years fought his battle by urging that the Government ought to follow
the advice of its military adviser, a theory of which the corollary is
that the adviser must resign the moment he is overruled. I have never
meant that the adviser is to be a dictator, nor that the Cabinet should
follow advice of the soundness of which it is not convinced. The Cabinet
has the responsibility and ought never to act without full conviction.
The expert who cannot convince a group of intelligent non-experts that a
necessary measure is necessary is not as expert as he should be; and if
he still retains his post after he has been overruled on a measure which
he regards as necessary he has not the strength of character which is
indispensable for great responsibility. Now, though the relation between
a Cabinet and its advisers ought to be secret, in the present case each
side has let the cat out of the bag. Lord Wolseley's friends defend him
by declaring that he has been overruled. But that defence kills him. If
he has been overruled on a trifle it does not matter, and the defence
is a quibble; if he has been overruled on an essential point why is he
still Commander-in-Chief? No answer can be devised that is not fatal to
his case. Lord Lansdowne's friend, for such Lord Ernest Hamilton may be
presumed to be, says: "Supposing, for the sake of argument, that the
short-comings of the War Office in and before the present war were due
not to neglect of military counsels, but to the adoption of such
counsels, contrary to the more far-seeing judgment of the civil side."
That is a condemnation of the civilian Minister and of the Cabinet, for
no man in charge of the Nation's affairs ought to take the
responsibility for a decision of the soundness of which he is not
convinced. If Lord Lansdowne disagreed with Lord Wolseley and was not
prepared to ask for that officer's retirement, why did he not himself
retire rather than make himself responsible for measures which he
thought wrong or mistaken? These are not personal criticisms or attacks.
Lord Wolseley and Lord Lansdowne have both of them in the past rendered
splendid services to the Nation. But the Empire is at stake, and a
writer's duty is to set forth and apply the principles which he believes
to be sound, without being a respecter of persons yet with that respect
for every man, especially for every public man, which is the best
tradition of our National life. What at the present moment ought not to
be tolerated is what Lord Ernest Hamilton suggests, an attack upon the
generals at the front, to save the War Office or the Cabinet; and what
is needed is that the Ministers should choose a war adviser who can
convince them, even though to find him they have to pass over a hundred
generals and select a colonel, a captain, or a crammer.
THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR
_January 11th_, 1900
The arrival of Lord Roberts at Cape Town announces the approaching
beginning of a new chapter in the war, though the second chapter is not
yet quite finished.
The first chapter was the campaign of Sir George White with sixteen
thousand men against the principal Boer army. It ended with Sir George
White's being surrounded in Ladysmith and there locked up.
The second chapter began with the arrival of. Sir Redvers Buller at Cape
Town. It may be reviewed under two headings: the conception and the
execution of the operations. When Sir Redvers Buller reached the Cape,
the force which he was expecting, and of which he had the control,
consisted altogether of nearly sixty thousand regular troops, besides
Cape and colonial troops. There was an Army Corps, thirty-five thousand,
a cavalry division, five thousand, troops for the defence of
communications, ten thousand, and troops at the Cape amounting to eight
thousand, some of whom were at Mafeking and Kimberley. After deducting
fourteen thousand men for communications and garrisons at the Cape, the
commander had at his disposal for use in the field about forty-four
thousand regular troops arranged as a cavalry brigade, seven brigades of
infantry, and corps troops.
There were many tasks before the British general. Southern Natal was
being invaded and had to be cleared of the enemy; the Cape Colony, too,
had to be freed from its Boer visitors, and the rising of the Cape Dutch
stopped. Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking were all awaiting relief,
and last, but not least, the Boer armies had to be beaten, and the two
Republics conquered. The strategical problem was how to accomplish all
these tasks at once, if possible, and if that could not be done, to sort
them in order of importance and deal with them in that order. The
essential thing was not to violate any of those great principles which
the experience of a hundred wars and the practice of a dozen great
generals have proved to be fundamental. The leading principle is that
which enjoins concentration of effort in time, space, and object. Do one
thing at a time and do it with all your might. If the list of tasks be
examined it will be seen that there is a connection between them all,
and that the connecting link is the Boer army. Suppose the Boer army to
be removed from the scene every one of the other aims would be easy of
accomplishment. There would then be no invaders in either colony;
Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking would be safe, and the troops in
those places free to march where they pleased; the Cape rising could be
suppressed at leisure, and the British general could at his convenience
go to Pretoria and set up a fresh government. No other of the tasks had
this same quality of dominating the situation; any one of them might be
accomplished without great or immediate effect upon those that would
remain. For this reason wisdom prescribed as the simplest way of
accomplishing the seven or eight tasks the accomplishment of the first
or last, the destruction of the Boer army. That army was in three parts:
there was a fraction on the western border of the Free State, a fraction
south of the Orange River, and the great bulk of the whole force was in
northern Natal. Destroy the principal mass, and you could then at your
leisure deal with the two smaller pieces. Everything pointed to an
attempt to crush the Boer army then in Natal.
There were two ways of getting at that army which was holding Ladysmith
in its grip. One was along the railway from Durban, one hundred and
eighty-nine miles long; it was sure to bring the British Army face to
face with the Boers at the Tugela. That point reached, either the Boers
would stand to fight and, therefore, give the opportunity of crushing
them, or they would retreat, in which case Ladysmith would be relieved,
and the British force, strengthened by White's division, would be
within three hundred miles of Pretoria. A great victory in Natal would
save Natal, stop the Cape rising, and, if followed up, draw the Boer
forces away from Kimberley and the Cape Colony.
The other way was to follow the railway line or lines from the Cape
ports, to collect the Army on the Orange River and advance to
Bloemfontein, and thence towards Pretoria or towards the western exits
from the passes through the Drakensberg mountains. This plan, however,
gave no immediate certainty of an opportunity to attack the Boer army.
The British force could be assembled on the Orange River no sooner than
on the south bank of the Tugela. But from the Orange River to
Bloemfontein there would be a march of one hundred and twenty miles, and
the Boer army was not at Bloemfontein. There was a probability that when
the British force reached Bloemfontein the Boer army might leave Natal,
but the probability did not amount to certainty; it rested upon a guess
or hypothesis of what the Boer general or the Free State Government and
its troops would think. Supposing, however, that these persons did not
think as was expected; that they determined to complete the conquest of
Natal (except Durban, which was protected by the fleet), and to keep
their grip upon Ladysmith, at any rate until the British force was
nearing the passes of the Drakensberg or crossing the Vaal, and then,
but not till then, to retreat to Middleburg? In that case the purpose of
the advance, the crushing of the Boer army, might be deferred for a very
long time, and meanwhile every one of the minor tasks, except the relief
of Kimberley and the repulse of the Free State invaders of the Cape,
would be left over. Ladysmith might fall, and its fall stimulate the
Cape rising and endanger the communications of the British force
advancing north of the Orange River.
These were the two plans, and I confess that my own judgment at the
beginning of November inclined to the former, though, as I am aware
that most of those whose strategical judgment I respect hold a decided
opinion the other way, I cannot be dogmatic. The prevalent opinion
attaches more importance than I can persuade myself to do to the
difficulties of the hilly and mountainous country of northern Natal.
There is, moreover, a reserve imposed upon observers at home by our
ignorance of the state of the transport services of the British forces.
No concentration of troops is profitable if the troops when collected
cannot be fed.
Subject to these reserves it may be said that Sir Redvers Buller at the
beginning of November had to choose between two lines of operations,
that by Natal and that by the Cape. The cardinal principle is that you
must never divide your force between two lines of operations unless it
is large enough to give you on each of the two lines an assured
superiority to the enemy's whole force. Sir Redvers Buller's design,
however, violated this principle. He neither determined upon action with
all his might through the Cape Colony nor upon action with all his
might through Natal, but divided his effort, directing four of his seven
brigades to Natal and the other three towards the Orange River; half his
cavalry brigade going to Colesberg, and a mixed force of the
communication troops to Sterkstrom on the East London line.
This design gave no promise of effecting the dominant task, the crushing
of the Boer army, though it aimed at grappling in detail with several of
the subordinate tasks; but its execution proved as indecisive as its
conception. In Natal the main force under Sir Redvers Buller himself
completely failed in the attack on the Boer army at Colenso on December
15th; Lord Methuen's advance for the relief of Kimberley came to a
standstill at the Modder River, and met with a serious repulse at
Magersfontein; while the smaller parties of Gatacre and French have made
little headway against the Free State troops and the rebellious Cape
farmers.
The fifth division, the bulk of which was directed to Natal, has been
added to Sir Redvers Buller's force, without having enabled him as yet
to strike the decisive blow or even to prevent a determined assault upon
Ladysmith by the Boer army. That assault is believed to be now
impending, and its delivery will close the second chapter of the war. If
Sir Redvers Buller can win his battle in Natal while Sir George White is
still unconquered, the military power of the Boers will receive a great
shock, and the issue of the war will no longer be doubtful, though its
end may be distant. But if Sir Redvers Buller should again fail the
result must be to leave Sir George White's force in extreme peril, to
give the Boer forces the spirit of a veteran and victorious army, and to
encourage the Dutch element at the Cape to take an active part against
the British.
This is the situation which confronts Lord Roberts on his arrival at the
Cape. The problem bears a general resemblance to that which Sir Redvers
Buller had to solve at the beginning of November, but there are
important differences. Lord Roberts has in hand only a brigade, the
twelfth or first of the sixth division, which has just reached Cape
Town; he has to expect the rest of the sixth division, the seventh, a
possible eighth, and a considerable extra force of mounted troops and of
artillery; but the arrival of these forces will be gradual, and he will
have no mass of fresh troops until the beginning of next month. Even
then he may not have the means of feeding on the march the newly-arrived
divisions. Meantime a British victory in Natal would be more valuable, a
British defeat there more disastrous than ever. The effort ought to be
made if there is a reasonable probability of success, for though failure
would have disastrous consequences, material and moral, the admission of
helplessness involved in making no attempt would depress the hearts of
the British troops perhaps as fatally as a lost battle.
The first decision required is whether Sir Redvers Buller's force is to
try its fate once more. In all probability that decision has been made
while Lord Roberts was at sea, and according to the event will be the
situation with which the new Commander-in-Chief will have to deal. A
victory in Natal will make his task easy; a failure will put before him
a problem the fortunate solution of which would be a triumph for any
commander.
THE DECISIVE BATTLE
_January 18th_, 1900
Yesterday began the action upon which in all probability depends the
future course of the war. By the time these lines are in the reader's
hands more will be known of the battle that can be guessed to-day by the
wisest, though several days may pass before the result is fully known.
Sir Redvers Buller on Wednesday, the 10th, had under his command three
infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, some two thousand mounted
infantry, and probably altogether about eighty guns. Clery's division
consists of Hildyard's and Lyttelton's brigades; the third division,
comprising Hart's and Barton's brigades, is not known to have had a
commander appointed; Warren's division is composed of Woodgate's brigade
and of half of Coke's brigade, to which another half may have been added
by taking two battalions which have been some time in Natal, and belong
neither to Clery's nor to the third division. The whole force ought to
be thirty thousand strong for a fight, taking the division at nine
thousand instead of ten thousand, for though there have been losses
there have also been drafts to fill up gaps. A party of mounted troops
probably one thousand strong is reported to have been detached a few
days ago by rail to Stanger on the coast near the mouth of the Tugela,
and thence to have disappeared on a mission of which the purpose is as
yet unknown, though it looks like a raid upon the railway between Dundee
and Newcastle. The strength of the Boers in Natal has never been
accurately known, and the estimates differ widely, ranging from
thirty-five thousand to more than double that number. Sir George White
may have nine thousand effectives at Ladysmith and might be contained by
fifteen thousand Boers, perhaps by a smaller number. There will,
therefore, be available against Sir Redvers Buller a force on the lowest
estimate about equal to his own, and possibly outnumbering it by two to
one.
On Wednesday, the 10th, the British force started westward. No telegram
as yet gives its distribution, but it is plain that Clery's and Warren's
divisions moved out, together with the cavalry brigade and whatever
mounted infantry had not been sent south. Hart's and Barton's brigades,
or one of them, with a proportion of artillery may be assumed to have
been left in the entrenchments which face Colenso and cover the British
line of communications by the railway. On Thursday morning Lord
Dundonald with the cavalry brigade and some of the mounted infantry was
in possession of the hills overlooking Potgieter's Drift and of the pont
or ferry-boat. The same day the infantry or the leading division,
Clery's, was in the hills north of Springfield. Lord Dundonald's force
commanded the river at Potgieter's Drift, and the crossing there was
thus assured. A pause of four days followed: a pause probably not of
inaction, but of strenuous preparation in order to make the final
advance vigorous. During those days, no doubt, supplies would be
accumulated at Springfield Bridge Camp, at Spearman's Farm, and at some
point near to the next drift to the west. This would save delays when
the advance began, for if the force depended upon magazines at Frere the
transport would break down in the advance beyond the Tugela, whereas if
the transport had in the later stages merely to start from the south
side of the Tugela, the force could be kept supplied for a few days.
Lord Dundonald was engaged in strengthening his position at Zwart's Kop,
so that in any case there would be a secure retreat across the river if
need be. The river itself seems also to have been properly reconnoitred.
The enemy's position could be seen four or five miles to the north, and
he was known on Thursday to be strongly entrenched. A passage for
Warren's division was chosen at Trichardt's Drift five miles above
Potgieter's and near to Wagon Drift which is marked on the sketch map
issued by the Intelligence Division. From Trichardt's Drift there is
evidently a road leading into the Bethany-Dewdrop Road, and parallel to
that which runs from Potgieter's Drift. On Tuesday, the 16th,
Lyttelton's brigade of infantry with a battery of howitzers crossed the
Tugela at Potgieter's Drift and gained a line of hills to the north,
probably the edge of the plateau on which lies the Boer position. The
telegrams say nothing of bridge-making at Potgieter's Drift, but are
explicit as to the crossing of at least some of the artillery. On
Wednesday General Lyttelton shelled the Boer position with howitzers and
naval guns without drawing a reply. This silence of the Boer guns is
correct for the defenders of a position, as a reply would enable the
assailant to fix the position of the guns and to concentrate his fire
upon them. The same day (Wednesday) Warren's division crossed the Tugela
at Trichardt's Drift, and driving in the enemy's outposts secured a
lodgment on the low wooded hills about a mile north of the river; this
division, after its advance guard had crossed, was passed over by a
pontoon bridge. The remainder of yesterday may have been spent in
reconnaissance, bridge building--for an army that has crossed a river
needs to have behind it as many bridges as possible--in bringing up all
the forces destined for the battle, perhaps including Hildyard's
brigade, and in making complete arrangements for the attack which was
probably delivered this morning.
Sir Redvers Buller has aimed his blow in a right direction, for, if it
can be delivered with effect, if he can drive the Boers back, their army
will be in a perilous situation. The plan evidently is that while
Clery's division holds the Boers in front, Warren's should strike upon
their right flank. If, then, the combined attack of the two divisions
forces the Boers back the situation would be that the Boer army would
have to retreat eastward across the Klip River, its retreat in any other
direction being barred by the defences of Ladysmith, by Warren's and
Clery's divisions, and by the British force in the lines at Chieveley.
In such a situation a forced retreat would be disastrous for the Boers,
as Sir Redvers Buller's two divisions would be nearer to the Boer line
of retreat through Glencoe than the Boer army.
Of the probabilities of success it would be rash to speak. But though
numbers are against the British we must never forget the splendid
qualities which British troops have displayed in the past and which, as
the actions of this war have proved, are possessed by our officers and
men to-day. The experiences of the last few weeks have taught them what
are the formations to avoid and have shown them that they shoot at least
as well as the Boers. We may, therefore, hope for victory even against
numbers.
But even if Sir Redvers Buller finds positions as strong as that at
Colenso, the Boers will probably be baulked of their prey, the garrison
of Ladysmith. Sir George White has with him the flower of the British
Army, and he does not mean to be reduced by degrees to the extremity of
famine and helplessness. During Sir Redvers Buller's attack the
Ladysmith's force will not be idle, but will attack the Boers who are
investing the place. Signals must have been prearranged between the two
commanders, and it can hardly be doubted that if and when Sir George
White should have reason to believe that Sir Redvers Buller may be
unable to force his way through the Boer positions he would himself set
out to cut his way through the investing lines, and at whatever
sacrifice to carry the remnant of his force into Sir Redvers Buller's
camp, and thus to vindicate the honour of the British arms and the
character of the British soldier.
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS
_January 25th_, 1900
The decisive operation is proceeding slowly but surely. On Wednesday,
the 10th, Lord Dundonald reached the south bank of the Tugela at
Potgieter's Drift, and on Thursday a brigade of infantry was up with
him. A week later, on Wednesday, the 17th, Lyttelton's brigade crossed
by the drift, and Warren's wing of the Army began the passage by a
pontoon bridge at Trichardt's or Wagon Drift. On Thursday, the 18th,
Dundonald was on the high road west of Acton Homes, and drove away a
party of Boers.
North of the Tugela there is a great crescent-shaped plateau three or
four miles across at the widest part. The crescent has its convex side
to the south-west. One of its horns touches the Acton Homes--Ladysmith
road; its broadest part bulges south towards the river bank between
Wagon Drift and the loop near Potgieter's Drift; its other limb is
broken into irregular heights, Brakfontein kopje apparently marking its
south-eastern apex. On the concave north-eastern side Spion Kop is about
at the centre, and is four miles north of Wagon Drift. The plateau is
three or four hundred feet above the river and Spion Kop about the same
height above the plateau. Near the northern apex rises the Blaauwbank
River, which flows eastward towards Ladysmith along the foot of an east
and west range, a spur from the Drakensberg mountains jutting out so as
to separate the Van Reenen's road and valley from the valley followed by
the Acton Homes--Ladysmith road.
When Warren crossed the river he found the western half of the crescent
held by the enemy.
Whatever his original design, which may have been to take his whole
force to Acton Homes, and then march eastward along the road, he had to
drive the Boers from the plateau. His action was deliberate, without
hurry, but without waste of time. The troops had been prepared for
tactics better suited to their weapons, the bullet and the shell, to the
enemy's weapons, and to the ground, than the rapid advance and charge,
which was the plan of earlier actions in this war. The view that the
bullet should do its work before the appeal to the bayonet is made had
at length asserted itself. Moreover, the need for method in attack had
been recognised; first reconnaissance, then shelling; during the
shelling the deployment of the infantry in extended and flexible order,
then the musketry duel supported by the artillery; and then, as the
infantry fire proves stronger than the enemy's, an advance from point to
point in order to bring it to closer and more deadly range; last of all,
if and where it may be needed, the charge. These sound tactics--the
only tactics appropriate to modern firearms--cannot be hurried, for to
charge men armed with the magazine rifle and not yet shaken is to
sacrifice your troops to their own bravery.
Warren's attack then was rightly deliberate. On Friday, the 19th, he was
reconnoitring and feeling for the enemy. On Saturday the shooting match
began. It was continued throughout Sunday, and was not over on Tuesday.
During these days the British were making way, gradually and not without
loss, but steadily. There were, no doubt, pauses for renewing order, for
reinforcing, and for securing the ground won. On Tuesday evening Spion
Kop was still held by the Boers, who seem even then not to have been
driven off the plateau, but to have been clinging to its eastern edge.
On Tuesday night Spion Kop was taken. It was assaulted, probably in the
dark, by surprise, and the Boers driven off. Even on Wednesday the Boers
were tenaciously resisting the advance, making heavy attacks on Spion
Kop and using their artillery with effect. At midnight between
Wednesday and Thursday Sir Redvers Duller telegraphed home Sir Charles
Warren's opinion that the enemy's position had been rendered untenable,
and added his own judgment of the behaviour of the British troops in the
words, "the men are splendid."
All through the week Lyttelton's brigade has been facing a force of the
enemy on the eastern limb of the plateau in front of Potgieter's Drift.
He has not pressed an attack but has kept his infantry back, not pushing
them forward to close range, but contenting himself with shelling the
Boer positions.