THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME
From July 2 to July 14, 1916
General situation--Capture of La Boiselle by Nineteenth
Division--Splendid attack by 36th Brigade upon Ovillers--Siege and
reduction of Ovillers--Operations at Contalmaison--Desperate fighting
at the Quadrangle by Seventeenth Division--Capture of Mametz Wood by
Thirty-eighth Welsh Division--Capture of Trones Wood by Eighteenth
Division.
The terrible fighting just described, during which the German line
was broken at its southern end, was but the opening of a most
desperate battle, which extended over many months. This, while it
cost very heavy losses to both sides, exacted such a toll from the
Germans in prisoners and lost material, as well as in casualties,
that it is probable that their army would have been largely
disorganised had not the wet weather of October come to hamper the
operations. As it was, the letters of the soldiers and the
intercepted messages of the Generals show an amount of demoralisation
which proves the mighty pressure applied by the allied armies. It
was a battle which was seldom general throughout the curve into which
the attackers had encroached, but which confined itself to this or
that limited objective--to the north, to the east, {103} or to the
south, the blow falling the more suddenly, since during the whole of
this time the Allies preserved the command of the air to an extent
which actually enabled them to push their guns forward across the
open. Sometimes it was a fortified village which was carried.
Sometimes it was the trenches between villages, so that the garrisons
might feel in danger of being cut off. Sometimes--the worst obstacle
of all--it was one of the patches of wood dotted over the
countryside, which had to be cleared of the enemy's stubborn infantry
and machine-gunners. But whatever the task might be, it may be
stated generally that it was always carried out, if not at the first,
then at the second, third, or some subsequent attempt. It may also
be said that never once during all that time did a yard of ground
which had been taken by the Allies pass permanently back to the
enemy. Before the winter had fallen more than forty villages had
been carried and held by the attack--but not one by the
counter-attack. The losses were heavy, sometimes very heavy, but so
perfect now was the co-ordination between infantry and guns, and so
masterful the allied artillery, that it is highly probable that at
last the defence was losing as many as the attack. Those deep
ravines which had enabled the Germans to escape the effects of the
early bombardments no longer existed in the new lines, and the
superficial ditches which now formed the successive lines of defence
offered little protection from a fire directed by a most efficient
air service. On the other hand, since the German air service had
been beaten out of the sky, the sight of the German gunners was dim,
and became entirely blind when by their successive advances the
Allies had pushed them over the {104} low ridges which formed their
rearward positions. The map, however skilfully used, is a poor
substitute for the observation officer and the aeroplane.
Standing on the edge of this welter, and gazing at this long haze
into which vigorous divisions continually plunge, relieving exhausted
units, only to stagger out in their turn, rent and torn, while yet
others press to the front, one feels appalled at the difficulty of
following such complex operations and of conveying them clearly and
in their due order to the mind of the reader. Some fixed system must
evidently be followed if the narrative is to remain intelligible and
the relation of the various actions to each other to be made evident.
Therefore the course of events will still, so far as possible, be
traced from the north, and each incident be brought to some sort of
natural pause before we pass onwards down the line. We can at once
eliminate the whole northern portion of the British line from the
Gommecourt salient down to Albert, since for that long stretch attack
had changed definitely to defence, and we start our narrative from
the south of the Albert-Bapaume road. From that point four villages
immediately faced the old British line, and each was now a centre of
fighting. From the north they were La Boiselle, Fricourt, Mametz,
and Montauban. The latter had been held against a strong
counter-attack on the early morning of July 2, and it was firmly in
the possession of the Thirtieth Division. Mametz was held by the
Seventh Division, who were pushing on to the north, driving a weak
resistance before them. Fricourt had been deserted by the morning of
July 2, and had been occupied by the Seventeenth Division, who also
at once pushed on towards the woodlands {105} behind. La Boiselle
was closely assailed with part of the Thirty-fourth Division to the
south of it, and the Twelfth and Nineteenth Divisions with other
troops all round it. These four villages and the gaps between them
represented the break in the German front line.
The second German main line ran through the Bazentins and Longueval,
and it was reached and carried by the British Army upon July 14. The
intervening fortnight between the battle of the front and of the
second line was occupied in clearing the many obstacles, consisting
for the most part of woods and subsidiary trenches which filled the
space between the two lines, and also in attacking the two villages
of Ovillers and Contalmaison, which hampered operations upon the left
wing. It will help the reader very much to understand these
apparently complex movements if he will realise that they divide
themselves into three distinct groups of activity, counting from the
north of the line. The first group is concerned with the capture of
Ovillers, and in it the Twelfth, Nineteenth, Thirty-second, and
Twenty-fifth Divisions are concerned. The second group is connected
with the capture of the strong position which is bastioned by
Contalmaison upon one side and Mametz Wood at the other, with the
Quadrangle system of trenches between. In this very severe conflict
the Twenty-third, Seventeenth, Seventh, and Thirty-eighth Divisions
were engaged. Finally there is the group of operations by which the
right wing was advanced through Bernafoy Wood and up to Trones Wood.
In these, the Ninth, Thirtieth, and Eighteenth Divisions were chiefly
concerned. We shall now take each of these in turn, beginning with
the {106} northern one, the taking of Ovillers, and carrying each
narrative to a definite term. Before embarking upon this account it
should be mentioned that the two northern corps of Rawlinson's
army--the Eighth and Tenth--were from now onwards detached as a
separate Fifth Army under Sir Hubert Gough, one of the most rising
commanders in the Service. The functions of this Army were to hold
the line from La Boiselle to Serre, and to form a defensive flank and
pivot for the Third, Fifteenth, and Thirteenth Corps to the south.
We shall first follow the further fortunes of the troops which
operated in the north. Upon July 3 there was a short but severe
action upon that part of the old British line immediately to the left
of the gap which had been broken. In this action, which began at 6
A.M., the Thirty-second Division, already greatly weakened by its
exertions two days before, together with the 75th Brigade, lent them
by the Twenty-fifth Division, tried to widen the rent in the German
line by tearing open that portion of it which had been so fatal to
the Eighth Division. The attack failed, however, though most bravely
delivered, and the difficulties proved once more to be
unsurmountable. The attempt cost us heavy casualties, a considerable
proportion of which fell upon the 75th Brigade, especially upon the
11th Cheshires, whose colonel was killed, and upon the 2nd South
Lancashires, who ran into wire and were held up there. The 8th
Borders reached their objective, but after one-and-a-half hours were
forced to let go of it. The operation proved that whatever
misfortunes had befallen the Germans to the south, they were still
rooted as firmly as ever {107} in their old positions. The same
lesson was to be taught us on the same morning at an adjacent portion
of the line.
This episode was at the immediate south of the unsuccessful attack
just described. It has already been stated that the Twelfth, the
English division which had seen so much hard fighting at Loos, had
taken over part of the trenches of the Eighth Division, and so found
themselves facing Ovillers. Their chances of a successful advance
upon the village were increased by the fact that the Nineteenth
Division, after hard fighting, had got into La Boiselle to the south,
and so occupied a flank to their advance.
Some further definition is required as to the situation at La
Boiselle, how it was brought about, and its extreme importance to the
general plan of operations. When the left of the Thirty-fourth
Division had failed to hold the village, while some mixed units of
the right brigade had established themselves within the German lines
as already narrated, it became very vital to help them by a renewed
attempt upon the village itself. For this purpose the Nineteenth
Division had moved forward, a unit which had not yet been seriously
engaged. It was under the command of a fighting Irish dragoon, whose
whimsical expedient for moving forwards the stragglers at St. Quentin
has been recorded in a previous volume. On the evening of July 1,
one battalion of this division, the 9th Cheshires, had got into the
German front line trench near the village, but they were isolated
there and hard put to it to hold their own during a long and
desperate night. On the following afternoon, about 4 o'clock, two of
their fellow-battalions of the 58th Brigade, the 9th {108} Royal
Welsh Fusiliers and the 6th Wilts, charged suddenly straight across
the open at the village, while by a clever device the British barrage
was turned elsewhere with the effect of misleading the German barrage
which played upon the wrong area. By 9 P.M. on July 2 the south end
of the village had been captured, but the resistance was still very
fierce. Early next morning the whole of the division was drawn into
this street fighting, and gradually the Germans were pushed back.
There was one desperate counter-attack during which the British line
was hard put to it to hold its own, and the house-to-house fighting
continued throughout the whole day and night. Two British colonels,
one of the 7th South Lancashires and the other of the 8th
Gloucesters, particularly distinguished themselves in this close
fighting. The latter, a dragoon like his commander, was a hard
soldier who had left an eye in Somaliland and a hand at Ypres, but
the sight of him in this day of battle, tearing out the safety-pin of
bombs with his teeth and hurling them with his remaining hand, was
one which gave heart to his men. Slowly the Germans were worn down,
but the fighting was fierce and the British losses heavy, including
three commanding officers, Wedgwood of the North Staffords, Royston
Piggott of the 10th Worcesters, and Heath of the 10th Warwicks, the
first two killed, the latter wounded. In the midst of the infantry
fighting a single gun of the 19th Battery galloped with extraordinary
gallantry right into the village and engaged the enemy point-blank
with splendid effect. For this fine performance Captain Campbell and
ten men of the gun's crew received decorations. By the evening of
the 6th the whole {109} village was solidly consolidated by the
Nineteenth Division, they had broken up a strong counter-attack from
the direction of Pozières, and they had extended their conquest so as
to include the redoubt called Heligoland. We must turn, however, to
the attack which had in the meanwhile been prepared upon the line to
the immediate north of La Boiselle by the Twelfth Division.
This attack was carried out at three in the morning of July 7 by the
35th and the 37th Brigades. The fighting line from the right
consisted of the 5th Berks, 7th Suffolks, 6th Queen's Surrey, and 6th
West Kent, with the other battalions in close support. Unhappily,
there was a group of machine-guns in some broken ground to the north
of La Boiselle, which had not yet been reached by the Nineteenth
Division, and the fire of these guns was so deadly that the
battalions who got across were too weak to withstand a counter-attack
of German bombers. They were compelled, after a hard struggle, to
fall back to the British line. One curious benefit arose in an
unexpected way from the operation, for part of the 9th Essex, losing
its way in the dark, stumbled upon the rear of the German defenders
of the northern edge of La Boiselle, by which happy chance they took
200 prisoners, helped the Nineteenth in their task, and participated
in a victory instead of a check.
It was evident that before the assault was renewed some dispositions
should be made to silence the guns which made the passage perilous.
With this in view, another brigade, the 74th from the Twenty-fifth
Division, was allotted to the commander of the Twelfth Division, by
whom it was placed between his {110} own position and that held by
the Nineteenth at La Boiselle. It was arranged that these fresh
troops should attack at eight o'clock in the morning of July 7,
approaching Ovillers from the south, and overrunning the noxious
machine-guns, while at 8.30 the 36th Brigade, hitherto in reserve,
should advance upon Ovillers from the west. By this difference of
half an hour in the attack it was hoped that the 74th would have got
the guns before the 36th had started.
After an hour's bombardment the signal was given and the 74th Brigade
came away with a rush, headed by the 13th Cheshires and 9th North
Lancashires, with the 2nd Irish Rifles and 11th Lancashire Fusiliers
in support. The advance found the Germans both in front and on
either flank of them, but in spite of a withering fire they pushed on
for their mark. Nearly every officer of the 13th Cheshires from
Colonel Finch down to Somerset, the junior subaltern, was hit.
Half-way between La Boiselle and Ovillers the attack was brought to a
halt, and the men found such cover as they could among the
shell-holes. Their supporting lines had come up, but beyond some
bombing parties there was no further advance during the day. Fifty
yards away the untaken machine-gun emplacements lay in front of them,
while Ovillers itself was about 500 yards distant upon their left
front.
In the meantime, after waiting half an hour, the 36th Brigade had
advanced. The machine-guns were, however, still active on either
flank of them, and on their immediate front lay the rubbish-heap
which had once been a village, a mass of ruins now. But amid those
ruins lay the Fusiliers {111} of the Prussian Guard--reputed to be
among the best soldiers in Europe, and every chink was an embrasure
for rifle or machine-gun.
The advance was one which may have been matched in the glorious
annals of the British infantry, but can never have been excelled.
The front line consisted of the 8th and 9th Royal Fusiliers, one upon
each wing, the 7th Sussex in the centre, and the 11th Middlesex in
support--south-country battalions all. They had lain waiting for the
signal in trenches which were beaten to pieces by a terrific German
shelling. There were considerable casualties before the first man
sprang from fire step to parapet. As they crossed No Man's Land
bullets beat upon them from every side. The advance was rendered
more frightful by the heavy weather, which held down the fumes of the
poison shells, so that the craters in which men took refuge were
often found to be traps from which they never again emerged. Many of
the wounded met their death in this terrible fashion. Still the thin
lines went forward, for nothing would stop them save death or the
voice of their company officers. They were up and over the first
German line. A blast of fire staggered them for a moment, and then
with a splendid rally they were into the second trench, and had
seized the line of hedges and walls which skirt the western edge of
the village. Five hundred men were left out of those who had sprung
from the British trench; but the 500 still went forward. The two
Fusilier battalions had hardly the strength of a company between
them, and the leaders were all down--but every man was a leader that
day. Their spirit was invincible. An officer has recorded how a
desperately wounded man {112} called out, "Are the trenches taken,
sir?" On hearing that they were, he fell back and cried, "Thank God!
for nothing else matters." In the centre the Sussex men still
numbered nearly 300, and their colonel aided and directed while they
consolidated the ground. One hundred and fifty were hit as they did
so, but the handful who were left defied every effort of shell, bomb,
or bayonet to put them out. A lodgment had been made, and nothing
now could save the village. By a wise provision, seeing that no
supplies could reach them, every man had been loaded up with twenty
bombs, and had been instructed to use every captured German bomb or
cartridge before any of his own. As dusk fell, two companies of the
supporting Middlesex battalion were sent up, under heavy fire, to
thicken the line, which was further strengthened next day by two
battalions from the 37th Brigade, while the 75th Brigade prolonged it
to the south. In the morning of July 9 the Twelfth Division, sorely
stricken but triumphant, was drawn from the line, leaving the
northern half of the Ovillers front to the Thirty-second Division and
the southern half to the Twenty-fifth, the scattered brigades of
which were now reunited under one general.
That commander had found himself during these operations in a
difficult position, as the 74th Brigade had been moved from him and
allotted to the Twelfth Division, and the Seventy-fifth by the
Thirty-second Division. None the less, he had carried on vigorously
with his remaining Brigade--the 7th, and had enlarged and
strengthened the British position in the Leipzig salient. During
July 5 and 6 the 1st Wilts and the 3rd Worcesters had both broadened
and {113} extended their fronts by means of surprise attacks very
well carried out. On the 7th they pushed forward, as part of the
general scheme of extension upon that day, advancing with such dash
and determination that they got ahead of the German barrage and
secured a valuable trench.
When upon Sunday, July 9, the Thirty-second Division had entirely
taken over from the Twelfth on the west of Ovillers, the 14th Brigade
were in the post of honour on the edge of the village. The 2nd
Manchesters on the left and the 15th Highland Light Infantry on the
right, formed the advanced line with the 1st Dorsets in support,
while the 19th Lancashire Fusiliers were chiefly occupied in the
necessary and dangerous work of carrying forward munitions and
supplies. Meanwhile, the pioneer battalion, the 17th Northumberland
Fusiliers, worked hard to join up the old front trench with the new
trenches round Ovillers. It should be mentioned, as an example of
the spirit animating the British Army, that Colonel Pears of this
battalion had been invalided home for cancer, that he managed to
return to his men for this battle, and that shortly afterwards he
died of the disease.
On July 10 at noon the 14th Brigade advanced upon Ovillers from the
west, carrying on the task which had been so well begun by the 36th
Brigade. The assailants could change their ranks, but this advantage
was denied to the defenders, for a persistent day and night barrage
cut them off from their companions in the north. None the less,
there was no perceptible weakening of the defence, and the Prussian
Guard lived up to their own high traditions. A number of them had
already been captured in the {114} trenches, mature soldiers of
exceptional physique. Their fire was as murderous as ever, and the
2nd Manchesters on the north or left of the line suffered severely.
The 15th Highlanders were more fortunate and made good progress. The
situation had been improved by an advance at 9 P.M. upon this date,
July 10, by the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers from the Sixth Division,
higher up the line, who made a lodgment north-west of Ovillers, which
enabled a Russian sap to be opened up from the British front line.
The Inniskillings lost 150 men out of two companies engaged, but they
created a new and promising line of attack.
The British were now well into the village, both on the south and on
the west, but the fighting was closer and more sanguinary than ever.
Bombardments alternated with attacks, during which the British won
the outlying ruins, and fought on from one stone heap to another, or
down into the cellars below, where the desperate German Guardsmen
fought to the last until overwhelmed with bombs from above, or
stabbed by the bayonets of the furious stormers. The depleted 74th
Brigade of the Twenty-fifth Division had been brought back to its
work upon July 10, and on the 12th the 14th Brigade was relieved by
the 96th of the same Thirty-second Division. On the night of July 12
fresh ground was gained by a surge forward of the 2nd South
Lancashires of the 75th Brigade, and of the 19th Lancashire
Fusiliers, these two battalions pushing the British line almost up to
Ovillers Church. Again, on the night of the 13th the 3rd Worcesters
and 8th Borders made advances, the latter capturing a strong point
which blocked the way to further progress. On {115} the 14th,
however, the 10th Cheshires had a set-back, losing a number of men.
Again, on the night of July 14 the 1st Dorsets cut still further into
the limited area into which the German resistance had been
compressed. On the night of the 15th the Thirty-second Division was
drawn out, after a fortnight of incessant loss, and was replaced by
the Forty-eighth Division of South Midland Territorials, the 143rd
Brigade consisting entirely of Warwick battalions, being placed under
the orders of the General of the Twenty-fifth Division. The village,
a splintered rubbish-heap, with the church raising a stumpy wall, a
few feet high, in the middle of it, was now very closely pressed upon
all sides. The German cellars and dug-outs were still inhabited,
however, and within them the Guardsmen were as dangerous as wolves at
bay. On the night of July 15-16 a final attack was arranged. It was
to be carried through by the 74th, 75th, and 143rd Brigades, and was
timed for 1 A.M. For a moment it threatened disaster, as the 5th
Warwicks got forward into such a position that they were cut off from
supplies, but a strong effort was made by their comrades, who closed
in all day until 6 P.M., when the remains of the garrison
surrendered. Two German officers and 125 men were all who remained
unhurt in this desperate business; and it is on record that one of
the officers expended his last bomb by hurling it at his own men on
seeing that they had surrendered. Eight machine-guns were taken. It
is said that the British soldiers saluted the haggard and grimy
survivors as they were led out among the ruins. It was certainly a
very fine defence. After the capture of the village, the northern
and eastern outskirts were cleared by the men of the {116}
Forty-eighth Territorial Division, which was partly accomplished by a
night attack of the 4th Gloucesters. From now onwards till July 29
this Division was engaged in very arduous work, pushing north and
east, and covering the flank of the Australians in their advance upon
Pozières.
So much for the first group of operations in the intermediate German
position. We shall now pass to the second, which is concerned with
the strong fortified line formed by the Quadrangle system of trenches
between Contalmaison upon our left and Mametz Wood upon our right.
It has been mentioned under the operations of the Twenty-first
Division in the last chapter that the 51st Brigade passed through the
deserted village of Fricourt upon the morning of July 2, taking about
100 prisoners.
On debouching at the eastern end they swung to the right, the 7th
Lincolns attacking Fricourt Wood, and the 8th South Staffords,
Fricourt Farm. The wood proved to be a tangle of smashed trees,
which was hardly penetrable, and a heavy fire stopped the Lincolns.
The colonel, however, surmounted the difficulty by detaching an
officer and a party of men to outflank the wood, which had the effect
of driving out the Germans. The South Staffords were also successful
in storming the farm, but could not for the moment get farther.
Several hundreds of prisoners from the 111th Regiment and three guns
were captured during this advance, but the men were very exhausted at
the end of it, having been three nights without rest. Early next day
(July 3) the advance was resumed, the 51st Brigade still to the fore,
working in co-operation with the 62nd {117} Brigade of the
Twenty-first Division upon their left. By hard fighting, the
Staffords, Lincolns, and Sherwoods pushed their way into Railway
Alley and Railway Copse, while the 7th Borders established themselves
in Bottom Wood. The operations came to a climax when in the
afternoon a battalion of the 186th Prussian Regiment, nearly 600
strong, was caught between the two Brigades in Crucifix Trench and
had to surrender; altogether the 51st Brigade had done a very
strenuous and successful spell of duty. The ground gained was
consolidated by the 77th Field Company, Royal Engineers.
The 62nd Brigade of the Twenty-first Division, supported by the 63rd,
had moved parallel to the 51st Brigade, the 1st Lincolns, 10th
Yorkshires, and two battalions of Northumberland Fusiliers advancing
upon Shelter Wood and carrying it by storm. It was a fine bit of
woodland fighting, and the first intimation to the Germans that their
fortified forests would no more stop British infantry than their
village strongholds could do. The enemy, both here and in front of
the Seventeenth Division, were of very different stuff from the
veterans of Ovillers, and surrendered in groups as soon as their
machine-guns had failed to stop the disciplined rush of their
assailants. After this advance, the Twenty-first Division was drawn
out of line for a rest, and the Seventeenth extending to the left was
in touch with the regular 24th Brigade, forming the right of
Babington's Twenty-third Division, who were closing in upon
Contalmaison. On the right the 17th were in touch with the 22nd
Brigade of the Seventh Division, which was pushing up towards the
dark and sinister clumps {118} of woodland which barred their way.
On the night of July 5 an advance was made, the Seventh Division upon
Mametz Wood, and the Seventeenth upon the of the Quadrangle Trench,
connecting the wood with Contalmaison. The attack upon the wood
itself had no success, though the 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers reached
their objective, but the 52nd Brigade was entirely successful at
Quadrangle Trench, where two battalions--the 9th Northumberland
Fusiliers and 10th Lancashire Fusiliers--crept up within a hundred
yards unobserved and then carried the whole position with a splendid
rush. It was at once consolidated. The Twenty-third Division had
advanced upon the left and were close to Contalmaison. On the night
of July 5 the Seventh Division was drawn out and the Thirty-eighth
Welsh Division took over the line which faced Mametz Wood.
The Seventeenth Division, after its capture of the Quadrangle Trench,
was faced by a second very dangerous and difficult line called the
Quadrangle Support, the relative position of which is shown upon the
diagram on the next page.
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{119}
[Illustration: QUADRANGLE POSITION, July 5-11, 1916.]
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It is clear that if either Mametz Wood or Contalmaison were to fall,
this trench would become untenable for the Germans, but until those
two bastions, or at least one of them, was in our hands, there was
such a smashing fire beating down upon an open advance of 600 yards,
that no harder task could possibly be given to a Division. The
trench was slightly over the brow of a slope, so that when the guns
played upon it the garrison were able to slip quickly away and take
refuge in Mametz Wood, coming back again in time to meet an assault
which they were well aware could only be delivered by {120} troops
which had passed through an ordeal of fire which must shake and
weaken them.
It seemed that the best chance to bring a striking force up to the
trench was to make the attempt at night, so at 2 A.M. of July 7 the
9th Northumberland Fusiliers and 10th Lancashire Fusiliers, the same
battalions which had already taken Quadrangle Trench, advanced
through the darkness of an inclement night upon their objective. The
enemy proved, however, to be in great force, and their trench was
stuffed with men who were themselves contemplating an attack. A
party of Lancashire Fusiliers got into Pearl Alley, which is on the
left near Contalmaison, but the village stands on a slight eminence,
and from it the trench and the approaches can be swept by fire. The
British attack was driven back with loss, and was followed up by the
9th Grenadiers of the Prussian Guard, who were in turn driven back by
the left of the British line, consisting of the 10th Lancashire
Fusiliers and some of the 1st Worcesters. In the morning another
attempt was made upon Quadrangle Support, this time by the 9th West
Ridings and the 12th Manchesters. Small parties got up to Acid Drop
Copse, close to Contalmaison, but they were too weak to hold on. At
the end of this attack the 52nd Brigade, which had been so badly
mauled, was drawn out and the 51st put back in its place.
This severe fighting at the Quadrangle was part of a wider action,
which was to include an attack by the Twenty-third Division upon
Contalmaison and an attack by the Thirty-eighth upon Mametz Wood.
The Contalmaison attack won its way into the north-west side of the
village at 11 o'clock on the morning {121} of July 7, but by 12
o'clock it had been held and eventually repulsed. By 4.30 the 24th
Brigade of the Twenty-third Division, which was on the immediate left
of the Seventeenth Division, had been driven back to its trenches,
the 1st Worcesters, 2nd East Lancashires, and 2nd Northamptons
suffering heavily.
Whilst the Contalmaison attack had failed upon the left, that upon
Mametz Wood had no better success upon the right. It was to have
been carried out by the Thirty-eighth Welsh Division, but in its
approach such opposition was encountered to the wood that the 16th
Welsh (City of Cardiff) and 10th South Wales Borderers could not get
forward. Meanwhile, the 50th Brigade from the Seventeenth Division
had been told off to co-operate with this attack, and naturally found
themselves with their right flank in the air, the 7th East Yorks
suffering severely in consequence. None the less, some advance was
made upon this side.
In the night of July 7 a third attack was made upon Quadrangle
Support, with no better result than the others. On this occasion the
51st Brigade had relieved the 52nd, and it was the 10th Sherwood
Foresters which endured the heavy losses, and persevered until they
were within bomb-throw of their objective, losing Major Hall Brown, a
gallant Ceylon planter, and many officers and men. At the same hour
the 50th Brigade had again tried to gain ground in the direction of
Mametz Wood, but had failed on account of uncut wire. The military
difficulties of the situation during this day were greatly enhanced
by the state of the ground, owing to most unseasonable heavy rain,
which left four feet of mud in some of the trenches. Altogether,
when one considers the want {122} of success at Ovillers, the repulse
at Contalmaison, the three checks in one day at the Quadrangle, and
the delay of the attack on Mametz Wood, the events of July 7 showed
that the task of the British, even inside a broken German line, was
still a very heavy one. General Horne upon the line and Sir Douglas
Haig behind it must both have felt the strain that night.
At six in the morning of July 8 the undefeatable Seventeenth Division
was again hard at work encompassing the downfall of its old opponents
in Quadrangle Support. Since it could not be approached above
ground, it was planned that two brigades, the 51st and the 50th,
should endeavour to bomb their way from each side up those trenches
which were in their hands. It is wonderful that troops which had
already endured so much, and whose nerve might well be shattered and
their hearts broken by successive failures, should still be able to
carry out a form of attack which of all others call for dash and
reckless courage. It was done, none the less, and with some success,
the bombers blasting their way up Pearl Alley on the left to the
point where it joins on to the Quadrangle Support. The bombers of
the 7th Lincolns did particularly well. "Every attempted attack by
the Bosche was met by them with the most extraordinary Berserker
fury. They utterly cowed the enemy." So wrote an experienced
spectator. On the right the 50th Brigade made some progress also up
Quadrangle Alley. Artillery fire, however, put a term to the advance
in both instances, the guns of Contalmaison dominating the whole
position. In the evening a fresh bombing attack was made by the same
{123} troops, whose exertions seem really to have reached the limit
of human capacity. This time the 7th Borders actually reached
Quadrangle Support, but were unable to get farther. The same evening
some of the 50th Brigade bombed down Wood Trench towards Mametz Wood,
so as to facilitate the coming attack by the Thirty-eighth Division.
On July 9 both Brigades again tried to bomb their way into Quadrangle
Support, and were again held up by the enemy's fire. This was the
sixth separate attempt upon the same objective by the same
soldiers--an example surely of the wonderful material of which the
New Armies were composed.
But their labours were not yet done. Though both brigades were worn
to shadows, it was still a point of honour to hold to their work. At
11.20 that night a surprise attack was made across the open under the
cover of night. The 8th South Staffords on the left--charging with a
yell of "Staffords!"--reached the point where Pearl Alley joins the
Quadrangle Support (see Diagram), and held on most desperately. The
50th Brigade on the right were checked and could give no assistance.
The men upon the left strove hard to win their way down Quadrangle
Support, but most of the officers were down, the losses were heavy,
and the most that they could do was to hold on to the junction with
Pearl Alley. The 50th were ready to go forward again to help them,
and the Yorkshire men were already on the move; but day was slowly
breaking and it was doubtful if the trench could be held under the
guns of Contalmaison. The attack upon the right was therefore
stopped, and the left held on as best it might, the South Staffords,
having lost {124} grievously, nearly all their officers, including
the Adjutant, Coleridge, being on the ground.
We may now leave this heroic tragedy of the Quadrangle and turn our
attention to what had been going on at Mametz Wood upon the right,
which was really the key to the situation. It has already been
stated that the wood had been attacked in vain by a brigade of the
Seventh Division, and that the Thirty-eighth Welsh Division had found
some difficulty in even approaching it. It was indeed a formidable
obstacle upon the path of the army. An officer has described how he
used to gaze from afar upon the immense bulk, the vast denseness and
darkness of Mametz Wood, and wonder, knowing the manifold dangers
which lurked beneath its shadows, whether it was indeed within human
power to take it. Such was the first terrible task to which the
Welshmen of the New Army were called. It was done, but one out of
every three men who did it found the grave or the hospital before the
survivors saw the light shine between the further tree-trunks.
As the Welshmen came into the line they had the Seventeenth Division
upon their left, facing Quadrangle Support, and the Eighteenth upon
their right at Caterpillar Wood. When at 4.15 on the morning of July
10 all was ready for the assault, the Third Division had relieved the
Eighteenth on the right, but the Seventeenth was, as we have seen,
still in its position, and was fighting on the western edge of the
wood.
The attack of the Welshmen started from White Trench, which lies
south-east of the wood and meanders along the brow of a sharp ridge.
Since it was dug by the enemy it was of little use to the attack,
{125} for no rifle fire could be brought to bear from it upon the
edge of the wood, while troops coming over the hill and down the
slope were dreadfully exposed. Apart from the German riflemen and
machine-gunners, who lay thick among the shell-blasted stumps of
trees, there was such a tangle of thick undergrowth and fallen trunks
lying at every conceivable angle that it would take a strong and
active man to make his way through the wood with a fowling-piece for
his equipment and a pheasant for his objective. No troops could have
had a more desperate task--the more so as the German second line was
only a few hundred yards from the north end of the wood, whence they
could reinforce it at their pleasure.
The wood is divided by a central ride running north and south. All
to the west of this was allotted to the 113th Brigade, a unit of
Welsh Fusilier battalions commanded by a young brigadier who is more
likely to win honour than decorations, since he started the War with
both the V.C. and the D.S.O. The 114th Brigade, comprising four
battalions of the Welsh Regiment, was to carry the eastern half of
the wood, the attack being from the south. The front line of attack,
counting from the right, consisted of the 13th Welsh (2nd Rhonddas),
14th Welsh (Swansea), with its left on the central ride, and 16th
Royal Welsh Fusiliers in the van of the 113th Brigade. About 4.30 in
the morning the barrage lifted from the shadowy edge of the wood, and
the infantry pushed forward with all the Cymric fire which burns in
that ancient race as fiercely as ever it has done, as every field of
manly sport will show. It was a magnificent spectacle, for wave
after wave of men could be seen advancing without hesitation and
without a break {126} over a distance which in some places was not
less than 500 yards.
The Swansea men in the centre broke into the wood without a check, a
lieutenant of that battalion charging down two machine-guns and
capturing both at the cost of a wound to himself. The 13th on the
right won their way also into the wood, but were held for a time, and
were reinforced by the 15th (Carmarthens). Here for hours along the
whole breadth of the wood the Welsh infantry strove desperately to
crawl or burst through the tangle of tree-trunks in the face of the
deadly and invisible machine-guns. Some of the 15th got forward
through a gap, but found themselves isolated, and had great
difficulty in joining up with their own battle line once more.
Eventually, in the centre and right, the three battalions formed a
line just south of the most southern cross ride from its junction
with the main ride.
On the left, the 16th Welsh Fusiliers had lost heavily before
reaching the trees, their colonel, Carden, falling at the head of his
men. The circumstances of his death should be recorded. His Welsh
Fusiliers, before entering action, sang a hymn in Welsh, upon which
the colonel addressed them, saying, "Boys, make your peace with God!
We are going to take that position, and some of us won't come back.
But we are going to take it." Tying his handkerchief to his stick he
added, "This will show you where I am." He was hit as he waved them
on with his impromptu flag; but he rose, advanced, was hit again, and
fell dead.
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{127}
[Illustration: MAMETZ WOOD]
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Thickened by the support of the 15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the line
rushed on, and occupied the end {128} of the wood until they were
abreast of their comrades on the right. Once among the trees, all
cohesion was lost among the chaos of tangled branches and splintered
trunks, every man getting on as best he might, with officers rallying
and leading forward small groups, who tripped and scrambled onwards
against any knot of Germans whom they could see. On this edge of the
wood some of the Fusiliers bombed their way along Strip Trench, which
outlines the south-western edge, in an endeavour to join hands with
the 50th Brigade on their left. At about 6.30 the south end of the
wood had been cleared, and the Welshmen, flushed with success, were
swarming out at the central ride. A number of prisoners, some hale,
some wounded, had been taken. At 7 o'clock the 113th were in touch
with the 114th on the right, and with the 50th on the left.
Further advance was made difficult by the fact that the fire from the
untaken Wood Support Trench upon the left swept across the ride. The
losses of the two Fusilier battalions had been so heavy that they
were halted while their comrades of the 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers,
under Colonel Flower, who was killed by a shell, attacked Wood
Support--eventually capturing the gun which had wrought such damage,
and about 50 Germans. This small body had succeeded, as so often
before and since, in holding up a Brigade and disorganising an
advance. Until the machine-gun is checkmated by the bullet-proof
advance, the defensive will maintain an overpowering and
disproportionate advantage.
The 10th Welsh had now come up to reinforce the left of the 114th
Brigade, losing their colonel, Rickets, as they advanced into the
wood. The 19th {129} Welsh Pioneer Battalion also came forward to
consolidate what had been won. There was a considerable pause in the
advance, during which two battalions--the 17th Welsh Fusiliers and
the 10th South Wales Borderers from the Reserve Brigade, 115th--came
up to thicken the line. At about four, the attack was renewed, until
at least two-thirds of the wood had been gained. The South Wales
Borderers worked up the eastern side, pushing the defenders into the
open, where they were shot down by British machine-guns in
Caterpillar Wood and Marlborough Wood. About 50 yards from the
northern end the khaki line was at last held up and remained there,
crouching in shell-holes or behind broken trunks. The main
resistance came from a trench outside the wood, and it was eventually
determined to bombard it, for which purpose the troops were withdrawn
some hundreds of yards. Late in the evening there was another
gallant attempt to get the edge of the wood, but the trench was as
venomous as ever, and the main German second line behind it was
sweeping the underwood with bullets, so the advance was halted for
the night.
During the night the 115th Brigade had come to the front, and in the
morning of July 11 had relieved the 113th and 114th Brigades. The
relief in a thick wood, swept by bullets, and upon a dark night in
the close presence of a formidable enemy, was a most difficult
operation. The morning was spent in reconnaissance, and it was only
at 3.15 P.M. that the advance could be made upon the main German
defence, a trench just outside the north end of the wood. About 4
o'clock the Brigade swept on, and after a sharp bayonet fight gained
the trench towards the north-east, but the {130} Germans still held
the centre and swept with their fire the portion in our possession.
The 11th South Wales Borderers (2nd Gwents) held on splendidly, in
spite of their heavy losses. The situation was now such, with only
300 yards to go to reach the German second line, that it was deemed
well to relieve the Thirty-eighth Division by the Twenty-first
Division, who had been selected for the coming battle. This change
was carried out by the morning of July 12.
The action of the Thirty-eighth Division in capturing Mametz Wood had
been a very fine one, and the fruit of their victory was not only an
important advance, but 398 prisoners, one field gun, three heavy
guns, a howitzer and a number of smaller pieces. It was the largest
wood in the Somme district, and the importance attached to it by the
Germans may be gathered from the fact that men of five different
German regiments, the 3rd Lehr, 16th Bavarians, 77th, 83rd, and
122nd, were identified among our opponents. Among many instances of
individual valour should be mentioned that of a colonel of the
Divisional Staff, who twice, revolver in hand, led the troops on
where there was some temporary check or confusion. It is impossible
to imagine anything more difficult and involved than some of this
fighting, for apart from the abattis and other natural impediments of
a tangled wood, the place was a perfect rabbit-warren of trenches,
and had occasional land mines in it, which were exploded--some of
them prematurely, so that it was the retreating Germans who received
the full force of the blast. Burning petrol was also used
continually in the defence, and frequently proved to be a two-edged
weapon. Some of the garrison stood to their work {131} with
extraordinary courage, and nothing but the most devoted valour upon
the part of their assailants could have driven them out. "Every man
of them was killed where he stood," said a Welsh Fusilier, in
describing the resistance of one group. "They refused offers of
quarter right to the last, and died with cheers for the Kaiser or
words of defiance on their lips. They were brave men, and we were
very sorry indeed to have to kill them, for we could not but admire
them for their courage." Such words give honour both to victors and
vanquished. The German losses were undoubtedly very heavy--probably
not less than those of the Welsh Division.
Though the Welsh Division had overrun Mametz Wood from south to
north, there was still one angle in the north-west which had lain out
of their course, and had not been taken by them. This part of the
wood was occupied upon the evening of July 11 by the 62nd Brigade of
the Twenty-first Division, which had already performed such notable
services upon the Somme. Eight field-guns were discovered in this
part of the wood and were captured by the Brigade.
The situation had now greatly improved for the Seventeenth Division
in front of Quadrangle Support, for not only was Mametz Wood mostly
in the hands of the Welsh, but the Twenty-third Division on the left,
who after their temporary check at Contalmaison had fallen back upon
the line Peake Alley-Birch Tree Wood-Shelter Wood, now came forward
again and occupied Bailiff Wood upon the north of Contalmaison.
Under these circumstances, the 50th Brigade upon the right again
attempted to get forward in order to keep level with the Welsh in the
wood. {132} Connection had not yet been made at that point, however,
and the 7th East Yorks, who were the leading battalion, suffered
heavy losses before being compelled to abandon the attempt.
Victory, however, was at last coming to reward the living and
vindicate the dead. At four in the afternoon of July 10, the
Twenty-third Division advanced from Bailiff Wood for its second
assault upon Contalmaison. This time everything went to perfection,
and the much-enduring infantry were able to take possession of the
village, while a counter-attack by the third Reserve Division of the
Prussian Guards came under concentrated artillery fire, and was
completely disorganised and destroyed. It was the wounded of the
Guard from this attack who were seen at Potsdam, and described by Mr.
Curtin, the American journalist, in one of the most brilliant
articles of the War. Carried into furniture vans, they were conveyed
to their hospitals with every secrecy, in order to conceal from the
populace the results of the encounter between the famous Corps and
those men of the New Army who for more than a year had been the
favourite butt of the _Witz-Blätter_ of Berlin. Old Father Time has
a humour of his own, and his laugh is usually the last. Besides the
Guard the 70th Jaeger and the 110th, 114th, and 119th Regiments were
included in this defeat.
The two bastions having fallen, the problem of the Quadrangle Support
became a very different one, and the 51st Brigade, joining up with
the right of the Twenty-third Division in the evening, was able to
get hold of the left end of it. Even now, however, the Germans
fought hard to the right, and both the 7th East Yorks and the 6th
Dorsets had to push strongly {133} before they could win through.
They were encouraged in their efforts when, in the waning light, they
were able to see small bodies of the enemy retiring in the distance
out of the fringe of the wood. By ten o'clock that night the long
task had been accomplished, and the dead might sleep in peace, for
Quadrangle Support was in the hands of the Seventeenth Division.
They were relieved by the Twenty-first Division upon July 11.
At or about the same time as the relief of the Seventeenth Division,
the Twenty-third upon their left were also relieved, their line being
taken over by the First Division. Since the capture of Contalmaison
and the heavy repulse of the German Guard Division the British had
made further progress, so that both Pearl Wood and Contalmaison Villa
to the north of the village were firmly in their hands. The
instructions to the First Division were to endeavour to improve this
advantage, and an advance was at once made which, occurring as it did
upon the night of July 15, may be best described under the heading
which treats of the breaking of the second German line.
Having dealt with the operations upon the left and those in the
centre of the intermediate German position, we will now turn to those
upon the right, which are concerned with the Eighteenth and the
Thirtieth Divisions, supported by the Ninth. After the fall of
Montauban, these Divisions advanced, the one upon Caterpillar Wood,
and the other to Bernafoy Wood, both of which were occupied. For the
occupation of Bernafoy Wood the 27th Brigade of the Ninth Division
had been put at the disposal of the commander of the Thirtieth, and
this {134} force occupied the position without much loss, but were
exposed afterwards to a most deadly shell-fire, which caused heavy
losses to the two front battalions--the 6th King's Own Scottish
Borderers and the 6th Scots Rifles. The wood was held, however,
together with three guns, which were found within it. On July 5 the
Thirtieth Division handed over that line to the Ninth. On that date
they sustained the heavy loss of Colonels Trotter and Smith--both
killed by distant shell-fire.
The rest of the Thirtieth Division only lasted for a very few days,
and upon July 7 they were facing the enemy position from Malzhorn
Farm upon the right to Trones Wood upon the left, and were about to
be initiated in that terrible wood fighting which cost us so dear.
There is no fighting in the world which is more awesome to the mind
and more exhausting to the body than such combats as these amid the
ghostly atmosphere of ruined woods, with Death lurking in the shadows
on every hand, and the thresh of the shells beating without cessation
by night and by day. Trones, Mametz, High Wood, Delville--never has
the quiet, steadfast courage of the British soldier been put to a
more searching test than in those haunts of gloom and horror. In the
case of Trones Wood some account must be given of the peculiar
tactical difficulties of the situation, and then we shall turn to the
sombre but glorious narrative of the successive attacks.
The tactical problem was a remarkable one. The wood was connected up
on the German side by good lines of trenches with Malzhorn Farm on
the south, with Guillemont on the east, and with Waterlot Farm on the
north--each of these points being from 400 {135} to 700 yards away.
It was also commanded by a large number of heavy guns. The result
was that if the British stormers held the wood in strength, they were
shelled out with heavy losses. If, on the other hand, the wood were
lightly held, then the German infantry pouring in from the east and
north could drive them out. The British, on the other hand, had no
trenches leading up to the wood, though in other respects the Germans
found the same difficulties in holding the place that they did. It
was a terrible contest in tenacity between the infantry of the two
nations, and if in the end the British won it must at least be
admitted that there was no evidence of any demoralisation among the
Germans on account of the destruction of their main line. They
fought well, were well led, and were admirably supported by their
guns.
The first attack upon Trones Wood was carried out from the south upon
July 8 by the 21st Brigade. There was no suspicion then of the
strength of the German position, and the attack was repulsed within a
couple of hours, the 2nd Yorks being the chief sufferers.
There was more success upon the right of the line where the French
were attacking Malzhorn Farm. A company of the 2nd Wilts made their
way successfully to help our Allies, and gained a lodgment in the
German trenches which connect Malzhorn Farm with the south end of
Trones Wood. With the aid of some of the 19th Manchesters this
position was extended, and two German counter-attacks were crushed by
rifle-fire. The position in this southern trench was permanently
held, and it acted like a self-registering gauge for the combat in
{136} Trones Wood, for when the British held the wood the whole
Southern Trench was British, while a German success in the wood
always led to a contraction in the holding of the trench.
At one o'clock upon July 8 the 21st Brigade renewed their attempt,
attacking with the 2nd Wiltshires in the lead from the side of
Bernafoy Wood. The advance was a fine one, but Colonel Gillson was
badly wounded, and his successor in command, Captain Mumford, was
killed. About three o'clock the 18th and 19th Manchesters came up in
support. German bombers were driving down from the north, and the
fighting was very severe. In the evening some of the Liverpools came
up to strengthen the line, and it was determined to draw out the
weakened 21st, and replace it by the 90th Brigade. At the same time
a party of the 2nd Scots Fusiliers of this Brigade took over Malzhorn
Trench, and rushed the farmhouse itself, capturing 67 prisoners. The
whole of the trench was afterwards cleared up with two machine-guns
and 100 more prisoners. It was a fine bit of work, worthy of that
splendid battalion.
Upon July 9 at 6.40 A.M. began the third attack upon Trones Wood led
by the 17th Manchesters. They took over the footing already held,
and by eight o'clock they had extended it along the eastern edge,
practically clearing the wood of German infantry. There followed,
however, a terrific bombardment, which caused such losses that the
17th and their comrades of the 18th were ordered to fall back once
more, with the result that the Scots Fusiliers had to give up the
northern end of their Malzhorn Trench. An enemy counter-attack at
4.30 P.M. had no success. A fresh British attack (the fourth) was
{137} at once organised, and carried out by the 16th Manchesters, who
at 6.40 P.M. got into the south end of the wood once more, finding a
scattered fringe of their comrades who had held on there. Some South
African Highlanders from the Ninth Division came up to help them
during the night. This fine battalion lost many men, including their
colonel, Jones, while supporting the attack from Bernafoy Wood. In
the morning the position was better, but a gap had been left between
the Manchesters in the wood and the Scots in the trench, through
which the enemy made their way. After much confused fighting and
very heavy shelling, the evening of July 10 found the wood once more
with the Germans.
In the early morning of July 11 the only remaining British Brigade,
the 89th, took up the running. At 3.50 the 2nd Bedfords advanced to
the attack. Aided by the 19th King's Liverpools, the wood was once
again carried and cleared of the enemy, but once again a terrific
shell-fall weakened the troops to a point where they could not resist
a strong attack. The Bedfords fought magnificently, and had lost 50
per cent of their effectives before being compelled to withdraw their
line. The south-east corner of the wood was carried by the swarming
enemy, but the south-west corner was still in the hands of our
utterly weary and yet tenacious infantry. At 9.30 the same evening
the 17th King's Liverpools pushed the Germans back once more, and
consolidated the ground won at the southern end. So the matter stood
when the exhausted division was withdrawn for a short rest, while the
Eighteenth Division took up their difficult task. The Lancashire men
had left it {138} unfinished, but their conduct had been heroic, and
they had left their successors that one corner of consolidated ground
which was needed as a jumping-off place for a successful attack.
It was the 55th Brigade of the Eighteenth Division which first came
up to take over the fighting line. A great responsibility was placed
upon the general officer commanding, for the general attack upon the
German line had been fixed for July 14, and it was impossible to
proceed with it until the British held securely the covering line
upon the flank. Both Trones Wood and the Malzhorn Trench were
therefore of much more than local importance, so that when Haig found
himself at so late a date as July 12 without command of this
position, it was a very serious matter which might have far-reaching
consequences. The orders now were that within a day, at all costs,
Trones Wood must be in British hands, and to the 55th, strengthened
by two battalions of the 54th Brigade, was given the desperate task.
The situation was rendered more difficult by the urgency of the call,
which gave the leaders no time in which to get acquainted with the
ground.
The German defence had become a strong one. They had formed three
strong points, marked S1, S2, and S3 in the Diagram, p. 141. These,
together with several trenches, dotted here and there, broke up every
attack, and when once order was broken it was almost impossible in
the tangle and obscurity for the troops to preserve any cohesion or
direction. Those troops which penetrated between the strong points
found themselves with the enemy in their rear and were in a
disorganised condition, which was only {139} overcome by the
individual bravery of the men, who refused to be appalled by the
difficult situation in which they found themselves.
The attack of the 55th Brigade was made from the sunken road
immediately south of the wood, and it ran at once into so heavy a
barrage that it lost heavily before it had reached even the edge of
its objective. The 7th West Kents, who formed the attacking force,
were not to be denied, however, and they pushed forward through a
deepening gloom, for it was seven in the evening before the signal
had been given. Whilst the Kents fought up from the south, the
Queen's Surreys attempted to win a lodgment on the north-west where
the Longueval Alley led up from Bernafoy Wood. They also suffered
heavily from the barrage, and only a few brave men reached the top of
the wood and held on there for some hours. The West Kents passed the
line of strong points and then lost touch with each other, until they
had resolved themselves into two or three separate groups holding
together as best they could in the darkness with the enemy all round
them, and with the communications cut behind them. The telephone
wires had all been broken by the barrage, and the anxious commanders
could only know that the attack had failed, that no word came back
from the front, and that a British battalion had been swallowed up by
the wood.
The orders were peremptory, however, that the position should be
taken, and General Maxse, without hesitation, threw a second of his
brigades into the dangerous venture. It was the 54th Brigade which
moved to the attack. It was just past midnight when the soldiers
went forward. The actual assault {140} was carried out from south to
north, on the same line as the advance of the West Rents. The
storming battalions were the 6th Northamptons and 12th Middlesex, the
former to advance direct through the wood and the latter to clean up
behind them and to form a defensive flank on the right.
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{141}
[Illustration: TRONES WOOD Attack of 54th Brigade July 13th, 1916.]
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The attack was a fine feat of arms. Though heavily hit by the
barrage, the Northamptons, closely followed by two companies of the
Middlesex, pushed their way into the wood and onwards. It was pitch
dark, and the men were stumbling continually over the fallen trees
and the numerous dead bodies which lay among the undergrowth. None
the less, they kept touch, and plodded steadily onwards. The gallant
Clark was shot, but another officer led the Northamptons against the
central strong point, for it had been wisely determined to leave no
enemy in the rear. Shortly after dawn on July 14 this point was
carried, and the Northamptons were able to get forward. By 8 o'clock
the wood was full of scattered groups of British infantry, but the
situation was so confused that the colonel went forward and rallied
them into a single line which formed across the wood. This line
advanced until it came level with the strong point S3, which was
captured. A number of the enemy then streamed out of the eastern
side of the wood, making for Guillemont. These men came under
British machine-gun fire and lost heavily. The remaining strong
point at S1 had been taken by a mixed group of Buffs and Middlesex
about 9 A.M. These three strong points having been occupied, the
whole wood was now swept clear and was permanently occupied, though
still subjected to very heavy shell {142} fire by the enemy. Thus,
the right flank of the army was covered, and the important operations
of July 14 were enabled to go forward without danger of molestation.
Of the two gallant battalions who mainly achieved this important
result, the losses of the Northamptons were about 300, and of the
Middlesex about half that amount.
There was an epilogue which was as honourable to the troops concerned
as the main attack had been. This concerns the fate of the men of
West Kent, who, as will be remembered, had been cut off in the wood.
The main body of these, under the regimental adjutant, together with
a few men of the Queen's, formed a small defensive position and held
out in the hope of relief. They were about 200 all told, and their
position seemed so hopeless that every excuse might have been found
for surrender. They held out all night, however, and in the morning
they were successfully relieved by the advance of the 54th Brigade.
It is true that no severe attack was made upon them during the night,
but their undaunted front may have had something to do with their
immunity. Once, in the early dawn, a German officer actually came up
to them under the impression that they were his own men--his last
mistake upon earth. It is notable that the badges of six different
German regiments were found in the wood, which seemed to indicate
that it was held by picked men or volunteers from many units. "To
the death!" was their password for the night, and to their honour be
it said that they were mostly true to it. So also were the British
stormers, of whom Sir Henry Rawlinson said: "The night attack on and
final capture of Trones Wood were feats of arms {143} which will rank
high among the best achievements of the British Army."
An account of this fortnight of desperate and almost continuous
fighting is necessarily concerned chiefly with the deeds of the
infantry, but it may fitly end with a word as to the grand work of
the artillery, without whom in modern warfare all the valour and
devotion of the foot-soldier are but a useless self-sacrifice.
Nothing could exceed the endurance and the technical efficiency of
the gunners. No finer tribute could be paid them than that published
at the time from one of their own officers, which speaks with heart
and with knowledge: "They worked their guns with great accuracy and
effect without a moment's cessation by day or by night for ten days,
and I don't believe any artillery have ever had a higher or a longer
test or have done it more splendidly. And these gunners, when the
order came that we must pull out and go with the infantry--do you
think they were glad or willing? Devil a bit! They were sick as
muck and only desired to stay on and continue killing Bosches. And
these men a year ago not even soldiers--much less gunners! Isn't it
magnificent--and is it not enough to make the commander of such men
uplifted?" No cold and measured judgment of the historian can ever
convey their greatness with the conviction produced by one who stood
by them in the thick of the battle and rejoiced in the manhood of
those whom he had himself trained and led.
{144}