new Cabinet, except one containing Mr. Morley or Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman, would be given a chance. The House of Commons would
wait a few weeks to see how it bore itself. If there were prompt
evidences of knowledge and will in the measures adopted, even though
half the Ministers or all of them except Lord Rosebery were new men,
there would soon be a feeling of confidence, and the Nation, knowing
that it was led, would respond with enthusiasm. In that case Great
Britain might make a good fight, though no one who knows the state of
our preparations and those of the rest of the world will make a sanguine
prediction as to the result.
TRY, TRY, TRY AGAIN
_February 8th_, 1900
Sir Redvers Buller on Monday set out on his third attempt to relieve
Ladysmith. He appears to have made a feint against the Boer position
north of Potgieter's Drift, and, while there attracting the attention of
the Boers by the concentrated fire of many guns, to have pushed a force
of infantry and artillery across the river to the right of Potgieter's
Drift. This force, of which the infantry belongs to Lyttelton's brigade,
carried and defended against counter attack a hill called Vaal Krantz,
at the eastern end of the Brakfontein ridge. To the east of Vaal Krantz
runs a good road to Ladysmith, along which the distance from the Tugela
to Sir George's White's outposts is about ten miles. To the east again
of the road is a hill called Dorn Kop. Here the Boers have an artillery
position which seems to command Vaal Krantz, and they probably have the
usual infantry trenches. The Boer position then faces the Tugela and
runs from Spion Kop on the west, the Boer left, to Dorn Kop on the east,
the Boer right. Sir Redvers Buller's attack is an attempt to pierce the
centre of this position.
To break the centre of an enemy's line, to pour your forces into and
through the gap, and then roll up the more important of his divided
wings, is an operation which if it can be successfully executed makes a
decisive victory; if followed up it ruins the enemy's army. But it is in
modern conditions the most difficult form of attack. The long range of
modern weapons, of guns that kill at two miles and of rifles that kill
at a mile--to take a moderate estimate of their power--enables the
defender to concentrate upon any attack against his centre the fire of
all the rifles in his front line for a couple of miles, and of all the
guns standing on a length of four miles. A similar concentration of fire
is only occasionally and temporary possible for the assailant, though if
it should happen that the ground exposes a point of the defender's line
to such concentric fire, while it protects some points held by the
assailant, the attack would have a prospect of success. But the moment
the point of attack is recognised by the defender he will collect every
available battery and rifleman from all parts of his line and place them
on that portion of his front which commands the path of the assailant.
To prevent this the assailant must engage the defender along his whole
line so that all the defending forces are fully occupied and there are
none to spare for the critical point or region.
Sir Redvers Buller's task is rendered harder by the fact that his own
troops before they can attack must cross the Tugela. He has two bridges
at the point here supposed to have been selected for the main attack,
but troops can hardly cross a bridge at a quicker rate than a brigade an
hour, and as the Boers ride faster than the British infantry can walk,
and as the British troops south of the river cannot effectually engage
the Boers, it will not have been easy so to occupy the enemy along the
whole front as to prevent his massing guns and rifles--at any rate
rifles--to defend his centre.
So much for the initial difficulties, which seem by a combination of
feint and surprise to have been so far overcome on Monday that the
advanced British troops effected a lodgment in the centre of the Boer
position, from which a counter-attack failed to eject them. The next
thing is, as the British force is brought across the river, to attack
one of the Boer wings while containing or keeping back the other. Before
this, can be done the enemy's centre must really be pierced, so that
troops can be poured through the gap to turn the flank of one of the
enemy's divided halves. This piercing is most difficult in the
conditions of to-day, for the enemy by establishing a new firing line
behind the point carried by our troops may be able to enclose in a
semicircle of fire the party that has made its way into the position.
Against such an enveloping fire it is a hard task to make headway.
All these aspects of his problem a General thinks out before he starts;
he does not make his attempt unless and until he sees his way to meet
the various difficulties, both those inherent in the nature of the
operation and those that arise from the local conditions and from the
character of the particular enemy. The difficulties are therefore not
reasons why General Buller should not succeed, but their consideration
may help to show why with the best previous deliberation and with the
bravest of troops he may perhaps not be able to break the Boer
resistance.
There is one feature of his task that is perhaps not fully appreciated
by the public. In order to relieve Ladysmith he must thoroughly defeat
and drive away the Boer army--must, so to speak break its back. For,
supposing he could clear a road to Ladysmith and march there, leaving
the Boer army in position on one or both sides of his road, his position
on reaching the place would be that he would have to fight his way back
again, and that unless he could then defeat the Boers his Army would be
lost, for it would be cut off from its supplies. The relief of Ladysmith
and the complete defeat of the Boer army are therefore synonymous terms.
There is, however, a sense in which a partial defeat of the Boers would
be of use. If the Boer army, though not driven off, were yet fully
absorbed in its struggle with Sir Redvers Bullet and had drawn to its
assistance some portion of the force investing Ladysmith, it might be
possible for Sir George White to make a sortie and to break through the
investing lines. To that case, however, the term "the relief of
Ladysmith" could hardly be correctly applied.
How far Sir George White can co-operate with Sir Redvers Buller depends
partly upon the mobility of his force. His horses after three months in
Ladysmith can hardly be in much condition, even supposing that they have
not already begun to be used as food for the troops. Supposing there
are horses enough for the field guns, and that the naval guns and
mountain guns were destroyed at the last moment before the sortie. The
men and the field artillery would then have to make a night attack,
followed by a march of about seven miles in trying conditions, and by a
second attack in which they would join hands with Sir Redvers Buller.
This does not imply exertions impossible to troops like Sir George
White's, and such a move perhaps offers the best way out of the
difficulties of the situation. If in that case Sir George White made for
the north side of Dorn Kop a part of the Boer army would probably be
destroyed, and the loss which the British force would have suffered
would thus to some extent be made up for. It is presumed that Sir
Redvers Buller and Sir George White, who are able to communicate with
one another, have a cipher which enables them to inform each other
without informing the enemy.
Any plan which will unite Sir George White's force, or the bulk of it,
with that of Sir Redvers Buller on the Tugela will simplify the whole
problem of the War. Lord Roberts is preparing for an advance in force
from the Orange River, which will sooner or later transfer the centre of
gravity to the western theatre of War, in which the British troops will
not be confronted by the difficulties of an unknown or very imperfectly
known mountainous region. The movements now taking place in the Cape
Colony are the preliminaries to that advance. The method, the only right
method, is to use the reinforcements that have arrived--the sixth and
seventh divisions--to secure a preponderance first at one point and then
at another, instead of distributing them evenly over the whole area and
the various points of contact. The idea would seem to be, first, to
strengthen General French until he has crushed the Boer force with which
he is dealing, then to use his troops to secure the defeat of the Boers
who are opposing Sir William Gatacre, and then to cross the Orange
River with three divisions and deal a blow against the Boer army that is
now between the Riet River and Kimberley. This plan of beating in detail
the Boer forces in the western theatre of war, if carried out so as to
lead in each case to a crushing defeat of the Boers, would be the
prelude to a collision between the main Boer army and a British force
its superior in every respect. The first certain evidence that some such
idea is at the foundation of the new operations may be hailed as the
beginning of victory. For the present it is enough to know that the
departure of Lord Roberts from Cape Town augurs the opening of an
energetic campaign with that unity of direction in a strong hand which
is the first element of success in war.
A COMMANDER
_February 15th_, 1900
In war, as in other great enterprises, the first element of success is
unity of direction in a strong hand. The reason is that whenever the
co-operation of large numbers is involved the needful concentration of
purpose can be supplied only by the head man, the leader or director.
Concentration of purpose means in war the arrangement in due perspective
of all the various objectives, the selection of the most important of
them, the distribution of forces according to the importance of the
blows to be delivered, of which some one is always decisive. To the
decisive point, then, the bulk of the forces are directed, and at other
points small forces are left to make shift as well as they can, unless,
indeed, there is a superabundance of force--not a common phenomenon.
The same principle of concentration prescribes that action when once
begun should, at any rate at the decisive point, be sudden, rapid, and
continuous. These fundamental ideas are illustrated by the practice of
all the great commanders, and there is perhaps no better definition of a
great commander than one whose action illustrates the simple principles
of war. Lord Roberts is once more revealing to his countrymen the nature
of these principles. The tangled mass of the war has suddenly become
simplified, and there is clearness where there was confusion.