large forces dispersed over a front of two or three hundred miles, the
reinforcements at sea, and the transport still in a state very like
confusion. By February 6th, two or three weeks earlier than was
anticipated by those at home who had the most perfect confidence in him,
he was on his way to the front, enabling those at home to draw the
certain inference that all was ready, the divisions assembled, and the
transport in order. While he was travelling the six hundred miles from
Cape Town to the Modder River various preliminary moves which he had
ordered were in course of execution. There had been a large display of
British infantry near Colesberg, covering the withdrawal of General
French and the cavalry division. This had the effect of causing the
Boers to reinforce Colesberg, probably by detachments from
Magersfontein. The British infantry, however, was there only to lure the
Boers; it was composed of parts of the sixth division on the way further
north, and only a small infantry force was left to hold the reinforced
Boers in check. The next move was a reconnaissance in force from Modder
River to Koodoosberg Drifts, which drew Commandant Cronje's attention
and some of his troops to his right flank. The reconnaissance had the
further object of inspiriting the Highland Brigade which had been so
badly damaged at Magersfontein, and of establishing good relations
between these troops and their new commander, General Mac Donald. On
their return to camp a short address from Lord Roberts had the effect
upon them that Napoleon's proclamations used to produce on the French
troops. A day or two was spent in completing the organisation of the
force at Modder River, where a new division, the ninth, had been formed
probably of troops brought up from the communications. The mounted
infantry were also brigaded, as had been those at Orange River Station.
Meantime various movements had been going on of which the details as yet
are unreported. Two infantry divisions, the sixth and seventh, the last
two from England, were moving towards the Riet River to the East of
Jacobsdal. The point or points from which they started are not known,
nor the direction of their march, which was screened by the cavalry
division and perhaps also by a brigade of mounted infantry. At any rate
on Sunday, the 11th inst., Hannay's brigade of mounted infantry from
Orange River, on the march to Ramdam, had to cover its right flank
against a party of Boers. Ramdam is not to be found, but if it is on
the Riet above Jacobsdal the probability is that Hannay's brigade was
covering the right flank of the infantry divisions.
On Monday French with his cavalry brigade seized a drift or ford across
the Riet ten or a dozen miles above Jacobsdal, and the two infantry
divisions were so close behind him that on Tuesday Lord Roberts could
report them both encamped beyond the river. On Tuesday French was off
again to the north with a cavalry brigade, a mounted infantry brigade,
and a horse artillery brigade, a second cavalry brigade, under Colonel
Gordon moving on his right. By half-past five French was across the
Modder River, having forced a drift and seized the hills beyond so as to
secure the passage for the infantry, while Gordon had seized two drifts
further to the west. Between them the two cavalry commanders had
captured five Boer laagers, and the slightness of the opposition they
encounter proves that the Boers were completely surprised. On Wednesday
morning the sixth division was on the march to follow the cavalry, and
the seventh division was to take the same direction on Wednesday
afternoon.
These are all the facts reported until now, Thursday afternoon. Let us
see what they mean. First of all, Lord Roberts has chosen his objective,
the Boer force before Kimberley, on the right flank of the Boer front
Stormberg--Colesberg--Magersfontein. A blow delivered here and followed
by a march into the Free State places Lord Roberts on the communications
of the Boers now at Stormberg and Colesberg and between the two halves
of the Boer army, of which one is on the border of Cape Colony and the
other in Natal. The objective, therefore, has been chosen with
strategical insight. In the next place forces have been concentrated for
the blow. Lord Roberts has four infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade,
and at least one brigade of mounted infantry, his total strength
amounting to at least fifty thousand men. Then there has been a skilful
and successful attempt to distract the enemy's attention, to conceal
from him the nature of the movement and the force to be employed, and
last, but not least, there has been the suddenness and the rapidity of
movement essential to surprise. These are the proofs of that breadth and
simplicity of conception and of that mastery in execution which are the
marks of the best generalship.
But there is in the best work more than breadth of mind and strength of
hand. The details fit in with the design and repay the closest scrutiny.
The march of twenty-five thousand men round Jacobsdal towards the Modder
tactically turns the Boer position at Magersfontein, so that it need not
be carried by a frontal attack. But it also places the British force on
the direct line of the Boer communications with Bloemfontein, and if
Commandant Cronje values these communications he must either make a
precipitate retreat by Boshof, offering his flank during the process to
attack by French, or must attack the sixth and seventh divisions on
their march from the Riet to the Modder. But in either case he has to
reckon with the Guards and ninth divisions which are not mentioned in
the telegrams, but which are assuredly not idle. Lord Methuen has long
held a crossing on to the peninsula or Doab between the two rivers, and
the advance of a division into this peninsula must compel the prompt
evacuation of Jacobsdal or bring about the ruin of any Boer force there,
while at the same time it would increase the weight of troops that
intervene between Magersfontein and Bloemfontein. A single division is a
more than ample force to cover the British railhead at Modder River.
Commandant Cronje may elect to fight where he is, which would be to
court disaster, for he would be attacked from the east in great force,
with no retreat open except to the west away from his base, and with a
considerable river, the Vaal, to cross. Such a retreat after a lost
battle and under the pressure of pursuit would be ruin to his army. He
may move off by Boshof, but that would be impracticable unless the
start were made soon after the first news of the British advance. On
Wednesday he would have only the mounted troops to deal with; even on
Thursday (to-day) the sixth division could hardly be used with effect on
the north bank of the Modder, but on Friday he would have the sixth and
seventh divisions to reckon with. Probably his best course would be to
retire before he can be attacked to Barkly, on the right bank of the
Vaal. He would there be in a position most difficult to attack, and yet
his presence there on the flank of any British advance either to the
north or to the east would make it impossible to neglect him. His
decision has been taken before now, or this opinion would have been
suppressed out of deference to the anxiety of those who imagine that
strategical advice is telegraphed from London to the Boer headquarters.
Of the effect of the new move upon the general course of the war it
would be premature to enlarge. We must wait and see the close of the
first act. The most effective issue of this week's movements would be a
battle leading to the thorough defeat, the military destruction, of the
Boer army before Kimberley. A less valuable result would be the raising
of the siege of Kimberley without fighting, a result which is not to be
preferred, because a force that retires before battle has to be fought
later on. For this reason the true Boer game is to retreat in time.
It will be interesting to watch the effect of the new campaign upon the
ripening resolve of the British Nation to have, its Army set in order.
Upon many minds, and no doubt upon Ministers and their adherents, the
impression made by success in the field will be that reform is needless.
The true impression would be that it is as urgent as before, and that
the right way to begin is to give authority to the right man, the
commander who is now revealing his strength.
CRONJE'S SEDAN
_February 22nd_, 1900
A week ago the news was that Lord Roberts had begun his movement, that
he was moving with fifty thousand men against Commandant Cronje, and
that General French with the cavalry division had crossed the Modder,
the sixth and seventh divisions following him between the Riet and the
Modder.
The great object was to strike down Cronje's force before it could
receive help, and the design must have been to cut off his retreat to
the eastward. On Thursday, the 15th, French marched from the Modder to
Alexandersfontein, attacked the rear of the Boer line investing
Kimberley, and in the evening entered the town. He had left the sixth
division at the drifts of the Modder. This movement of French's appeared
to imply that Cronje's army was known to be retreating to the west or
north-west, and that French took the road through Kimberley as the
shortest way to reach a position where that retreat could be
intercepted. It could hardly be imagined that the move was made for the
sake of Kimberley, of which the relief was assured whether Cronje stood
to fight or retreated in any direction. The essential thing was to find
where Cronje's force was--if it was at Magersfontein to surround it or
drive it to the west; if elsewhere to delay it with the cavalry and
pursue it with the infantry. But Cronje was not found. When French was
in Kimberley, Cronje, retreating eastwards, passed through the fifteen
miles gap between the town and Kelly-Kenny. Kelly-Kenny on Friday
discovered this and set off in pursuit while French was following a Boer
force retreating northwards, probably part of the force that had
invested Kimberley. Kelly-Kenny shelled the Boer laager and captured a
number of waggons, but the Boers retreated eastwards along the north
bank of the Modder with Kelly-Kenny at their heels. To assist
Kelly-Kenny French was recalled from the north, and Macdonald with the
Highland Brigade pushed out by a forced march from Jacobsdal. Accounts
differ as to the site of the fighting, but there was a three days'
running fight, during which Cronje may have crossed the Modder and
approached Paardeberg or may have been stopped on the north bank. The
Boer reports, which imply at least that Cronje was hard pressed, were
sent off before the finish, and the first British official reports,
consisting only in a list of officers killed and wounded, show that each
of the three infantry brigades had hard fighting with considerable
losses.
Of eight infantry brigades with which Lord Roberts began his movement
three were engaged against Cronje; one has probably been sent to
Kimberley, with which town railway communication has been re-opened, so
that it will be soon an advanced base for the Army. Lord Roberts,
therefore, who was at Paardeberg on Monday evening, may have had with
him four brigades or two divisions, representing twenty thousand men,
besides the three brigades engaged, which represented before the battle
something like fifteen thousand.
Of French and the cavalry division there is no report. The Boers publish
a telegram from Commandant de Wet, who seems to have brought up
reinforcements while Cronje's action was in progress on Sunday.
The Boer commander evidently counted on reinforcements from all
quarters; a party from Colesberg cut off a British waggon train at the
Riet on or about Friday, the 16th, and reinforcements from Natal arrived
during Cronje's action. Lord Roberts has thus drawn the Boers away from
the circumference towards the centre. He has lightened the tasks of
Buller, Clements, Gatacre, and Brabant, but has thereby brought the
chief load on to his own shoulders. It seems a misfortune that Cronje
was able to escape eastwards from Magersfontein, though it would be
wrong until full knowledge of what took place is obtained to assume that
this could have been avoided.
Cronje, however, has not been able to make good his escape. A Renter's
telegram from Paardeberg dated. Tuesday explicitly states that Cronje's
force was enclosed and remained enclosed. Lord Roberts on Tuesday
reported that after examination of the enemy's position by
reconnaissance in force, he decided to avoid the heavy loss involved in
an assault, but to bombard the enemy and to turn his attention to the
approaching reinforcements. The result was that the reinforcements were
driven off and dispersed with heavy loss to them and trifling loss to
the British. This seems to have been effected on Tuesday. Boer prisoners
reported that they have come from Ladysmith, and the commander of the
reinforcements is said to have been Commandant Botha, who was last heard
of at Spion Kop. On Tuesday also the shelling of Cronje's position is
said to have induced him to ask for an armistice, which must be assumed
to be the prelude to a surrender; at any rate the request would hardly
be granted except to settle the terms of a capitulation or to enable the
Boer general to be told that unconditional surrender was the only
alternative to a continuance of the bombardment.
The advance into the Free State implied that Lord Roberts meant to take
the benefit of acting on "interior lines," that is, in plain English,
of getting in between his enemies and striking them in turn before they
can unite or combine. This plan required him with his main body to
attack the enemy's reinforcements in detail as they came up. In that way
he secured time for the completion of the action against Cronje, and
upon its favourable issue he will be master of the situation.
In Natal the situation has been changed by the action of Lord Roberts.
The two Boer Republics are well aware that they must stand or fall
together. Either the Boer Commander-in-Chief has decided to strike at
Lord Roberts, in which case he must move the bulk of his force into the
Free State, or he hopes to be in time to resist Lord Roberts after
making an end of Sir George White. In the former case he must raise the
siege of Ladysmith, for he cannot carry it on without a strong covering
force to resist Sir Redvers Buller. Then there will be forty thousand
British troops in Natal, whose advance will be almost as dangerous as
that of Lord Roberts. In the latter case there can be little chance of a
successful resistance to Lord Roberts, whose advance northwards from
Bloemfontein would in due time compromise the safety of the Boer army.
The reports do not enable us to feel sure which decision has been taken.
Sir Redvers Buller's telegram of Wednesday to the effect that one of his
divisions had crossed the Tugela and was opposed only by a rear guard
looks very like a Boer withdrawal from Natal. A later unofficial
telegram, describing a very strong position north of the Tugela held by
the Boers to cover the siege, suggests that the Boer commander is again
trying to lead his adversary into attack upon a prepared position. Each
case has its favourable aspect. If the Boers are raising the siege the
forces of Buller and White will in a few days be united, and need only
good leading to force the passes and invade either the Free State or the
Transvaal. If the Boers are determined to hold on to Ladysmith, they
cannot effectively check the advance of Lord Roberts.
While the war is going on the Nation ought to set its military forces in
order. The Militia should be formed into divisions for the field and be
shipped off to manoeuvring grounds at the Cape; they can be brought home
as soon as it is certain they will not be wanted. The Volunteers could
soon be formed into an army if the War Office would carry out the
measures which have for years been urged upon it by Volunteer officers.
The first step is to give the officers the authority which has hitherto
been withheld from them, so that by its exercise they may form their
characters; the second to give them the best instruction and
encouragements to learn; the third to find them ground for ranges, for
field firing and for manoeuvres. A minister of war who combined
knowledge of war and of the Volunteers with a serious purpose would be
able in two months to infuse the whole Volunteer force with the right
ideal, and then, by mobilising them for another two months, to transform
them into an army. It is for the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to secure the four months that are needed.
THE BOER DEFEATS
_March 1st_, 1900
February has made up for the blunders of August and September, and
retrieved the disasters of October, November, and December.
On Tuesday the 27th, Commandant Cronje with four thousand men, the
remains of his army, surrendered to Lord Roberts at Paardeberg; the same
day, Sir Redvers Duller attacked and carried the Boer position near
Pieters, in front of Ladysmith, and on Wednesday the 28th, Lord
Dundonald with two mounted regiments, entered Ladysmith.
The fighting in the Free State and in Natal has been simultaneous, and
it may be worth while briefly to review the two campaigns. Lord Roberts
set out from Modder River on Monday the 12th. On that day began the
march of his force to the attack of Cronje. French with the cavalry
seized Dekiel's Drift on the Riet and was followed by two infantry
divisions. Next day, Tuesday the 13th, French was holding the drifts of
the Modder, and on Thursday morning the sixth division was at Klip
Drift. Thereupon French pushed on with his cavalry to Kimberley. The
same night Cronje marched off between Kimberley and Klip Drift, making
eastwards along the north bank of the Modder, which he was to cross near
Paardeberg. But his march was discovered. He was followed and attacked
on Friday the 10th by the advance guard of the sixth division, which
detained him at the crossing of the river. The Highland Brigade made a
forced march to intercept him on the south bank, and between Friday and
Sunday, the 16th and 18th, he was surrounded and driven back into a
position formed by the river banks. Here, from the 17th to the 27th, he
held out against a bombardment, while the British forces, pushing their
trenches gradually nearer, were preparing for an assault. Lord Roberts
had brought up the bulk of his force, and parried with ease the attacks
of two or three parties of Boers who came up in succession to Cronje's
assistance; some of them having been sent for the purpose from Northern
Natal. On Tuesday, February 27th, the anniversary of Majuba, Cronje
surrendered.
The effects of this campaign against Cronje were felt at once in various
parts of the theatre of war. The advance of Lord Roberts and the retreat
of Cronje carried with them the relief of Kimberley. It drew away the
Boers from the Colesberg district, so that on the 26th General Clements
was able to enter Colesberg, which had been evacuated, and on the 27th,
to move his troops forward from Arundel to Rensburg.
Lord Roberts had arranged for other action simultaneous with his own. On
Friday, the 16th, General Brabant with his Cape Mounted Division
attacked the Boers near Dordrecht and defeated them. A week later he was
in Jamestown, the Boers were retreating towards the Orange River, and
the rebels in Barkly East were asking for terms, receiving the answer
that there were no terms but unconditional surrender.
On Wednesday the 14th, while French was leading the advance from
Dekiel's Drift to the Modder, Sir Redvers Buller took Hussar Hill,
north-east of Chieveley. Four days later, on Sunday the 18th, he fought
a considerable battle at Monte Cristo, a point of the Inhlawe range, the
capture of which turned Hlangwane Hill and led to its capture next day,
Monday the 19th. On Tuesday the 20th, Buller's advance guard crossed the
Tugela near Colenso. On Wednesday the 21st, the river was bridged, and
three brigades crossed to the north bank. The fighting then became
continuous. On Friday there was a determined attack by the Irish brigade
upon a Boer position west of the railway near Pieters. The assault
failed and the troops suffered heavily, but the British force maintained
the general line of front which it had gained. On Monday the 26th, a
fresh bridge was thrown across the Tugela, a mile or two east of the
railway line, and on Tuesday the 27th, Pieters Hill, east of Pieters
Station, in the prolongation of the Boer front, was stormed by General
Barton, whereupon the whole British force renewed the attack in front
upon the Boer positions west of the railway and carried them, dispersing
the enemy. It now seems that this was the decisive attack, for the next
evening, Wednesday the 28th, Dundonald with two mounted regiments was in
Ladysmith, and to-day Sir Redvers Buller with his Army Corps moved
forwards towards Nelthorpe, the last railway station before Ladysmith.
On Wednesday morning Sir Redvers Buller reported a considerable force of
the enemy still on and under Bulwana Mountain, to the east of Ladysmith.
His task and that of his Army Corps is to inflict what damage he can
upon that force of the enemy, taking from Sir George White whatever
assistance that officer and his troops can give, and leaving to the
auxiliary services the work of attending to the sick and wounded in
Ladysmith and the provisioning of the troops and the town. A part of Sir
George White's force is, no doubt, still fit for action so soon as its
supply of cartridges can be renewed. The most effective plan would
probably be to leave a strong rearguard at Nelthorpe, and to push on
with the main body and the bulk of the artillery through Ladysmith to
the assault of one of the Boer positions on the north side of the town.
This would compel the Boers to abandon Bulwana, perhaps to leave behind
their heavy guns; would, if successful, prevent their retreat by the
direct road into the Free State, and might greatly embarrass or, at
least, harass their retreat through the Biggarsberg.
The defeat of the Boer army in Natal and the relief of Ladysmith is a
great blow to the Boer cause. It frustrates the hopes of the Boers for
the one great success on which they were to some extent justified in
counting, and makes an end of their plan of campaign.
A few days will be needed to repair the railway from the Tugela to
Ladysmith, and to build a temporary railway bridge at Colenso. By that
time the force of Sir George White and Sir Redvers Buller will be
rested, refreshed, and reorganised, forming an army of from thirty-five
thousand to forty thousand men. In the Free State Lord Roberts has
probably forty-five thousand. The collapse of the Boer invasion of Cape
Colony points to the early reopening of the railways from Naauwpoort and
Sterkstrom to Norval's Pont and Bethulie, the repair of the railway
bridges over the Orange River, and the concentration at Bloemfontein of
sixty thousand men, with the railway from the Orange River working and
guarded behind them, possibly with a new line of railway from Modder
River or Kimberley to Bloemfontein as an additional resource. The
advance of Lord Roberts with sixty thousand men to the Vaal River must
open to Sir Redvers Buller the passes of the Drakensberg range from Van
Reenen's to Lang's Nek, and between the two forces the Boer army must be
crushed. The Boers may abandon the attempt at resistance by battle, and
may confine themselves to the defence of Pretoria, to raids on the
British communications, and to the various devices of irregular warfare.
But the British forces will shortly have at their disposal as many
mounted men as the Boers, so that even irregular warfare can but lead
to their destruction in detail.
The only hope for the Boer cause now rests upon the intervention of
other Powers, and the crucial moment for the British Government is at
hand. That the Nation is resolved to brook no intervention is absolutely
certain, and that it is ready to make great sacrifices and great efforts
to resist any attempt at intervention seems equally beyond doubt. Has
the Government appreciated either the needs of the situation or the
temper of the Nation? Intervention if offered will be proposed suddenly,
and foreign action, if it is contemplated at all, will follow upon the
heels of the rejection of the proposals. If, then, fleets have still to
be completed for sea, plans of campaign to be matured and adopted, and a
Volunteer Army to be improvised, the great war will find us as unready
and as much surprised as did the supposed small war five months ago.