THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
The Attack of the Fifteenth and Thirteenth Corps,
July 1, 1916
The advance of the Twenty-first Division--64th Brigade--First
permanent gains--50th Brigade at Fricourt--Advance of Seventh
Division--Capture of Mametz--Fine work by Eighteenth
Division--Capture of Montauban by the Thirtieth Division--General
view of the battle--Its decisive importance.
Immediately to the south of Pulteney's Third Corps, and extending
from Bécourt in the north to a point opposite Fricourt village, lay
Horne's Fifteenth Corps. The general task of this Corps was to
attack Mametz on the right, contain Fricourt in the centre, and
attack between there and La Boiselle towards Mametz Wood. It
consisted of the Twenty-first, the Seventh, and the Seventeenth
Divisions. Of these, the most northerly was the Twenty-first, that
fine North-country division which had so terrible an ordeal when it
came up in support upon the second day of Loos. Those who held that
in spite of defeat its conduct upon that occasion was soldierly, were
borne out by its achievement on the Somme, where it made a lodgment
in the enemy's line upon the first {77} day, and did good service at
later stages of the battle. Let us now turn our attention to its
advance. It may first be mentioned that the units were the same as
those enumerated in the description of Loos, save that in each
brigade one regular battalion had been substituted. Thus the 1st
Lincolns, 4th Middlesex, and 1st East Yorks took the place of the 8th
East Yorks, 12th West Yorks, and 14th Durhams respectively. The 50th
Brigade of the Seventeenth Division was attached to the Twenty-first
Division for the purpose of the attack, and will be included with it
in this summary of the operations. The rest of the Seventeenth
Division was in reserve.
The attack was on a three-brigade front, the 64th Brigade upon the
north, just south of La Boiselle, and in close touch with the
Thirty-fourth Division. To the right of the 64th was the 63rd
Brigade, and to the right of that the 50th, which advanced straight
upon Fricourt. The 62nd Brigade was in reserve. It will be best to
deal with the attack of the 64th Brigade with some detail, as its
exploits had a very direct bearing upon the issue of the battle.
This brigade advanced upon the signal with the 10th Yorkshire Light
Infantry upon the left in touch with the Royal Scots of the 101st
Brigade. On their right was their 9th namesake battalion. Behind
them in immediate support were the 1st East Yorks (left) and 15th
Durhams (right). The advance was greatly helped by the formation of
a Russian sap between the lines on which the front companies could
assemble. It was found, however, upon the men advancing that the
fire was so severe that they could only get forward by crawling from
hole to hole, with the result that the barrage lifted {78} before
they could reach the front trenches, and the Germans were able to
mount the parapet and slate them with rifle-fire. Colonel Lynch of
the 9th Yorkshire Light Infantry was killed by a shell between
trenches, as were all four captains, but the men stuck to their work
and finally the leading battalions swept over the German lines, which
had been greatly disorganised by the artillery, and they killed or
captured the occupants with no very severe resistance. Two fixed
points lay in front of the brigade, which were part of the definite
objectives of the division. The first was a sunken road 1100 yards
from the British front, the second was a trench 400 yards farther, on
which, by the irony of Fate, a large wayside crucifix looked down, so
that it was called Crucifix Trench. Beyond these on the left front
were several shattered woods, Shelter Wood and Birch-tree Wood, which
gave the enemy good cover, and to the right was a large ruined
building, Fricourt Farm, which raked the advance with its snipers and
machine-guns.
On passing the front German line the successive British waves lost
their formation and clubbed together, so that a long loose line of
Yorkshire and Durham men scrambled onwards into, out of and over the
successive impediments, beating down all resistance as they went.
When the fire became too hot, the men crawled forwards upon their
stomachs or made short sharp rushes from one shell-hole to another,
but the advance was steady and unbroken. The smoke from the shells
was as dense as a Scotch mist. Every now and then through the haze
the flashes of a machine-gun would be spied and possibly the vague
figures of the German gunners as they swept it across in their deadly
traverse, but a rush of {79} furious infantry put each in turn out of
action. The evidence seems to be conclusive that some at least of
these gunners were found to be chained to their guns, which may well
have happened at their own request, as a visible proof that they
would never desert their post. They fired up to the last instant,
and naturally they received no quarter from the stormers. Now and
again the ragged line of men would stumble suddenly upon a section of
proper trench, would spring down into it, clear up the occupants, and
then sit in flushed, hard-breathing groups until a whistle from the
officer and a cheer from their comrades would call them on once more.
In this sector there appears, however, to have been a systematic, if
superficial, examination of the dug-outs before a trench was passed.
One does not hear of those surprise attacks from the rear which were
so common and so fatal to the north. The examination usually took
the form of a sharp summons at the mouth of the burrow, quickly
followed--if there were no response--by a Mills bomb. Then, as often
as not, there would crawl out of the black orifice eight or ten
terrified and bleeding men, who would join the numerous small convoys
trailing backwards to the rear. These prisoners were nearly all from
the 110th and 111th Reserve Bavarian Regiments, and the alacrity with
which they made for the rear with their hands above their heads,
formed the only comic touch in a tragic day. One made a grab for a
rifle. "He lived about five seconds," says the narrator. "They were
thin, unshaven, and terrified," says an officer, talking of the
particular batch he handled. "Most had dark hair--a very different
type from the Prussians."
Having overrun the German trenches, the infantry {80} were now faced
with a considerable stretch of open which lay between them and the
Sunken Road, leading from Fricourt to Contalmaison. Many were hit
upon this perilous passage. A subsidiary line of German trenches lay
in front of this road, and into this the British tumbled. The
colonel of the 15th Durhams was the senior officer who had got up,
and he took command at this point, rallying the weary men of all four
battalions for a fresh advance. A few of the Royal Scots of the
Thirty-fourth Division were found already in possession, the fringe
of that body who have previously been described as making so
invaluable a stand at Round Wood.
At this point the 64th Brigade was found to be some distance in front
of the main body of the Thirty-fourth Division on the left, and of
their comrades on the right, so that they could get no farther for
the moment without their flanks being badly exposed. In front
through the haze they could dimly see the Crucifix which was their
ultimate objective. The men had to cower low, for the bullets were
coming in a continuous stream from Fricourt Farm on the right and
from the woods on the left. The Sunken Road was ten or twelve feet
deep at the spot, and though it was exposed at the sides, by rapid
digging the men got some cover, though many dropped before they could
make a shelter. Here the survivors of the advance waited for some
hours, spending some of the time in ransacking the enormous
thirty-foot deep dug-outs which the Germans had excavated at certain
points along the side of the road. Into these the wounded were
conveyed, and refreshed by the good things of life, from
Seltzer-water to gold-tipped cigarettes, which were found within.
{81}
In the afternoon the General Officer Commanding had come up as far as
the Sunken Road, and had examined the position for himself. The 63rd
Brigade was now well forward upon the right and the advance could be
resumed. It was pushed swiftly onwards and Crucifix Trench was
occupied, nearly a mile from the British front line. A lieutenant of
the 9th Yorkshires, though wounded by shrapnel, seems to have been
the first to lead a party into this advanced trench, but soon it was
strongly occupied. The pressing need was to consolidate it, for it
was swept by gusts of fire from both flanks. Another lieutenant of
the Yorkshires, also a wounded man, took over the direction, and the
men, with very little cover, worked splendidly to strengthen the
position. Their numbers were so reduced that a counter-attack would
have been most serious, but the splendid support given by the
artillery held the German infantry at a distance. A few of the
British tried to advance upon Shelter Wood, but the machine-guns were
too active and they had to fall back or lie in shell-holes until
after dark, only seventeen out of sixty getting back.
A captain of the 10th Yorkshires took over the advanced command and
sent back to the colonel of the Durhams, who had meantime been
wounded at the Sunken Road, to ask for instructions. The answer was
to hold on and that help was at hand. This help was in the form of
the 62nd Reserve Brigade, the leading battalions of which, the 1st
Lincolns and 10th Yorkshire Regiment, came swinging splendidly across
the open and flung themselves into Crucifix Trench. From that time
the maintenance of the ground was assured. The men of the 64th
Brigade who had done so finely were {82} drawn back into the Sunken
Road, having fully secured their objective. One cannot but marvel
here, as so often elsewhere, at the fine work done by young
subalterns when the senior officers have been disabled. A lieutenant
of the 9th Yorkshire Light Infantry found himself in command of the
whole battalion at the most critical moment of the engagement, and on
leaving could only hand it over to a brother subaltern, who carried
on with equal courage and ability. The brigade was drawn back to the
German first line, where it lay for forty-eight hours, and finally
acted as reserve brigade to the successful advance undertaken by the
62nd Brigade, by which Shelter Wood was captured on July 3.
Such, in some detail, were the adventures of the 64th Brigade, which
may be taken as parallel to those of the 63rd upon the right, who
were faced by much the same obstacles, having the Sunken Road ahead
and the Fricourt houses upon their right. The 8th Somersets were on
the left in touch with the 9th Yorkshire Light Infantry, and
supported by the 8th Lincolns. On the right were the 4th Middlesex
and the 10th York and Lancasters. They were able to get well up to
Fricourt Farm upon the left of the village, but the ground was
unfavourable and they never got as far forward as their comrades on
the left. Of the German resistance on this front, it can be said
that it was worthy of the reputation which the Bavarians have won in
the War. The men were of splendid physique and full of courage.
They fought their machine-guns to the last. All was ready for a
vigorous advance next morning. The artillery of the Twenty-first
Division, which has won a name {83} for exceptional efficiency, was
up nearly level with the infantry at 10 P.M. that night, a road
having been laid in that time from the original gun position to a
point half a mile inside the German front line.
On the immediate right of the 63rd Brigade, in front of Fricourt, was
the 50th Brigade (Glasgow), to which was assigned the task of
attacking the village while the Twenty-first Division got part of it
upon the north. The brigade advanced gallantly, the front line
consisting of two fine Yorkshire battalions, the 10th West Yorks and
the 7th East Yorks, with part of the 7th Yorkshires. The attack
reached and partly occupied the front trenches, but the fire and the
losses were both very heavy, the 10th West Yorkshires being specially
hard hit. The survivors behaved with great gallantry, and some of
them held on all day, though surrounded by enemies. In the afternoon
a second advance was made by Yorkshires and East Yorkshires, with 6th
Dorsets in support, but again the losses were heavy and no solid
foothold could be got in the village. When dusk fell some of the
troops who had held their own all day were able to get back to the
British trenches bringing prisoners with them. A notable example is
that of a lieutenant of the West Yorks, who managed to stagger back
with three wounds upon him and three Germans in front of him. The
51st Brigade was brought up in the evening to continue the assault,
but with the morning of the 2nd it was found that the work had been
done, and that the advance upon both flanks had caused the evacuation
of the village.
The line of trenches takes a very peculiar turn just south of
Fricourt, which is shown in the diagram of the battle, so that the
attack of the Seventh {84} Division, which was the next in the line,
was from almost due south, whilst all the others had been from due
west. The project was that a holding attack to engage the defenders
should be made upon Mametz, whilst the remaining divisions in the
line, the Seventh of the Fifteenth Corps, with the Eighteenth and
Thirtieth of the Thirteenth Corps, should advance upon the line
Mametz-Montauban. Their success would obviously make the position
both of Fricourt and of Mametz impossible, the more so if the
Twenty-first Division could maintain its position at the Sunken Road
to the north of Fricourt. This was the calculation, and it worked to
perfection, so that both these villages fell eventually into our
hands with a minimum loss of life to the assailants. Every honour is
due to the leaders who devised and to the soldiers who carried out
the scheme, but it should at the same time be understood that in the
case of these southern divisions, and also of the French Army of
General Foch upon the right, they were attacking a portion of the
line which was far less organised, and manned by very inferior troops
to those in the north. All this section of attack seems to have been
a complete surprise to the Germans.
The famous Seventh Division was now commanded by one of the three
Brigadiers who had led it during its heroic days at Ypres. Its
units, however, had changed considerably, and the 91st Brigade had
taken the place of the 21st. This Brigade, consisting partly of
Manchester battalions and partly of old units of the Seventh Division
(2nd Queen's Surrey, 1st South Staffords, 21st and 22nd Manchesters),
attacked upon the right, while the 20th Brigade advanced upon the
left, having the 2nd Gordons and 9th {85} Devons in the van, with the
8th Devons and 2nd Borders in support. The front trenches were
overrun without much difficulty. The order of battle was the 22nd
Manchesters upon the right with the 1st South Staffords in close
support. In the centre were the 2nd Gordons and upon their left the
9th Devons. The right got forward with comparatively small losses
and overran the front German line. The Gordons had their left
company held up by uncut wire, but got forward none the less with
considerable losses. The 9th Devons were the most exposed and
suffered very severely, but in spite of a casualty list which
included half the officers and men, they never winced or wavered for
an instant, showing what had been often shown before, that the spirit
of old days still lives in the country of Drake and of Raleigh. The
survivors seized and held Tirpitz Trench. The 2nd Borders had also
seized Danube Support, and the whole front line was in British hands.
The 91st Brigade were now closing in upon the right of Mametz village
and had entered Danzig Alley, from which they were for a time driven
by a brisk counter-attack. The 1st South Staffords had won their way
into the outskirts of Mametz, but the losses were heavy, and half of
the 21st Manchesters came racing up to reinforce. At one o'clock the
Danzig Alley had again been occupied by the Manchesters. Half the
2nd Warwicks were sent up to reinforce the Gordons and the line of
infantry dashed forward upon the village, 600 of the enemy throwing
up their hands in front of them. The 20th Manchesters also advanced,
losing heavily by the fire from Fricourt, but pushing on as far as
the Sunken Road on the extreme left of the advance. There is a
tangle of {86} trenches at this point, the chief of which is the
Rectangle, but with the aid of the 1st Welsh Fusiliers they were all
cleared and the flank of the Division made good, and consolidated,
since it had advanced farther than the troops to the left. In the
morning however, when it was found that Fricourt had been evacuated,
the whole division was able to get forward and by July 3 had occupied
Bottom Wood, while the 2nd Royal Irish had actually penetrated Mametz
Wood, taking 2 guns and 50 prisoners. Some days later, Mametz Wood
had become a different proposition, but the general orders at the
time were that it should not be seriously attacked.
Altogether in these Mametz operations the Seventh Division took 1500
prisoners, seven field-guns, and much booty of different kinds.
We have now recorded in succession the repulse of the Seventh Corps
at Gommecourt, that of the Eighth Corps at Serre and Beaumont Hamel,
and that of the Tenth Corps at Thiepval. The record of heroic
disaster was then alleviated by the partial success of the Third
Corps at La Boiselle, the considerable success of the Fifteenth Corps
at Mametz, and now by the complete success of the Thirteenth Corps at
Montauban. South of this point along the whole French line the
victory was never in doubt. These latter operations do not come
within the direct scope of this narrative, though some short account
must be given of them later, in order to co-ordinate the results of
the two wings of the Allied Armies.
The Thirteenth Corps was commanded by General Congreve, who, it will
be remembered, gained his V.C. in the affair of the guns where young
Roberts met his death at Colenso. It consisted of the {87}
Eighteenth, the Thirtieth, and the Ninth Divisions of the New Army.
Of these the Eighteenth was on the left in touch with the victorious
Seventh, the Thirtieth was on the right in touch with the French, and
the Ninth, the Scottish Division which had done such great work at
Loos, was in reserve.
The Eighteenth Division, which had done no serious fighting before,
established a remarkable record for good service during the whole
course of the Somme battle, into which it was thrust again and again,
never without leaving its mark. It was entirely an English division.
Some complex and successful trench-digging had been done on this part
of the front. Eight covered saps had been driven forward and reached
a point within twenty yards of the German trenches without their
knowledge. Upon the advance being ordered the ends of these were
opened up, machine-guns and flame-throwers were thrust through, and
the saps behind were quickly unroofed and turned into communication
trenches. It was a variant of the device adopted in the Eighth
Division, and was superior to it in that its success did not depend
upon the actual capture of the trench.
The front of the attack was about 2500 yards, and it was carried out
by three brigades abreast, each covering about 700 yards. Each
brigade had two battalions in front, one in support and one in
reserve. Each was also allotted its own particular artillery apart
from the general divisional artillery. There are many good arguments
for such a formation of divisional attack, as compared with the
two-brigades-in-front and one-in-the-rear formation. Upon this
occasion, at any rate, it worked very smoothly. The objectives were
from the immediate {88} western end of Montauban upon the right,
along Montauban Alley to a point east of Mametz where they should
touch the right units of the Seventh Division.
Of the three brigades the 55th was on the right, the 53rd in the
centre, and the 54th on the left. In accordance with the general
scheme of description we will begin with the latter.
The 54th Brigade had the 7th Bedford on the right, the 11th Royal
Fusiliers on the left, the 6th Northants in support, and the 12th
Middlesex in reserve. As they rushed forward they faced a feeble
barrage, but a heavy machine-gun fire. It was found, however, here,
and along the whole divisional front, that the German wire was
utterly destroyed, thanks largely to the work of the trench mortars
which had supplanted field-guns for this particular purpose. The
first trenches were taken without a pause, and parties remained
behind to clear out the dug-outs.
"Cowering in the trench," says one of the stormers, "clad in the pale
grey uniforms we had longed for twelve months to see, unarmed and
minus equipment, with fear written on their faces, were a few of
those valiant warriors of the Kaiser whose prowess we were out to
dispute. Here let me say that the exact moment selected for our
attack had taken the Huns by surprise. This view was subsequently
confirmed by prisoners, who said that they had expected us earlier in
the day and had since stood down." This idea of a surprise only
refers of course to the front trench. Soon the fighting grew very
severe.
The first serious check was in front of a strong {89} point called
the Pommiers Redoubt. The wire here had been invisible from long
grass so that its presence was a surprise. Again and again the
machine-guns swept away the leading files of the attack. The redoubt
could be outflanked, however, and an officer of the Fusiliers brought
his bombers round and eventually to the rear of it. Snipers held him
for a time, but they were rushed by an officer and a few men. The
Germans still held bravely to their point, but Bedfords and Fusiliers
swarmed in upon them until their arms went down and their hands up.
From this strong point bombing parties were sent down the
communication trenches, the infantry following closely and occupying
the new ground.
The brigade was now in some danger from its own success, for it had
outrun the 91st Brigade of the Seventh Division upon its left, and
its own comrades of the 53rd Brigade upon its right. The 6th
Northants held the defensive flank on the left. Later in the day the
53rd came into line upon the right, and before dark the 54th was able
to move on again with little resistance until it had reached its full
objective at Montauban Alley.
The 53rd Brigade was on the right of the 54th. Its assaulting line
was formed by the 8th Norfolk upon the right, and the 6th Berkshires
upon the left, with the 10th Essex in support and the 8th Suffolk in
reserve. The first two lines were taken in their stride with little
loss. A strong point behind these lines held them up for a short
time, but was rushed, and its garrison of the 109th Regiment was
captured. Further progress of the Norfolks was made difficult,
however, by a flanking fire and by a second redoubt in front. As in
the case of the 53rd Brigade {90} it was found that the way round is
often the shorter. Two bombing parties under gallant subalterns
worked up the trenches on the flank, while that murderous weapon, a
Stokes gun, was brought up and opened fire. The combined effect was
decisive and 150 Germans threw down their arms. Sixty more were
taken in another redoubt to the left.
Whilst the Norfolks had been fighting their way forward in this
fashion the Berkshires upon their left, following very closely upon
their own barrage, had attained their objective in twenty minutes,
and had to hold it for some hours until the Norfolks had made good.
During this time their right flank was necessarily exposed. This
flank was defended successfully by means of bombing parties and a
Lewis gun, while the left company instead of resting lent a hand to
their neighbours of the 54th Brigade in carrying Pommiers Redoubt.
Meanwhile the Norfolks had come ahead again, but the advance of the
Berkshires was held up by a small but determined band of bombers and
snipers in a strong position. A Stokes mortar drove back the
bombers, but the snipers still held fast, and killed in succession
Lieutenant Rushton and Lieutenant Saye who gallantly attacked them.
A sergeant-major of the Berkshires was more fortunate, however, and
killed the chief sniper whose automatic rifle had played the part of
a machine-gun. In doing so he was severely wounded himself. The
Essex had come up into the firing line, but progress was still slow
until an invaluable Stokes mortar was again brought to bear and with
its shower of heavy bombs blasted the strong point out of existence.
When night fell the whole line of Montauban Alley had been
successfully {91} won and the various units were in close touch and
were busily organising their position.
Great obstinacy was shown by the Germans in their defence, which was
a gallant one, and might well have been successful against a less
skilful attack. Among other instances of their tenacity was one in
which a sniper in a trench behind the stormers continued to fire from
some subterranean retreat and defied all efforts to get at him, until
it was found necessary to blow in the whole face of the dug-out and
so to bury him within his own stronghold.
The hardest fighting of any fell to the lot of the 55th Brigade upon
the right. The advance was made with the 8th East Surrey and 7th
Queen's Surrey in front, the latter to the left. The 7th Buffs were
in support and the 7th West Kents in reserve. No sooner had the
troops come out from cover than they were met by a staggering fire
which held them up in the Breslau Trench. The supports had soon to
be pushed up to thicken the ranks of the East Surrey--a battalion
which, with the ineradicable sporting instinct and light-heartedness
of the Londoner had dribbled footballs, one for each platoon, across
No Man's Land and shot their goal in the front-line trench. A crater
had been formed by a mine explosion, forming a gap in the German
front, and round this crater a fierce fight raged for some time, the
Germans rushing down a side sap which brought them up to the fray.
Into this side sap sprang an officer and a sergeant of the Buffs, and
killed 12 of the Germans, cutting off their flow of reinforcements,
while half a company of the same battalion cleared up the crater and
captured a machine-gun which had fought to the last cartridge. It is
worth recording {92} that in the case of one of these machine-guns
the gunner was actually found with a four-foot chain attaching him to
the tripod. Being badly wounded and unable to disengage himself, the
wretched man had dragged himself, his wound, and his tripod for some
distance before being captured by the British. The fact was duly
established by a sworn inquiry.
The brigade was winning its way forward, but the hard resistance of
the Germans had delayed it to such a point that there was a danger
that it would not be in its place so as to cover the left flank of
the 90th Brigade, who were due to attack Montauban at 10 A.M. Such a
failure might make the difference between victory and defeat. At
this critical moment the officer commanding the East Surreys dashed
to the front, re-formed his own men with all whom he could collect
and led them onwards. Captain Neville was killed in gallantly
leading the rush, but the wave went forward. There was check after
check, but the point had to be won, and the Suffolks of the 53rd
Brigade were brought round to strengthen the attack, while the West
Kents were pushed forward to the fighting line. By mid-day two
platoons of West Kents were into Montauban Alley, and had seized two
houses at the western end of Montauban, which were rapidly fortified
by a section of the 92nd Field Company. The flank of the 90th was
assured. A South African officer led the first group of Surrey men
who seized Montauban. He is said during the action to have slain
seventeen of the enemy.
The rest of the brigade, however, had desperate work to get into line
with the village. The East Surreys and Buffs were coming along well,
but the {93} Queen's Surreys had lost heavily and were held up by a
strong point called Back Trench. A major of the Queen's gathered his
men together, called up a bombing party from the 8th Sussex, the
pioneer battalion of the brigade, and then by a united front and
flank attack carried the position. One hundred and seventy Germans
remained alive in the trench. The infantry then surged forward to
the line of the Mametz-Montauban Road, where they lay under
machine-gun fire with their left in the air, for a considerable gap
had developed between them and the 53rd Brigade. The main line of
Montauban Alley in front of them was still strongly held by the
enemy. Once again the Stokes guns saved what looked like a dangerous
situation. They blasted a hole in Montauban Alley, and through the
hole rushed a furious storming party of the Queen's. As evening
fell, after that long day of fighting, the weary Eighteenth Division,
splendid soldiers, splendidly led, held the whole line from Montauban
to the junction with the Seventh Division near Mametz. One does not
know which to admire most--the able dispositions, the inflexible
resolution of the troops, or the elastic adaptability which enabled
the initiative of the officers upon the spot to use ever-varying
means for getting over the successive difficulties. The losses were
very heavy, amounting to about 3000 officers and men, something under
1000 being fatal. Of the Germans 700 were captured, 1200 were buried
after the action, and the total loss could not possibly have been
less than those incurred by the British. It should be added that a
great deal of the success of the attack was due to the 82nd, 83rd,
84th, and 85th Brigades, Royal Field Artillery, forming the
divisional artillery, who earned the deepest {94} gratitude of the
infantry, the highest reward to which the gunner can attain. Some of
the artillery of the Ninth Division was also engaged.
A few words may be said of the immediate future of the Eighteenth
Division before the narrative of July 1 is completed by a
consideration of the work of the Thirtieth Division. The ground
captured included part of what may be called the Montauban Ridge, and
the possession of this point proved to be of great service for
observation in connection with the immediate operations at Bottom,
Shelter, and Mametz Woods by the Fifteenth Corps. The guns were at
once advanced and patrols were thrown out in front which penetrated
and eventually occupied Caterpillar Wood, a long winding plantation
on the immediate front of the Division. These various patrols picked
up no less than twelve German field-guns abandoned by the enemy. The
front was held until July 8, when the Eighteenth was relieved by the
Third Division.
As to the fighting of the Germans upon this front, it was excellent
as usual--but it is needful to accentuate it, as there is a tendency
to depreciate the enemy at a point where he is beaten, which is an
injustice to the victors. The latter had no doubts about the matter.
"There is one thing we have all learned and that is that the Hun is a
jolly good soldier and engineer, so don't listen to any other
nonsense. If you get hand-to-hand with him he gives in at once, but
he practically never lets you get so close. As long as Fritz has a
trench and a gun he will stick there till he is made crows' rations.
We know we are just slightly better than he is, but there's nothing
much in it--nothing to justify contempt or {95} liberties." Such was
the considered opinion of an experienced soldier.
If the advance of the Eighteenth Division was successful, that of the
Thirtieth upon its right was not less so. This division had been
raised originally from Liverpool and Manchester, the battalions being
all of the King's Liverpool or of the Manchester Regiments. The
greater part of these battalions, which owe their origin largely to
that great patriot, Lord Derby, were recruited on the "pal" system,
by which friends in peace should be comrades in war. So close was
Lord Derby's connection with the division that his brother commanded
one brigade, and three of his family served with the guns, one of
them commanding an artillery unit. This was the first appearance of
this fine force in actual battle, and it can truly be said that no
division could have been more fortunate or have given a better
account of itself. It may be explained that it had exchanged its
91st Brigade for the 21st of the Seventh Division, and that several
of the veteran battalions of the old Seventh now served with the
Thirtieth.
The objective of this division was the important village of Montauban
deep within the enemy's line. It seemed an ambitious mark in a war
where every yard means an effort, but it was accomplished with
surprising ease, for the advance was as determined as the defence was
slack. On the right opposite Maricourt the attack fell to the 89th
Brigade, consisting of the 2nd Bedfords and the 17th, 19th, and 20th
King's Liverpool battalions. On their left was the 21st Brigade,
while the 90th Brigade was in immediate support with orders to go
through and seize the village {96} itself. From the start the attack
went like clockwork. The artillery was admirable, the infantry
inexorable, and the leading all that could be desired. The
ever-ready machine-guns put up a fierce defence, especially on the
left flank, where the 18th King's Liverpools, led by their popular
colonel, lost three-quarters of their effectives but carried their
objective none the less. The 2nd West Yorks behind them were also
terribly scourged, but gained the line of the Glatz Redoubt all the
same. Here, as with the Eighteenth Division, there was every sign
that the garrison of the front trenches had been surprised. "The
Germans gave us plenty of machine-gun fire while we were advancing
upon them; when we reached the trench only a few showed fight. The
rest flung up their arms and cried: 'Mercy, Kamerad!'" It was clear
they had been taken by surprise, for many of them were barefooted,
none of them had any equipment. When there was no attack at 4 A.M.
they were then told that they could lie down and have a rest, "as the
British would not now come out till four in the afternoon." It is
abundantly clear that the famous German intelligence department was
absolutely at fault in the southern sector of the great battle.
Although the first three trenches were carried without a hitch, the
garrison of the fourth had time to stand to arms, and were greatly
assisted in their defence by a flank fire from the still untaken
village of Mametz, and from machine-guns in the southern corner of
Mametz Wood which lies to the north of Montauban. The resistance
caused considerable losses, including that of Colonel Johnson of the
17th Manchesters, but the advance was irresistible, and {97} swept
over every obstacle until they had reached their objective. On the
right, the Liverpool brigade, the 17th and 18th King's Liverpools in
the lead, fought their way up to the brick-fields, which lie nearly
level with Montauban, but to the south of it. A company seized these
and a good bunch of prisoners. There it consolidated in close touch
with the famous "iron corps" of the French army upon their right,
while on the left the blue and yellow advance-flags of the Thirtieth
formed a continuous line with the red and yellow of the Eighteenth
Division. On the left of the Liverpools the Manchesters with the
Scots Fusiliers of the 90th Brigade had stormed their way into
Montauban, the first of that long list of village fortresses which
were destined in the succeeding months to fall into the hands of the
British. It was carried with a rush in spite of the determined
resistance of small groups of Germans in various houses, which had
already been greatly mauled by our artillery. The British fought
their way from room to room, drove their enemies down into the
cellars, and hurled bombs on to them from above. The German losses
were heavy, and several hundreds of prisoners were sent to the rear.
By the early afternoon the whole village was in the hands of the 90th
Brigade, who had also occupied Montauban Alley, the trench 200 yards
upon the farther side of it, whence by their rifle-fire they crushed
several attempts at counter-attack. These were feeble during the
day, but a very heavy one came during the night, aided by a powerful
shrapnel fire. The Germans, advancing in the closest order, for a
time won a lodgment in the new British front trench, killing a party
of the 17th Manchesters, but {98} they were unable to hold it, and
with daylight they were ejected once more. The reader who is weary
of hearing of British losses will be interested to know, on the
authority of Colonel Bedell of the 16th Bavarians, that out of a
garrison of 3500 men from the 6th Bavarian Reserve Regiments only 500
escaped from the Montauban front. All these operations were carried
out in close touch with the French upon the right, so close indeed
that the colonel of the 17th King's Liverpools, seeing that the
French colonel of the flank battalion was advancing beside his men,
sprang out and joined him, so that the two colonels shook hands in
the captured position.
Some stress has in this narrative been laid upon the fact that the
difficulties to be overcome in the south were less than those in the
north. Such an assertion is only fair to the gallant men who failed.
At the same time nothing should detract from the credit due to those
splendid southerly divisions who really won the battle and made the
hole through which the whole army eventually passed.
Though the French operations do not primarily come within the scope
of this record, it is necessary to give some superficial account of
them, since they form an integral and essential part of the battle.
So important were they, and so successful, that it is not too much to
say that it was the complete victory upon their line which atoned for
our own want of success in the north, and assured that the balance of
this most bloody day should be in our favour. It is true, as they
would be the first to admit, that the troops of General Foch had none
of those impassable barrages, concentrations of machine-guns, and
desperately defended inner lines of trenches which {99} inflicted
such losses upon our stormers. Both the positions and the men who
held them were less formidable. On the other hand, it is for us to
bear in mind that the French had already made their great effort in
the common cause at Verdun, and that this attack upon the West was
primarily a British offensive in which they were playing a subsidiary
part. It is the more remarkable that their success should have been
so great and that they should have been able for months to come to
play so notable a part in the battle that the tale of their prisoners
and booty was not less than our own.
The attack of the British was roughly upon a twenty-mile front, from
the Gommecourt salient to Maricourt. On this stretch they broke the
German lines for 7 miles from the north of Fricourt to Montauban.
The French front was about 8 miles long, and moved forward for its
whole extent. Thus it may be said that the whole battle line was 28
miles, and that more than one-half, or 15 miles, represented the area
of victory. During the whole operations for many months the French
army was cut in two by the marshy valley of the Somme, the detachment
to the north of it acting in close unison with the British Thirteenth
Corps upon their left. We will call these the northern and the
southern French armies, both being under the direction of General
Foch.
It may briefly be stated that the advance of the French army was
carried out with great dash and valour on both banks of the river.
After carrying several lines of trenches at very little loss to
themselves, the northern army found itself, on the evening of July 1,
holding the outskirts of the villages of {100} Curlu and of
Hardecourt. On July 2 Curlu was entirely occupied, and shortly
afterwards Hardecourt also fell. The southern army, which consisted
of the fiery Colonial Division upon the left and the Twentieth upon
the right, under the immediate leadership of General Fayolle, had
even greater success. Not only all the lines of trenches but the
villages of Dompierre, Becquincourt, Bussu, and Fay were stormed upon
July 1. On the 2nd Frise and the Moreaucourt Wood had also been
taken, and several counter-attacks repelled. On that evening the
French were able to report that they had taken 6000 prisoners, while
the British operations had yielded 3500--or 9500 in all.
When the sun set upon that bloody day--probably the most stirring of
any single day in the whole record of the world--the higher command
of the Allies must have looked upon the result with a strange mixture
of feelings, in which dismay at the losses in the north and pride at
the successes in the south contended for the mastery. The united
losses of all the combatants, British, French, and Germans, must have
been well over 100,000 between the rising and the setting of one
summer sun. It is a rout which usually swells the casualties of a
stricken army, but here there was no question of such a thing, and
these huge losses were incurred in actual battle. As the attackers
our own casualties were undoubtedly heavier than those of the enemy,
and it is natural that as we turn from that list we ask ourselves the
question whether our gains were worth it. Such a question might be
an open one at Neuve Chapelle or at Loos, but here the answer must be
a thousand times Yes. Together we had done the greatest day's {101}
work in the War up to that time--a day's work which led to many
developments in the future, and eventually to a general German
retreat over 70 miles of front. It was not a line of trenches which
we broke, it was in truth the fortified frontier of Germany built up
by a year and a half of unremitting labour. By breaking it at one
point we had outflanked it from the Somme to the sea, and however
slow the process might be of getting room for our forces to deploy,
and pushing the Germans off our flank, it was certain that sooner or
later that line must be rolled up from end to end. It was hoped,
too, that under our gunfire no other frontier of similar strength
could grow up in front of us. That was the great new departure which
may be dated from July 1, and is an ample recompense for our losses.
These young lives were gladly laid down as a price for final
victory--and history may show that it was really on those Picardy
slopes that final victory was in truth ensured. Even as the day of
Gettysburg was the turning-point of the American Civil War, and as
that of Paardeberg was the real death-blow to the Boers, so the
breaking of the line between Fricourt and Frise may well prove to
have been the decisive victory in the terrible conflict which the
swollen dreams of Prussia had brought upon the world.
When one considers the enormous scale of the action, the desperate
valour of the troops engaged, and the fact that the German line was
fairly and permanently broken for the first time, one feels that this
date should be for ever marked in British military annals as the
glorious First of July.
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