CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME

Attack of the Tenth and Third Corps, July 1, 1916

Magnificent conduct of the Ulster Division--Local success but general

failure--Advance of Thirty-second Division--Advance of Eighth

Division--Advance of Thirty-fourth Division--The turning-point of the

line.

Morland's Tenth Corps consisted of the Thirty-sixth, Forty-ninth, and

Thirty-second Divisions. It lay between Hunter-Weston's Eighth Corps

upon the left and Pulteney's Third Corps upon the right. It covered

a front from a mile north of Hamel to a mile north of Ovillers. At

its northern end it was cut by the river Ancre, a sluggish canalised

stream, running between two artificial dykes which the Germans

periodically cut by their artillery fire and the British mended as

best they might. This sector of attack, together with the one

farther south which faced the Third Corps, presented peculiar

difficulties to the assailants, as the ground sloped upward to the

strong village of Thiepval with the ridge behind it, from which

German guns could sweep the whole long glacis of approach. Nowhere

were there more gallant efforts for a decision and nowhere were they

more hopeless.

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The division to the north of the Tenth Corps was the Thirty-sixth

Ulster Division. This division was composed of magnificent material,

for the blend of Scot and Celt to be found in the North of Ireland

produces a soldier who combines the fire of the one with the solidity

of the other. These qualities have been brought to a finer temper by

the atmosphere of opposition in which they have lived, and the

difficult economical circumstances which they have overcome in so

remarkable a way. Long ago in unhappy civil strife they had shown

their martial qualities, and now upon a nobler and wider stage they

were destined to confirm them. It might well seem invidious to give

the palm to any one of the bands of heroes who shed their blood like

water on the slopes of Picardy, but at least, all soldiers would

agree that among them all there was not one which could at its

highest claim more than equality of achievement that day with the men

of Ulster.

The objective of this division was the German position from

Beaucourt-sur-Ancre on the north to the northern edge of Thiepval.

When the signal was given the two leading brigades, the 108th and the

107th, came away at a deliberate pace which quickened into the rush

of a released torrent, and went roaring over the German trenches.

"They were like bloodhounds off the leash." Like every one else they

were horribly scourged by shrapnel and machine-fire as they rushed

across, but whether it was that some curve in the ground favoured

part of their line, or whatever the cause, they suffered less than

the other divisions, and struck on to the German front line with

their full shattering momentum, going through it as though it were

paper. The 108th {60} Brigade, consisting of the 9th Irish Fusiliers

and the 11th, 12th, and 13th Irish Rifles, was on the left. Two of

these, the Fusiliers and one of the Irish Rifle battalions, were on

the north side of the Ancre, and were acting rather with the

Twenty-ninth Division upon their left than with their own comrades on

the right. This detachment fought all day side by side with the

regulars, made their way at one time right up to Beaucourt Station,

and had finally to retire to their own trenches together with the

rest of the line north of the Ancre. Next morning the survivors

crossed the Ancre, and from then onwards the Eighth Corps extended so

as to take over this ground.

South of the Ancre the two remaining battalions of the 108th Brigade,

and the whole of the 107th Brigade, consisting of the 8th, 9th, 10th,

and 15th Irish Rifles, advanced upon a front of 3000 yards. The men

had lost very heavily in the assembly trenches, and two companies of

the 10th Irish Rifles had dwindled to two platoons before ever they

got clear of the shattered wood in which they gathered. None the

less, the fire and fury of their onset was terrific and sustained.

"The place was covered with smoke and the explosion of heavy shells,"

says one who saw the scene from a front observation post. "I felt

that no attack was possible, when suddenly out of the clouds I saw

men advancing as if on parade, quite slowly. It seemed impossible,

and yet they went on, stormed at on the left by high explosive and

shrapnel, and on the right by enfilade machine-gun fire. Suddenly

they charged, and when I could next see through the clouds on the

slope (less than a mile away) I saw that they had taken the front

trench, and in another minute the trench behind was taken, {61} as

our fellows shouting, 'No surrender!' got through--God knows how! As

they advanced the fire of the guns became more and more enfilade, but

nothing could stop their steady progress."

The long line of Irish Riflemen had rolled over every obstacle, and

although their dead and wounded lay thick behind them they still

stormed forwards with the same fury with which they started.

Bunching up into platoons in artillery formation they pushed on and

carried the third line. Ahead of them, across a considerable

interval, was a fourth line, with a large redoubt upon the flank.

They steadied themselves for a few minutes, and then dashing onwards

once again they captured both the fourth line and the redoubt. So

far forward were they now that they had reached regions north of

Thiepval which were never trodden by a British foot again until three

months of constant fighting had cleared a way to them. It was the

great Schwaben Redoubt which was now before them. The reserve

brigade, the 109th, consisting of the 9th, 10th, and 11th

Inniskilling Fusiliers, with the 14th Irish Rifles, had dashed

forward at 10.40, leaving only the pioneer battalion, the 16th Irish

Rifles, to guard the trenches. With the additional weight of the

survivors of this reinforcing line the fringe of stormers, for they

were now a fringe and nothing more, again rushed forward and threw

themselves into the Schwaben trenches. This was their limit, and for

most of them their grave. They had no further supports, no

ammunition could reach them, and they were embedded in the depths of

the German line at a point far deeper than any unit upon the left of

the line had attained. The village of Thiepval commanded them from

their right rear. {62} Some remained in little groups, huddling in

some coign of vantage, and fighting to the last cartridge, absolutely

refusing to take one step to the rear. To the Germans they were as

dangerous as so many cornered wolves. Others fell back in orderly

fashion, but not an inch farther than was needful, for they held on

all day to the frontage taken by them. The first two lines were kept

in their fierce grip till nightfall of the next day, when they handed

them over to the relieving division.

In this splendid deed of arms the Thirty-sixth Division left half its

number upon the battlefield. The instances of gallantry were

innumerable, and so equally distributed that their General, when

asked to name a special battalion, could only answer that the whole

twelve had done equally well. Had the divisions to right and left

been able to get as far, the whole gain would have been permanent.

As it was, 540 prisoners were brought in, and few were lost save the

wounded, chief of whom was Colonel Craig, who directed the movements

of his men long after he was unable to direct his own. Colonel

Bernard of the 10th Rifles, Captain Davidson, who worked his

machine-gun after his leg was shattered, Captain Gaffikin, who died

while leading his company with an orange handkerchief waving in his

hand, are but a few of the outstanding names. The pressure upon the

different brigades is indicated by the losses in officers of the

107th, the 108th, and the 109th.

A very detailed account would be necessary to bring home to the

reader the full gallantry of this deed of arms. Experienced soldiers

who saw it were moved to the limit of human speech. "I wish I had

{63} been born an Ulsterman," cried one of them. "But I am proud to

have been associated with these wonderful men." To have penetrated

all alone for two miles into the German line, and to withdraw from

such a salient in military order, holding fast to all that could be

retained, was indeed a great feat for any troops to have performed.

The requiem for their fallen was best expressed by one of the

survivors, who wrote that "they died for the cause of Liberty,

Honour, and Freedom, for the Old Flag, the emblem of Britain, died

for Ireland, died for Ulster!"

The Thirty-second Division was on the immediate right of the men of

Ulster. Their advance was carried out with the 96th Brigade on the

left, the 97th upon the right, and the 14th in support. The reader

may be warned that from this time onwards he will often find, as in

this case, that old brigades have been added to new formations, so

that the former simplicity of numbering is often disturbed. The

storming lines went forward in each case with two battalions abreast

in front and two in succession in support. The front line of attack

taken from the north, or left, consisted of the 15th Lancashire

Fusiliers, 16th Northumberland Fusiliers, and the 16th and 17th

Highland Light Infantry. Of these four battalions the 16th

Northumberland Fusiliers came under very heavy fire, and were unable

to press their attack home. On the right the Highlanders had crawled

up to within a hundred yards of the Leipzig salient and were into it

with a rush the moment that the barrage lifted. The 15th Lancashire

Fusiliers upon the left made a particularly brilliant advance. The

right company was held up in front of Thiepval village, but the left

company swept on with the Thirty-sixth Division, {64} keeping pace

with their magnificent advance. It appears to have reached the east

end of Thiepval, but there it was buried deeply in the enemy's

position and was never heard of again. The supporting battalions of

the 96th Brigade, the 16th Lancashire Fusiliers and the 2nd

Inniskilling Fusiliers, tried hard to regain touch with their lost

comrades, but in vain. These various gallant bodies who, at

different points of our line, pushed forward into impossible

positions, were no doubt for the greater part killed or wounded, but

from among them came the 850 prisoners whom the Germans claimed to

have taken on the northern part of the line on that day. The left of

the divisional line was so weakened by these losses that they were

compelled to withdraw to their own front trenches.

On the right, however, the Highlanders were able to hold on to a part

of the Leipzig salient. The losses, however, upon this flank had

been very heavy, not only in the front wave, but among the 1st

Dorsets and the 11th Borders as they came out from a wood in support.

Coming under a concentrated fire of machine-guns, these two

battalions suffered heavily. Colonel Machell, gallantly leading his

Borders, was shot dead, his adjutant, Lieutenant Gordon, was badly

wounded as he stooped over his body, Major Diggle was wounded, and

the greater number of the officers were on the ground. Colonel

Machell, it may be remarked, was a high civil official of the

Egyptian Government, Under Secretary for the Interior, whose

patriotism had led him to join the New Armies and thus to meet his

death upon the field of battle. The 1st Dorsets lost nearly as

heavily as the men of the Border; their leader, Major Shute, was

disabled, and their ranks thrown into temporary {65} confusion. They

were splendidly rallied, however, by the adjutant, who led them on

and succeeded with the survivors in reaching the Leipzig Redoubt.

Colonel Laidlaw, of the 16th Highland Light Infantry, had also been

wounded, the third commanding officer killed or injured on this wing

of the attack.

There had been no flinching anywhere, and the military virtue shown

had been of the highest possible quality; but the losses from the

machine-guns and from the barrage were so heavy that they deprived

the attack of the weight and momentum necessary to win their way

through the enemy's position. Under the desperate circumstances, it

might well be considered a remarkable result that a stretch of the

Leipzig Redoubt should be won and permanently held by the

Highlanders, especially by the 17th Highland Light Infantry. The

sappers had prepared a Russian sap running up to the enemy line, and

this was invaluable as a communication trench. On the 2nd and 3rd

the enemy endeavoured to turn out the intruders, but the 2nd

Manchesters and 15th Highland Light Infantry not only held their

ground, but enlarged it. On the night of the 3rd the division was

relieved by the Twenty-fifth Division and withdrew to refit after its

tragic but splendid exertions.

Out of the novel conditions of what may be called Bloch warfare

certain rules and axioms are slowly evolving. That it is impossible

without artificial protection to attack over the open against an

unshaken enemy provided with machine-guns is the most certain. But

there is another which might be formulated thus: If there are sharp

salients in the enemy line, either these salients must be taken first

or the attack must be made out of range of them, {66} otherwise their

guns must flank the whole advance. Very many examples might be

quoted where the disregard of this axiom has brought disaster to

either side. A conspicuous case would be that of the Third Corps now

to be described, where the sinister salient of Thiepval protruded to

the north, and a smaller but very efficient one to the south, so that

the whole advance was conducted under the fire of two lines of guns

which raked it from end to end. In addition the opposing infantry

included a division of the Prussian Guard. In the whole long

position there would appear to be no sector where there was less

prospect of success, and yet there was no sector where it was more

essential to hold the enemy fast, since victory might await us to the

immediate south.

The Third Corps, under General Pulteney, occupied the front

immediately to the east of Albert. This large town was almost

exactly in the centre of its rear, and the important road from Albert

to Bapaume bisected the British position. Ovillers to the north,

within the German lines, and Bécourt to the south, in the British,

marked roughly the two ends of the sector. It was a comparatively

narrow stretch, so that only two divisions were in the firing line,

and one in reserve. These were respectively the Eighth Regular

Division to the north, the Thirty-fourth of the New Army to the

south, and the Nineteenth, also of the New Army, in support.

Had the Thirty-second Division succeeded in holding its grip upon

Thiepval upon the north, there might have been some chance of

success, but as it was, the machine-guns from that quarter shaved the

whole of No Man's Land as a mower may shave a lawn, and after the

first rush, which {67} carried the brave fellows of the Eighth

Division over the trenches, it proved to be absolutely impossible to

send them either supports or supplies. The main body of this

magnificent division disappeared into the smoke and haze of the

battle, and their comrades in the trenches waited with aching hearts,

their eyes fixed upon their front where the roar of battle rose from

the other side of the pelting sleet of bullets. All day they waited,

dashing out occasionally and being beaten back with ever-dwindling

numbers. After dusk, they searched the shell-holes and brought in

some 400 wounded. A few bewildered men came staggering in during the

night, half-delirious with fatigue and strain, and unable themselves

to say how they had got back across the enemy's front line from the

depths to which they had penetrated.

This tragic but heroic attack in which the whole force who went

forward fought literally to the death, was carried out in the

following order:

On the right was the 23rd Brigade; in the centre the 25th; and on the

left the 70th. The 23rd and 25th were the old hard-working units of

Neuve Chapelle and many another fray. The 70th was a particularly

fine brigade of the New Army. This division had up to the last

moment been without a pioneer battalion, but the infantry had dug

themselves particularly good assembly and communication trenches,

which helped them much upon the day of battle. They had also, under

the direction of the Commander of Divisional sappers, run two covered

ways up to the enemy's trenches which might have been a vital factor

in the day's work, had it not been that the stormers pushed on,

leaving it to others to {68} secure their gains. The result was that

the advancing infantry passed rather than occupied the front

trenches, the barrage cut off supports, the enemy emerged from their

dug-outs, and the line still remained under their control, forbidding

the use or even the disclosure of the covered ways, since men could

not emerge in single file in an enemy trench.

Following the plan of describing operations always from the north, we

will first picture from such reliable material as is available the

attack of the 70th Brigade, which contained some of the finest

North-country stuff that ever fought the battles of the country.

This brigade was separated on the north by a clear space of about 300

yards from the Highland Light Infantry of the 97th Brigade, who

formed the extreme right of the Thirty-second Division. The 8th York

and Lancaster was the flank battalion, with the 8th Yorkshire Light

Infantry upon its right. The 9th York and Lancaster were behind

their comrades, and the 11th Sherwood Foresters behind the Light

Infantry.

As it is impossible to give with any fulness the story of any one

regiment, and as each may be taken as typical of the others, we may

follow the front flank battalion on its advance. This, the 8th York

and Lancaster, consisted almost entirely of miners, a class of men

who have furnished grand military material to the New Armies. This

unit came chiefly from the Rotherham district. The frontage of the

battalion was 750 yards.

As the hour of attack approached, the enemy's counter-bombardment

became so violent that there was the utmost difficulty in getting the

men into the front-line trenches. Many were killed and even {69}

buried before the advance had begun. When the whistles blew the

stormers went forward in four waves with 50 yards between, the

supporting battalions following instantly. The machine-guns were

sweeping the ground and about 350 yards had to be covered between the

lines. Officers and men went down in heaps under the enfilade fire

from four lines of guns, one behind the other, in the Thiepval

district. The approach was over a billiard-table glacis with no

cover of any kind. The ranks kept formation and trudged steadily

forward, throwing themselves head-long into the front German

trenches. There they steadied themselves for a few minutes, and then

advancing once more sprang down into the second German line which was

strongly held. Colonel Maddison had been shot down early in the

attack. Captain Dawson, the adjutant, had been wounded, but

staggered on with the men until he was killed at the second line of

trenches. "Come on, boys! let's get at 'em and clear 'em out!" were

his last words. On this second line the battalion, together with its

support, beat itself to pieces. A few survivors unable to get back

were taken prisoners, and a German report has stated that they were

very proud and defiant when marched away. At night a number of

wounded were carried in along the whole divisional front from No

Man's Land, but many lives were lost in the gallant work, and many of

the wounded also lost their lives in trying to crawl back, for the

Germans turned their machine-guns during the daytime upon everything

that moved in front of their lines.

To show how uniform was the experience, one may quote the doings of a

battalion of the 23rd Brigade. This brigade was on the right of the

Eighth Division {70} line, and the 2nd Middlesex, the battalion in

question, formed the right battalion joining on with the Tyneside

Scottish of the Thirty-fourth Division to the south. Upon its left

was the 2nd Devons. The supporting troops, two companies of the 2nd

West Yorkshires and the 2nd Scottish Rifles, seem to have been held

back when it was seen how fatal was the advance, and so in part

escaped from the catastrophe. The Middlesex advanced almost opposite

to La Boiselle. There was a slight dip in the ground to the

immediate front which formed a partial protection from the

machine-guns, so that although the losses were very heavy, about 300

men with six Lewis guns made good their footing in the German

front-line trench. Their gallant commander was wounded twice, but

still kept at their head while they swept onwards to the second line.

It was stuffed with Germans, but the handful of British stormers

flung themselves in among them and cleared a standing place in the

trench. The German guns, however, had the exact range, and four out

of the six Lewis guns were blown into the air. Finally, only five

men and a sergeant were left unwounded in this trench. This handful

made its way back. One hundred and thirty of the Middlesex men seem

to have got through or round on to the Pozières Road, but their fate

was never cleared up. Finally, only 30 men of this grand battalion

answered the roll-call that night.

The space between the two attacks described from the point of view of

the two wing battalions of the division was occupied by the 25th

Brigade, whose advance and losses were exactly similar to those which

have been narrated. The 2nd Lincolns and 2nd Berkshires were the

leading battalions, and their {71} devotion in attempting the

impossible was as great as that of their comrades to right and left.

Both regiments suffered heavily, and it is probable that the

Berkshires went deeper than any other. The 1st Irish Rifles had

occupied the trenches for six days in dreadful weather, and had

suffered heavily from the retaliatory bombardment of the Germans.

They were therefore held in reserve, but none the less made repeated

efforts and with great loss to cross the barrage and help their

comrades, for which they afterwards received a special message of

thanks from the Divisional Commander.

Up to this point the writer has been faced by the painful and

monotonous task of one long record of failure from Gommecourt in the

north to La Boiselle in the south. It cannot be doubted that we had

over-estimated the effects of our bombardment, and that the German

guns were intact to a degree which was unexpected. Our one

consolation must be that the German reserves were held in their

position, and that improved prospects were assured for the remainder

of the British line and for the whole of the French line. Had the

front of the battle covered only the region which has been treated up

to now, the episode would have been a tragic one in British military

history. Thousands of men had fallen, nor could it be truthfully

said that anything of permanence had been achieved. Next day the

remains of the Eighth Division were withdrawn, the 70th Brigade was

restored to the Twenty-third Division, to which it rightfully

belonged, and the Twelfth Division came forward to fill the gap in

the line, helped by the gunners and sappers of the Eighth, who

remained at their posts until July 4.

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On the right of the Eighth Division was the Thirty-fourth, a unit

which consisted of one mixed English and Scotch Brigade; while the

other two were raised respectively from the Tyneside Irish and from

the Tyneside Scots, hardy and martial material from the coalpits and

foundries of the North. They attacked upon the front between the

Albert-Bapaume Road on the north and the village of Bécourt on the

south. The idea was to storm La Boiselle village, and to push the

attack home both north and south of it upon Contalmaison, which lay

behind it. Immediately before the assault two great mines were

blown, one of which, containing the unprecedented amount of 60,000

lbs. of gun-cotton, threw hundreds of tons of chalk into the air.

Within a few minutes of the explosion the Thirty-fourth Division were

out of their trenches and advancing in perfect order upon the German

trenches. The 101st Brigade, consisting of the 15th and 16th Royal

Scots, the 10th Lincolns, and 11th Suffolks, were on the right, the

Tyneside Scots upon the left, and the Tyneside Irish in support

behind the right brigade. In the immediate rear lay the Nineteenth

Division with instructions to hold and consolidate the ground gained.

In no part of the line was the advance more gallant, and it marks the

point at which unalloyed failure began first to change to partial

success, ripening into complete victory in the southern section.

Some slight cover seems to have helped the troops for the first few

hundred yards, and it would appear also that though the small-arm

fire was very severe, the actual shell-fire was not so heavy as that

which devastated the divisions in the north. None the less, the

obstacles were sufficient to test to the highest any {73} troops in

the world, and they were gloriously surmounted by men, none of whom

had been in action before. "I, their commander," wrote the

Divisional General, "will never forget their advance through the

German curtain of fire. It was simply wonderful, and they behaved

like veterans." The scream of the war-pipes, playing "The Campbells

are coming," warmed the blood of the soldiers. Upon the left, the

Tyneside Scots penetrated two lines of trenches and found themselves

to the north of the village of La Boiselle, where further progress

was made impossible by a murderous fire from front and flank. Of the

four battalions of the 101st Brigade, the two English units were

nearly opposite the village, and though they advanced with great

resolution, they were unable to get a permanent lodgment. The two

Royal Scots battalions upon the flank got splendidly forward, and

some of them made their way deeper into the German line than any

organised body of troops, save only the Ulster men, had succeeded in

doing, getting even as far as the outskirts of Contalmaison. The

valiant leader of the advanced party of the 15th Royal Scots was

wounded, but continued to encourage his men and to try to consolidate

his desperate position, which was nearly a mile within the German

lines. He was again severely wounded, and Lieutenant Hole was

killed, upon which the only remaining officer fell back to a point

some hundreds of yards westward, called Round Wood or Round Alley.

Here the Scots stuck fast, and nothing could budge them. Germans

were in front of them, were in La Boiselle upon their left rear, and

were behind them in the trenches, which led from the village. By all

the laws of war, the detachment was {74} destroyed; but in practice

the Germans found that they could not achieve it. A small

reinforcement of the 27th Northumberland Fusiliers (from the 103rd of

the Brigade), under an experienced soldier, had joined them, and

their situation was less forlorn because they were in slight touch

with the skirts of the 64th Brigade of the Twenty-first Division, who

had also, as will presently be shown, won a very forward position.

By means of this division communication was restored with the

isolated detachment, and the colonel of the 16th Royal Scots, a very

well-known volunteer officer of Edinburgh, succeeded in reaching his

men. His advent gave them fresh spirit, and under his leadership

they proceeded next morning not only to hold the position, but to

enlarge it considerably, sending bombers down every sap and

endeavouring to give the impression of great numbers. Two companies

of the East Lancashire Regiment from the Nineteenth Division made

their way forward, and joined with effect in these attacks. This

small body of men held their own until the afternoon of July 3, when

the advance of the Nineteenth Division upon La Boiselle enabled them

to be relieved. It was time, for the water was exhausted and

munitions were running low. It was a glad moment when, with their

numerous German captives, they joined up with their cheering

comrades. It should be said that in this fine feat of arms a small

party of the 11th Suffolks played a valiant part. General Pulteney

issued a special order thanking these troops for their stout defence,

and the matter was in truth of wider importance than any local issue,

for it had the effect of screening the left flank of the Twenty-first

Division, enabling them to make {75} good their hold upon Crucifix

Trench and the Sunken Road, as will now be told.

Before leaving the Thirty-fourth Division it should be said that

although La Boiselle remained untaken, the Tyneside Scots and Irish

carried a number of trenches and returned with many prisoners. It

has been the universal experience of our soldiers that the Germans,

though excellent with their guns, and very handy with their bombs,

are wanting in that spice of devilry called for in bayonet work--a

quality which their ally the Turk possesses to a marked degree. In

this instance, as in many others, when the Tyneside men swept roaring

into the trenches the Germans either fled or threw up their hands.

The condition of the prisoners was unexpectedly good. "They have new

uniforms, new brown boots, leggings, and are as fat as butter," said

one spectator, which is at great variance with descriptions from

other parts of the line.

We have now completed our survey of that long stretch of line in

which our gallant advance was broken against an equally gallant

resistance. The account has necessarily had to concern itself with

incessant details of units and orders of battle, since these are the

very essence of such an account, and without them it might read, as

contemporary descriptions did read, like some vague combat in the

moon. But, casting such details aside, the reader can now glance up

that long line and see the wreckage of that heroic disaster--the

greatest and also the most glorious that ever befell our arms.

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The British Campaign in France and Flanders, 1916 · 第 3 / 13 章